

Capacity-building on small arms control and DD&R in Southern Sudan

January 2008

Southern Sudan: Peace on the brink?

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government in Khartoum and the rebel forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in January 2005, the headlines of the international news media have been dominated by the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. The southern part of the country—for two decades the focus of much international attention—has slipped from the radar of many observers, and seemingly for a good reason. With the establishment of an autonomous government for Southern Sudan in Juba, dominated by the SPLA's political arm (SPLM), the creation of a Government of National Unity in Khartoum, and the deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (UNMIS), there seemed to be a positive momentum to the peace process. A popular referendum on the political future of Southern Sudan planned for the year 2011, and an agreement on the sharing of the oil revenues between Khartoum and Juba was meant to allow the people of Southern Sudan time to breathe, providing a window of opportunity to rebuild the social and physical infrastructure of the war-torn country before resolving the final political status of the territory.

Initially, the strategy seemed to be successful. The peace process survived the first two years without major hiccups. Even the tragic death of the charismatic Southern leader John Garang in a helicopter accident in July 2005 did not derail the agreement, even though the incident intensified behind-the-scenes power struggles between those elements of the SPLM sharing Garang's vision of political reform at the national level and those favoring independence for the South. Garang's successor, Salva Kiir, initially adopted a conciliatory approach vis-à-vis both the government in Khartoum and the SPLA's enemies in the South. The conciliatory attitude towards the SPLA's enemies culminated in the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of January 2006, which aimed at integrating militias who were formerly affiliated to the North, into the SPLA.

A budget in disarray causing tensions

However, in 2007 matters took a turn for the worse. During the first few months of the year, Southern Sudan's share of the oil revenues, which accounts for more than 95 percent of the territory's budget, dropped from US \$76 million in January to US \$29

million in March, triggering a massive cash crisis. While Khartoum argued that production problems and price discounting were responsible for the reduction in revenues, many observers in the South believe that the national government was trying to starve the South. With the budget in disarray, the Kiir administration struggled to find the necessary funds to pay salaries and to invest in infrastructure projects. Looting and other acts of violence by disgruntled soldiers created tensions in some Southern towns. While oil revenues increased significantly during the second half of 2007, these problems undermined the trust between political leaders in the South and the national government,



while also highlighting the weak capacities of the Southern administration in monitoring the oil production on its territory. The cost of paying the salaries of the estimated 170,000 soldiers of the SPLA, which includes some 30,000 members of armed groups formerly affiliated with Khartoum, represents a major

drain on the administration's resources. According to some estimates, 40 percent of all government funds are used to pay for the upkeep of the military, and any disruption of the revenue pipeline carries the risk of new violence, in particular from unruly militia members.

Governments between rhetoric and reconciliatory gestures

Another significant cause of tension has been the failure of both SPLA and government forces to withdraw from contested areas near the border between the North and the South in accordance with the July 2007 deadline foreseen by the CPA. Khartoum claims to maintain only a small force of 3,600 soldiers in the South, while Salva Kiir puts the number at 17,000. Meanwhile, the SPLA is believed to retain some forces north of the 1956 border line, primarily



in South Kordofan and in the Nuba Mountains. For much of the second half of 2007, the governments in Khartoum and Juba have been oscillating between bellicose rhetoric and reconciliatory gestures. The crisis culminated in the October 2007 decision of the SPLM leadership to withdraw from the Government of National Unity. Politicians from the South have blamed the Khartoum government not only for the delayed withdrawal from contested areas, but also for continuous military and political support for militia groups hostile to the SPLM, such as the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army and various indigenous groups. This claim is difficult to verify as two decades of civil war have turned Sudan into a regional arms bazaar and a transit point for numerous regional rebel movements. In the meantime, President Omar al-Bashir went on record stating that the oil-rich Abyei region—a region equally claimed by both sides—had historically been part of Northern Sudan, making a peaceful resolution of the border conflict difficult. He also called for the increased recruitment of *mujahedeen* in the North.

In December 2007, hectic diplomatic interventions by the United Nations and neighboring countries fearful of a return to civil war seem to have succeeded in calming down the parties and a new timetable was drafted for the withdrawal of troops to be completed in January 2008. The Juba government also announced its intention to start demobilizing the first batch of 25,000 SPLA soldiers in early 2008, a process which, if successful, could result in a peace dividend for the government, with government revenues available for development projects. Yet, the rift between the North and the South has deepened three years after the signing of the historic peace agreement; a peaceful or violent break up of the country seems more likely than ever.

Wolf-Christian Paes

Capacity-building for DD&R in Southern Sudan

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) of both SPLA and government forces is a key component of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Nevertheless, almost three years into the process, precious little has been achieved, frustrating both government and civil society representatives in Southern Sudan as the salaries for the 170,000 members of the SPLA are draining government coffers. Even the military agrees that the number of soldiers needs to be reduced drastically, as very little disposable

funding remains in the defense budget after the SPLA's payroll has been met. The South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) is the government body tasked with overseeing the DD&R process in Southern Sudan in cooperation with the SPLA and other government agencies (such as the Ministry of Education). UNICEF and UNMIS, the latter through a dedicated DD&R Support Unit, are to provide financial and logistical assistance. During the course of 2007, the SSDDRC has been recruiting personnel and has started to build a network of field offices in the Southern States. When the Interim DDR Program (IDDRP), which had mostly targeted women and children affiliated with fighting forces, came to an end in mid-2007, a new national DD&R strategy aimed at force reduction in both parts of the country came into effect. It foresees the gradual demobilization of significant numbers of government and SPLA soldiers, starting with an initial batch of 25,000 military men and women in early 2008.

The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) is supporting the work of the SSDDRC through its capacity-building program on disarmament in Southern Sudan. In close cooperation with the relevant UN agencies, BICC has conducted a training program for the professional staff members of the commission both at headquarter and field level. During a series of three five-day workshops in Rumbek, Malakal and Juba in October 2007, more than 80 men and women received an introduction into the subject of DD&R by an international team of trainers from France, Germany, Ghana, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The course was based on the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) of the United Nations, but had been tailored to the needs of Southern Sudan in collaboration with the SSDDRC leadership. It incorporated elements of role play and group work, in addition to formal teaching, as well as the use of audio-visual media. In Rumbek and Juba, UNICEF experts provided additional input on the challenges of reintegrating former child soldiers into communities. Both the international trainers and the facilitators from SSDDRC headquarters stressed the need for an integrated DD&R strategy for Southern Sudan and warned that to start the demobilization process without a clear programmatic vision (as well as the necessary funding) for the social and economic reintegration of former fighters could lead to disaster. In 2008, BICC plans to continue capacity-building efforts for the SSDDRC through a series of specialized training courses on issues such as arms control and community security, and the reintegration of special needs groups.

Wolf-Christian Paes



BICC delivered a second workshop in partnership with World Vision Sudan (WVS) in Yambio, Western Equatoria. Working with WVS's local Peace and Protection Committee, BICC also provided approximately 25 participants with an overview of the small arms issue with a specific focus on developing messages and raising awareness of the dangers of small arms ownership, possession and misuse among civilians. The objective of the workshop was to integrate small arms issues into the community outreach activities of the Committee, which is composed of representatives of women's groups, youth associations, local chiefs, and elders. On the second day of the workshop, participants created action plans to educate

Building capacity for civil society to counter the threat of SALW

In November 2007, BICC delivered two workshops for members of civil society on small arms control.

The first workshop was delivered in Bor, Jonglei, in partnership with Pact Sudan. The focus of this workshop was on children and education—working with the state Ministry of Education (MoE) to develop a curriculum supplement on small arms awareness. The workshop was attended by 23 participants composed primarily of teachers, headmasters and state administrators, and was facilitated by two BICC trainers—Elvan Isikozlu and Lydia Stone—as well as a curriculum specialist working with the Jonglei MoE, Manasseh Mudanyi. Over the course of the three-day workshop, participants learned about the meaning and definition of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the trade in SALW, the regional and international laws that regulate their use, the dangers they pose to children and youth, and how they can be controlled. Based on this information, participants developed teaching and learning activities for primary school levels to serve as the basis of a draft supplement.

A number of small arms risks were identified as priorities for children in Bor County. These include the risk of growing exposure to violent behavior in movies, natural curiosity toward guns and explosive remnants, and the risk of handling guns for power and revenge. The supplement aims to educate students on the consequences of these risks through a variety of creative learning activities and tools. In cooperation with the curriculum specialist, BICC is currently working on a draft to be piloted in Bor County in the near future.




their fellow peers and community members on these dangers, which included activities such as creating posters, holding public events, distributing information, and organizing community meetings. A civilian disarmament campaign had already been undertaken in Yambio, though the general feeling in the workshop was that this campaign had left the community vulnerable to attack from neighboring and cross-border groups, such as the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). At the same time, there was overwhelming agreement that small arms in civilian hands present unacceptable risks and consequences to local communities. BICC placed most emphasis on this aspect during the workshop.

In early 2008, BICC will engage in another series of small arms awareness workshops for representatives of civil society, most likely in Tonj and Yei.

Elvan Isikozlu

European Coalition on Oil in Sudan



Block 1,2,4, GNPOC
 - 40% CNPC
 - 30% Petronas
 - 25% ONGC Videsh
 - 5% Sudapet

Block 3,7, PDOC
 - 41% CNPC
 - 40% Petronas
 - 8% Sudapet
 - 6% Sinopec
 - 5% Al Thani

Block 5A, WNPOC-1
 - 68,875 Petronas
 - 24,125 ONGC Videsh
 - 7% Sudapet

Block 5B, WNPOC-2
 10% awarded to GOSS; composition to be renegotiated
 - 39% Petronas
 - 24,5% Lundin
 - 23,5% ONGC Videsh
 - 13% Sudapet

Block 6, CNPCIS
 - 95% CNPC
 - 5% Sudapet

Block 8, WNPOC-3
 - 77% Petronas
 - 15% Sudapet
 - 8% Hi Tech

Block 9,11, Sudapak I
 - 85% Zafir
 - 15% Sudapet

Block 10, Free

Block 12A, Qahtani & Others
 - 33% Qahtani
 - 20% Ansan
 - 20% Sudapet
 - 15% Dindir Petroleum
 - 7% Hi Tech
 - 5% A.A. In.

Block 12B, Free

Block 13, CNPC, Pertamina & Sudapet
 - 40% CNPC
 - 15% Pertamina
 - 15% Sudapet
 - 10% Dindir Petroleum
 - 10% Express Petroleum & Gas
 - 10% Africa Energy

Block 14, Petro SA
 - 80% Petro SA
 - 20% Sudapet

Block 15, RSPOC
 - 35% Petronas
 - 35% CNPC
 - 15% Sudapet
 - 10% Express Petroleum & Gas
 - 5% Hi Tech

Block 16, Lundin

Block 17, Ansan
 - 66% Ansan
 - 34% Sudapet

Block A, Sudapak II
 - 83% Zafir
 - 17% Sudapet

Block B, Total
 - 32,5% Total
 - 27,5% Kuppec
 - 10% Sudapet
 - 10% GOSS
 - 20% open

Block C, APCO
 - 65% Hi Tech
 - 17% Sudapet
 - 10% Khartoum State
 - 8% Hegleig

Block Ea, Free

Fatal Transactions in oil-rich Sudan

Oil accounts for 92.6 percent of Sudan's export values, and the country's oil industry is exceptionally profitable¹. This oil wealth currently is the reason for strong economic growth rates and has the potential to be a major driver of development. At the same time, Sudan's oil industry stands out for having been at the center of warfare and gross human rights violations. Especially since 1999, the development and control of Sudan's oilfields has been accompanied by gross human rights abuses, forced displacement and arson. Up until today, Sudan's oil industry remains poorly managed and highly politicized, and as such, a continuing source of strife and division in the country.

The Dutch Non-governmental organization IKV Pax Christi, partner of BICC and other NGOs in the Fatal Transactions campaign, calls for action by governments and the business sector to ensure that Sudan's oil wealth contributes to peace and equitable development in the country.

The oil map (see picture) is part of the web dossier "www.ecosonline.org" by the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan and shows the exploitation of oil in the different areas in Sudan by international oil companies. With China being the largest oil contractor in Sudan and the China National Petroleum Corporation being at present the largest oil producer in Sudan, the website gives the public an opportunity to write a letter to the Chinese government and Corporation officials to encourage them to take all necessary action to ensure that China will become a force for good in Sudan.

More information: www.fataltransactions.org/ and www.fataltransactions.de

¹ European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. 2007. *The Economy of Sudan's Oil Industry*. Fact Sheet II. www.ecosonline.org

Artists promoting awareness of peace and disarmament

BICC's capacity-building efforts on SALW control and DD&R can only go so far without a broader public consensus on the importance/benefit of these activities. With this in mind, BICC is working with local media and entertainment groups to promote a national consciousness on peace and disarmament.

A key partner in this endeavor is the Southern Sudan Artists Association (SSAA). The SSAA is a local youth

group composed of Sudanese musicians, actors, illustrators and performers that aim to promote peace and security in Southern Sudan through entertainment. In as vast a region as Southern Sudan with a high rate of illiteracy, poor broadcast technology, and hard-to-access areas, more informal and creative channels of information dissemination are often the most effective option. These include performances, theater, song and artwork that combine education with entertainment, and which aim to reach even the most remote communities.

*Small arms and light weapons of mass destruction
When you purchase one, you think of protection
When it's used against you, you'll wish it
was never made,
Our brothers murdered, our women killed
Our children slain, our future ruined
Because of the misuse of guns*

Excerpt from SSAA's song, "Gun, Gun, Gun!"

From September to December 2007, the SSAA engaged in a series of awareness-raising activities on the importance and benefits of disarmament on behalf of BICC. The first included the development of three original songs with lyrics for air during the SSAA's 'Burning Issues' program twice weekly on Capital FM and Miraya FM. Two of these songs were also performed at the Beijing Hotel in October 2007 on the final evening of BICC's training course for the Southern Sudan DDR Commission in Juba.

Music videos were recorded for two of these songs and debuted at the SSAA's two-day mobile campaign on peace and disarmament in early December in Bor Town, Jonglei. The campaign attracted a great deal of spectators who also received posters, pamphlets and t-shirts containing the SSAA's anti-SALW message in both English and Arabic. The 'anti-SALW' message was also integrated in the SSAA's annual Miss Malaika New Sudan 2007 beauty pageant held in Juba last October, which was attended by over 2,000 people.

Information dissemination is a key goal of BICC's media and capacity-building activities. Toward this end, a new booklet entitled "Communities Safe from Small Arms in Southern Sudan" was produced and distributed, which is based on a previous edition that was widely circulated last year. The new booklet targets community-based organizations and civil

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society groups with an emphasis on community action. It contains more simple language, less text, and illustrations to highlight key points. The booklet can be downloaded for free at BICC's Sudan project website, www.bicc.de/sudan.

In the coming months, BICC will continue to work with the SSAA along with other partners such as the Southern Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) and the Juba Post in the development of more media and entertainment initiatives.

Elvan Isikozlu

