



BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

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BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION • INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN



# brief 30

## Promoting Security: But How and For Whom?

*Contributions to BICC's  
Ten-year Anniversary Conference*

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*Edited by  
Michael Brzoska and Peter J. Croll*

october 2004

# Introduction and Summary

The anniversary of an institution provides a useful occasion to pause and reflect on what has been achieved and, perhaps even more so, on what lies ahead. On 1 April 1994 the first director of BICC, Herbert Wulf, and his secretary, Svenja Bends (née Goergens), started work on the premises of *An der Elisabethkirche 25* in Bonn, where BICC is still located today.

BICC's international staff numbers more than 40 persons, among them guest researchers and fellows from many parts of the world.

During the first 10 years of BICC's existence, more than 120 individuals have worked at the Center where they have been kept busy dealing with the broad range of topics related to conversion. True to BICC's mandate, a wide variety of 'products' have emerged from BICC, tailored to the occasion and the user. Written publications have included the annual *conversion survey* and other books and articles, along with reports, brief expert opinions and papers on current topics connected to our field. In addition, BICC staff have spoken at a multitude of conferences and given advice to a wide spectrum of clients. More recently, they have increasingly facilitated international conferences worldwide.

It is now time, therefore, to ask what all this work has achieved? Which contributions will endure? What has proven to be of lasting value? And what approaches led to dead ends? Furthermore, with respect to the issues studied by BICC, what lessons for the future can be drawn?

These and similar questions related to the past record of conversion, together with BICC's contribution to it, provided one set of questions which we wished to see addressed on the occasion of BICC's Ten-year Anniversary. The other, and possibly even more important theme, however, was to

explore avenues for future work at BICC, an issue we wanted to share with our national and international partners. In the summer of 2003, when planning for the Tenth Anniversary began, BICC was in the middle of its second evaluation. In preparation for the evaluation and in the course of discussions with the Evaluation Commission, outlines of the future work program had already been sketched and some priority issues identified. Hence the Ten-year Anniversary seemed a particularly good opportunity to test some of our ideas, as well as to present the overall shape of the program within a forum of distinguished experts and partners.

Planning of the panels for the Ten-year Anniversary proceeded with these two considerations in the forefront, namely a review of past achievements, and an exploration of future fields of work. Obviously, in view of the limited time available for such a conference, we had to be selective, focusing on specific themes. One introductory panel would have to suffice to discuss the general framework. This would be followed by further discussion groups centering on particular themes. The climax of the event would be a Festive Ceremony following the conference, in the kind presence of the German Federal President, Johannes Rau.

We finally came up with six topics, each of which was to be deliberated in its own discussion group: (1) lessons and legacies of the post-Cold War period; (2) the interesting but still controversial concept of 'human security'; (3) the relations between major international institutions relevant to the provision of peace and security; (4) the role of external actors in internal conflicts; (5) disarmament and arms control and, last but not least, (6) issues related to small arms control.

When considering which experts to invite, we looked at three groups of people in particular. The first consisted of cooperation partners—colleagues

with whom BICC had collaborated in the past or was doing so at the present, or those whom BICC sees good prospects of working together with in the future. The majority of the research and practical work done at BICC in the past has taken place in cooperation with partners throughout the world, a good number of whom have become strategic partners for longer-term collaboration, and this is a tradition we definitely wish to continue. A second group of people were top international experts in their respective fields of work, including members of BICC's international advisory board. Finally, we also wanted to invite those who use BICC's products and who would therefore also be able to provide some guidance on future demand. Our hope was that this mix would make it possible to reflect cooperatively, constructively and critically on conversion itself, the role played by BICC, and especially on the future of both.

And indeed, the conference did achieve what we had hoped for. It provided a very useful review of the past achievements of BICC in some important areas of its work, including arms control and disarmament, base conversion in Germany, industrial conversion in Russia, and small arms control. Moreover, the contributors of major inputs to the conference had given a great deal of thought to what they saw as major future subjects of conversion-related work. While it is impossible to summarize the richness of the discussions in a few words, a few themes stood out.

One, mentioned in the initial plenary session and in several panels, was the unfinished business of conversion. Many legacies of the Cold War remain, ranging from unfinished arms control matters to unreformed armed forces, or bases which still need to be cleaned up and redeveloped.

A second theme was the disheartening prediction, heard repeatedly, that post-conflict reconstruction work—and this includes aspects BICC has already focused on, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, small arms control, and security sector reform—will become more important in the future. This is a disheartening prediction because it is predicated on the assumption that post-conflict situations will be frequent and long-drawn-out. Future work in this area, including that which BICC could do, will need to better integrate the various necessary components, ranging from security to political and economic issues. At the same time, pro-active conversion and conflict resolution issues will appear increasingly on the Center's agenda.

A third thread running through all the panels was the theme under which we had posited the conference: the question of what security policy should be about, both today and in the future. Security is a vexing subject, not only for academics but also for political decision-makers. The complexity of defining security emerged from various panels, not only from the panel devoted specifically to discussing the concept of human security.

A fourth issue worth mentioning was the critical discussion of the role of military force and the appropriate allocation of scarce resources to military efforts. BICC's mandate is to try to help find peaceful ways to solve conflicts and minimize the use of military means. But where do you draw the line? How much is needed in terms of military effort? Civil-military cooperation becomes increasingly an issue in a post-conflict situation. In early 2004, this eternal debate was visibly marked by the fall-out from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the Iraq war of 2003.

Finally, many participants expressed the need for more dialogue between groups of experts who still often find it difficult to speak to one another. This applies to experts in different fields, such as arms control and development,

but also to experts in diverging institutions, such as the armed forces and think-tanks. The conference, like many past BICC events, included participants from very different environments who found it most rewarding to be able to talk freely to each other. Some suggested running such an event on a regular (annual or bi-annual) basis.

Obviously there were many matters of substance on which participants disagreed. This included what the priorities for future work, including BICC's future work, should be. However, we also received much support for the general thrust of our arguments in favor of continuity or change at BICC, as presented in the introductory plenary session and since finalized in a new Five-year Work Program which is available on BICC's website.

The conference was followed by a Festive Ceremony where the key speaker was the German Federal President, Johannes Rau. His speech, as well as the introductory address by the Director of BICC, Peter Croll, and the speeches by Hannelore Kraft, Minister for Science and Research of North-Rhine Westphalia; Bärbel Dieckmann, Mayoress of Bonn; and Erich Stather, State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, are documented in a separate publication. All the speakers expressed their appreciation of the quality of BICC's work in the past and their expectations of many useful contributions to come in the future. The conference provided a great deal of support for these endeavors and we are grateful to all the contributors.

## *Acknowledgments*

Many of BICC's staff contributed to making BICC's Tenth Anniversary a success. I would like to thank in particular Katharina Moraht, who was in charge of the organization of the conference, Susanne Heinke, BICC's press officer and coordinator for BICC's partnership with the City of Bonn in 2004, and Michael Brzoska, who shared responsibility for the selection of contributors and for the content of the conference. Sami Faltas organized the sixth panel focusing on small arms. Able organizational support was provided by Susanne Zacharias, Heike Webb and Michael Dedek. Thanks to all BICC staff who participated in the proceedings, including Sami Faltas and Corinna Hauswedell, who prepared introductory statements, and to Julie Brethfeld, Renée Ernst, Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Joakim Kreutz, Hartmut Küchle and Marc von Boemcken, who acted as rapporteurs.

*Peter Croll, Director BICC*

Editing:  
**Maira Davidson-Seger and  
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# Vorwort und Zusammenfassung

Ein Jubiläum gibt einer Institution die Gelegenheit, einmal innezuhalten und darüber zu reflektieren, was erreicht worden ist und, noch wichtiger, wie es weitergehen soll. Am 1. April 1994 nahmen Herbert Wolf als erster Direktor des BICC und Svenja Bends (geb. Görgens) als seine Sekretärin ihre Arbeit in dem Haus An der Elisabethkirche 25 in Bonn auf, in dem das BICC auch heute noch seinen Sitz hat.

Der international zusammengesetzte Mitarbeiterstab des BICC zählt heute über 40 Personen, darunter Gastwissenschaftler und Forschungsstipendiaten aus vielen Regionen der Welt.

Mehr als 120 Personen waren im Laufe der ersten zehn Jahre seines Bestehens beim BICC tätig, um Fragen der Konversion – also der Umwidmung militärischer Ressourcen zur zivilen Nutzung – zu untersuchen. Getreu seinem Auftrag hat das BICC eine vielfältige Palette von Produkten hervorgebracht, jeweils zugeschnitten auf den Anlass und die Nutzer. Zu den Publikationen gehören neben dem Jahrbuch *Conversion Survey* auch andere Bücher und Artikel sowie Berichte, kurze Expertisen und Papiere zu aktuellen Themen unseres Arbeitsgebiets. Des Weiteren haben Mitarbeiter des BICC an zahlreichen Konferenzen als Referenten teilgenommen und ihr Wissen einem breiten Spektrum von Zuhörern zukommen lassen. In den letzten Jahren war das BICC außerdem weltweit in zunehmendem Maße an der Durchführung internationaler Konferenzen beteiligt.

Was ist das Ergebnis all dieser Arbeit? Welche Beiträge werden auch in Zukunft noch von Interesse sein? Was hat sich als von dauerhaftem Wert erwiesen? Welche Fragen haben in eine Sackgasse geführt? Und welche Lehren können daraus hinsichtlich der Themen gezogen werden, mit denen sich das BICC nun befasst?

Die Erfolgsbilanz bisheriger Konversionsbemühungen und der Anteil, den das BICC daran hatte, bildeten den ersten thematischen Schwerpunkt, den wir anlässlich des zehnjährigen Bestehens des BICC behandelt sehen wollten. Als zweiten, vielleicht sogar noch wichtigeren Komplex aber wollten wir ausloten, welche Wege sich für die künftige Arbeit des BICC abzeichnen. Diese Frage wollten wir auch an unsere nationalen und internationalen Partner richten. Im Sommer 2003, als die Planung für das Jubiläum begann, stand das BICC gerade in seiner zweiten Evaluierung. Im Zuge der Vorbereitungen dafür und in Gesprächen mit der Evaluierungskommission waren die Konturen des künftigen Arbeitsprogramms bereits skizziert und einige vordringliche Themen festgestellt worden. Das Jubiläum schien eine besonders gute Gelegenheit, unsere Ideen zu testen und das Gesamtkonzept unseres Programms vorzustellen, indem wir sie einem Forum herausragender Experten und Partner vortrugen.

Auch bei der Planung für die Besetzung der Podien bei der Jubiläumskonferenz standen diese beiden Gesichtspunkte im Vordergrund – zum einen die Rückschau auf das bisher Erreichte und zum anderen der Ausblick auf mögliche Schwerpunkte der künftigen Arbeit. Angesichts der begrenzten Zeit bei einer solchen Konferenz mussten wir natürlich eine Auswahl treffen und uns auf Wesentliches konzentrieren. Zur Vorstellung des generellen Rahmens sollte eine einführende Runde genügen. Daran sollten sich die Diskussionen über ausgewählte Themen anschließen. Und den Höhepunkt der Veranstaltung sollte nach der Konferenz ein Festakt mit Bundespräsident Johannes Rau bilden.

Wir legten schließlich sechs Themen fest, die in sechs Diskussionsgruppen behandelt werden sollten. Dies waren: die Lehren und das Erbe der Zeit nach dem Kalten Krieg; das interessante, aber immer noch umstrittene Konzept der menschlichen Sicherheit; die Beziehungen zwischen den großen internationalen Institutionen, die maßgeblich sind

für die Gewährleistung von Frieden und Sicherheit; die Rolle externer Akteure in internen Konflikten; Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle, und, nicht zuletzt, die Kleinwaffenkontrolle.

Bei den Überlegungen, welche Experten wir zu der Konferenz einladen sollten, richteten wir unseren Blick auf drei Personengruppen. Zum ersten auf unsere Kooperationspartner, also die Kollegen, mit denen das BICC in der Vergangenheit zusammengearbeitet hat oder derzeit beziehungsweise in Zukunft kooperieren will. Der größte Teil der Arbeit des BICC wird gemeinsam mit Partnern auf der ganzen Welt geleistet. Etliche von ihnen sind für uns zu strategischen Partnern für eine längerfristige Kooperation geworden – eine Tradition, die wir auf jeden Fall fortsetzen wollen. Die zweite Gruppe bestand aus internationalen Experten, die auf ihren jeweiligen Gebieten zur Weltspitze gehören, darunter auch Mitglieder des internationalen Kuratoriums des BICC. Zum dritten wollten wir Nutzer von BICC-Erzeugnissen einladen, die uns auch Hinweise auf die künftige Nachfrage geben könnten. Unsere Hoffnung war es, dass diese Mischung von Themen und Teilnehmern eine kooperative, von konstruktiver Kritik geleitete Diskussion über die Konversion, das BICC und beider Zukunft ermöglichen würde.

Die Konferenz hat unsere Hoffnungen voll und ganz erfüllt. Sie bot einen überaus nützlichen Rückblick auf die bisherige Arbeit des BICC in einigen seiner zentralen Bereiche, darunter Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung, Standortkonversion in Deutschland, Umwidmung der Rüstungsindustrie in Russland und die Kleinwaffenkontrolle. Außerdem hatten sich Redner mit wichtigen Beiträgen für die Konferenz eingehend darüber Gedanken gemacht, was künftig für die konversionsbezogene Arbeit wichtig sein wird. Es ist nicht möglich, die Gesamtheit der vielfältigen Diskussionsbeiträge hier in wenigen Worten zusammenfassend darzustellen, aber ein paar herausragende Themen verdienen eine besondere Erwähnung.

Angesprochen wurden sowohl in der Plenardiskussion zu Beginn der Konferenz als auch in verschiedenen Diskussionsgruppen die nach wie vor nicht abgeschlossenen Kernaufgaben der Konversion. In vielen Bereichen haben wir es noch mit dem Erbe des Kalten Krieges zu tun, so z.B. in Sachen Rüstungskontrolle, reformbedürftiger Streitkräfte und bei Liegenschaften, bei denen die Beseitigung ökologischer Altlasten und deren Umbau für eine neue Nutzung noch ausstehen.

Ein zweites Thema war die immer wieder zu hörende Besorgnis erregende Voraussage, dass die Wiederaufbauarbeit nach Kriegen zukünftig an Bedeutung gewinnen wird. Dabei spielen auch Aspekte eine Rolle, mit denen sich das BICC bereits in der Vergangenheit befasst hat, wie z.B. Entwaffnung, Demobilisierung und Reintegration ehemaliger Kämpfer, Kontrollen für Kleinwaffen und die Reform des Sicherheitssektors. Schmerzlich ist diese Vorhersage deshalb, weil sie auf der Annahme gründet, dass es in Zukunft häufig zu Kriegen und damit auch zu lang anhaltenden Nachkriegssituationen kommen wird. Das BICC wird sich verstärkt um eine bessere Integration verschiedener Sicherheitsaspekte sowie politischer und wirtschaftlicher Gesichtspunkte bemühen müssen. Gleichzeitig werden aber proaktive Ansätze der Konversion und Konfliktlösung vermehrt auf der Tagesordnung des Zentrums stehen.

Durch alle Diskussionsforen zog sich die spezifische Frage, unter die wir diese Konferenz gestellt hatten - nämlich, um was es bei der Sicherheitspolitik heute und in Zukunft gehen sollte. Sicherheit ist eine sehr heikle Thematik, nicht nur für Akademiker, sondern auch für politische Entscheidungsträger. Die Schwierigkeit, etwas so Komplexes wie Sicherheit zu definieren, spielte in mehreren Diskussionsrunden eine Rolle, nicht nur in der Gruppe, die dem Konzept der menschlichen Sicherheit gewidmet war.

Ein viertes erwähnenswertes Thema war die kritische Diskussion der Rolle militärischer Gewalt und der Frage,

welche Mittel angesichts der Ressourcenknappheit für militärische Aufgaben angemessen seien. Das BICC hat satzungsgemäß u.a. den Auftrag, nach besten Kräften zur friedlichen Lösung von Konflikten beizutragen und auf eine Minimierung des Einsatzes militärischer Ressourcen hinzuwirken. Aber wo zieht man die Grenze? Wie viel an militärischem Einsatz ist notwendig? In Nachkriegssituationen gewinnt auch die Frage der zivil-militärischen Kooperation zunehmend an Bedeutung. Anfang des Jahres 2004 war diese lang geführte Debatte stark von den Auswirkungen der Terroranschläge des 11. September 2001 und des Irakkriegs von 2003 geprägt.

Abschließend stellten viele Teilnehmer fest, dass Bedarf an einem verstärkten Austausch zwischen den verschiedenen Expertengruppen besteht, denen es nach wie vor oft schwer fällt, miteinander zu reden. Das betrifft sowohl Fachleute, die sich mit unterschiedlichen Gebieten wie z.B. Rüstungskontrolle oder Entwicklung befassen, als auch Experten, die für unterschiedlich orientierte Institutionen tätig sind, wie z.B. Streitkräfte oder Forschungsinstitute. Der Tradition zahlreicher früherer Veranstaltungen des BICC folgend, wurden auch bei dieser Konferenz Teilnehmer aus sehr unterschiedlichen Bereichen zusammengeführt. Sie empfanden es als außerordentlich lohnend, frei miteinander reden zu können. Es wurde vorgeschlagen, derartige Begegnungen auf regelmäßiger Basis (jährlich oder zweijährlich) abzuhalten.

Inhaltlich vertraten die Teilnehmer natürlich bei vielen Themen unterschiedliche Positionen. Das Gleiche galt auch für die Frage, wo die Schwerpunkte der künftigen Arbeit, auch der des BICC, liegen sollten. Insgesamt aber fanden unsere Argumente für Kontinuität und Wandel beim BICC, die in der einführenden Plenardiskussion vorgestellt wurden, ein sehr positives Echo. Sie wurden inzwischen ausformuliert und finden sich im neuen Fünf-Jahres-Arbeitsprogramm wieder, das auf der kann.

Im Anschluss an die Konferenz fand eine Festveranstaltung statt, bei der Bundespräsident Johannes Rau die zentrale Ansprache hielt. Seine Rede ebenso wie die Einführung von BICC-Direktor Peter Croll und die Grußworte der nordrhein-westfälischen Ministerin für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Hannelore Kraft, der Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Bonn, Bärbel Dieckmann, und des Staatssekretärs im Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Erich Stather, sind an anderer Stelle dokumentiert. Alle Redner sprachen dem BICC ihre Anerkennung für die bisherige gute Arbeit aus und äußerten die Hoffnung auf viele weitere nützliche Beiträge in der Zukunft.

Die Konferenz hat uns für dieses Bemühen viel Unterstützung gegeben und wir danken allen, die dazu beigetragen haben.

### *Danksagungen*

Viele Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter des BICC haben dazu beigetragen, das zehnjährige Jubiläum zu einem Erfolg zu machen. Mein besonderer Dank gilt Katharina Moraht, die für die Organisation der Konferenz verantwortlich zeichnete, Susanne Heinke, die Pressesprecherin des BICC und Koordinatorin der Partnerschaft des BICC mit der Stadt Bonn 2004, sowie Michael Brzoska, der mit verantwortlich war für die Auswahl der Teilnehmer und die inhaltliche Gestaltung der Konferenz. Sami Faltas hat die sechste Diskussionsgruppe organisiert, die sich mit Kleinwaffen befasste. Susanne Zacharias, Heike Webb und Michael Dedek haben hervorragende organisatorische Unterstützung geleistet. Mein Dank gilt außerdem allen Mitarbeitern des BICC, die an der Konferenz selbst beteiligt waren, darunter Sami Faltas und Corinna Hauswedell mit einführenden Statements, sowie Julie Brethfeld, Renée Ernst, Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Joakim Kreutz, Hartmut Küchle und Marc von Boemcken, die als Rapporture tätig waren.

*Peter Croll, Direktor des BICC*

# 1 Opening Panel 10 Years of BICC—The Past and the Future

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*



*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

# 10 Years of BICC— The Past and the Future

*Hartmut Krebs*

Today, BICC is exactly ten years old. A good reason both to look back and to look forward. Let me begin by looking back.

The idea of an international center for conversion is a little bit older than BICC. It was first ventured during a conference in Moscow in 1990, organized by the United Nations. It became more concrete in 1992, when the State of North-Rhine Westphalia joined hands with the United Nations to organize a conference on conversion and the environment in Dortmund. Many of the participants from all over the world expressed their wish for the establishment of a focal point for practical research, consultancy and communication on conversion. The objective was to improve the basis for practical conversion work through better networking.

After some deliberations, the State Government of North-Rhine Westphalia took up the challenge. We had market research conducted and found that there was no center of the kind we were looking for. We also discovered that we were faced with a typical case of market failure: There was strong demand from many actors in the field of conversion, particularly in Eastern Europe, with little money, but little willingness to found such a center by those that did have the money, such as the German Federal Government. North-Rhine Westphalia then decided to act. We took the initiative and founded BICC. And I am glad that I personally had the chance to promote this process because I served as the deputy minister of the Ministry of Economic Affairs that time, and I still remember that crucial meeting a couple of days before Christmas 1993 (if it wasn't Christmas Eve itself) when practically the decision was made. It was

a risk, but today, looking at what BICC has become, we are thankful that we took that risk.

BICC has achieved a lot. Some of the achievements will be discussed during the conference that we begin today. BICC was founded during a particular time in history. It was a time when there were great hopes for a more peaceful world, for major disarmament and for successful conversion.

Let me quote from Johannes Rau's introductory speech at the Dortmund conference. At the time he was Minister President of the State of North-Rhine Westphalia. Tomorrow, he will speak on the occasion of BICC's tenth birthday as President of the Federal Republic of Germany. Johannes Rau said: "Conversion—originally a concept by experts for experts—might well become a keyword of the decade. Indeed as a central task, conversion is already an item on the agenda of world politics. We know today that the success of international détente depends, to a very great extent, on by what means and at what cost disarmament will be translated into practice."

The theme of practical disarmament set the foundation for BICC's work. BICC should, as the statutory document—the shareholder treaty—says, "... be concerned, on the basis of science and research, with questions and problems arising from the transformation of military to civilian activities and make results available to the public."

How successful has BICC been? I do not want to preclude the discussions of the coming two days, but I would like to stress three points:

*First*, BICC has made a number of very important contributions to both the analysis and the practical implementation of conversion. Here I will only name two of these contributions which I can attest to at first-hand. One is its contribution to the redevelopment of bases in North Rhine-Westphalia. The closure of a significant number of bases was the one major conversion challenge that we faced in this state. We have been able to deal with it quite effectively, not least thanks to the expert advice that we and the communities affected by base closures received from BICC. The second contribution which I would like to mention concerns small arms and light weapons. BICC was one of the first institutions worldwide to do serious research on microdisarmament, or as it was later called, practical disarmament. I remember well the praise BICC's work received during the 2001 small arms conference in New York.

So there *are* definite achievements. But, and that is my *second* point, these remain small compared with the size of the problem. When we set up BICC, it was clear to us that we would not be able to fund more than a small institute, one that was much too small for the task of analyzing and promoting practical disarmament worldwide. The hope was that the ideas and proposals would spread. What we have found is that indeed they have spread. But not everywhere and not without difficulties. It needs fertile ground for good practice to spread. Let me take the example of base redevelopment again. In some places, and here I would include the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, BICC's ideas and proposals found fertile ground. In other areas, for instance in Eastern Europe, a lack of funds still prevents the application of the full scope of BICC's work.

Looking back to the Dortmund conference, I would say today that many of the participants were overly optimistic about what could be achieved. Contrary to what Johannes Rau had hoped, conversion did not become the keyword of the decade. The world moved on and in some places disarmament and conversion were very successful, and in others they were not. The record is definitely mixed:

- In Europe détente has succeeded, supported and strengthened by major processes of disarmament. Compared to the level at the end of the Cold War era, the number of major weapons, to take just one indicator, has been reduced by 45 percent.
- In many other regions of the world, we can see a reduction in warfare. The conflict data from the Uppsala University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recorded 23 conflicts in 2002, compared to 32 in 1990.
- The great exception to this trend is Africa. Here the number of conflicts continues to be high. In addition, we see a crisis of government in a number of African states.
- New threats have arisen, in particular that of international terrorism. In actual fact, they are not really new threats, they are only more widely perceived. During the Dortmund conference, Klaus Töpfer, at that time Federal Minister of the Environment, said: "If the process of transition from military to civilian economic activities is not to be interrupted again very soon, we have to accomplish the intellectual conversion. If we fail to do this we will soon have to waste considerable energy for curbing ideological

intolerance, energy which we are in urgent need of in order to achieve disarmament in the war between the human race and nature." These words, spoken in 1992, have proven to be quite prophetic, both with respect to the outcome, namely rearmament in order to fight ideological intolerance, and the cause, the lack of intellectual conversion.

This leads me to the *third* point which I would like to make. BICC has proved to be highly flexible and adaptable in its working approaches, trying to tailor its output to the needs of its customers. BICC started out, in 1994, with an agenda which focused on the conversion of assets and resources, such as military industries and military land. This agenda was chosen because of the immediate need for such conversion, in this state but also elsewhere. However, BICC also dealt early on with larger issues, such as post-conflict peacebuilding or disarmament and arms control. These issues have clear relations to resource conversion; they provide the framework for the more technical advice on resource conversion. BICC has approached such rather political questions carefully but unhesitatingly. It has also built a reputation in these issues, which is clearly based on solid research. BICC has not become, and was never intended to become, an institute of security policy, or peace research geared towards providing advice to policy-makers or the general public. But it has performed similar functions in many cases because it needed to be knowledgeable on these issues in order to perform solid work in its core competency of conversion. In this connection, I would like to mention two of BICC's main products, the annual *conversion survey* and the *Friedensgutachten*, which BICC publishes jointly with the leading institutions of peace research in Germany. For a wide range of actors, including policymakers, this combination of research and consultancy has become a trademark of BICC.

Let me now also look forward, for just a few minutes.

BICC has recently been evaluated by an expert team, for the second time since it came into being. The evaluation team sees some of the traditional issues of BICC remaining important. But it also recommends that BICC applies its expertise to new fields. In particular, the team recommends a broad understanding of conversion focusing on the conflict cycle. BICC should seek conversion opportunities in conflict prevention, during conflicts, and in the post-conflict phase.

I have no objection to expanding BICC's task in this way. In view of its strong track record of flexibility in adopting to new themes in the past, I have no doubt that BICC will manage to remain topical and relevant as challenges change.

I would like to emphasize that for us at the Ministry of Higher Education and Research in North Rhine-Westphalia, the first important question we ask is whether BICC deals with issues that are important for the whole world, but also for this state, for the city of Bonn, for Germany and Europe, and although I am here as the representative of the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia, I put them in this particular order. The second important question that we ask, or you may also call it a prerequisite, is that BICC performs its work at a very high level of excellence, and here I would certainly be willing to consider the world as the yardstick, though I realize that in some of the fields which BICC works in we will have to settle for the European level of excellence.

The role of the state and of the city of Bonn are also highly important. Not so much as a measure of excellence, but rather as a platform for cooperation and networking. BICC, as we all know and

appreciate, is a small institute, which already has a large agenda, and which has been challenged to expand this agenda. This can only be done through networking and cooperation.

Such networking has to take place worldwide, and I am aware that BICC is good at cooperating on a global scale. We have noticed with great interest the memoranda of understanding that BICC has signed with a number of important institutions, including the GTZ, the German organization for Technical Cooperation, IGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa, and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

But in addition and in parallel, local networking has to take place. Regional economics teaches us that local and regional networking has become one of the, if not *the* most important factor for regional success. We here in this state of North Rhine-Westphalia are particularly concerned about this factor, as we have had to master major regional structural change ourselves, most prominently in the Ruhr Area, once one of the largest coal and steel production centers of the world and now a major center for high technology production and services. One of the secrets of success in the transformation of the Ruhr Area has been the combination of flexibility, often in small commercial units, with networking, which included both governmental and private actors. Science and research similarly needs to use the synergies of local and regional networking. We have begun to reshape the landscape of science and research here in Bonn with this approach in mind.

It is my impression, strengthened by the evaluation report that we received just a month ago, that BICC is well positioned as an organization that performs high quality applied research and consultancy work on civil-military relations and conflict situations. In

order to maintain this position, it needs to constantly review its work agenda and methods of work. I have seen in the past that BICC has this flexibility.

In my view, a stronger emphasis on conflict issues provides a promising way for BICC to apply its expertise in such a manner. However, BICC must expand its scope of activities carefully, in order not to lose its market leadership in some of the more traditional areas of conversion.

The changing agenda of BICC is also reflected in the program of the conference today and tomorrow.

Some of the working groups deal with issues that have concerned BICC during the first 10 years of its existence, some of them reflect new topics that BICC is in the process of dealing with. The purpose of this conference is to both demonstrate the contributions that BICC has made to these fields, as well as to learn from international experts. The conference is another example of the networking approach that BICC aims to take in its work.

Let me conclude by wishing us all an interesting and fruitful exchange during this meeting. It has been organized to mark a special occasion, the first ten years of BICC. But its main purpose is to exchange views and discuss issues that are important for us here in this room, but also for the wider world.

# Ten Years of Conversion— The Main Achievements

*Michael Brzoska*

The objective of this contribution is to highlight some of the achievements of BICC as an insider, as someone who has helped to shape BICC's program and activities during the last 10 years. I will start with a few remarks on what I see as the intellectual foundation of BICC's work. I will then discuss, in brief, six issue areas where I think that BICC has made a dent, in terms of academic knowledge or political impact.

BICC has been set up to apply big ideas to a fairly narrow range of topics. The big ideas are peace and development worldwide, to which BICC is supposed to make a contribution. Obviously we are a small institute, and therefore our contribution can only be small. Does this orientation give our work a normative slant? Possibly, but I am confident, that there is positive evidence that the promotion of peace and development is good for humankind. Let me quote from what I consider the founding manifesto of BICC, BICC Report No. 1 written by Edward Laurance and Herbert Wulf: "Conversion cannot solve all the of the world's economic, social and environmental problems, but taken together the investment in conversion programs . . . has the potential of shortening the transition time, promoting economic growth and reducing social hardships".<sup>1</sup>

The two authors were smart enough to condition this promise on the development of new international security structures. They argued: "A major part of the explanation for both the initial surge of attention and activity on the conversion front and its continued progress is a function of the international security system. The unambiguous and abrupt end of the cold war forced nation-states to respond by reducing defense budgets and downsizing both armed forces and industry.

But . . . the basic point [is] that the nature of the evolving international system can have a major effect on the pace of conversion and needs to be taken into account when planning and implementing conversion programs".<sup>2</sup>

They thus posited a circular link between conversion and security. Successful conversion can help improve economic conditions, and reduce insecurity. A feeling of security, on the other hand, is necessary for making conversion possible. Obviously, conversion is not the only factor which influences security, and security is not the only factor which influences conversion. But the conviction that this link exists—and that it is important—has driven BICCs work in the past, and is driving it today.

What has our contribution been towards explaining and exploiting the link between security and conversion? Let me focus on six areas which I judge to be of interest for this conference:

1. Conversion as resource-reuse
2. Conversion, armaments and disarmament
3. Post-conflict peacebuilding
4. Preventive conversion
5. The role of institutions
6. Human security

## ***Conversion as resource-reuse***

What is conversion? In the 1980s, conversion was predominantly understood as the retooling of arms factories for the production of civilian goods. Already, before BICC was established, this understanding had been extended, by many analysts to include the reallocation of defense budgets to the much debated 'peace dividend'. One of the contributions that BICC has made is to effectively and comprehensively expand the concept of conversion further. The particular

approach that was chosen was one that emphasized the development angle. The starting point was to look at military sectors, comprised of armed forces and the ancillary infrastructure of production and administration to make them operative, as a production unit which used various types of inputs and assets.<sup>3</sup> All these elements could be reused for civilian purposes, some more efficient and useful than others.

This resource-reuse view of conversion proved quite helpful in analysis and consultancy of post-Cold War conversion, particularly in Europe. It made clear the possibilities and challenges of conversion in detail. Some assets were costly to transform; for others there was little demand in the civilian economy. With this approach, it was easy to explain why there was no peace dividend in Eastern Europe, while there was a sizeable one in the United States and in Germany.<sup>4</sup> The demand for transferred assets obviously depended on the general state of the economy, which was dismal in the East and healthy in many countries in the West. The transfer of assets resulted in cumulate processes in both cases: In the West, it contributed to further growth and, in the East, to further economic downturn. At the same time, the resource-reuse approach made clear that successful conversion depended on a combination of functioning markets and state intervention to address some specific market failures associated with the specific ways in which assets are typically used in the military sector. These include the secrecy requirements of the military sector, its performance orientation, but also others.<sup>5</sup>

The concept of conversion was not only deepened but also widened. When designing the first work program for BICC, Herbert Wulf came up with the



six issue areas of BICC which until fairly recently provided a major part of any description of BICC's work. While possibly not fully logically consistent—military expenditures for instance is a rather different type of asset than are weapons—it proved helpful for distinguishing various aspects in both the analytical and consultancy work of BICC.

### ***Conversion, armaments and disarmament***

A more important shortcoming of the resource-reuse view of conversion is that it largely ignores the security and peace aspect of conversion mentioned earlier. To give an example: although it may not be economical to transform production facilities for weapons of mass destruction, it will likely do a lot to improve the security situation. In fact, for a good part of the assets that we at BICC put on the conversion agenda with our broad definition of the six issue areas of conversion, asset transformation is not economical. The most obvious case is that of conventional weapons which are not needed any more by armed forces. Here the issue is disposal and destruction with the objective of contributing to peace and security—directly through the elimination of excess weaponry and production facilities for weapons, and indirectly as a confidence-building measure.

We have worked on a number of elements in the link between conversion and disarmament and I would like to just briefly mention three here. The first is that we have tried to raise the issue of what we call surplus weapons<sup>6</sup>. We have collected data on surplus and ways to dispose of surplus weapons but also for former military bases<sup>7</sup>. I have to say that the political interest in this kind of work was never very strong, with one exception, namely the surplus in the states comprising the former Soviet Union. There was strong interest in the West in making disarmament perma-

nent through disposal in these countries, but much less so elsewhere. We are glad that Alyson Bailes of SIPRI has taken the initiative to look again at the legacy of the Cold War in a comprehensive way.<sup>8</sup> The second aspect I would like to mention is the cost of disarmament and conversion. Very often it is not bad will, or the wish to maintain surge capacity in times of crisis, that limits disposal, but rather the costs of transformation. We all know that these costs are substantial in the areas of chemical and nuclear weapons, but they are also considerable for other elements on the conversion agenda, including the restructuring of armed forces. BICC provided a framework for analyzing the costs of the disarmament agenda,<sup>9</sup> but was not able to raise the necessary funds to do much more, before the issue became somewhat less topical with the onset of rearmament in the late 1990s. The third issue is the one of confidence-building through conversion.<sup>10</sup> This was very much on our minds in the early days of BICC, but became more of a side issue later on, where there was so much emphasis on the actual transformation of assets. But we later picked up the issue again, albeit not in the post-Cold War framework, but in the framework of post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-building.

### ***Post-conflict peacebuilding***

From the early days, BICC was not only concerned with the legacy of the Cold War but looked to other regions undergoing major transformation including reduction of military sectors. Luckily, our sponsors gave us a wide mandate, and encouraged us to work on an international scope.

Obviously, transformation of the type named is likely to be most extensive, and important, after the end of conflicts. So post-conflict situations became a natural focus of our work outside of the core area of the Cold War, but I would also like to point to

our work in South Africa, in cooperation with colleagues in that country.<sup>11</sup>

True to our first core competency, that of resource-reuse management, our initial angle to work in post-conflict situations was the transformation of human resources. A number of terms have been used to describe the relevant body of work, of which the most common one is DDR, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. If you are familiar with German history, it will be easy to understand that we were never very happy with this abbreviation. Still, we have made contributions to all its letters. On disarmament, our work has especially centered on small arms issues, a major focus of our work that I will come back to later. On demobilization, we have done a lot of data- and information-gathering and analysis.<sup>12</sup> But our main contribution has been on the analysis of reintegration, where we have, in addition to studies, provided advice to a good number of parties and also designed some programs.

But I want to come back to our small arms work. I think it is justified to say that BICC was among the first institutions to take this issue up. At that time, our main cooperation partner was the SAND program at the Monterey Institute for International Studies in California, directed by Ed Laurance. Together, BICC and Monterey have been quite instrumental, in my judgement, in raising the issue from one discussed among interested individuals in academia to new levels of interest, among non-governmental organizations as well as at the level of the United Nations. As a German citizen I am particularly proud that we were able to help make the German government one of the most active ones with respect to small arms control worldwide.

Of course, the time was ripe. And after the negative effects of the proliferation of small arms had been largely ignored for many years, it was clear there was major catching-up to be done among NGOs, development donors, and governments in general. Since the mid-1990, we have seen a major surge in small arms work. The Geneva Small Arms Survey, with whom we are cooperating on several levels, has become the main source of fresh knowledge in this field<sup>13</sup>, in which BICC has had to look for its appropriate niches. One of those is small arms collection<sup>14</sup> and disposal<sup>15</sup>. One expression of our leading position in this subfield is the high demand for the services of our colleagues. We have also supported work on the gender aspects of small arms.<sup>16</sup> Another area that we are currently expanding into is training tools for small arms control (TRESA).

These two issue areas—demobilization and reintegration of former combatants as well as small arms control—were the original main pillars of our work in post-conflict and political transition situations. Similar to what I said earlier about resource-reuse conversion, technical expertise, which BICC can provide, is important for effective and efficient action. However, in view of our mission to promote peace and development, my colleagues early on strived to provide more than just technical expertise, linking the management of transition to the building of stable peace, in various ways.

In a few select cases, colleagues from BICC, in close collaboration with experts in the relevant regions, explored the links between our core areas, such as demobilization and small arms, and the whole gamut of elements that make or break sustainable peace. Both in Corinna Hauswedell's work on building peace in Northern Ireland<sup>17</sup>, in cooperation with colleagues in Derry, and Kees Kingma's work in Southern Africa in cooperation with colleagues in that region, the links between conversion and the conditions for peace fare prominently.

The other contribution I would like to mention has a more narrow focus particularly on those institutions charged with the provision of physical security, that is, the military, police and so on. The term of security sector reform, which few seem to particularly like, has nevertheless established itself on this agenda. For us at BICC, the idea of applying generally accepted standards of political and administrative reform to these institutions was also appealing, and indeed, obvious. A number of contributions on development of the concepts of security sector reform have come from BICC, mostly in cooperation with what I consider the leading institution in the field, the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force, directed by Ambassador Theodor Winkler.<sup>18</sup>

### *Preventive conversion*

Work in post-conflict situations has been one direction where we have expanded our scope of analysis and activities, conflict prevention another. Obviously, if one is asking for the links between security and conversion, conflict prevention is one important element. But, as the team performing the first evaluation of BICC's work in 1997/98 pointed out, more than that, conflict prevention should constitute a particular focus for attention within BICC's mandate.

I have to admit that we initially struggled with this proposition. From the resource-reuse perspective, the decision to end a conflict and convert assets and resources comes first, conversion second. Preventive conversion requires doing more than just implementing decisions to reduce resource-use in military sectors. The concept calls for the development of a conversion agenda that is geared towards the prevention of conflict which, as we know from empirical research, is often in fact renewed conflict.

We have been helped in understanding and adapting the concept of preventive conversion by the recent research on conflict economics, work that was greatly stimulated by the, often controversial, publications by Paul Collier and other colleagues from the World Bank.<sup>19</sup> Collier has, in my view, convincingly demonstrated the old Marxist adage, albeit on the basis of neo-classical economic theory, that economics are *a*, if not *the* main cause of war. However, contrary to the Marxist belief, economic interests in war are not class-driven but are the result of incentive structures in regions with low state power to regulate interpersonal violence but various opportunities for private gain, particularly through the marketing of lootable resources. Weapons, as well as persons that can be recruited for violence, are an important asset for furthering such economic interests.

Preventive conversion can provide some measures to prevent the emergence of such situations of economically-driven violence and help end them. In BICC's work we have pursued three aspects in particular. Two of them have already been mentioned, namely small arms control and the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. Renewed conflict, as well as long-lasting peace and development are, to some extent, shaped by the failure or success of a demobilization and reintegration program, as well as small arms policies.

The third area of work I would like to mention here is on the links between private sector activities and conflict. About a year ago, we began a project on the role of external actors in resource conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa through which we hoped to contribute knowledge on how resource conflict can be defused. In addition, we are also interested in understanding better the correlates of investment in conflict-prone situations. The reasoning behind this interest is the recognition—prominently expressed in the Global Compact—that both the private and public sector need to cooperate better to

prevent conflict and rebuild war-torn societies. Codes of conduct, as well as appropriate incentive structures are important elements in this context. Partly because of our work on resource reuse, where we also worked with various private sector entities, we feel quite well positioned to pursue this kind of work.

### *The role of institutions*

A fifth area of research and cooperation I would like to mention here is that of international institutions, particularly the United Nations, but also others which are charged with maintaining peace and security and advancing development.

We were not set up, and have never been tempted, to become an institute doing much research on security issues in the traditional sense, that is, national security. One reason, of course, is that there are already a large number of institutes that focus on national security, but more important was, I believe, the general feeling in the post-Cold War era that more had to be invested into the search for non-national arrangements for the provision of peace and security.

So we have done some work on the way in which the United Nations is performing this function.<sup>20</sup> An initial focus was on issues related to conversion in a resource-reuse perspective. However, despite a good number of proposals, including those stemming from the conference in Dortmund mentioned earlier, nothing much was done at the UN. I very well remember the discussions at UNCTAD in the late-1990s, charged with coordinating conversion work within the UN system, on what the proper role of UN organizations could be. Unfortunately, as is frequently the case in the UN as elsewhere, the discussion turned stale when principled statements were tagged with price labels. Many transition and developing countries were asking for major resource transfers

for conversion, which were clearly unlikely to be forthcoming, while many developed countries used these unrealistic demands to close off any further discussion of what they might be able to do to help these countries. All in all, a frustrating experience.

More rewarding has been our work on sanctions, in particular arms embargoes. While not a conversion issue proper, it is of interest for BICC's work because of its close relation to conflict. In addition, working very closely with governments and the United Nations Secretariat in New York in the "Bonn-Berlin Process"<sup>21</sup> on the improvement of arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions<sup>21</sup> has been a very educative process with regard to the functioning of the United Nations.

I would also just briefly like to mention in this context the work that has been done on the European Union, in particular within a joint project funded by the European Union, together with eight other research institutions and universities in Europe, focusing on the accountability of the emerging European Security and Defence Policy ([www.esdpdemocracy.net](http://www.esdpdemocracy.net)).

### *Human security*

International and regional organizations have been one area where we have worked on peace and security issues, outside of the traditional analytical framework of national security. In addition to the supra-national, we have also been challenged to look at the subnational level of the provision of security.

This challenge was partly self-made, I understand. When Herbert Wulf came to BICC, he had for some time been an advisor on peace and disarmament issues to Mahbub ul Haque, former Finance Minister of Pakistan and at that time the founding spirit and leader of the team of the *Human Development Report*.

As some of you may remember, the *Human Development Report* published in 1994—the year BICC was founded—was devoted to the subject of security and development. In this report, the term 'human development' was first mentioned and explored. The concept of 'human development' favored by Mahbub ul Haque was a very broad one, not only with respect to the subject of security policies and the individual, but also with respect to the range of threats to be considered important enough to be called security threats.

Unfortunately, we never quite had the time to take up Mahbub ul Haque's visionary challenge of human security. Some may say that this was a good thing, because the concept is just too wobbly. I, however, would argue to the contrary, namely that the concept—or rather, if one looks at recent attempts to define what is meant by the term 'human security', the concepts—*do* provide important insights. Because of this potential, but also on account of our own questions, we have set up a discussion group for this conference which I am sure will be very interesting.

### *Conclusions*

I would like to end with two brief remarks. One is to stress that our main interest has always been to apply our research, expertise and knowledge to practical problems that actors are grappling with. This focus on customers has been, for me, one of the benefits of working at BICC, but I would also admit that it may have made BICC's expansion into new fields of activity sometimes look somewhat patchy. I feel, however, that we have, *cum grano salis*, succeeded in continuing to base such extension on solid research.

The second is to express my gratitude to many people for their support, criticism and intellectual stimulation during the last 10 years. We have only been able to perform the many tasks we were asked

to perform because of the close cooperation with many good colleagues, but also because of the critical appraisal they freely gave of our work. It helped us to move on intellectually and as an organization, keeping its basic orientation but moving on to new, important themes, a topic covered in Peter Croll's contribution to this publication.

### Notes

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- 3 BICC. 1996. *Conversion Survey. Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization*. 1996. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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- 8 Alyson J. K. Bailes, Oleksiy Melnyk and Ian Anthony. 2003. *Relics of Cold War. Europe's Challenge, Ukraine's Experience*. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 6. SIPRI, November.
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- 11 Peter Batchelor, Jacklyn Cock and Penny McKenzie. 2000. *Conversion in South Africa in the 1990s: Defense Downsizing and Human Development Challenges*. Brief 18. Bonn: BICC, December.
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- 15 Sami Faltas and Vera Chrobok. 2004. *Disposal of Surplus Small Arms: A Survey of Policies and Practices in OSCE Countries*. A joint publication by BICC, the British American Security Information Council, Saferworld and the Small Arms Survey.
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# 10 Years of BICC—A Critical View from the Outside

*Klemens van de Sand*

## **Main results of the evaluation**

Let me start by quoting from the evaluation report:

“In the course of just a few years, BICC has developed to become a research and consultancy institute in the field of conversion which is recognized in specialist circles throughout the world. Within just a short period of time, it has not only acquired a high reputation in the scientific community, but has also gained the respect of important decision-makers and advisors in the fields of national and international politics . . . .”

All in all, BICC has not only been able to maintain its international standing as a global “market leader” in the field of research into conversion and consultancy work, but has also even expanded this position over the last few years. This is demonstrated, among other things, by the steady increase in the third-party funds which it has acquired. In the course of the last three years, these funds have reached almost the same level as institutional funding. I am emphasizing this, because there is no better indicator for quality of research and consultancy and meeting demand than the amount and trend of third-party funds.

BICC assumes an exceptional position compared with other institutes worldwide working in similar areas because it has succeeded in combining its research and consultancy work with providing information to the broader public. In fact, this constitutes an essential characteristic of singularity, the very basis of its uniqueness, its reputation and, thus, the very basis for its future existence.

The commission also attempted to summarize its assessment with the help of a few quantitative indicators. Here are the results:

“The experts consider BICC’s research and consultancy work to be extraordinarily professional (9.0). They also give high marks (8.5) to the soundness of its working and procedural methods, the quality of the work performed, the Center’s productivity and effectiveness in implementing projects and tasks, and the international nature of the topics dealt with and the international background of the staff employed. High marks were also given to the continuity of work in individual topic fields and problem areas (7.75), and the cooperative approach in dealings with clients, international associations and other scientific experts and institutes (7.5). The criteria of interdisciplinarity (6.5) and publicity (6.5), on the other hand, received somewhat poorer marks, although these were still at the higher end of the assessment scale.”

It was an evaluation: We had to look for critical points and found some—but not many. To put your mind at rest: they were not ‘life-threatening’.

## **Critical points**

### ***The actuality and appropriateness of the term of ‘conversion’***

The evaluation commission has grappled with the changing meaning of conversion (which Michael Brzoska mentioned in his introductory statement) in two ways: First, it suggests the outlines of a comprehensive concept of conversion as “transformation by which societal benefit can be gained from the ‘civilianization’ of military functions, structures, objects and potentials, of ideas, structures and institutions”. We further recommend that BICC explore and further develop such a comprehensive concept of conversion. Second, we suggest that BICC make its focus on work related to all aspects of the conflict cycle—from conflict

prevention to post-conflict rehabilitation—more visible. Concretely, we recommend that the governing bodies of BICC consider a name change. The commission favoured the name “Bonn International Institute for Conversion and Conflict Consulting” but that is only one possibility. The challenge here is that the name should reflect the broadening scope of BICC’s work, while not changing the well-established acronym.

The commission argued: “The established acronym ‘BICC’, which stands for outstanding product quality, will, on the one hand, guarantee the necessary continuity of a trademark with a positive image in the international field of product placement on this hotly contested research market. On the other hand, the connection between the institute’s new name and the proposed shift in BICC’s tasks will set a clear and unambiguous signal for the strategy of modernizing the institute’s topic areas of research and consultancy. Internally, the recommended change of name will provide BICC and its staff with a clear message concerning the Center’s future development and its prospects for sustainable, independent development. Externally, it will demonstrate that BICC has recognized and has taken up the new challenges.”

To summarize this point: The term ‘conversion’ has been both a boon and a burden for the center. On the one hand, it has made it very visible, and provided it with an unusual and therefore recognizable focus for its work. On the other hand, it has been a burden, because of the rather narrow common understanding of the term. BICC should be more aggressive in developing and promoting an understanding of conversion that is concomitant with its work as well as the requirements for its capabilities.



***Related to this is the scope of BICC's work***

BICC has, in the past, focused on issues and themes that are close to the defense or military sector. It has devoted less efforts to the wider spectrum of themes related to transformation in the above sense, such as transformation of ideas, or political institutions, or even societies. One can understand this self-restraint in view of the limited capabilities and capacities at BICC. On the other hand, it lies in the logic of a comprehensive approach to conversion to 'focus out', to bring its expertise into other fields that are important. BICC will become more useful for us and others, if it continues on this path and seeks to link up to the urgent problems of today, such as the fight against terrorism, and the fight against poverty.

The evaluation commission recommended in particular that: "Special attention should be paid to questions concerning the conversion of conflicts and resources, human development, as well as security and 'cultural' conversion ('culture of peace') against the background of the North-South problem."

***The range of activities at BICC***

BICC is primarily a research and consultancy outfit. It does some training—mostly informal and for individuals such as interns and fellows—but this could be extended. In general, as mentioned above, we see room for improvement in outreach, in spreading the message in various circles of users and customers. It makes little sense to do good research but not to spread the message in all ways possible. The commission has argued in particular:

"In principle, the current activities (research, consultancy work, documentation, conferences, training) should be maintained. It is, however, recommended that activities in the field of research should be enhanced to include modern measures of guidance and further training, and, in the practical field, intensified to include coaching and

mediation services in conflicts pertaining to conversion issues."

***BICC as an international institution based in Bonn***

In the early years of BICC, there was much concern about the international nature and work of BICC. It is obviously not an international organization, but one which has an international profile. However, this remains a challenge. It is not easy—and expensive—to recruit international staff and to justify working in English to German customers and sponsors. Still, we feel that this is important for BICC, not the least because of its location here in the city of Bonn.

Bonn offers a particularly distinctive international setting. This is especially due to the growing number of international organizations, including in particular the United Nations' agencies, but also to the federal ministries which are to remain in Bonn and whose work focuses on areas which are of interest to BICC—first and foremost my own ministry, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation, but also other ministries. In addition there are approximately 150 national and international non-governmental organizations located in Bonn, many of which deal with topics which are of interest to BICC. In its capacity as a renowned seat of research with long-established as well as new research institutes, Bonn is able to offer BICC numerous fields of cooperation.

Based on this assessment, regarding cooperation with the United Nations, there would appear to be starting points for cooperation with the UN Volunteers Programme, the UNESCO Institute for Vocational Education and Training, and the new Institute for Environment and Human Security of the United Nations University.

***Disciplines at BICC, multidisciplinary work***

BICC is dominated by economists and political scientists, with a little sprinkling of other disciplines. The commission recommends:

"The range of disciplines among BICC's research staff should be widened and more effort could be made to draw the attention of the international press to the results of the Center's work."

***Conclusions and prospects***

Let me, in conclusion, come back to my initial remarks:

BICC's projects, expertise, and 'products' are needed more than ever before in this peaceless world, which, at the dawn of the 21st century, is characterized by new risks and dangers, weapons and wars, violence and terrorism, injustice and underdevelopment. BICC's tasks are by no means completed with the resolution of the problems inherited from the East-West conflict (arms and site conversion). The conditions of globalization, both at the present and in the future, make it essential that BICC should conduct research into the many different new problem areas related to the cultural aspects of violence (that is, fundamental changes in the cultural foundations of conflicts) and use its sound expertise to provide advice in the political processes of peace, development and security policy.

BICC's exemplary cost-benefits balance should be honored by the political powers-that-be, but also by industry and the media, etc.,—even in these difficult times of tight funds—in such a way that BICC can be assured in future of the political, financial and media support which it has received in the past and which it needs in order to be able to perform its work systematically in the future.

BICC is an essential provider of ideas and a center of knowledge and, as such, a universally respected institution in the service of tackling violence by prevention, constructive conflict settlement, and the sustainable shaping of peace—always seen from the point of view of the conversion and transformation of violent situations and the promotion of peace.

# The Future of BICC

*Peter J. Croll*

Our Chairman of the Board, Hartmut Krebs, has talked about the insights at BICC's foundation, Michael Brzoska about some of the achievements during the past 10 years, and finally Klemens van de Sand highlighted some of the main messages of the recent evaluation of BICC and the view of an external person. It is for me now to look into the future and to share with you my vision for BICC. What would BICC look like if we came together again in about ten years? A famous person once said "I have a dream" and as the Director of BICC I want to share with you my dream for BICC. With you—the ones who have loyally accompanied us during the last ten years of our progress and were definitely a part of our success story.

## *The changing environment for BICC*

There is no doubt about it. The world around us has changed tremendously. Many researchers, decision-makers and politicians considered the Cold War to be the major obstacle to progress and hoped that its end would help solve the worldwide problems of war, hunger, poverty or environmental degradation and that the threat of nuclear dangers would be overcome. The end of the Cold War gave an unprecedented opportunity to reverse the arms race, build a new foundation for international security, and reorient billions of dollars in defense budgets to neglected domestic and development needs. The Charter of Paris, the declaration of the leaders of OSCE states and their hopes for a peaceful Europe, is a striking example of how euphoric the world was at the end of the Cold War. Peace and development seemed to be attainable.

All of us gathered here know that the realities of today are different. Most of the peace dividends—to the extent they came about—were not spent on development and security but rather on reduction of public debt.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 deeply affected the United States and, with it, the whole world. "Will anything ever be the same?" was the question often asked.

September 11 became a powerful symbol with far-reaching repercussions. September 11 did not change everything: the geopolitical map of the world, the global model of economic activities, and the patterns of military power remained the same. Globalized insecurity and—especially after 11 September 2001—additional threats such as terrorist attacks seem to be an increasing part of our daily life and have therefore changed our lives and perceptions.

BICC was founded because of, and therefore naturally concentrated on, the urgent needs arising from the initial concept of conversion which consisted of the six issue area—an immediate response to the then relevant and pressing topics. The six issue areas of BICC that Michael Brzoska has talked about were an immediate response to the mandate of BICC. Conversion experiences we gathered in the 1990s are of extremely high value for post-conflict situations worldwide, although it is obvious that no mechanical transfer—or blue print—is possible.

In the first half of the 1990s, incentives for conversion were seen and treated as a by-product of the end of the Cold War and of ending the wars in the Balkans. Especially in the East, military production capacities were obviously oversized and the problems of converting military enterprises gained international significance. Defense industry conversion formed—and still forms—an integral component of economic reforms from socialist to market economies and from national arms industries to European

armaments cooperation. The economic impact of conversion affects high numbers of people. How could the intellectual scientific and technological potential of the defense complex be preserved? Military sites designed for interstate wars became equally obsolete, yet their infrastructure was to be used for civilian purposes wherever possible. Since the early 1990s, several waves of military base closures have resulted in the decommissioning of hundreds of facilities. Communities faced job losses as a result of base closures. They had to be assisted to redevelop the properties into housing developments, office parks and industrial zones. Base redevelopment proved to be an opportunity to create major new projects in desirable locations, and BICC assisted many municipalities in doing so.

Developers, working with local authorities, turned barracks into apartment buildings, shooting ranges into recreational parks, and runways into car racing courses. A decade of experience has convinced developers that these projects can produce healthy returns for those with the resources, political skills and patience to carry off such ambitious development.

Another aspect pertains to human resources demobilization and reintegration of combatants. Military-trained personnel leaving the armed forces in record numbers had, and still have, to find work in the private sector. Career counseling, additional education, vocational training and promotion of small businesses were important services to these individuals. The scale, terms and speed of conversion, and the still weak market economies made it impossible to make direct use of Western experiences. Only the joint and concerted actions of the state, the regions and private enterprises allows the conversion process to be conducted with any likelihood of success.

But, just as there was no end to history, there was no end to mobilization of military resources, regardless of large-scale downsizing. Conversion in the 1990s was not just about getting rid of the legacy of the Cold War, it was part of a global restructuring and modernization of armed forces. Armies became leaner, more mobile, based on technology rather than sheer manpower, geared at interventions and power projection capabilities rather than classical interstate wars. Conversion was part of this modernization in military technology as well as the paradigmatic shift in the forms of violent conflict.

We are faced with new forms of organized violence by non-state actors, failing states, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, globalized terrorism, and human security issues of a wider global scale like, for example, HIV/AIDS.

### *Challenges for BICC*

We at BICC are challenged to adapt to the new situation as well as to try to anticipate trends of the future.

#### *Conversion, security and development*

To my understanding, conversion must reflect the shift from a clash of ideologies as the key security concern to broader conceptions of security that transcend the 'Westphalian' world order of sovereign states. Security is a global concern, a common good. It is not just about the protection of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of nation states.

If, in this connection, conversion is understood as part of a comprehensive endeavor to prevent conflict, then it follows that conversion must be orientated according to the points of reference of a changing security discussion. At the international level, security is gradually being understood

less and less as solely the 'securing' of territorial integrity, but rather as the protection of life and the human rights of all people. As the main object of security policy, the individual has a right to physical immunity (from the direct application of force, illness, hunger, etc.) embedded in a stable economic structure as a basis for life. Under the catchword 'human security'—at least in the rhetoric—an epistemological shift in the concept of security itself can thus be seen. Security discourse is increasingly expanding from the protection of specific state-boundaries to identifying the wellbeing of the people therein. For the Independent Commission on Human Security chaired by the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, and the Nobel Prize Winner Amartya Sen, the aim of human security is "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment."<sup>1</sup>

The Millennium Development Goals, put forward by UNDP with the aim of eradicating human poverty, can therefore be interpreted as a challenge to a responsible security policy. Conversion research which is conducted in a similar way definitely cannot limit itself to a mere critical study of political realities; within the very specific context of the reduction of military and the bolstering of civilian social structures; it must at the same time be interested in helping in the eradication of poverty and with a more equal distribution of resources. In some countries, disproportionately high military expenditures are still a significant factor contributing to widespread poverty. This became adequately clear for example in the recent war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of the poorest countries in the world.

On the other hand, poverty itself can become a source of insecurity. The world is seven times richer than at the end of the Second World War, but more people have to live on a daily income of one dollar. The inequality has never been greater in world history. Poor

people are more likely to live in insecure circumstances or to be more prepared to use force, sometimes possibly also as a means to securing a living. Furthermore, poverty and inadequate development are often given as a justification for terrorist activities. Even if the perpetrators do not necessarily stem from poor families themselves, they nevertheless cite economic injustice and exploitation as the motivation and justification for their deeds. From the perspective of conversion research, poverty appears in the first instance to be a security problem. By accepting the fight against poverty as a central contribution to achieving human security, conversion research exhibits a number of points of contact and overlap with development policy and development research.

Conversion is part of a broadening of our understanding of security, including issues of democracy, development, and the primacy of the security of human beings. In the sense described above, conversion cannot only be understood as merely a technical component, but must have a final goal of changing attitudes and minds and hearts, in order to embark on a peace process.

### *Evaluation of BICC's work*

The recent evaluation of BICC, Dr Van de Sand referred to, covering our work during the period from 1999 to 2003, concluded that BICC has managed to become a "global market leader" in the field of conversion. For us, my colleagues and myself, this is great news. It confirms that, especially during the last few years in which we have tried to apply the wider concept of conversion and are 'zooming out', we are going in the right direction.

The team, however, recommends we follow the path started during the last few years in "its sound expertise to advise and mediate in the political processes of peace, development and

security policy . . . to realign the Center's focus towards new and future challenges in the field of conversion research . . . and recommends that BICC should be for example renamed 'Bonn International Institute for Conversion and Conflict Consulting'."

Following the recent discussions and the evaluators' conclusion, ". . . conversion is understood to be those processes of redesign and transformation by which societal benefit can be gained from the civilianization of military [processes], functions, structures, objects and potential . . . ." Conversion represents a specific type of transition—like the transition to the market economy it marks the transition from a war, or militarily dominated economy, i. e. environment, to the use of scarce resources for development, welfare, and education. Conversion furthermore deals with the societal/ non-state actors and state sectors that dispose of means of organized violence. Conversion thus deals partially with governance structures.

Consequently, in my view, BICC's future work should concentrate on the interfaces and causes of "violent conflict and resource mobilization", on "violent conflict and structures of governance", and on "violent conflict and development" and "armaments and disarmament". Conversion in my view is a socially desirable outcome. But these outcomes cannot simply be wished into existence; they must be based on compelling incentives (positive and negative sanctions) for all key actors we want to reach.

### ***The most well-known meaning of conversion***

Ten years after BICC's foundation we should take into consideration again the most well-known meaning of conversion—the conversion from one system of beliefs to another. Conversion is, in the final analysis, about changing behavioral patterns of

actors, and is not just restricted to the civilian use of material resources. This would be limiting and is only one element of change.

Who are the main actors BICC attempts to convert through its research, networking and consultancy efforts? Whose (self-) interest would we like to change? In principle, behavioral change can come about in three forms.

*First, by influencing economic incentives for organized violence.* This includes at its center the overall arching field of armaments and disarmament, or in short "arms": more specifically, for example, applying international sanctions to the illegal arms trade, fighting against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), making the civilian use of military resources pay off, and constraining the scope of unfair resource exploitation. Replacing the stimulus of military spending requires investments that will open up alternative markets for defense contractors and promote sustainable economic growth. Economic conversion involves concerns and interests of governments, entrepreneurs, and the labor force. Economic conversion provides an opportunity to use military industries for environmentally sound civilian alternatives. Conversion must influence the main actors involved in violent conflicts.

*Second, we may attempt to change people's attitudes and the political structures of peacebuilding,* including for instance governance structures in the security sector, by making them more transparent, accountable, and subject to democratic control. Security sector reform comes to mind in this topic.

The all-embracing concept of security sector reform addresses societies undergoing transition from authoritarian rule, post-conflict societies, and underdeveloped countries with poor governance capacities. Security sector reform is about democratization, state-building, confidence-building, and ultimately conflict prevention. A key

aspect in strengthening the capacity of the state to provide security for its population is to ensure that the police, the judicial system, the armed forces and paramilitary forces are separate and subject to democratic control. The challenge of security sector reform is to develop effective civilian and democratically legitimized oversight mechanisms. Solutions may differ as do the prescriptions of Western agencies.

Key objectives will include the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, adherence to fundamental principles of public-sector management such as accountability, comprehensiveness and transparency. But it is the time to go beyond these normative, idealistic prescriptions for security sector reform. Security sector reform should not become an excuse for preserving authoritarian rule, disrespect for human rights or the build-up of a police state. What are the domestic, international, institutional, and economic prerequisites? External support and linkages with other areas of development or financial policy might be crucial, yet, incentives for security sector reform must mostly be identified on domestic grounds. Security sector reform has strong resource implications—it involves a functional and predictable downsizing of military personnel, the streamlining of services, as well as fighting corruption. Capacities of the media and NGOs will have to be strengthened in order to make national elites committed to the reform process. Furthermore, reform will depend on community-based activities. Yet, we have to be humble and honest in our ambitions—most often security sector reform will only work as an element of the overall democratization process.

Among these political structures is also the policy link between development policy and reforms of the security sector. The cooperation between military forces and civilian humanitarian and development organizations is becoming



increasingly more important and a field where changes of attitude will be essential, and a wide field for applied research. We have started to work on this topic and the demand for our expertise is high.

*Third, by addressing the causes of violent conflict, and the management of violent conflict.* The link between resources and violent conflicts is obvious. Resource scarcity as well as abundance can lead to violent conflicts. There are many examples of successful management of conflict over scarce resources. The conditions for ending wars in situations where war economies have become endemic because of the availability of internationally marketable resources is a subject for conversion in the sense described above.

We have begun to look into these matters in the context of water, especially transboundary water, and last month had an international conference, comparing notes between two regions in the world.

## Summary

Let me summarize what I have elaborated upon in my earlier remarks:

**1. Themes of pro-active conversion** are peace, development, economics, and security.

**2. Future key areas** are:

- **‘Zooming out’** the results and approaches of our applied research work into the various operational measures of our clients
- Embarking on a **wider concept of conversion** as I have described above
- **Expanding topics** of violence, violent conflicts and management of violent conflicts into our agenda in line with the conflict cycle

- Strengthening the **link between conversion, security and development**

- **Bridging the gap** between academia and policymakers

- Increasing our focus on **advisory services to policy- and decision-makers.**

To achieve all this we will need the same, or even more, support from you, our cooperating partners and researchers—and more so your critical comments and observations. This conference will be a start of our discussions and I would like to ask all of you in the various working groups ahead of us during the two days to reflect on some of the issues I have raised in my comments.

This question could be: “Does this topic or this approach contribute to the wider scope of BICC’s work and how could this best be achieved?”

## Note

- <sup>1</sup> Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, eds. 2003. *Human Security Now*. Report of the Human Security Commission. United Nations: New York, May, p. 4



## Group A

# 2 The long ‘Decade of Disarmament’ 1986–1999: What Remains to be Done? What Lessons can be Drawn?

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

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For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

## Discussion Group A The long 'Decade of Disarmament' 1986–1999 What Remains to be Done? What Lessons can be Drawn?

### Rationale, questions and participants

If one judges by indicators such as global military expenditures, the latest cycle of major disarmament began in the second half of the 1980s and lasted until the end of the 1990s. There was substantial downsizing in the military sectors during this period, particularly in the countries in Europe and North America closely involved in the Cold War. Global military expenditures, for example, were reduced by more than 30 percent between the mid-1980s and the end of the 1990s. In the early part of this period, major new international arms control treaties accompanied disarmament, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. In this respect, the early 1990s represented a 'golden period' for international arms control.

Downsizing opened up many opportunities and challenges for conversion in the practical sense. Three areas of conversion activity stand out in particular: industrial conversion; civilian reemployment of former soldiers; and the conversion/redevelopment of bases. In the course of the past years, BICC has contributed a good number of studies on these topics, along with supporting actors involved in relevant activities in many parts of the world.

Initially, military downsizing ignited great hopes for economic revitalization and long-term growth throughout the world. However, soon it became clear that many difficulties and obstacles existed. Towards the middle of the last decade (1990s), conversion came to be increasingly viewed as a failure. What many observers saw as particularly disappointing was the fiscal use of the savings from reduced military expenditures. It seemed as if the anticipated 'peace dividend' had not actually materialized; indeed, some even diagnosed something like a 'peace penalty', particularly in Russia and other former socialist countries.

With time, however, both a good part of the expectations directed towards, as well as some of the later disappointment with, conversion gave way to a more balanced view. Conversion constituted neither a panacea for all economic problems nor a major burden to be borne by society. If conversion is to be made possible, investment is needed in many cases, and it is the general economic conditions, outside the purview of conversion, which ultimately determine whether this investment pays off.

The panel of Discussion Group A, chaired by BICC's first director *Herbert Wulff*, was asked to address a number of issues relating to past and future aspects of the latest period of military downsizing, including:

- What has been achieved? What has gone wrong?
- What remains to be done in terms of practical work?
- What are the major lessons learned to be applied in possible future periods of disarmament?

The Introductory Statement was made by *Alyson Bailes*, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden. BICC has cooperated in a number of projects with SIPRI, the most recent being a study on the 'Legacies of the Cold War.'

Comments were prepared and invited by *Edward Laurance* of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), an early contributor to BICC publications and a close cooperation partner in a number of projects; by *Ksenia Gonchar* of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who has authored several BICC studies on Russian defense industry conversion, military research and development, and industrial restructuring and who was BICC's representative in Moscow until early 2004; and by *Reinhard Weise*, a member of BICC's International Advisory Board and a practitioner in base redevelopment at Brandenburgische Boden Ltd.

Arms control was never a magic bullet or a panacea, even in its 'heroic age' during the Cold War. It was not treaties that forced governments to reduce or abjure certain weapons, but other positive and negative incentives that made it worth their while both to sign agreements and abide by them. Arms control was and is an instrument among many, dependent on and needing to be adjusted to its environment. To accept this offers a much better chance of keeping arms control alive today than would nostalgia for some 'pure' bygone form of the concept—which its enemies can too easily claim is time-bound and thus overtaken.

This said, there is no denying that the post-Cold War environment confronts traditional, formally negotiated disarmament and arms control with unusual difficulties. They are a mixture of effects inherited from the past and generated by the present: of concrete obstacles, and shifts of political/psychological focus and motive which—perhaps most fatefully of all—have sapped the urge to find cooperative solutions.

Just as the aftermath of a conflict may go sour in ways which all too soon lead back to violence, the disarmament achievements made in the détente period and early 1990s brought some unhelpful chain-reactions of their own. There was often temptation to export surplus equipment (created in Europe by voluntary as well as treaty-based cuts)

# Arms Control: How to Move from the Cold War Legacy to the Needs of a Globalized World?

*Alyson J. K. Bailes*

to regions much less stable than Cold-War Europe had been, with the risk of aggravating local conflicts. Even the 'reputable' defence industry was forced to make the most of its non-European markets, not excluding collaborative deals with former 'satellites' of the former strategic adversary, and thereby creating new secondary centres for technology diffusion. The stockpiling of items not exported and the time-lag in dismantling or converting military installations saddled Europe itself with costly, unproductive, and often dangerous military wastes. Where East and West had stocked up arms in their respective non-European proxy states, there was no attempt at arms control and no conversion programme at all until it was too late—i.e. post-conflict. All these problems have been the special province of research by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), and have never been better documented than in BICC's series of special studies and yearbooks.<sup>1</sup>

The other trends involved are hard to bring within a single analytical framework. They will be addressed here in a way that brings out certain contrasts, but also an underlying and unhappy synergy between the effects of the post-Cold War transformation in the developing and developed worlds respectively. First, there was an undeniable 'pull' for North-South transfers of arms and technology in the 1990s because of the rash of new or expanding conflicts no longer triggered—but also not easily to be controlled—by former Western or Eastern 'bloc' leaders. The combatants could often buy weapons from both East and West. The items most used

were not generally the ones that it had been most important to contain during the East-West competition, so they were generally not subject to international controls or even to binding transparency measures.<sup>2</sup> Unofficial and illegal supplies, the growing role of private suppliers of military services, the prevailing type of civil conflict with sub-state entities as combatants, and—more recently—terrorists' experimentation with a widening armoury all made controls based on traditional state-to-state agreements harder to apply. At the same time, the impact of open conflicts and other regional tensions and rivalries during this decade kept up the pressure for a number of states not recognized as nuclear weapons possessors in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to continue or start developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities for their national ends. The number of confirmed or new proliferators almost exactly balanced those who—for reasons which always included some re-ordering of the regional security environment—voluntarily gave up WMD holdings or ambitions during the same period.<sup>3</sup>

The arms control lobby was not idle in the face of these challenges. Particularly strong and often successful movements arose in the Western world, working with local humanitarian activists, to publicize and get a grip on the challenges of the typical 'poor man's weapons' such as small arms and landmines. In official policy circles there was growing concern about WMD proliferation, even if this did not 'break

out' as a leading topic of strategic debate until the next century. However, the point to stress here is that on the part of the developed West, both trends involved seeing arms control and proliferation as *someone else's problem*—or at least, a problem caused by someone else. In the NATO area and in many former Warsaw Pact countries, the local landscape for both policymakers and public opinion was dominated by the huge relaxation of strategic tension and the realization of a substantial 'peace dividend'. The sense of direct threat to Western populations from nuclear weapons or other arms accumulation quickly ebbed, and with it—more unfortunately—the sense of a shared responsibility to do something about it through *reciprocal* controls. Self-criticism and agitation for reform by Western NGOs and civic actors shifted rather to topics like civil nuclear power, the environment, animal rights or the 'threat' of globalization. Accordingly, arms control ceased in practice to be a central issue or part of high politics for most Western and former Warsaw Pact governments, with an inevitable downsizing of the material and political resources devoted to it. There were exceptions—like bilateral nuclear arms control in the US/Russia dialogue, or popular outcry over French nuclear testing in the mid-1990s—but these had either been overtaken or had lost much of their edge by the end of the century.

More significant, however, than a retreat from arms control as such was the positive movement of Euro-Atlantic security thinking in other directions. The end of the Cold War steered Western security policy in general away from the idea of *restraint* and *control* as conditions for stability, towards *active*

measures of engagement: including not just military intervention but many kinds of military dialogue, cooperation and aid aimed both at Europe's own periphery and the wider world. The virtual disappearance of risks of escalation and retaliation, and the undoubted need for and success of active interventionist methods in solving such challenges as the former Yugoslavian wars, created a temptation to re-define the (national and institutional) 'good guys' as those who had strong military resources and the will to use them beyond their own direct defence needs. The purpose might indeed have been good in most of the decade's specific cases: but the shift in attitude—not least because it was partly unconscious—created an obvious risk that the ideas of 'might' and 'right', 'capability' and 'justification' would gradually become interchangeable in the minds precisely of the world's most powerful defence actors. In these conditions, the concept of a virtuous security policy could—at least for such militarily active democracies—become de-linked from arms control to the point where the latter was first and foremost something to be done to the 'bad guys' (or emergent rivals). The 'good guys' were more conscious of the need to *avoid* restrictions which might shackle their beneficent strength.

This picture is of course somewhat over-drawn. Where it fits in to the present analysis is as a trend liable to deepen the rift of consciousness and divergence of arms control agendas—which in turn was part of a larger difference in security discourse—between the Northern and Southern, and to a lesser extent the Western and Eastern hemispheres. US analysts are not wrong in suggesting that a large part of the Western world has moved towards a 'post-modern'<sup>5</sup> condition, where one's own or a neighbour's weapons need no longer be seen as sources of risk *per se* (though gun use within society may be); and where stability is sought not by quantitative balance and mutual containment, but by

interpenetration and shared engagement. Some parts of the developing world are free enough of traditional conflict to approximate already to this model, and others are striving towards it through building their own regional integration systems. There remain, however, significant regions, countries, and combatants within countries who are from this viewpoint in a 'pre-modern' condition. Whether they still calculate security in terms of dominance, coercion, local balance and 'deterrence'—or whether they prefer asymmetric methods and the weapon of unpredictability, like the classic 'rogue' states—such players are likely to see arms control as irrelevant or directly inimical to their interests, in a way for which the Europe of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries provides a better model than of the twentieth. International terrorist groups can also be seen as pre-modern in this perceptual sense (notably in their extreme zero-sum thinking), even while they use hi-tech globalized *techniques* designed to exploit post-modern vulnerabilities. The coexistence in the modern world of these different phases of security perception, superimposed on more familiar differences of national and community interests, makes it easy to see how global consensus could break down (notably in the UN's Committee on Disarmament) on developing the arms control agenda. The irony of the situation is that both sides actually have a new point of agreement, in their attachment to and normative comfort with the present role of their own weapons holdings.

In Western attitudes, the justification of a permanent divide between 'haves' and 'have-nots' which has been so familiar—and inimical to progress—in the debate over nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation now often seems to extend to the whole field of defence capability and defence-related technology. Post-modern players are automatically trusted, or at least trust themselves, to develop and use these powers without external restraint: pre-modern possession of them becomes part of an 'asymmetrical' threat. The new preoccupation, following the events

of 11 September 2001, with risks from 'rogue state' or terrorist actors and with the danger of proliferation processes carrying the worst kinds of weapons into their hands has further hardened attitudes and led to a much-quoted (if insufficiently debated) view that the 'bad guys' of today can neither be deterred nor negotiated with. From the developing world perspective, on the other hand, all this can readily be seen as a 'rich man's agenda' which at best ignores the objective need of other regional powers for adequate defence (and for a chance to compete on the technology market), and at the worst leads to regionally destabilizing military aid policies and outright threats to local nations' security—threats against which, or course, the knee-jerk reaction is to procure even more and worse weapons.<sup>6</sup>

This situation places obvious and objective difficulties in the way of pursuing 'modern', i.e. late-20th century models of bilateral, regional or universal *reciprocal* disarmament. It has, however, generated various new attempts to address what might most broadly be defined as 'weaponry-related threats' from a variety of angles. Three of these trends in developed-world thinking will be mentioned here because they illustrate the difficulty of making real security progress without addressing—or while actually widening—the policy gap between the Northern and Southern, post- and pre-modern worlds.

One is to try to cut off and shield the more developed communities, so that it matters less if threatening capacities multiply outside. Missile defence is the obvious example: a kind of security ghetto or 'gated community' writ large. But the barrier can never be watertight enough, especially if proliferation does get out of hand; and it will never be practical to shield all the other regions, like energy-producing ones, on which developed societies depend for their trade and prosperity; and no shield based on traditional defence technology will keep out terrorists, criminals, diseases and natural or climatic forces



which are capable of killing larger numbers of post-modern citizens than any mere weapons strike. Morally, of course, the shield approach represents discrimination and divisiveness in its purest form.

Letting the post-modern world's own defence superiority develop unconstrained—even without the constraint of shared vulnerability, if one believes in missile defence—also has obvious pitfalls. Apart from the costs, it represents nothing more than a new kind of arms race directed against a new and more diffuse range of opponents. The race is unstable because the definition of the 'enemy' is vague to the point of infinity, and it may be fruitless because of the much greater currency and effectiveness in this context of asymmetrical responses. Moreover, so long as the modern/post-modern community's strength continues to rest on superior technology and its social constructs favour less manpower-intensive solutions, this situation will inevitably provoke 'vertical proliferation', i.e. the exploration of different applications of known destructive techniques and the opening up of new ones. In modern conditions, the eventual leakage of such 'edge-giving' technologies to less 'reliable' users as well is only a matter of time.

A third approach which has been much used in practice, and defended by serious thinkers, is for modern<sup>7</sup> or post-modern players to intervene in other regions in a 'pre-modern', forceful and coercive style adapted to the perceived conditions there. In practical terms, this approach is a natural outgrowth of the 'active' problem-solving trends of the 1990s as discussed above.<sup>8</sup>

Philosophically, at its simplest, it has been defended by the contention that 'asymmetrical' threats (including those of WMD) have become a matter of direct self-defence for the advanced powers, and that (as also mentioned above) 'some people will never understand anything but force'. More subtly, it could be argued that a surgical strike to remove pre-modern elements of

threat may be needed to open the way for modern or post-modern progress. Characteristic methods are the physical destruction of weapons, capabilities, and sometimes whole insurgent movements or regimes—as seen most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The problems are:

- Any actor using direct non-consensual force makes himself the enemy of those acted upon, in classic pre-modern style, and opens up his own (probably ill-prepared) society to every kind of asymmetrical retaliation. For political and systemic reasons also, it is actually very hard to operate for long in two radically different security modes at home and abroad.
- It is hard to use force in another region without making a *de facto* choice between the merits of actors there (states, sub-state factions, individual leaders), and this in turn carries strong risks of maintaining or even increasing a typically pre-modern security *polarization* in the local environment. Unless all backward and threatening elements can be destroyed throughout the given country or region simultaneously, this will make it difficult for friendly or 're-constructed' governments and nations to maintain a post-modern security style. Either they must re-arm against their unreformed competitors, or the post-modern intervener must commit unending resources to protecting them in a kind of security 'bubble'. 'Post-modernism in one country' is extremely hard to maintain. This is one explanation of the frequency with which one-time Western protégés (persons or régimes) have evolved into new sources of threat—armed with all the resources which the West initially gave, and/or exempted from arms control.

- Last but not least, there is no guarantee that even the best-designed coercive intervention will actually liberate and guide the local forces needed for 'progress' as the post-modern world defines it. Reasons include the obvious contradictions in *imposing* democracy; the risk of pre-modern resentments and reactions against the intervention itself; and the problems (well illustrated in Iraq) of avoiding distortion and manipulation of those *economic* processes which play so crucial a role in transitions to modernity and post-modernity elsewhere.

No one has yet put forward a convincing alternative approach for bridging the post-modern/pre-modern gap in security and arms control: not least because the problem has not generally been defined in that way. Recent discourse has been cast much more in terms of the *effectiveness* or effective *enforcement*<sup>9</sup> of arms control, in relation to specific negative examples: with all too little reflection on how effectiveness should be defined and by whom, and on the broader circumstances which conduce to failure or success. All too few developing-world voices have been raised on the subject or, if they have been raised, have been heard by today's Western thought leaders.

Starting from the post-modern/pre-modern dilemma cannot solve everything either, but it offers a new way to explore and test the merits of some specific approaches already under debate. For example: even a little reflection should show that post-modern, and even truly modern, civilisation is not compatible with the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest in any dimension. Advanced democratic nations ought to be leaders in 'restraint' in general—including arms control—as well as in positive action. In practical terms, the most important assets for successful crisis interventions are not bound by any present or proposed arms control restraints. In the field of mass-destruction and other destabilizing

technologies, advanced countries have more to lose than gain by insisting on remaining free to create new sources of danger when top-down export controls are clearly inadequate to stop these dangers travelling full circle and striking back against them.<sup>10</sup>

Secondly, if there is any merit in seeing arms control approaches in terms of a historical progression, it must follow that ‘modern’, 20th century-style approaches are still very much relevant for regions which have not yet followed Europe’s *fin de siècle* path. Classic instruments such as improved transparency and data disclosure, quantified manpower/equipment reductions and ceilings, military disengagement and confidence-building measures, nuclear and other ‘-free zones’, and ‘Cooperative Threat Reduction’<sup>11</sup>-type programmes have all been applied by the international community (together with demobilization and conversion of personnel) in *post-conflict* situations world-wide. They have been surprisingly absent from many Western approaches to conflict *prevention* and general security-building, possibly because work on small arms in those contexts has crowded out other aspects.<sup>12</sup> They cannot, of course, have deep and lasting value unless embraced and internalized by local actors, in forms genuinely adapted to local conditions.<sup>13</sup>

Where there is no alternative to the pre-modern use of force against stubborn offenders, it should be applied in circumstances that make the creation of a two-sided adversary relationship impossible and that minimize subjectivity and bias in the choice of targets: i.e., under the mandate and the ownership of the world community represented through the United Nations. This is easy to say and is likely to be said again by the High-level Panel appointed by the UN Secretary-General to deliver a report on updating the UN’s security functions at the end of 2004. One of the many challenges facing the restoration of the UN’s central role in this field is, however, that it requires all

Security Council members to collaborate in using the organ according to post-modern principles, even when their own security civilisation and behaviour is not of that type.

Other kinds of universally applicable action by the United Nations (and/or other global organizations) may, however, also be helpful. The processes of globalization have in some respects an equalizing effect between, or at least comparable impact on, all types of states from post-modern to pre-modern, and both the success and moral standing of individual nations has become closely linked with how well they adjust to ‘globalized’ conditions. A good guide to devising arms control and non-proliferation measures with similarly comprehensive and ‘modernizing’ impact could, thus, be to link them with the known vectors of globalization like transnational law, trade, financial processes, and information flows—which also means extending the action and responsibility to new constituencies such as the private sector, scientists, media and (under the legalistic approach) potentially all individuals. This approach has already been adopted, with some success, for the purpose of combating the flow of cash resources to terrorism,<sup>14</sup> and was most recently and innovatively applied in a UNSC Resolution ‘criminalizing’ certain transactions involving WMD wherever and by whomever committed—leaving implementation essentially to national systems.<sup>15</sup> Whatever the success of its enforcement, this measure does open a conceptual door to some novel palliatives for the North-South divide, not least because it offers such a good basis for indigenous regional cooperation initiatives. Unfortunately, a comparable approach would be much harder to devise in the field of conventional technology—though the ICOC<sup>16</sup> was a commendable attempt to apply it to missiles.

Even harder are the challenges of finding globalized solutions for the rapidly expanding area of ‘dual-use’ technology and security-relevant

scientific and technological research. The problems are multiple:

- As economic *and* political development continues in other regions, the current limited export control groups constituted mainly on a North-South basis are less and less competent in practice to control technology diffusion, notably from ‘second tier’ producers.
- Systemic changes like advanced IT and the increasingly multi-national nature of (especially private-sector) research teams are easing the spread of ‘dangerous knowledge’.
- The legitimacy of ‘top-down’ or discriminatory approaches developed unilaterally in the West is also under attack for conflicting with the goals of free-market competition and self-sustaining development propounded by the West itself.
- Nevertheless, a leap of faith which would draw the whole range of developing-world actors into enforcement as subjects, rather than objects, of the control process will remain very tough to take as long as so many ‘pre-modern’ features persist in these countries’ own policies and environments, and so long as no objective international yardstick exists for diagnosing responsible technology management.
- To close the vicious circle, and in the light of what was said above on coercion, the West has little leverage to create real changes of heart in the South except by sharing the ‘peaceful’ versions of the technologies in question.

For these and other reasons, the prescriptions discussed here can only be a poor and partial approach to tackling the problem. All of them, however, have the merit of trying to *open out* and *adapt* arms control, rather than attempting to refine, re-focus, ‘purify’ or mechanistically ‘enforce’ it; and of attempting to apply it across new

borders, with new partners, and in new multi-functional combinations. In the Cold War, arms control was actually part of just such a political/psychological/security, technological/economic mix. Re-inventing it in an equally complex and flexible way for today's changed world offers the best hope of respecting the lessons of history.

### Notes

- 1 For BICC publications, see [www.bicc.de](http://www.bicc.de). A SIPRI publication on the same subject (in cooperation with BICC) is: Alyson Bailes, et al. 2003. *Relics of Cold War: Europe's Challenge, Ukraine's Experience*. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 6. November. Available at [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org).
- 2 The most-discussed example is the trade in small arms and light weapons (see [www.smallarmssurvey.org](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org) for background). The transfer of larger items like aircraft, helicopters, APCs, tanks and artillery was not constrained by treaty outside Europe: the UN's Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) was meant to provide *transparency* on such sales, but was voluntary and tended to be least respected by states in the areas of greatest tension and conflict. (Simon T. Wezeman. 2003. *The Future of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 4. August. Available at [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)) The West's Cold-War COCOM export control system was converted into the more general-purpose Wassenaar Agreement, but this remained focused more on technologies seen by the West as destabilizing than on restraining those most critical in conflict terms. The EU's Code of Conduct on conventional exports came closest to the latter motivation.
- 3 Weapons or development programmes were given up in the 1990s by Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. States previously understood to have nuclear capacities were India, Israel and Pakistan, joined by Iran, Iraq and North Korea as states known or strongly suspected to be developing such weapons by the end of the century.
- 4 It is a commonplace that NATO's agenda in the 1990s shifted decisively towards the 'expeditionary' use of armed forces outside the Alliance's own territory. But there was also a movement *away* from arms control topics as a major focus of NATO's political and policy-making activity: among other things, because of the energy devoted to *positive* cooperation with ex-enemies (through the Partnership for Peace, etc); NATO's limited suitability for tackling the newer (global) arms control challenges; and, perhaps, institutional coyness about grasping the nettle of the US missile defence programme including its arms control implications. By the early years of the 21st century, NATO's work in this area was focussed largely on self-defence and 'counter-proliferation' measures. The European Union's decision to establish its own military capacity for crisis management can be seen as part of the same broad trend.
- 5 The 'post-modern'-'pre-modern' terminology was first introduced by Jürgen Habermas but is here based on arguments developed by Robert Cooper in: 2003. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Atlantic Books. October.
- 6 For the 'rich man's agenda' argument, see chapters in the final section of Alyson Bailes and Isabel Frommelt, eds. 2004. *Business and Security: Public-Private Relationships in a New Security Environment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI. May; and Armativ Mallik. 2004. *Technology and Security in the Twenty-first Century: A Demand-side Perspective*. SIPRI Research Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI. Summer.
- 7 According to the European analysis, the United States would be classed as a 'modern' rather than 'post-modern' actor.
- 8 Even some of the more controversial novelties of this approach, like the notion of 'pre-emption' developed in the United States' National Security Strategy published in 2002 and the doctrine that 'the mission makes the coalition', were coloured by earlier experiences like US frustration with 'management by committee' during NATO's Kosovo campaign.
- 9 Current attitudes to enforcement could also be seen as a sub-set of Western double standards, since some advanced powers (notably the United States) have held out against monitoring provisions which would have an intrusive effect on their own territory. The element of verification was weakened in the latest US-Russian Strategic Arms Treaty (SORT).
- 10 Technology transfer issues are picked up in more detail in the final section below.
- 11 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) was the label adopted for (initially) US national programmes to assist Russia in safely disposing of WMD capacities left over from the Cold War. The activities are now being pursued under a wider 'Global Partnership' initiated at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit. See: Ian Anthony. 2004. *Reducing Threats at the Source: A European Perspective on Cooperative Threat Reduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI. March.
- 12 Similarly, current discussions on a new regional security order for the 'greater Middle East' have been led by 'new threat'-related and Iraq-related thinking, and/or have focused on promoting national reforms, rather than looking at the region's overall military balance and strategic dynamics.
- 13 Russia, China, and four Central Asian states have adopted measures of this kind in the framework of (what is now) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. See the chapter by Dimitri Trofimov in: SIPRI. 2003. *Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia*. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 3. July. Available at [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org).
- 14 In the form of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee set up in early 2002. See the chapter by Thomas Biersteker in: Bailes and Frommelt, eds. *Business and Security* (see Note 6 above).
- 15 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted on 28 April.
- 16 The International Code of Conduct (now known as the Hague Code of Conduct) negotiated in 2002 attracted a membership wider than that of the classic export control regime MTCR—though still not fully representative, or global. See the chapter by Christer Ahlström in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

# Reflections on the ‘Decade of Disarmament’ 1986–1999

*Edward J. Laurance*

## **Introduction**

Since the late 1980s, much has changed in the way that the international community deals with the negative effects of military weapons—their manufacture, proliferation and misuse. A disarmament professional who had been disconnected from the world since 1986 would hardly recognize the current disarmament landscape. While some issues remain salient and are addressed through fora established in the Cold War period (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation), a host of new global problems and policies have emerged since the last major arms control and disarmament treaty of the 1980s, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, was signed in 1990. In addition, the modalities of dealing with weapons problems through disarmament have also changed.

## **Key factors shaping disarmament action in the 1990s**

There are at least four major global strategic shifts which have had an impact on the use of disarmament to prevent and reduce conflict, as well as laying the groundwork for economic, political and social development.

The *first* of these factors is the end of the Cold War, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as the sole superpower in military and economic terms. Many of the regional and local conflicts controlled and dampened by the two superpowers are now coming out into the open, creating new disarmament challenges.

A *second* key causal factor which affected the disarmament agenda was the Iraqi arms buildup of the late 1980s, the subsequent Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, which then led to the Gulf War

and the surrender of Iraq, and subsequent agreements which led to a new and intrusive disarmament approach. The development and activities of the UN Special Commission prompted a global review and discussion of disarmament as a tool in curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them.

A *third* factor which shaped disarmament developments was the increase of truly global problems and illicit trafficking networks, challenges which increasingly required global solutions. These problems drew increasing attention to the need for global cooperation as well as the rise of the humanitarian element, the negative effects of such weapons as antipersonnel landmines (APL), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and the explosive remnants of war (ERW).

*Fourth*, this period saw a decline in major interstate armed conflicts and a rise in intrastate conflict. This resulted in an increase in UN peacekeeping operations, greater impact on innocent civilians, greater visibility of these civilian casualties (television, internet), and the rise of non-state actors. All of this resulted in a subtle shift from dealing exclusively with state security to the much more difficult challenge of human security.

## **Trends and lessons learned**

A review of disarmament from the late 1980s through the 1990s produces a set of trends and lessons learned which can be used in thinking through the way forward.

## **New approaches to norm-building, verification and compliance**

The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990 by the two groups of states which faced each other during the Cold War—NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in 1993, was also viewed as a triumph for traditional disarmament, in that it too has a destruction component as well as a verification and inspection regime. The failure of the CD to agree on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1993 resulted in it shifting to the UN General Assembly. This enabled it to get started sooner but also meant that states supporting the CTBT had to engage in normal diplomatic action to convince the non-ratifying states to do so. It is not yet in force, due to the lack of ratifications.

This seems to be a trend that has emerged as the 1990s developed. The APL Convention (Ottawa Treaty) would have been a non-starter had it contained a verification and inspection regime. The opposition of the United States to a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is further evidence of this trend. Approaches to verification and compliance with disarmament and arms control norms have become less formal and more subject to *ad hoc* approaches.

## **The demise of the state was premature**

Despite the rise of global governance, with a wider range of actors involved in the making and implementation of global policy, it is national governments which remain critical to disarmament action. As the 1990s developed, it became fashionable to speak of new forms of global governance, which featured actors in addition to the state setting agendas and norms, participating in monitoring compliance with norms,



etc. As this period ended, however, a fair assessment shows that the state remains the most critical actor.

***Intrusive disarmament is difficult and incentives still matter***

In the wake of the defeat of Iraq in 1991 and the creation of UNSCOM, supporters of intrusive disarmament championed this new approach. Very quickly such talk diminished in the face of the reality which emerged on the ground in Iraq. Cooperation is still the key element to disarmament. At the other end of the weapons spectrum, peacekeepers and military forces faced with reducing armed violence found that the disarmament of threatening forces can only be accomplished by developing approaches whereby the armed combatants agree to disarm.

Throughout this period there was evidence that both positive and negative incentives for states to comply with disarmament goals can be useful. After several years of threats and negative incentives, positive incentives in the form of financial assistance were used to convince the Ukrainian government to turn over these weapons and they then joined the NPT. South Africa, in anticipation of political and economic rewards from the international community, dismantled its nuclear program. After many years of economic and political isolation under embargoes, Libya decided to give up all of its WMDs. In the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), positive incentives were used to defuse the 1994 crisis but it has now rejected such an approach and the US and its major Asian allies are struggling to determine which kind of incentives will succeed in getting the DPRK to disarm.

***The tools of violence are as important as the root causes of violence***

As indicated above, it is no longer in doubt that disarmament as a means of lowering the threat is a mainstream approach to preventing and reducing arms conflict. This has always been the

case for nuclear nonproliferation, but it accelerated in the 1990s with the rise of non-state actors and the specter that terrorists would acquire and use WMD. Additional evidence comes from the efforts to deal with the negative effects of the excessive availability, proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) which began in 1994. Successful agreement on a Programme of Action at the 2001 UN Conference on SALW is based on the premise that the tools of violence must be addressed.

***Destruction of weapons is important***

The actual destruction of weapons on a grand scale was a new development in the 1990s. Missile and WMD destruction in Iraq have proven to be a crippling blow to Iraq's military capacity. It also sent the message that despite the billions of dollars spent on producing and acquiring weapons which are still useful militarily, there is a political gain which outweighs economics. This is also true for the WMDs destroyed by South Africa, Libya, and Russia. As a result of the CFE Treaty, more than 55,000 tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, helicopters and aircraft were destroyed, publicly, and in one case filmed for a widely acclaimed UN video. In the case of SALW, after initial reluctance, public destruction has become the norm.

***Disarmament does not always mean destruction***

This period also witnessed the recognition that, while the destruction of weapons and their support systems is a valued final goal, there are many disarmament actions that can be useful prior to this last step. For example, the temporary storage of weapons, monitored by neutral personnel, has become a common approach, even during conflict. It has been used in the case of IRA stockpiles, DPRK fuel rods, and in peacekeeping operations where one or both parties to a conflict wish to turn in weapons in stages and reserve destruction as the symbol of a completed transition from war to peace

(e.g., El Salvador). The lesson learned here is that people, organizations and states acquire weapons for a reason, and these rationales must be an integral part of the disarmament process.

The objectives of disarmament must cover a wide range of outcomes beyond simply lowering the number of arms possessed by persons and groups participating in the violence. In many cases reducing the visibility of arms can contribute significantly to bringing stability to a local situation which will enhance other conflict resolution initiatives. Even temporary possession by a neutral party can have positive effects.

Understanding the process by which weapons are developed and get into the hands of those who would misuse them is also necessary in order to develop effective disarmament actions.

***The unfulfilled promise of transparency***

In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the major arms suppliers (the P5 in this case) could not avoid taking some of the blame for this aggressive act by Iraq and searched for a way to control an arms trade clearly responsible for Iraq's arms buildup. What emerged was an innovative approach, transparency in armaments, in the form of the 1991 UN Register of Conventional Arms. The Register was based on the theory (using Iraq as the major historical case) that if only states would make their arms transfers public, excessive and destabilizing arms buildups could be detected and (unspecified) action taken to prevent such a buildup. While voluntary submissions by states to the UN Register are now seen as normal and routine, the Register has not fulfilled its promise as an instrument that would prevent such buildups. Many states are reluctant to participate fully because they believe that transparency runs counter to the most effective means of defending their countries, secrecy.



What did evolve was the Wassenaar Arrangement, a suppliers' club of 33 arms-supplying states who meet to discuss proposed arms exports to determine if they are excessive and destabilizing. In both the Wassenaar Arrangement and the OSCE, member states have become transparent when it comes to sharing data on arms transfers, military holdings, etc. It is just that this transparency is not the same as public information, which would then invite civil society and other participants to participate in shaping arms transfer policy. Most national governments are not prepared to do this.

#### ***Human security—enter 'putting people first'***

One of the major disarmament developments of the 1990s was the introduction of humanitarian concerns into disarmament work. The first place that this appeared was with antipersonnel land mines, which were identified as inhumane as they continued to kill and maim innocent people long after conflicts had ended. The current disarmament efforts regarding Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) by the States Parties of the CCW Treaty is a continuation of this phenomenon. In 2001, it was the humanitarian impact of SALW which led the states of the UN to agree to a Programme of Action (PoA) to reduce and prevent the negative effects of SALW.

The humanitarian impact of weapons of mass destruction was established years ago, coinciding with the development of these weapons themselves. The 1990s saw these norms both challenged and reinforced. But absent the nuclear saber-rattling of the Cold War, these events in themselves did not threaten to undo the regime and its norms. A deal was reached with DPRK, UNSCOM went about disarming Iraq, the standoff between India and Pakistan was defused, etc. The specter of mass destruction remained

generally as it had been, perhaps even less now that the US and Russia were cooperating in dismantling nuclear weapons and retraining nuclear scientists.

What really changed the WMD landscape was the rise of non-state actors and the growing threat that these groups (e.g., terrorists) could acquire or manufacture WMDs. Most of the international public felt that in the end *governments* would not use these WMDs in anger and those that would were being dealt with. However terrorists were another matter.

It should be noted, however, that no such (humanitarian) rationale exists for major conventional weapons. The UN Register of 1991 was *not* related to human security, but rather the excessive and destabilizing accumulations by *states*. Evidence of the importance of the human security factor is the recent activity by states in several multilateral fora to control the manufacture and transfer of man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADS). This highly sophisticated weapon, designed for military forces and state security, can shoot down a civilian airliner and instantly create 300 innocent civilian deaths, a clear human security threat.

#### ***Some of the Cold War-era disarmament machinery is not working***

Given the above realities, some of the disarmament machinery designed to deal with these problems is not working. The most obvious case is the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. The members of the CD, operating on a consensus basis, have been unable to agree on a program of work for seven years. The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), with all states as members, last year could not agree on an agenda. Since 11 September 2001, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly has begun to drift back to the previous era of resolutions designed for political purposes, not for the purpose of moving toward disarmament actions which will have an impact.

## ***Looking ahead***

This brief review of disarmament action since the late 1980s has highlighted some of the lessons learned and trends which should shape future action on disarmament. One obviously important factor in how the world will deal with disarmament is the role of the United States. The recent policy orientation of disdain for multilateral approaches to arms control and disarmament may, for a variety of reasons, begin to shift back in the direction of multilateralism as the US recognizes the need for more genuine partners and a collaborative approach. The reality is that these multilateral regimes continue to provide the framework for all parties to address the issue, including the United States. The recent US promotion of multilateral approaches to the MANPADS threat is a good example. Much will depend on the outcome in Iraq and the US presidential election in November 2004.

There will be other challenges to disarmament work in the future. Much of the disarmament action continues to be discriminatory, with northern and industrialized states still controlling the disarmament agenda. This is especially true in addressing the problems stemming from the uncontrolled trade in conventional arms. The fact that the five original nuclear powers are slow to disarm is always a factor in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.

However, many of the lessons learned and trends outlined in this paper are being acted upon. The UN is addressing the problem of its disarmament machinery. Governments are beginning to take a more multidimensional approach to disarmament. Organizations such as BICC and the Small Arms Survey are leading the way in this regard. The full range of actors are now being integrated into disarmament work.

# In Defense of Conversion Studies

*Ksenia Gonchar*

Not once in the last decade has concern been raised about whether conversion research, debate and policy designs have produced sensible results. The grounds for criticism have arisen mostly from the critical mass of failures which emerged in the practical implementation of the conversion agenda in transition economies. Empirical and theoretical support for the claims that the conversion effort would result in a peace dividend, reduced poverty and economic growth in the sectors where civilian production replaced military production has been criticized as weak, exaggerated and utopian.

The conversion concept had a powerful influence on policy advice and action in post-Cold War Russia, especially during the later Gorbachev administration. The subject was enthusiastically discussed at meetings of experts, taught at universities, and guided policy programs. The failures and disappointments of initial efforts (especially of balancing both security and economic considerations) caused a departure from the enthusiasm and strong commitment to conversion of the late 1980s. Conversion of the defense industry and the armed forces has been removed from the central priorities of high politics, research programs have been abandoned, and the topic marginalized.

My argument, summarized in these notes, is, however, that abandoning the conversion role model would at least appear premature. Not only because it has a role to play in tackling the underlying causes of modern threats to security, which are real economic and political problems. There is reason to believe that the decade of the conversion debate has generated a useful set of ideas, concepts, networks, patterns of successful behavior, on which it is possible to build.

Criticism of conversion does indeed have convincing points. Summarizing them, several weaknesses should be particularly stressed:

- The dominant and mostly public perceptions of early stage conversion studies—the peace dividend, the trade-off between defense and government social spending, alternative job creation—were based on arguments which were too straightforward and significantly simplified the field at a time when it was imaginary. The challenges of reality when defense budgets were really reduced and the forces demobilized conflicted strongly with the expectations and caused a lot of frustration. The available perceptions failed to produce answers to acute problems, such as surplus weapons and military waste-management, barriers to entry onto the civilian markets, gaps in productivity or production factors in the defense and civilian social worlds, etc. It was no surprise therefore that many policy proposals reflected wishful thinking. They have either remained on paper or, in the worst case, have claimed additional resources, further wasted.
- The fundamentals of conversion literature used to be based on a strong moral imperative, which affected conclusions and policy advice beyond the findings of quantitative, historical and empirical research. The notion that militarization is ‘bad’ and conversion ‘good’ from a moral standpoint discredited the conversion model in struggling societies no less than failures. Links to ideological and other social variables also resulted in misleading impressions: experts have often been too fast to explain adaptation difficulties by the inadequacy of ‘red directors’.

- Conversion literature endeavored to link high defense spending with social and economic degradation. Empirical evidence, however, did not prove the link. Thus the Russian cases of regional conversion studies showed that heavily defense-dependent cities in the country’s industrial heartland appeared to perform much better in transition reforms than the regions that did not host the defense industry. Accumulated industrial and human resources outweighed the negative externalities of militarization.
- Conversion research also suffered from generality, and claims and conclusions obvious to everyone, while empirical studies with all the paradoxes of real life stories were largely neglected. Quantitative conversion studies, though, succeeded better than descriptive and general studies and confirmed difficulties in selecting a precise mix of variables that affected GDP dynamics, labor market and standard trends.
- The economics of conversion often came dangerously close to politics, and the corresponding argumentation fell victim to immediate political interests. In the countries involved in wars, this problem is particularly thin-skinned: innocent studies may be accused of lack of patriotism, playing on the wrong side, or collecting sensitive information.

However, in spite of the above mentioned problems (and due to learning from the lessons they have taught), the incorporation of conversion studies into the modern security and economic analysis appears to be more than sensible, and efforts to revitalize conversion research deserve encouragement. It might be useful to take a step back and look at the contributions which the conversion studies made.

*First*, they made pioneering contributions to understanding defense economics and the institutions of the armed forces. They helped to destroy the myths and stereotypes, imposed by military insiders, and to make defense economics researchable and debatable, and data much more transparent and accessible to independent non-military experts. Work on conversion contributed to a broader debate about the social and political effects of militarization and brought new stakeholders into the debate on defense economics. The studies showed that the demilitarization process is much more complicated than a structural reaction to the defense build-down: it raises the problems of cultural gaps and radical changes in organization; it teaches a lesson that no conversion strategy can be perfect, and shows the crucial importance of accountability.

*Second*, conversion studies played a part in security research and policy. Detailed studies of the way the defense industry and armies reacted to the alarm signal—spending cuts and reductions in the hierarchy of political elites—added a lot to our understanding of the changed requirements of security, the vulnerability of traditional (pre-modern, as Alyson Bailes put it) attitudes to military security and the military instruments of conflict resolution.

*Third*, important gains were obtained in initiating interagency, international and state-industry dialogue and a sense of shared values and a shared fate emerged. In this context, the conversion debate had a positive impact on military and defense-industrial communities; it made them talk to and learn from outsiders. Conversion conferences that brought together the military, industrialists, academics—people who could never meet together before—strengthened this dialogue. This in turn contributed to the creation of cooperative practices and institutions with the potential to influence security and peace. In addition,

a new information and communication system was created between governmental and non-state actors (defense ministry and universities, for example).

*Fourth*, conversion research underlined the remarkable capabilities of communities to adjust and solve demilitarization problems much better than the central governments did. Thus it may be suggested that communities, especially networked communities, can demonstrate efficiency in the 'post-modern' security domain.

In conclusion, it should be noted that efforts to abandon conversion research and policy would hardly be successful. Research into conversion and related policies has the potential to enrich the understanding of the nature of contemporary security threats and to help find solutions, building on achievements and learning from failures.

# A Short Review of 10 Years of Redesignation of Military Installations in Brandenburg

*Reinhard Weise*

## *Introduction*

After focusing on the worldwide problem of disarmament, arms control and conversion, I would like to draw your attention to the more practical aspect of conversion and redesignation in a part of Germany, in the *Land* of Brandenburg. To give you an idea of where it is—it is the region surrounding the German capital, Berlin.

The long decade of disarmament has not yet been completed in the *Land* of Brandenburg due to the fact that Brandenburg was only recreated in October 1990. But the *Land* of Brandenburg has already gained a lot of experience within the framework of conversion, mainly in the field of the conversion of military objects—because there are definitely enough of them in that region.

The *Land* of Brandenburg is not a very big one—but round about half of all Russian military objects in Germany were located here up to the time that the Berlin Wall came down in 1998, which means the end of the Cold War-period in Germany. These objects, in addition to those the East German Army had used, cover about 8% of Brandenburg's territory.

Allow me to give you first an idea of what the most important period of disarmament in Brandenburg looks like since it started in 1994.

Two years before, the Russian Army had left Germany taking with them almost all weapons and missiles. One year later, the Federal Government offered all the Russian military installations located in

East Germany to the respective *Länder*. It took another year for the Brandenburg Government to contemplate this offer. In 1994, the parliament of Brandenburg decided to accept the offer to take charge of the military installations on its own territory.

In this context the members of parliament took three decisions:

- *First:* Not to burden the administration of Brandenburg with the problem of managing the installations.
- *Second:* Not to burden the government's budget, that is to say: no money was allocated for the solution of conversion problems.
- *Third:* Not to keep the territories under the ownership of the *Land*, but to sell them to third parties for civilian purposes on the real estate market.

## *Insight into the practical work*

Now I would like to say a few words about those who are responsible for the practical work of conversion in the *Land* of Brandenburg, and where the money for the funding of this process is coming from.

To do the job of redesignating military objects, the *Land* of Brandenburg founded a subsidiary company as a company with limited liability in order to be able to compete and be

competitive on the difficult real estate market. The reason for that decision was: no one can survive on the real estate market for such military territories without having the possibility of operating flexibly, quickly and unbureaucratically as only a private company can do.

As you may well imagine, bringing these military objects back to civilian use confronts you with the problem that you cannot achieve a profit in every case. In such cases, your main principle should be to recover the running costs of managing the military objects.

To achieve positive results you need a team of enthusiastic people from different professional backgrounds who know not only the real estate market, but also the military installations on these territories. For these reasons we employ real estate agents, architects, lawyers, geologists, chemists, engineers and munitions specialists, etc. In this way we reintegrated demobilized military staff as experts for 'demunition', for decontamination and for demolition.

Our general objective is to redesignate and transform the military objects for safe civilian use as soon as possible and with as little cost involved as possible.

Now I would like to say a few words about financing this process without financial support from the government.

As all great things, it sounds very simple: The funds needed to implement the process of conversion come from the process itself.



The main source of income comes as a yield from selling the objects, the barracks, exercise grounds, radar stations, residential areas, sports fields, forests and shelters and developed real estate for different uses.

Additional money comes in from renting it out to tenants, renting it out to film companies (parts of the films “Stalingrad” or “The Pianist” were shot on former military grounds), renting it out to music-video companies that love our bizarre scenery, and, last but not least, smaller amounts of money come in from the selling of scrap-metal (sometimes an old tank or parts of an airplane), or sales of bricks and cobblestones from barracks that were pulled down, and whatever may be needed by the public.

And of course, we also apply for grant money wherever we can, for instance from EU programs such as PERIFRA, KONVER or EFRE, from private sponsoring or from programs of the federal government.

### *Lessons to be learnt*

Ten years of experience in the field of the conversion of military installations have led us to the following conclusions:

1. You need money for the conversion process—but it is not good to have too much money for it. The temptation to waste money is very low with the financing system we have adopted. The Brandenburg conversion funding system forces us every day to think about the best way to fulfil the scheduled goals with the lowest possible expenditure.
2. Selling military objects as they are brings less money than developed ones do. But we stop the development from the moment we find a private investor who is happy with that stage of development and

can pursue his own targets on this basis. This means we only invest in the conversion process up to the point where private investors find it attractive to continue the process. We do not picture ourselves as a professional development company and do not compete with other private development companies. Our only intention is to get the process of redesignation going.

3. We introduced a portfolio-management system some years ago to define the different strategies for the different objects. Strategies on which military real estate should be sold as it is and other strategies on which real estate should be developed.
4. We found out that chasing quick results may turn out to be very expensive. The problem is that politicians at governmental as well as at local levels always want to get quick results. Apart from the pressure the politicians exert, it is necessary to take your time to find the best strategies for the main problems such as decontamination, ‘demunition’ and demolition because this helps to economize on expenditure.
5. A company or an organization or an administration which is responsible for the conversion process in a region or in a country should be a kind of coach to harmonize the conflicting interests among local authorities, government interests, environmental necessities, financial possibilities, the hopes of the local residents and investors’ demands. Otherwise the various different players can block the whole process of conversion or part of it over a longer period.
6. There is a drop of bitterness in the result of 10 years of practical experience in this field. Unfortunately it will not be possible to redesignate and transform *all* of the former military installations at reasonable cost and over an acceptable period of time. We have to face the fact that even in the middle of Europe some

of these military installations were so contaminated or full of munitions or of such solid construction that they cannot be redesignated to civilian use. These tasks will have to be left to the next generations.

I am convinced that the process of disarmament and détente within Europe will continue. So coming to the end of my short paper, I hope our experience can be useful to other small states dealing with military installations. We would be happy to assist with our know-how and give advice to others.





# 3 Group B Human Security: More than Just a Good Idea?

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

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For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

## ***Discussion Group B*** ***Human Security: More than Just a Good Idea?***

### ***Rationale, questions and participants***

Despite conceptual weaknesses and the different ways it can be interpreted, the concept of 'human security' has gained some prominence in political debate over the last ten years. The work of BICC, too, is increasingly seeking to approach conversion issues from the new perspective of 'human security'. However, as yet, the definitional scope of the term remains anything but straightforward. For example, viewpoints differ on whether the term should refer to a more comprehensive state of individual security, as in 'freedom from want', or whether it should simply confine itself to describing a more narrow state of 'freedom from fear'. In this sense, the conference session aimed at removing some of the conceptual confusion from the notion 'human security' and sought to develop instead a more practically orientated working definition, particularly with regard to BICC's field of work in conversion and post-conflict reconstruction.

Discussion Group B was chaired by *Reinhard Helmke*, former Assistant Secretary General at the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The panel, which comprised experts from both the academic as well as the more policy-orientated field, touched on a range of important questions including the following:

- How might 'human security' be defined in a useful way?
- In which way could such a definition be utilized for the sake of pursuing concrete political objectives, especially in the area of development?
- How can it be linked to more traditional notions of state and regional security, thereby contributing to the promotion of an integrated concept of security?

*Keith Krause* undertook the Introductory Statement. He is Programme Director of the Small Arms Survey (SAS), a partner organization of BICC, based at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. Comments were received from *Andrew Mack* of the Centre for Human Security at the University of British Columbia, a long-term partner of BICC; and from Ambassador *Theodor Winkler*, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and member of BICC's International Advisory Board. BICC has jointly cooperated in numerous projects with DCAF. Comments were also provided by *Tobias Debiel* of the Center for Development Research in Bonn (ZEF), another of BICC's strategic partners.

# Is Human Security “More than Just a Good Idea”?

*Keith Krause*

## *Introduction*

Thank you for the invitation to speak to this group today about a theme that is close to my practical and academic interests. Before I begin, I want to also say publicly how pleased I am to be here at the celebration of BICC’s 10th anniversary. I participated in the 5th anniversary event, and am pleased to have collaborated with BICC on several common projects since then, and to have benefited from the research and publications of BICC on an ongoing basis.

My engagement with the concept of human security is both practical and academic. Our work at the Small Arms Survey, and with the Swiss and other governments within the Human Security Network, has led me and our team to think hard about the practical meaning of human security. From a scholarly perspective, I have worked for almost a decade now on the changing nature of security in contemporary world politics. As a result, I have a particular perspective on what human security *means*, how it should be put into *practice*, and how it is—or should be—linked to other ideas such as human development and national security.

I am going to answer the question of this session—“Is human security more than just a good idea?”—in the affirmative, and I am going to make the even stronger claim that it is an ‘idea whose time has come’. But let me first start with a story that will help set the stage for our reflections.

In 1945, in the US Senate hearings on the post-World War II American defense policy and military structure, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal invoked the idea of ‘national security’ as a guiding principle for US policy. It was

a ‘new’ idea—you literally cannot find the term being used before that time. Senator Arthur Vandenberg—a very influential foreign policy advocate—replied, very simply, “I like your words ‘national security’.” And before long, the phrase, rich in both meaning and symbolism, became common currency around the world.

As Daniel Yergin<sup>1</sup> has noted, “At certain moments, unfamiliar phrases suddenly become common articles of political discourse, and the concepts they represent become so embedded in the national consciousness that they seem always to have been with us. So it was for the phrase ‘national security’ in 1945 . . . its sudden popularity resulted from the fact that it encapsulated an outlook on the world, a mentality”. We have to remember that before the Cold War, “the term ‘national security’ was not common in American political discourse” (or in that of any other state). It was invented, popularized, and used for particular purposes.

I think the concept of ‘human security’ is entering our common international discourse in much the same way. Like all concepts of security, its meaning is constructed through the various efforts of institutions and individuals, and in today’s world, it is a very powerful concept around which practical policies and concrete initiatives can be developed and promoted.

In the rest of my presentation, I want to explore the strengths, and some of the weaknesses, of this concept. I will talk first about the genesis of the concept ‘human security’, and then about the two different visions of human security that are in circulation. I will say a few words about how human security relates to the concepts of human development and state security, and then try—in a very general way—to situate the concept more broadly within ideas about how states should relate to

their citizens. Overall, I want to convince you that it matters if states and decisions-makers use different concepts of security: the promotion of human security is not just a ‘conceptual’ or ‘theoretical’ issue; it leads states and policymakers to focus on different issues, to ask different questions, and even to promote different policies. And this is a good thing.

## *The origins of ‘human security’*

The most striking thing about the concept of human security is that it was born in the ‘policy world’, and did not spring forth from academics or analysts. It was first used in a serious way in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report—and I believe Herbert Wulf, the founding director of the BICC, was a contributor to this report.

The UNDP vision of ‘human security’ was very broad: it encompassed seven different dimensions, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The overall goal was to expand the concept of security, which had “for too long been interpreted narrowly, as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust”. Human security was thus meant to change the referent object of security “from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security”.<sup>2</sup>

The political strategy was twofold: First, and very practically, the idea was that putting an emphasis on human security would make it possible to capture the ‘peace dividend’ and to ensure that the resources devoted to the military



through the Cold War were directed towards more productive ends. The direct aim of the 1994 Human Development Report was to influence the outcome of the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit. So, right from the beginning, the idea of human security was a practical one with clear strategic goals.

Second, and also on the practical level, a focus on human security meant—in the words of one advocate—“putting people first”. It meant adopting a bottom-up, local or grassroots approach to security that focused on the relationship between states and their citizens, and that moved away from equating the security of a state or regime with the economic, political and social well-being of the citizens. In most parts of the world, the state or regime was secured at the expense of the needs of its citizens—or worse: the state itself posed the threat to human security.

Throughout the late 1990s, the concept of human security was used by a vast array of non-governmental or international organizations, including Oxfam, the UN High Commission on Refugees, the Academic Council on the UN System, the UN University, the Arias Foundation, the Center for Defence Information, the Worldwatch Institute, the Commission on Global Governance, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the International Action Network on Small Arms, Pax Christi, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the “People’s Summit Conference” (Halifax, June 1995), Saferworld, BICC, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and so on.

Of course, these groups were attracted to the idea because it was a nice slogan. But there was more to it than that: human security was a lens, a way of describing or framing what they were doing that allowed a number of disparate policy initiatives to be linked, and to be given greater coherence.

The other important initiative to use the language of human security was the Human Security Network, created in 1999—a loose grouping of states led initially by Canada, Norway and Switzerland, but that includes Chile, Jordan, Austria, Mali, Greece, Thailand, South Africa, the Netherlands and several others, who had as a goal pursuing common policies on human security in a variety of international and regional institutions. They meet annually at the ministerial level, and throughout the year pursue their initiatives in a variety of formal and informal ways, as a forum for the coordination and shaping of the international security agenda.

### *Two visions of human security*

There were, however, two competing visions of human security that emerged out of these various initiatives. The first, broad, vision was closely linked to the original UNDP formulation, and could be summarized by the phrase “freedom from want”—human security was about ensuring basic human needs in economic, health, food, social, and environmental terms. It was also reflected in the more recent 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security,<sup>3</sup> which focused not just on situations of conflict, but also on issues of fair trade, access to health care, patent rights, access to education and basic freedoms.

The second, more tightly focused, vision was linked more closely to the activities of the Human Security Network, and its key slogan was “freedom from fear”—human security was about removing the use of, or threat of, force and violence from people’s everyday lives.

My own position on this is clear: human security ought to be about “freedom from fear,” and not about this broad vision of “freedom from want”, for two reasons. The first reason is a negative one: the broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves

slapping the label of human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link, and at a certain point, human security becomes a loose synonym for “bad things that can happen”. At this point, it loses all utility to policymakers—and incidentally to analysts—since it does not allow us to see what is distinctive about the idea of ‘security’, and how it is inextricably tied up with conflict and existential threats, and the use of violence. Perhaps even more important, it is not clear to me that anything is gained by slapping the label “human security” on issues such as the right to education, fair trade practices, or public health challenges. Does it change our understanding of the right to basic education when we describe illiteracy as a threat to human security? Does it facilitate more effective action? Does it help us solve problems? Or does it actually lead us down the wrong path in some cases, to treating certain problems, such as migration or HIV/AIDS, as threats to “our own” security, building walls between people where we should be building bridges?

On the other hand, if we keep human security focused on “freedom from fear”—from the threat or use of violence, we can link it to a powerful and coherent practical and intellectual agenda. Let me elaborate.

The question of controlling the institutions of organized violence and evacuating force from political, economic and social life, has been central to the whole modern understanding of politics and the struggle to establish legitimate and representative political institutions. It is part of Thomas Hobbes’ vision of the political leviathan—an institution created to bring us out of the situation of “war of each against all” into a civil state in which economic, social and political life could flourish. It is echoed in Max Weber’s definition of the state, as an organization that has the legal monopoly over the legitimate means of

violence. And it is tied up with the centuries-long struggle to eliminate the threat of force and violence from everyday human interactions.

### ***The practical agenda of human security***

When we move off the definitional heights and down to the ground of policymakers and activists, the idea of human security—at least in its narrow form of “freedom from fear”—gives rise to a concrete agenda for political action. It includes a range of issues—including many that the BICC has been working at the forefront of—such as:

- Eliminating the scourge of anti-personnel land-mines
- Stopping the use of child soldiers and implementing effective demobilization and reintegration programs for them
- Ending the tradition of impunity by promoting the work of the International Criminal Court
- Combating proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons
- Working towards security-sector reform, including not just the armed forces, but the police and criminal justice system
- Promoting good governance in the security sector.

This is a wide-ranging and ambitious agenda. It is *certainly not* the case that the wide conception of human security is ‘progressive’, and the narrow conception is somehow ‘conservative’. Both agendas contain a significant progressive element. We should also note that ten years ago it would have been nearly impossible to find a large-scale set of activities in any of these domains.

### ***How should we link human security to human development?***

No agenda for human security can be pursued in a vacuum, and it is crucial that we think clearly about how the two main pillars of contemporary multilateral action—those concerning security and development—interact and are linked. I think I could generalize, without being totally unfair, by saying that for almost four decades ideas about development and security were completely disconnected and were pursued in parallel institutional and political structures. The explanation for this lies deep in the Cold War, but the result was that development agencies and international financial institutions, at least until the early 1990s, excluded *national security* concerns from their mandates, because these were seen as touching upon issues of national sovereignty. Entire institutions were built up to promote both security, and development. People in GTZ—or the British, Canadian, Swiss, French, Dutch and other equivalent development agencies—hardly spoke to their counterparts in foreign and defense ministries, and the gap in institutional cultures is enormous.

In addition, I think it was widely believed in economic and development circles that development was a *precondition* for security, and that increased economic development would almost automatically reduce the incidence of conflict within, and potentially even between, states.

But on the ground, things were not so simple, because ideas of security and development cannot be so easily separated, and because the development-security link was not one-way.

Human or economic development by itself turned out not to be a recipe for eliminating or reducing conflict. For the international development community in the early 1990s, Rwanda was a success story—high levels of multilateral ODA,

rapid progress in a variety of economic and social indicators. But the 1994 genocide taught us that something was terribly, terribly wrong with this picture, and that a focus on economic development without attention to basic security concerns and needs, was likely to lead to waste, as waves of conflict wiped out whatever gains had been made in health care, education or infrastructure.

From the perspective of human security, you cannot achieve sustainable human development without human security—you cannot achieve ‘freedom from want’ without achieving ‘freedom from fear’. In some cases, we perhaps therefore need to pursue the ‘security first’ doctrine, and in all cases we need to recognize that we cannot advance far on promoting human development without attention to basic security needs.

### ***How should we link human security to state security?***

A lot of states, especially in the South, have regarded the concept of human security as a thin justification for a new form of interventionism, as a means of pitting citizens against their states. There is some truth to this, at least in the sense that the language of human security has been used to combat the culture of impunity and to strengthen civil society institutions and NGOs.

But I think we should not be too impressed by what state elites say about security, because one of the main sources of threat to people’s security around the world comes from the state—from corrupt police and judges, from violent and unruly gangs of ex-combatants, from predatory rulers who ignore basic rights and rule of law. As the ICISS put it, the international community may not have a right to intervene, but it should have a “responsibility to protect” the weak and vulnerable members of any community, especially from the threats of large-scale violence.<sup>4</sup>

Paradoxically, most of the issues on the agenda of human security actually involve strengthening the role and resources of the state. Most of the activities around security-sector governance, or around stemming the proliferation and misuse of small arms, and other such issues, focus on the national level, and involve working with state authorities. But the goal is of course to reshape the relationship between states and their citizens, and to make the legitimacy and sovereignty of states conditional on how they treat their citizens. In a sense, promoting human security is about making states and their rulers keep their side of the basic social contract: states are created (among other things) to provide security – in order that individuals can pursue their lives in peace. States have responsibility not just to provide for welfare, or representation, but—first and foremost—security of their citizens: the basic “compact” or contract that led us out of the Hobbesian anarchy.

## Conclusions

Let me by way of conclusion simply say that human security is “more than just a good idea”, but also an idea ‘whose time has come’. Promoting an agenda of human security—promoting “freedom from fear”—draws our attention to a number of essential challenges around the world. It goes well beyond the traditional conflict prevention or conflict resolution agenda, and leads us to ask some very basic questions about how to make people safe and secure in their daily lives—in their homes and streets, within their communities, and in their regions. It also shines a spotlight on the links between violence and insecurity and underdevelopment and poverty, and perhaps can help give new direction or energy to some parts of the development community.

For political actors and activists, “human security” is an excellent mobilizing slogan. It highlights and gives coherence to a set of policy issues that urgently need to be addressed,

including the problems of post-conflict reintegration, the situation of vulnerable groups in conflicts, the role of small arms and light weapons in both war and non-war situations, and the effective and legitimate operation of the institutions that we have built to provide security and safety in the modern state.

More than that, it provides an intellectually strong foundation for innovative and focused policy initiatives. The contemporary promotion of human security is the culmination of the liberal project of building strong, legitimate and representative political institutions. It has its roots in Enlightenment ideas of the importance of individual rights and personal freedoms. And if I can be so bold and optimistic, I would predict that if the 20th century can be characterized as the century of conflict, ideology and the “national security state”, perhaps the 21st will unfold under the sign of “human security”.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Daniel Yergin. 1978. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 195.
- <sup>2</sup> United Nations Development Programme. 1994. *Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 22 and 24.
- <sup>3</sup> Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, eds. 2003. *Human Security Now*. Report of the Human Security Commission. New York: United Nations. May.
- <sup>4</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*. Toronto, Canada. December.

# The Concept of Human Security

*Andrew Mack*

## **What does human security mean today?**

The term 'human security' first came to prominence with the publication of the 1994 UNDP *Human Development Report*. Like most attempts to conceptualise this somewhat elusive idea, the UNDP definition focused on a broad range of threats (economic, food, health, environmental, community and political) to *individuals*. Traditional security concepts, by contrast, focus on a narrow range of external (military) threats to the territorial and political integrity of *states*.

Canada (particularly under former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy) and Japan have promoted the idea of human security most vigorously, but the two governments conceive human security very differently.

Canada's conception focuses primarily on violent conflict and humanitarian issues. Human security "... is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives."<sup>1</sup>

Japan, on the other hand, stresses the importance of development issues and 'human dignity' and has been critical of Canada's approach to human security, which it sees as associated with humanitarian intervention.

The government of Japan sponsored the Human Security Commission, chaired by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata and Nobel Prize winner, Amartya Sen, which produced a major report in 2003. The Commission had no Canadian members.

Along with Norway, Canada was instrumental in helping create the 13-nation Human Security Network. Japan has declined offers to join the Network.

For many people, Astri Suhrke has noted, the attraction of human security is that the term "... evokes 'progressive values'".<sup>2</sup> To be concerned about human security is to be concerned about the threats to people posed by human rights abuses, poverty, hunger, environmental hazards and natural disasters as well as war. Proponents of human security believe in the interconnectedness of these various threats and are committed to a holistic approach in addressing them. They prefer non-violent prevention strategies such as 'peacemaking' and 'peacebuilding' over deterrence and the use of force. From this perspective, human security is less an analytic concept than a signifier of shared political and moral values.

All proponents of human security agree that the individual rather than the state should be the referent object of security. Despite this, consensus breaks down with respect to the nature of threats to the individual that should be addressed. Proponents of 'broad' conceptions of human security argue that these threats should include hunger, disease, pollution and other harms in addition to violence. Critics argue against such broad conceptions on both methodological and pragmatic grounds.

## **Human security and the academic security studies community**

Human security remains a contested concept, and one that has yet to make much impact on the discipline of international relations (IR), or the related field of security studies. The fact that little has been written on the subject by the mainstream international relations community or in security studies journals is a sign that the concept is still not yet taken seriously in these quarters. The few articles that have been published on the subject have tended to be critical.

It is unnecessary, however, to accept any current definition of human security in order to support what is perhaps the concept's single most important implicit challenge to contemporary academic security studies, namely the designation of the individual, rather than the state, as the referent object of security.

In the predominantly American academic security studies community, the state is still the referent object—that is, the entity to be 'secured'. Neo-realism, the dominant security studies paradigm, sees threats to security as emanating from the nature of an anarchic system of sovereign states. Anarchy condemns states to an unending—and destabilizing—struggle for power.

In the realist paradigm, citizens are the *ultimate* referent objects and the state is the necessary mechanism to ensure their security. However, while state security and citizens' security may be virtually synonymous in Western democracies and in the theoretical world of realism, in many parts of the real world states frequently constitute a major threat to the lives of their own citizens. Indeed, in the 20th century millions more people have been killed by their own governments than by foreign armies.<sup>3</sup>

While neo-realism's treatment of states as unitary actors may have some heuristic utility for understanding the causes of interstate war, it makes little sense in those cases, typical of many armed conflicts in the developing world, where the state itself has failed, or elements of it are fighting each other.

National security is about the protection of states; human security is about the protection of individuals. States *should be* the primary security providers for their citizens. Often, however, they fail in this task. Indeed, sometimes they violently persecute the very citizens they are required to protect. The *national* security paradigm, with its focus on



security from external threats, is of only limited relevance to the security of the individual—particularly in regard to civil wars, which now constitute more than 90% of all armed conflicts.

The mainstream security studies paradigm simply cannot deal with threats to individuals emanating from the state itself. On the other hand, where the individual is the referent object of security no assumptions regarding the role of the state are required—it may protect citizens or it may threaten them.

The fact that realism is a theory about competition *between* states has diverted the attention of the security studies community away from the overwhelming majority of contemporary wars—e.g. those that take place *within* states. Making the state the entity to be secured privileges national or regime security over the security of citizens.

It is true that there have been some attempts to take realist models, for example the security dilemma, and apply them to intrastate conflicts.<sup>4</sup> But the security dilemma model assumes anarchy, which in the case of intrastate conflict requires the collapse of the state. The security dilemma model does not—and cannot—explain state collapse. It may be able to explain some of the escalatory dynamics of armed conflict once a state has failed, but it cannot explain the root causes of that failure.

Realism's many critics assail it for a multitude of sins—from underestimating possibilities for cooperation in the international system to ignoring domestic determinants of foreign policy. What these critics have not done is to criticise realism for its failure to address the issue of civil war.

The neglect of civil war as a field of research within the security studies community is remarkable. In an influential, much-cited and wide-ranging

1991 review of security studies, Stephen Walt, a leading US-based realist scholar, identifies the study of war as central to the study of security, but then ignores completely a key threat to security—civil war. Despite the fact that even a decade ago intrastate wars comprised the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts, Walt's omission is not untypical.

While it is true that *some* scholars in the mainstream realist security studies community have examined the causes and conduct of civil wars, their work remains the exception rather than the rule. This was evident in a survey conducted by the author of all articles published in the 1990s in the two leading security studies journals, *International Security* and *Security Studies*. Although civil wars made up more than 90% of all armed conflicts fought in this period, intrastate war was the subject of less than 15% of all articles dealing with war in the two journals.

Governments—particularly those in OECD countries—also continue to conceptualize security in *national*, rather than *human*, terms. Defence planners in the major powers evaluate military procurements, the force structures and doctrines of potential state adversaries; they chart major weapons transfers between nations, and negotiate and verify compliance with interstate arms control treaties. The focus in all of these endeavours is on states not people.

The annual global reviews published by major international strategic studies institutions, such as the UK's International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), reflect the preoccupation of major states with *national* security and with interstate rather than intrastate conflict. The 2000 issue of IISS's prestigious *Strategic Survey*, for example, ignored African security issues completely, despite the fact that Africa is by far the most conflict-prone continent.

Even when traditional security studies institutions focus on intrastate conflicts in the developing world, they pay little attention to developmental and

governance problems that constitute the root causes of these conflicts. The burgeoning econometrics literature focusing on armed conflict remains largely ignored.

Today the most compelling contemporary research on civil wars is not produced by the mainstream realist security studies community, but by peace researchers,<sup>5</sup> students of comparative politics, area specialists, and economists who have not previously worked in this field. The latter include the researchers associated with the World Bank's innovative *Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence* project.<sup>6</sup>

### ***Making the individual the 'referent object' of security***

Proponents of human security take it as axiomatic that the individual should be the referent object of security, just as realists take it as axiomatic that the state is the entity to be protected. But—as the word suggests—this case is generally asserted rather than argued.

What then *is* the argument for making individuals rather than states the referent object of security?

First, the state-centric paradigm of traditional security studies simply cannot explain the civil wars that are now overwhelmingly the most prevalent form of armed conflict.

Second, privileging the state as the entity to be secured deflects attention from the fact that the pursuit of state security is too often at the expense of individual security.

Third, the idea of people-centric security has an important historical genesis. As the Canadian government has pointed out, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions have been core elements in the evolution of human security. Moreover, as Emma Rothschild



has noted, the historical antecedents of human security can be traced back much further and are associated with the centrality of the individual in the evolution of liberalism.<sup>7</sup>

Making the individual the referent object of security is not, however, uncontroversial. Within the UN, some states equate human security with attempts to impose what are seen as alien and inappropriate Western conceptions of human rights on the developing world—part of a ‘West against the rest’ syndrome which is in turn associated with the policy of humanitarian intervention. Asian states are also resistant to what is seen as an individualistic Western ethos underpinning much of the human security agenda.

Human security is also—correctly—seen as embodying moral values that can pose a fundamental challenge to the doctrine of state sovereignty. If the international community intervenes with military force to prevent a state from perpetrating genocide or other gross violations of human rights, it is effectively placing the protection of human beings above state sovereignty. Since the UN is an organization of states and not peoples, and since many of the states represented at the UN pose deadly threats to their citizens, the source of some of this opposition is as obvious as it is self-serving.

But many developing countries that do not repress their own citizens are also deeply troubled about the undermining of the principle of state sovereignty—a principle that is seen as providing a number of important protections, particularly for small and weak states. Many of these states have been victims of colonialism or other forms of intervention and remain understandably skeptical about the motives of would-be interventionists.

Making the individual the referent object of security also has critics in the academic community. Barry Buzan, for example, raises two objections. First, although he agrees that states may threaten the security of their citizens, he

also argues that they “are almost certainly a necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals.”<sup>8</sup>

Buzan’s objection betrays a marked lack of imagination. Governments are by no means the only possible protectors of people. In confronting violently repressive states, citizens can resort to a variety of defensive strategies. They can mobilize and mount armed or non-violent resistance. In the last 30 years the latter strategy has proven remarkably effective in overthrowing repressive authoritarian regimes around the world.

Where states perpetrate genocide or other forms of mass murder, or fail to stop it, the international community may intervene to protect the victims. This is Buzan’s second concern. Making individuals the referent object of security, he notes, can quickly lead “. . . to questions of human rights intervention, and risks generating major conflicts in places where human rights are not accepted as a universal value. . . . In this view the national security, state-centric position on security is the preferred one.”<sup>9</sup> This is an argument that both the Khmer Rouge and the genocideurs of Rwanda would have warmly endorsed. Buzan does not make clear why he appears to support it.

### ***What about the threat agenda?***

The forthcoming *Human Security Report*<sup>10</sup> adopts a narrowly focused definition of human security in which the threat is the relatively conventional one of political and criminal violence.

The *Report*’s editorial team accepts that ‘broad’ conceptions of human security point to threats to human welfare that impose far greater human costs than does violence. Political and criminal violence on average kill less than a million people a year according to the WHO; communicable diseases kill well in excess of 20 million.

Focusing on a broad range of threats may have some utility from the point of view of advocacy. Some advocates argue, for example, that since far more people are killed by disease than war, resources should be transferred from defence to health budgets.

But the analytic—as against advocacy—utility of the broad conceptions of human security is questionable. As Gary King and Christopher Murray, both proponents of a broad and development-oriented conception of human security, note, “. . . even some of the strongest proponents of human security recognize that it is at best poorly defined and unmeasured, and at worst a vague and logically inconsistent slogan.”<sup>11</sup>

One argument for broadening the concept of human security is that non-military threats to individuals—for instance epidemics or gross environmental degradation—can be ‘securitized’, i.e. given the status of ‘existential’ threats. When issues become ‘securitized,’ they move up the political agenda and increased resources are allocated to address them.

The attraction of ‘securitization’ is that it is a means of gaining political attention and material resources that might otherwise not be available.

But even if the argument that the broad security threat agenda holds political/advocacy benefits is accepted, these benefits may come at real analytic cost. Conflating a very broad range of disparate harms under the rubric of ‘insecurity’ is an exercise in re-labeling that serves no apparent analytic purpose. If the term ‘insecurity’ embraces almost all forms of harm—from affronts to dignity to genocide—its descriptive power becomes diffused. A concept that explains everything in reality explains nothing.

Moreover, in order to examine relationships between, for example, poverty and violence, each must be treated separately for the purposes of analysis. Any definition that conflates

dependent and independent variables renders causal analysis virtually impossible.

The fact that the *Human Security Report* takes violence as the key measure of human security does not mean that governance and development issues are unimportant. On the contrary, the causes of political and criminal violence are largely the result of the poor governance and lack of state capacity that are most prevalent in poor countries.

### **The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) human security threat agenda**

Because UNDP's conception of human security is so frequently cited in the literature, it is worth examining in more detail. The UNDP concept, which was first articulated in the 1994 *Human Development Report*, defines human security as a combination of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.

UNDP argued that human security has seven elements:

- Economic security: the threat is poverty
- Food security: the threat is hunger and famine
- Health security: the threat is injury and disease
- Environmental security: the threat is pollution, environmental degradation and resource depletion
- Personal security: the threat includes various forms of violence

■ Community security: the threat is to the integrity of cultures

■ Political security: the threat is political repression

Having introduced a new concept—'human security'—UNDP then effectively 'defined' it by introducing seven more. There is nothing inherently wrong with such a strategy provided that the relationship(s) between the elements are spelled out. However, UNDP failed to do this. It argued that threats to any one of the seven elements are likely to impact "like an angry typhoon" all other elements. This may or may not be the case. The important question, however, is *under what conditions* do—say—decreases in income ('economic insecurity') generate violent outbursts ('personal insecurity'). Nothing in the UNDP framework provides answers to such questions.

Nor is it clear what, in practice, the differences between 'human security' and 'human development' in UNDP's typology are. Poverty is defined as 'economic insecurity' and yet is also central to the definition of underdevelopment. UNDP attempts to distinguish between human development and human security by arguing that the former 'widens people's choices', while the latter is the ability to exercise those choices 'safely and freely'. It is difficult to comprehend how this distinction can be practically applied—and neither the Human Development Report nor any subsequent studies have attempted to do so.

UNDP was right to stress the interconnectedness between security, development and governance issues, but no major analytic empirical study has used UNDP's conceptual framework to actually study the war/development/governance nexus. It is not clear that this framework could be used for this purpose.

### **Notes**

- 1 Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 1999. *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*. Toronto, Canada. April.
- 2 Astri Suhrke. 1999. "Human Security and the Interests of States." *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 30, No. 3, September, p. 264.
- 3 Rudolf Rummel. Continuously updated. *Freedom, Democracy, Peace, Power, Democide and War*. Available at [www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/](http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/).
- 4 Barry Posen. 1973. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Politics." *Survival*, Vol. 25, No. 1; Barbara F. Walter and Jack Syner, eds. 1999. *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 5 The *Journal of Peace Research* and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* have published much of the work of researchers in this field.
- 6 See [www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/](http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/).
- 7 See: Emma Rothschild. 1995, "What is Security?" *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 3.
- 8 Barry Buzan. 2000. "Human Security in International Perspective." Paper presented at the 14th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, June, p. 8.
- 9 *Ibid.* p. 6.
- 10 Human Security Centre. 2004. *Human Security Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 11 Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray. 2001. "Rethinking Human Security." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 4, pp. 585–610.

# The Toolbox for Security

*Theodor H. Winkler*

The term 'human security' has been coined in opposition to the notion of 'state security'. It was a differentiation which appealed, above all, to the international development cooperation community, for which the term 'security' was—and still remains—an essentially dubious notion, much too close to the dreaded military. To break the term 'security' down to the level of the individual rendered it much more acceptable. The notion of 'human security' thus permitted the development cooperation community to finally face the reality that war, conflict, and their tragic legacy are some of the most fundamental obstacles to sustained development—and hence need not only to be addressed, but indeed to be integrated into any meaningful development cooperation strategy.

This was a major step forward—for without addressing the issue of security there cannot be any development, no rule of law, no democracy, and no peace.

In today's world, the risk of large-scale traditional inter-state war has dramatically receded. There are still regions where such conflict remains a possibility—such as South Asia, the Korean peninsula, perhaps the Straits of Taiwan—and there is the US willingness to use force at any level perceived to be necessary to combat terrorism. Yet these are the exceptions that confirm the rule. The overwhelming majority of conflicts today are civil wars and domestic unrest. At the same time, organised international crime has become a threat of strategic proportions, often blurring the borders between internal political strife and criminal violence. International terrorism, finally, has—with the attacks of 9/11 and Madrid—in turn become a challenge of strategic (and no longer only tactical or operational) dimensions.

As a result, human security has declined in the post-Cold War world. The number of people killed, maimed and

raped in conflicts remains intolerably high. Never before have there been so many refugees. Never before were there so many states faltering, if not collapsing. Never before were there so many mines, booby-traps and unexploded ordnance forming a ghastly legacy of war. The horrible spectre of genocide has come back. The dreadful word of ethnic cleansing has re-entered the political vocabulary. We are witnessing, in all too many parts of the world, not the end of history, but its return with a vengeance.

Very often, the security sector (i.e. the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, border guards, internal security forces of all kinds, intelligence agencies and other armed elements) does not form part of the solution to these problems, but part of the problem. There is the 'Milosevic' problem—a young and fragile democracy replacing a dictator and confronted with the issue of how to reform the security apparatus shaped by the latter. There is the problem of collapsed states, in which the only form of 'order' left are the criminal structures created by warlords. There are—in Colombia, in West Africa and elsewhere—warlords who have become entrepreneurs—selling human beings, weapons, drugs, blood diamonds, tropical woods and wild species, cigarettes and human organs. There are the death squadrons of Latin America and there are party militias challenging the state monopoly of legitimate force. There are, last but not least, a growing number of private military and security companies largely escaping any parliamentary and democratic control.

The distinction between state and human security becomes artificial in the post 9/11 world and in the face of problems such as those of West Africa, the Balkans or the Caucasus. It is hence becoming increasingly evident that the reform and the democratic control of the security sector must be understood as an intrinsic part of sustained development. Clare Short, the former British Cabinet Minister for

development cooperation, was right when she coined the term "security sector reform" as an important aspect of development policy. It is urgent that the development community at large—from national agencies to the World Bank—overcome the prejudices which still exist and integrate the security dimension into their work. It is no less urgent that political leaders recognise how crucial it is not only to 'win' wars, but to build peace. The reality of Baghdad was predictable. From Kosovo to Kabul—we are only at the beginning of understanding what it takes to master a post-conflict situation. We cannot permit things simply to drift, to create international protectorates deprived of political perspectives and a genuine vision for the future. The problems of regional security challenges and solutions are another area urgently needing more attention. And so is the need to equip ourselves with the toolbox needed to foster peace, security and stability in a sustained way.

It is against this background that the close partnership between the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has been forged. Both institutions are working closely together in order to find answers to the problems that bedevil us—answers both at the analytical level and on the ground. Much has already been achieved; much more still needs to be done. We at DCAF are, therefore, very pleased to have BICC as our partner in this important task. Together we just might make human life a little bit more secure.

# The Need for an Integrated Security Concept

*Tobias Debiel*

Security is one of the constitutive concepts of peace and security studies, one that has also been taken up and further developed by the field of development studies since the mid-1990s. Up to and far into the 1980s, security thinking both in the ‘strategic community’ and in the—once multilateralism-oriented—field of peace and security studies was dominated by a state-centered security concept focusing primarily on the external threats to national security posed by military factors. The end of the East-West conflict shifted the focus to multi-dimensional, often internally motivated conflict constellations, and the result was a broad consensus on the outdatedness of traditional security concepts. However, the new concepts of “extended”<sup>1</sup>, “comprehensive/global”<sup>2</sup>, or “human”<sup>3</sup> security often lacked analytical finesse, tending more to take cognizance of new threats, new scopes for external actors, and new security needs at the societal and individual level, and to append them to existing, traditional security concepts in an additive approach. This is a somewhat surprising development in view of the fact that in publications in the early 1990s by Buzan<sup>4</sup> and Wæver et al.<sup>5</sup> the authors opened up a convincing new approach to an altered concept of security. These studies widen the traditional state security approach by enlarging it to embrace the complementary concept of societal security.

## *The outdatedness of the traditional concept of state security*

The concept of security in international relations up to the end of the 1980s was in essence a product of the realist school. The concept was given its classic formulation in 1943 by Walter Lippman. According to Lippman<sup>6</sup>, a state is “secure to the extent to which it

is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.” Such “core values” include in particular a country’s territorial integrity, political independence, and its viability as well as its ability to safeguard the existence of its citizens. In the end, this state-centered security concept rests on two basic premises: first, that most threats come from the outside, and second, that these threats are primarily of a military nature, and thus, as a rule, call for a military response.<sup>7</sup>

The traditional notion of state security has two conceptual weaknesses. First, it is based primarily on the type of conflict occurring between states in continental Europe since the 19th century. One particularly problematic assumption is that of consolidated statehood, since the security problems faced by the Third World are largely bound up with processes of state-building.<sup>8</sup> This process is generally confined to an internal debate on the legitimacy of the ruling regime, since ruling elites generally tend to secure their power by repression rather than by the provision of political and socioeconomic services which could foster social integration and stability.<sup>9</sup>

Second, the traditional concepts are based on the assumption that individual states are comparatively invulnerable to the emergence of crises in neighboring or strategically important regions. As early as 1974, Joseph S. Nye pointed out a broadening of threat factors: “Economic issues have risen in importance on the agendas of world politics. In such a world, the composition of threats to states has become more subtle and more complex. ‘Security’ is more than a military matter”<sup>10</sup>. Since the early 1990s, a multiplicity of studies have dealt in

detail with the altered nature of security. Both “strategic studies”, a field close to the realist school, and multilateralists have recognized the need for a multi-dimensional security concept. While the strategic community prefers the term “extended security” (which tends to stress threats to Western countries and the applicability of military means), the multilateralists refer to the concepts of “comprehensive” and “human security”. In the following, I will focus on the latter discourse.

## *Comprehensive and human security*

Since the mid-1990s, a return to a “comprehensive security concept” can be observed among multilateralists in which “questions of economy, ecology, demography, communication, and the development of civilization and technology”<sup>11</sup> are assuming growing importance, a concept which includes “not only direct military threats to territorial integrity but also economic and stability risks such as the debt problematic, global ecological problems like climate change, and threats to political stability—such as terrorism”<sup>12</sup>. One major reason for this shift is a development policy which has become progressively more sensitive to phenomena of collective violence and which increasingly involves discussions on concepts of “global security”<sup>13</sup>.

Against this background, both the Commission on Global Governance and UNDP, the United Nations Development Programme, have called for a broadening of the traditional concentration on state security to embrace the dimensions of human security and the security of the planet. The concept “human security” recognizes that global security extends beyond the protection of borders, ruling elites, and exclusive state interests



to include the protection of people<sup>14</sup>, whereby extreme economic or social need, disease, systematic crime, and massive oppression may all constitute central threats to security. Ken Booth and Peter Vale<sup>15</sup>, for example, have argued that scarcity of food and water, poverty, unemployment, drug and arms trafficking, corruption, migration, etc. have become the central threats to individual security in Southern Africa.

Most recently, a report titled “Human Security Now” was published by the Commission on Human Security<sup>16</sup>, headed by Mrs Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Prof Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in economic science. The idea for this report grew out of the UN Millennium Summit which focused on securing “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. In this context, human security means “protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop the capabilities for making informed choices and acting on their own behalf”<sup>17</sup>. A core concept is that of “vital freedoms” which refers to “the inalienable fundamental rights and freedoms that are laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments”<sup>18</sup>. Besides defining the conceptual framework, the Commission’s report “concentrates on a number of distinct but interrelated issues concerning conflict and poverty: protecting people in conflict and post-conflict situations, shielding people forced to move; overcoming economic insecurities, guaranteeing essential health care, and ensuring universal education. In its report, the Commission formulates recommendations and follow-up activities” (see [www.humansecurity-chs.org](http://www.humansecurity-chs.org)).

### ***Conclusions: Towards an integrated concept of security***

‘Comprehensive’ or ‘human’ concepts of security do justice to the Janus-faced globalization process of the 1990s, which is casting an increasingly doubtful light on classic ways of thinking and acting in terms of state sovereignty. At the same time, though, several points of criticism have been raised in the past.<sup>19</sup> A thought-provoking and fundamental critique directed at the ‘broadeners’ of security concepts has been put forward by Yuen Foong Khong.<sup>20</sup> He identifies “three major pitfalls of well-intentioned attempts to ‘securitize’ the individual human being”: First of all, according to Yuen Foong Khong, putting the security of every individual on the agenda may lead to the “(total) paralysis of our ability to prioritize”. Secondly, the overstretched moral claim to intervene and act on behalf of all victims of oppression may give rise to false hopes. And thirdly, Yuen Foong Khong criticizes the false causal assumption that international peace and security are always directly linked to the safety of each and every person.

I would like to add a further dimension that seems to be even more relevant from an analytic perspective. The concepts of comprehensive and human security appear remarkably unfocused as soon as they are applied to the domestic conflict constellations which are so extraordinarily relevant for peace and security policy. These constellations are not assessed on the basis of a specific concept of societal security but are primarily viewed in a rather loose relation to global factors or individual security threats. True, societal developments are mentioned by the ‘broadeners’, but they are frequently labeled as ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious conflicts,’ terms which are of only limited usefulness, and tend to be simply added to the existing list of complexes at the root of such conflicts.

In other words, the ‘comprehensive/human security’ concept remains too unfocused in analytical terms to grasp the first weakness of the state-centered security concept, the issue of civil-conflict constellations in unconsolidated states. Apart from including ‘societal security’ as an interim level between national/state and human security, further differentiation is also called for at the international level. Both national and societal security are, first and foremost, tied into a regional context, a “security complex”<sup>21</sup> which is concerned less with the survival of the planet than with more concrete issues of migration and flight, reciprocal stabilization and destabilization, economic exchange and competition. In short, as commendable as the ‘comprehensive/human security’ concepts may be, they run the risk of being unable to pay adequate attention to the analyses of societal and regional security which are so central to the dominant conflict formation represented by ‘regionalized civil conflict.’ And what is more, the analytical focus remains unclear.

Against this background it would appear more useful to focus on core issues than to place emphasis on an expansion of the security dimension. As Mohammed Ayoob<sup>22</sup> rightly notes, the state continues to be at the center of the security question. The consolidated state may function as a guarantor of security and the rule of law, but on the other hand the state constitutes one of the main causes of violence, both internal and external. It is precisely this ambivalence which shows that the state is the key focal point involved in reaching any understanding of security. Still, not even a modified concept of state security is sufficiently far-reaching, since social collectives capable of inciting violent action are also constituted at the subnational level. Civil wars, above all ethno-national and ethno-political conflicts, cannot be explained solely with reference to state institutions; their causes must also be sought in threats to



the core values (security, political, social and economic participation, identity) held by major societal groups.

It is for this reason that I consider the concept of 'societal security' a central one. In so doing I base my arguments on a concept presented at the beginning of the 1990s by researchers of the European Security Group at the Centre for Peace.<sup>23</sup> The starting point of this concept is the issue of the identity of societies in turbulent settings. According to Wæver<sup>24</sup>, societal security concerns the ability of a society to maintain its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual risks.

A concept of societal security constructed in this way must be seen as complementary to, and not as a replacement for, the model of national security, the substance of which is the survival and sovereignty of the state. Both concepts emphasize an element constitutive for the survival for the unit under analysis: while states are concerned with protecting their sovereignty, societies define themselves through identity. One major advantage of the societal security approach is that it provides a substantive theoretical background which enables it to relate the significance of ethno-national and religious, as well as political, ideological, and socioeconomic identities, to the formation of social cohesion or, depending on the case, to the collapse of social structures.

An integrated security concept of this kind serves to enhance the traditional understanding of state security by integrating a social dimension in it as well. Threats to individual security ('human security') also have a place here, provided that they are seen in direct relation to the security threats faced by major societal groups. By integrating the various levels of social action in this way, it is possible to escape the trap set by the temptation to simply additively juxtapose the items on a growing list of security dimensions. While it is true that

the increasing interrelatedness of socioeconomic, political-ideological, ecological, and geostrategic causes of conflict calls for an 'extended' or 'multidimensional' security concept, it is essential for any such extension to focus on the issue of systematic violence perpetrated by collective actors if the concept of security is not to 'blur' and distract the discussion from the matter at hand.

It is quite likely that the 'integrated concept of security' will also prove able to transform the bogged-down controversy over a 'negative' or 'positive' concept of peace.<sup>25</sup> The minimalist concept of peace, i.e. the absence of war, is not comprehensive enough either to grasp internal violence or to sufficiently take into consideration the need for continuous efforts aimed at nonviolent conflict resolution. On the other hand, the maximalist concept of peace, which in addition calls for social justice and the self-realization of the individual personality, tends to overburden the concept of peace without paying adequate attention to the crucial substantive element of the concept of peace, the function of pacification<sup>26</sup>. For in essence, peace is the absence of organized and armed violence at all levels of human community. This definition includes not only organized military conflicts within or between states but also systematic repression of populations by a terrorist state machinery, by 'warlords' or Mafia-like groups, be it at the regional or global level, not to forget the actions of mercenary armies, terrorist groups, and secret services.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1996. *Strategic Survey 1995–1996*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- <sup>2</sup> Commission on Global Governance. 1995. *Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- <sup>3</sup> United Nations Development Programme. 1994. *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security*. New York.
- <sup>4</sup> Barry Buzan. 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. 2nd edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- <sup>5</sup> Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaître. 1993. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter.
- <sup>6</sup> Walter Lippman. 1943. *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little Brown. p. 51.
- <sup>7</sup> Mohammed Ayoob. 1995. *The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.
- <sup>8</sup> See Note 7, p. 21.
- <sup>9</sup> Edward A. Azar and Chung-in Moon. 1988. "Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security." In Edward A. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds. 1998. *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats*. College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, pp. 77–101.
- <sup>10</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1974. "Collective Economic Security." *International Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 4.
- <sup>11</sup> Adam Daniel Rotfeld. 1995. "Introduction: The International System in Transition." In Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–10.
- <sup>12</sup> Klaus Dicke. 1994. "Globale Sicherheit in einer Welt ethnischer Konflikte." In Ekkehard Hetzke und Michael Donner, eds. *Weltweite und europäische Sicherheit im Spannungsfeld von Souveränität und Minderheitenschutz*. Berlin/Bad Herford: E. S. Mittler & Sohn Verlag, pp. 1–30.

## Summary of the Discussion

<sup>13</sup> See Note 3, p. 30.

<sup>14</sup> See Note 2.

<sup>15</sup> Ken Booth and Peter Vale. 1995. "Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism." *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 285–304.

<sup>16</sup> Commission on Human Security. 2003. *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*. New York: Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen.

<sup>17</sup> Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels. 2003. "Human Security—Protecting and Empowering the People." *Global Governance*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 273–282.

<sup>18</sup> See Note 17.

<sup>19</sup> For an overview, see: Roland Paris. 2001. "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 67–102.

<sup>20</sup> Yuen Foong Khong. 2001. "Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?" *Global Governance*, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 231–236.

<sup>21</sup> See Notes 4 and 5.

<sup>22</sup> See Note 7, pp. 8–12.

<sup>23</sup> See Note 5.

<sup>24</sup> Ole Waever. 1993. "Societal Security: The Concept." In Ole Waever et al. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, pp. 17–40.

<sup>25</sup> Johan Galtung. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6, pp. 167–191.

<sup>26</sup> Herfried Münkler. 1985. "Krieg und Frieden." In Iring Fetscher and Herfried Münkler, ed. *Politikwissenschaft. Begriffe – Analysen – Theorien*. Reinbek: Rowohlt, pp. 279–325.

In a nutshell, 'human security' describes the shift of the referent object-to-be-secured from the 'state' to the 'individual'. Both the presenter and those involved in the discussion agreed that this shift in international attention was in fact "more than a good idea" for it embraces a powerful political concept "whose time has come" and which consistently engenders "practical policies and new initiatives." A reference to 'human security' sheds an international spotlight on the extent to which a selected range of mostly peripheral governments accommodate the assumed (security) needs of their citizens and thereby acts as an arbiter on their degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the donor community.

However most participants warned against a broad and all-encompassing understanding of 'human security'. Instead, they stressed the necessity of a clearly focused concept, which would simply refer to an individual's protection from external aggression. In fact, such a straightforward definition may translate into a highly practicable agenda for action including, for example, the implementation of demobilization and reintegration processes; programs for combating the proliferation of small arms; and efforts at promoting security sector reform.

Other commentators displayed a far more critical attitude. Some cautioned against a one-sided preoccupation with 'human' as opposed to 'state' security. Whereas the former concept emerged as a reaction to the cracks and flaws increasingly evident in the latter, taken on its own 'human security' was considered unable to replace more traditional notions of security discourse. A more 'integrated' concept, on the other hand, might aspire to not only re-think both state and supra-state security in the light of the numerous challenges confronting them, but also take account of their distinctly 'human' dimension.

The bulk of criticism focused, however, on the conceptual confusion pertaining to the precise definition of 'human security', on the one hand, and the resulting difficulties in practically applying it 'on the ground', on the other. In fact, widespread uncertainty about what an agenda referring to 'human security' might *really* entail often leads to suspicion—or even hostility—towards the concept on the part of mostly peripheral governments. Very much a brainchild of the donor community, 'human security' might be perceived as promoting double standards or, indeed, as simply a bad excuse for pursuing an egotistical neo-colonial policy of intervention.

Although most of those involved in the discussion showed a favorable attitude towards the idea of 'human security', many contested its practicability. It was by and large not regarded as an academically compelling concept, but rather as a broad *leitmotif* for a wide range of different political purposes. Thus the final discussion seemed a great deal more reserved and critical towards the concept of 'human security' than the initial presentation.

*By Marc von Boemcken, BICC*

# 4 Group C United Nations, NATO, European Union: Partners or Competitors in Conflict Prevention and Containment?

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

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For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

## ***Discussion Group C*** ***United Nations, NATO, European Union:*** ***Partners or Competitors in Conflict Prevention*** ***and Containment?***

### ***Rationale, questions and participants***

Over the last decade-and-a-half at major international institutions, crisis prevention and management, as well as post-conflict reconstruction, have become more important as regards both practice and planning/strategic thinking. The end of the Cold War has allowed more intellectual energy and financial resources to be spent on conflict-related policies and activities. In numerous countries, the general public is increasingly demanding action aimed at dealing with threatened and real humanitarian disasters. The 'duty to protect', to quote from the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, has been put onto the international agenda. The threat of international terrorism, perceived by many as being linked to conflicts and failing states, has added urgency to this agenda.

However, the implications of this trend are not clear, especially as regards which international organization is allotted which task. Early in the 1990s, the United Nations took a leading role but, in the second half of the 1990s, this was largely supplanted in terms of action on the ground by NATO. Beginning with the Cologne Summit of 1999, the European Union decisively broadened its toolkit for dealing with crises throughout the world. On the other hand, the United States—particularly since the advent of the Bush administration of 2001—seems to be critical of all international organizations and to prefer unilateral action and 'coalitions of the willing'.

In effect, the UN, NATO, the EU, and other international actors such as regional organizations have been both cooperation partners and competitors, be it in peace support operations on the ground or high-level discussions on strategy, priorities and resource allocations. Is there not a better way than simply deciding *ad hoc* and on the basis of practicality and power games who is to do what? Or is an agreed division of labor a bad idea, since it

would lead to divided responsibilities for a common task?

Chaired by *Eugenia Date-Bab* from the International Labour Organization, the panelists were asked to address the following questions related to the role of major international organizations:

- How can a response to international crisis be organized?
- Decision-making over military interventions
- Relations between NATO and the European Union in crisis management
- The role of the UN in crisis management
- New challenges from international terrorism

The Introductory Statement was given by *Eric Remacle* of the Free University of Brussels, an expert on European politics particularly in the peace and security fields. Comments were contributed by *Crister Garrett* from the University of Wisconsin, Professor for European and International Studies, who provided a view from the United States; *Patrick Hardouin*, as Director of the Economics Directorate at NATO, a NATO 'insider'; and *Patricia Chilton*, an international expert on security issues from the University of East Anglia. BICC has cooperated with both Professors Remacle and Chilton in a project on transparency and accountability of the European Security and Defense Policy which began in 2001 ([www.esdpdemocracy.net](http://www.esdpdemocracy.net)); Patrick Hardouin is a member of BICC's international advisory board. Professor Garrett took part with the support from the *Amerika-Haus* in Cologne, which on several occasions has helped BICC to remain in touch with relevant discussions in the United States.



# Consent and Dissent in the Recent Evolution of the Transatlantic Security Architecture

*Eric Remacle*

## *The relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations*

Since 2001, the international and European security architecture has been subject to deep changes in security perceptions from most of the important actors on the international stage. The Iraqi war has accelerated this trend and the final point of this process has not yet been reached. It is useful to describe previous patterns of this so-called architecture in order to understand the extent of these changes.

*Stage 1:* After the end of the Cold War (1989) and the discourse by George HW Bush about the New World Order (1990), there was a period when the primacy of the United Nations was upheld by most of the world actors both as peacekeeper (as in the case of UNPROFOR in Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and as a mandate-giver for peace-enforcement activities under Chapter VII (as in the case of the Gulf War). In the UN Agenda for Peace, regional organizations were considered subordinate vis-à-vis the United Nations and seemed to accept this principle at the NATO Oslo Council, the WEU Petersberg Council and the CSCE Helsinki Summit (all in 1992).

*Stage 2:* The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) provided the setting for getting this nice hierarchical model into trouble and for replacing it progressively by a polyarchic ‘network multilateralism’, the so-called model of ‘inter(b)locking institutions’. This new

model of relationships between organizations has been motivated mainly by functional needs on the ground during the conflict (and other cases in Western Africa for example), but was also very much influenced by the willingness of some key players to use the legitimacy of international organizations in order to promote their own national interests. During this period, the US emphasis on NATO, Russian use of the CIS, and EU/WEU attempts to become militarily operational illustrated this game. This led major powers to pay more attention to regional organizations than to the overall one.

*Stage 3:* In parallel, the fighting for legitimacy has also considerably widened the list of legitimate reasons for military intervention and the use of force, namely either by a decision of the Security Council or by the unilateral decisions of certain powers. Starting in 1992 with humanitarian cases (Somalia, BiH), this extension of the justifications for ‘just wars’ has quickly included the restoration of an elected president (Haiti); protection of so-called ‘safe havens’ (BiH); preventive deployment (FYRoM); containment of ‘rogue states’ and punishment for the attempt to kill a former president (Iraq 1998–2002); prevention of genocide (? Kosovo); the fight against terrorism (Afghanistan); regime change and prevention of the use of WMD (Iraq 2003). This has been reflected by philosophical debates (Waltzer, Habermas, Rawls), production of official and independent reports

inventing very vague but prolific concepts (*droit d’ingérence*, ‘duty to protect’) and a very great confusion about legality and legitimacy. The characteristics of this debate is to accumulate causes for ‘just wars’ whose legality is much more than questionable—while their supposed legitimacy is defined in a very absolute and moral way, whose discussion is rendered impossible because it is so wide. (Who could possibly support humanitarian catastrophe, genocide, terrorist attacks, use of WMD, etc.?). This has led to a step-by-step transfer of the legitimacy from a logic based on the international rule-of-law to a logic inspired by so-called morality, leading quickly to double standards and self-justification of the use of force. In this context, the ‘preventive’ approach already used by the Agenda for Peace has become a motto, including in the Brahimi Report (2000).

*Stage 4:* There have been two diplomatic crises illustrating this tension. In the case of Kosovo (1999), Russia and China—plus important other states like India or Brazil—have criticized the use of force by NATO against Yugoslavia. Some participating states, especially France, insisted on the ‘exceptionality’ of the Kosovo case which could not be a precedent for illegal use of force. Interestingly, the word ‘unilateralism’ was not used during this crisis, while it became a keyword during the Iraqi war (2003). In this case, the critics of the US-led war on Iraq came from the Western side first (France, Germany), jointly with Russia and many third world countries.

*Stage 5:* Year 1999 became a real turning point, in particular because it was the moment the two regional organizations really tried to become dominant in this domain: NATO through its new strategic concept; and the EU through the process of the headline goal and the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In parallel, the Brahimi Report (2000) contributed to the re-boosting of UN legitimacy as the central actor in this field. But the multiplication of approaches inspired by the concept of 'regionalization of peace support' led to the question whether regional organizations complement the United Nations or compete with it. The year 2003 is therefore the year of the crisis of the United Nations because of the Iraqi war, though it was not challenged by a regional organization, as in Kosovo, but by a coalition of states led by one permanent member of the Security Council.

*Stage 6:* 'Coalitions of the willing' have emerged in the cases of the 'Bushite wars' (Afghanistan and Iraq) as the new pattern for military interventions. In Afghanistan, the model is based on articulation and coexistence between one US-led offensive action and one UN-led stabilization force (ISAF), using NATO as the major provider of headquarters. Very likely the same model will be used also in Iraq. Here the question is neither legality nor legitimacy, but acceptance of power politics by the United Nations and the use of NATO as an 'operational go-between'. The whole peacekeeping and peacemaking system of the United Nations seems dependent on the ability of the United States and other Western states to build compromises and use NATO for their common interests. This would seem to imply a revival of the concept of the 'West' and drop any option of 'Common Security'.

## *The European Union as a new security actor*

Will the emergence of the European Union as a security actor challenge this development? The year 2003 has been very important in this respect.

*First*, the European Union has completed the establishment of its full political and military 'chain of command' for implementing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This includes creating the office of the High Representative for the CFSP Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and related bodies like the Committee for Civilian-Military Relations. The Draft Constitution has contributed to making this structure even more complex by the creation of the positions of a Chair of the European Council and an EU Foreign Minister. It is interesting to note that, by comparison, the parliamentary dimension of CFSP and ESDP remains very limited.

*Second*, the EU has developed its own capabilities as a follow-up of the 1999 headline goal and subsequent conferences of contributors and has declared itself operational. The creation in January 2004 of the Agency for Armament, Research and Capabilities strengthens this trend while the agreement about the operational headquarters in November 2004 has paved the way to giving the EU a variety of different operational instruments for leading operations, either through national means, NATO means or a modest UN civilian-military operational headquarters located within the EU military staff in Brussels.

*Third*, the first EU-led military operations took place in 2003. Two police and two military deployments have been implemented, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the District of Ituri in Congo. What lessons can be

drawn from these missions? They proved the European Council's ability to strengthen its legitimacy to act both in the Balkans and Central Africa, in close connection with NATO in the first case and with the United Nations in the second. In the Balkans, this has confirmed the EU's readiness to use all its instruments for transforming this area into some kind of 'periphery'. By replacing former national, UN-led or NATO-led interventions, the EU is launching a political signal to its main partners. It shows the importance of the Anglo-French axis (the 'revival' of the Saint-Malo spirit) and helps France to illustrate strongly the 'framework-nation' concept (adopted by the EU in 2002). This is also helping the United Nations and NATO to reduce their own burden and reorient their activities. For NATO especially, this paves the way for going outside the European continent (Afghanistan, Iraq? Caucasus?). This means a new division of labour between the Western powers, welcomed by the United States. The way *Concordia* and *Artemis* military operations have been conceived also illustrates the two possible models for European military interventions. On the one hand, the Union has used NATO assets and experienced the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements between the two organizations; the same model will inspire other missions where the EU replaces NATO in the Balkans (BiH in 2004, and maybe Kosovo in 2005). On the other hand, NATO was not involved and national means were pooled together under a UN mandate and with the key contribution of a framework-nation.

*A fourth development* has been the adoption of the European security strategy by the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003. This document is a good instrument to measure the extent of co-operation and competition between the EU and the other organizations.

### ***Security strategies of the EU, the United States and NATO: Defending the 'West' or promoting common security?***

The European security strategy is divided into three parts. The first part describes the security environment, i.e. a list of threats and challenges. The second part addresses the strategic aims of the Union. The third part discusses policy implications for Europe. By comparison with other documents of the same style, the strategy looks very similar to the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999 and the US National Security Strategy of 2002.

What these documents have in common is above all obvious in the way the three documents define threats and non-military 'global challenges'. This is a mix between a very pessimistic threat assessment, looking like a series of worst-case scenarios, and a very enthusiastic definition of the impact of liberalization on the world. Their strategic aims are also very similar and emphasize especially the importance of both 'threat prevention' and 'conflict prevention', and the need to stabilize 'the periphery' (or new neighbourhood for the enlarged EU). Among policy implications, the claim for increasing military expenditures is also very similar to a messianic plea for bringing 'good' to the world.

Differences mainly focus on the EU concept of 'effective multilateralism' which makes the compromise between the two European approaches to the Iraqi War: condemnation of unilateralism on the one hand; emphasis on robust intervention for implementing multilateral policies on the other. Furthermore, the EU document does not use certain provocative Bushite words like 'pre-emptive action' or 'rogue states'.

Rather than exploring the subtleties of what these documents have in common and the differences between them, it may be more interesting in fact to discuss their basic assumptions which are summarized in the (indirect) dialogue between Robert Kagan and Robert Cooper, Javier Solana's advisor. Both agree that military power is the key instrument for promoting security interests and Western values, even if both recognize that civilian means are also important and, for Cooper, the 'policy mix' of all the EU instruments. Kagan's argument is even used by Cooper to justify his own demand for increasing military means (without ever justifying why the EU should be as powerful as the United States since it does not intend to compete militarily with the United States). For Robert Cooper, as for Robert Kagan, the world is divided into three groups of states (as have also been described by Jürgen Habermas in his short essay on Perpetual Peace in 1995). The first group is composed of post-modern democracies which do not need to make war on each other any more and have therefore a special mission to fulfil in promoting Western values and universal regimes. The second group is composed of 'rogue states' which use force against their own population and their neighbours. The third group is composed of 'failed states' where anarchy has destroyed the state apparatus. In such a vision, equal sovereignty of states is abolished and the West has a kind of '*mission civilisatrice*' which looks very much like a 19th century-type vision of the world. Robert Cooper calls it the "liberal imperialism" and divides it into two kinds of strategies: a voluntary imperialism based on the international financial and economic institutions which drive the world economy; and a neighbourhood imperialism consisting in the stabilization of "peripheries".

If we look at these kind of wider representations of the world, we see that they in fact converge more than they diverge and are based mainly on a

defence of Western interests as the basis of world security and on the proclamation of the superiority of Western values over other kinds of states and regimes. Here 'morality' and ideology are again dominating any kind of legality. It would be difficult to say that such a vision is helping to build 'common security' with the rest of the world.

As with the construction of ESDP and European military assets, we see that the EU and NATO are very much intertwined in their representation of the world and are very far indeed from other key players within the United Nations.

# Cooperation or Competition: Weighing the Evidence

*Crister S. Garrett*

Surveying the evidence of efforts at international crisis management cooperation from the past decade, one can find plenty of support to sustain the argument that the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union have been competitors rather than partners. Where one winds up in that assessment process probably has quite a bit to do with the larger political point that one would like to make. The real and ultimate challenge is whether the international crisis management community can create a culture and regimes for systematic coordination and cooperation between these critical institutional pillars of international politics and policy. Currently, we are on a path of what I call 'a contingent partnership' toward that long-term goal. This *de facto* and *ad hoc* strategy can be seen as constructive toward creating a new culture of coordination and cooperation, or counterproductive. Let us weigh the evidence, and draw some tentative conclusions.

Let us start with a quick piece of good news. There are really very few points of outright competition between the UN, NATO, and the EU. The most obvious is in providing substantial physical security (military operations) and how this component of providing security overall has led to contentions between the ambitions of the EU and the future roles of NATO. After the conclusion of the Berlin Plus Agreement, however, we have a quasi regime in place to enhance coordination if not cooperation in this regard (the Agreement outlines how the EU can 'borrow' critical hardware and services from NATO for rapid deployment needs). The extent to which this Agreement increasingly involves using American hardware for European operations will still provide points of ongoing debate to be sure.

But while a pattern of open competition between these three pillars of international politics is hard to discern, a history of concerted cooperation is also clearly difficult to ascertain. A combination of relative youth, rapidly shifting structural parameters, and clearly increasing expectations have led the UN, NATO, and EU to all seek legitimacy and support via self-contained processes, i.e. not primarily through records of cooperation with other international institutions. That is understandable. Generally, institutions and individuals like to cooperate from a position of strength. Alas, none of these institutions is sufficiently strong to enhance its legitimacy substantially on its own, especially when dealing with providing a 'total security package', i.e. a comprehensive security solution.

When discussing the prevention and containment of conflicts and the establishment of long-term security, we are generally talking about three components or stages of constructing security: stabilization, development, and sustainable security. This reality has led in turn to a strategy among NATO, the EU, and the UN of 'complementary and contingent cooperation'. Currently, NATO clearly possesses the most robust capability to 'stabilize' or prevent a crisis, be it in Kosovo or Kabul. Here we are talking about establishing a modicum of physical safety for the inhabitants of the region in question. When it comes to development, the EU possesses many comparative advantages, especially when it concerns deploying funds and expertise in a relatively quick fashion. Sustainable security, or the implementation of strategies for creating contextual cultures of cooperation in a region (i.e. solutions formatted for local conditions), is arguably the domain of the United Nations.

In talking about stabilization, development, and sustainable security as the three components for providing a 'total security package' or comprehensive security solution, we are in essence describing the short, medium, and long terms elements of establishing and constructing security. None of the institutions in question is capable now or in the nearer future of providing 'the total package' of services needed to establish this form of security. They thus seek naturally enough complementary strategies rather than competitive ones since ultimately all are measured in terms of legitimacy by the crucial variable of to what extent can they enhance security over the long term (defined at a very minimum as stability but more broadly as sustainable physical and psychological safety or the absence of persecution).

The degree of complementarity is of course contingent upon the case of crisis in question. The case of Bosnia, for example, is an existential one for the EU and NATO, but not for the UN. The case of Rwanda or Sudan gets to the heart of UN legitimacy, but not to the heart of EU legitimacy. Southeastern Europe involves the long-term credibility of the EU and NATO; Africa involves the long-term credibility of the UN. Realism defines the constructive nature of cooperation, and that is not necessarily a bad thing. The coordination of relative resources ultimately can increase international efficiencies, an overall desired goal in an ongoing age of ongoing limited resources.

That NATO and the EU invest much more in the Balkans and the UN in Burundi does beg the question of a third category of crisis prevention and containment: The cases of rogue states or rogue movements inviting not just prevention but perhaps even



preemption. Obviously this is a highly controversial point, and the degree of controversy is strongly contextual. Preemptive strategies are highly contested in the case of Iraq, but would presumably be much less so in the case of Sudan. These cases naturally beg the question of where is the strict demarcation point between preemption and prevention. Were the United States and its allies seeking in Iraq to preempt or prevent a possible terrorist or WMD strike? Would military intervention in Sudan be seeking to preempt or prevent full-scale mass slaughter or genocide? Does the distinction really carry a difference? In both cases, are we not really discussing the 'violation' of sovereignty to scotch either planned or possible wide-scale death? Perhaps we are talking about 'two degrees of prevention', with preemption representing a relatively rapid and relatively military degree of prevention, and prevention on its own as a relatively long-term and a relatively civil component of prevention.

What a discussion of the relative merits of deploying terms like preemption and preventive also underscores for us is the importance of the size and speed with which one can deploy resources in the name of constructing security. Here we come upon the case of Afghanistan. The manner in which the United States preempted or prevented further violence being exported from that country has been very controversial. The relative legitimacy of that effort is generally uncontroversial. But the purposeful sidestepping of NATO by Washington has left a legacy of whether the Alliance can continue to be used to build transatlantic cooperation in constructing security. The critical role that NATO has played in this region since the quick and formal military victory shows that it clearly can, but that victory and the strong American military presence in the country underscore another important point in our discussion: any comprehensive discussion of international crisis management should not only

involve the UN, NATO, and the EU, but the comparative capabilities that the United States brings to this effort, even outside the context of NATO.

We can highlight this point by running a 'small counterfactual' simulation: Would NATO command the same respect and be as effective in Afghanistan without the presence of US troops in that contingent? I think that we can answer in all modesty, "No, it would not", and not by a long shot. And, for that matter, this is also the case in the Balkans. This reality has to do with several factors, from hardware, cultures of warfare, to forces being under one clear and concise chain of command (i.e. they can be deployed quickly and efficiently). The last thing that is being argued here is that robust military capabilities are the central aspect of a strategy for pursuing a comprehensive security solution. But what is being argued here is that American military capabilities can clearly be a component of that effort. As we see in Afghanistan or the Balkans, it has to do with credibility, and credibility counts in crisis prevention, let alone preemption.

And the last thing being argued here in detailing strategies and capabilities for complementarity and contingency is that somehow America should 'fight the war' while Europe and the international community should 'establish the peace'. That is not in America's interests, Europe's interests, or the international community's interests. Rather, what is being highlighted is the continuing importance of that component of effective crisis prevention and containment, namely the credible capacity for the rapid and effective deployment of robust military force to a region. America still provides the best capacity to do so, and thus it must be included in any serious discussion of crisis prevention and containment.

While the American strategy behind the case of Afghanistan, whether dubbed a 'coalition of the willing' or a 'coalition of convenience' was highly controversial in the context of America and NATO, it also raises broader questions in the context of international institutions such as the UN, EU, and NATO, and their ability to cooperate rather than to openly compete. For the 'middle road' that these institutions have settled upon to pursue in the near term, constructing security in different regions of the world, namely, a strategy of 'complementarity and contingency', does hinder in its own right the ability to create a systematic and embedded culture of cooperation that arguably would maximize the ability of the international community to pursue conflict prevention and containment. In short, we have here three categories of strategies, often in open conflict or contradiction with one another: strategies of institutional profiling, strategies of short-term efficiencies, and strategies of institutional cooperation. How do we adjudicate between these conflicting strategies, and in fact, should we? We can, and we should.

The process involves projects, projects that can construct a culture of cooperation to enhance what will remain for the foreseeable future a predominant culture of complementarity and contingency. Projects are the ideal tool through which to travel from the latter to the former, with the former being what we ultimately all seek. A highly interesting case to test this proposed model, especially in a transatlantic context, is the case of Haiti. This tiny country represents the inherent failures of policy for security on both sides of the Atlantic, both from a colonial past and from a past in the domain of a dominating power. Two hundred years of suffering in Haiti have led to an embedded culture of violence, deprivation, and instability.



Models for long-term security on Haiti would not only receive international attention, be a tangible and welcome contribution to constructive transatlantic ties, but also a splendid example of how to achieve sustainable security (BICC could play a key role in devising models here). Real success on Haiti will require short-term stability, medium-term development strategies, and long-term cultural transformation for political, economic, and social stability. The UN, EU, NATO, and the United States would all have clear roles requiring clear cooperation. The case of Haiti could even provide the necessary project through which these international actors could address a fundamental need for this country and for other conflicts and their prevention: the coordinated and uniform training and deployment of an international police force (not military force).

Competition and even conflict between ambitious international bodies is to be expected. The enormous variety and number of international challenges and conflicts facing leading international actors compels them to cooperate with strategies of complementarity, even if on a contingent basis. This is nevertheless a step forward in deploying resources efficiently and effectively. To maximize the returns on cooperation however, we will need to further coordinate strategies. Some of the thorniest cases of international crisis management, like the case of Haiti, can provide an excellent vehicle with which to achieve this critical goal, especially in a transatlantic context. This analysis has addressed the first half of the central question of this conference, namely, of how to promote security. The case of Haiti underlines the other half of the conference title, namely, for whom do we promote security. We do so for the sake of the weakest, those least able to provide for their own physical and psychological security. Surely that is a goal around which we can unite our resources, and our resolve.

# Remarks on NATO's Role in Meeting Security Challenges

*Patrick Hardouin*

Professor Remacle has provided us with a stimulating paper. Allow me to add a few thoughts and reflections—about the security challenges, about NATO's role in addressing them, and about the need for a broader institutional approach.

Perhaps the best starting point is globalisation. Globalisation offers our societies the opportunity to become more creative and more prosperous. But it also makes our societies more vulnerable.

One consequence of globalisation is the growing interplay between domestic problems and international security concerns. People, information, technology and resources cross international borders with increasing ease. As a result, security problems can no longer be neatly categorised as 'national', 'regional' or 'international'.

Terrorism is a case in point. It has transformed from a domestic problem into an international challenge. Terrorist networks like Al Qaeda may profess to resist globalisation, yet they are quite astute in using globalisation's benefits—from computer banking to cell phones.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is another 21st century security challenge. To some extent, it is also a result of globalisation's darker side: the rapid dissemination of technology and knowledge. When coupled with the new kind of apocalyptic terrorism, the threat of proliferation becomes even more severe.

'Failed states' are another security challenge. In the past decade or so, we have seen states collapse, fragmenting into numerous small regions, run by

warlords, who finance themselves by drug smuggling and other criminal activities. As Afghanistan has demonstrated, such failed states are both a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorists.

NATO is already playing its part in responding to these new challenges—because NATO is a unique organisation, with enormous influence to effect positive change. A good example is NATO's presence in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. In both theatres, NATO provides the safe environment for political and economic progress to take root.

We are also improving our military capacities to better protect ourselves against terrorist attack, and against the use of weapons of mass destruction. We are taking steps to improve the overall capabilities of NATO forces to manage crises. And we continue to engage our many partner countries, including Russia, in developing common responses.

I could go on extolling the virtues of NATO's long list of mechanisms and policies, but I won't. Because no matter how successful any single institution might be, it cannot hope to have a decisive effect just by itself. To address 21st century challenges effectively, we need a 21st century security network. Diplomats, militaries, financial institutions, law enforcement officials, and arms control experts must move beyond narrow definitions of their mandates. They must adapt to take on new challenges. And more and more, they must identify common challenges, and work together to solve them.

Addressing terrorism, for example, can no longer be a job only for law enforcement officials. Now, our militaries must also be prepared to tackle this challenge, both to protect themselves and to help protect our populations. Financial institutions must track, and freeze, terrorist money. Intelligence cooperation must be stepped up.

Similarly, stopping regional conflicts must be a job for more than just the military. Law enforcement officials must also be deployed in conflict zones, to prevent organised crime from taking hold. Financial experts must also be available to stop corruption. And civilian institutions in post-conflict areas must be supported, to preclude the instability that is the source of so many other threats.

One of the major trends of the last few years, and even months, has been a growing sense of the need for consultation and cooperation between international organisations.

Today, no organisation—neither NATO, nor the EU, nor the UN, (and you could add the OSCE to this list)—is on its own able to provide for the security needs of its members across the full security spectrum (conflict prevention, peace enforcement and peacekeeping/peace-building). But when they work together, organisations have greater chances of successfully tackling the challenges of the new century.

The key institutional elements of such an international security network are already in place: the European Union, NATO, the OSCE and the United Nations. Individually, each of these

institutions reflects a distinct approach to security. Together, they offer the chance to establish a new quality of security.

Such contacts between organisations were virtually non-existent until 10 years ago. Interaction 'in the field' developed in a very practical, pragmatic manner in the mid-1990s, out of a need to coordinate the organisations' respective activities in the Western Balkans. Over the last few years, they have become a matter of routine. NATO has not only developed relations with the EU, but also has regular high-level political contacts and staff-to-staff talks with the United Nations.

Yesterday, Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer had a meeting with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the Afghanistan Conference in Berlin. And today Mrs Fréchette, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, has a meeting with her NATO counterpart at NATO HQ. Contacts between NATO and the OSCE have also moved beyond crisis management in the Western Balkans and now cover areas such as terrorism, border security and management, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation.

We have already seen the powerful logic of institutional cooperation in the Balkans: NATO, the UN, the OSCE and the EU are working together to bring peace, economic prosperity and democracy to that region. We now see a similar pattern emerge in Afghanistan, with NATO and the UN as two major political and military players, and the EU the biggest financial donor. And sooner rather than later, we are going to need a similar institutional get-together in Iraq as well.

In the Balkans as well as in Afghanistan, our major institutions pursue policies that are mutually reinforcing. This is in itself a good thing. Today, however, we

have to go one decisive step further. Not only do we need synergy in the policies of our major institutions, we also need to connect these institutions with one another. In other words, we must move from a mere 'peaceful coexistence' to the actual linkage of our institutions. Given the seriousness of the threats we face, anything else will fall short of what is required.

NATO-EU cooperation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (see Box) is a perfect illustration of the potential of direct institutional cooperation. By co-ordinating the political, military and economic influence of the two organisations, we have been able to prevent a civil war from breaking out in a vital strategic area. When the EU takes over many of NATO's security responsibilities in Bosnia later this year, that will make the case for a direct and trustful relationship between the Alliance and the EU even more compelling.

As of today, NATO-EU consultations cover a wide agenda, from crisis management in the Western Balkans, over discussions on Afghanistan, to consultations on terrorism and non-proliferation. Joint meetings at ambassador level take place roughly every month. NATO and the EU have established a relationship for the long haul. Later this year, the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU will be further developed through the establishment of permanent military liaison elements.

After the enlargement of NATO with 7 new members on 29 March, and that of the EU with 10 new members, on 1 May, the number of countries which are members of both organisations, will go from eleven to nineteen<sup>1</sup>. I am confident that this will contribute to what Joschka Fischer qualified in his interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* as an "increased strategic parallelism between NATO and the EU"<sup>2</sup>. More security-related items will likely be added to the agenda of joint meetings. The objective is not

necessarily cooperation: exchanging information, greater transparency, and trying to avoid unnecessary duplication are equally valuable motives.

This strategic parallelism should be welcomed and encouraged. Coordinated action by international organisations is more effective than isolated initiatives. We have seen in 2001 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia how a concerted effort by NATO, the EU and the OSCE prevented a civil war from erupting. NATO, the EU and the OSCE jointly guaranteed the necessary security and set the political process in motion which led to the Ohrid political framework agreement which is now being implemented. Just days ago in Kosovo, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, paid a joint visit to Pristina. It is of utmost importance that international organisations be seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing, not as competing.

Each organisation, NATO and the EU, but also the OSCE and the UN, has its comparative advantages in the three respective security functions (conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping/peace enforcement). When further developing their Middle East initiatives, the US, the G8, the EU and NATO need to focus on their respective comparative advantages to help shape a secure, stable and prosperous environment in the Greater Middle East. But of course, local ownership is essential.

Through their combined weight, these organisations can decisively influence the global political agenda. At the same time, they also have a major responsibility for meeting the global security challenges.

The need for a multidimensional approach to security is not a new idea. More than half a century ago, President Truman used to speak of the relation-

ship between the Marshall Plan and NATO as “two halves of the same walnut”—economic and military stability going hand in hand.

What is new today, however, is the degree of direct cooperation among our major institutions. Establishing such institutional ties is difficult, given the different history, character and original remit of each of our institutions. But the benefits of a tightly-knit security network should be obvious enough to warrant the effort.

NATO, the EU and the UN are on the same side in the global battle for a life worth living, in security and prosperity.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The 8 additional countries to become members of both NATO and the EU are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

<sup>2</sup> See interview with Joschka Fischer in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 6 March 2004 under the title “Die Rekonstruktion des Westens”.

<sup>3</sup> Operation *Concordia* was terminated on 15 December 2003 and replaced by an EU-led police mission, called *Proxima*.

## NATO-EU Consultations and Cooperation

NATO’s consultations and cooperation with the EU, established in January 2001, have in little more than 3 years developed into a very regular feature on NATO’s agenda. This is only natural: NATO and the EU share common strategic interests. Both organisations now consult and work together to prevent and solve crises and armed conflicts in a spirit of complementarity. Cooperation has accelerated ever since, in particular with:

- The adoption on 16 December 2002 of the landmark NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP, which reaffirmed the EU’s assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for EU-led military operations and paved the way for the Berlin Plus arrangements
- The adoption on 17 March 2003 of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which form the basis for practical work in crisis management between the two organisations.

In effect, the Berlin Plus arrangements allow the Alliance to support EU-led military operations in case the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. On 31 March 2003, the EU-led operation *Concordia* took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, *Operation Allied Harmony*, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.<sup>3</sup> NATO supported the EU with strategic, operational and tactical planning.

NATO-EU cooperation in the Western Balkans had not remained limited to military crisis management. In their search for ways to adopt a comprehensive approach, encompassing the entire region, the two organisations in July 2003 approved a *Framework for an Enhanced NATO-EU Dialogue and a Concerted Approach on Security and Stability in the Western Balkans*.

NATO and the EU have also reached an understanding to complete SFOR and start an EU-led operation, under Berlin Plus arrangements as well, by the end of 2004. This would not mean the end of NATO’s engagement in Bosnia: a new NATO military liaison and advisory mission (NATO HQ Sarajevo) will complement the EU mission with NATO competencies, such as support on defence reform and for the country’s potential Partnership for Peace membership.

Concerted planning of capabilities development and mutual reinforcement between NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) have also become part of the NATO-EU agenda. NATO experts have provided military and technical advice starting from the preparations to the implementation of the ECAP. NATO and EU capabilities planning and mutual reinforcement between the PCC and the ECAP are being addressed in the NATO-EU Capability Group, established in May 2003. In this Group, NATO and the EU have also started discussing ongoing work to establish the NATO Response Force and the EU Rapid Reaction Elements, including the recent Battlegroup Concept launched by the UK, France and Germany.

# The EU-UN Strategic Partnership: Neither Partners nor Competitors

Patricia Chilton<sup>1</sup>

## What is new?

The new EU-UN 'strategic partnership' is an important aspect of the European Union's new security strategy and ought to be significant for international crisis management. The Solana strategy identifies one of the EU's three strategic objectives as the "need to build an international order based on effective multilateralism". The European Council, in its Conclusions of 21 July 2003, "reasserted the commitment of the EU, as well as of its Member States, to contribute to the objectives of the UN in conflict prevention and crisis management". On this basis, bilateral contacts were established between the EU Presidency and the UN Secretariat, which set in motion the defining of a 'Framework Agreement' between the two organisations.

Four key documents were produced in parallel with the development of the European security strategy in the latter part of 2003. First came a communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, in September 2003: *The EU and the UN: The choice of multilateralism*.<sup>2</sup> This sets out to make the EU contribution to the development and implementation of UN instruments more effective, to improve the capacity of the two organisations to work together, and to make the EU's *modus operandi* in the UN system more consistent. While increased cooperation with the United Nations is not a new idea, this strategy is explicit, and takes into account the implications of EU reform and EU enlargement for how the EU deals with the UN.

Second, the EU-UN *Joint Declaration*,<sup>3</sup> signed on 24 September 2003, constitutes the legal basis for enhanced

cooperation in this area. In it, the EU pledges to strengthen its crisis management capacities for use in UN operations or under a UN mandate, and to improve EU-UN cooperation in the security field. While not binding, it is effectively a memorandum of understanding confirming the EU's determination to contribute to UN efforts in crisis management and conflict prevention. Again, this is not new, but it has given new impetus to institutional contacts.

The third document, the Laschet Report,<sup>4</sup> published in December 2003, is the European Parliament's response to the Commission, elaborated by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. In the interim, the Commission's proposals were discussed by member states in the relevant Council working groups.

A fourth and very different style of publication rounds off the process in January 2004.<sup>5</sup> *Making Multilateralism Matter* illustrates the new image of 'the EU at the UN'. Dramatic in its message and its glossy presentation, it demonstrates the mechanism by which "an enlarging European Union takes the world stage". Its soft message is that the EU "is committed to ensuring a stable and peaceful Europe while building its presence on the world stage to contribute more effectively to peace and development across the globe". Its hard message, reinforced by visuals and layout, is that the new EU is a world power to be reckoned with, and a newly integrated force within the UN.

In part, this is an outcome of the European experience at the UN in February 2003, the run up to the Iraq

war, and the humiliation suffered by the core of 'old Europeans' who distrusted US strategy. The EU-UN strategic partnership also has a longer genesis. It recalls the WEU and NATO bidding to become the 'organisation of choice' in carrying out mandates for the UN in 1992, and even at that time offering their services to the OSCE (designated a 'regional organisation of the UN'). For the UN, cooperation with regional organisations in peace support operations has its legal basis in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, reinforced by the Agenda for Peace (1995), and goes from simple consultation to diplomatic support, operational support, and co-deployment and joint operations. For the EU, the adoption of the European security strategy, and the current EU enlargement process, have given an urgency to previous commitments, and made coordination of the positions of EU member states within the UN General Assembly and Security Council more of an issue than when the Treaty on the European Union was drawn up.<sup>6</sup>

The new strategic partnership based on 'making multilateralism matter' invites comparison with the Clinton multilateralism of the 1990s. However, US multilateralism was characterised by the doctrine: 'with the UN whenever possible, without when necessary'. The EU has neither the power nor the problem of the US in this regard. For the EU, it is not only impossible to act without the UN. It is also not necessary to act without the UN. What matters is who controls the UN. The Laschet Report complains: "For years the EU has merely played a reactive role in the UN." The strategic partnership sets out to reverse that trend. Without engaging



in explicit competition—*Pax Europa versus Pax Americana*—the EU has redefined its structural power within the UN. As a group of member states, it has the votes. Integrated, it is the biggest player.

### *What does it say?*

First, there are many positive dimensions to the EU-UN strategic partnership. At its core is a vision of security cooperation which could be revolutionary—it says ‘the EU will provide’. A confident EU is offering the UN a broad range of instruments, civilian and military, including multi-lateral forces able to fulfill bridging missions at short notice, not only on a regional basis, but in any corner of the globe. Such an offer could replace the concept of a UN standing army.

Proof that the EU has the capacity to respond to a crisis situation is *Operation Artemis*. “It is encouraging that at this relatively early stage in the development of ESDP, the Union has shown itself capable of responding to a UN appeal for help in a humanitarian crisis.” *Artemis*, in June 2003, was the first autonomous EU military operation, and the first experience of EU-UN military cooperation. In response to the UN call, the EU helped re-establish the conditions of security in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and has continued its support for multinational actions in the area through the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and through economic rehabilitation programmes. Such experience provides evidence of the ‘added value’ of EU crisis management, namely the ability to deploy a range of instruments, financial, civilian, and military, in a well-coordinated way.

Secondly, practical measures leading to closer cooperation have been stepped up, measures which are concrete, feasible, and in many cases under way. The EU is already working jointly with

the UN on training operations and crisis management exercises, on planning, and on developing a practice of desk-to-desk dialogue. In addition, an EU-UN common financial administrative framework has now been achieved, following the initial framework agreement of 2003.

To enhance cooperation in the area of security, the two organisations are now intensifying staff-to-staff contacts between the General Secretariat of the EU Council and the UN Secretariat, including through their respective Liaison Offices in Brussels and New York. There will henceforth be a more coordinated EU-UN approach to planning and evaluating peacekeeping operations, and to defining common standards for training military and civilian personnel. Other priorities are desk-to-desk dialogue on risk assessment between relevant agencies and working groups, and more contact between staff working on crisis regions, both between the headquarters and in the field. The EU will also take new initiatives to drive the UN reform agenda forward, focusing on the key decision-making bodies, and including concomitant adjustments in their budgets.

Thirdly, accompanying these practical engagements is the attention given to creating EU solidarity in the UN. There needs to be more ‘upstream’ preparation of EU positions so as to avoid split votes by the EU in the UN forums, and help the EU gain support for its positions through increased informal dialogue with other groups and countries.

Commission requirements are that EU member states set an example by working towards the early preparation of EU initiatives and their systematic follow-up, including the prompt ratification of UN instruments. The EU should also strive to establish common positions as early as possible in major UN conferences and Security Council meetings, and actively seek to build alliances in support of important multilateral initiatives. Care is needed to

ensure coherence between the instruments of the EU and the external actions of its Member States. The agendas of EU bilateral meetings often do not reflect the objectives pursued by the Union in multilateral forums, and the Commission recommends that the EU should systematically introduce points relating to the multilateral agenda into bilateral discussions with its partners. For its part, the Commission will ensure that UN targets, including those in the field of development, counter-terrorism, organised crime and human rights, are integrated into EC programming and delivery of assistance. The role of the EU Council working groups responsible for UN matters will be reinforced, and the Presidency will promote EU positions in the UN on the basis of agreed mandates. Proposals to appoint an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs should also help promote EU cohesion within the UN system.

### *What does it mean?*

So much for the statement. But how to read it? On the one hand, it is a much more visionary statement than it at first appears. On the other hand, it is politically ambiguous. There is much good institutionalist discourse—and many good people with good intentions in both the institutions—but there is a powerful realist undertow which should be recognised and reckoned with. For the institutions in themselves are powerless and can still be side-stepped by those member states which control resources, and such states can only formally be called to account by their own constituencies.

The glossy picture of the January 2004 document is a political statement in itself, and as such it deliberately gives mixed messages. The visuals in particular are striking. They turn textbook analysis of the UN on its head. Instead of the US being the main provider and contributor, it is the EU. And though the EU is only 25 distinct

states in the UN system, it is nonetheless represented as a powerful physical entity at the UN. The physical space occupied by the EU caucus is graphically depicted. Its physical weight is represented in pie-chart after pie-chart in which the EU dwarfs all other players. It shows the EU as a unified actor in the UN playing a 'big' role, big-hearted, big in terms of financial contributions, big on troop provision, and big on 'values'.

The EU 25 are the largest financial contributors to the UN system, already paying 37.7% of the UN's regular budget (compared with 22% from the US), around 40% of UN peacekeeping operations, and around 50% of all UN member states' contributions to UN funds and programmes. They contribute the lion's share in UN operations—troops, police, and civilians. They are by far the largest troop contributor to other peace missions under the authority of the UN Security Council, even if not directly run by the UN. And they pay their contributions on time and in full. Add to this that the EU produces a quarter of the world's gross national product, and is the world's largest donor of overseas development assistance. The EU is *big*—and *it is enlarging*.

Another message of the glossy brochure is that, in a sense, the EU *is* the UN. At the very least, there is considerable EU-UN overlap and they have very similar objectives. So "it is not surprising that the EU and the UN should be deepening their relationship at this time". The EU, after all, works with all UN bodies across virtually the whole range of UN activities, from development policy and peacemaking to humanitarian assistance, environment, human rights and culture, throughout the world. "Conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding are at the heart of the EU, which is itself a successful example of how stability and prosperity can be promoted through reconciliation and understanding. European integration has proved to be a model for regional cooperation, and hence, conflict resolution."

The final message is that the EU is *one*! Besides revealing the attention given to EU coordination at the UN, statistics show that the EU (almost always) speaks 'with one voice'. Graphs illustrate that the EU votes together at the UN General Assembly, and the 'new Europe' member states are not out of line. "From globalisation and human rights, to development and disarmament, the EU aims for unanimity. And the results are clearly evidenced in EU cohesion, which has stood at around 95% of all resolutions passed since the mid-1990s."

On the public front, reporting of Kofi Annan's visit to the EU on 30 January 2004 reflects the institutionalist discourse: "The logic behind EU-UN partnership is plain to see ... international cooperation is an essential prerequisite if common challenges are to be effectively, and equitably, tackled." Chris Patten offers by contrast a realist view: "The EU needs to find concrete ways of strengthening our political influence in the UN system."

### **Conclusion: BICC's role**

If the EU has virtual 'ownership' of the UN, and the EU has at its heart 'conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding', is this not bound to improve international crisis management?

*One problem is making the discourse operational.* Implementation will of course be long and uncertain, given that it involves the concerted mobilisation of member states and the reform of working practices in two large and complex bureaucracies. But there are other ambiguities. Solana defines the distinctive European view on security issues as 'multilateralism, prevention and coordinated use of military and civilian capabilities', and also highlights the importance of generating more civilian capabilities, arguing that recent experience has demonstrated their

indispensability in crisis management and conflict prevention. By contrast, in the same speech (25 February 2004), he recalls that member states must make better use of the 160 billion euros they devote annually to defence, and argues for more systematic thinking on how to reduce duplication, share tasks and create more multinational capacity, pointing to the likely establishment of a European Armaments Agency. Militarily, the initiative of February 2004 (originally Franco-British, but now with German support) for the creation of EU Battle Groups is also relevant, insofar as it aims to strengthen the rapid reaction capacity of the EU in support of UN action. Forces of about 1,500 men could be deployed within 15 days of the outbreak of a crisis. These are some of the tools one would expect to find in the kit for effective global governance and a strengthened multilateral system. However, Javier Solana is less forthcoming on the actual provision of *EU civilian instruments*.

*A second, perhaps more fundamental problem is the distance between discourse and politics,* in terms of political decision-making and accountability. The EU and the UN use the same language—crisis management, conflict prevention, civilian tools and instruments. But even though the discourses match, the EU cannot be *representative* of the UN, with its much wider, disparate, and many-interested membership. Both institutions contain basically the same group of European states, only in different configurations of interests and opportunities. And while institutional expertise and capabilities play a role in their decisions, it is clear that the choice of whether a multilateral operation should be conducted by a coalition of the willing or under the leadership of the EU or the UN (or NATO) is always a political one, made on a case-by-case basis. Some see the 'strategic partnership' as the EU becoming a sub-contractor of the UN—or turning itself into a 'One-Stop-Shop' for the UN's security needs. But without vigilance on the part of organisations like BICC and

similar international NGO elites, the political decisions of an EU-dominated UN will be just as biased towards European interests, and just as subject to domestic politics in Europe, as they have been in recent years by American interests.

The EU-UN strategic partnership is a piece of brilliant strategising, but it is not yet sufficiently politicised. Keeping it politically on track and making it *accountable* is the job of its constituency, and that is not readily identifiable at the present time. The EU demarche is a political act, a self-interested act, an act of transatlantic defiance, and an act of intent towards the rest of the world. This is not necessarily a worse world order than the one we have now, but it promises no better. To make it better would require an altered structure of accountability of global systems.

BICC's role consists in keeping people and agencies accountable in their choices of security. The 'conversion of a system of beliefs' which BICC has furthered has taken place at the level of the discourse. And that is a vast area of success for researchers and think tanks such as BICC. But operationalising and politicising the discourse is the even vaster area still to be worked on. So far, we have an EU-UN partnership, a European security strategy, and talk of European battle groups; a European armaments agency, and an additional European security research programme directed exclusively at hardware. But little money, planning, or research resources in the direction of civilian instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management, and little opening up of the democratic space for the creation of security. We still have that on our 'To do'-list for tomorrow.

## Notes

- 1 The author wishes to acknowledge the financial support provided through the European Community's Human Potential Programme under contract HPRN-CT-2000-00070, and the research support of Catriona Gourlay, Daniela Manca, Catriona Mace, Gerrard Quille and Jocelyn Mawdsley, writing for the *European Security Review* at [www.isis-europe.org](http://www.isis-europe.org).
- 2 European Commission. 2003. *The EU and the UN: The Choice of Multilateralism*. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament COM (2003) 526 final, 10 September.
- 3 European Union and United Nations. 2003. *Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management*. New York, 24 September.
- 4 Armin Laschet (Rapporteur), European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2003. *Report on the Relations between the European Union and the United Nations*. 16 December.
- 5 European Union. 2004. *The Enlarging European Union at the United Nations: Making Multilateralism Matter*. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, January.
- 6 Article 19 of the TEU states that "Member states which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other member states fully informed. Member states which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provision of the UN Charter".

## Summary of the Discussion

The discussion started off with several participants noting that the year 2003 had been very important for the relationship between the UN and regional organizations. The EU had completed the establishment of its full political and military “chain of command”, it had developed its own capabilities as a follow-up of the 1999 “headline goal” and had declared itself “operational”. The creation in January 2004 of the Agency for Armament, Research and Capabilities strengthened this trend. The first EU-led military operations took place in 2003—in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the District of Ituri in Congo. Both missions proved the European Council’s ability to act and showed the importance of the Anglo-French axis. The adoption of the European Security Strategy by the European Council on 12 December 2003 was a valid instrument to measure the extent of cooperation and competition between the EU and other organizations.

It was suggested in the discussion that ESDP and the US policy could play complementary roles. The EU would have an advantage in conflict prevention and development policy while NATO would play the leading role in stabilization; the UN would promote sustainable development while the United States would control the overwhelming military force for containment.

Further contributions highlighted that (1), with globalization, vulnerability would increase; (2) weapons of mass destruction would disseminate rapidly; (3) failed states were a breeding ground for terrorism. No single organization would be capable of coping with all security aspects. NATO and EU were not competitors.

According to another speaker, the EU wants to be effective as an actor inside the European Union, to present itself as ‘big-hearted’, ‘big’ in terms of

financial resources, ‘big’ on troop provision; and strong in the ‘conversion of beliefs’. The problem would consist in making these claims operational.

Some speakers maintained that ‘on the ground’ the EU, NATO, and the UN would actually compete and that their mandates were not compatible; inter-agency meetings would exist, but without efficiency. One speaker questioned the concept of a ‘development policy’ of the ESDP.

The discussion stressed the EU’s power ambitions, the US superpower status as a prerequisite for international stability and rule enforcement, as well as the need for EU-NATO cooperation in coping with newly emerging security threats—as evidenced, for example, by the positive record on the Balkans.

*By Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, BICC*





# 5 Group D Peaceful Ways out of Internal Conflicts: Can External Actors Make a Difference?

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

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please refer to printed publication*

## *Discussion Group D* *Peaceful Ways out of Internal Conflicts:* *Can External Actors Make a Difference?*

### *Rationale, questions and participants*

Work relating to post-conflict situations has become increasingly important for BICC. In its wake, interest in the conditions necessary for successful peacemaking has also increased. As an institution working with many issues on the borderline between civil and military activities, BICC has been particularly interested in the relationship between civilian and military measures and their roles in containing, or eventually ending, a conflict. Because of its close contacts with development donor organizations, BICC has tried to look at a broad range of issues in this connection, including peace and development. In a way, then, this discussion group addressed the same set of real-world problems as Group C did, but from the perspective of development donor organizations, the military, and non-governmental organizations.

Seen from this perspective however, conflict situations often look much more complicated than they do from the lofty heights of strategic discussion at international organizations. From this perspective, conflicts often seem messy and long-drawn-out, with conflict parties entrenched in positions which are not easy to grasp by external actors, let alone resolve. In the last 15 years, the willingness of the international community to protect vulnerable people in conflict situations may have increased but how do you go about it? And what are realistic objectives? Views on these issues differ sharply, for instance among those favoring or rejecting military measures or between optimists and pessimists as regards that which development assistance can achieve. Often those who participate in the discussion have particular country cases in mind from which they generalize. The idea of this group was to bring together some of these views in fruitful discussion.

Chaired by *Winrich Kühne*, Director of the Center for International Peace Missions in Berlin, which trains and provides personnel for a wide variety of operations, panelists were asked to address relevant questions including:

- When can external actors make a difference and, if so, which external actors and how?
- What difference can development assistance make?
- What is the relationship between civilian and military measures in conflict resolution?

The Introductory Statement was presented by *Corinna Hauswedell*. She has been associated with BICC more or less since the beginning, focusing her work lately on conflict management and post-conflict peacemaking, with Northern Ireland as her main empirical case. Comments were prepared by *Christoph Weller*, of BICC's long-time partner organization the Institute for Development and Peace (INEP) at the University Essen-Duisburg; *Cornelia Richter* of German Technical Cooperation, for and with whom BICC has cooperated in a number of projects; and *Eben Friedman*, of the European Centre for Minority Issues.

# Prerequisites to Successful Peacebuilding

*Corinna Hauswedell*

The role of external actors in internal conflicts is a core issue in the broader context of peacebuilding and has become relevant among academics and even more so among policymakers during the last decade of the 20th century when, in the aftermath of the Cold War, growing international attention was paid to the processes by which violent conflicts of various origins would be best transformed or settled to create opportunities for peaceful societal development. Conceptual and operational efforts in the field of conflict or crisis management (CM), conflict resolution (CR), and peacebuilding (PB) have engaged numerous studies and implementation programs, encompassing empirical, and case-study based analysis, as well as comprehensive theory-building in order to enhance 'lessons-learned' approaches around the globe.<sup>1</sup> In Germany, the *Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding*, commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), has just been published.

In many cases, outside assistance or involvement is considered to have a positive impact on the processes of ending wars or violent strife by influencing conflicting parties through positive political and economic incentives, mediation, supportive diplomacy, or negative sanctions. Cases are, however, also reported where the dominant involvement of exogenous actors, in spite of good intentions, has led to counterproductive results—and external players became part of the problem instead of being part of the solution.

The more frequent deployment of military means in international crisis interventions during the last years, increasingly in the context of the 'war against terrorism', has added more skeptical voices to the debate. Realities in which peacebuilding efforts are confronted with ongoing violence and

*peacekeeping* measures often make for a blurred picture which poses a new challenge to discernment. Outside involvement under these circumstances—from the viewpoint of peace making—needs to clearly define its goals and criteria for successful external strategies in conflicts from the onset.

Let me, in my introductory notes, give you some thoughts on the following four questions:

1. Which are 'right' (or wrong) forms of outside involvement? Which actor suits best for which type of conflict?
2. Are some issues in peacebuilding easier to tackle, with greater prospects of success by outsiders, than other issues?
3. Which phases of conflict make for the 'best moment' for outside involvement?
4. How can we deal with the increasingly blurred picture of military and civilian forms of intervention?

For some of my conclusions I will draw on lessons from the Northern Ireland (NI) peace process<sup>2</sup>—which may sound surprising, particularly for the German debate with its focus on development cooperation. But conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Northern Ireland has throughout the last decade been widely influenced by international involvement: although it never came under any kind of UN mandate, the process of coming out of violence in the early nineties was strongly endorsed by prominent international players like the US government, and to a lesser extent the EU, but also by what I would call semi-external actors like the British and the Irish governments who in Northern Ireland are acting in ambiguous double roles, both as mediators and as parties to the conflict.

Case studying such as in Northern Ireland also leads to the observation that we may better talk about external factors than external actors, because a number of more indirect influences coming from the international community dealing with peacebuilding may also be considered as relevant.

## ***1. Which are 'right' (or wrong) forms of outside involvement? Which actor suits best for which type of conflict?***

The general answer would be that there is no general answer. With the UN Agenda for Peace in 1992, a number of basic goals for peace consolidation or peacebuilding processes were established which, at the time, primarily addressed post-conflict rehabilitation needs such as ending the circle of violence and opening up the path for a restructuring process, that is, a 'catching up'-type of prevention (or so called 'negative peace') would avoid serious relapses in the future. In the meantime, the attention of outside involvement has shifted to more long-term goals of creating conditions for sustainable or 'positive peace' and structural stability. Along with more case-study based experience, a few overall lessons have moved up front:

Generally, outside involvement should always be considered a political project rather than a project of pure technical assistance or economic reconstruction. In more detail that is:

- a) Each type of outside involvement must be carefully tailored to the specifics of the conflict. This requires profound knowledge of the political and cultural make-up of the country, society and people affected, including clues about the history of the conflict.

- b) External assistance with a more long-term perspective will only work with the partner country and local actors ‘in the driver’s seat’.
- c) It remains the responsibility of the external actors and donors to guarantee a joint approach in planning and implementing support that is based on a consistent concept and coordination of projects. Several cooks may not necessarily spoil the broth—on the contrary, both governmental and NGO actors may find their appropriate partners for cooperation—but one hand should know what the other one is doing.

In many of the aspects mentioned, the EU Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (EUPPR), which from 1994–1999 donated approximately 700 million euros to peacebuilding projects on the ground in Northern Ireland, was exemplary. It was distributed and managed by a NI umbrella organization and targeted to political initiatives on the ground level of civil society to work in various fields of reintegration, dialogue and reconciliation. Critical evaluation, though, stated that the program lacked consistency with other donors, and a more long-term approach. Other critical voices stated that the EUPPR helped to create a ‘peace industry’-type of complex which worked in a self-sustaining way towards the conflict.

Besides this type of empowerment of civil society, Northern Ireland provides a few more political lessons in terms of outside involvement.

On the positive end:

- Inclusion: Giving a political voice to radical groups during negotiations and peace talks through internationally and domestically accepted mediators (in Northern Ireland: US Senator George Mitchell among others).

- Broadening the scope of potential outside influence by organizing dialogue with other actors from comparable peace processes (such as in the case of NI: South Africa, Central America, the Middle East) may provide a useful floor for low-key confidence-building.
- International expertise and norms persevere best when they are institutionalized in a peace agreement. That is in particular true for conflict-sensitive issues of security concerns (in NI: the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning; international inspectors for disarmament; the Commission on police reform, etc.; the EU Human Rights Convention became the portfolio for safeguarding human rights issues written into the Belfast Agreement).

On the critical end:

- Neutrality of mind: Outsiders may lose their neutral status and become partial to the conflict when they take one or the other side in conflict, or are chosen as ‘guardians’ by conflicting parties themselves.
- The problem of ‘parental guidance’: Too much in terms of outside involvement may prevent local actors from taking independent responsibility for leadership in their society. Neighboring states may play an ambiguous role in this respect.
- Outsiders may underestimate their psychological capacity to foster (or hinder) ‘win-win’ perceptions which are crucial in order to turn local constituencies of conflict into ‘peace constituencies’.

## ***2. Are some issues in peacebuilding easier to tackle, with greater prospects of success by outsiders, than other issues?***

Four major areas of activity in peacebuilding have been recently identified in the *Joint Utstein Study*, commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ):

1. Provide security
2. Establish the socioeconomic foundations of long-term peace
3. Establish the political framework of long-term peace
4. Generate reconciliation and justice

For many conflicts, these four areas indicate a certain order in terms of both timing and priority setting. Depending on the case and circumstances, not all four areas are likely to be addressed best by outsiders. In particular, international organizations and bilateral state institutions may limit themselves to the first two areas, as they touch on highly sensitive matters (1), such as demobilization and disarmament (DDR) or security sector reform (SSR), and require a large amount of funding (2). While (3) and (4), addressing the ‘softer issues’ of societal change and state reconstruction can, in the mid-term perspective, be more successfully dealt with by internal actors, who may be advised by single individuals of international reputation (truth commissions, etc). Outsiders involved in these areas should be extremely careful to not over-impose seemingly ‘ideal’ values and standards which do not match reality on the grounds. Fragmented societies emerging from violent times require rather pragmatic approaches; a ‘bad government’ may be better than no government.



Northern Ireland, although well surrounded by democracies, is yet another example where linking success in one of the areas with success in the others, or, even more difficult, making the one a prerequisite for the other, may be asking for too much at the same time. Slow progress, in particular in areas (3) and (4), is showing the limitations of external influence on the peace process, and points to one of the more important lessons: there is no 'quick fix' to violent conflicts (see also Kosovo). Peace processes—especially conflicts with a difficult historical legacy—are long-term endeavors which may suffer repeatedly from setbacks and stumbling blocks. From outsiders involved, they require patience, an acceptance of ambiguities, and modest, realistic approaches with respect to goals and instruments.

At the end of the day, peace cannot be brought from outside; the internal parties must achieve peace.

### 3. Which phases of conflict make for the 'best moment' for outside involvement?

William Zartman, a senior academic figure in the field of conflict resolution, has repeatedly emphasized that the timing of the beginning of a peacebuilding process is as much of the essence for a solution as the substance of proposals and the areas of action. His theory of the 'ripe moment' which suggests that a 'hurting stalemate' among the conflicting parties may become a window of opportunity, can be a useful tool in the hands of external actors who want to start early, i.e. when the negotiation of issues for the resolution is still in a prenatal stage. Negotiation and political dialogue about a settlement remains the crucial phase in which further conditions for outside assistance may be defined. Usually, this is the phase in which the internal players

actively start to seek help, de-escalation concepts can be introduced, and a mutually accepted road to peace can be established.

Governments, international institutions and NGOs who would like to shift their activities from a primarily post-conflict reconstruction-approach towards sound strategies of prevention and de-escalation of acute crises should bear this in mind.

### 4. How can we deal with the increasingly blurred picture of military and civilian forms of intervention?

Military forces and organizations dealing with humanitarian aid and development cooperation are increasingly operating in similar or even the same places as violent conflict (both acute wars and post-conflict situations). Along with expanding missions of *peace-keeping*, *peace-enforcement* and *peace-building* in areas of so called 'complex emergencies', the range of both military and civilian activity in crisis management is widening. Consequently, the differentiation and discernment of traditional tasks and capacities are getting more and more difficult.

Some of the issues to be discussed here are:

- How do these different types of external actors perceive their (new) roles?
- By whom are they mandated? What are their terms of reference?
- How will they be perceived by those who are suffering under the conflict and expect support that is geared to improving security, humanitarian needs and societal reconstruction?

In most cases of so-called CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) operations, development policy is subordinated to a

predominantly military strategy, and civilian strategic and financial priorities depend heavily on prior military political decisions. These new types of conflict intervention raise fundamental issues of legitimacy, credibility, norms, and rules of cooperation in (post-)conflict situations, and have led to numerous controversies among both scholars and practitioners.

Will former strategies of 'peaceful ways out of conflict', as discussed earlier in this paper, have to be abandoned under the terms of CIMIC?

How can different (state) actors with partly opposing or competing goals and mandates operate along the same line of strategy?

How can parliamentary and public forms of debate have an impact on this new type of peacebuilding?

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, eds. 2003. *Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*. Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Basingstoke/New York; Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds. 2000. *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*. National Academy Press. Washington, DC; Mir A. Ferdowski und Volker Matthies, eds. 2003. *Den Frieden gewinnen. Zur Konsolidierung von Friedensprozessen in Nachkriegsgesellschaften*. Dietz Nachf., Bonn; Tobias Debiel, ed. 2002. *Der zerbrechliche Frieden. Krisenregionen zwischen Staatsversagen, Gewalt und Entwicklung*. Dietz Nachf., Bonn.

<sup>2</sup> A more comprehensive 'lessons-learned' study on Northern Ireland's experience with international involvement has been published by the author: Corinna Hauswedell. 2004. *Der nordirische Friedensprozess – Ein Modell? Leben für die internationale Einbeziehung innergesellschaftlicher Konflikte*. Wissenschaft & Frieden, Dossier Nr. 45, Bonn.

# A Warning Against ‘Social Engineering’: Every Peace Process First Needs the Involvement of the Conflict Parties

*Christoph Weller*

Here are some comments on the introductory statement by Corinna Hauswedell.

In most aspects of her presentation, I agree with Corinna Hauswedell. But I would like to make three comments and pose some additional questions we have to deal with if we want to help external actors to make successful interventions in internal conflicts.

I agree with Corinna Hauswedell, especially when she argues that we should differentiate, first, between various forms of outside involvement; second, between different actors who could develop strategies to promote peaceful ways out of internal conflicts; and, third, that conflict escalation processes contain right or wrong—or, at least, better and worse—moments for successful outside involvement.

## *Comment 1*

To concentrate first on the questions about external actors and the central question of this panel “Can external actors make a difference?”, we all agree—I think—that different actors are needed for different forms of outside involvement: neighboring states could play a role different from that of the superpower; the potential impacts of international organizations could draw, for example, on their special reputation

of having no self-interest in a given conflict; non-governmental organizations have, for example, better chances to cooperate with societal actors, groups, or networks in a conflict region. But such a broad range of actors gives rise to problems of coherence, coordination, and cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution. Looking at a conflict from the outside, external actors often wish to gain influence on the conflict itself and want other actors to work in the same direction. But if it is more coherence of external activities we are looking for, we may overlook three preconditions needed for any such coordinated strategy:

*First:* Somebody must have the masterplan for external crisis management or conflict resolution.

*Second:* Even if we were able to develop such a masterplan for crisis management and conflict resolution, this does not mean that it would automatically be turned into action by the actors concerned or that they would provide the necessary resources and coordinate their activities. Such a plan might outline what is needed, but it cannot guarantee that the political will for implementation is there.

*And third:* If any success in crisis prevention and conflict resolution is to materialize, the conflict parties and the people affected by conflict and violence must be involved in any plan and

strategy for peacebuilding. This was already a major aspect in Corinna Hauswedell’s presentation.

In today’s crisis prevention policies, we would be happy to meet 20% of these three preconditions. But this is not to say that we should give up any efforts at crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding from the outside, quite the contrary: Every external activity determined by conflict resolution strategies and not by the self-interests of external actors could help the conflict parties to prevent escalation and violence. But these goals could not be reached by external actors alone, even if they were perfectly coordinated and acted in a coherent manner. Such a masterplan approach would come close to what is referred to in German as *Sozialtechnologie*, ‘social engineering’. Conflict, and especially the conflicts in which we are not involved, are things where such an approach could not work.

Do not get me wrong! I do not want to argue against any external influence or against coordination for enhanced coherence. But by focusing on conflict and violence as the central problems, we probably underestimate the importance of the actors involved in the conflict and their interests and strategies. This leads me to my second comment:

## Comment 2

Corinna Hauswedell asked: “Are some issues in peacebuilding easier to tackle, with more prospects of success by outsiders, than other issues?” I do not believe that conflicts, conflicting parties, and external actors with the will to influence the conflict process are so similar that the conditions for successful peacebuilding activities are the same in different conflicts, and that we could come up with *general* answers to the questions of external peace-building. And to highlight only one argument for this skeptical view:

A large measure of the impact of activities managed from the outside depends on the perceptions of the external actors held by the conflicting parties. This issue, I think, is underestimated in many cases, and Iraq and Afghanistan are relevant examples: Even the best intentions of external actors, and the right strategy, would have been unable to overcome distrust of or former bad experiences with the external actors. And one consequence, in my view, must be that conflict analyses concerning external activities for conflict resolution or peacebuilding must include detailed findings on how potential outside actors are perceived by the conflict parties and the societies in which conflict resolution activities are set to start.

## Comment 3

And finally, I would like to comment only on one aspect of the blurred picture of military and civilian forms of intervention. In my view, one main problem in these discussions is the categories into which the activities are broken down. These categories, subsuming all non-military activities under the term ‘civilian’ forms of intervention, come from international—or to put it in a more precise form—from interstate relations: Interactions between states are either the job of the military or diplomatic actions intended to avoid violence. But conflict resolution today is more a field of *transnational* than international

relations. The conflict parties in internal conflicts are in many cases non-governmental actors. And looking at the external actors, too, we find more and more important non-governmental organizations and non-military personnel: Their activities may be very different in nature, for example security agents or policemen, on the one hand, and teachers in conflict management or conflict mediation, on the other. Both are called *civil* forms of intervention, although there are major differences between such activities in the field of civil conflict prevention. The only common ground is that the actors themselves are not from the military, but aside from this they have nothing in common. To overcome this dichotomy between military and civil forms of intervention in conflicts, we need more differentiation, especially in the field of non-military conflict prevention activities. We need better concepts and precise terms to mark the diversity of conflict resolution activities. This could also help us to handle the chances and the risks of civil-military cooperation better than we can at the moment.

# Challenges for Development Cooperation

*Cornelia Richter*

The title of today's working group is: "Peaceful ways out of internal conflicts. Can external actors make a difference?" Let me answer this question briefly by saying: "Yes."

Yes, external actors can make a difference, and even if the contribution of every single actor is comparatively small, the sum of contributions can tip the balance between choosing a peaceful or a violent way out of conflict.

But please, let us not cherish an illusion: Crisis prevention is technically and politically extremely difficult. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, military operations as a last resort will not become redundant. However, until now military operations have failed to bring long-lasting stability and peace to the countries concerned, because they do not address the root causes of conflict and the capacities of a society to deal with conflicts constructively.

Development cooperation especially has recognised its role in crisis prevention and conflict transformation during the last decade. Why is this? The reason is evident: More than 90% of all internal wars take place in developing countries. The consequences for development assistance are devastating:

- First of all, achievements of years of development assistance are destroyed. By the end of a typical civil war, incomes are around 15 percent lower, and about 30 percent more people are living in absolute poverty (*Source*: Worldbank).
- Second, the conditions for starting development assistance after a war are worse than ever. We are confronted with heightened military expenditures and capital flight, heightened mortality and morbidity rates, and accompanying high health costs.

- Third, being important players in developing countries and in post-conflict reconstruction, development agencies have to ask themselves not only how they can help to prevent future violent conflict but how they can assist the countries concerned on their way back to peace.

Since the middle of the nineties, German development cooperation has systematically developed its crisis prevention and peacebuilding competency not only in theory but also in practice. Speaking about GTZ's experience, we can now look back at a decade of successful mainstreaming of crisis prevention and peacebuilding. Today, GTZ implements projects and programs which are especially designed to contribute to crisis prevention or which deal with the topic as an important crosscutting issue in about 35 crisis-prone countries world-wide. Most of them are countries with internal conflicts, like Nepal, or with a mixed form of internal and international conflict, such as Afghanistan.

Last year, GTZ undertook an evaluation of the peacebuilding efforts of the German Development Cooperation within the framework of the *Joint Utstein Study of Peace-building*. I cannot describe here in detail the different experiences of GTZ in internal conflicts. But let me briefly state four aspects which are of considerable importance:

- First, general conflict-sensitivity according to the principle of 'Do no harm' of all development activities is of utmost importance. This approach has to be combined with peacebuilding programs designed to directly contribute to conflict transformation. GTZ developed this

strategy closely with other actors in Sri Lanka and is currently expanding it to Nepal, Guatemala, and Yemen.

- Second, the vertical integration of peacebuilding strategies by means of a combination of policy advice and active fieldwork: a good example is the GTZ program *Justice and Reconciliation* in Rwanda which combines legal advice for reconciliation and the support of local *gacaca* courts.
- Third, central to making a difference is close cooperation with other leading agencies in key peacebuilding areas, in order to increase political weight and broaden impact, as we do in Guatemala where the GTZ program to support peace and reconciliation closely cooperates with the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).
- Fourth, one very important issue is the improvement of security. The lack of security is a great obstacle for reconstruction and development, as we can all see today in countries like Afghanistan, Colombia and, of course, Iraq.

I would like to stress the importance of this last point mentioned, namely the importance of security for development and vice versa. In this context, I would like to focus on the issue of civil-military cooperation.

Today, we understand that crisis prevention has to be supported by a wide range of means. This includes civilian as well as military measures. There are an increasing number of civilian and military interfaces both at the international and at the national level, such as:

- In recent UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor and Kosovo linking military and civil tasks
- The European security strategy aiming at extending both civil and military capacities for crisis prevention
- The African Peace Facility, which uses development funds to finance peacekeeping missions
- The German concept of reconstruction teams in response to the US concept of PRTs in Afghanistan.

GTZ's experience with civil-military cooperation on the ground, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, has been largely positive. However, there is still a lot of reservation and fear of contact between civilian and military actors, especially at the political level. This also results from a lack of understanding of the differences caused by the different mandates of civilian and military actors. Different mandates lead to different strategies and working principles.

The objective of development cooperation is the improvement of living conditions of the local population. The military assignment aims at establishing and maintaining security. And security in this context does not necessarily refer to human security, the security of the local population, but primarily to military security. Also, military and development actors are looking at totally different time-frames. Development is a long-term objective. Thus, *sustainability* is the key word for development agencies. *Quick impact measures* the military wording.

It follows that civil and military actors understand civil-military cooperation differently. The term 'CIMIC' is used in the military context and aims first and foremost at the support of the military mission.

In contrast, for GTZ the term 'civil-military cooperation' is much broader. It includes cooperation with military actors like the *Bundeswehr* but also development cooperation with military actors in partner countries in the context of crisis prevention.

Again, it is important to stress the different mandates and tasks of civil and military actors: Development cooperation cannot, and should not, be carried out by military actors. At the same time, development funds should not be used to finance military measures. Instead, specific financing instruments should be created that serve the purpose of crisis prevention by military means.

With an increasing number of civil and military interfaces, we are confronted with the need for complementary action by civilian and military actors. And we are confronted with the need to develop comprehensive strategies incorporating all line ministries involved. A promising example in this respect is the support of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana.

As a first step, it is necessary to clarify roles and responsibilities. We have to ask: Which actions need to be carried out by military actors? When should the intervention of military actors end and when should the intervention of development actors start? How can we improve cooperation?

Until now, the cooperation between civilian and military actors has been too often carried out on an *ad hoc* basis. It is now necessary to *institutionalize* a permanent dialogue, for example, the reciprocal participation in training courses—which already takes place—and the exchange of personnel.

If we develop a joint strategy for crisis prevention, then we can really tip the balance!



# The Macedonian Conflict of 2001: External Actors and Conflict Resolution

*Eben Friedman*<sup>1</sup>

## *Introduction*

Until early in 2001, the Republic of Macedonia enjoyed the reputation of being a beacon of stability in a region beset by conflict. This reputation derived, on the one hand, from the preventive activities carried out by numerous domestic and international actors and, on the other, from the relative moderation of domestic political leaders representing the country's two largest ethnic groups, the Macedonians and the Albanians. With the outbreak in February 2001 of fighting between Macedonian border guards and ethnic Albanians belonging to an organization calling itself the National Liberation Army (NLA), however, references to Macedonia as an oasis of peace were quickly succeeded by less flattering appellations.<sup>2</sup> Spreading in March to the second-largest city in Macedonia with an ethnic Albanian majority (i.e., Tetovo), fighting between the NLA and Macedonian security forces continued throughout the spring in the regions around Tetovo (Western Macedonia) and Kumanovo (to the north), reaching the immediate suburbs of Skopje in early June when the NLA occupied the village of Aracinovo. Fears of civil war during this period were further fuelled by incidents of interethnic violence and anti-government demonstrations. Nonetheless, on 13 August 2001, after more than a month of intense negotiations mediated by representatives of the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United States (US), Macedonia's four largest political parties (two Macedonian and two Albanian)

signed an agreement on a set of measures designed to address many of the grievances of the country's ethnic Albanian population.<sup>3</sup>

This contribution to BICC's Ten-year Anniversary Conference attempts a brief analysis of the armed conflict of 2001 in Macedonia and of the role of external actors in bringing that conflict to a close. While the paper's first section subjects to critical examination the thesis that the Macedonian conflict was in fact an internal one, the second section summarizes the processes leading to the drafting of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The paper's final section focuses on the role of international actors in promoting the implementation of the Framework Agreement.

## *Nature of the conflict*

The emergence of the NLA as a force capable of posing a serious threat to the Macedonian state points to the difficulties of sustaining a strict distinction between internal and external conflicts in the successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; in order to explain the outbreak of armed conflict in Macedonia, we must look not only to factors operating within the country, but also to a spillover from Kosovo. On the domestic side, relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians had been deteriorating throughout the decade since Macedonia's peaceful secession from Yugoslavia. The ethnic Albanian population's dissatisfaction with its representatives in parliament also seems to have grown in the course of this decade, allowing the NLA to effectively marginalize established ethnic Albanian political parties by adopting a

political program similar to theirs, including recognition of Albanians as an equal constituent people in the preamble of the Constitution, making Albanian an official language, and equal job opportunities in state institutions and administration.<sup>4</sup>

However, if the armed conflict of 2001 was internal insofar as it took place within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia and capitalized on popular discontent, its outbreak cannot be explained without reference to neighboring Kosovo. First, the very domestic tensions that eventually erupted into fighting might be traced back to the Kosovo uprisings of 1981 and to the (then-Federal) government crackdown in response to them which saw a large influx of ethnic Albanians into Macedonia, leading Macedonian authorities in turn to take various measures to combat the perceived threat from Albanian nationalism.<sup>5</sup> In the more recent past, the NLA had apparently drawn many of its leaders and a significant proportion of its rank-and-file members (as well as its insignia) from the defunct Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the fact that the NLA carried out many of its operations in the immediate vicinity of the Kosovo-Macedonia border points to the importance of Kosovo as a staging area. Further afield, available evidence suggests that the NLA was founded and largely financed from within the ethnic Albanian diaspora in Western Europe.

## *The road to Ohrid*

The Macedonian government initially attempted to destroy the NLA by military means and, on 21 March 2001, issued a 24-hour deadline for the NLA to lay down arms and/or leave the country. The NLA responded with a unilateral cease-fire, stating that it did not wish to threaten the territorial integrity of the country, and called for dialogue on the rights of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Refusing to negotiate, the Macedonian government ordered a full-scale military offensive on 25 March. Within the course of the next month, however, not only did the government's pursuit of a military solution not succeed in neutralizing the NLA, but its tactic of shelling Albanian-inhabited villages also served to strengthen ethnic Albanian support for the NLA.

On 13 May 2001, against a backdrop of intense political pressure and promises of economic assistance from the EU and the United States, Macedonia's main parliamentary parties formed a 'Government of National Unity' for the purpose of finding a political solution to the crisis. The government's name notwithstanding, a palpable lack of unity both within and between the two ethnic blocs which composed it made for little headway in resolving the crisis, with the efforts of the late President Boris Trajkovski to stabilize the situation and generate a peace plan meeting with little domestic support. Simultaneously condemning the NLA's violent tactics while acknowledging the need to improve the situation of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, international actors progressively expanded their activities throughout the spring of 2001 to bring about a political solution to the crisis. Beginning with shuttle diplomacy by representatives of the EU and NATO, the efforts were stepped up in late June when the EU and the United States each nominated a special

representative to facilitate peace talks. The OSCE also played an important role, with the direct negotiations between the two major ethnic Albanian political parties and the NLA brokered by the Chairman-in-Office's Personal Representative likely contributing to the NLA's assent to the Framework Agreement despite not being a signatory to it.

Following an internationally brokered cease-fire, peace talks began in Skopje on 9 July 2001. Mediated by representatives of the EU, the United States, and (from 10 July) OSCE, the talks involved only the country's four largest political parties (two Macedonian and two Albanian), with NATO's chief representative in Skopje responsible for liaising with the NLA. Although the talks broke down on 18 July when the ethnic Macedonian parties rejected a draft agreement for its concessions to the Albanian bloc, negotiations resumed ten days later, and by the end of the first week of August a final agreement had been initialed. Immediately preceded by some of the worst fighting of the conflict as both sides attempted to gain ground before the official conclusion of hostilities, the signing of the Framework Agreement took place at a low-key ceremony in Skopje on 13 August.

## *Implementing Ohrid: The role of external actors*

The need for international support in implementing the Framework Agreement is explicit in the document itself as well as in communications between the EU and Macedonia since the signing of the Agreement. Annex C of the Framework Agreement invites international monitors to go to the sensitive areas, requesting international assistance for facilitating reconstruction and the return of persons displaced by the fighting. Also requested is help in strengthening local self-government as well as in training local police, minority

lawyers and judges. Additionally, Annex C calls for aid to projects aimed at strengthening the media (which had contributed to ethnic polarization in the country before and during the conflict). For its part, the EU has promised large amounts of aid to Macedonia while making this support contingent on satisfactory progress in implementing the Agreement.

Nearly three years after the signing of the Framework Agreement, Macedonia is at best in the early stages of "the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society" which the document seeks by its own account to promote. While there is no denying the role of government and civil society in Macedonia in bringing this about, the conflict of 2001 has also demonstrated that Macedonia exists at the mercy of destabilizing regional factors. Given that the continued implementation of the Framework Agreement seems to provide the most favorable prospects for the country's development as such, international actors have a responsibility to maintain a regional environment and to promote domestic economic conditions conducive to the Framework Agreement's implementation.

## *Notes*

- <sup>1</sup> This paper consists primarily of excerpts from the longer study by ECMI Senior Non-resident Research Associate Farimah Daftary and the author, entitled "Power-Sharing in Macedonia?" and slated to appear as a chapter in an edited volume to be published in 2004 within the framework of the Carnegie Corporation-funded project "Resolving Self-Determination Disputes through Complex Power-Sharing" undertaken by the European Centre for Minority Issues and Cambridge University.
- <sup>2</sup> See, for example, Tom Walker, "NATO Troops caught in a Balkan Ulster," *Sunday Times* (London), 18 March 2001.

- <sup>3</sup> The original (English-language) text of the Framework Agreement is available at [www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm](http://www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm).
- <sup>4</sup> For the political programs of the two major Albanian parties active before the conflict, see Kongresi i Partisë Demokratike Shqiptare, *Programi i Partisë Demokratike Shqiptare* (Tetovo, 1997); Sobranie na Partijata za demokratski prosperitet, *Programski opredelbi* (Tetovo, 1999).
- <sup>5</sup> For a discussion of these measures, see Hugh Poulton, 1989. *Minorities in the Balkans*. London: Minority Rights Group, pp. 25–27.
- <sup>6</sup> What further complicates the internal-external distinction is the fact that some of the KLA's fighters were ethnic Albanians from Macedonia, with the career of (Major General) Gezim Ostreni a case in point. An ethnic Albanian from Debar (Western Macedonia), Ostreni was a commander in the KLA, taking a position in the Kosovo Protection Corps following the KLA's disbandment. During the Macedonian conflict, Ostreni served as the NLA's chief of staff. Since 2003, Ostreni has headed Macedonia's National Coordinating Body for the voluntary surrender of weapons.

## Summary of the Discussion

Normally, military operations do not address the root causes of conflict, nor do they have long-lasting effects on stability. Their aim is to provide security first, so that humanitarian organizations can work in a secure environment. Indeed, where the environment is not secure, much money has been spent in vain on development programs. However, there is no inherent cultural clash between those who provide security and those who provide civilian services because both are necessary: both should accept the importance of each other's roles, both should try to understand each other's tasks, and both should work out mechanisms and practices of how to cooperate effectively. A 'masterplan' is essential and activities in the field must be coordinated.

Often it is not the military, but the political approach that has failed. It is an illusion to think that sending the military into a conflict area is sufficient. In the Balkans, for instance, peace forces from outside have already been engaged for nine years and there is still no solution. As for a proposed 'masterplan', this may sound good from a logical point of view, but the reality is clearly different: masterplans never seem to work out. Similarly, 'early warning' does not seem to succeed, as past examples have shown. Somehow crisis prevention appears to be the less attractive alternative: the media are only interested in a region if shooting is taking place there, that is, when you can see blood on the television—if not, nobody's interested.

A problem we are still struggling with is the question of the ownership of peace operations. To whom do we give ownership? There is definitely a tendency in peace operations to dominate. When has the time come to hand over control?

'Conflict resolution' is not the right term to use because it is actually 'the management of transformation' we are dealing with. This entails many problems, but the main one is that there is usually no plan right from the beginning for an exit strategy: we may know how to send the military in, but

we do not have convincing concepts of how to withdraw them again.

We should be very critical of a masterplan and ensure that it is civilian-dominated. If they are involved at all, the military should be a tool and not in the lead. Again, this is an ideal picture and the crisis will often act out differently. Possibly we should look at the situation from a more historical viewpoint: what type of de-escalation measures at the civil and military level worked in the past and could these be applied to the conflict and crisis now being faced?

Civilian and the military culture are both very masculinized cultures and concepts. When the military enters a civilian space, it very often closes up the space that women have created for peace. Usually women are neither included in the peace talks, nor are they consulted about peace, included DD&R measures, a fact which is borne out adequately by the statistics.

Now, the military not only often have policing obligations but are also involved in conflict prevention to the extent that they are really involved in the fighting. This is a role the military have never taken on before, even during the period of the Cold War. German armed forces have never been involved in fighting before but now—all of a sudden—they are fighting again in the name of conflict prevention. This should give us food for thought.

Dramatic lessons have been taught by peace operations in the past. For example, although Haiti was initially evaluated in terms of operational capabilities as one of the best peace operations, it is now back at square one—or maybe worse. When Kofi Annan's special envoy came back from Haiti recently, he said: "If we are not prepared to make a decision to stay for as long as twenty years, we should not go." This would imply a completely new approach.

*By Renée Ernst, BICC*

6

# Group E Arms Control and Disarmament: Still Relevant in the New Century?

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*



*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

## *Discussion Group E* *Arms Control and Disarmament: Still Relevant in the New Century?*

### *Rationale, questions and participants*

Talking about arms control and negotiated disarmament seems almost outdated in the new century. A number of recent attempts to arrive at new instruments, such as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or to strengthen existing treaties, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions, have come to nothing. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not had a negotiation agenda for some years.

But can we write off arms control and disarmament altogether? Is there any alternative to seeking more security and stability at lower costs and with less danger to the lives and health of people?

What is often forgotten is that there *were* major successes in arms control in the early and mid-1990s, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the prolongation without a time limit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. Have conditions for successful arms control changed so much since the mid-1990s that such treaties are no longer possible? Or does this indicate just a temporary waning of interest? Shouldn't the perception of new threats—such as terrorism—lead to renewed efforts in ascertaining how arms control could address these very threats? Is the Ottawa Convention, which was negotiated outside the regular disarmament machinery, a promising example for future arms control or a unique case?

The objective of this group was to find out, from known practitioners and experts, what prospects for arms control they saw, how they analyzed the current crisis in arms control, and what suggestions they had for a new arms control agenda.

Chaired by *Walter Jürgen Schmid*, the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control at the German Foreign Office, panelists were invited to share their views on the issue, including questions such as:

- Does arms control, as it exists, address current and future international problems?
- What gaps need to be closed, and how?
- Are there new ideas for arms control agreements?
- Is there still a role for disarmament and, if so, what is it?

The Introductory Statement was provided by *Patricia Lewis*, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and a member of BICC's International Advisory Board. BICC has long been associated with UNIDIR and has cooperated on a number of projects. Comments were prepared by *Josef Holik*, German Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament in the early 1990s and involved in many negotiations in the 'golden days' of arms control in the late 1980s and early 1990s; by *Ruprecht Polenç*, Member of the German Federal Parliament, with a seat on the Committee for Foreign Policy as well as on the Sub-Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control; and by *Gerrard Quille* of the International Security Information Service, a non-governmental organization in Brussels, which, among other topics, looks at recent military developments and identifies gaps and opportunities for arms control.

# Reframing Arms Control and Disarmament

*Patricia Lewis*

“Success is going from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm” (a quote from Winston Churchill). In the arms control community we often think of our work as a failure because we haven’t managed to achieve everything. But we have actually achieved a great deal. And we have to keep remembering what we have achieved, how we achieved it, and what were the elements of success. Moreover, we have to look at what is happening today that could actually give us clues to how we might succeed in the future.

## *Disarmament in the inter-world war period*

How did we get here and why did we get here? When we talk about arms control, we usually only talk about the post-Second World War period, the Cold War and now the post-Cold War period. However, much of the stage was set for the debates on arms control in the inter-world war period. Arguments about the relationships, for example, between disarmament and development or disarmament and economics, the economic consequences of disarmament, the concern of being able to trust that countries were actually sticking to their word, are the same arguments that persist today and undermine or underpin the credibility in the concept of disarmament. The debates which took place within the framework of the League of Nations—particularly on the connection between disarmament and security: Does disarmament increase security or does security lead to a ‘natural’ reduction in arms?—were lost or won as a result of what happened in the inter-war period. These opposing strands of opinion are still the basis of a debate that rages today. Another important thing that happened during that inter-war period—and one we should do well to remember—is that the use of chemical and biological weapons was prohibited and that prohibition of use has remained with us for almost one hundred years.

## *Disarmament and arms control post-World War II*

Immediately following the Second World War, nuclear weapons radically altered the political landscape. In terms of arms control and disarmament, no longer were we talking about the control of conventional weapons; suddenly nuclear weapons dominated the whole issue of weapons control and power politics and changed the scene completely.

So we have a problem that started then and remains with us today: a balance of power. At first it was only America who had nuclear weapons, then quickly other countries, the UK, Russia, France, China created a sort of balance of power. Even today, we hear this argument: if the UK or France or Russia or China gives up its nuclear weapons, the US military power could not be kept in check, hence we cannot have nuclear disarmament. If a counter argument is made pointing out that US military power seems not to be held in check by these other permanent members of the UN Security Council through their possession of nuclear weapons, then we are warned, gently but firmly, that things could be much worse than they are now.

On the other hand of course, proliferation concerns abound in this nuclear age. Once nuclear weapons had spread to those five countries, what would stop them spreading beyond? Indeed, although proliferation has been slower than had been predicted, there *has* been a spread. And we are concerned that there continues to be a spread. The technology for a simple nuclear weapon is 1940s’ technology. It is hardly impossible for a wide range of countries now to develop this technology or to buy from those that already possess it. One thing that works in favour of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is that they require a very specific type of material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium—so control

over these materials is key to preventing proliferation. Controls on these fissile materials are good but not perfect. If a country or a non-state armed group can get hold of weapons-grade fissile material, then it would be possible for most industrialised and developing countries to be able to make nuclear weapons. In addition, there is growing concern over the access that non-state actors now have to such technologies and materials.

In the end we are left with an unsustainable situation. Since 1968, the nuclear weapons states, as defined by the NPT, have retained their nuclear weapons whilst expecting all other states to give up the nuclear option. Granted, during and after the Cold War some progress was made on nuclear disarmament, including the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, the reduction in strategic nuclear missiles and bombs, and the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. However, many nuclear warheads remain, including battlefield nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear forces, and a wide selection of strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, the hard-fought, hard-won CTBT has not been ratified by the United States, and so other key states are following suit. It is not surprising then that cracks are appearing in the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Following the Second World War we also had, and still have, another tension, and that was that of conventional weapon versus weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, the balance of these was seen to be critical and completely influenced the way in which we approached arms control in general. Nuclear disarmament was not seen as possible whilst there was a perception of a strong conventional force in the East. Of course this concern shifted dramatically once the Cold War ended. However, the lack of concern over large conventional forces poses another arms control problem in a much wider, global arena.

The issue of verification was critical before and after the Second World War and is still critical today. Perceptions of what constitutes ‘adequate’ or ‘effective’ verification still differ widely and can make or break the possibilities for successful arms control regimes.

During the Cold War-period, the 1925 Geneva Protocol gained in strength and was built upon by making and winning for “no use means no possession” in the arena of chemical and biological weapons, thus leading to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention. This has not yet translated as a norm into nuclear weapons.

### *Matching needs with institutions and frameworks*

My proposition is that 60 years on from the beginning of the UN, we have old and out-dated machinery to cope with this increasingly complex world. We have software written in a language that none of us would recognise if we were writing it today, and we need a major upgrade. We are working at the Conference on Disarmament for example on an agenda that was set in 1978 and since then there has been no serious attempt to change that agenda. Some issues have fallen off the agenda in that a treaty was agreed and that’s a positive sign. But most of the things remain on it. There have been some attempts to at least discuss changing the agenda but none have achieved anything. We have the UN Security Council with five permanent members and a structure that was relevant to 1945 which has to be updated. The UN Security Council is a mechanism for brokering power within the world and so the question that we have to ask ourselves is: Does it still do that job effectively? (Whether it ever did the job effectively is another question.)

We still have the UN Disarmament Commission that now acts in an advisory role but can still never get to any agreement recently. We have the First Committee of the UN General

Assembly where resolutions are passed. Sometimes these resolutions are taken notice of and even acted upon, but all too often they are repetitions of previous years’ resolutions. There is talk of reform of the First Committee and General Assembly but so far the reform has been mostly focused on dates and timing.

We have a number of treaties, the biggest of them the NPT, the BWC, CWC. Are those sufficient for what we need today? A number of countries have decided they are not sufficient and they have looked for ways to supplement them such as through export control regimes and proliferation and security initiatives and arrangements. Some see these supplements as a direct threat, undermining efforts; others see them as a way of underpinning efforts.—That’s the debate that is going on today.

### *Back to basics*

If we are looking at arms control and disarmament we have to go back to the basic question: Why do we want arms control? Is it some kind of nostalgia? Is it some kind of religious adherence to the idea? Or is it something else that it provides for us? To me it’s about security. It’s about increasing security. But then I have to ask: Security for whom? If it’s security just for a few, is that really the sort of security we are looking for?

The reverse of retaining nuclear weapons to keep power in check is that arms control keeps power in check. That’s one of its most important functions. The control of arms is a form of the control of power, and in our world that seems to be vital. There are also rational and emotional reasons for our concerns over weapons and we should not dismiss these. We react to the effects of weapons emotionally and rationally and indeed our perception of security is, in part, emotional. These are very important reasons for looking for arms control and disarmament.

What we have learned about arms control is that, despite its limitations — and there are many—if it is set up well, then it works. It does the things we want it to do. It can enhance security. It can keep power in check. It can assist development. It can provide the assurances we need to increase the good relationships between states, and indeed one of its primary roles is confidence-building.

So then we have to ask, having gone back to basics and looked at the reasons why we still want disarmament and arms control, what we have. We are not starting from scratch. This is not a clean slate. We are always building on the remains of what we had before.

### *What we have—Is it what we need?*

So the question to ask first: Is there a treaty or a forum that you would actually get rid of? Would you be prepared to axe an established forum? Which one? The Conference on Disarmament? The Disarmament Commission? I’ll leave that as an open question.

Is there anything in the established disarmament structures that you would change, knowing of course that when you start to make changes, all sorts of things might happen that you have not predicted?

And the other question is: Where are the gaps and how can we fill those gaps? What is it that is missing from our arms control toolbox?

The gaps—and you may have others to add to the list—are primarily as follows (we are looking only at weapon system technologies here; there are other gaps in terms of processes):

■ With regard to **large conventional forces** there has been a gap now since the end of the 1980s. We have the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty that was negotiated then in Europe—but what has been done on large conventional forces in terms of arms control since then?

■ **Missiles:** We have voluntary export controls on missiles. We have the Hague Code of Conduct, which is a multilateral arrangement, and the (now) second UN expert study on missiles that is taking place at the moment. Of course missiles are dealt with in the bilateral process between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. And it has always been ironic within the arms control community that nuclear arms control is primarily missile control between those two countries but when it came to everyone else, missiles were just completely ignored and were off the agenda.

■ **Space:** We have very few limits on the development of space. We have the Outer Space Treaty that prohibits weapons of mass destruction in space and we have the Moon Treaty. But that's about it. We don't have anything at the moment that would stop the types of dominance in space that some countries are both considering and fearful of.

■ **Nuclear disarmament:** Some steps towards nuclear disarmament have been undertaken, but we don't have what one could call deep and meaningful disarmament. We have nothing that in many ways really makes a serious impact on the numbers of nuclear weapons that the very large nuclear weapons states have. And that is having a big impact on trust in the whole system and proliferation.

■ **Non-lethal weapons:** Although they are not at all non-lethal, we have nothing on what some people call 'non-lethals'.

■ **New technologies:** Upstream arms control. For example, nanotechnologies—Is it possible to put controls on things before they are developed? It has happened in some cases.

### *What is working? What is not?*

Why is it that there is so much sensitivity about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons within the states that deal with these things—the large powerful states—when these are weapons that will probably never be used, whereas there seems to be so little sensitivity about discussing conventional forces that are actually used, such as landmines, small arms, explosive remnants of war and so on? Why is it that in those negotiations NGOs and academics sit with the states' delegations, almost as full partners and all sorts of military discussions take place that have real meaning on the ground whereas when we talk about weapons of mass destruction it is all theology and doctrine—and yet NGOs are not allowed into the discussions. This is a rather ironic and puzzling approach. It all has to do with the political value of weapons of mass destruction, the status that weapons of mass destruction give a country, rather than their true military value. We need to challenge that particular sensitivity.

The other thing we need to look at is what is it that is working and what is it that isn't working. If we compare the UN Programme of Action for Small Arms with the Vienna Protocol on firearms, which was negotiated just a few weeks before the Programme of Action, they both deal with small arms, but the Vienna Protocol is a legally binding protocol and so it has to be ratified to enter into force. Very few states have so far ratified it, so little has happened since 2001 to implement this protocol. But as a result of the UN Programme of Action, which is a non-legally binding agreement between states and thus a political statement, there have been a mass of activities since 2001. It's been one of the big success stories of arms control in the last few years. This I think is a lesson for us.

The CD is not working, the NPT is not working, and then there are all the gap issues that are just not on the table.

So the question is: What makes one set work and one not? Partly it is the issue of sensitivity; partly it is the issue of whether we go for 'legally binding' or 'non-legally binding' and how flexible we are. And partly it has to do with the ways in which NGOs and academics etc. 'think outside the box' which is so difficult for governments to do.

### *Where now?*

What kind of arms control and disarmament do we want to have for the future? And what do we have to do to get there? The final question—and perhaps the most difficult one—is: Are we prepared to do what it takes to get there?

We need a very adaptable framework. We are in a different world from 1945 or 1978. Our structures don't reflect that, but they need to. We need to reflect the new realities in any framework that we set up. We need to focus on the human being at the centre. Is there a difference between state security and human security? There should not be, but there often is. The state should provide security for its civilians, but sometimes we have to protect civilians from the state.

It is preferable to focus on people within states rather than states themselves, because it helps us to get it right. We need to try to focus on the issues of human rights, the effects of these weapons on the health of people, the development, the long-term aspects of the use of these weapons, and humanitarianism. This does not only mean landmines, small arms etc. only because these weapons are killing people now. Nuclear weapons are really bad for your health too when they are used; biological weapons unbelievably bad for your health when they are used; and it's no good saying "They are not being used. We don't have to worry about them." If we do that, we are negligent for the time in which they might be used.



What do we need to do to get there? We need a vision for the future and that means leadership. We need to change attitudes. We need structural changes. Structures are very important. When we don't have a match between reality and our structures to deal with reality we are doomed to failure. We need to set priorities. We need to be very pragmatic. We need to understand power and realities and what can be achieved when and by whom. And we need persistency, creativity and a strong stomach.

What is leadership? 'Them'? Elected leaders? No! Leadership means 'Us'. We are leadership. That means that we have to understand that we have to use our own power. What is our power? The whole history of humanity is about the power of ideas and the battle between ideas.

We, in the arms control/disarmament community, need to foster our own debate. We agree too much. We need to value the different points of view among us. There are different schools of thought—the clans of arms control—and they are very important. And then, once we appreciate the different points of view, we need to find the common ground. So we first need a multidisciplinary approach and then need to find the common ground that we have. We need to move collectively on that common agenda.

Moreover, we need structural change. We need change in the political groupings that we have—within the UN, for example. We have, for instance, the Eastern group within the Conference on Disarmament, that now has NATO member states. We have the non-Alliance that is traditionally against nuclear weapons with two or three (depending on how we count them) states that possess nuclear weapons within it. We are in trouble within the political groupings and they can't agree within each other. The western group can't agree. China usually agrees with itself because it is in a group of one.

The First Committee has all of these problems as well. The CD cannot, it seems, reform itself. It has to do everything through consensus so, to

reform it, all involved would have to agree fully. But it is reform or die for the CD, so someone has to do something about that. The irony is that the consensus rule is working *against* finding consensus. And from what we see in other forums, often where you have voting, you get consensus. There is nothing like the fear of a vote for producing agreement. One of the key structural roles we have to change is the work of NGOs. The most historic decision of the CD took place this year when it was agreed that for the first time NGOs will be allowed to address the CD once a year, as soon as its program of work has been agreed. But this is nowhere near enough.

We also need structural changes within the Security Council. The responsibility within the Security Council is to find agreement. That primary responsibility rests with the permanent member of the Council as they have the power of veto.

### ***What should our priorities be?***

We need to use a problem-solving approach. First we have to assess the immediate threats and agree to deal with those first. That's not easy within the international community, but has to be done. Then we have to assess the long-term threats and assure that the responses to the immediate ones are not undermining our responses to the long-term threats. In this way we would build an overarching approach. But we should build in flexibility so that we don't end up in the situation that we are in today where we have a 1978-agenda so enshrined that we cannot change it. We have to work along parallel tracks. We do have to be able to work on conventional forces, nuclear, chemical, biological, all at the same time, as well as on new technologies.

### ***What does that mean in practice?***

Let us take the fissile material issue as an example. The big debate is whether nuclear weapons stocks should be included in this negotiation or not. Why

not think about stocks in an entirely different way such as the way in which we think about stocks in the small arms context, where we look at stockpile security and management first. This way all the nuclear weapons states and the *de facto* nuclear weapon powers can be brought in. The concerns over loss of materials to terrorists can be taken care of and the stuck debate on stocks gets a new lease of life.

Another example would be to integrate commercial space policy issues with space security issues. Let's bring in the business sector, thus creating room for all in the debate that we have about weaponisation of space. This could lead to a common approach to space, a bit like the Antarctic approach, building up 'rules of the road' for space or a space 'code of conduct' along the lines of the laws of the seas. Discussions on preventing an arms race in outer space could begin in Geneva or Vienna or Paris, or anywhere else appropriate. It is too important an issue to delay any longer.

We need to reframe the way in which we approach disarmament and arms control. Disarmament is a humanitarian issue; it is a human issue, and so we have to focus on the indiscriminate and inhuman effects of weapons. That has been successful for a large number of other weapons systems. Why are we not thinking of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in that framework today? Why not look at the Cooperative Threat Destruction as a completely new framework for dealing with security. Let's look at a new partnership between governments, NGOs and IGOs that will bring fresh ideas and new thinking into the debating halls.

"If you're going through hell, keep going" (a quote from Winston Churchill again) and I think that is what we need to do. We need to just keep going, reframe ourselves, rethink things, be more creative and make sure that we don't give up on this particular project.

# Arms Control Achievements: A Solid Foundation

*Josef Holik*

Before going into this question we have to understand why arms control and disarmament were so relevant in the 'Decade of Disarmament' from 1986 to 1996 and before.

The basic reason: There was the greatest military confrontation in history, called the Cold War, with a revolutionary new ingredient, the nuclear weapon. From the beginning, the Cold War and the bomb reinforced each other in an interlocking process of fear and challenge. This process led to the invention of arms control in the United States in the early 60s—an endeavor with, at first sight, moderate ambitions: slowing down the nuclear arms race, reducing the nuclear danger, stabilizing the strategic relationship.

In Europe, the arms control story was different from in the United States. In America, arms control was separated from the underlying political issues dividing East and West. The stalemate reached in the strategic arms race—before real disarmament started with the INF Treaty—seemed a sufficient achievement. In Europe, the frontline between NATO and the Warsaw Pact proved less stable, with weaknesses of the West in the conventional and in the substrategic nuclear sector. Arms control, an "integral part of Western security policy", became an important instrument to help maintain a rough military balance—just think of the 'Double Track Decision'. For two decades, even without tangible results at the negotiating tables, arms control and disarmament remained a relevant factor for Western security policy.

Then, in the mid-80s, arms control found a new role as an instrument of cooperative security between East and West. It started with Gorbachev accepting principles developed by the

Western arms control community: principles like the renunciation of military superiority, parity and asymmetric reductions, transparency. As so often in history, the losing side showed itself ready to take over the ideology of the winner.

The effects of this breakthrough in cooperative security went beyond Europe and East/West relations and activated the multilateral sector with the focus on UNDC in Geneva. After 20 years of fruitless negotiations, for example, the CW Convention was concluded.

So the classical instruments of arms control and disarmament were developed in a situation that has ceased to exist: The military confrontation between East and West in Europe. In the present state of global power structures, it is hard to recognize, with the possible exception of India and Pakistan, any military confrontation between major countries or blocs that could endanger peace. There are centers of regional tensions, some with grave implications for world peace, but no constellations in which comparable military forces confront each other and where you could apply criteria like parity, non-capability for attack, transparency, or military confidence-building. Asymmetric military buildups, not to speak of asymmetric threats like terrorism, are not suitable for arms control.

Certainly, the power structures which dominate the world today will change sooner or later. The end of the Cold War was not, as Francis Fukuyama predicted 12 years ago, the end of history. History teaches that great powers and empires had their rise and fall, with or without the help of their rivals. Even unspectacular factors like over-aging populations in many countries may change the face of the world and the balances between nations.

Looking forward to this period of change and possibly turmoil, the framework of cooperative security which we owe to arms control and disarmament may again prove an anchor of stability. I am thinking of achievements like the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document on CSBMs, the CSCE Forum for Security, or Open Skies. In this sense, all these agreements are still relevant and deserve to be kept alive and further developed, although this is probably a less exciting task for my successor than it was for me to participate in their making.

For the continuation of the START process, the present global situation seems particularly favorable. The former rivals do not feel threatened by each other any more. While the START I Treaty of 1991 was the result of 10 years of negotiation and comprised 700 pages, the last treaty signed in Moscow in 2002 was negotiated in 6 months and consisted of 3 pages. But if the United States and Russia really destroy two-thirds of their nuclear weapons by 2012, the world will be a safer place, whatever it may look like by then.

What remains is the global multilateral sector. Here we had in the 90s—mainly as a spillover of the success of arms control and disarmament in Europe—remarkable achievements in the cooperative efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ideal model of cooperative security at this level was the Chemical Weapon Convention, in which all member states, with equal rights and obligations, agreed, under strict international control, to destroy their chemical weapons and not to produce new ones. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although less ideal as an instrument for international cooperation, was

nevertheless given unconditional and unlimited extension. There is no doubt that these instruments remain highly relevant, especially in the struggle against terrorism. Certainly, ‘counter proliferation’ has become more important than cooperative non-proliferation, at least for one important player in the recent past. In spite of my deeply rooted preference for cooperative action, however, I have to admit that American actions, even if their legitimacy under existing international law may have been doubtful, have had some positive effects on international cooperation—think of Libya or Iran.

To sum up, arms control and disarmament as practised in the last quarter of the last century remain relevant for our security—less as a framework for new action, but as a basis that has to be followed up. Followed up also in the sense of the conversion of military resources for civilian purposes, the main task given to BICC by its founding fathers 10 years ago.

I am skeptical about the enthusiasm shown by surviving members of the shrunk arms control community in their efforts to revive the security agenda of yesterday. I believe that the emphasis should be shifted. There is a new need for arms control and disarmament in a field hardly foreseen 10 years ago. Arms, especially small arms, and their use in internal and external conflicts constitute one of the gravest impediments to development in world regions that were once victim of colonialism and may now become victims of globalization. Disarming warring factions is disarmament in the proper sense of the word. ‘Practical disarmament’ or ‘microdisarmament’ have—with the assistance also of BICC—been introduced into the security agenda of the United Nations. Controlling and civilizing the use of military power in developing countries and reforming their security sector is arms control in a

new form. Dissolving armed forces, reintegrating fighters into civilian life, the disposal of weapons and military resources is a challenging task for conversion.

If, in my days as German Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, these issues were generally considered as part of our security policy, I would maintain that by now they have mainly become an indispensable part of development policy. In a sense, the new tasks will also remain part of our security policy, in so far as it is very much in our proper security interest to overcome poverty, injustice and instability in the Third World. How often do we hear speeches these days about the real reasons for terrorism?

In my days, too, I had to deal with hosts of experts, think tanks, and institutes specializing in arms control and disarmament in the context of military security. Sometimes we were all regarded as a growth industry. For the new brand of arms control and disarmament, as part of development policy, there is much less competition, both in research and in practice. We are lucky to have one of the worldwide leading relevant institutions here in Bonn. In the 10 years since its foundation, BICC has managed to adjust its agenda to the needs of our time.

# Priorities for Arms Control

*Ruprecht Polenz*

The exposure of the international network centred on the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the revelation of the Libyan programme of weapons of mass destruction, and the discoveries in Iran have demonstrated in an alarming fashion how urgently necessary the reform of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is and the kind of crisis arms control finds itself in.

As is shown by these cases, and others, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the main pillar of our nuclear disarmament work and the most important instrument in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is being broken and circumvented for ideological reasons of power politics or on economic grounds. On the one hand, the revelations and disclosures of the last few weeks are positive. On the other, however, they also make clear the extent to which international agreements and controls can be evaded and point to the gaps in the monitoring system.

Though North Korea—by breaking the NPT—India, Pakistan (and Israel) have joined the nuclear club, the number of atomic powers has not grown in the decades since the NPT entered into force. Nevertheless, the scale and speed of proliferation are increasing ever further. The risk that the approach taken by North Korea will be emulated and other states will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—Iran is already threatening to do this—presents the signatory states with an extraordinary challenge. The contraventions of the treaty committed openly by Libya and North Korea are fostering doubts about the reliability of NPT agreements and may trigger attempts to acquire weapons systems among the neighbouring states.

What are the causes of the crisis in arms control?

Firstly: The existing arms control mechanisms were developed for the East-West conflict. We relied on reciprocal disarmament on equal terms and reciprocal controls. Secondly: The mechanisms with which we have been familiar up until now were developed with the defence capabilities of sovereign states in mind. But today—and this characterises the transformed situation—we are seeing new, changed conflicts and perceptions of threat. Wars within states, in other words civil wars, are not covered at all by the arms control regimes put in place to date. These regimes do not take account of the privatisation of war. We have the problem of terrorism and failed states, and the problem of the association of terrorism and the countries of concern to us that the Americans call “rogue states”.

Of course, when we talk about the crisis in arms control work, we must also consider the reasons for the acquisition of advanced military technology and the increasing efforts being made to obtain weapons systems. There are essentially five causes:

Firstly: the perception of threat in specific situations. Secondly: the striving for supremacy, influence and prestige. Thirdly: the maintenance of domestic power. We only have to think of the fact that Saddam Hussein did not just use his armed forces to bolster his dictatorial regime, but even deployed weapons of mass destruction for this purpose. Fourthly: entrepreneurs of violence, for whom the acquisition of arms is part of a lucrative business. Fifthly: the pursuit of terrorist goals, including the striving for weapons of mass destruction.

The new conflicts also have to be addressed if we are to enjoy success in the disarmament field. When it comes

to failed states, nation-building is necessary. There is a need for anti-proliferation policies incorporating export controls, but also for the interception of shipments of weapons of mass destruction—on the high seas, for example. We are thus at a point where international law has to be further developed.

Moreover, we will not make progress in the fight against terrorism without the idea of prevention. A further development of international law is required in this field. Above all, the debate about prevention is concerned with these last two issues: anti-proliferation measures and action to combat terrorism. Of course, any settlement that is reached—this is a point on which we will certainly be in agreement—must apply generally, which means it must apply to India and Pakistan as well, and it must not result in the escalation of conflicts.

On 11 February, the American President, George W. Bush, discussed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in a keynote speech on security policy. In it, he proposed a tightening of export controls and the strengthening of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as well as calling for the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enter into universal force. The President also put forward a proposal concerning the civilian use of atomic energy: countries that are able to produce and export nuclear fuel should offer to sell fuel to states that are not in a position to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. In principle, as the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed el-Baradei, has also said, these proposals point in the right direction. They are important steps that will promote cooperation with the United Nations and the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In my estimation:

- Control and verification of compliance with the treaty will not be sufficient. It is necessary to ensure that compliance is enforced.
- The threat of the use of force as a deterrent must be credible.
- It is possible to take effective preventative action to counter proliferation by hindering the spread of missiles and nuclear weapons from the industrialised countries. At the same time, this will help to forestall military interventions.

Finally, such an initiative—the Europeans and the Americans would certainly have to participate in it—would also be a signal that peace and security in the Middle East constitute a shared transatlantic interest.

If we are to achieve the disarmament of further states that are in conflict with each other, the crucial question will be whether and how far we succeed in gaining acceptance for the basic idea that security cannot be won from other states or in conflict with them, but only through cooperation. For example, we should call on the German Federal Government to throw its weight behind talks on arms control in the Middle East. Such talks have been held in the past: from 1992 to 1995 following the Madrid Middle East Conference. The changes that have recently occurred in Iraq and the changes that are hopefully beginning to take shape in Iran could provide the momentum for such talks.

I am not deluding myself: there is no likelihood of an agreement on disarmament in the Middle East in the near future; but such a forum could serve to initiate discussion of the threats perceived by the states involved. Unlike previously, Syria might be prepared to take part. Of course, by contrast with the earlier talks, Iran and Iraq—if necessary its transitional government—would also have to be invited to take part. Middle East arms control talks along these lines would provide an opportunity for the USA and Iran.



# A Role for the European Union

*Gerrard Quille*

Following on from Dr Lewis's initial presentation it is clear there is a rich, challenging and demanding role for arms control and disarmament to play in meeting today's complex security challenges. I would agree wholeheartedly with that perspective and with the range of challenges demanding our attention. I would also like to say that, by stating the relevance of disarmament and arms control, we are not blindly endorsing failed policies or a hopeless agenda; I would argue that those interested in understanding the role that disarmament can play in tackling international security challenges are entering the debate at a critical moment where serious reflection and analysis is required to understand past failures and introduce policies that are appropriate to today's security environment. Whilst some might say unilateralism's weaknesses have been laid bare over Iraq, I would argue that the future of multilateralism lies not in point-scoring over what happened in Iraq, but in developing policy responses that are practical and that meet today's security priorities whilst maintaining a united international approach to its normative underpinnings. For this reason I would like to centre my remarks on the new developments within the European Union (EU) that appear to be taking up this agenda and responding with a firm 'Yes' that arms control and disarmament are still relevant today.

## *The rise of the EU on security*

The EU's portfolio on security matters has taken a definite acceleration in recent years. The origins of security policy in the EU can in fact be traced to its origins in the Treaty of Rome, but there security policy *per se* took a second place to economic security co-operation. Nevertheless references to security policy continued throughout the period under review, with European political cooperation culminating in the 1986 Single Europe Act that institutionalised political cooperation.

In the 1990s, the institutionalisation of European security policy developed rapidly through the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the 1997 Treaty on the European Union (Amsterdam) where the Union was endowed with a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the potential to develop a common defence policy. This was within the context of the post-Cold War peace dividend and Europe's baptism of fire as a helpless bystander in the unfolding tragedy of ethnic violence in the Balkans.

Finally, in 1998, after the Kosovo War, the United Kingdom and France got together in a much quoted meeting at St Malo to breathe life into treaty references to defence and security policy.

Perhaps even more dramatic and specifically relevant to this session was the impact of September 11 and the Iraq War on the EU's accelerated role in defence and security policy and in particular in tackling terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Just as in the United States, these two events have had a dramatic effect in putting substance on the up-to-now bare bones of EU defence and security policy. The EU has now developed, alongside NATO, to become both a security provider and an institutional framework through which its members can achieve their security objectives—ones which they could not achieve individually. This last statement is the key to understanding the rapid evolution of the EU and its main focus on the concepts of 'coherence' and 'multilateralism' in meeting the common and shared security priorities.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was partly a response to the Union's disarray over Iraq and partly a response to the assertive US National Security Strategy published in September 2002 with its emphasis on 'preemptive

strikes'. The Member States gave Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, a mandate to finally address the issue of where the Union stands as a global actor and how it sees its evolving security instruments meeting that vision.

The ESS was first proposed as a draft at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 and then adopted in a revised form in Brussels at the December 2003 European Council in a document entitled: "A Secure Europe in a Better World".<sup>1</sup>

The ESS clearly states that the EU and its member states will tackle their security priorities within a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions (specifically the UN and regional organisations) and the rule of law (upholding the principle of the use of force only as a last resort). It has no illusions regarding the weakness of the EU as a military power. Indeed, the Union's lack of military capability is highlighted as a major weakness in the EU Crisis Management/Conflict Prevention toolbox.

Amongst the five security challenges identified by the ESS, two are given priority:

- Security threats from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- International terrorism

Alongside the key threats and global challenges, the ESS identifies three additional strategic objectives in applying its external instruments to meet contemporary security challenges:

- Extending the zone of security on Europe's periphery
- Supporting the emergence of a stable and equitable international order, particularly an effective multilateral system

- Seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats.

Together, a picture emerges of the Union seeking to tackle its security objectives by supporting the UN system, by strengthening common national responses through the EU, and by addressing root causes such as poverty and weak governance. These characteristics, along with an emphasis on 'preventive engagement' rather than 'preemption', are generally acknowledged to make the ESS stand apart from the US National Security Strategy. Thus, importantly, it is read as identifying security priorities which meet current US concerns but which do not amount to a European endorsement of US methods.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, the ESS remains a general security document—a starting point in the process of Europeans moving towards a strategic culture on security matters. The document is intended to be followed up by further strategies elaborating the EU's approach to the key threats and challenges. This in turn is intended to provide the basis for action. The process of developing a strategic culture will indeed take time and overlap with ongoing security actions (as witnessed in the operations *Concordia* and *Artemis* in 2003), but we now have a starting point and benchmark against which to measure EU activities and approach such important issues as WMD non-proliferation and disarmament.

### ***Towards an EU strategy against WMD***

The 'EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' (the EU WMD Strategy) was adopted by the European Council in December 2003. It had been developed from two previous documents entitled the 'Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' and

an 'Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' that were referred to in the Thessaloniki Council conclusions under its 'Declaration on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction'.<sup>3</sup>

The EU WMD Strategy, although developed alongside the ESS, has been designed to elaborate in more detail how, through the ESS, the EU will approach the security priority of WMD.

The Strategy has three main chapters:

Chapter I, entitled 'Proliferation of WMD and Means of Delivery is a Growing Threat to International Peace and Security' sets out the case why proliferation continues to be a serious concern for Europeans, not least because of the continued existence of weapons stockpiles and the spread of technologies, information and delivery systems. Interestingly, while the chapter states that proliferation is continuing—and with it the risk of the use of WMD either by state or non-state actors (such as terrorists)—it also pays tribute to the success of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to date in slowing down and, in some cases, even reversing the process proliferation.<sup>4</sup>

Chapter II, entitled 'The European Union cannot Ignore these Dangers. It must Seek an Effective Multilateralist Response to this Threat', is really a strong rallying cry for Europeans to respond through effective multilateralism. The chapter draws heavily on the previous 'Basic Principles' document when it refers to "our conviction that a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order and hence our commitment to uphold, implement and strengthen the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements".<sup>5</sup> This strong statement of principles is supported

with specific reference to how the member states can meet these commitments such as the universalisation of the NPT, the IAEA Safeguard agreements and additional protocols, the CWC, the BTWC, the HCOC and the early entry into force of the CTBT.<sup>6</sup> This is followed by the sobering view that "if the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible it must be made more effective", which includes taking verification and non-compliance seriously.<sup>7</sup>

Chapter III is the final chapter and is entitled 'The European Union must Make Use of All its Instruments to Prevent, Deter, Halt, and if possible Eliminate Proliferation Programmes that cause Concern at Global Level.' This is regarded as the member states taking a strong line on WMD as their key security concern and is elaborated in the statement that: "We have a wide range of instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; co-operative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter."<sup>8</sup>

This final chapter includes a long list of measures, drawing upon the Action Plan, that is, measures to be undertaken and implemented in the short to medium term. These include the following major objectives (each of which has precise sub-targets):

A) In rendering multilateralism more effective the member states will act resolutely against proliferators and will:

- Work for the universalisation and when necessary strengthening of the main treaties, agreements and verification arrangements on disarmament and non-proliferation

- Foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation
  - Enhance political, financial and technical support to verification regimes
  - Strengthen export control policies and practices in coordination with partners of the export control regimes; advocating, where applicable, adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the existing regimes and arrangements; strengthening suppliers regimes and Europeans coordination in this area
  - Enhance the security of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and expertise in the European Union against unauthorised access and risks diversion
  - Strengthen identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking.
- B) In promoting a stable international and regional environment the member states will act by:
- Reinforcing EU cooperative threat reduction programmes with other countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise
  - Integrating the WMD non-proliferation concerns into the EU's political, diplomatic and economic activities and programmes, aiming at the greatest effectiveness.
- C) Will co-operate closely with the United States and other key partners by:
- Ensuring adequate follow-up to the EU-US declaration on non-proliferation issues at the June 2003 summit

- Ensuring coordination and, where appropriate, joint initiatives with other key partners.

D) Will develop supporting structures within the Union by:

- Organising a six monthly debate on the implementation of the EU Strategy at the External Relations Council
- Setting up . . . a unit which would function as a monitoring centre, entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the EU Strategy and the collection of information and intelligence, in liaison with the Situation centre. This monitoring centre would be set up at the Council Secretariat and fully associate the Commission.

Conflating the political need for regime change with an immediate threat of WMD in Iraq and at times with the War on Terror has perhaps undermined, in the European public, the confidence in WMD as the most significant threat to international security. Nevertheless, the member states have remained focussed on it as a key security concern as they have for many years, although it has been perceived to have slipped down the political hierarchy to more fashionable but equally serious security policies such as humanitarian intervention, conflict prevention and resolution, and conventional weapons proliferation such as small arms and light weapons and antipersonnel landmines. This agenda and the list of practical issues to pursue are providing a fruitful dynamic to achieving the short-term objectives of the WMD Strategy. The key will be to sustain this agenda of action and to capitalise on the momentum achieved to seriously address issues of resources, consistency and coherence, not least on disarmament matters.

## ***Key challenges— disarmament***

The EU WMD Strategy reaffirms the member states' commitment to a normative and legal international framework in tackling the key security concern of non-proliferation. While the member states recognise the weaknesses in the non-proliferation regimes and clearly state that a major obstacle to effective multilateralism is 'verification and compliance', they however strongly state their determination to mobilize all their (including the EC's) collective policy instruments to tackle this key security problem. Their policy objectives, elaborated in the ESS and WMD Strategy, therefore provide an important benchmark to measure the collective pursuit of EU security objectives on non-proliferation and disarmament. Nevertheless, key challenges remain for the international peace research and disarmament community to support. The need for our collective efforts to give practical support to the Union stand out in three areas in particular:

- As an engine for reform and progress at the international level where common statements in pursuit of our disarmament and non-proliferation efforts would send a powerful message internationally considering that it would be a united front between nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapons states and non-aligned states.
- In internal coherence of action across a range of export controls, border management, national standards in handling and transit of certain materials, which would set benchmarks for others to study, understand and follow.
- And in recognising that, for our common agenda, 'perceptions' between us (the member states) and external states matter. In this respect our relations with third states and

other regional organisations will be affected by our actions and our own standards. When reaching out, we must lead by example; that is, not bickering and following, but offering ‘lessons learned’ and providing, when necessary, technical and financial support in the pursuit of our own security policy objectives. This will also mean addressing the issue of resources which are essential for making our nicely worded documents real frameworks for coherent action.

It really is time we begin to think more collectively—‘soft coordination’ for those of you that are emotionally fragile when it looks as if the Westphalian state is under attack again. A simple review of what we are doing in Europe and at the EU level across the range of WMD and conventional arms control and disarmament would be a good start. This would provide a rich agenda for European researchers and the policy community. This would partly consist of data collection and analysis and of identifying the scope for action, regions of interest, and ranges of existing programmes. We could then identify any gaps requiring priority of action. One could assess ‘best practices’ and ‘standards’ and then follow this by concerted coordinated action. Whether that means more centralised funding on arms control and disarmament is a question for the future, but the policy agenda set out by the EU’s member states requires practical thinkers from the research community—as represented here—to understand the scope of the problem and provide analysis of priorities and resources necessary for practical European action on WMD and conventional weapons matters.

Often-neglected aspects of policy debate on security matters at the EU level—long a sensitive and hotly debated aspect of national security policy debates—are the issues of transparency and accountability, and the broader problem of democratic deficit. It is worth

pointing out to this audience that we have long understood the critical importance of transparency and accountability in the success of arms control and disarmament in the past, not least in confidence- and security-building measures at the height of the Cold War. I would argue that transparency and accountability are no less relevant today, in particular if the EU WMD and Security strategies are to retain the support of the member states and the parliaments of Europe and—just as important—build trust and confidence in the outside world to support our objectives.

### Notes

- 1 Javier Solana. 2003. “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World.” ISS-EU, Paris. December. Available at: [www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf](http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf).
- 2 Gerrard Quille. 2003. “Making Multilateralism Matter: The EU Security Strategy.” ESR, ISIS Europe, No. 18, July. Available at: [www.isis-europe.org](http://www.isis-europe.org).
- 3 ‘EU WMD Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Brussels European Council, December 2003.
- 4 *Ibid.* par. 6.
- 5 *Ibid.* par. 14.
- 6 *Ibid.* par. 16.
- 7 *Ibid.* par. 17.
- 8 *Ibid.* par. 29.

## *Summary of the Discussion*

Recent developments, such as the Iraqi war, have shown that disarmament issues are relevant for the new century, and the challenge is to identify the problems for arms control and how these can best be addressed. Since most existing rules and bodies in the area were created during the Cold War, there is a potential need for some adjustments to them within the present international order.

It was suggested that three questions needed to be asked to improve the effectiveness of the international regime of arms control:

- Firstly, whether all treaties and fora in place were necessary or whether some could be discontinued.
- Secondly, whether there was a need to change any of the treaties and fora.
- And, finally, to identify where there was a need to build a new disarmament structure.

The discussion suggested that it was useful to learn from the ‘success stories’ of disarmament—geographical as well as topical—and that a momentum of arms control in some sectors might carry over to new areas. Other types of growing international cooperation should be encouraged to expand into disarmament policy. In particular, the EU has a unique opportunity of initiating new control regimes for several different types of armament.

When creating or reinventing disarmament regimes, it was emphasized that new initiatives must be sensitive to the perceived security threat for some states when asked to downsize their military or defense industry. To bridge that threat and create a sense of confidence, it was considered important that arms controlling bodies be multilateral and open for membership and initiatives from all states, and that all actions are generally applicable.

There was criticism of the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ as it should be clear that there are specific challenges for controlling different types of weapons. In relation to nuclear weapons, it was agreed that the current arms control policies on nuclear weapons were not sufficient, as they do not correspond to the situation on the ground.

It was argued that there is a need for a major overhaul of the disarmament agenda with the intent of including all types of weapons as possible objects for control regimes. A wide palette of issue areas should be addressed, such as conventional forces, missiles, space, nuclear disarmament, verification of biological weapons control, ‘non-lethal’ weapons, and new technologies and research.

Another important issue for disarmament is to retain the public focus. To do this, it is necessary to refer to a ‘missile defense shield’ as what it really is—a new set of missiles. Also, arms control should be reestablished as part of national and international security policy. One possibility to further this is that arms control should be linked to other types of threats as well, as emerging technologies can lead to an actualization of, for example, targeted environmental warfare. As security policy expands through new concepts such as human security, a similar approach should be possible for the disarmament agenda.

*By Joakim Kreutz, BICC*



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# Group F

## Small Arms Control: Developing Human Resources

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

## *Discussion Group F Small Arms Control: Developing Human Resources*

### *Rationale, questions and participants*

Since the UN Conference on Small Arms in 2001, the necessity to control the spread, availability and use of small arms has been recognized by the international community, governments, NGOs and civil society as a crucial aspect in conflict prevention and resolution. With small arms control and disposal one of the core fields of its work, BICC hopes to contribute to improving small arms control efforts by providing applied research data and advisory services.

Even though the small arms control issue is now firmly set on the international agenda, the implementation of small arms control policies and programs leaves a lot to be desired. Apart from a lack of political will and commitment to fight the spread of small arms, one main problem is the failure to develop human resources adequately—a matter particularly spotlighted by this discussion group. There is a need to increase the capability of people in the decision-making bodies, both at the governmental and institutional levels, as well as within NGOs and civil society and the implementing agencies, to implement small arms control measures successfully. But, even once policies and programs have been implemented, it is as equally important to critically evaluate and improve such efforts, and to cooperate with other relevant stakeholders in the field.

The discussion panel on the topic of ‘Small Arms Control: Developing Human Resources’ was chaired by *Agnès Marcaillon* from the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The panelists, who were experts from research institutes, policy-oriented bodies, non-governmental organizations and practitioners from the field, touched upon a variety of problems, including the following:

- How can the training of small arms control experts and the cooperation and coordination between decision-making and -implementing agencies be improved?
- In what ways can institutional learning be made more than just post-project evaluation, but generate lessons for future small arms control programs?
- What can the small arms control community do to bridge the gap between small arms control research and the implementation of its results in the field?
- Should programs focus on small arms control, or rather on combating the underlying causes of conflict?
- How can reintegration efforts in DD&R (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) programs for ex-combatants be improved, and do we need a new concept for the notion of ‘reintegration’?

The Introductory Statement was given by *Sami Faltas* who is working as a senior researcher at BICC, focusing on small arms control issues and DD&R. Comments were received from *Irma Specht*, who has been working for the InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction at the ILO in Geneva; *Zahid Hussein* of the Sustainable Research Foundation (SuRF) in Pakistan; *Peter Batchelor*, who has been working at the Small Arms Survey and is now Team Leader at the Small Arms Demobilisation Unit at BCPR/UNDP; *Mikiko Sawanishi*, also from the Small Arms Demobilisation Unit at BCPR/UNDP in Geneva; and Colonel *Wolfgang Richter* from the Center for Verification Tasks of the Federal German Armed Forces.

# Capacity-building for Small Arms Control

*Sami Faltas*

If we want adequate security at the local, national and international level, we must reduce the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). This used to be a controversial notion, but today it is conventional wisdom. It has become mainstream politics. While we still lack an international convention on small arms control, we do have the UN Programme of Action of 2001 and regional arrangements like the OSCE Document of 2000. Nearly all governments have undertaken to fight the illegal possession, movement and use of SALW. Some are seriously implementing these commitments, while others are dragging their feet.

## ***Obstacles to small arms control***

Today, the question is not whether governments need to engage in small arms control, but how the struggle against proliferation and misuse can be made more effective. The main obstacles are:

- 1) *A lack of political will to pay more than lip service to the cause of small arms control.* Governments in several parts of the world (notably North Africa and Asia) continue to resist the idea that they are internationally committed to fighting the illegal spread and misuse of SALW. They continue to regard weapons control as a purely domestic issue. Besides, some of them have domestic political reasons to shy away from strict weapons control.
- 2) *A lack of public interest in small arms control.* Generally speaking, politicians change direction when they are pushed. If hundreds of thousands of people march in the streets demanding strict gun control, newspaper editorials support them,

and politicians are asked on TV what they are doing to prevent gun violence, this may not change government policy immediately, but it will have an effect in the long run. Its influence will be all the greater if civil society not only pushes the government, but also makes an effort of its own to educate the population and canvas support for weapons control. Without such public pressure, the government will probably not take decisive action, especially if such action would anger the people who possess weaponry and make money selling it.

- 3) *A lack of capacity for small arms control.* However much public opinion and governments may want to institute effective weapons control, it may be impossible to achieve because of the lack of some basic requirements. The first is information. Thanks to the efforts of the Small Arms Survey and other think-tanks, we know more about the extent and nature of the small arms problem today than we used to. But we are also more acutely aware of the limits of our knowledge. Some of these limits are imposed by governments that refuse to reveal information on SALW to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to their allies, or indeed to their own parliaments. There is a shocking lack of transparency on small arms. The second requirement for the implementation of weapons control is institutions and other structures. Take weapons laws. If a country does not have a law that prohibits the possession, trading and moving of SALW under certain conditions, then all these activities are legal. This means that the government will hardly be able to restrict and suppress such activities. In reality, most countries do have

weapons laws, but they are often poorly implemented. Or take freedom of expression. In many countries, anyone speaking in public about weapons and their use may be suspected of being involved in espionage or subversive activities and face harassment, imprisonment or worse. This means that civil society will not be able to play a constructive role in fighting the spread and misuse of weapons. Third, even if the necessary institutions exist, they may not have the expertise, the staff, the equipment and the money they need to effectively control weapons. This brings me to the subject of our discussion group: developing human resources for small arms control.

## ***Current capacity-building efforts***

Of course, the realization that many countries lack the capacity to effectively control weapons is not new. Indeed, funds have been provided by the international community, programs have been designed, and workshops have been held to expand and improve the human resources available for small arms control.

### ***Where do we stand today?***

In the UN system, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has been organizing capacity-building workshops, especially through its regional centers for peace and disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC). For instance, my institute, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), was involved in the development of a curriculum for small arms control for government officials in West Africa, which has since been adopted in East and Central Africa as well. DDA's

regional disarmament program is currently looking into the possibilities of similar activities in the Arab world.

UNDP is even more active in this field. Its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has a Small Arms and Demobilization Unit (SADU), whose new chief is Peter Batchelor. SADU's training expert Mikiko Sawanishi has devised a wide-ranging program for capacity development, published in June 2003.<sup>1</sup> It identifies needs for capacity development among government authorities, project and program staff, and civil society groups. The report states that UNDP's capacity-development activities could include:

- *Human resources development (training)* for managers of national small-arms programs, middle managers, UNDP program officers and NGOs working in the field of public awareness. With the exception of the one for UNDP officers, these programs are to be provided by a subcontractor.
- *Exchange programs and mentoring:* Managers and coordinators of small arms programs can improve their skills by working at a project at a UNDP office in another country.
- *Institutional development:* Continual support programs for regional and national authorities. Some of this is to be done with the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.
- *Technical assistance* for national and regional groups on reporting to the UN (support pack), on legislation (clearing house), on stockpile management (software manual and training module) and data collection (guidelines). Some of these services are to be provided by subcontractors.
- *Knowledge network and information sharing:* UNDP has established a roster of experts and hopes to establish a repository of materials, an

on-line learning module on small arms control issues, a discussion group for networking, as well as round tables and workshops. Some of this is to be done with partners.

Clearly, capacity development at UNDP/SADU means much more than training.

Then there are regional programs in West Africa and the Balkans, supported by UNDP.

I already mentioned the curriculum for small arms control in the ECOWAS region developed by PCASED, with the assistance of BICC and others. More recently, Ibrahima Sall of PCASED and Anatole Ayissi of UNIDIR published a training manual for military and security personnel in West Africa on the struggle against the proliferation of SALW.<sup>2</sup> BICC is currently discussing the development of new training programs for the ECOWAS region.

In Belgrade, the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), led by Adrian Wilkinson, is engaged in a wide and growing range of training activities for government officials, journalists and civil society groups. It has also developed training tools, especially Simon Rynn's *Small Arms Awareness Support Pack*, a hardcopy report<sup>3</sup> with a supporting CDROM.

Saferworld, International Alert and Oxfam have developed a resource and training handbook for NGOs called 'Action Against Small Arms'.<sup>4</sup> Saferworld will use this manual in a series of capacity-building activities for government agencies and civil society in Africa, Asia, the Balkans and maybe the Caucasus. Saferworld is also working with UNDP on a 'training of trainers' program that was recently piloted in the Great Lakes region. With SEESAC, it is implementing a training course for journalists in the Balkans, and with SaferAfrica, it is compiling a resource guide, training manual and outreach program for National Focal Points.

These are government departments responsible for the implementation of the UN Programme of Action.

The Small Arms Survey in Geneva produces the leading reference work on small arms issues, which is a training tool besides serving many other purposes. It also offers opportunities for young researchers from developing countries to improve their skills and is developing training courses for field research on small arms.

The UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UNDP and the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs are jointly developing a program to help governments report to the United Nations on the implementation of its Programme of Action (also see under UNDP technical assistance above).

The European Union's Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (EU ASAC) is providing support to the national authorities on drafting and implementing gun control legislation, as well as stockpile management and small arms destruction. BICC is in close contact with EU ASAC and is discussing closer co-operation. In 2001, BICC participated in a capacity-building workshop in Phnom Penh.

SaferAfrica and the Institute of Security Studies engage in training in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in capacity-building among government officials. BICC researchers taught at an ISS course for Angolan government officials in 2003. SaferAfrica has produced a Practitioners' Guide to SALW Initiatives Relevant to Africa.<sup>5</sup>

The Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) has a well-established and developed course on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, called 'The Hard Road Home', that is offered to government officials. BICC was involved in teaching such a module



at a PPC course in Burkina Faso and helped to teach a 'train the trainers' course on DD&R in Mali. PPC and BICC are currently discussing the development of training courses for government officials with UNDP. Soon Pearson will publish a practical guide to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, developed with the Norwegian Defence International Centre, the Swedish National Defence College, and the German development agency GTZ.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has developed a Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons,<sup>6</sup> which is, among other things, a useful tool for training. It has also organized capacity-building workshops in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Similarly, NATO and the Partnership for Peace have organized training courses on small arms control, like the one hosted by Switzerland in 2002. BICC was involved in teaching it.

I am sure I have not mentioned all organizations active in this field and I have left out some of the work done by the organizations mentioned. I would appeal to readers to send me additions and corrections.

Finally, let me outline my own institute's activities. Several examples of BICC's work in capacity-building for small arms control have already been mentioned. Back in 2000, we joined the Monterey Institute of International Studies in producing a manual called *Tackling Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collection and Destruction*, which is currently available in six languages ([www.bicc.de/publications/books/guide\\_smallarms/contents.html](http://www.bicc.de/publications/books/guide_smallarms/contents.html)). This is used as a training tool by various organizations, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. On 9 July 2003, during the Biennial Meeting of States at the United Nations in New York, we organized a workshop on training programs for SALW control ([www.bicc.de/events/unconfII/bicc\\_new\\_york\\_II.html](http://www.bicc.de/events/unconfII/bicc_new_york_II.html)).

Currently, as part of our Training and Education on Small Arms (TRESA) program, we are developing training modules for development workers and conflict prevention specialists, teaching in capacity-building workshops, especially in the Balkans and Africa, and organizing international meetings to discuss and promote this type of capacity-building. With the support of GTZ, we developed NGO Briefings on various aspects of small arms action, which are to be published in 2004 and will be widely distributed and used as tools in capacity-building, either for self-education or in training courses.

These training activities are a natural extension of our research work, which has always been geared to supporting the development of sensible arms control and management policies. It also builds on the experience in adult education gained by BICC researchers at universities, diplomatic training institutes, and other schools.

Despite its strong interest in training, BICC is not a school, nor does it plan to evolve into one. Its ambition is to promote, develop, facilitate and test-drive training courses in the field of disarmament, demobilization and weapons control.

### *What remains to be done?*

Clearly, there are many good ideas, plans and activities in the widening field of training for small arms action. Yet a great deal remains to be done.

I would like to explain what remains to be done by discussing the evolution of training for small arms control.

In the early stages, the emphasis was entirely on organizing training events. Experts would be invited to speak at a capacity-building workshop and presented with a rudimentary program. Participants would also be invited, not necessarily after careful selection. As

preparatory material, they would typically receive the program, a few articles and the text of political resolutions on small arms. At the workshop, the experts would speak, and the participants would ask some questions and engage in some discussion. At the end of the workshop, the participants would not be tested and they received little additional material to take home, except perhaps a certificate of attendance. Sometimes, they were asked to fill out evaluation forms. No one would study the impact of these workshops.

The limitations of this approach soon became clear. The workshops themselves were in some cases quite good, depending on the quality of the speakers and the interest and skills of the participants. But their quality was unpredictable, uncontrollable and unrepeatable. Their impact was unknown. And the effort invested in them was of very limited use on future occasions.

The first step toward greater professionalism was to develop training tools. I mentioned several of these in my survey of current capacity-building activities. The manuals, CD-ROMs and films made for this purpose are an improvement in several ways:

- They record and document information and insights that were so far stored in the heads of specialists and in specialist publications
- They translate this knowledge for non-specialists
- They provide it in a digestible form
- They suggest packages of information to be conveyed in training courses
- They serve as reference works that trainees can take home for future use.

Of course, manuals are all the more useful if they are regularly used, evaluated, improved and updated.

Unfortunately, this is often not the case. At BICC, we are delighted to see that our practical guide on weapons collection and destruction is downloaded thousands of times every year, in its various editions. Currently, the Portuguese edition is our 'bestseller'. But I must confess that we have no idea who is downloading it, how they are using it, how happy they are with it, and how they think it could be improved. This is obviously unsatisfactory.

It seems to me that we are now entering the next stage in the development of good training programs for small arms control, in which the emphasis is on the development of fully structured and documented **training courses**. That is what our TRESA program is intended to do.

### ***The Training and Education on Small Arms (TRESA) Program***

Now, what do we mean by fully structured and documented courses? How does this fit in with all the training activities listed above? And what exactly will TRESA's specific contribution be? A training course that is fully structured and documented meets the following requirements:

1. It has been designed for repeated use
2. It has a narrowly defined training objective
3. It is meant for a certain kind of target group
4. It is modified to suit the needs of each specific audience, and contains guidelines on how to carry out such modification
5. It comprises several training modules handling specific subjects

6. It provides the participants with required reading and exercises, as well as hints for further reading
7. It provides the trainer with didactical guidance
8. It includes a course evaluation after each delivery, and an impact assessment at a later stage
9. It is regularly evaluated, revised and updated.

I am not aware of any training courses on small arms control that fulfil all these requirements, and I know only one that comes close to doing so. However, among the organizations actively engaged in training, I see an awareness of the need to move toward programs that fulfil these requirements.

This is where our program TRESA comes in. It is not supposed to develop many new training tools. Rather, it will use the growing number of good tools available. Nor will it deliver any training courses on a wide scale. It will leave this to organizations for which training is a primary activity. Instead, TRESA will seek to design courses, and modules for courses, that meet the requirements I just listed, mostly making use of the experts, the tools, and the experience already available.

And when I speak of TRESA, I am not merely speaking of BICC. When the German Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development (BMZ) assigned funds to this project, it required us to carry out this work in close co-operation with United Nations and other organizations active in the field. This has been our intention all along. Hence our intensive discussions and close collaboration with DDA, UNDP and ILO. We intend to extend this to UNIDIR, DPKO, the ICRC and other parts of the UN family. And the same applies to organizations outside the UN system, like the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Saferworld, SaferAfrica, International Alert, the

Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), etc. We also intend to work with local and national NGOs that have much to contribute from their perspective in the field.

### **Notes**

- 1 United Nations Development Programme. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. 2003. *UNDP Strategy and Framework for Capacity Development in the Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Geneva, June.
- 2 Anatole Ayissi and Ibrahima Sall, eds. 2003. *Lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères en Afrique de l'Onest: Manuel de formation des forces armées et de sécurité*. UNIDIR, Geneva.
- 3 South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. 2003. *Small Arms and Light Weapons Support Pack*. Belgrade, SEESAC.
- 4 Jim Coe and Henry Smith. 2003. *Action Against Small Arms: A Resource and Training Handbook*. London, International Alert, Oxfam GB and Saferworld.
- 5 SaferAfrica. 2002. *Practitioners' Guide to SALW Initiatives Relevant to Africa*. Pretoria, SaferAfrica.
- 6 Organization for Security and Development in Europe. 2003. *Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Vienna, OSCE.

# Developing Human Resources in the Field of Reintegration of Former Combatants

*Irma Specht*

***E*mpphasis:** Critical need for training of the different national actors to improve their knowledge and capacities to play a greater and more efficient role in reintegration efforts.

The impact of conventional disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes is limited in terms of durable reintegration of ex-combatants. Their centralised nature and strongly security-oriented objectives result in insensitivities to local contexts, including the needs of the receiving communities. Current DDR programmes are mainly being designed by military actors who are only concerned with DD, i.e. Security Sector Reform. Their main focus is to ensure security by “keeping them off the streets”<sup>21</sup> rather than assisting the combatants and their communities to find durable solutions. Subgroups of combatants, such as child soldiers, female combatants, combatants of minority groups and those with disabilities generally do not threaten the security situation and are thus not included in the programme. Furthermore, with all eyes on disarmament and demobilization, serious and timely reintegration planning is often overlooked in the process.

DDR, as it is currently carried out, hardly includes civil society actors and the ministries concerned with reintegration issues in the planning process. They inherit a blue print from the peace agreement, the false expectations raised during the DD phases and a target group which does not necessarily include all combatants, and are then

expected to reintegrate them into the war-torn communities and local communities with almost no absorption capacity—and they need to do it quickly, as their target group is already frustrated and impatient for cash through earnings.

The delays in providing reintegration assistance to all combatants have proven to seriously challenge the fragile peace process, and have actually caused refuelling of conflicts. Most frequently, the national and international actors responsible for the complex reintegration challenges inherit the so called ‘case-load’ or ‘rest group’ from the DD process, i.e. ex-combatants not recruited into the new security sector. The reintegration actors have not been involved in the original planning process and therefore have had no influence on the design of the reintegration programme. Neither have they had the time to prepare for the services they need to provide, as war has destroyed many pre-existing structures for training, education, micro-credits, etc.

By not including national stakeholders immediately in the DDR programme design, the reintegration services are delivered too late and suffer in quality and quantity. This is an error that has been, and is still being, repeated in many post-war conflict situations with the consequences that we are all well aware of.

The national stakeholders who play a key role in reintegration programmes can be divided into three main categories:

- *Key ministries*, such as labour, education, vocational training, youth, commerce, health, women or gender ministries, etc. They are responsible for overseeing and coordinating specific reintegration services. Additionally, they themselves often provide direct services as well; although its capacity is often weak or almost absent, local government also plays a key role.
- *Civil society*, including NGOs, CBOs and religious organizations. They in fact implement the main part of the reintegration programme, often under the supervision of UN agencies and international NGOs.
- *Private sector actors* are often unacknowledged major players in reintegration programmes. Private training institutions and employers play a key role in training ex-combatants. Small, medium and large businesses are potential employers. Private consultancy firms provide services to the donor community.
- Additionally, many countries have their own *universities and research centres* that contribute to data-collection and research in the field of post-conflict reconstruction, including DDR.
- Finally, *national security sector actors*, such as the police, play a role in ensuring local security, which is the precondition for sustainable reintegration.

These stakeholders do not automatically respond to the conventional top-down DDR programmes. They are non-military actors focusing on development, community-based assistance, socio-economic recovery, and national ownership and policies. The potential role of all these actors can, and should be, intensified.

Furthermore, these local actors can play a key role in ensuring that DDR programmes address the root-causes of war and disintegration<sup>2</sup>. Finally, by strengthening the capacity of local actors through DDR funds, they will also be in a better position to assist the other war-affected groups such as refugees, returnees and ultimately also the normal groups such as job-seekers, youth, emerging entrepreneurs, female-headed households, etc.

Building capacities through training is the key, as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration pose challenges which the national actors have never been exposed to. Developing their human resources will help them to play a more active and important role in all the steps of the DDR programme. Training should focus on exposing local actors to international DDR experiences and helping them to apply the lessons learned to their context. This training should be provided at a very early stage, possibly while the conflict still persists, in order to allow them to apply the acquired knowledge at relevant stages of the peace-process.

The reintegration of ex-combatants into war-torn local communities and economies is a major and complex process which has many angles. Getting the local actors on board—through training and social dialogue at an early stage—will improve their capacity to plan and prepare for the timely delivery of services, and will also empower them to counterbalance the international (military) approaches and to advocate for decentralised and partly community-based reintegration.

### Notes

- 1 Irma Specht. 2003. *Jobs for Rebels and Soldiers*, in E. Date-bah. *Jobs after War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle*. Geneva: ILO, p. 81.
- 2 For a detailed analysis of root causes of youth participation in armed conflict and recommendations on addressing some of these issues see Rachel Brett and Irma Specht. 2004. *Young Soldiers: Why they Choose to Fight*. New York: Lynne Rienner.

# Pakistan: The Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Issue

*Zahid Hussein*

## **Background**

Over the past 55 years, Pakistan and India have fought three wars over the disputed territory of Kashmir. None of these wars has helped the two countries to find a solution to the Kashmir problem which would be acceptable to the people of Kashmir, and the Pakistan and Indian governments. However, although a state of cold war has existed between India and Pakistan for most of their independent lives, in recent months the troubled relations seem to be on the mend.

Various aspects of the Afghan wars have added another dimension to the security sector in Pakistan. Pakistan has seen itself playing many roles over the past three decades. These roles have varied from being an ally of the US and Mujahedin against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to a supporter of the fundamentalist Taliban government to the existing supporter of the new Afghan government and a major non-NATO ally of the US engaged in a full-blown war against the Al Qaeda terrorists in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP).

In addition to the arms bazaar ushered in through Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan, another major anomaly in the Pakistan constitution has directly contributed to the 18 million illegal SALW in Pakistan against a number of 7 million licensed small arms. This constitutional glitch, or anomaly as you will, grants a special status to the tribal areas in NWFP and Baluchistan. These areas, called Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), are run by a "Political Agent (PA)", an administrative legacy from British colonial times! The PA is responsible for maintaining the linkages between the federal government and the political heavyweights of this area called the *maliks* (chiefs). Pakistani laws do not apply in these territories or "Agencies." This has caused both the large-scale manufacturing and the distribution of SALW from this area to all parts of Pakistan to flourish. Besides, these Agencies have also grown poppies, and produced heroine for the past umpteen years. Hence SALW and drugs are alienable allies in this wild North West of Pakistan. The social services delivery infrastructure in these tribal agencies hardly exists and neither the federal nor the provincial government has done much to provide one.

The Kashmir issue, involvement in Afghanistan, the special constitutional status of the tribal belt, and the definition of national security solely in terms of the armed forces are some of the major factors determining the SALW issue in Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's SALW issue has to be seen from an overall security context and should not be analyzed and handled as a stand-alone phenomenon.

Both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed neighbors. The importance of the SALW issue becomes imperative and critically important as nuclear war between the two countries may well be the end result of terrorists using SALW in both India and Pakistan.

## ***The SALW issue***

According to the Small Arms Survey and other reliable data sources, the number of illegal SALW in Pakistan stands at 18 million compared against 7 million legal weapons. According to the National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS), Islamabad, the male population between 25 and 49 years of age is 25 million. The SALW possession in this group is as follows (see Figure):

## ***Distribution of illegal/legal SALW among the population of Pakistan***

*Source: National Institute of Population Studies, Small Arms Survey, and Daily Dawn)*

Total population	Male/female ratio	Male population between the ages of 25 and 49	Estimated number of illegal/legal SALW	Possession of illegal/legal SALW among the 25–49 male population
151.1 million	78.3/72.8 million	25.27 million	18/7 million	0.71/0.28 illegal/legal SALW per capita (almost 1 illegal/legal weapon per head)



Although we are all drawn towards using the *per capita* possession of arms as I have done, this by no means is indicative of an 'equity' in SALW distribution in Pakistan. The major concentrations of illegal weapons are found in the NWF province, Karachi and certain areas of Punjab.

The illegal SALW were recently used in a spate of sectarian killings in Karachi and other parts of Pakistan. The recent operation of the Pakistan army against Al Qaeda operatives in NWFP has made the SALW situation in Pakistan worse.

### ***A silver lining among the clouds***

Over the past few months, the Government of Pakistani, led by Prime Minister Jamali with General Musharraf as President, has shown a determined muscle and political will backed by massive fire power by the armed forces in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This action seems to reflect a veiled desire on the part of the government to formally integrate tribal areas into Pakistan, and provide them with the basic civic amenities while flushing out the terrorists. The only kink in the whole strategy is that the government has not done much to mobilize public opinion in its favor, with some ultra rightwing religious fundamentalists painting the picture as a nakedly pro-American action against "brave NWFP fighters of Islam." The Government of Pakistan must take the masses into their confidence in order to render the fight against terrorism sustainable and popularly acceptable.

The second 'silver lining' in the dark cloud of Indo-Pak relations is that the thaw created by the former Indian Prime Minister Vajpai's Baratiya Janata Party (BJP) and Musharraf is being constructively maintained by the new Congress government in India and by the Pakistani leadership. Both sides do see Kashmir as an issue, but this does

not prevent them from reaching consensus on other issues like nuclear confidence-building measures, water disputes and other problems that have plagued both countries for the past 56 years, the entire life-span of their existence as independent countries from British colonialism.

The set of developments that has taken place recently within Pakistan, and especially between India and Pakistan, has surely paved a new way for cracking down on those involved in sustaining an arms bazaar in Pakistan, and for reconciliation between India and Pakistan.

### ***The future of SALW***

If we analyze the events described above, this is what we get:

- Pakistan's support of fundamentalist Islam in Afghanistan and within the tribal areas is long over. The new realities, such as the ongoing military operation in the tribal areas in the South Waziristan agency on the Afghan border, spells out a new status for these areas that may eventually mean formal integration of these tribal areas into Pakistan. This may gradually mean the beginning of a very careful DDR program in Pakistan's North West.

- The encouraging development in tense Indo-Pak relations could translate into another instance of DDR. The number of armed militants on both sides of Kashmir may then have to be formally integrated in the society.

- The Government of Pakistan is as serious in combating the threat of illegal SALW as it is in flushing Al Qaeda terrorists out of Pakistan. Since all major decisions in this regard are made by General Musharraf who has proved himself to be not only a very active but a liberal person, it is time for the donor community to seriously come and help the Government of

Pakistan in not just the destruction of illegal SALW but also with comprehensive DDR. Any half-hearted measures in this regard would be counterproductive.

- Moreover, it is high time that SALW is handled in a holistic manner rather than as a short-lived 'de-weaponisation' campaign. The last such campaign in the second quarter of 2001 in Pakistan only managed to collect 200,000 illegal weapons (a claim independent experts thought was exaggerated). This makes a campaign which is designed, executed and monitored scientifically a *sine qua non* for successful DDR.

- Finally, following re-integration of the tribal areas into Pakistan, a fully operative social services delivery infrastructure has to be laid out in the tribal areas. That would be another area which would be crying out for the donors' interest, as the current status is basically a vestige of British colonialism for which there is no place in a modern Pakistan.

# The Development of International SALW Control Regimes and Practices

*Wolfgang Richter*

Most of the current conflicts are internal conflicts within destabilized or disintegrated states. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are the instruments of choice in such conflicts. These weapons are not the main cause of the conflicts, but the availability of large amounts of small arms and light weapons beyond legal governmental control undermines political peace solutions and the states' monopoly of power. This availability of weapons adds to a general readiness to use violence as well as to the increasing crime rate, thus forming a stumbling block to economic and social development, the restoration of public safety, political stability and social peace. At the same time, destabilized states and conflict zones are points of origin of uncontrolled arms flows, threatening peace and stability in other regions. They are a burden on the international community, both because of the great expenditures necessary for military peace operations and compensation for destroyed development aid projects and because of the danger posed to peacekeeping forces and development aid volunteers.

Political awareness of this problem has significantly increased during the last decade. Numerous instruments were created under international law or in a politically-binding context in order to strengthen transparency, control of possession and production, and responsible import and export procedures, and to combat the illegal arms trade. In this context, I would like to mention first and foremost the United Nations Programme of Action,

regional agreements like the OAS convention on small arms and light weapons, the ECOWAS import moratorium, the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the European Union Joint Action and initiatives of the G8 states, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and other subregional organizations in eastern and southern Africa and Southeast Asia. At the same time, several states reviewed and tightened their national legislation and enhanced the training and equipment of their enforcement agencies to combat the illegal arms trade and possession. Millions of small arms and light weapons which were no longer needed for legal defense purposes after the reduction phases in the armed forces of Europe were destroyed.

Nevertheless, every day images come to our attention from southern and eastern Europe, central and southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America and these pictures show ethnically, religiously or socially founded—or just plain criminal—violence which is exercised with openly displayed small arms and light weapons. It is true indeed to point out gaps and barriers which stand in the way of implementing the aforementioned initiatives regarding small arms and light weapons (lack of political will, public interest and capacity). However, we must also become aware of the complex character of this task: Although the readily available excessive supply of small arms and light weapons aggravates and extends the duration of conflicts, it must not be confused with the original causes of the conflicts. We have also to consider the political and

social deficiencies which trigger demand, the inability to settle ethnic, religious and social conflicts peacefully, and the often occurring priority of group and clan interests over loyalty toward the national state which has often failed to create a national awareness among all parts of the population and an identification of the people with the state. We must also talk about arms traditions and the carrying of arms as a symbol of manliness, about reservations in constitutions and the traditional special rights of tribes and regions, and about cultures of violence in which the settlement of an argument by professional lawyers is either non-existent or deemed dishonorable because—according to the traditional conceptions of honor—the honor of a man or a clan can be restored only through the use of arms. Furthermore, the experiences gained in years of guerilla warfare and the anti-colonial liberation myth, which transfigures the freedom fighter carrying a Kalashnikov into the romantic ideal of heroic resistance, are still living on after liberation from foreign rule and serve as a convenient excuse for the daily use of violence. Generations of children and adolescents were influenced, presenting their weapons proudly in front of the camera. In many cases, the total breakdown of public security is also the result of the failure or the brutal actions of the security forces themselves, who thus become a part of the problem instead of part of the solution. In such cases, the citizens arm themselves for protection.

It is true that the problem of small arms and light weapons is not a technical problem; it is not only a question of correct stockholding and registration or a problem exclusively connected with the combating of the criminal black market. It is rather an outstanding political and cultural challenge. He who wants to solve this problem must also be ready to tackle questions of conflict solution, state building, good governance and the traditional importance of carrying and using weapons in the solution of quarrels in different cultures. Such action always interferes with the internal affairs of states; for this reason, it is such a difficult venture to reach international agreements. It goes without saying that the discussion on the misguided behavior of states, e.g. regarding deficiencies in democratic values and human rights, and on the necessary corrective actions meets with low acceptance on the side of the affected parties and often fails in international negotiations because of the proviso of sovereignty of the states. For this reason, it was not possible to formulate the title and the purpose of the United Nations Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons in such general terms as to meet the complexity of the issue. Instead, the title was confined to the “Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons”; we were only able to add “in all its aspects” to counteract a too restricted interpretation.

If, however, the analysis is true that a large amount of small arms and light weapons escape control *within* states and that these weapons—together with former and sometimes even current deliveries to resistance movements and civil war parties by superpowers and neighboring states—form the core of the problem, a promising international approach to solve the problem of small arms and light weapons cannot be limited to combating the illegal criminal arms market. However, such an approach must be aimed at the removal

of the political and social causes of destabilization in the affected countries and at the far-reaching prevention of government deliveries to non-state actors, as well as at the radical limitation of private weapon possession:

- After their official independence from the former colonial power, some states have not yet reached internal unity across their ethnic boundaries, and they have never exercised control over their entire territory and the small arms and light weapons abandoned by the colonial power.
- In several countries, rivaling political and ethnic groups of former governmental forces fight each other—with small arms and light weapons previously legally procured—over power or national separation after the breakdown of public order.
- During the Cold War, interested states often supported opposing civil war parties (“proxy wars”). States still support—sometimes covertly—civil war parties or resistance movements through large deliveries of small arms and light weapons in accordance with their own national interests.
- Other states have lost control of large numbers of weapons in their own territory because:
  - they issue weapons possession cards liberally (mainly because of a lack of civilian control of the security forces); or
  - they provide arms to militias and civil protection groups in emergencies; and because
  - small arms were stolen from poorly secured storage facilities, robbed from insufficiently protected transports or embezzled and transferred by corrupt security officials.

- International military peace missions have failed several times because the peace support forces did not have a robust disarmament mandate, a fair peaceful solution could not be enforced and the missions did not succeed in disarming and demobilizing former combatants and reintegrating them into a peaceful society.

- States with deeply rooted ‘arms traditions’, which have either a very liberal law on arms or none at all, or where a traditional customary law permits the carrying of arms, usually do not have any control of the arms holdings among the population. Hence, a gray area for the uncontrolled arms trade and a precondition for public insecurity and destabilization is created especially in the areas where the threshold for the use of violence is traditionally very low anyway.

In all these situations, a limitation of SALW strategies to the so-called ‘illegal arms trade’ would not be sufficient to address the different reasons for the loss of state control over stockpiles and flows of arms. This is especially due to the fact that most of the currently uncontrolled small arms and light weapons were once indeed ‘legal’, that is they were acquired or transferred with state approval, and it is often not possible to clearly determine if and when these arms turned ‘illegal’. Moreover, there is no globally recognized standard which determines when arms deliveries by states to non-state actors are illegal, since such a standard would run counter to the population’s right to resist an illegal public authority, which is claimed by several states (right of self-determination of the people, right to resist foreign or colonial occupation or serious human rights violations, etc.).

A holistic strategy to fight the uncontrolled and destabilizing spread of small arms and light weapons must try, through *reactive measures*, to recover the large stockpiles of small arms and light weapons which are no longer under state control, and, through *preventive measures*, to stop further uncontrolled flows of small arms and light weapons.

In order to effectively apply *reactive measures*, it is necessary to bring peace to crisis regions and, generally, to secure this peace through international peace support forces equipped with a robust disarmament mandate. Another precondition is a just and acceptable solution for peace which is reached during international negotiations and monitored by international forces. If necessary, the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants must be carried out under international military protection. International assistance is also needed for the social rehabilitation and reintegration of those combatants into civil society, including economic and social incentives for economic and social reconstruction. In this field, the non-governmental organizations have offered well thought-out concepts and done excellent work, in close cooperation with the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development/German Technical Cooperation. Still, it would be desirable to reach a state where military protection and civil reconstruction assistance are understood, even to a higher extent than today, as two sides of the same coin, and to give up reservations against cooperation. At the international level, too, it is necessary to find a reasonable solution for harmonizing reconstruction and military mandate and to develop appropriate standards for disarmament and demobilization which create and strengthen confidence among the former combatants and the population that there is a stable security situation and that the peace-support

forces abide by the rule of law. As early as 1999, the UNDC developed useful guidelines in this respect which should be taken into consideration to a higher extent in the formulation of mandates by the UNSC. The *Bundeswehr*, too, will have to try in the future to incorporate adequate DDR concepts into its training and employ appropriate experts in its Verification Center (FAFVC).

An essential aspect of the *stabilization process* is the re-establishment of *public security* by professional, i.e. law-abiding, loyal, corruption-resistant and well-trained, *security forces*. In order to create such forces, the international community must provide training support. Germany has provided assistance in this field as well by training police officials. In this context, however, it must be taken into consideration that a precondition for a reliable and loyal police force is a body of public service officials who have developed a national awareness and feel committed to the state as a whole than rather to an individual clan or ethnic-religious group.

Among the stabilizing measures it is essential that *surplus stockpiles* are destroyed and the remaining small arms and light weapons under state control are kept in *safe storage*, so that they cannot serve as a source of uncontrolled transfers. This opens up a broad field of international technical cooperation in which both Germany and the EU member states have been successfully engaged. We have seen impressive figures and even more impressive pictures of destruction activities, but, unfortunately, the often celebrated symbolic acts are out of all proportion to the actual dimension of the problem. It is not uncommon that older arms are surrendered, while newer ones are hidden and kept in reserve. Still, Germany assisted in the destruction of about 116,000 small arms and light weapons in Albania, for example.

However, more than 500,000 small arms and light weapons were 'lost' during the riots in 1997, and of those, it has so far only been possible to recover about 150,000.

In this context, the EU member states set a good example and, in the process of the drastic reduction of their armed forces in the 1990s, destroyed several millions of small arms and light weapons. The *Bundeswehr*, for example, has destroyed about 1.8 million items so far. We will have to make sure that the new NATO partners follow this example by carrying out the reductions and conversions which will take place in the framework of NATO expansion.

International advice, equipment aid and training support are also needed for other indispensable stabilization measures, such as the introduction of strict national *export/import regulations*, the establishment of effective *border monitoring procedures*—especially in the case of long borders which are sometimes not clearly determined and difficult to patrol—as well as the creation of a professional *customs control* and the necessary cooperation between the national security agencies to combat illegal arms transfers. Together with other EU states, Germany has also contributed to these measures. The difficulties in this field are obvious, especially in a situation where the same ethnic group is living on both sides of the border and does not feel a national commitment towards the respective national states.

Any improvements in export/import regulations as well as in border monitoring, customs control and cooperation to fight illegal trade will be incomplete, however, if they are undermined by continuing state deliveries to non-state actors. There is a considerable need for action at the international level in this field. So far, it has not been possible to reach international consensus on *prohibiting arms*

*deliveries to non-state actors* due to the fact that some states claim a right of resistance against public authority that is not legitimately exercised (e.g. occupation and colonial oppression, serious human rights violations, suppression of minorities and of the right of self-determination of the people). Therefore, it remains an important objective on the agenda of international negotiations to reach a legally binding instrument containing strict export provisions which prohibit arms deliveries to civil war areas or to states threatened by destabilization, violating international law or human rights or refusing to give end user guarantees. Such an instrument should also include a general ban on deliveries to non-state actors—with the possibility of granting an exception in serious cases where a substantiated right to resist public authority that is not legitimately exercised can be claimed under international law.

As a long-term preventive measure, it is vitally important to establish an effective legal system and an efficient administration which will ensure a proper marking of arms, restrictive licensing procedures, a reliable registration and control of arms possessions and arms trade, as well as an unrelenting prosecution of illegal activities. The current negotiations under the umbrella of the United Nations on an international agreement on the identification and tracing of small arms and light weapons are a step in the right direction. This agreement will introduce a commitment to mark and register small arms and light weapons and to cooperate in the tracing of confiscated illegal weapons. This, in turn, will generate the need to create adequate capacities within the individual states, thereby leading to an improved national control of these arms as well as to improved international cooperation.

However, the agreement will not result in an international standard governing the national norms of arms legislation

and the conditions of legal private possession of small arms and light weapons. In the case of liberal or non-existent arms laws or negligent control practices, the mass availability of small arms and light weapons will therefore continue to be 'legal'. A substantial improvement in the situation in this respect can be reached only by an international standard which includes the *prohibition of private possession of war weapons*. Given the traditional resistance against such a measure in states from all cultural backgrounds, the implementation of such a standard would require a strong civil-society movement and the exercise of considerable public pressure in order to bring about paradigmatic change in the public consciousness and to encourage governments to take relevant action.



## *Summary of the Discussion*

Today, a variety of initiatives exist worldwide to fight the spread, availability and use of small arms. To strengthen these small arms control efforts, a number of things seem to be necessary: further development of human resources; an improvement of coordination and cooperation between the stakeholders involved; and improved institutional learning.

In international organizations, especially the UN, there is apparently a shortage of small arms control experts in the decision-making bodies and project management. As these persons exercise the crucial functions of giving advice to policymakers and implementing projects, a system should be developed to provide them with special training, standards and guidelines. Also, the cooperation and coordination between decision-making and decision-implementing agencies and the exchange of information has to be improved. Another issue is the problem of institutional learning, as lessons that should have been learned are often not implemented sufficiently in future small arms control programs—in some cases, with deplorable results: “Until the dirty linen is washed in public, as was the case in Ruanda, not much will be learnt from failures”.

Another discussion point was the linkage between research and the implementation of its results in the field. Research findings on the small arms problem are not included sufficiently in current small arms control programs, and the research being done does not respond to the needs of the people in the field. It was suggested that a crosscutting effort to bridge this gap should be attempted by the SALW (small arms and light weapons) control community.

The question was raised why weapons collection programs are hardly carried out as a preventive measure, but only after a conflict. One of the problems is

that organizations like the UN can only act on a country's request, and cannot intervene independently in a country's internal affairs.

It was discussed whether the priority of small arms programs should be small arms control, or combating the underlying causes of violent conflict and small arms possession and use. As efforts to fight the root causes are often seen by the respective state as an intervention in its sovereignty and are thus problematic, it was suggested that NGOs should embark on education programs and thus try to change the people's attitude towards violence and small arms step by step. However, the abundant availability of small arms remains a crucial issue which has to be fought.

To improve the success of DD&R (disarmament, demobilization & reintegration) projects, attractive alternatives for ex-combatants have to be found to convince them to give up their weapons, and to offer them a *real* option which is a more interesting, promising and sustainable way to earn a living than the use of a weapon. To this end, creating employment opportunities is crucial. However, it is difficult to promote employment in war-torn regions which offer no natural or economic resources to create jobs. Furthermore, financial resources are limited. In this context, the use of the term ‘reintegration’ was criticized. Literally the term implies that the objective of DD&R is merely to reconstruct the political, economic and social situation which existed before the outbreak of the conflict, which is not the case. Both ex-combatants and the integrating communities have to adjust themselves to a completely new situation, a challenge which has to be recognized by the international community.

*By Julie Brethfeld, BICC*

# 8 Keynote Speeches

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

*This is a web-adjusted version.  
For version with photograph  
please refer to printed publication*

# Promoting Security: But How and For Whom?

*Adam Daniel Rotfeld*

## *Introductory remarks*

The question: “Security—How and for whom?”—is more than justified. However, before sharing with you some modest comments and reflections, I would like to congratulate the Bonn International Center for Conversion on its 10th Anniversary. I am impressed how much has been done by so few people in such a short period. It is remarkable to what extent Herbert Wulf and Michael Brzoska have been able to attract so many researchers from different countries who represent so many different cultures and educational backgrounds to work as a team and achieve results which can hardly be overestimated.

The conference is addressing a fundamental question. Determinants and criteria for evaluating the security environment have changed, along with the parameters and actors present on international stage. September 11 did not change the world but perceptions of it changed dramatically. There is not a single state in Europe which poses the threat of external aggression against its neighbour. Nowadays the threat is generated too a much *lesser* extent by strong and aggressive states than by a global network of criminal and terrorist organizations which do not identify themselves with any specific state, territory or nation. Having said this, I would like to discuss today—in ten points—some new institutional dimensions of the ESDP and transatlantic security as seen from the Polish perspective.

## ***1. The common European security and defence policy implemented as part of the European Union should not replace or duplicate the tasks and functions of NATO***

Making this thesis a starting point for further considerations, one should try to specify the essence and significance of the Common European Security and Defence Policy implemented as part of the European Union. A new beginning of that policy was initiated by the St Malo Declaration of December 1998. No qualitative change in the shaping of EU common security and defence policy could have taken place were it not for that agreement between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac.

However, the foundations of the political philosophy today enabling the implementation of that policy were formulated by Karl Deutsch. Over 45 years ago, Deutsch presented the idea of a pluralistic security community. The basic elements of Deutsch’s philosophy are states’ sovereignty and independence; communality of shared basic values stemming from and applied in the practical operation of common institutions; readiness for cooperation and mutual positive responses to partners’ expectations; mutual loyalty and respect for individual identity; integration to the point at which states are ready to make “peaceful changes” answering their partners’ expectations; and communication cementing the political community. I would also add shared ethical norms and principles of solidarity as significant to the pluralistic security community concept, understood in this way.

The whole idea of common security and defence is based on the conclusions drawn from past experience, on the lessons of history. Both World Wars started in Europe. They resulted from conflicts of interests and national egoism which ultimately led to the greatest tragedy in the history of mankind: Nazi Germany’s policy of aggression and genocide. The development of European integration and community structures was, to a considerable extent, aimed at preventing the scenario that led to the outbreak of the two World Wars from happening again. This leads me to the second thesis.

## ***2. In searching for an efficient way to prevent security policy from re-nationalization, there is no better institution or structure than the Common European Security and Defence Policy***

No such policy existed in either Europe or the EU before. It is emerging as a qualitatively new, unprecedented phenomenon and institution. One should bear in mind that the EU has been undergoing a process of enlargement, first from 6 to 9 members, later to 15 and, as of 1 May 2004, to 25 members. This process is accompanied by the most developed consolidation and transformation in history. The very specific criteria of the Copenhagen summit of 1993 and the fact that EU candidate countries have met them has been a more significant form and way of eliminating possible conflicts in

Europe than any treaty on the reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe. I would not like to be misunderstood at this point: I recognize the importance of treaties such as the CFE, yet I believe the importance of eliminating potential sources of strain and conflict is even greater. Therefore, the formulation of the Common Security and Defence Policy can hardly be overestimated. This does not, however, mean that the institutions and norms reflecting this policy will manage to solve all the problems of mutual relations between EU states once and for all. Which leads me to the third thesis.

### ***3. Speaking about European security, nations have in mind—first and foremost—their own security***

This is entirely natural and not unusual in any way. At the same time, none of the states has a monopoly on the Common European Security and Defence Policy, although some want their specific particular right to define that policy to be commonly recognized. The point is that European states' interests in strategic issues are alike. This fact enabled the founding of the institution referred to as the Common European Security and Defence Policy. However, the attitudes of particular states differ on immediate, concrete and detailed matters. It is known that the devil lies in the details.

At this point I will allow myself to make a digression and express a more general thought, namely, that observers and some security analysts frequently mix the equality of states in legal terms with actual equality. It may be true that the partners in the European process are comparable and, from the formalistic point of view, that they have equal rights, but my point is simple: the countries are not equal in terms of their economic potential, demographic potential or political influence. Nations may be equal before the law, but not in all other dimensions.

The search for equilibrium among conflicting interests is never simple or easy and it becomes even more difficult when one party is accused of being governed by “national egoism” while one’s own stand is described as very “European”, out of definition or the very nature of things. I would, however, not exaggerate the problem. Instead, I would suggest eliminating the rhetoric that presents negotiations as battles. In every battle there are winners and losers. As a result, the outcome of the summits in Nice and Copenhagen are referred to by many as great triumphs, and the December meeting in Brussels is considered a defeat and a catastrophe. Success and achievements have, as a rule, many parents. Only failures are orphans.

It is worth recalling that the EU, also in its Common Security and Defence Policy, is based upon the search for compromise. Such a search is by its very nature an arduous and non-spectacular activity. It incorporates the necessity of taking the partial interests of all participants in the process into account. As a result, EU documents are not attractive to read and are written in a difficult and dull bureaucratic language which, although expressing the convergence of interests, leads the public to fear that a given state or nation’s stand may not be properly reflected in the final decisions. This also applies to agreements concerning security and defence. Therefore, agreements on Biafra and Salvador, Nicaragua and Angola, or Haiti and Liberia are far easier to reach within the Union than those referring to the “near abroad”—to the Middle East, Belarus or Russia.

### ***4. The Common Security and Defence Policy is needed to balance interests, overcome divisions existing in Europe, and prevent new lines dividing EU states from emerging***

This refers mainly to common threats. The EU security strategy, known as Javier Solana’s “A Secure Europe in a Better World” report<sup>1</sup>, incorporates an apt diagnosis of threats and dangers and marks the thresholds of Europe’s common reaction to new threats. In Solana’s approach, the new security environment is determined by the following strategic threats:

*Terrorism*, undermining the basis of a tolerant, open and democratic society. The terrorist attacks in Madrid once more proved that we are dealing with a qualitatively different and supranational phenomenon here. The fight against terrorism requires cooperation so wide in scope that it could not be provided in an equally optimal form and range by any structure other than EU institutions and their Common Security and Defence Policy.

*Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.* The danger of these weapons spreading, particularly in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, poses a direct threat to European and global security. The problem is not restricted to nuclear weapons. To a greater extent, it concerns chemical and biological weapons, which are easier to produce and transport. Indeed, the only effective preventive method ensuring that these weapons will not be used is prohibition, elimination and destruction, in fact, abolishment. However, the only aspect of the problem which is discussed today is how their *proliferation* can be effectively prevented.



*Weak and failed states.* The paradox of our times is that the main source of threats is not strong and aggressive states, as used to be the case, but rather weak and failed countries which have lost the ability to control the development of events taking place on their territories. Such regions include Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Yemen, Sudan or, on the outskirts of Europe, the trans-Caucasus and Balkan regions. Only joint activity by the whole community of democratic European states and the cooperation of NATO and EU countries can effectively neutralize the threats posed by criminal organizations and structures enjoying full freedom and impunity in the regions mentioned.

*Organized international crime* today poses a considerable threat to states, particularly in regions where state and legal institutions have ceased to exist or to function properly. As a consequence, the main product exported from Afghanistan is narcotics. In other regions of the world, the smuggling of arms, flesh peddling and money laundering remain the main sources of income.

These, and other forms of criminal activity, cannot be fought against more effectively than by means of the procedures and commitments of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Such reasoning leads me to a conclusion which makes the formulation of another thesis possible.

### ***5. Constructing a new international order based on effective multilateralism is neither a choice nor an alternative but a necessity in our times***

I do not have the intention to criticize unilateralism here. I will refer to two American political strategists. The first is Joseph S. Nye, who published an important book two years ago: "The

Paradox of American Power."<sup>2</sup> He offered an answer to the question of why the only superpower of the contemporary world cannot cope alone. (Nye, today a teacher at Harvard University, was for many years employed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, which means he not only *says* what he *knows*, but he also *knows* what he is talking about.)

The second is Henry Kissinger, who believes that America should be aware of its superiority, yet should act as if it were functioning in a world where security depends on numerous other centres of power. "In such a world," writes Kissinger, "the United States will find partners not only for sharing the psychological burdens of leadership, but also for shaping an international order consistent with freedom and democracy."<sup>3</sup>

Such a new centre of power is constituted by the EU. It was Kissinger who, commenting on the Balkan crisis when Europe could not cope with the conflict in the region without the help of the US, expressed the later frequently quoted question: "Does anyone know the phone number of Mr Europe (i.e., of the European Minister for Foreign Affairs) whom the US President could call in a crisis?" Although the question was formulated many years ago, not much changed in Europe for a considerable time. Now, however, when the Constitutional Treaty is accepted there *will be* a person whom one may call. There is no need to say that the name of this person is Javier Solana.

I would like to use this opportunity to mention another book. I have in mind the most recent book by Zbigniew Brzezinski "The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership."<sup>4</sup> He warns Americans not to identify might and strength with omnipotence. America is potent, but not omnipotent. Brzezinski encourages Europeans to overcome their "parochialism" and Americans to change their narrow and arrogant understanding of national strategy in order to face unprecedented

challenges. "A genuine US-EU transatlantic alliance, based on a shared global perspective, must be derived from a similarly shared strategic understanding of the nature of our era, of the central threat that the world faces, and of the role and mission of the West as a whole."

### ***6. EU states' assent to establishing a common security and defence institution does not indicate that differences between them have ceased to exist***

This refers to the very idea of the European Security and Defence Policy as well as to the states' own roles and the motives for their participation in the policy. What is more, recent events prove that a crucial influence is exerted upon European policy not only by the differences between particular states' attitudes, but also by the countries' internal divergence. This thesis is proved by the U-turn in Spain's foreign policy that followed the March 14 elections.

The phenomenon is particularly true of the differing understandings of EU structures and operational capabilities in the context of the tasks the structures face—particularly in the context of relations with NATO. While France traditionally aimed at establishing an independent European Security and Defence Policy, autonomous towards NATO and possessing its own independent resources, the United Kingdom saw that project as an opportunity to consolidate "the European pillar of NATO." The French attitude influenced a certain evolution of the British idea of the European Security and Defence Policy. Nevertheless, it still incorporates the element of securing NATO's primacy in the system of European security and emphasizing the need for close cooperation between the EU and NATO. This aim is also favoured by the Berlin Plus<sup>5</sup> agreement reached in March 2003 following many years of

negotiations. For France, the development of the EU institution and structure of security and defence was a significant instrument in carrying out its vision of the EU as an equal partner, and even as a counterbalance to the United States' position in Europe and the world.

The EU's lack of ability to cope with new tasks is in many cases 'balanced' by empty political declarations and ambitious plans and intentions concerning the future. The essence of the EU structures' weakness is the erroneous attitude according to which they are supposed to function independently of, if not in opposition to, NATO and the US. Such an understanding of the role of European security institutions can lead to marginalization of the EU and the unnecessary antagonizing of European-American structures. The US, in turn, on the one hand used to encourage its European allies to develop their capabilities and establish a strong European pillar of NATO. On the other, as a consequence of political controversies, the US approaches the EU's growing independence in the domain of security and defence with mistrust and criticism. The mistrust stems primarily from the Americans' fear that autonomy and independence will in the future lead to rivalry.

As the EU's economic power and its involvement in developmental support are increasing and new political ambitions and aspirations to play the role of an active player on the international political scene are being formulated, a new problem has emerged. It is summarized by journalists saying that the EU does not intend to "clean up the mess" made by the US and "pay the bills", but wants to perform an active role on the international scene as an independent world superpower.

***7. Much seems to suggest that the times of producing blueprints and Grand Designs are gone. The EU has entered the stage of putting its plans into effect***

Concrete and specific activities are underway. This refers, for instance, to the European Capabilities and Armaments Agency and the latest British-French-German initiative aimed at establishing combat groups to take part in crisis management.

***8. Matters of security and defence are governed by the principle of unanimity and crucial decisions have to be taken on the basis of consensus, except for executive ones***

The European Security and Defence Policy thus remains an area of intergovernmental cooperation which guarantees respect for the equal status of all member states' interests. Decisions on establishing structural cooperation (introduced into the Treaty as a result of a British-French initiative) will be made by all member states. This requirement, together with the principle of obtaining information concerning cooperation via the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, will enable states not participating in structural cooperation to maintain a certain control over the shape of that cooperation.

Following the decision of the European Council of December 2003, preparations are being made to appoint an EU planning unit as part of the EU Military Headquarters, as well as proper communication units at the SHAPE and EUMS headquarters.

***9. A close relation and interdependence between the operational capabilities developed in the EU and the actual needs and possibilities of their application should be recognized***

The development of EU capabilities will to a crucial extent depend upon the structural cooperation and the possible implementation of the February British-French-German initiative on building combat groups which would constitute European rapid reaction forces. The initiative, however, may in practice be hard to implement even for such EU states as Germany. The point is that a majority of states have put the same forces at the disposal of the EU that are also intended to be shaped for the needs of NATO.

***10. Adopting the EU Security Strategy in practice triggered the process of creating a common European strategic culture***

The adoption of the Strategy also served as a starting point for the process of preparing partial strategies in what are considered priority areas, such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; combating terrorism and international crime; a common policy concerning the so-called Greater Middle East—Bosnia and Herzegovina (connected with the planned taking over of responsibility for the military campaign from NATO); and implementation of the idea of effective multilateralism. Remarkably, the term "preemptive action" associated with the American doctrine that appeared in the first draft of the Strategy has been replaced with "preventive action."

It remains an open issue whether the basis of the values shared by NATO and the EU and their common threats will pass the test *vis-à-vis* the differences between the US and European attitudes, as well as the excess of ambitions and preferences concerning methods of action noticed on both sides of the Atlantic. EU cooperation with NATO should be governed by the need to effectively accomplish aims, practicability, and financial and organizational effectiveness. This thought led us in Poland to initiate a Reflection Group in Warsaw on the future of NATO and its cooperation with the EU. The outcome of the Group's debate will be presented to all allies before the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul.

### Concluding remarks

I would like to end my analysis with a remark of a general nature. The new world we are living in expresses an essential antinomy between states and nations on the one hand, and community and society on the other. Nothing is associated with nations' sovereignty and the independence of sovereign states more than the policy of security and defence. The new international order is expressed in the fact that the existing structures are increasingly less and less intergovernmental and more and more trans- and suprastate in their nature:

- The difference between foreign policy and internal policy is disappearing
- International structures and states belonging to them have a right, and even an obligation, to intervene in matters that in the past used to fall under the exclusive competence and discretionary power of national governments of sovereign states
- Contemporary states are to an increasing extent recognizing the judgements of international courts, particularly those concerning human rights and minority groups.

The EU, together with its Common Security and Defence Policy, is the first institution so large in scope as to cover the whole region and, so far, the most successful attempt at reconciliation of community and society interests with the needs of nations and states constituting the integral parts of the community.

### Notes

- 1 Javier Solana. 2003. *A Secure Europe in a Better World. The European Security Strategy*. Approved by the European Council and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Council of the European Union: Brussels, 12 December.
- 2 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2002. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Do It Alone*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 3 Henry Kissinger. 2001. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 288.
- 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2004. *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. New York: Basic Books, p. 222.
- 5 The Berlin Plus formula is a reference to the decision of the NATO Council made in June 1996 in Berlin which obligated all allies to participate in the European NATO Security and Defence Initiative. The assumption denotes the respecting of the anti-trinity of three Ds—no-duplication, no-decoupling, no-discrimination—supplemented with the fourth requirement according to which the EU is always to leave the precedence of action to NATO structures. Only if NATO does not take any action, is the EU allowed to use NATO's resources. The scope of the EU's activity widened in the domain of security and defence (ESDP) as its forces were involved in the Balkan region.

# The Other Conversion: From Conflict to Peace

*Reinhart Helmke*

The festive ten-years' anniversary celebration this morning was a reminder for us that the work of BICC is built on three columns: classic conversion, conflict prevention, and the consolidation of peace.

The conversion from conflict to peace has been more in the public view recently than it had been in a long time. As the motivation for war in Iraq is shifting to bringing peace and democracy to Iraq and the Middle East, this aspect of conversion has moved to centre stage, even though it is surrounded by a number of misconceptions.

At a Pentagon press briefing in June 2003, the US Secretary of Defense spoke about peace-keeping and reconstruction in Iraq as a new challenge. The United States, he said, was accumulating considerable experience in such efforts and could "provide some leadership for training of other countries' citizens" interested in participating in similar programs.<sup>1</sup> He was quick to add, however, that the US would not be interested in playing a leading role in such operations for long.

What, in short, are the distinguishing marks of this reconstruction effort in Iraq? First, in its present phase, it is considered a military job. Accordingly, security concerns are viewed through a military lens—not in the sense of human security as was discussed this afternoon in our conference. This is made more complex by the fact that in Iraq a number of tasks traditionally carried out by the military have been 'outsourced' to private contractors who seem to operate with both little supervision and support. The results

are more insecurity and less accountability. In terms of governance, a 'top-down' approach has been chosen, with little participation by the population, who cannot help but compare their present lot with that during ten years of embargo.

## *Is it true that the international community does not know better?*

Far from it. Important lessons in reconstruction after war and conflict have been learned since before the end of the Cold War. After the Peace Agreements of Esquipulas, six Central American countries appealed for international support in rebuilding their economies and their societies. This was largely a 'learning-by-doing' exercise that turned out to be very successful. Both displaced persons and ex-combatants were reintegrated into newly emerging peace economies, and governments committed themselves to social development policies designed to prevent future conflict in the region. Why did this work? Two reasons stand out. First, the countries asked the United Nations to exercise management of the operations. And, maybe even more importantly, it was a country without a geopolitical agenda in Central America—Italy—that took both political and financial leadership in the effort. This built a level of trust and credibility that would have been out of the reach of a hemispheric power.

It is hard to emphasize too much how important an ingredient trust really is for the conversion from conflict to peace. Francis Fukuyama made this point just a few days ago in an interview he gave to the German newspaper *Die Welt*.<sup>2</sup> He said that the US alone cannot

credibly bring about democracy in Iraq for three reasons. First, he refers to the lack of legitimacy of the operation, as had been pointed out by Hans Blix.<sup>3</sup> Second, in the light of security considerations, the US Administrator has found it necessary to close TV stations and the written media, while taking credit, at the same time, for the introduction of freedom of expression. And similarly, according to Fukuyama, it will be virtually impossible for the occupying force to allow the majority vote in free democratic elections as this could lead to a government of a kind declared in advance as unacceptable. In Fukuyama's view, trust must urgently be reestablished in US relations at three levels: with its European Allies, with the political 'heavyweights' of the Third World, and with the Iraqi society itself.

But, back to the impressive body of knowledge about reconstruction with conflict prevention that started in Central America. In 1995, the OECD—that is, the world's largest economies—established a Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development that continues as a network to this day. In 1997, the OECD published Ministerial Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation that were endorsed by the governments of all OECD-member countries without exception. In 2001, an updated and consolidated 146 page-version of the guidelines was published under the title "Helping Prevent Violent Conflict".<sup>4</sup>

Based on its operational experience in Central America, my former organization, UNOPS, created a "Division for Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability" that has done practical



reconstruction work in some twenty countries. Innumerable foundations, academies, think tanks and NGOs have specialized in similar work. And certainly not least, in recognition of the importance of a workable interface between military and civilian specialists, the US Army established a Peace-Keeping Institute as early as 1993, which however was placed on the backburner when nation-building ceased to be part of proclaimed US policy.

### *Is there a common thread?*

It is easy to imagine that work carried out by all these actors over a period of some 15 years has created a wealth of knowledge that humanity simply cannot afford to cast aside in the aftermath of the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq. Of course, each case is unique, and an approach that works in one place may not work in another. But there are elements common to all these approaches. Reduced to their simplest expression, they can be grouped under four headings:

- Basic principles
- Operations design
- Execution
- Coordination.

#### *Basic principles*

Invariably, the entry point for operations is the civil society at the local level. It is here that everything starts: reconciliation and healing; confidence-building; reconstruction of physical infrastructure; and the re-launching of essential local institutions. Foreign support teams will look to cooperate with entities that are most broadly respected by local populations, be they councils of elders or Shuras, as in the case of Afghanistan.

Unlike traditional development projects, these operations are based on an area focus, not on target groups. The territoriality of the area-based approach transforms all inhabitants of the area into beneficiaries of the reconstruction effort. This is essential to avoid any form of social exclusion, which was often at the very root of the conflict. This, then, is the only conditionality of these operations: there can be no exclusion of any group living in the area, be it on ethnic, religious, political, gender-related or cultural grounds.

A high degree of participation flows from this principle. It makes sure that every segment of society can play a role in the reconstruction effort, especially the weak and marginalized, such as child soldiers or women.

The perspective of this set of principles is democratic and inclusive governance in a decentralized political environment. In this environment, priorities can only be set by local participants themselves, not by outside actors.

#### *Operations design*

The key design element derived from these principles is local capacity-building, starting with non-conflictual decision-making on priorities for investment in the local area. I have been present in training courses held for this purpose. There is no pretence that conflicts do not exist. It is recognized that they do, quite naturally, but they can be managed in such a way that they do not fuel conflict again. A key for these sessions is the conducting of compromise negotiations. An agreement may be reached that the rehabilitation of an irrigation scheme for rice production may have to be accomplished first, under condition that the reconstruction of schools will be the next priority.

Outside help typically contributes part of the investment, but it is essential that substantive decisions are left to the local entity.

Setting up a local planning capacity in this fashion, and thereby opening the throttle for setting the conversion from a war economy to a peace economy into motion, is a common feature of all successful reconstruction programmes. It has been found that, if an investment of some US \$40 per year and beneficiary is sustained for three years in a row, this will be sufficient to reach 'the point of no return'. This means that, even if half of Iraq were to be covered by such a program, the cost would be US \$1.5 billion for three years, that is, less than 2 percent of the funds already approved for 2004 alone.

While there is no doubt that the entry point is local, there is no denying that interfacing with regional and national governance must be part of the operations design. This is done through the creation of multiplier effects, from programme areas into neighbouring areas, and from the local to the regional and eventually to the national level. Information and communication components of the programme design are formulated so as to facilitate these multiplier effects and to prevent conflict from spreading again.

#### *Execution*

Programme implementation is supported by guidelines, such as those approved by the OECD, or operational guides, such as the dozen or so that were condensed from experience on the ground by UNOPS and the multilateral agencies associated in programme execution. Operational guides are subdivided into technical briefs and tools. It is recognized that there are no 'one-fits-all' kind of tools. The conditions necessary for a specific tool to work are described in detail in these guides.

One such tool that has worked in many places is the Local Economic Development Agency, LEDA. LEDAs are associations of incipient local



entrepreneurs with the capacity to develop investment projects tailor-made to local concerns and financing opportunities. I recall a LEDA in Honduras developing a major coffee project for foreign investment conditioning it on the respect for ecological concerns with toxic effluents that previously had affected the water quality of the area's rivers. LEDAs regroup the local business community. They are forerunners of Chambers of Commerce.

Another well-known set of tools are small-scale credit schemes, open to all inhabitants of the selected area.

Training on how to participate successfully in local markets is invariably part of reconstruction programmes. This is very much a 'hands-on' activity answering to such concerns as "How do I write a proposal?"; "What are the essential elements of transparent procurement practices?"; and "How does civil society supervise investment contracts?"; "Are the specifications for building a dam being respected by the contractor?" It is this last aspect of supervision and corrective action, if needed, that constitutes the forerunner of local parliaments.

### *Coordination*

I use this word with a degree of trepidation. It is one of these concepts that depicts a general virtue, even though everybody resents being coordinated.

What is certain is that reconstruction programmes as described involve large numbers of participating entities with different outlooks, mandates, and capabilities. The Central American programme I mentioned involved: 6 countries; 40 municipalities; 50 local NGOs; 12 international NGOs; 15 international organizations; 22 European municipalities; 3 financial

institutions; and 2 donor government agencies. This amounted to 150 parties. Without coordination, or, better said, operational management farming out specific tasks to each party and holding it accountable for the output, the result would have been a nightmare.

Cooperation also means that there must be agreement on mundane operating modes, in line with the basic principles mentioned above, by each of the parties. If one of the principles is "no exclusion", then each party must abide by it lest the trust is eroded. If local planning is open to all segments of the local civil society, then food distribution, for instance, cannot exclude any of them. It seems to me that donor conferences would be much more meaningful if their objective would be to reach a firm commitment to the principles, rather than agreements on how to distribute work to the donors by, say, sectors of the economy.

### *What lessons have been learned from practical experience?*

One major conclusion sounds like a paradox: the more complete the disintegration of the social fabric, the easier it is to launch the conversion from conflict to peace.<sup>5</sup> That this is indeed so, has been seen in all cases where the demobilization of combatants and the return of populations displaced by war was a particular challenge.

A universal finding was that success is impossible without local ownership. Peaceful reconstruction cannot be achieved as long as there is opposition within the civil society.

When applying the local entry point paradigm, it becomes quickly evident that the sector approach of traditional development projects does not work for rebuilding civil society at the grass roots. At the village level, economic and political actors are one and the same.

They have a hard time dealing with the sector division too often imposed by foreign actors. The United Nations, with its immovable distinction between its political and economic sectors, has created barriers in its village-level work even more than other foreign actors. What is needed is a high degree of sectoral integration.

Local values, be they cultural or religious, must be the basis of decision-making processes just as much as the principles of conflict management and conflict prevention.

Planning and investment work are practical exercises in reconciliation.

The territorial approach enforces focus. It avoids one-sided planning, which can become the source of future conflicts. Since it prevents duplication, it also facilitates negotiations with the foreign donor community.<sup>6</sup>

Successful conversion programmes have used a human rights concept going beyond protection against violations. This broader concept includes access by all to scarce resources, such as water or credit, and, especially, to decision-making.

The degree of democracy at national level lies in the eye of the beholder. It can be argued that there are different approaches to nation-wide democracy, derived from each country's history and culture. However, there is only one standard for local democracy. Even in societies referred to as "non democratic", certain essential key positions are filled by popular vote to make sure that the best and most trusted carry out these functions.

The *mirab*, the Middle Eastern water bailiff responsible for guiding irrigation water through channels to the right field, at the right time, and for the right length of time, comes to mind. Even

during the bleakest years of the Taleban regime, Afghan *mirabs* were elected by votes of the shareholders in the *qanats*, the age-old water distribution systems that are the life blood of traditional arid agriculture.

There is not much democracy needing to be taught by foreigners at this level.

### ***Are there conclusions for BICC?***

Yes, there are:

- Broad-based conversion leads to values that are cherished by the entire civil society, in donor countries as much as in the countries emerging from conflict.
- Conversion is more than a job in one sector. It looks at all aspects that concern individuals living in a particular place.
- Conversion is as much a matter for local actors as for state actors.
- Conversion, as practised by BICC, makes a vital contribution to reconciliation after conflict and to building true democracy.

What better way to commemorate BICC's Tenth Anniversary than to thank its Director, Peter Croll, and his entire staff for this inestimable contribution? Please join me, Ladies and Gentlemen, in wishing the Bonn International Center for Conversion 'Many Happy Returns'!

### **Notes**

- 1 Alex Massie. 2003. "Pentagon Establishes New Force for Future Invasions." *Scotsman*, 30 November.
- 2 Nathan Gardells. 2004. "Francis Fukuyama: Amerika ist nicht in der Lage, Irak zu demokratisieren. Europäer und Amerikaner müssen ihre jeweilige Art der Konfliktlösung im Verbund einsetzen." *Die Welt*, 30 March.
- 3 Hans Blix. 2004. "Disarming Iraq." New York: Pantheon Books.
- 4 OECD. 2001. "The DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict." Paris.
- 5 Edward Luttwak, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues: "The true appreciation of war's paradoxical logic ... is to let it serve its sole useful function: to bring peace". For more details, see his article "Give War a Chance", in: *Foreign Affairs*, 1999, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 36–44. New York.
- 6 A good example of this is the "Bosnia Atlas", the product of the Italian cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Municipalities throughout the country used their chapter of the Atlas to assign priorities not otherwise attended to by thousands of NGOs offering aid.

# Conference Speakers

**Alyson J.K. Bailes** (UK) became Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in July 2002, after serving in the British Diplomatic Service for 32 years. She had held posts in Hungary, Germany, Norway, Finland and China where she participated as Deputy Head of Mission in the Sino-British negotiating team for the future of Hong Kong. She also dealt with arms control at the UK Delegation to NATO in Brussels, and served at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as Deputy Head of the Policy Planning Department and as Head of the Security Policy Department. From 1996 to 1997, Alyson Bailes was Vice-President responsible for security policy programs at the New York-based East West Institute, and from 1997 to June 2000 the Political Director of the Brussels-based European defence institution, Western European Union.  
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**Michael Brzoska** (Germany) has been Head of the Research Department and Deputy Director of BICC since 1994. Before that, he worked at the German Africa Institute and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies, both in Hamburg, and co-directed the Arms Transfer and Production Project at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden. He was later a lecturer at the Political Science Department of the University of Hamburg.  
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**Pat Chilton** (UK) is currently working at the School of Economic and Social Studies at the University of East Anglia (UEA). Before that she held a Chair in Politics and Peace Studies at Sunderland, having previously worked in universities and research institutes at Manchester Metropolitan, Warwick, Aston, the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris, and Stanford in California. She is currently Chair of the ISIS Europe Board, and Coordinator of the ESDP democracy project, a Framework Five Research Training Network funded by the European Commission.  
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**Peter J. Croll** (Germany) has been Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) since January 2002. His wide experience in national and international development cooperation includes project management, development banking, institutional development, policy advising, and development management. He has held senior management positions in international organizations and with German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) at its headquarters and abroad. His previous assignment was as GTZ Country Director in Kenya, where he was responsible for the design and implementation of German-Kenyan bilateral programs and projects.  
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Since August 2004 **Tobias Debiel** (Germany) has been acting as Executive Director at the Institute for Development and Peace/Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF), at the University of Duisburg-Essen. From February 2003 until July 2004 Dr Debiel was Senior Researcher and Head of Research Group at the Department of Political and Cultural Change at the Center for Development Research/Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF) of the University of Bonn. From April 2003 to March 2004 he also served two terms as interim professor of Political and Cultural Change at the same institute. In 1991 he had started his career as Research Fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), Duisburg, and as a lecturer in International Politics at the University of Duisburg, Department of Social Sciences. From 1997 to 2003 he served as Research Associate at the Development and Peace Foundation (SEF) in Bonn.  
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**Crister Garrett** (USA) is the first holder of the new Fulbright-Leipzig Chair for American and International Studies (2003–2005). Dr Garrett is also Professor for International Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Executive Director of the European and International Studies Program. He teaches international politics with a focus on transatlantic affairs, and publishes in the same area, including most recently "The Many Meanings of Multilateralism: US Foreign Policy and the Management of Transatlantic Relations" (American Institute of Contemporary German Studies, 2004).  
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**Ksenia Gonchar** (Russia) is an economist who worked for BICC over a number of years as a consultant in the field of Russian defense conversion. Currently she is working at the Russian Academy of Sciences (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, IMEMO) as a researcher in the economics of innovations. She studied economics at the Moscow State University and defense economics in a post-graduate program at IMEMO.  
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**Patrick Hardouin** (France) has been Deputy Assistant Secretary General of the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since September 2003 and Chairman of the Economic Committee and Director of the Defence and Security Economics Directorate since October 2000. He started his academic career as a lecturer and Academic Department Head at Sciences-po (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) (1979–1986) and Dean of the Economics Department for undergraduate studies (1979–2000). He worked as the General Secretary of the Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques (1986–1991) and became Deputy Director of Sciences-po (1991–1995) and then Professor of Economics (1995–2000) before joining NATO.  
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**Corinna Hauswedell** (Germany) is a PhD historian who has been closely involved with BICC in various positions for many years. She represents BICC as a co-editor of the *Friedensgutachten* (German Annual Peace Report), jointly published by the five major German peace research institutes and is co-editor of the quarterly journal *Wissenschaft und Frieden*. Between 1994 and 1998 she was responsible for public relations and publishing management at BICC (as of 1997 as Head of the PR Department); and between 1999 and 2003 she was project leader of a research project on Governance and Demilitarization in the Northern

Ireland Peace Process. She also works as a lecturer on Modern Irish History and comparative conflict studies at several German universities.  
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**Reinhart Helmke** (Germany) had been Executive Director of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) with the rank of UN Assistant Secretary-General for nearly ten years when he retired in 2003. Before that he worked for several branches of the United Nations Organisation: he was Director of the United Nations Development Programme's Regional Division for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States; Executive Secretary of the UN Capital Development Fund (1991–1992) and UN Resident Coordinator in Haiti from 1988–1991. His other career steps include the position of Head of Programme Coordination of the Department of Technical Cooperation at the International Atomic Energy Agency (1982–1985). Before joining the UN, he had worked as a consultant in industrial planning and as a manager of a land-reform project. His educational background is that of an economist with a specialization in international trade.  
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Ambassador (ret.) **Josef Holik** (Germany) joined the German Foreign Service in 1960, serving in Moscow, Madras, Brussels, Mogadishu and Vienna. He was leader of the German Delegation in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks which paved the way for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. From 1987 to 1995 he served as Commissioner of the German Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament. After retirement he became a member of a number of advisory boards, including the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board for Disarmament and BICC's International Board until 2003. From 1996 to 2001 he was head of the Board of Governors of the Saint Barbara Foundation, devoted to fighting landmines.  
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**Zahid Hussein** (Pakistan) is President of the Sustainable Resource Foundation (SuRF), an NGO and consulting company based in Islamabad. SuRF works in health, population, environment, and nutrition, governance, democracy, human rights, security and SALW issues. Over the past 20 years, Mr Hussein has been involved in the use of communications as an individual and social behavioral change tool. Some of the projects that he has headed include the Johnson & Johnson-funded Breastfeeding Promotion Project in Pakistan (BPPP, 1992–1998); the USAID-funded Pakistan Child Survival Project (PCSP, 1990–1994); and the Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), Nutrition and Breastfeeding, and Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases. In security and SALW issues, his special interest lies in human security versus typical military security and the raising of awareness towards the effects of SALW through communication and mobilization strategies. He is a strong advocate of 'humanizing' typical SALW and security issues by creating linkages between purely military or police/legal issues and the socio-economic milieu in given situations. Mr Hussein is a strong believer in "knowing the man behind the gun" before designing any interventions aimed at DDR.  
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**Hartmut Krebs** (Germany) has been Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Education, Science and Research in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)—now the North Rhine-Westphalia Ministry of Science and Research—since the year 2000. He has worked at several ministries in NRW and at the office of its Minister President. In 1990 he was nominated Deputy Minister of the NRW Ministry of Economics, Business, Technology and Transport where he served until 1996 focusing on promoting external trade, overseeing the structural changes in the Ruhr, and on technology transfer between research and business. For three years he was Member of the Executive, then CEO of the Messe Düsseldorf GmbH trade fair corporation.

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**Edward Laurance** (USA) is currently Executive Director of the Program on Security and Development at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). Since 1991 he has been Professor at MIIS, where he teaches courses in international organizations and relations, arms proliferation, security and development, and public policy analysis and research methods. In 1993 he was appointed as a member of the International Advisory Committee of the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch. From 1998 to 1999 he was the administrator of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for a Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons, an Internet community of NGOs and individuals dedicated to preparing for a global campaign on small arms and light weapons. He has also served on the governing board of the successor organization to PrepCom, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). Furthermore he was consultant to the 1996–1997 UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, as well as to the UN Conference on Small Arms which produced a Programme of Action in 2001.

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**Patricia Lewis** (UK/Republic of Ireland) is the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Prior to this appointment, she was the Director of the Verification Technology and Information Centre (VERTIC) in London from 1989 to 1997. Patricia Lewis was appointed UK Governmental Expert to the 1990 UN Study on the Role of the UN in Verification and was also appointed consultant on conventional forces verification to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1989/90. She was the Elizabeth Poppleton Fellow at the Australian National University in 1992. In 1998/99, she served as a Member of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, having previously served as an external reviewer for the Canberra Commission. Dr Lewis sits on the boards of the following organizations: The Acronym Institute; the Farndon House Information Trust; the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); the International Conflict Research Centre (INCORE), Northern Ireland; the Oxford Research Group; the Geneva Forum; and the editorial board of the *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*.

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**Irma Specht** (Germany) is an anthropologist with wide experience in the field of transition from war to peace. She is currently the Director of the consultancy firm Transition International (TI). She has an international reputation in the field of reintegration of ex-combatants and child soldiers. Seven years of field and headquarter experience in the ILO program on Crises Response and Reconstruction has provided her with a specific focus on employment issues and the inclusion of vulnerable or special groups in reintegration processes. She has a broad understanding of the key elements of reintegration such as vocational and business training; labor market analyses; small business set-ups; private sector development; capacity-building and training; context analyses; program design; and monitoring. Her record as a researcher and writer is illustrated by her recent book: Brett and Specht, *Young Soldiers: Why they Choose to Fight*, New York, 2004 and her chapter in the book *Jobs after War* on rebels and soldiers, ILO 2003. Additionally, she is a known trainer and is currently involved in the design and delivery of several training modules and courses on DDR/youth/SALW for the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).  
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# BICC

## at a glance

**B**ICC is an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting peace and development through the efficient and effective transformation of military-related structures, assets, functions and processes. Having expanded its span of activities beyond the classical areas of conversion that focus on the reuse of military resources (such as the reallocation of military expenditures, restructuring of the defense industry, closure of military bases, and demobilization), BICC is now organizing its work around three main topics: **arms, peacebuilding and conflict**. In doing this, BICC recognizes that the narrow concept of national security, embodied above all in the armed forces, has been surpassed by that of global security and, moreover, that global security cannot be achieved without seriously reducing poverty, improving health care and extending good governance throughout the world, in short: without human security in the broader sense.

**Arms:** To this end, BICC is intensifying its previous efforts in the fields of weaponry and disarmament, not only through its very special work on small arms but also by increasing its expertise in further topics of current concern such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms embargoes and new military technologies.

**Peacebuilding:** BICC is extending its work in the area of peacebuilding. In addition to examining post-conflict demobilization and reintegration of combatants and weapon-collection programs, the Center aims to contribute, among other things, to the development of concepts of security sector reform with an emphasis on civilmilitary cooperation, increased civilian control of the military, and the analysis of failed states.

**Conflict:** BICC is broadening its scope in the field of conflict management and conflict prevention, including tensions caused by disputes over marketable resources and transboundary issues such as water.

These three main areas of analysis are complemented by additional crosscutting aspects, for example, gender, pandemics, or environmental protection.

Along with conducting research, running conferences and publishing their findings, BICC's international staff are also involved in consultancy, providing policy recommendations, training, and practical project work. By making information and advice available to governments, NGOs, and other public or private sector organizations, and especially through exhibitions aimed at the general public, they are working towards raising awareness for BICC's key issues. While disarmament frees up resources that can be employed in the fight against poverty, conversion maximizes outcomes through the careful management of such transformation of resources. It is in this sense that they together contribute to increasing human security.

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