BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

B·I·C·C

BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION • INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN

brief 7

The New Field of Micro-Disarmament:

Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons

september 96

Contents

About the Authors

Edward J. Laurance is Professor of International Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. He has a Ph.D. in Internaional Relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He has been consultant to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs since 1991, working on the UN Register of Conventional Arms and with the current UN Experts Panel on Small Arms.

Sarah Meek is program manager at the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion, Monterey.

An earlier version of this study was prepared by the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion, Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the Bonn International Center for Conversion on behalf of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Appendix I is based on BASIC's listing of projects of light weapons. Appendix VII is reproduced from Michael Klare (see note 13).

Appendix II, III and IV are excerpted from UN documents.

Cover photo:
dpa, Deutsche Presseagentur
Nicaraguan guerrillas handing over their guns.

Bonn International Center for Conversion • Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn

brief 7

The New Field of Micro-Disarmament:

Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons

A study prepared initially for the German Foreign Office

by
Edward J. Laurance,
assisted by
Sarah Meek

september 96

Zusammen-fassung

German Summary

Kleinwaffen - wie Gewehre, Maschinenpistolen, leichte Artillerie und Minen - werden zunehmend zu einem sicherheits- und entwicklungspolitischen Risikofaktor, insbesondere in Regionen, in denen militärische Konflikte beendet wurden. Zurückgelassene Landminen und nicht explodierte Munition bedrohen Leben und Gesundheit der Bevölkerung und behindern die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in einer Vielzahl von Ländern, wie beispielsweise Kambodscha und Angola. In einer Reihe von Ländern, wie El Salvador, ist die bewaffnete Kriminalität nach dem Ende von Kriegen stark angestiegen. Nach einem Friedensschluß nicht mehr benötigte Waffen werden in andere Kriegsgebiete weiterverkauft, zum Beispiel von Äthiopien in den Sudan.

„Mikroabrüstung" - dieser Begriff wurde im Januar 1995 vom UN-Generalsekretär geprägt - wird zunehmend als Problembereich erkannt, aber nur unzureichend umgesetzt.
Erstmalig wird in der vorliegenden Studie eine umfassende Bestandsaufnahme der Probleme und Möglichkeiten der Entwaffnung von Kriegsparteien nach dem Ende von Konflikten und der internationalen Bemühungen zur Vorbeugung destabilisierender Transfers von Kleinwaffen vorgenommen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf Aktivitäten im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen.

Kriege und Konflikte, vor allem in der Dritten Welt, haben dazu geführt, daß auch in den 90er Jahren, in denen der Handel mit schweren Waffen stark zurückging, der Kleinwaffenhandel florierte. Diese Waffen und ihre Munition sind vor allem in den Industriestaaten hergestellt worden. Ihre Nutzungsdauer ist häufig sehr hoch, so werden immer noch regelmäßig, während des ersten Weltkrieges hergestellte Gewehre in Kriegen in der Dritten Welt verwendet. Weder die Vereinten Nationen, noch unabhängige Institutionen verfügen derzeit über genaue Statistiken über den Umfang des Handels mit Kleinwaffen. Bekannt ist allerdings, daß ein hoher Anteil des Handels illegal erfolgt. Die große Bedeutung des schwarzen Marktes unterstreicht nicht nur die Notwendigkeit verbesserter Kontrollen des legalen Exportes aus den Industrieländern, sondern weist ebenso auf das Erfordernis zusätzlicher Maßnahmen der Eindämmung hin.
Gute Möglichkeiten zur Abschöpfung und Vernichtung von Kleinwaffen eröffnen sich unmittelbar nach der Beendigung von bewaffneten Konflikten. Kampfparteien sind dann häufig bereit zu vereinbaren, ihre Waffen abzuliefern und vernichten zu lassen. Allerdings muß, etwa durch „Blauhelme" der Vereinten Nationen, gesichert sein, daß der Abrüstunsprozeß gleichgewichtig stattfindet. Einzelne demobilisierte Kämpfer können zur Abgabe von Waffen motiviert werden, wenn ihnen dafür Gegenleistungen angeboten werden, etwa Saatgut oder Hausbaumaterial. In den USA liegen umfangreiche Erfahrungen über den „Handfeuerwaffen-Tausch" vor, die auch international lehrreich sind. Mit wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Anreizen werden in solchen Aktionen Kleinwaffenbesitzer zur Abgabe ihrer Waffen bewogen.

Die Möglichkeiten der Mikroabrüstung nach dem Ende von Konflikten sind in der Vergangenheit nur unzureichend genutzt worden. Im Rahmen von UN-Blauhelmmissionen, etwa in El Salvador und Mozambik, hatte der Aspekt der Mikroabrüstung nur einen geringen Stellenwert. Aktivitäten scheiterten am mangelnden Willen einzelner Kriegsparteien, wie in Kambodscha und 1992 in Angola, oder an Geldmangel, wie in El Salvador und Mozambik. Positivere Fälle betreffen Haiti und Nikaragua, wo es mit der Androhung von Strafen, aber auch dem Angebot von Gegenleistungen bei Ablieferung von Waffen gelang, große Zahlen von Kleinwaffen einzusammeln.
Ein weiteres Feld der Mikroabrüstung ist die Minenräumung. Obwohl in jüngster Zeit Vereinbarungen über das Verbot einiger Typen von Landminen getroffen wurden, muß damit gerechnet werden, daß die Zahl der in derzeitigen und ehemaligen Kriegsregionen verlegten Landminen, die gegenwärtig auf ca. 100 Millionen geschätzt wird, steigen wird. Der von den Vereinten Nationen eingerichtete Fonds für Minenräumung ist finanziell schwach ausgestattet.

In der Studie wird gefordert, dem Thema Mikroabrüstung mehr Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Als kurzfristig umsetzbare Maßnahmen werden Erhöhung der Transparenz im Handel mit Kleinwaffen, verbesserte nationale Exportkontrollen, höhere Priorität für Mikroabrüstung im Rahmen von Blauhelm-Missionen und die Bereitstellung von mehr finanziellen Mittel für die Abschöpfung und Vernichtung von Kleinwaffen und zur Minenräumung genannt. Die Anstrengungen zur Kontrolle des internationalen Handels mit Kleinwaffen müssen verstärkt werden. Insbesondere sollten die Bemühungen zur Einsammlung und Vernichtung von Waffen nach der Beendigung von bewaffneten Konflikten erhöht werden.

Die Studie wurde vom Auswärtigen Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Auftrag gegeben und dient unter anderem als Arbeitsgrundlage für eine Expertenstudie der Vereinten Nationen zur Kontrolle der Verbreitung von Kleinwaffen. Die Studie gibt die Ansichten der Autoren und nicht unbedingt die der Bundesregierung wieder.

Abstract

In January 1995, the Secretary-General of the United Nations published the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. After noting the "considerable progress" made in dealing with weapons of mass destruction, he focused his attention on the urgent need for "micro-disarmament," defined as "practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands." As a new field of action and research, work has only just begun to operationally define the concept of micro-disarmament and how policy is to be fashioned at the national and multilateral levels to deal with the negative effects of the proliferation and buildup of this class of weapons.

This study provides an overview of the various components of the issue, including its history and evolution, the types of small arms and light weapons of concern, the various types of effects of the accumulation of these weapons, the scenarios and situations in which micro-disarmament is applicable, and the array of policy instruments and tools that might be employed in addressing problems created by these weapons. Particular attention is paid to the urban US-american experience, where the various policy approaches to reducing excessive gun violence may have applicability in the broader global context.

A typology of light weapons is developed, using the work of researchers in the field, the methods applicable to open publications devoted to light weapons, and the empirical approach of recording the weapons actually being used in the conflicts in which the UN is involved. A second typology of the various methods used by governments and sub-national actors to acquire these weapons is presented with basic categories of indigenous production, legitimate trade, and illicit trade including theft and black market transfers. Policy development in controlling the effects of this class of weapons will be more problematic than in other classes, since the large surplus available has made linking the weapon with its actual producer more difficult.

Critical to micro-disarmament policy development is clarifying and developing a consensus on the negative effects of buildups of this class of weapons. The dominant type of warfare in the post-Cold War era is defined by insurgency, terrorism and a heavy emphasis on the psychological aspects of warfare, leading to a preference for light weapons. Buildups of light weapons can impact the outbreak of conflict (e.g., Rwanda). The conduct of conflict can also be affected, as seen in the cases of anti-personnel landmines and man-portable surface-to-air missiles. Availability and lethality of light weapons increases the number of casualties, especially to civilians, and contributes to the proliferation of centers of violence within states. All of these effects make the resolution and termination of the conflict more difficult. In those cases in which a buildup has enhanced criminal violence, economic, social and political development can be seriously affected.

Micro-disarmament policies can be and have been used in preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping operations and post-conflict peace-building. Particularly relevant is the effective use of micro-disarmament in the process of demobilizing soldiers. A typology of policy tools and instruments is developed in the study. At the national level these include improved policing and weapons seizure tactics, controls on the manufacture, export and import of this type of weapons and corresponding types of ammunition, and the use of voluntary weapons turn-in or gun buy-back programs. At the multinational level, tools include support for capacity building, transparency mechanisms, embargoes, the use of force, bans on certain types of weapons, demobilization, and the development of multilateral consultative mechanisms to enhance a cooperative approach to dealing with these problems. In using these tools, policy-makers should place equal attention on devising approaches that lower the demand for as well as the supply of these types of weapons.

The study concludes with a set of recommended operating principles for UN and other multilateral involvement in micro-disarmament.

This report was prepared by the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion, Monterey Insitute of International Studies, and the Bonn International Center for Conversion on behalf of the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany. Principal author was Edward J. Laurance, assisted by Sarah Meek. Research was conducted by Kevin Kenney, Rachel Stohl, Tim Myers, Arturo Beeche, and Neil O'Connor. Michael Brzoska and Herbert Wulf contributed to text revisions. The study benefited from comments by officials from the Foreign Office, especially Cornelius Zimmermann. The study reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the German Federal government.

Background and Purpose

In response to a request from the members of the Security Council, in June of 1992 the Secretary-General of the United Nations published "An Agenda for Peace". It consisted of an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Less than three years later, quantitative and qualitative changes in the nature of conflict and the UN response demanded that the Secretary-General revisit this document. He did so on 3 January 1995 in his "*Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,*"[1] a document which highlighted "certain areas where unforeseen, or only partly foreseen, difficulties have arisen" which require "hard decisions" by Member States.

In Part III "Instruments for Peace and Security," the Secretary-General summarized the experience of the past three years in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, disarmament, sanctions, and enforcement actions. In the area of disarmament, after quickly stating the "considerable progress" in dealing with weapons of mass destruction, he focused his attention on the urgent need for "micro-disarmament," defined as "practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands" (para. 60).

In response to the coining of this phrase in January 1995, the United Nations, Member States and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began to address the issue. For example Argentina, Ecuador, Japan and South Africa put forward a draft resolution focused on the detrimental role of small arms, during the fiftieth session of the First Committee. This resolution was approved and requests that the Secretary-General prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel of qualified governmental experts, on the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of these small arms, and the possible role the United Nations can play in this field. The panel's first session took place in late June 1996. Additionally the UN Disarmament Commission has discussed but not acted on the possibility of putting micro-disarmament on its agenda. The UN also hosted a Review Conference of the UN Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, often referred to as the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC) or simply CCW, in response to the growing problem of casualties to civilians from anti-personnel mines. At the request of Mali the United Nations has sent two advisory missions to the region to review the situation of the proliferation of light weapons. It is also assisting in the collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons as one approach to the armed conflict within that country. During March 1996 2,642 rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers and pistols, all in good working order, were destroyed.

Within the NGO community many had already taken up the question of anti-personnel mines. But in addition they began to more formally address other types of light weapons. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) commenced a Project on Light Weapons, developing a network for such efforts. At last count their publication Current Projects on Light Weapons listed 41 organizations and researchers working on this issue.[2]

So far, no comprehensive study on micro-disarmament and the role of small arms in international conflict has been done. In fact, there is a great deal of conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term micro-disarmament. Even more problematic is the lack of reliable statistics and information on the volume of small arms, their illicit trade and their role in regional conflict. This study will therefore serve as a preparatory study on micro-disarmament that will be a useful background for the deliberations of the UN Disarmament Commission in 1996, the UN panel group on small arms, and Member States addressing these issues individually or as part of either of these forums. The basic text of the study provides an overview of the various components of the issue, including the history and evolution of the issue, the types of small arms and light weapons of concern, the negative effects of the accumulation of these weapons, the scenarios and situations in which micro-disarmament is applicable, and the array of policy instruments and tools that might be employed in addressing problems created by these weapons. To enhance the utility of the study, a series of appendices contain more in-depth treatment of selected topics to aid policy-makers in discerning and developing appropriate micro-disarmament policies.

[1] *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace.* A/50/60-S/1995/1.

[2] A summary of these organizations is included as Appendix I.

History, Definition and Evolution of the Concept of Micro-Disarmament

Supplement to An Agenda for Peace[3]

In the first three paragraphs of the disarmament section of this document (nine paragraphs in all), the Secretary-General observed that considerable progress had been made since the 31 January 1992 Summit of the Security Council in several areas of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. In the area of weapons of mass destruction he specifically noted the forthcoming conclusion of the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the decision by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin seriously negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the signing by 159 countries of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the effort to develop verification mechanisms for the Biological Weapons Convention. He alluded to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, a transparency and confidence-building mechanism designed to prevent the excessive and destabilizing buildups of major conventional weapons such as tanks, aircraft and missiles. He concluded this section by noting that while the problems surrounding these categories of weapons have not been resolved, the international community has devised modalities to deal with their eventual resolution.

In the remaining six paragraphs the Secretary-General called for "parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons." In paragraph 60 he introduces the concept of micro-disarmament, referring to the light weapons actually being used in the conflicts with which the UN is dealing. He went on to refer to the "enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines (APM) and the like." He also identified the negative consequences of such proliferation, including the economic costs of acquiring such weapons, the dissipation of resources that could be used for development, and the human cost in casualties. In regard to small arms other than APMs, he noted that the "world is awash with them and traffic in them is very difficult to monitor, let alone intercept." He identified four causes for such proliferation—the earlier supply during the Cold War, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, and criminal activity exacerbated by the collapse of governmental law and order.

[3] Appropriate excerpts of this document are included as Appendix II.

The Secretary-General's statement sets forth the challenge and in some cases he provides concrete guidelines for the work ahead, particularly in pinpointing the causes of the proliferation, which should shape approaches to their control and elimination. However, the statement was a call for action and was not intended to provide an agenda for action. For example, there is little in the statement regarding exactly how this class of weapons can be destabilizing. At one point he specifically mentions that such proliferation "creates a legitimate reason for ordinary citizens to acquire weapons for their own defense," indicating that mere possession of these types of weapons will not be the only focal point of policies designed to solve the problem. In pointing out the difficulties of implementing sanctions and embargoes on this class of weapons, he also points out that new types of solutions must be found, without specifying what these solutions might be. He concludes with a challenge to the international community, a challenge addressed in the remainder of this study. "It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now."

UN activities and involvement

The UN does not start from a clean slate in dealing with this problem. Several important and related initiatives have been taken and need to be noted, especially given this body's antipathy for the development of new institutions and mechanisms in the current fiscal crisis. A brief summary of these activities is summarized below.

- **General Assembly Resolution 40/151H** (1985) provides the opportunity for the UN to provide advisory services to Member States, on request, in the field of disarmament and security.

- **General Assembly Resolution 46/36 H** (1991) concerns the illicit trade in small arms and the role of the UN. It requests the Secretary-General to assist in the provision of advice, on request, on the recommended measures for enforcement of relevant rules and administrative procedures.[4]

- **The United Nations Disarmament Commission** (UNDC) was established to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament identified in resolutions of the General Assembly. During the UNDC's 1995 substantive session, a Working Group was entrusted with the mandate of "international arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991." The UNDC completed this work at its 1996 substantive session.[5] These guidelines developed by the UNDC focused in particular on the illicit arms trade. While not specifically addressing light weapons, the fact that most of the illicit trade is in this class of weapons indicates that this work will serve as important preliminary work for the larger question of micro-disarmament.

- **General Assembly Resolution 49/75 G** (1994) welcomed the initiative taken by Mali concerning the question of the illicit circulation of small arms and their collection in the affected states of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion, as well as the action taken by the Secretary-General in the implementation of this initiative.

- **Security Council Resolution 1013** (September 1995) established an International Commission of Inquiry to collect information and investigate reports relating to the sale or supply of arms and related material to former Rwandan government forces in violation of the previously established UN arms embargo, and to recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion. The Commission arrived in the subregion in November 1995, and issued an interim report in January 1996 and a final report in March 1996. Both reports are attached as Appendix IV.

- In November 1995 the **UN Center for Disarmament Affairs** (UNCDA) held a one-day workshop in New York designed to develop the concept of micro-disarmament. Entitled "Micro-Disarmament: A New Agenda for Disarmament and Arms Control," the opening remarks by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Marrack Goulding underscored the origins and importance of this new issue. Papers and presentations were then given by UNCDA staff and consultants on "Light Weapons and Current Conflicts," "Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Subregion of Africa," "Disarmament and Conflict Resolution," "Disarming and De-Mobilizing of Ex-Combatants," and "Surplus Weapons and the Micro-Disarmament Process (El Salvador)."

- At the **Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders** (Cairo, 29 April - 8 May 1995) a resolution was unanimously adopted recommending, among other small arms related issues, a regular exchange of information among governments on
(a) the situation with regard to transnational illicit trafficking in firearms
(b) national legislation and regulations relevant to firearms regulations
(c) relevant initiatives for firearms regulation at the regional and interregional levels.
The Congress resolution was subsequently forwarded to the Fourth Session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (Vienna, 30 May - 9 June 1995) from whence it was forwarded to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). A subsequent resolution of the ECOSOC (doc E/1995, chapter II, paras 9-20) provides the legal mandate for a United Nations International Study on Firearm Regulation to be conducted by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division at the United Nations Office at Vienna.

- **General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/70 B** (1995) requested that the Secretary-General establish a panel group of experts to prepare a report on small arms for submission to the General Assembly in the fall of 1997. It is the most developed initiative to date by the UN to deal with micro-disarmament issues. First, the introductory paragraphs take note of all of the UN activities cited above in this study. Second, it lists three questions for study which are at the heart of the micro-disarmament issue:

  (a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations

  (b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade

  (c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict.

[4] Both of these resolutions were the basis for the Secretary-General sending a mission to Mali in 1994 to investigate and make recommendations regarding the significant problem that country was having in regard to armed conflict related to excessive quantities of small arms; see Appendix IV.

[5] The final report is included as Appendix III.

- **Resolution A/RES/50/70 B** also mentions the "*complementary role of regional organizations* (emphasis added)." As this study was written little if any attention has been paid by regional organizations to the problem of micro-disarmament. A recent exception is the Organization of American States (OAS), whose Committee on Hemispheric Security on 13 March 1996 discussed a proposed draft resolution to ban the production and use of anti-personnel landmines. The small arms resolution also calls for the **views of Member States**, (emphasis added) which may provide a source of ideas regarding solutions related to micro-disarmament. Related to the micro-disarmament issue is that of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Some progress has been made with respect to regional forums and a possible creation of regional transfer registers, for instance in the frameworks of the Asian Regional Forum and the OAS. The regional approach may be more promising with respect to the integration of small arms and light weapons in registers than a global approach (see below). Regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the OAS and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are already actively involved in conflict-prevention activities and the prospects for expanding their activities to post-conflict peace-building are promising. They can, for instance, cooperate in controlling illicit transborder flows of light weapons and in the establishment of police forces. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the OSCE is assisting re-establishment of the legal order with police officers from member countries.

- **The Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project** being conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva is generating evidence, data and conclusions directly related to micro-disarmament. UNIDIR's basic premise is that "the combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked (UN) peace operations since 1990." While recognizing that social and political development issues are critical sources of violence, they have as a mandate a focus on the material vehicles for violence, in particular the elimination of excess weapons and munitions.[6] Their focus on the establishment of disarmament programs as part of peace operations that continue into the post-conflict reconstruction phase is revealing important lessons for micro-disarmament. UNIDIR will complete its work on this project by the fall of 1996.

[6] *The Disarming of Warring Parties as an Integral Part of the Settlement of Conflicts.* January 1996. Progress Report. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Treatment of micro-disarmament by academia and NGOs

Appendix I to this study lists the major work being done by NGOs and researchers related to micro-disarmament. This activity is focused on several important functions. First, an epistemic community is being developed around the issue of small arms, light weapons and micro-disarmament. This includes the use of the Internet, the exchange of papers and documents, workshops and conferences, and the publication of two major books on the subject. Second, information from public sources on types of light weapons is being published. Third, national capabilities to produce such weapons are becoming transparent, to include rudimentary information on their export. Fourth, case studies are being written by regional specialists who have witnessed directly the impact of small arms and light weapons on conflict. These case studies are particularly useful as a source of answers to the two main questions of micro-disarmament—the negative consequences of excessive accumulations of these weapons, and the various policies being developed to deal with these consequences.

Typology of Light Weapons

Introduction

The "micro" in micro-disarmament is intended to draw attention to small arms and light weapons, and the unique set of problems created by the proliferation and accumulation of this class of weapons in the post-Cold War era. Before describing the characteristics of these weapons, a brief overview is needed as to how these characteristics affect conflict and possible resolutions. A pre-condition for the current situation is the increase in the trade in and production of these weapons in the post-Cold War era, as opposed to a decline in major conventional arms trade and production. This has occurred for some well known reasons. First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has resulted in the sudden availability of large amounts of new and surplus light weapons. This is due to the military nature of the Soviet industrial base, the collapse of export control systems in the former Soviet Union (FSU), and a need for hard currency. Second, countries of the FSU are not the only countries finding themselves with surplus stocks of light weapons. Europe, China and many developing countries find these weapons surplus, given the end of the Cold War and the resolution of several major conflicts in Central America and Africa.

Additionally, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the rise in intra-state conflicts in many parts of the world are indicative of a relative loss of control by major powers over these conflicts. The surplus of light weapons, whose export is much more susceptible to the control of and covert supply by private parties, has had little difficulty finding its way into these zones of ethnic and intra-state conflict. Also, these conflicts do not need the high technology weapons so dominant in the Cold War arms trade. While some of the more repugnant atrocities were committed by tanks and heavy mortars (e.g., Bosnia), most were promulgated using lighter weapons that went undetected both by governments and the news media covering these conflicts. Finally, the world economic system is transforming into one characterized by both more legitimate free trade and the development of illicit networks that foster the trade in light weapons as well as drugs and laundered money.

The increasing **quantity** of the trade in light weapons, as indicated above, creates significant challenges to the control of its negative consequences. But equally important in devising solutions for problems created by light weapons are **qualitative** factors related to the nature of the weapons involved. First, light means small and less visible, meaning that satellites will not help much in detection and verification. This also means that monitoring and control efforts by national governmental officials, from desk officers to customs officials, are inherently more demanding. This creates a situation in which, even if states do begin to practice cooperative security in the post-Cold War era, the implementation phase of their arms control policies may be seriously hampered by an inherent inability to verify the trade, even on the part of national governments. In addition these weapons are not very expensive, meaning that many more types of participants and channels can be and are available for their trade and acquisition.

If it is difficult to develop a consensus around the negative consequences of major advanced conventional weapons, the task is even more daunting for light weapons. Generally it takes major quantities of light weapons to have an impact. Given the international availability of these arms, a recipient state or non-state actor has the option of multiple sources, eliminating dependence on one supplier or a national government. It should also be noted that the lighter and smaller the weapon, the more likely it is that there are provisions for legitimate use by citizens for personal security. It will not be easy to outlaw all light weapons if they are needed by the majority of the citizens for personal safety/defense in intra-state conflict locales. In addition, small arms are part of the local culture in a number of societies, for instance in the Afghan/ Pakistani border area or in the Horn of Africa.

Definitions and categories of light weapons

The increased attention paid to small arms and light weapons by NGOs and researchers in the past year has produced several approaches to defining this class of weapons. Several general definitions are cited below.

"Manufactured small arms, also described as light weapons, are all conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle. These are weapons which do not require an extensive logistical and maintenance capability."[7]

"..such arms can be defined as all those conventional munitions that can be carried by an individual combatant or by a light vehicle operating on back-country roads...The distinction between light and heavy weapons can also be made in operational and user terms. Heavy weapons typically require an elaborate logistical and maintenance capability that can only be provided by professional military organizations with sufficient technical experience—in other words, by the armed forces of established states."[8]

A good way to define the weapons of concern is to analyze ongoing conflicts. Such surveys may reveal that major conventional weapons can play a role in these conflicts (e.g., the use of tanks and heavy mortars in Bosnia). But such surveys will also make clear the type and in many cases the source of the light weapons in use.

The following box lists the weapons used during the civil war in El Salvador from 1980-1992.[9] The list was compiled from UN documentation of the FMLN weapons collection effort and the demobilization of the Salvadoran armed forces, both part of the peace process.

More empirical work is needed to determine which are the "weapons that actually kill" in ongoing conflicts. The UN has kept records of each of the conflicts in which it was involved in the post-Cold War era, especially where disarmament was a part of the operation. Therefore this exercise can be repeated for each conflict and an empirical definition of small arms and light weapons can be developed that is directly relevant to the micro-disarmament work of the United Nations.

Cumulatively, definitions such as the mentioned ones contain four major elements:
(a) the focus is on weapons and ammunition, that is lethal equipment generally used by military and paramilitary forces, excluding those lethal items generally in private use such as knives or hunting rifles and non-lethal support equipment
(b) emphasis is on the "man portability" and "crew portability", that is weight and size of the equipment
(c) weapons should be easy to maintain and require little training and be serviceable without much logistical backup
(d) items should have been in frequent use in recent conflicts, by regular and/or irregular forces, that is, should be among the "weapons that really kill".

[7] Rana, Swadesh. 1995. *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*. Research Paper 34. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

[8] Klare, Michael T. 1995. "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold War Era." In Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds. *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, p. 33.

[9] A case study of El Salvador appears in Appendix V.

Weapons collected during the disarmament process in El Salvador

Rifles
M-16 (USA)
G-3 (Germany)
Dragonov precision rifle (USSR)
AK-47 (USSR)
M-14 (USA)
FAL (Argentina)
Mauser 98-k (Germany)
AR-15 (USA)
SKS Simonov self-loading rifle (USSR)
AKM-47 assault rifle (USSR)
FAMAS rifle (France)
HK-9 shotgun (Germany)

Machine Guns
M-16 light machine gun (USA)
RPK light machine gun (USSR)
Sterling patchett MKS L34AI (UK)
Steyr submachine gun (Austria)
Ingram M-16 submachine gun (USA)
Thompson .45 submachine gun (unknown)
Madsen 9mm submachine gun (Denmark)
PA3-DM 9mm submachine gun (Argentina)
UZI (Israel)
Ingram M-10 submachine gun (USA)
HK-5 MPS (Germany)

Cannons
M-56 (Yugoslavia)
20 mm (DP) (unknown)
75 mm unretractable (unknown)
57 mm unretractable (unknown)

Pistols
Colt .45 (USA)
Star 9mm (Spain)
Stechkin 9mm (USSR)
Browning (Belgium)
F-1 (France)
.357 magnum (unknown)
.38 special (unknown)

Mortars
82 mm
81 mm
60 mm

Grenades
RPG-2 portable rocket launcher (USSR)
RPG-7 portable rocket launcher (USSR)
M-79 grenade launcher (USA)
M72 LAW grenade launcher (USA)
RPG-18 light anti-armor weapon (USSR)
F-1 hand grenade (USSR)
M-67 hand grenade (USA)
M-26 grenade launcher (USA)
GME-FMK2-MO (Argentina)
RGD-5 (USSR)
M-60 (USA)

Surface-to-Air Missiles/Rockets
SAM-7B (USSR)
C-2M (China)
C-3M (China)
SAM-14 (USSR)
SAM-16 (USSR)

Sources: List of weapons: *United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador;* Country of manufacture*: Jane's Infantry Weapons*

In our view, all four elements must be addressed in any definition of small arms and light weapons. The difference between the two terms is in the rigor of the four criteria. Small arms are those items meeting strict criteria on all counts. Light weapons, the broader term, includes some weapons on the fringe, such as shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile systems, which are not easy to maintain and which require extensive training, and landmines, which are not generally carried around. In addition to the weapons as such, their ammunition must be included in any useful definition since weapons cannot function without ammunition.

Unfortunately, these four elements are not directly operational. For practical purposes we therefore propose the following categorization[10]:

Small arms:
Pistols
Rifles
Sub-machine guns
Machine guns
Ammunition for the above

Light weapons (in addition to small arms):
Small- caliber cannons
Light support weapons
Combat grenades
Anti-personnel mines
Mortars
Anti-tank weapons
Anti-tank mines
Shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles
Ammunition for the above

It is with these definitions in mind that we continue the analysis in this paper. We are fully aware that there is much further room for definitional discussion and clarity. In the end, practical consideration, which may even differ in individual cases, are decisive. But definitional problems should not detract from the search for policies in the field of micro-disarmament.

[10] Partly based on the categorization by one of the leading authorities on weapons systems, Jane's Information Systems. See the annual editions of *Jane's Infantry Weapons*.

Light weapons of specific concern

Anti-Personnel landmines

There are over 300 models of landmines in use today, which can be grouped into four basic categories, depending on function and intent. Their composition ranges from wood to metal, plastic and concrete, and their prices range from US $3 to US $40. These four types of anti-personnel landmines—blast, fragmentation, directional fragmentation, and bounding—are described in detail in Appendix VI.

In addition to the four types of mines described above, there is currently debate regarding the emergence of a new class of „smart" mines, so named because of their self-destruct or self-deactivation capability. The rationale is that these „smart" mines will reduce the incidence of innocents (refugees, farmers, women and children) stepping on mines left over from a conflict. While this would improve the situation, there exists a 5% to 10% failure rate on the self-detonating mechanisms and even additional self-deactivation mechanisms cannot assure total safety. A major component of the landmine crisis is how the lives of local populations are affected by landmine presence if local populations cannot be certain that all of the mines in a particular area have detonated.

Ammunition

Increased attention is being paid to the idea that the focus of micro-disarmament work should also include the ammunition for these weapons. First, one of the more lethal and popular weapons in intra-state conflicts is the automatic assault rifle (e.g., AK-47, M-16). Many of the combatants in these conflicts who use these weapons are not well-trained members of national armed forces. As a result fire discipline is often lacking, resulting in an emphasis on volume and high rates of fire, not accuracy. This leads to a chronic shortage of ammunition, or at a minimum constant attention being paid to its re-supply. This then becomes a choke point that can be exploited in devising solutions to the conflict that focus on the weapons themselves.

A second point to be made regarding ammunition is that often the technology required for its manufacture is more difficult to acquire and maintain than the technology for the manufacture of the weapon itself. Research in South Asia reveals that locally-produced AK-47s are everywhere, but those that were manufactured in national arsenals (Russia, China, East Germany, etc.) still fetch a higher price. In the case of ammunition this phenomenon is even more prevalent, since users of AK-47s demand reliable ammunition, not the home-made variety which can and does cause the weapon to explode in the hands of the user.[11]

A third point relevant to transfer control measures is that ammunition is bulky and heavy and thus much less easy to transfer clandestinely. Supply of ammunition to conflict areas should be noticeable and thus be more amenable to transparency measures. Currently, information about production and flows of ammunition is scant. Not even standard sources, such as *Jane´s Information Service* are able to provide much data on ammunition production. Also, the methods that have been employed in acquiring information about light weapons supply in some case studies (see below) have been much less successful in the case of ammunition. Improved transparency is especially needed in this area, both for the purpose of acquiring more knowledge about flows and because of the promise of ammunition transfer controls in stopping or at least reducing fighting in ongoing conflicts.

[11] Smith, Chris. 1995. "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia." In Boutwell, Klare and Reed (note 8), pp. 77-78.

Production and Methods of Accumulating Light Weapons

Light weapons and their producers

In those cases where problematic accumulations developed through importing arms and technology from outside the zone of conflict, the source of supply becomes a critical question to be answered. In the case of major conventional weapons such as tanks and aircraft, the high technology, maintenance and logistics required for successful operation of the equipment has normally meant that industrialized countries can be identified as suppliers. In the conflicts of the post-Cold War era, however, this assumption is less valid. Essentially, it is becoming more difficult to link an arms import to a specific producer. A significant amount of surplus in major conventional weapons has been generated. Third parties less linked to national governments are now engaged in the transfer of even these sophisticated weapons. More importantly, as previously mentioned, these conflicts use light weapons that are even more readily available through a variety of sources. While the temptation in assessing a conflict is to find the source and build a restrictive policy accordingly, this is proving difficult.

An example of this problem has occurred in the case of the UN International Commission of Inquiry in Rwanda. The Commission was created due to the development of "detailed and voluminous information suggesting that arms deliveries had been made to Goma airport in Zaire for the use of the former Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo imposed by the Security Council in May 1994. This information came mainly from the NGO Human Rights Watch Arms Project."[12] Armed with this information the Commission began the process of verification. They found the governments involved reluctant to respond to official inquiries, but eventually France and Zaire denied knowledge of involvement. There are several lessons here. First, with Africa awash with a light weapons surplus from previous conflicts (e.g., Mozambique) governments who originally manufactured these weapons may have a built-in plausible denial. Second, NGOs and their flexible methods of research (e.g., using investigative reporters) are better equipped to assess sources of supply and methods of accumulation than official bodies such as the Commission. They said as much in their interim report. In contrast, in its first study of the Rwandan conflict, Human Rights Watch clearly documented the arms buildups that led to the outbreak of conflict in Rwanda, citing and publishing bills of lading and bank statements that implicated France and Egypt in this supply.

Having made the point that producers are harder to trace in this new environment, it remains true that the arms trade in light weapons that is controlled by governments is significant and any micro-disarmament work must be informed by a knowledge of such weapons and where they originally were manufactured. The previously cited *Jane's Infantry Weapons* is a thorough compendium of every weapon now produced, and also an inventory of the light weapons now in use in the armed forces of every country in the world. Several summaries of these data have been compiled and are included in Appendix VII.

Methods of accumulating light weapons

Those charged with making micro-disarmament policies must first address how an excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons occurred. The answer will be found in part in how governments and sub-national groups acquired such weapons, the methods used. In assessing conflicts using these weapons, several typologies have been proposed with consensus beginning to emerge that a complex model is necessary to guide policy development. Three models of the global spread of small arms and light weapons have been proposed: the proliferation model, the circulation model and the diffusion model. [13]

[12] Excerpt from the interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry, transmitted in a letter to the Security Council from the Secretary-General (S/1996/67) dated 29 January 1996.

[13] Pioneering this conceptual work has been Michael Klare. The following discussion on models is based on his latest work, "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era." In Jasjit Singh, ed. 1995. *Light Weapons and International Security*. Delhi and Washington: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, pp. 1-40.

The **proliferation model** corresponds to the familiar pattern of the trade in major conventional weapons: there are a handful of major producers that export weapons to a large number of recipients. Policies therefore focus on stemming the flow (on the supply or recipient side). The **circulation model** posits that the number of light weapons, and especially small arms, already transferred to volatile areas around the world is so large, that trade-oriented approaches must fail. Reports from individual conflicts indicate that government stores are often the major source of weapons and ammunition for insurgent groups. Governments on the other hand, have often seized large caches of small arms and given them to friendly states or irregular groups. In addition, weapons are circulated from one conflict area to the next, either within a region or beyond. Often these transfers are not part of regular legal foreign trade but rather of networks of "black market" trade that also include trade in narcotics and raw materials exploited by insurgent groups.[14] Within this model, policies to stem the flow should concentrate on those areas where conflict has just ended, trying to prevent out-flows of weapon systems, and on those areas where conflict is threatening, trying to prevent the in-flow, in addition to trying to clamp down on illegal trade. This also means that disarmament policies must be devised which focus on lowering the demand for weapons already in circulation.

Case studies from the many conflict-regions indicate that both models have some merits, but do not capture the full picture. For one, there are cases, such as Rwanda, where exports from major suppliers had an important role. And there are other cases, such as the Horn of Africa, where small arms circulate in great numbers. In addition, there are other forms of transfers, not covered by these models, such as clandestine, but government- sponsored transfers. In practice, policies addressing the proliferation of light weapons have to be multifaceted and fit specific goals and circumstances. The **diffusion model** attempts to combine the proliferation and the circulation model from a policy perspective. It gives a typology of the methods in which weapons are acquired by parties to a conflict:

1. Indigenous production
- a. Pure domestic
- b. Imported technology and licensed production

2. Legitimate import
- a. Government grants
- b. Government sales
- c. Commercial sales

3. Illicit import
- a. Covert arms exports from foreign governments
- b. Foreign government gifts to allied paramilitary groups
- c. Black market arms imports
- d. Imports from allied foreign insurgent group

4. In-country circulation
- a. Theft from government arsenals
- b. Seizure of equipment from opponents
- c. Exchanges between domestic insurgent organizations
- d. Exchanges between domestic insurgents and criminal organizations

Unfortunately, it is not possible at the current stage of research, which is reviewed in the next section, to even begin to estimate quantities for the methods mentioned above beyond a few well-researched case studies, such as Rwanda. Much empirical work needs to be done. However, from a small arms control perspective it is important to know in any specific case what the major source of the supply.

[14] Examples include diamond sales by UNITA in Angola and timberwood sales by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

Data problems in formulating micro-disarmament policy

This brief discussion of the types of weapons now of concern to the international community and the ways in which they reach conflict areas highlights the importance of generating reliable and valid data and information in the making of policy in this issue area. First, it can be seen that micro-disarmament gets to the core interests of states. It should be expected that states reluctant to engage in micro-disarmament will often use unreliable data in their arguments. Second, the nature of light weapons and the methods by which they are accumulated are by definition murky. Small and often undetectable weapons, often traded by third and fourth parties, are the rule and not the exception.

Third, if it is the United Nations which will deal with developing micro-disarmament policies, the issue of open or public sources versus government sources is an important one. During the Cold War very little action on conventional weapons took place in the United Nations. It was also true that the role of NGOs and their public sources of information on weapons rarely entered into a debate. This may be changing and may affect the deliberations of the UN on micro-disarmament issues, if the International Commission's work in Africa is any indication. While conforming to the norm of not relying on NGO information for policy formation, their interim report is extraordinary in its constant reference to the reports of NGOs. It may be that this issue area of micro-disarmament, in which information on light weapons through official governmental channels is difficult to acquire, may require a more open approach to the role of NGOs and independent researchers. It should be noted that the international attention and action on anti-personnel landmines was generated in large part by the International Red Cross and other influential NGOs.

Negative Effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons

With diligent research the challenges noted above can be overcome and assessments can be produced that can tell policy-makers a great deal about the accumulation of small arms and light weapons in a particular region, sub-region, state or region of a state—what types, by whom are they held, how they are acquired, etc. But this type of information is only the first step in the larger challenge of micro-disarmament. A second and much more controversial step is the determination of the effects of these accumulations. A comparison with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and major conventional weapons is useful. In the case of WMD, international legal and political norms have evolved which make the negative consequences of their accumulation very clear. Although WMD accumulation is not without controversy, it is certainly clearer than the situation with major conventional weapons. While the international community reached a consensus that the arms buildup in Iraq that resulted in the Gulf War was excessive and destabilizing, efforts since this event to codify "excessive and destabilizing" have proven difficult, despite the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. When one is attempting to discern excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons, the task is even more daunting. First, there is the data problem referred to above. Second, these weapons are used in intra-state conflicts, where issues related to sovereignty and Article 51 of the UN Charter are even more sensitive than with WMD and major conventional weapons. But there is a third challenge, which we now address: given the sensitivities of micro-disarmament, it is crucial that the negative consequences be clear and agreed on by the Member States and the UN. To that end, the following typology identifies those situations in which the accumulation of small arms and light weapons can contribute to or exacerbate the outbreak, conduct and termination of conflict.

Nature of conflict

The first point to make is that the dominant type of warfare in the post-Cold War era is defined by insurgency, terrorism and a heavy emphasis on the psychological aspects of warfare. This leads to a preference for light weapons so that combatants can rely on being aggressive and mobile. "We are compelled to relate to the (light) weapons as exploitable by a non-military and a non-state actor (insurgent, terrorist, etc.), equally worthy of armed combat, versatile, cunning and unencumbered by conventional inhibitions."[15]

Outbreak of conflict

While it is true that people bent on killing each other will do so regardless of the weapons they possess, it is also true that a critical mass of weapons can be the impetus for starting a major conflict. This is best seen in the case of the war in Rwanda. For example, there were the well-publicized massacres of civilians with machetes, once the war was on in earnest. On the other hand a great deal of evidence has been produced that shows that the entire conflict was greatly influenced by the accumulation of armaments by the rebel Tutsi forces based in Uganda, via Egypt and other suppliers. Such conclusions are always controversial, for several reasons. First, there are always a host of contextual factors which explain the outbreak of conflict, as indicated by the literature on the causes of war. Isolating any one factor will always be difficult. Second, prior to the outbreak of an armed conflict there may be no legal mechanisms in place to prevent the legitimate acquisition of such arms. It is important to note that the International Commission was charged with investigating reports from Human Rights Watch of violations of an officially promulgated arms embargo, not the previous accusations by Human Rights Watch of Tutsi acquisitions prior to the start of the war, when no sanctions were in place.[16]

Impacts on the conduct of conflict

The first impact can be seen in the case of the massive proliferation of anti-personnel landmines (APMs). They are designed to deny territory and this has certainly occurred. The current experience of the NATO troops deployed in Bosnia is only the latest example of military operations being shaped by the indiscriminate use of APMs. But it is also true that the military in many states still argues that these weapons have important military functions,

[15] Dikshit, Prashant. "Internal Conflict and the Role of Light Weapons." In Jasjit Singh (note 13), p. 42.

[16] *Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda.* 1994. Washington, DC: The Arms Project, Human Rights Watch. This excellent case study of how the accumulation of light weapons can lead to and exacerbate conflict also appeared as an article: Goose, Stephen D. and Frank Smyth. 1994."Arming Genocide in Rwanda," *Foreign Affairs*. September/October. The Arms Project has also produced case studies on small arms and conflict in India and Zaire.

and are reluctant to support a total ban on their use. For example, in defending a point position, mines can be a cost-effective way of warning of approaching enemy troops. These states also argue that such deployments comply with the CCW and the laws of war, especially if the minefields are marked and the mines are picked up when the deployment is completed. From a purely military perspective, the effects of APMs are mixed and serve as the focal point for much debate in the current efforts to reduce the negative consequences of this type of weapon.

The effects on the conduct of war were also evident in several conflicts in which man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were used by combatants. In Afghanistan, for example, Soviet forces had to avoid areas and adjust bombing and helicopter tactics due to the possession by insurgent forces of US Stinger SAMs. The FMLN in El Salvador also had SAMs, SA-7s supplied from Nicaragua. The conflict could also be affected by the threat to use such weapons against civilian airliners, which occurred during the civil war leading up to the creation of the state of Zimbabwe. This type of weapon clearly fits into the man-portable definition and there is a clear consensus that its extensive proliferation has serious consequences for the conduct of a conflict. For this reason states producing such weapons tend to control their exports of these weapons and rumors of black market activity in this commodity receive a lot of attention. In the case of the supply of US Stingers to Afghanistan in the 1980s, there is a lot of evidence that the United States was reluctant to do so, mainly due to the well-founded fear that they could not be controlled once in Afghanistan.

A third effect of large accumulations of light weapons, especially assault rifles and hand grenades, is their increased lethality leading to greater numbers of casualties, which in turn exacerbates the disruption of the economic and social system. This often increases relative deprivation, especially if the state has promised its citizens security. Warring forces gain more support from the citizens in their geographic regions who increasingly count on them for security, making conflict resolution all the more difficult.

Fourth, the availability of arms enhances the proliferation of centers of violence, thereby increasing the instability and intractability of violence. This has been the case in Liberia, Somalia and Cambodia. "Modern light weapons can change the balance of power between the state and sub-state groups, such as insurgents and drug traffickers and other criminals."[17]

Finally, the availability of light weapons may cause what has been termed a "domestic arms race." [18] In this situation rival groups within a state race with each other to maintain an inventory of equally capable equipment, partly for prestige purposes but also to insure that one side does not prevail due to superior military capability. Often this race is less qualitative than it is quantitative, keeping in mind that predominance in this type of conflict takes a lot of light weapons.

Termination of conflict

Several consequences of large accumulations of light weapons can be noted in this phase of conflict. First, the higher the lethality of the weapons, the greater the casualties. The history of intra-state conflicts reveals that at some point the revenge motive begins to take over from the original and more objective goals of both government forces and insurgent groups. This leads to a second effect: negotiated solutions become less likely. A third impact concerns disarmament efforts that often accompany UN operations. An imperfect disarmament effort can easily lead to the conflict recommencing if the weapons are not taken in as planned, as can be seen in Cambodia and Angola. If the weapons are not taken in, they remain available for disgruntled groups and criminals, should the economic, social and political situation deteriorate in the post-conflict phase.

Effects on political, economic and social development

In addition to the above effects on armed conflict, large accumulations and ready availability of small arms and light weapons can have negative consequences in the absence of what governments might term armed conflict. First, the increase in availability of highly lethal light weapons increases the destructiveness of the conflict and adds to the refugee problem. In this

[17] Smith, Chris. 1995. "The Impact of Light Weapons On Security: A Case Study of South Asia." In *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 583.

[18] Jaramillo, Daniel Garcia-Pena. "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia." In Boutwell, Klare and Reed, eds. note 13), pp. 98-116. For a report on this phenomenon in Afghanistan, see Dikshit (note 15).

case the population may be fleeing from a situation in which it is not safe to reside or conduct a normal life. Second, the post-Cold War period has found many countries experiencing an increase in common crimes that can be directly traced to the availability of weapons. A typical case is El Salvador where gangs have formed, armed with M-16 and AK-47 assault weapons left over from the civil war. They also use hand grenades. As a result the economy has been seriously disrupted, just as the peace process had promised economic and social development. Crime does not occur in a vacuum, and the poverty and relative deprivation of the population explains a great deal of this crime wave. However, the use of military-style weapons has emboldened the disaffected and has added to the level of damage and insecurity in the communities involved. The increase in violence could also mean that eventually the move toward democratic political development could reverse itself. If a political party official was killed in an ordinary robbery, in a climate of increasing distrust the opposing party may well interpret this as a political attack masked by the prominence of crime.

The impact on economic development is real. In those countries in which weapons are a problem, it has become more difficult to conduct development projects and programs, leading to a decline in economic aid from donors who are questioning how their funds can achieve goals in a violent environment. Also, the increase in crime and violence means that the government must use more scarce resources to provide security, at a time when the donor states and international organizations are calling for less emphasis on security and military programs.

The increased availability of small arms and light weapons has also coincided with an increase in massacres of civilians. An automatic weapon or a hand grenade makes such actions easier and more impersonal to accomplish. Finally, these conflict situations find more and more child soldiers participating. To the extent that this class of weapons is easier to use and requires little in the way of logistics, it only compounds the problems resulting from using children as soldiers.

Micro-Disarmament in Practice: Situations and Scenarios

Having briefly outlined some of the negative effects of an excessive accumulation of this class of weapons, we now more formally link these effects to those situations and scenarios in which micro-disarmament is applicable.

Preventive diplomacy

In his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General stated that it "is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out."[19] Micro-disarmament could play a role in preventive diplomacy in several ways. First, multilateral and cooperative monitoring of the proliferation and build-up of small arms and light weapons in a particular region or subregion could provide early warning of the potential negative effects outlined in the previous section. Variants of the UN Arms Register are one example of how such monitoring could prevent and perhaps decrease arms buildups. Second, should such monitoring reveal a potentially destabilizing buildup, the State involved could ask the UN Secretary-General to send a small field mission experienced in customs procedures that might impede illicit transfers of weapons, developing and enforcing gun control laws, and planning and implementing voluntary light weapons collection programs. The role of the United Nations would be technical and advisory.

Peace-keeping operations

The role of micro-disarmament in peace-keeping operations is well-known. Weapons collection, for example, has been commonly used in such operations.

In the case of El Salvador, the UN observer mission initiated new techniques for peacekeeping operations that have been utilized by other missions whenever applicable. For example, when the FMLN insurgents and the Salvadoran army concluded that they could no longer achieve military victory, they agreed to a peace process brokered and monitored by the UN. Disarmament was a large part of this process. The FMLN agreed to turn in their weapons (about 10,000 light weapons) for destruction and the army agreed to withdraw from the countryside and demobilize and disarm 20,000 soldiers. The problem came in how this would occur. The UN devised a plan whereby unarmed observers would receive and destroy FMLN weapons, but only after a waiting period in which the arms would remain locked in a container until the UN verified that the army was keeping its end of the agreement (e.g., that the demobilized soldiers had turned in their weapons). During this sensitive period, both FMLN commanders and the UN observers at the container site had the keys to the container. Had the peace process broken down, and it almost did several times, the FMLN could have retrieved their weapons with no opposition. The assumption, however, was that they would be reluctant to do so unless they were certain that the war had recommenced. [20]

The previously cited UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution project has focused on lessons learned from such operations, lessons that should be integrated into the operation plans of current and future peace-keeping operations. In one example, the UNIDIR study on Somalia concludes that:

[19] *Supplement* (note 1), p. 7.

[20] Interviews with ONUSAL officials in El Salvador, March 1995.

"*In Somalia, the disarmament program became a casualty of the indecision of competing political authorities and Force Commanders...The general consequence of embarking on disarmament in fits and starts was that the entire program had the effect of punishing those compliant segments of the population, some of whom fell victim to gangs because they had been dispossessed of their weapons...To abandon a program of disarmament mid-way because humanitarian agencies run out of wheat flour- an incentive offered to the local population in exchange for their guns- or renege on their earlier promise to source the program, shows little regard for those who surrender their weapons.*"[21]
The lesson learned was that "disarmament need not be initiated in a mission unless there is a will to see it through." [22]

Post-conflict peace-building

Micro-disarmament can and does play a role in post-conflict peace-building, especially in the demobilization process.[23] The following table of recent demobilization in Africa and Central America illustrates that about one million soldiers and guerrilla forces have been demobilized during the 1990s in these regions, and more demobilization is planned. In other countries in Asia and Latin America large numbers of ex-combatants have also been demobilized.

Recent demobilization in Africa and Central America

Chad	15,000	Soldiers 1992-94
Eritrea	48,000	Ex-fighters 1991-94; 12,000 more planned
Ethiopia	500,000	Defeated Mengistu army 1991; 22,000 OLF 1992-94
Mozambique	90,000	70,000 government and 20,000 of the Renamo forces 1992-94
Namibia	43,000	Including people fighting for South Africa 1989
Uganda	32,200	Soldiers 1992-94; 12,500 more planned
Angola	70,000	Planned after unifying 160,000 FAA and UNITA forces
South Africa	40,000	Planned after formation of the new SANDF
Cuba	120,000	In early 1990s
El Salvador	38,000	Government and FMLN 1992-93
Haiti	7,000	All regular forces in 1994
Nicaragua	88,000	65,000 Sandinista soldiers and 23,000 'Contras' end of 1980s-1992

Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion. 1996. *Conversion Survey 1996*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 151-152

[21] Adibe, Clement. 1995. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 104-105.
[22] Ibid
[23] This section is based on a paper presented by Herbert Wulf to the U.N. workshop "Micro-Disarmament: A New Agenda for Disarmament and Arms Control," sponsored by the U.N. Center for Disarmament Affairs in November 1995.

An essential prerequisite of successful post-conflict demobilization is careful disarmament of the ex-combatants. If they are not properly disarmed and armories not well protected, banditry might be fueled or arms might end up in the wrong hands. Often, these ex-combatants have learned little else besides using lethal force to solve problems as they perceive them. Disarming them is complicated since they may own more than one weapon. If they turn in one weapon, another might be hidden elsewhere. It has happened that former guerrillas picked up these weapons when reintegration failed or when political problems emerged again. Political conflicts and the inability of the government to fulfill commitments made to the demobilized ex-combatants have caused the flare-up of conflict or have led to rebellions.

Conditions for successful post-conflict demobilization

* Demobilization and disarmament require a cessation of hostilities. Demobilization and disarmament have little chance if one of the fighting parties is not fully supportive.
* Demobilization and disarmament are facilitated by regional security and stability.
* Demobilization rests on a credible central authority.
* Early planning is important. Armies might start to disintegrate before formal demobilization is organized.
* Demobilization is fostered by bringing all the combatants into a unified national force prior to demobilization.
* Central assembly points are useful for disarming ex-combatants.
* If the living conditions in the encampments prior to demobilization are poor, desertion of soldiers (with their weapons) might occur.
* If the encampment takes too long and the demobilized are left without information about their prospects, violent activities and rebellion could undermine the demobilization and disarmament process.
* Failures to demobilize and disarm might endanger peace-keeping operations.
* Transparency with regard to arms collected is vital. Weapons should preferably be guarded by an external military presence.
* The disarmament must go beyond disarming individual soldiers and units to include national or regional disarmament.
* Appropriate ways of dealing with 'surplus weapons' should be applied to avoid their transfer into areas of conflict.
* Financial support is essential.
* Reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life helps to avoid a return to picking up the arms again.
* The post-conflict demobilization itself is a complex and sensitive logistical exercise and usually conducted in a rather short period of time. The reintegration phase is a long-term process.

Proliferation and deployment of anti-personnel landmines

The case of clearing anti-personnel mines (APMs) and efforts to control and outlaw their use is a micro-disarmament situation that is well known. It is perhaps the area of micro-disarmament that has the most support from the international community. The reasons for this should be briefly mentioned, in that the uniqueness of this weapon and its effects may not transfer directly to micro-disarmament efforts involving other types of light weapons. First, the problems related to the proliferation of APMs are well established. There are an estimated 100 million, or possibly even more, of these weapons scattered across the world, tens of thousands of innocent civilians are killed and maimed each year from these mines, clearing the mines is a very slow and expensive process, and their presence in mainly developing countries has cut the amount of land available for agriculture in half. Additionally irrigation systems, dams, electrical power stations and transportation systems are frequently mined, disrupting the normal and economic and social fabric of a country. All of this creates a significant economic burden on the international community.[24]

The micro-disarmament response by the international community has had several dimensions. First, the UN has raised money for and conducted mine clearance. In 1994 the UN was able to clear 100,000 mines at a cost of $70 million.[25] However, by far more mines are laid annually than are cleared, so the overall problem continues to grow. Second, for the past three years the General Assembly has passed resolutions calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines.[26] By early 1996, more than twenty-five states have declared export moratoria on APMs. Others followed since, with some also stopping production and stockpiling. A number of states continue to export.[27]

The third major micro-disarmament instrument was the Review Conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injourious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, often referred to as the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC) or simply CCW, which ended with the agreement on the text of a revised protocol II on mines. Six areas were under negotiation, which form a typology of focal points for the CCW and micro-disarmament in general. These were: 1) rules governing the use of APMs; 2) the scope of conflicts to which the CCW applies (internal versus international conflict); 3) transfers of APMs; 4) verification, compliance and transparency; 5) technical measures to assist mine clearance; and 6) review procedures.

Despite major obstacles to agreement on the revision of protocol II of the CCW, formulae for greater restrictions in the trade and deployment were finally found. First, non-detectable anti-personnel mines will be completely forbidden after entry into force. However, states that can not immediately comply can defer compliance after declaring so for a period not to exceed nine years. Second, APMs have to have a self-destructing and a self-deactivating mechanism unless they are hand-laid in fenced-in areas. However, the same escape clause as for non-detectable APMs applies. Third, exports of all mines to any recipient other than a State or State agency are forbidden. Exports of non-detectable mines are forbidden. Exports of mines the use of which is restricted by the Protocol—mines without self-destruction and self-deactivation mechanism—are discouraged. Fourth, the agreement applies to internal conflicts as well as to international conflicts. Fifth, states promise each other technical support for mine clearance. Sixth, annual reports and exchanges of information were agreed upon. Also, violators of the agreement are personally liable and must be persecuted.

[24] Literature on the mine issue is extensive. This summary of problems is taken from Terrence Taylor. *Landmines: Prospects for Effective Legal Controls*. February 1996. Paper presented to the United Nations Conference on the Current Disarmament Agenda. Kathmandu, Nepal.

[25] *Assistance in Mine Clearance*. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. A/49/357, 1994.

[26] General Assembly resolution A/RES/50/70.

[27] Taylor (note 24).

Many problems remain and some governments and NGOs who had pushed for more stringent regulations were disappointed. Some governments, for instance, had declared that they would destroy their stocks of APMs in order to show their earnesty in this matter. It remains to be seen to what extent the provisions will be followed, especially in cases of internal conflict in poor countries. The number of states party to the CCW is below 60. Possibly, the selective export restrictions will draw more countries into the CCW. On the other hand, the emphasis on more expensive mines with self-destruction and self-deactivation devices is viewed in a number of states as unbalanced and favoring the richer countries. Verification and compliance measures remain weak.

There are many lessons to be learned from this micro-disarmament effort. But there are also unique aspects of this effort that may not apply to negative consequences from buildups of other types of small arms and light weapons. For example, it is easy to make the case for the humanitarian effects of APMs, but much harder for assault rifles. The casualties from the latter often include civilians, but more often the casualties are members of organized groups fighting each other. Assault rifles are also in the possession of people who feel they are needed for personal safety. Second, and stemming from the first, it is more difficult to draw attention to the negative effects. APMs are inexpensive and can be scattered quickly across a wide area. For assault rifles to have such an impact they would have to be employed in large numbers in an organized fashion. Given that a prerequisite for micro-disarmament policies is a consensus on the negative effects from the weapons, the relative ease of establishing the negative consequences of landmines may hide the difficulties of the same task for other types of light weapons.

Crime and violence using military-style light weapons

The last scenario or situation in which micro-disarmament has a place is the prevalence of violent and common crime—that is, acts of violence that are both apolitical and generally unrelated to internal conflicts among organized groups. Gangs fall into this category because they are often apolitical. Drug trafficking can be very political but gangs employed for this purpose operate more as criminals in the business for economic gain. In this case we turn more to the experience of police forces and other bodies employed to keep the public order. The micro-disarmament tools and policies employed in these situations include building confidence in the police force, law enforcement techniques, and innovative weapons collection efforts such as seizure tactics and voluntary weapons collection efforts, commonly called gun buy-back programs.

Policies, Tools and Instruments

Approaches to micro-disarmament

Once it can be established that a buildup (qualitative or quantitative) has or will have negative effects, there are a variety of micro-disarmament approaches available to deal with the problem. Some of these emerged in the previous discussion on the agenda of the CCW. In this section we briefly summarize each of these approaches, some national and some multilateral.

National level

1. Improved policing, for example in seizing weapons. Experience in the US has shown that tactics can be developed to improve the success of weapons seizure programs, resulting in lower armed violence. It is particular important to lower the visibility of weapons—i.e., get weapons off the streets. Both in the US and in Haiti this has lowered the incidents of armed violence and made the environment more conducive for conflict resolution and economic and social development programs.

2. Manufacture, export and import controls. The range of options here includes legislation and laws restricting the possession, manufacture or export of certain types of weapons, restricting exports by type or recipient, and enhancing the bureaucracy tasked with the implementation of these laws.

3. Weapons turn-in programs. The experience in American cities is very relevant for the type of ethnic and intra-state conflict currently on the rise. This approach has also been attempted in Haiti, Panama and Nicaragua (see below and Appendix VII).

Multinational level

1. Support for capacity-building at the national level. The UN and other multinational organizations, governmental and non-governmental, could do much to enhance the capabilities of states to deal with this problem. For example, the UN has offered assistance to states experiencing violence from small arms and light, and has sent fact finding missions to several African countries. In El Salvador the UN Development Program has been very active in developing the new police force. However, such programs become problematic in the case of a state that is repressing a minority or otherwise behaving in a manner at odds with international norms.

2. Transparency. Much more could be done if more information could be supplied on the flows and accumulations of these weapons. The experience of the UN Register is useful to investigate.[28] Two types of knowledge are important: knowledge of the accumulations themselves, and knowledge of the negative consequences of such accumulations. The latter knowledge will be crucial in changing norms, which in many cases reinforce the acquisition of excessive and destabilizing amounts of weapons.

It has been proposed to add small arms or light weapons to the UN Register. There are two major obstacles: one is definitions, the other is acceptance. Even though earlier definitional work for the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was available to the architects of the UN Register, it still proved difficult to define the categories for heavy weapons. Light weapons would present unprecedented definitional problems. To counter them, it might make sense to concentrate on just a few types of light weapons, such as automatic rifles, submachine guns and machine guns which are fairly easy to define. Another possible group of light weapons are landmines, for which definitions were discussed in the framework of the extension of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Ammunition would be especially interesting to cover in a register for reasons outlined above Ammunition does not present large definition problems as such but circumvention would be easy. There is little difference between civilian (hunting) and military ammunition and casings and explosives can be sold separately.

Another argument often raised against the inclusion of light weapons in the UN Register is that acceptance of the Register as a whole may suffer. Already, participation is not universal and some countries may be disinclined to continue to cooperate if additional, often cumbersome demands are made. Many countries do have licensing procedures for the production and possession of small arms for their own internal security interests. However, the experience to date of the UN Register shows that some countries failed to report, or reported inadequately, due to inadequately developed bureaucracies for monitoring arms production and exports. For these, and perhaps additional countries, this problem would be more severe for light weapons. In addition, it becomes more difficult for a country without adequate arms export procedures to cooperate in UN mandated arms export embargoes if they have no oversight over export of weapons. Thus the argument about decreased acceptance has both a political and technical dimension.

[28] See e.g. Laurance, Edward, Siemon Wezeman and Herbert Wulf. 1994. *Arms Watch*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Furthermore, the question might be raised when small arms are added to the seven categories of major conventional weapon systems in the UN Register why other weapons remain excluded. This would be the case for ships below a certain tonnage, medium and small caliber artillery, certain types of armored personnel carriers, certain types of missiles and a whole range of conflict relevant military equipment such as electronic guidance systems, air-refueling aircraft and non-combat helicopters.

A possible way to overcome these problems may lie in combining regional registers with expansion to include light arms and ammunition.

3. Embargo. Very few case studies have been done on arms embargoes in the post-Cold War era.[29] The number of embargoes has increased while their effectiveness seems to have decreased. There is a consensus, for example, that Croatia was able to break the embargo and use such weapons in its recent attacks on the Bosnian Serbs. Similarly, weapons reached Rwanda even after a UN arms embargo. How did this happen? Obviously, political issues are important: supplier states do not necessarily follow international consensus. The increase in sources of weapons, including illegal transactions, has made arms transfer control more difficult. There are also technical problems, e.g. a lack of common guidelines of which goods all under what types of embargoes. In this respect, the European Union is exemplary: it has established common commodity lists for a variety embargoes of differing intensity. This is one way to improve the usefulness of this tool of micro-disarmament.

4. Use of force. Can military force be used against particular types and accumulations of weapons deemed destabilizing? The Bosnian case is instructive, as is Somalia and the failed attempt to seize the 'technicals,' trucks with mounted large caliber machine guns seen as a symbol of power in that conflict. Much of what can be learned has been collected within a UNIDIR project, led by Virginia Gamba (see Appendix 1). One practical lesson is that the priority of disarmament within peace-keeping missions has to be raised - now it often comes late in the planning and is not given much resources. Another is that peace-keepers would benefit from more knowledge about disarmament efforts in earlier operations. It would help to integrate disarmament methods and experiences into peace-keeping training.

5. Ban on certain types of weapons. Member states to the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW) have recently decided on a partial ban on the export and use of anti-personnel landmines (see above) as well as on a new protocol IV to the CCW for the total ban of blinding lasers. NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as a number of governments worked hard for more stringent control of mines. They are not content with the outcome of the recent negotiations and will continue to pursue the issue. They might also turn their attention to other weapons that can be considered to fall under the heading of especially cruel, for instance equipment used for internal repression, such as electrocuting batons or very dangerous chemical agents.

6. Conditionality. Donor states and international development aid organizations can link their aid to action by recipient states to better control the manufacture or importing of light weapons so as to avoid excessive accumulations that could become destabilizing. Discussion on linking development aid with measures of "overmilitarization" have occurred in a number of donor forums, including the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Emphasis has shifted from negative sanctions of governments with large military sectors to positive measures of support of demobilization, demilitarization and disarmament. While a number of donors have put substantial resources into this field, coordination among them remains rudimentary. Also, it might be useful, both for conceptual issues and for specific cases, to include developing countries in the discussion, for instance in the framework of UNDP.

7. Demobilization, demilitarization and disarmament. In a few cases, such as El Salvador, weapons were turned in and destroyed, and forces on both sides demobilized. What were the conditions and policies that promoted such an outcome? A set of lessons has already been learned and can be applied to other conflicts.[30]

8. Multilateral consultative mechanisms. Assuming that an assessment uncovers some information that a buildup of small arms and light weapons has increased the likelihood for conflict, how will the information be used? One of the weaknesses of the UN Register of Conventional Arms on this point is the lack of a global mechanism to address the objective of the Register, the prevention of excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. Lighter weapons present even more obstacles, especially given their importance in providing personal security for citizens in areas of deadly conflict. Action at the multilateral level will be difficult without the use or development of consultative mechanisms to develop and implement micro-disarmament programs.

[29] Some relevant discussion can be found in Brzoska, Michael and Frederic Pearson. 1994. *Armaments and Warfare*. Columbus, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.

[30] See Bonn International Center for Conversion. 1996. *Conversion Survey* 1996. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 4.

Differentiating between supply and demand strategies

The Member States of the UN that are experiencing buildups and accumulations of small arms and light weapons, and the accompanying negative effects, can be usefully divided into two categories. In a country such as Mali, it is clear that controlling weapons flows into the country is critical to establishing stability. It is a fluid situation in which border controls may be helpful. This type of situation demands some action on the **supply side**. In El Salvador, however, the accumulation is already there, in the form of 200,000-300,000 weapons circulating in a black market situation. For this type of situation the weapons are already present and, while border controls will prevent further accumulations if they are successful, micro-disarmament policies must be developed to deal with the current weapons in the hands of individual criminals and gangs. In this latter situation innovative **demand side** policies are needed. So the typology of tools and instruments in the section above must be further delineated as supply or demand.

The demand side of the problem involves tactics and strategies for lowering the need for weapons on the part of citizens. Instruments have been utilized in US cities in this regard, including educating citizens about the dangers of possessing a gun, creating a norm in youth that gun violence is counter-productive, and employing voluntary weapon collection programs as a device to change attitudes towards gun possession and use, as well as promoting other programs that can alleviate more basic causes of violence. The demand approach seeks to change the culture of gun possession and gun violence—not an easy task unless the body implementing such policies can also decrease the insecurity that created the problem in the first place. The payoff in the demand approach is that policies on the supply side, such as stricter law enforcement and gun seizure programs, may become more acceptable.

Some micro-disarmament strategies operate to affect both supply and demand. For example, enhanced transparency can pinpoint buildups to be addressed by law enforcement and security officials. On the other hand, increased transparency about the negative effects stemming from buildups of this type of weapon can also enhance the norm against their possession and use.

Weapons collection and reduction strategies

The approaches selected for micro-disarmament must take into account the well-established limitations of the UN and other regional organizations in the area of security, arms control and disarmament. The experience of UN-sponsored policing—for example, in Haiti and Bosnia—shows that despite a high level of expertise and experience, the sovereignty of the Member State must be respected. For example, while a particular gun seizure tactic may work in the United States or South Africa when employed by national police forces, the UN cannot simply adopt and implement such tactics in the name of the United Nations. Rather, any UN police contingent may be limited to advice and conflict resolution, if requested. In this regard, weapons seizure programs would have to be carefully crafted. However, the use of voluntary weapons collection programs, planned and implemented by the Member States concerned, appears to be a tool that fits the UN mode of operation when it comes to micro-disarmament programs.

These programs, known as buy-back programs, provide incentives for those possessing weapons (legal or illegal) to turn them in for money or in-kind benefits. They also involve amnesty for those turning in the weapons, focusing on getting the weapons off the street and out of homes. The goals of such programs are to publicize the connection between weapons and violence, develop norms against such use, and lower the number of weapons available for crime and violence. Normally hardened criminals do not turn in their weapons, so these programs are seen more as leading to changing attitudes and norms. As a result, they rely critically on the participation of the community and can have the spin-off effect of enhancing community-police relations and social development programs.
Voluntary weapons collection programs have been conducted extensively in American cities for the past five years, and continue to be a popular approach to both collecting guns and addressing gun violence by emphasizing the negative consequences of gun possession and use.

In the final report of the UN mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in April 1995, the Secretary-General stated the following:

"*12. During this last mandate, ONUSAL's remaining military observers have closely monitored the adoption and implementation of legislative and administrative measures taken to collect military weapons in the hands of civilians or State institutions. While a limited number of registered arms are still to be collected, the main problem lies with the unknown but large number of weapons of which there are no record. The Government has reported the seizing of approximately 2,000 such weapons since the beginning of 1995, but voluntary surrender has thus far been negligible. This is a matter for concern which should be addressed promptly.* ***Buy-back programmes***

such as those used in Nicaragua and Haiti might be considered." (emphasis added).

The staff of the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion (PACDC) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies has conducted a field assessment of the weapons collection programs in Haiti and Nicaragua. A brief summary of the two reports are also included as part of Appendix VIII.

The urban US-american experience as a source of micro-disarmament experience

While not directly related to current micro-disarmament cases, an ongoing investigation by PACDC of the problems of gun violence experienced in the cities of the United States has resulted in the conclusion that the international effort in micro-disarmament could learn a great deal from this experience. This is so for two reasons: One is that direct experience with voluntary firearm collection that has been made in the United States and that might be applicable to other countries where voluntary firearm collection is considered. In addition, the question of the objectives of gun control has been extensively discussed and lessons may be drawn for the question of how far gun control could and should go, that is who might be allowed to own what kind of small arms.

While it is true that as a country the US would appear to have little in common with El Salvador, Mali and

Varieties of firearms control

Target	Theory	Examples	Major Problems
Dangerous Uses	Some types of carrying and use of guns are more likely to produce violence than others; keeping guns from such settings will reduce gun violence.	Prohibition on carrying guns concealed on person or in cars; prohibition of firearms in urban public places; prohibition on discharge of firearms in urban areas.	Inability to detect and prevent high-risk uses.
Dangerous Users	Some categories of citizens are more likely to misuse guns than others. Forbidding these groups guns will reduce total firearms violence and its costs.	Prohibition of acquisition by convicted felons, minors, and persons with histories of mental illness confinement.	Prohibited classes obtain weapons in unregulated channels; false negatives; false positive.
Dangerous Guns	Some firearms are more likely to be misused than others. Removing these will reduce total firearms violence.	Prohibition of automatic firearms and sawed-off shotguns; bans on "Saturday night specials"; assault weapons restrictions; restrictive handgun licensing.	Displacement to other weapons; illicit market in prohibited weapons.

Source: Franklin Zimring, University of California, Berkeley

other developing countries experiencing violence from small arms and light weapons, sections of US cities share many characteristics with these potential targets of micro-disarmament. First, the poverty levels and other indicators of low social development are clearly present. Second, no country can claim as many guns per capita as the United States, with this figure probably higher when concentrated in the cities. It is also clear that despite well developed laws and police forces, illegal gun possession and gun violence is rampant. Third, like many developing countries, the supply in the US is unlimited. Many efforts are being made on the supply side, such as the Brady Bill of 1985 which calls for a five-day waiting period before purchasing a gun, so that a background check can determine if the buyer has a criminal record. But it is also acknowledged that this and other approaches do little to stem the ever increasing production and acquisition of small arms.

The research on guns and violence in the United States is extensive, and is beyond the scope of this study. The major point is that it is an experience worth looking at by those setting out to practice micro-disarmament. The matrix printed above, developed by Frank Zimring, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, one of the leading experts in the US on firearms and violence, for instance, clarifies the linkages between objectives and instruments of small arms control that are also relevant for decision makers in post-conflict situations. They have to decide what they see as the problems, what their objectives are and then may benefit from the corresponding experience in the United States, both with respect to the legal situation and the practicalities of the problem of "getting the guns back in" (see also appendix VIII).

Multilateral Action for Micro-Disarmament

In summary, efforts in the field of micro-disarmament must take into account a wide variety of concepts, issues and factors not normally considered part of the disarmament mandate. Some issues are familiar, such as the need to closely examine the weapons of concern, their capabilities and effects. But new efforts should be made to engage a wider group of government officials and an epistemic community beyond those normally involved in arms control and disarmament work. The United Nations System has a large role in micro-disarmament because of the global nature of the small arms predicament and because of its demonstrated importance in conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building. Regional organizations can supplement and partly substitute the UN´s role in concrete cases. The importance of action by governments and even non-governmental organizations has been pointed out above. Purely for practical purposes, the following points focus on the United Nations.

Principles for UN micro-disarmament actions

To conclude this study, a proposed set of operating principles is put forward for consideration as a guide to UN action in this new field. It takes into account the issues and concepts presented, as well as the illustrative examples of the landmine campaign and the current situation in El Salvador.

1. It must be clear to all parties that the accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the society is a major factor in the armed violence and the casualties that are occurring.

2. The weapons causing these problems should be military-style weapons not needed by law-abiding citizens for their personal security.

3. The internal security forces of the country concerned are unable to collect these weapons or otherwise disarm those using these weapons to destabilize the country on their own.

4. The internal security forces of the country must be developed enough, in terms of capacity and adherence to international norms, so that the UN can provide that marginal assistance which will allow these forces to conduct a disarmament campaign..

5. The community and social structure of the country must have the potential to organize so as to play a major role in working with internal security forces to combat the weapons and violence problem.

6. The initiative for UN involvement in micro-disarmament actions lies with the Member States, which are best suited to ascertain that the above criteria exist.

Operative measures

The following activities and policy instruments are discussed in the sections above. They partly are already practiced and might be improved and partly need further thought before implementation could be considered or attempted.

1. **Capacity building**. Many states, especially after the end of conflict are in need of improvements of various government agencies, such as customs services, arms export control agencies and police forces. They are often also in need of advice on demobilization, demilitarization, demining and destruction of surplus weapons. A related field is that of legal advice on small arms issues. Various bodies of the UN already do offer some of these services, such as UNDP on demobilization, as do national governments, and inter-governmental organizations. Much of this is ad hoc and haphazard. More coordination at the level of the UN would add value to ongoing activities.

2. **Field missions and early warning**. Current methods of making the international community aware of impending conflicts and ongoing man-made disasters are not sufficient. Information on accumulations of light weapons are an important element of such early warning. Better channels of information, including governments as well as NGOs are warranted, as well as more effective collection and assessment procedures at the UN. In some cases, national governments may not be capable, or not the best suited, actor to find out about what is going on with respect to the accumulation of small arms. UN expert mission such as the one to Mali, or to the Great Lakes Area, can provide important input to the assessment of the situation before it evolves into wide-spread conflict.

3. **Ban on certain types of weapons**. After the conclusion of the review conference of the CCW, activities for the ban of certain types of landmines are likely to go on. A good number of governments and many NGOs will continue to push for improvements. A different follow-up of the CCW discussion may have a better chance of acceptance. Also, more should continue on applying the lessons of the landmine and blinding-lasers campaigns to other types of weapons.

4. **Transparency**. It makes sense to consider the question of the inclusion of certain types of small arms, and ammunition, at the 1997 review of the UN Arms Register. Regional registers, for which there is some interest, could be set up including certain types of small arms. Another aspect of transparency concerns embargoes. The UN has agreed on a good number of arms embargoes in the post-Cold War period but there does not appear to be sufficient common understanding of what kind of goods embargoes should cover.

5. **Positive measures for disarmament**. The international aid community has for some time discussed issues of conditionality, for instance within the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. The outcome has been to favor positive measures, that is support for demobilization, disarmament, demining and destruction of old equipment, over negative measures, such as reduction in aid to certain states. In certain cases, the later approach may be the only one available to decrease conflict levels. These discussion should be intensified and broadened to include the view of recipient countries.

6. **Post-conflict disarmament measures**. UNIDIR has begun to systematically collect experiences with disarmament measures during peace-keeping operations. The major lessons of their study, complemented with the results of other studies, for instance on the case of Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador and of firearms exchange programs in industrialized countries, can be applied in a good number of cases of post-conflict peace-building. Unfortunately that is not the case so far. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, small and light weapons have not received much attention a potential danger both for internal security and the peace process as a whole.

About the Center

As an independent non-profit organization, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) supports and promotes the processes by which people, skills, technology, equipment, financial and economic resources are shifted from the mili-tary or defense sector towards alternative, civilian purposes.The estab-lishment of BICC in April 1994 resulted from the initiative of the German state government of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), in coop-eration with the Investitions-Bank and the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft (both of NRW), the state of Brandenburg, Germany, and the assistance of the United Nations.

Working as a worldwide clearinghouse on practical conversion experiences and projects, BICC provides documentation, research, information and consulting services and facilities for governmental and non-governmental organizations, companies, and individuals involved in conversion.

BICC's activities focus primarily on the following six areas of conversion:

- Analysis of the means and methods of reallocating the financial resources of the military sector to non-military purposes.
- Reorientation of military research and development (R&D) facilities and provision of this R&D knowledge and creativity for non-military purposes.
- Opportunities for and barriers to conversion of the arms industry in down-sizing its overcapacities and in reducing its dependence on arms production.
- Programs for the demobilization of military personnel and civilian personnel employed by the armed forces and their reintegration into non-military employment.
- Reallocation of military facilities and installations and their conver-sion to non-military purposes (base closures).
- Alternative use, disposal or scrapping of surplus weaponry with the purpose of avoiding indiscriminate exports.

BICC's publication series such as BICC *report*, BICC *brief* and BICC *paper* analyze the background of the international conversion process, report on conversion projects and experience, and offer scientific as well as practical know-how in the various fields of conversion. The BICC yearbook 'Conversion survey 1996' provides detailed information, facts and discussion on all topics related to the conversion process worldwide.

Information on BICC's work and activities can also be obtained on line via the Center's Internet service 'ConverNet' at http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

Published by
© BICC, Bonn 1996
Bonn International Center for Conversion
Director: Dr. Herbert Wulf
Publishing management: Corinna Hauswedell
An der Elisabethkirche 25
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
Phone +49-228-911960
Fax +49-228-241215
E-mail: bicc@bicc.uni-bonn.de

ISSN 0947-7322

Layout: Svenja Görgens
Printed in Germany

BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

B·I·C·C

Appendix I. Current Projects on Light Weapons

United Nations Disarmament Commission

In the Final Document of its tenth Special Session, res. S-10/2 para.118, the General Assembly decided to establish a Disarmament Commission composed of all UN members. It also decided that the Commission should be a deliberative body, required to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the tenth Special Session.

The Commission directs its attention at each substantive session to specific subjects from among those which have been and will be under its consideration, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the Assembly, and to make concrete recommendations on such subjects to the subsequent session of the Assembly.

During the Commission's 1996 substantive session, Working Group I was entrusted with the mandate of "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991". Guidelines for international arms transfers were unanimously adopted by the Working Group (A/CN.10/1996/CRP.3). The substantial annex is reproduced below as appendix III. The document pertains to arms transfers in general, but the focus is on the illicit arms trade.

The 1996 Working Group could built on earlier work done in the framework of the Commission. (A/CN/1995/WG.II/CRP.1/Rev.2).

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch
United Nations Office in Vienna
Vienna International Centre
Wagramerstrasse 5
PO Box 500
A-1400 Vienna
Austria

Contact:
Phone: 43-1-21131-4272
Fax: 43-1-209-2599

The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice was established by ECOSOC res. 1992/1

1. Its main functions are:

Provide policy guidance to United Nations Member States in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice

- Develop, monitor and review the implementation of the United Nations crime prevention programme
- Facilitate and help to coordinate the activities of the interregional and regional institutes on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders
- Mobilize the support of Member States
- Prepare the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders

An area of activity of the Commission is on crime prevention strategies, in particular as related to crime in urban areas and juvenile and violent criminality, including the question of victims. The continued study of the effects of criminality in urban areas, and the development of preventive measures, using a multidisciplinary approach, and considering recent developments, *inter alia*, in sociology, psychology, health, criminology and technology. Special attention was focused on firearms regulation for purposes of crime prevention and public safety, in view of the correlation between easy access to firearms and the high incidence of crimes, suicides and accidents. The Commission, at its next session, was to consider measures to regulate firearms commonly applicable to Member States, such as the prevention of transnational illicit trafficking in firearms, to suppress their use in criminal activities, and to ensure the proper regulation of firearms at both the national and transnational levels.

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
Room A218, Palais des Nations
CH-1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland

Phone: 41-22-917-4254
Fax: 41-22-917-0176
E-mail: unidir.disarm@ties.itu.ch

In recognizing that almost no attention had been exclusively given to the issue of arms control in peace processes and that little public information is available in this respect, special efforts will be made to assure the widest possible dissemination of this project's findings. It began with the Disarmament and Conflict Resolutions Project's (DCR) first publication in October 1995 and will cover the complete series of

DCR publications: the first of these will involve 10 case studies, covering UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, Rhodesia (1979), Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA/ ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include eight issue papers, addressing topics such as Security Council procedures, mandate specificity, doctrine, rules of engagement, coercive versus consensual arms control and demobilization processes, consensus, intelligence and media, and training. A third set of publications will involve three papers (in one volume) on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an over-arching paper summarizing research conclusions and providing recommendations.

The principal products of the Project include over 20 publications (case studies, policy papers, manuals, and final policy recommendation papers). Secondary products include the creation of a peace-keeping and disarmament database and an institutionalized network of collaborating institutes and individuals who exchange input and collaborate with UNIDIR on peace-keeping and disarmament policy research.

The Arms Project
Human Rights Watch
1522 K Street, NW, #910
Washington, D.C. 20005
USA

Contact:
Steve Goose
phone: (202) 371-6592
Fax: (202) 371-0124
E-mail: gooses@hrw.org

Kathleen Bleakley
Phone: (202) 371-6592
Fax: (202) 371-0124
E-mail: bleaklk@hrw.org

Human Rights Watch works mainly on light weapons, especially landmines. They have been closely involved in the CCW Review Conference. HRW has also taken on blinding laser weapons and have issued two reports about it. They have also conducted a research mission to Turkey to investigate the use of arms in the conflict in southeast Turkey against the PKK, and a mission to Colombia to investigate arms flows to the Colombian government and to the paramilitaries. They are updating past research into arms flows in the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi). The Arms Project continues to conduct field mission research into arms transfers and violations of the laws of war, as well as research and advocacy on certain weapon systems such as landmines, blinding lasers, and cluster bombs.

British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
United Kingdom

1900 L Street, NW
Suite 401
Washington, D.C. 20036
USA

Contact:
Natalie J. Goldring
Susannah L. Dyer
Joel Johnston
Phone: 1-202-785-1266
Fax: 1-202-387-6298
E-Mail: basicusa@igc.apc.org

Bronwyn Brady
Phone: 44-171-925-0862
Fax: 44-171-925-0861
E-Mail: basic@gn.apc.org

Project on Light Weapons

During the two-year initial period of the project (1995-1996), BASIC intends to:

- create the framework necessary to develop a joint plan of research and advocacy on the light weapons trade,
- construct a network of people working on light weapons to decrease the isolation of those working on these issues,
- create mechanisms to share information and strategies more effectively,
- determine whether there is sufficient support to pursue more extensive research and analysis of these issues, and
- help place the issue of the trade in light weapons on the agenda of national and international institutions by increasing public and elite attention to the problem.

To bring attention to the problem of the light weapons trade, project participants are writing several short studies and research papers, which are published under the series title, "Project on Light Weapons Working Papers".

Centre for International and Strategic Studies
York University
York Lanes, 3rd Floor
4700 Keele Street
North York, Ontario M3J IP3
Canada

Contact:
Andrew Latham
Phone: 1-416-736-5156
Fax: 1-416-736-5752
E-Mail: alatham@yorku.ca

Mr. Latham is currently working on six major research papers to eventually develop into the chapters of a book tentatively entitled: *Canadian Perspectives on the Light Weapons Proliferation Problem*. The chapter outline would be as follows:

1. Defining the problem: "Light Weapons" as a Proliferation Issue
2. Address the Problem I: Moving Beyond Existing Proliferation Paradigms
3. Canadian Interests with Respect to Light Weapons Proliferation
4. The Proliferation of Light Weapons: Causes and Consequences
5. Addressing the Problem III: Canada's Role in Constraining the Proliferation of Light Weapons

Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies
Hampshire College
Box SS
Amherst, MA 01002
USA

Contact:
Michael T. Klare
Phone: 1-413-582-5563
Fax: 1-413-582-5620
E-mail:
mklare@hamp.hampshire.edu

Last year, Professor Klare conducted research for a book on the international trade in small arms and light weapons. Essentially, he is interested in all aspects of the trade, including:

- Global production of small arms and light weapons
- Overt commercial and governmental sales
- Covert governmental sales
- Black-market sales
- The impact of small arms and light weapons on contemporary conflict: case studies
- Previous attempts to control this trade
- Possible approaches to controlling the trade

Professor Klare has been conducting this research and is also interested in methodology: how researchers better collect and process information on the light weapons trade. He is very interested in sharing information and insights with others in the field.

He will also be working with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to plan a fall 1996 conference on strategies for controlling the international trade in small arms and light weapons.

The Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security (IRSAIS)
424 S. Washington Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
USA

Contact:
Virginia Ezell, Chris Riggs
Phone: 1-703-549-7353
Fax: 1-703-549-7354

The Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security was incorporated in 1989 to promote the study of several aspects of infantry weapons: research and development, including the history of the technology of small arms; uses of small arms, (i.e. the tactical application of infantry weapons); and small arms transfers.

The Institute's quarterly journal, *Small Arms World Report*, features articles on the latest technical developments and the history of small arms. Regular developments include news about the small arms industry, a multi-lingual bibliography of recent publications, and developments in low-intensity conflicts with special focus on the infantry weapons.

Activities include the continuous updating of a country-by-country, worldwide database of small caliber weapons inventories which has been published as *Small Arms Today*. Data includes calibers 5.56 mm to 40 mm and mortars with local designation of the weapon, manufacturer, and, to the extent possible, source of supply. This listing includes information on government and anti-government forces when applicable.

North-South Defence and Security Programme
Centre for Defence Studies (CDS)
King's College, London
Strand
London WC2R 2LS
UK

Contact:
Chris Smith
Phone: 44-1273-385-714; 44-171-873-2859
Fax: 44-1273-385-713; 44-171-873-2748
E-mail: cnsmith@mistral.co.uk

Africa

Research on arms trafficking in southern Africa has been written up and will be published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research early next year. A conference in Mozambique is planned for next year. CDS contributed major input into the BBC "Human Rights, Human Wrongs" programme, screened in December 1995. Other BBC reports to which CDS contributed, involve filming the uncovering of an arms cache in Mozambique.

A book on arms trafficking in southern Africa is being prepared by Chris Smith and Charles Alao. The project to set up a weapons recycling plant at Rundu, northern Namibia is still possible. Funding for a feasibility study is being sought by Co-Operation for Development.

South Asia

Currently, there are plans to return to undertake further research in this area, perhaps in co-operation with south Asian colleagues. There has been a significant increase in interest in light weapons proliferation in the region. A large number of students in the region are pursuing the light weapons issue for Ph.D. and M.Phil dissertations.

European working group on firearms control

When time permits, Chris Smith will be traveling to several European centres to locate potential colleagues. Excellent contacts have been established with INTERPOL and its cooperation is anticipated. CDS and the International Security Information Service will host a House of Commons seminar with the INTERPOL secretary-general early next year.

Landmines

We have recently started a project based upon the military utility of landmines. The project is planned in three stages. The first is looking at the landmines policies of Germany, Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Austria and the United Kingdom. The report was ready for the April meeting in Geneva of the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The second stage will expand the number of case studies to include the United States, additional European countries (Italy) and a number of developing countries (South Africa, China, India/Pakistan, Israel, etc.). The final stage will look at the use of landmines by irregular forces.

Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion
Monterey Institute of International Studies
425 Van Buren Street
Monterey, CA 93940
USA

Contact:
Edward J. Laurance
Phone: 1-408-647-4142
Fax: 1-408-647-4199
E-mail: elaurance@miis.edu

Sarah Meek
Phone: 1-408-647-3589
Fax: 1-408-647-4199
E-mail: smeek@miis.edu

The primary mission of the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Conversion (PACDC) is to monitor current developments and conduct research on the acquisition, export and buildup of conventional armaments. This research is designed to generate and promote practical policy alternatives which address the negative consequences of the excessive accumulation of conventional military weapons - from tanks and fighter aircraft to light weapons such as anti-personnel land mines and hand grenades - which can be destabilizing and contribute to inter- and intrastate violence. PACDC's major activities and products include a world wide web site containing updated information on the acquisition and disposal of conventional armaments, published studies and policy analysis, workshops and conferences, and consultation to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national governments and the United Nations. The overall goal of the program is to promote human security by lessening the likelihood of conflict and freeing up resources to enhance economic and social development.
MIIS graduate students are extensively involved in the work of PACDC, contributing to the important program goal of developing the new generation of policy analysts and experts in arms control, disarmament and conversion policy. PACDC cooperates with internationally known institutions engaged in similar work through joint projects, the establishment of internships, and the exchange of researchers and scholars. These institutions include the Arias Foundation in Costa Rica, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs.

Appendix II. Excerpt from Supplement to An Agenda for Peace

A/50/60
S/1995/1

3 January 1995

Disarmament

57. At their Summit on 31 January 1992, the members of the Security Council underscored their interest in and concern for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, with special reference to weapons of mass destruction. They committed themselves to taking concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in those areas.

58. Considerable progress has been made since January 1992. The moratorium on nuclear testing continues to be largely observed. The Conference on Disarmament has finally decided to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The General Assembly has recommended the negotiation of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material. Efforts are under way to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), ratified by 131 countries, through development of verification mechanisms. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, has been signed by 159 countries, but has not yet entered into force, pending ratification by the required 65 signatories. There have been some important accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

59. I attach special importance to a successful conclusion of the forthcoming conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is also of great importance that the Chemical Weapons Convention enter into force as soon as possible. The momentum in all these areas needs to be maintained. Ways have to be found for reconciling transfer of technology with measures necessary to prevent its misuse for military purposes.

60. These issues are of paramount importance both to the security of humankind and to the release of economic, scientific and technological resources for peace and human progress. In the present paper, however, devoted as it is to the Organization’s recent experience in handling specific conflicts, I wish to concentrate on what might be called „micro-disarmament“. By this I mean practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands.

61. The contemporary significance of micro-disarmament is demonstrated by the enormous proliferation of automatic assault weapons, anti-personnel mines and the like. Competent authorities have estimated that billions of dollars are being spent yearly on light weapons, representing nearly one third of the world’s total arms trade. Many of those weapons are being bought, from developed countries, by developing countries that can least afford to dissipate their precious and finite assets for such purposes, and the volume of the trade in light weapons is far more alarming than the monetary cost might lead one to suspect.

62. Micro-disarmament plays an important part in conjunction with all the other techniques discussed in the present paper. The assembly, control and disposal of weapons has been a central feature of most of the comprehensive peace settlements in which the United Nations has played a peace-keeping role. As a result, the Organization has an unrivalled experience in this field. Micro-disarmament is equally relevant to post-conflict peace-building: Nicaragua has shown what can be achieved through imaginative programmes to mop up large numbers of small arms circulating in a country emerging from a long civil war. Disarmament can also follow enforcement action, as has been demonstrated in Iraq, where the United Nations Special Commission has played a pioneering role in practical disarmament, in this case involving weapons of mass destruction. All the sanctions regimes include an arms embargo and experience has confirmed the difficulty of monitoring cross-border arms flows into countries at war with their neighbours or within their own borders.

63. There are two categories of light weapons that merit special attention. The first is small arms, which are probably responsible for most of the deaths in current conflicts. The world is awash with them and traffic in them is very difficult to monitor, let alone intercept. The causes are many: the earlier supply of weapons to client States by the parties to the cold war, internal conflicts, competition for commercial markets, criminal activity and the collapse of governmental law and order functions (which both gives free rein to the criminals and creates a legitimate reason for ordinary citizens to acquire weapons for their own defence). A pilot advisory mission I dispatched to Mali in August 1994 at the request of that country’s Government has confirmed the exceptional difficulty of controlling the illicit flow of small arms, a problem that can be effectively tackled only on a regional basis. It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now.

64. Secondly, there is the proliferation of anti-personnel mines. One of the positive developments in recent years has been the attention this problem has attracted. The international community has begun to address it. Current efforts in the context of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects are giving priority to anti-personnel mines and the General Assembly’s call for a moratorium on their export has won much support from manufacturing countries. In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is developing new protocols to the Convention. Meanwhile work continues to try to deal with the approximately 110 million land-mines that have already been laid. This is an issue that must continue to receive priority attention. The Register of Conventional Arms is important in these endeavours. It is essential that the Register be developed into a universal and non-discriminatory mechanism.

65. Progress since 1992 in the area of weapons of mass destruction and major weapons systems must be followed by parallel progress in conventional arms, particularly with respect to light weapons. It will take a long time to find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin now, and I intend to play my full part in this effort.

Appendix III. Guidelines for International Arms Transfers

in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of December 1991

A/CN.10/1996/CRP.3
3 May 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1996 substantive session
New York, 22 April-7 May 1996

REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I ON AGENDA ITEM 4

1. At its 203rd plenary meeting, on 24 April 1996, the Disarmament Commission approved its provisional agenda for the 1996 substantive session (A/CN.10/L.38/Rev.1). It also decided that Working Group I should deal with agenda item 4 entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991", pursuant to General Assembly resolution 50/72 D of 12 December 1995.

2. In connection with its work, Working Group I had before it the following documents:

(a) Chairman's working paper; 1/

(b) Conference room paper submitted by the Chairman (A/CN.10/1996/WG.I/CRP.1);

(c) Conference room paper submitted by the Chairman (A/CN.10/1996/WG.I/CRP.2);

(d) Conference room paper submitted by the Chairman (A/CN.10/1996/WG.I/CRP.3).

3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Gheorghe Chirila (Romania) and held 15 meetings, between 23 April and 3 May 1996. Mr. Timur Alasaniya and Ms. Carolyn Cooper of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, served as Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the Working Group, respectively.

4. At the 1st meeting, on 23 April, the Chairman made an introductory statement and submitted to the Working Group the Chairman's working paper contained in the annex to the report of the Commission. 1/

5. At the same meeting, the Working Group decided to take up the Chairman's paper as a basis for discussion on the subject.

6. At its 15th meeting, on 3 May, the Working Group adopted by consensus its report on agenda item 4 entitled "International arms transfers, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991" and a text entitled "Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991", which is contained in the annex to the present report.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/50/42), annex.

ANNEX

Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Arms transfers are a deeply entrenched phenomenon of contemporary international relations. All States have the inherent right to self-defence, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and consequently the right to acquire arms for their security, including arms from outside sources. However, international transfers of conventional arms have, in recent decades, acquired a dimension and qualitative characteristics which, together with the increase in illicit arms trafficking, give rise to serious and urgent concerns.

2. Arms transfers should be addressed in conjunction with the question of maintaining international peace and security, reducing regional and international tensions, preventing and resolving conflicts and disputes, building and enhancing confidence, and promoting disarmament as well as social and economic development. Restraint and greater openness, including various transparency measures, can help in this respect and contribute to the promotion of international peace and security.

3. The problem of the illicit traffic in arms has a social and humanitarian component in addition to its technical, economic and political dimensions. The human suffering that is caused, inter alia, by the devastating consequences of war, destabilizing violence and conflicts, terrorism, mercenary activities, subversion, drug trafficking, common and organized crime and other criminal actions cannot be ignored. The negative effects of the illicit arms traffic can often be disproportionately large, particularly for the internal security and socio-economic development of affected States. Illicit arms trafficking, which affects many countries and several regions of the world, puts to the test the capacity of States to find a solution to it.

4. Legal, political and technical differences in internal control of armaments and their transfer and, in some cases, inadequacy or absence of such controls can contribute to the growing illicit traffic in arms.

5. International cooperation in curbing illicit arms trafficking and in condemning it will assist in focusing the attention of the international community on this phenomenon and will be an important factor in combating it.

6. The United Nations, in keeping with its overall purposes and principles, has a legitimate interest in the field of arms transfers, recognized by the Charter, which refers specifically to the importance of the regulation of armaments for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Illicit arms trafficking is understood to cover that international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law.

8. Limitations on arms transfers can be found in international treaties, binding decisions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and purposes of the Charter.

II. SCOPE

9. According to paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 43/75 I of 7 December 1988, arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community. The General Assembly, in paragraph 4 of its resolution 48/75 F of 16 December 1993, entitled "International arms transfers", noted that the Disarmament Commission had included the question of international arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991, in the agenda of its substantive session in 1994.

10. In its resolution 46/36 H, the General Assembly called upon all States to give high priority to eradicating illicit arms trafficking in all kinds of weapons and military equipment; urged Member States to exercise effective control over their weapons and military equipment and their arms imports and exports to prevent them from getting into the hands of parties engaged in illicit arms trafficking; and also urged Member States to ensure that they had in place an adequate body of laws and administrative machinery for regulating and monitoring effectively their transfer of arms, to strengthen or adopt strict measures for their enforcement, and to cooperate at the international, regional and subregional levels to harmonize, where appropriate, relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures as well as their enforcement measures, with the goal of eradicating illicit arms trafficking.

11. Licit transfers of conventional arms can be addressed, inter alia, through national legislative and administrative actions and increased transparency. The objective in the case of illicit arms trafficking must be the eradication of this phenomenon.

12. All stages of illicit arms trafficking should be the focus of scrutiny. An essential factor in eradicating illicit arms trafficking is the effective control of arms to prevent them from being acquired by unauthorized persons.

III. PRINCIPLES

13. In their efforts to control their international arms transfers and to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit arms trafficking, States should bear in mind the following principles:

14. States should respect the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, including the right to self-defence; the sovereign equality of all its Members; non-interference in the internal affairs of States; the obligation of Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; and respect for human rights; and should continue to reaffirm the right of self-

determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.

15. States should recognize the need for transparency in arms transfers.

16. States should recognize the responsibility to prohibit and eradicate illicit arms trafficking and the need for measures to achieve this end, taking into account the inherently clandestine nature of this traffic.

17. States, whether producers or importers, have the responsibility to seek to ensure that their level of armaments is commensurate with their legitimate self-defence and security requirements, including their ability to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations.

18. States have responsibilities in exercising restraint over the production and procurement of arms as well as transfers.

19. Economic or commercial considerations should not be the only factors in international arms transfers. Other factors include, inter alia, the maintenance of international peace and security and efforts aimed at easing international tensions, promoting social and economic development, peacefully resolving regional conflicts, preventing arms races and achieving disarmament under effective international control.

20. Arms-producing or supplier States have a responsibility to seek to ensure that the quantity and level of sophistication of their arms exports do not contribute to instability and conflict in their regions or in other countries and regions or to illicit trafficking in arms.

21. States receiving arms have an equivalent responsibility to seek to ensure that the quantity and level of sophistication of their arms imports are commensurate with their legitimate self-defence and security requirements and that they do not contribute to instability and conflict in their regions or in other countries and regions or to illicit trafficking in arms.

22. International arms transfers should not be used as a means to interfere in the internal affairs of other States.

IV. WAYS AND MEANS

A. National

23. States should ensure that they have an adequate system of national laws and/or regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over armaments and the export and import of arms in order, among other goals, to prevent illicit arms trafficking.

24. States should scrutinize their national arms control legislation and procedures and, where necessary, strengthen them in order to increase their effectiveness in preventing the illegal production, trade in and possession of arms in their territory that can lead to illicit arms trafficking.

25. States should intensify their efforts to prevent corruption and bribery in connection with the transfer of arms. States should make all efforts to identify, apprehend and bring to justice all those involved in illicit arms trafficking.

26. States should establish and maintain an effective system of export and import licences for international arms transfers with requirements for full supporting documentation.

27. The exporting State should seek to obtain an import certificate from the receiving State covering the exported arms. The receiving State should seek to ensure that imported arms are covered by a certified licence of the authorities in the supplying State.

28. The use of small arms and light weapons in conflicts and war has a major bearing on regional and international peace and security and national stability. The alarming dissemination and illicit transfer of such weapons and the serious threat they pose require States to ensure strong and effective supervision of all aspects of trade in such weapons.

29. States should provide for adequate numbers of customs officials adequately trained to enforce the necessary regulations over the export and import of arms.

30. States should define, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, which arms are permitted for civilian use and which may be used or possessed by the military and police forces.

31. In developing practical measures at the national level, States should take into account and apply, as appropriate, the relevant recommendations of Interpol.

32. States should recognize that combating illicit arms trafficking and reducing those potentially negative aspects of the arms trade require reciprocal commitments by producer and recipient countries, including through defence-conversion programmes and by way of refraining from destabilizing accumulations of armaments.

B. International

33. All arms transfer agreements and arrangements, in particular between Governments, should be designed so as to reduce the possibility of diversion of arms to unauthorized destinations and persons. In this context, a requirement by the exporter for import licences or verifiable end-use/end-user certificates for international arms transfers is an important measure to prevent unauthorized diversion.

34. States should cooperate at the bilateral and multilateral levels as appropriate to share relevant customs information on trafficking in and detection of illicit arms and coordinate intelligence efforts. In this context, States should endeavour to ensure effective control of borders with a view to preventing illicit arms trafficking.

35. States should intensify international cooperation in the relevant field of criminal law. They should assist each other in the development and enforcement of effective national controls, with a view to curbing the evasion of justice by illicit arms traffickers.

36. In order to help combat illicit arms trafficking, States should make efforts to develop and enhance the application of compatible standards in their legislative and administrative procedures for regulating the export and import of arms.

37. States have a legal obligation to comply strictly with sanctions and arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council under the authority of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

38. States should report all relevant transactions in their annual reports to the Register of Conventional Arms as an important confidence-building measure. Those States which do not yet provide annual reports to the Register are strongly encouraged to do so. States should also consider developing additional transparency measures at the regional, subregional and national levels as well as unilateral transparency measures.

39. States should maintain strict regulations on the activities of private international arms dealers and cooperate to prevent such dealers from engaging in illicit arms trafficking.

V. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A. Role of the United Nations

40. The United Nations has an important role to play in the field of international arms transfers and the eradication of illicit arms trafficking in accordance with its overall purposes and principles. The cooperation of the international community is essential for the United Nations to be successful in these endeavours.

41. The General Assembly, by its resolution 43/75 I of 7 December 1988, expressed its conviction that arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community, inter alia, because of: (a) their potential effects in areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security; (b) their known and potential negative effects on the process of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples; and (c) increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking.

42. Subsequently, pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a study, a/ prepared with the assistance of governmental experts, on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, taking into consideration the views of Member States and other relevant information, including information on the problem of illicit arms trafficking. A number of the recommendations made in the study were taken up subsequently in General Assembly resolutions 46/36 H and 46/36 L, of 6 and 9 December 1991 respectively.

43. By its resolution 46/36 L, entitled "Transparency in armaments", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish and maintain a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms; called upon all Member States to provide data on imports and exports of arms; and invited them, pending the expansion of the Register, also to provide available background information on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies.

44. Transparency measures concerning arms transfers are not in themselves measures of limitation or restriction, but they can in several ways promote and facilitate the introduction of unilateral or multilateral measures of restraint as well as help in the detection of arms transferred illegally. The United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other appropriate international forums should continue to play an important part in the elaboration and adoption of transparency measures in the field of arms transfers, including the possible improvement of the Register.

45. The adoption by consensus of resolution 46/36 H reflects the concern of the international community over the increasing illicit arms trafficking, which, by its clandestine nature, defies transparency. This kind of trafficking represents one of the major problems for the authorities of many countries which attempt to free their territories from the criminal use of arms and the consequences it has for peace and stability. Under that resolution, the Secretary-General was given the mandate for the promotion of efforts to eradicate illicit trafficking in arms.

46. By its resolution 46/36 H, entitled "International arms transfers", the General Assembly called upon all States to give high priority to eradicating illicit arms trafficking in all kinds of weapons and military equipment, a most disturbing and dangerous phenomenon often associated with terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and mercenary and other destabilizing activities, and to take urgent action towards that end, as recommended in the study submitted by the Secretary-General.

47. By its resolution 48/75 F of 16 December 1993, the General Assembly recognized that illicit arms trafficking was a disturbing, dangerous and increasingly common phenomenon and that, with the technical sophistication and destructive capability of conventional weapons, the destabilizing effects of illicit arms trafficking increased. The Assembly also called upon all Member States to give priority to eradicating the illicit arms trafficking associated with destabilizing activities, such as terrorism, drug trafficking and common criminal acts, and to take immediate action towards that end.

48. By its resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, within the existing resources, a report, with the assistance of a panel of qualified governmental experts, on the question of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

49. And by its resolution 50/70 H, the General Assembly invited the international community to give appropriate support to the efforts made by the affected countries to suppress the illicit circulation of small arms, which is likely to hamper their development.

B. Other institutional arrangements

50. States should continue to use and further develop mechanisms for the exchange of information at the global, regional and subregional levels in order to assist institutions engaged in the control, tracking and seizure of arms in making full-scale efforts to eradicate illicit arms trafficking.

Notes

a/ A/46/301, annex.

Appendix IV. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)

(Excerpts)

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/195
14 March 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

LETTER DATED 13 MARCH 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to resolution 1013 (1995), by which the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate, inter alia, reports relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of Council resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995).

By paragraph 4 of that resolution, the Security Council requested me to submit, within three months of the establishment of the Commission, an interim report on the conclusions of the Commission. That report was submitted to the Council on 26 January 1996 (S/1996/67). By a letter dated 13 February 1996 (S/1996/104), the President of the Security Council indicated that members looked forward to receiving the Commission's final report in due course.

The purpose of the present letter is to transmit to the Council the final report of the International Commission of Inquiry. As requested by the Council, the report contains the Commission's conclusions, as well as its recommendations regarding possible measures to curb the illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region.

In the light of these recommendations, the Security Council may wish to decide whether the Commission should continue its investigations or whether

other measures should be put in place to promote compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Council.

Should the Council decide that the Commission is to pursue its investigation, it would be my intention to review, in consultation with the Chairman, the composition and modus operandi of the Commission, taking into account the need for maximum cost-effectiveness, especially at a time when the Organization is facing an acute financial crisis.

I should like in this connection to emphasize that, in the absence of voluntary contributions to the budget of the Commission as called for in paragraph 8 of resolution 1013 (1995), the Commission would continue to be financed as an expense of the Organization. The necessary additional appropriations would therefore have to be made in the context of the regular budget of the Organization.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Excerpts

Annex

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 1 of its resolution 1013 (1995) of 7 September 1995, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations that former Rwandan government forces were being supplied with arms in violation of the embargo imposed by the Council in resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995). The Commission was also charged with investigating allegations that such forces were receiving military training in order to destabilize Rwanda, and with identifying parties aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by those forces, contrary to the Council's resolutions.

2. By paragraph 4 of resolution 1013 (1995), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, within three months from its establishment, an interim report on the conclusions of the Commission and, as soon as possible thereafter, to submit a final report containing its recommendations.

3. In a letter dated 16 October 1995 (S/1995/879), the Secretary-General notified the President of the Security Council that he had appointed the following persons as members of the International Commission:

Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt), Chairman

Inspector Jean-Michel Hanssens (Canada)

Colonel Jürgen G. H. Almeling (Germany)

Lt. Colonel Jan Meijvogel (Netherlands)

Brigadier Mujahid Alam (Pakistan)
Colonel Lameck Mutanda (Zimbabwe).

4. By a letter dated 20 October 1995 (S/1995/880), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council welcomed his decision and took note of the information contained in his letter.

5. The Commission completed its interim report three months after the nomination by the Secretary-General of its Chairman and members and submitted it to the Council on 26 January 1996 (S/1996/67, annex). In response to the letter of transmittal of the Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council stated (S/1996/104) that the Council members looked forward to receiving the final report of the Commission in due course.

6. The Commission herewith submits its final report, which contains additional information it has discovered since the submission of its interim report. In accordance with paragraph 1 (d) of resolution 1013 (1995), by which the Commission was requested to recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion in violation of the Council resolutions referred to above, the Commission also submits recommendations for the Council's consideration.

...

V. INFORMATION SOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ALLEGED SALE OR SUPPLY OF ARMS AND MATÉRIEL TO THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES IN VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

52. The mandate of the International Commission of Inquiry involved the investigation of reports relating to alleged violations of the Security Council arms embargo imposed on the former Rwandan government forces. In its interim report, the Commission noted that it had been obliged in the first instance to use non-United Nations sources of information until it was able to investigate the allegations at first hand (S/1996/67, annex, para. 9).

53. The reports immediately available to the Commission included the Human Rights Watch Arms Project report referred to above (see para. 21), a subsequent report by Amnesty International confirming the Human Rights Watch study and a number of British and French media accounts, including at least three television documentaries: "The Gun Runners" of 17 November 1994, "Merchants of death" of 13 June 1995, both broadcast by Carlton UK Television, and a BBC "Newsnight" production of March 1995 on training.

54. Though it used these and other reports as provisional sources of information in the early stages of its investigation the Commission, as it made clear in its interim report, was careful to substantiate all facts reported to it as far as possible. This was done by interviewing eye-witnesses and

inspecting documents, as well as by verifying allegations with the Governments concerned.

55. By paragraph 14 of its resolution 918 (1994), the Security Council decided to establish a Committee to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

> "(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 [of the resolution];
>
> "(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;
>
> "(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo ... and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States".

56. As noted in its interim report (para. 41), the Commission requested the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) to supply it with any information it had that might pertain to the Commission's mandate. The Commission was informed that the Government of Rwanda had submitted to the Committee the Human Rights Watch report, and that in response to questions arising therefrom the Governments of China and France had issued denials of any involvement in the alleged activities.

57. Shortly after the submission of its interim report, the Commission again wrote to the Committee requesting information on any measures the latter might have recommended in response to violations of the embargo, as called for in paragraph 14 (c) of resolution 918 (1994). The Chairman of the Committee replied that the Committee had no additional information and invited the Commission to share with the Committee any relevant information it might have.

58. The International Commission of Inquiry has received some assistance from United Nations agencies and programmes, including the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The Commission also obtained useful background information from some of the diplomats accredited to the States of the Great Lakes region, as well as from numerous individual sources. The report produced by Human Rights Watch Arms Project, subsequently endorsed by Amnesty International, was a primary source of detailed information, much of which the Commission was subsequently able to confirm for itself. Individual journalists and documentary film makers also produced detailed accounts of arms flows and training in eastern Zaire which were very carefully reviewed by the Commission. The French newspaper Libération pursued the matter doggedly, and press reports in the Seychelles newspaper Regar and the Paris-based Indian Ocean Newsletter contained information of great value, which the Commission was able substantially to verify. There can be no doubt that these various reports not only provided the Commission with strong leads to follow, but also kept the matter in the public eye and, in the view of the Commission, contributed substantially towards deterring violations of the United Nations embargo.

59. By contrast, however, the Commission could not fail to note the absence of an effective, proactive mechanism to monitor or implement the arms embargo the Security Council had imposed on Rwanda. Had such a mechanism been functioning properly, the task of gathering information and investigating reports concerning alleged violations of the embargo that was subsequently entrusted to the Commission would undoubtedly have been facilitated. Indeed, the alleged violations might not have occurred if such a proactive mechanism had been functioning and been seen to be doing so. The Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of resolution 687 (1991), concerning the disarmament of Iraq, might serve as a useful model in this context.

60. The Commission is well aware of the practical, political and budgetary obstacles confronting the United Nations in its efforts to deal with sudden crises such as that which engulfed Rwanda in 1994. But such difficulties need not prevent the Security Council from establishing the machinery required for the full implementation of its resolutions, and the Commission proposes in paragraphs 77 to 81 below what form this machinery might take. It should be made clear that if the Security Council were to adopt these recommendations, ways would have to be found of providing the necessary additional resources for these activities, so as to reinforce the Organization's preventive diplomacy efforts, particularly in the fields of fact-finding and the development of early-warning systems. As noted in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (S/24111), the specialized agencies and regional arrangements and organizations have an important role to play in this activity.

VI. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF RWANDANS IN ZAIRE IN ORDER TO DESTABILIZE RWANDA

61. In its interim report, the Commission found that Rwandan men were receiving military training to conduct destabilizing raids into Rwanda. In examining the larger question of the sources of destabilization, the Commission agreed with the view often expressed that the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees outside the borders of their own country was in itself a destabilizing factor.

VII. CURBING THE FLOW OF ILLICIT ARMS IN THE SUBREGION: NEED FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

62. The Commission proposes below a number of specific measures designed to deter possible attempts to sell or supply arms to the former Rwandan government forces in the future, and to encourage further investigation of violations it believes to have taken place in the past. In addition, the Commission would like briefly to address the broader issue of illicit arms flows in the Great Lakes region in violation of Security Council resolutions already adopted, and in the light of the Council's recent adoption of resolution 1040 (1996), taking into account the fact that embargo-related measures will probably not be effective unless they are applied throughout the subregion.

63. To supplement its recommendations, therefore, the Commission also suggests the adoption of confidence-building measures by the international community and some of the Governments of the subregion which the Security Council may wish to consider endorsing (paras. 82-83).

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

64. On the basis of the evidence it has discovered in Zaire and Seychelles, the Commission is satisfied that the Government of Seychelles, acting on the basis of an end-user certificate apparently issued by the Government of Zaire, authorized a sale of weapons in its possession in mid-June 1994. The arms, which included AK-47 rifles, 82-mm and 60-mm mortar shells and 37-mm and 14.5-mm ammunition, were transported from Seychelles to Goma on 17 and 19 June 1994 by an Air Zaïre DC-8 cargo aircraft, registration number 9QCLV, in two consignments of about 40 tons each. The transaction was negotiated by Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, then a high-ranking officer of the Rwandan government forces, with the participation of Mr. Willem Ehlers, a South African national, who described himself as director of a company called Delta Aero.

65. The Commission accepts that the Government of Seychelles immediately cancelled the planned remaining consignment in the light of new information which led it to believe that there was a possibility that the final destination of the arms could be the Rwandan government forces and that this would therefore have constituted a violation of the United Nations arms embargo against Rwanda.

66. The Commission has considered in great depth the significance of its findings. The first conclusion it has reached is that the response by the Government of Zaire to the questions posed by the Commission to the Zairian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa was, at best, highly misleading and inadequate. The Commission is satisfied that the Government of Zaire knew, or should have known, that one of the very few functioning aircraft in its national airline had engaged in the transportation of arms from Seychelles to Goma, apparently in violation of the Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization. If the Government was not aware of this, the publication of the allegations in the Human Rights Watch report and the questions posed by the Commission concerning those allegations should have induced the Government to investigate the matter rather than to prevaricate. Similarly, the Commission believes that the Zairian Government knew, or should have known, that a high-ranking Rwandan army officer, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, was acting or purporting to act on its behalf in arms negotiations in Seychelles on the basis of an end-user certificate apparently issued by the Zairian Ministry of Defence in Kinshasa. In spite of this, the Zairian Government informed the Commission that it had no knowledge of this affair, or of Colonel Bagosora.

67. The Commission was conscious that one possible explanation of the delivery of arms to Goma in mid- and late 1994 and 1995 could have been that the Zairian authorities had themselves been supplying their own troops there or, subsequently, the troops of the UNHCR Zairian Camp Security Contingent. However, as shown above, the Zairian Government made no such claim when asked to explain the Seychelles shipments.

68. The question remains whether or not there was a violation of the Security Council embargo, that is, whether or not the arms flown to Goma from Seychelles were subsequently handed over to the former Rwandan government forces. The Commission, for reasons made clear in its interim report, was effectively prevented while in Goma from seeking first-hand evidence of such a handover.

69. However, given the unsatisfactory response of the Government in Kinshasa to the Commission’s questions, particularly its specific question about the

issuance of an end-user certificate in respect of the Seychelles arms; the participation of Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, a senior officer of the former Rwandan government forces, then under a United Nations arms embargo, in the negotiations for the arms in Seychelles; the fact that Colonel Bagosora himself accompanied the arms to Goma; the fact that he informed a person interviewed by the Commission that the arms were destined for and delivered to the Rwandan government forces; the denial by the Zairian Minister of Defence of any knowledge of Colonel Bagosora, despite the latter's claim to have officially placed an Air Zaïre aircraft under military control and taken delivery of the Seychelles arms consignments on behalf of the Zairian Armed Forces; and the obstructive and uncooperative attitude of the Zairian Government officials assigned to assist the Commission in Goma, which made it impossible for the Commission to conduct its investigation there, the Commission concludes that it is highly probable that a violation of the United Nations embargo took place involving the supply of more than 80 tons of rifles, grenades and ammunition in two consignments flown to Goma airport on 17 and 19 June 1994 and subsequently transferred to the Rwandan government forces then in Gisenyi, Rwanda. If that is indeed the case, the Commission believes that the Government of Zaire or elements within it, in at least this one case, did aid and abet this violation.

70. The Commission accepts that the South African-made weapon found on Iwawa Island in the wake of the battle there in November 1995 was supplied to the then Rwandan Government some years before the embargo was imposed. However, the Commission does consider that further investigation is required into whether or not Mr. Willem Ehlers, a national of South Africa, also aided and abetted the sale or supply of arms to the Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo, and whether the Delta or Delta Aero Company of which he identified himself as a director was also involved.

71. Finally, the Commission cannot fail to express regret at the difficulties it has experienced in obtaining information from some of the Governments of Member States of the United Nations. By paragraph 3 of resolution 1013 (1995), which contains the Commission's mandate, the Security Council called upon States, relevant United Nations bodies, including the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994), and as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations, and non-governmental organizations, to collate information in their possession relating to the mandate of the Commission, and requested them to make this information available as soon as possible.

72. By paragraph 5 of that resolution, the Council called upon the Governments of the States concerned in which the Commission will carry out its mandate to cooperate fully with the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the Commission for security, assistance, and access in pursuing investigations, and listed a series of measures intended to assist the Commission in its work.

73. During the four months of its existence, the Commission addressed more than 40 letters to the Governments of Member States, and to international humanitarian organizations, non-governmental organizations and others, bringing these provisions, where appropriate, to their attention and requesting specific assistance (see appendix VII). As has already been observed in the interim report, the response was sometimes tardy and occasionally non-existent. In its numerous informal contacts, too, though it received extremely valuable cooperation from many sources, the Commission felt that some of its

interlocutors might have been more helpful and informative. If they had been, the Commission might have been better able to address some of the questions that still remain unanswered. The Commission notes that its concerns in this matter were reflected in the letter dated 13 February 1996 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General (S/1996/104).

74. The Commission proposes (para. 91 below) measures to strengthen the sanctions regime currently existing in respect of the sale or supply of arms and matériel to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

75. The recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry are designed to be practical at low cost to the United Nations and to Member States. It has, however, been made very clear to the Commission that even these modest measures cannot be taken without the provision of the necessary additional resources. The Commission must therefore state plainly its view that if the Security Council's resolutions are to be properly implemented, sufficient additional resources must be made available to put in place the measures proposed by the Commission, should the Council wish to adopt them.

76. Those measures take into account the efforts already made by the United Nations to resolve the situation in the Great Lakes region, and to deal with the economic, military and ethnic aspects of that situation. Concerns relating to national sovereignty were also taken into consideration. Against the background of the formidable constraints which confront the Organization, the Commission considers these measures to be the optimum practicable steps that can be taken towards achieving the aims embodied in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

A. Mechanisms to monitor, implement and enforce Security Council resolutions, to gather information and preserve evidence

77. The Commission recommends that the Security Council, when imposing an arms embargo on a State or part thereof under Chapter VII of the Charter, consider simultaneously urging neighbouring States to establish within their respective Governments an office with the necessary legal, political, military, police, customs and border-guard personnel. The tasks of this office would be to incorporate the United Nations embargo into national law, to monitor, implement and enforce the operation of the embargo on its own territory and to make regular reports to the Security Council or such other organ as the Council may designate for this purpose.

78. A further responsibility of these offices would be to gather information, collect and preserve evidence and assist such investigating bodies as might subsequently be dispatched by the Security Council to inquire into any allegations of violations, or itself to undertake investigations if so requested by the Council.

79. Where the States concerned cannot staff and equip such offices wholly from within their existing resources, consideration could be given to establishing an

appropriate trust fund within the context of Article 50 of the Charter, and to seconding personnel to assist the requesting Government.

80. Given the need for promptitude in any investigation of allegations of violations of an embargo, the Commission recommends that the Security Council, when establishing an embargo, should consider simultaneously creating an organ analogous to its Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994), but with expanded functions. These would include the maintenance of liaison with the offices proposed above, the receipt, analysis and circulation to Member States of any reports submitted by those offices and the coordination with them of any investigation into alleged violations. The Commission further proposes that additional resources be found to provide adequate staff support for such a body.

81. This still leaves open the question of monitoring, implementing and enforcing the present embargo against the former Rwandan government forces following the completion of the work of the Commission. As proposed in paragraph 91 below, the Commission believes steps can and should be taken immediately to establish a monitoring unit in the subregion. Such a unit need not be large but should be mobile, and should be established and prepared to assume its duties at very short notice.

B. Measures designed to foster stability in the subregion

82. The Commission recommends that the Governments of the Great Lakes region, particularly that of Zaire, intensify their efforts:

(a) To ensure that their territory is not used for the recruitment or training of refugees and that it is not used as a base for armed groups to launch incursions or attacks against any other country;

(b) To prevent military training and the sale or supply of weapons to militia groups or other groups among the refugees.

83. The Commission is in complete agreement with the following conclusion of the summit meeting held at Cairo in November 1995, and recommends that the Security Council endorse it, that the Heads of State and delegation who participated in the meeting be invited to implement it without delay, and that the international community stand ready to provide technical assistance if so requested:

> “The Heads of State and delegations viewed with deep concern the use of radio broadcasts to spread hate and fear in the region. The participants pledged to take all possible action to terminate the illegal and inflammatory radio broadcasts from one country into another. They called upon the international community to assist by providing technology to identify the location of mobile transmitters.”

C. Confidence-building measures designed to reduce the flow of arms in the subregion

84. Many of the conflicts the Security Council seeks to address through the imposition of arms embargoes, including the situation in and around Rwanda and Burundi, are fuelled and exacerbated by small arms and land-mines. The Commission therefore recommends that, when an arms embargo is imposed, neighbouring States be encouraged to participate on a voluntary basis in maintaining a register or data bank of movements and acquisitions of small arms, ammunition and matériel. As a preliminary step, the Security Council may wish to encourage the States of the Great Lakes region to consider creating such a register.

85. Those States, if they have not already done so, should also be encouraged to adhere to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its Protocols, particularly those relating to the use of anti-personnel land-mines, as well as to the Moratorium on the Export of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines. In addition, supplier countries might be requested to ensure that they do not transfer such arms, including mines, to non-State entities or private businessmen.

D. Recommendations for the further investigation of violations which have or may have taken place

86. The Commission recommends that the Security Council consider inviting the Government of South Africa to investigate the participation of Mr. Willem Ehlers in the negotiations in Seychelles in June 1994 which led to the delivery of arms and ammunition to Goma, Zaire. This investigation should also extend to the activities of the Delta Company and related individuals and companies, if any, and its findings should be reported to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) for general distribution to Member States.

87. The Commission recommends that the Security Council consider calling on the Government of Bulgaria to make available to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) for general distribution to Member States the findings of the investigation conducted by the Interdepartmental Council on the Military Industrial Complex and Mobilization Readiness of the Government of Bulgaria into allegations that officials of the Kintex Company, Sofia, were apparently willing to sell arms in violation of Security Council resolutions.

88. The Commission recommends that the Security Council call on the Government of Zaire to investigate the apparent complicity of its own personnel and officials in the purchase of arms from Seychelles in June 1994. The Government should also be required to conduct a thorough and transparent inquiry into alleged Zairian complicity in other suspected violations of Security Council resolutions and to report its findings to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994), in accordance with a timetable set by the Security Council, for general distribution to Member States.

89. This investigation should resolve the serious discrepancies between the Government’s responses to the Commission’s written questions and the facts as

subsequently established by the Commission. In particular, the investigation should explain why a high-ranking Rwandan officer of a force placed under a United Nations arms embargo, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, was apparently authorized to act for the Zairian Ministry of Defence in the purchase of arms from Seychelles in June 1994 and to take delivery of arms on behalf of the Zairian Armed Forces; how Colonel Bagosora came by the end-user certificate apparently issued by the Zairian Ministry of Defence; who authorized him to charter an Air Zaïre aircraft to transport the arms; and what became of those arms.

90. If the recommendations in section D above are adopted and the Member States concerned comply with the Council's requests, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) may then wish, in accordance with paragraph 14 (b) of resolution 918 (1994), to consider this information and to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo.

E. Measures to deter further violations of the embargo

91. Finally, with specific reference to the situation concerning the former Rwandan government forces, the Commission recommends that:

(a) The Government of Zaire should again be invited to consider the stationing of United Nations observers on its territory to monitor the implementation of the embargo and deter the shipment of arms to the former Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo;

(b) The Security Council may wish to consider extending the concept embodied in the UNHCR Zairian Camp Security Contingent, by which national troops are recruited, led and paid by the international community, and applying it to the monitoring of the embargo in Zaire, perhaps in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity under Chapter VIII of the Charter;

(c) As an interim measure, in order to maintain an element of deterrence and oversight until such longer-term solution can be found, the Security Council may wish to consider retaining the International Commission of Inquiry or creating a similar body with a very small number of members to maintain contacts with the Governments of the Great Lakes region, to follow up the investigations of the Commission, to respond to any further allegations of violations and to make periodic reports to the Secretary-General on the evolution of the situation with regard to compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

...

Appendix VII

Correspondence between the International Commission of Inquiry and Governments and others, November 1995-February 1996

	Outgoing			Incoming	
No.	Date	Addressee	Subject	Date	Remarks
1	12 Nov.	Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)	Request for information	24 Nov.	No information available
2	24 Nov.	Zaire	Explanation of Commission's mandate and purpose		No reply, but Commission visited Kinshasa, 8-16 December
3	27 Nov.	International Committee of the Red Cross	Request for information		No reply, but ICRC representative visited Commission on 1 December to discuss
4	27 Nov.	China	Request for information concerning allegations	30 Jan.	Allegations denied
5	27 Nov.	South Africa	Request for information concerning allegations	20 Feb.	Minister for Foreign Affairs replied
6	27 Nov.	France	Request for information concerning allegations	2 Jan.	Allegations denied
7	29 Nov.	South Africa	Request for information about weapons	20 Feb.	Reply contained information requested
8	29 Nov.	Belgium	Request for information about weapons	10 Jan.	Reply contained details requested
9	29 Nov.	UNAMIR	Request for review files		Partial review took place on 1 December
10	30 Nov.	United Kingdom Customs	Request for information		No reply
11	1 Dec.	Bulgaria	Request for information concerning allegations	14 Feb.	Allegations denied

12	4 Dec.	UNAMIR	Request for information concerning arms handed over by Opération Turquoise		No reply, but contacts continued
13	5 Dec.	France	Request for name of designated official	2 Jan.	Government designated official
14	5 Dec.	Belgium	Request for name of designated official	10 Jan.	Reply received, but no official designated
15	5 Dec.	United Republic of Tanzania	Request to visit		No reply
16	5 Dec.	Médecins sans frontières	Request for information	11 Dec.	Promise of assistance
17	7 Dec.	Seychelles	Request for information concerning allegations		No reply
18	9 Dec.	Zaire	Request for information concerning allegations	15 Dec.	Reply provided orally and in writing by Minister for Foreign Affairs
19	18 Dec.	United Kingdom Customs	Follow-up to earlier request		No reply, but meeting took place on 10 January
20	18 Dec.	UNHCR	Request for information	19 Jan.	Information provided
21	19 Dec.	United Republic of Tanzania	Request to visit		No reply
22	19 Dec.	Uganda	Request to visit		No reply
23	20 Dec.	Burundi	Request to visit	24 Jan.	Visit took place, 26-29 January
24	20 Dec.	Rwanda	Request for further information		No reply, but informal contacts have continued
25	5 Jan.	ICAO	Request for information	8 Feb.	Information provided
26	18 Jan.	Belgium	Request for information		No reply as yet
27	18 Jan.	Seychelles	Request to visit	23 Jan.	Visit took place, 31 January-5 February
28	22 Jan.	Kenya	Request for meeting	29 Jan.	Meeting took place on 29 January

29	22 Jan.	Burundi	Request to visit	24 Jan.	Visit took place, 26-29 January
30	23 Jan.	United Republic of Tanzania	Renewed request to visit		No reply
31	25 Jan.	France	Request to meet with French officers	13 Feb.	Reply offered meeting with officers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others
32	30 Jan.	Kenya	Note verbale requesting contacts with officials	29 Feb.	Reply proposed meetings on Commission's return
33	30 Jan.	Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)	Request for information	8 Feb.	No information available
34	5 Feb.	Federal Reserve Bank of New York	Request for information	27 Feb.	Information provided
35	6 Feb.	Bulgaria	Follow-up letter	14 Feb.	Allegations denied
36	6 Feb.	South Africa	Follow-up letter	20 Feb.	Reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs
37	8 Feb.	Seychelles	Further request for assistance	10 Feb.	Information provided
38	12 Feb.	ICAO	Further request for assistance		No reply as yet
39	14 Feb.	Federal Reserve Bank of New York	Follow-up letter	27 Feb.	Information provided
40	15 Feb.	Uganda	Renewed request to visit	8 March	Response received
41	16 Feb.	Kenya	Renewed request for meetings	29 Feb.	Reply proposed meetings on Commission's return
42	16 Feb.	France	Request to meet with French officers	23 Feb.	Interview with officers arranged; meetings took place, 26-29 February

—

Appendix V. Case Study - El Salvador

A brief discussion of the current situation in El Salvador is presented as an example of the prototypical environment in which micro-disarmament might be useful. In El Salvador, disarming the FMLN insurgents and reducing the army were stipulated by the peace treaty of 1992 which ended the twelve-year civil war. Comprehensive demobilization occurred under UN supervision, beginning with partial disarmament. More than 11,000 guerrillas surrendered approximately 10,000 hand guns, rifles and automatic weapons such as M-16s and AK-47s, 74 missiles and over 9,000 grenades. These weapons were destroyed and a similar amount of weapons were collected from those soldiers of the Salvadoran army who were demobilized.

But three years after the civil war ended, it is now known that despite the successful peace process, not all of the weapons supplied to the FMLN and the Salvadoran army during the civil war were collected. The Salvadoran Defense Ministry, as well as the UN mission (MINUSAL), estimate that 200,000-300,000 military-style weapons remain in civilian hands and pose a serious threat to peace. Social and economic conditions also play a major role in producing the climate of violence present in El Salvador today. Close to 40,000 combatants were demobilized with the arrival of peace, the large majority of whom have been unable to adapt themselves to the new climate of peace and reconstruction. The unemployment rate oscillates around 50%.

Military weapons and poverty are proving to be a deadly combination. Thousands have taken up arms and formed criminal gangs responsible for the violence threatening to overwhelm El Salvador. Disgruntled youths have formed US-style criminal gangs, well trained in the handling of military-style weapons, such as M-16s, AK-47s, M-3 hand grenades and RPG-2 rocket launchers. Their criminal activities include road blocks, bank robberies, bus robberies, street theft, kidnappings, extortions and street violence. These activities, when promulgated with military style weapons, also result in injuries and death to innocent civilians. The authorities are extremely challenged, particularly the National Civilian Police (PNC), which expects to increase its ranks by 6,500 new recruits by July of 1996, doubling its present number. In addition, communities have began forming neighborhood watch groups to cooperate with the authorities in the fight against crime. The government has had to divert development funds to handle the security situation.

Senseless acts of violence have become common-place. Hand grenades are a particularly critical problem, given that they are so available. They are commonly carried by many citizens in their pockets and on their belts, and increasingly are used to settle personal arguments, with devastating effect on the targets as well as innocent bystanders. Car theft using hand grenades is an every day occurrence. Children are hurt or killed when playing with hand grenades. M-16 and AK-47 assault rifles are the weapon of choice for robberies and robbing busses, making public transportation less and less safe for citizens. Bus routes have been either shortened or eliminated

Monsignor Fernando Sáenz Lacalle, Archbishop of San Salvador, the government of El Salvador, through the Defense Ministry, human rights activists and community leaders all concur that the violence is the country's most pressing problem. In a recent poll of Salvadorans, over 80% of the civilian population considered crime and violence the most serious threat to peace and national security. The violence committed with these military weapons is apolitical and effects all sectors of the population of El Salvador.

Appendix VI. An Introduction to Anti-Personnel Landmines and Their Effects

Types of landmines

Blast mines

The most common type of APM, these mines range from very small (several inches in diameter), to quite large. The mine is deployed either directly on the ground and lightly camouflaged, or buried an inch or two below the surface. Upon activation by a very light step (usually 15 to 40 pounds of pressure is enough), the mine detonates, sending fragments of the mine body, along with dirt, sand, gravel, vegetation, footwear and clothing fragments, and bone fragments up the legs and groin of the victim (if not causing death, then resulting in amputation), and causing secondary damage to the trunk, hands, and face.
The appeal of blast mines is due to the fact that they can be deployed in large numbers over a wide area in a very short period of time, through the use of aircraft.

Fragmentation mines

As the name suggests, these mines rely on a blast of fragments over a field of fire of about 20 meters. Fragmentation mines are deployed above ground (with the exception of those fixed with bounding devices, to be discussed below), and are supported by stakes, or attached to fixed structures with mounting brackets. A trip-wire, strung between two mines or between one mine and a fixed object, activates the mine(s) with as little as 1 kilogram of pull force, sending fragments into the legs, stomachs and chests of the victims.

Directional fragmentation mines

A relative of the fragmentation mine is the directional fragmentation mine. These mines are deployed in a like manner and contain pre-formed fragments encased in front of a charge. When activated, the fragments are blasted in a 50 meter arc, thus increasing the field of fire. Like ordinary fragmentation mines, the target area is also the legs, stomach and chest.

Bounding mines

This type of mine, predictably, earned its name by the manner in which it functions. A mine with a bounding device is inserted into a small tube with a wire affixed to the fuse-pin, and buried with just the fuse visible. Through the means of either direct pressure or a trip wire, a primary explosion propels the mine out of the tube approximately one meter (3 feet) in the air, at which point the fixed wire pulls the pin and the mine explodes, sending fragments flying in all directions.

Location of landmines throughout the world

(estimated from compiled sources; numbers do not include other unexploded ordinance - mortar and RPG rounds, etc.)

Afghanistan
Number: 10 million
Location: Military and civilian positions. Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Khost. Footpaths, tracks and roads and the surrounding areas, bridges, houses, wells and their access routes are mined.
Worst affected provinces (largest amount of total mines):
-Helmand - 26%
-Kandahar - 10.4%
-Paktia - 9.6%
-Logar - 8.6%
-Herat - 7.25%
Dispersal of APMS by target area:
-Grazing land - 70%
-Agricultural land - 20.2%
-Irrigation systems - 6%
-Roads - 2.4%
-Residential areas - 1.2%

Angola
Number: 10-15 million
Location: As a means of denying the enemy land and resources, roads, waterways, rail lines, airports, ports, bridges, towns, schools, hospitals, markets and private dwellings were all mined. According to VVVAF, the status of the provinces is as follows:
-Bie: Movement restricted by mines and booby-traps.
-Kuando Kubango: The Mavingo Valley is abandoned due to mines.
-Lunda Norte: All roads, bridges and riverbanks are considered mined.
-Lunda Sul: 37 major bridges and 58 secondary bridges are destroyed, and surrounded by uncleared minefields.
-Malanje: Power lines and the airport are mined, as is hotel access at the Kalandula Waterfalls.
Amputees in the population: 1 per 470

Bosnia
Number: 3 million (figure very uncertain).
Location: There are no reliable data available regarding the specific locations of APMs in Bosnia.

Cambodia
Number: 10 million (still being deployed by both sides).
Location: Mines have been deployed in almost every conceivable area in Cambodia: roads, irrigation systems, paddy fields, water wells, schools, commerce routes and homes.
According to the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), the status of the provinces is as follows:

-Battambang: Over 1/4 of the province is declared as „no go" areas.
-Banteay Meanchy: The west and southwest areas are severely mined. Major stretches of the Xtrung Cop river are mined, as are the banks of the Kop river. Route 69 is partially mined.
-Siem Reap: 60% of all bridges destroyed. All primary, secondary and tertiary roads and rail beds have been mined and north-south roads into Khmer Rouge territory end with minefields. RN6 and RN68 also are mined. Siem Reap has minefields covering 9,399,353 sqm of minefields.
-Pursat: Minefields ring hills, forests and key forts. Bakan district has 79 minefields. Mines were also laid along rail lines, and RN5 leading into Phnom Penh.
-Kampot: Heavily mined, under the control of anti-government forces.
-Kompong Cham: Moderately mined, but boasts the highest number of incidents involving children.
-Kompong Thom: RN12 is mined. Bridges along RN6 are destroyed regularly. Due to lack of food security, Kompong Thom has the most severe malnutrition problem in the country.
-Preah Vihear: The two main roads leading to the border are mined.
-Koh Kong: 47 minefields with 240,663,204 sqm of mined area.
-Kompong Speu: Mines in 168 locations with 324,172 sqm of mined area.
-Kompong Chnang: Mines in 24 locations with 32,480,626 sqm of mined area.
Mine incidence rate: 10/day
Amputees in the population: 1 per 236

Mozambique
Number: 2 million mines
Location: mines were placed in defensive rings around villages and other settlements. Also deployed offensively around potential enemy soldier resting spots (i.e. around trees and structures which provide shade). Power lines, roads, rail lines airport tarmacs, schools factories and livestock water troughs were all mined extensively.
According to ICRC data, the location frequency for APMs is as follows:
-37% on bush paths
-27% on roads
-21% on rail tracks
-16% in fields
Worst affected provinces: Niassa, Caba delgado, Nampula, Inhambane and Maputo.
Mine incidence rate: 50/month.

Others
Nations with serious landmine problems include:
-El Salvador
-Nicaragua
-Somalia
-Yemen

Technical responses

Landmine technology is forging ahead. Plastic landmines have become more popular due to their ability to escape searches made with metal detectors. This has prompted a whole new area of negotiation centering on requiring a minimum content requirement of metal (8%) to be present in all landmines, to assist in the clearance operations. Additionally, these plastic landmines can implant tiny plastic fragments into the victim which escape detection by x-ray machines.

The responses from the technical community to the problem of mine clearance have been both numerous and innovative. Methods of mine detection range from manual probing to destruction with explosives, electromagnetic induction (EMI), thermal imagers, ground-penetrating radar (GPR), thermal neutron activation (TNA), and biosensors.

The fact remains, though, that the single-most effective method for landmine clearance remains probing. Probing is the only technique which insures 100% clearance. Military clearance techniques can only provide 90 to 95% effectiveness, which (for reasons discussed previously), is unacceptable.

States which have adhered to the 1980 CCW (as of 31 July 1996)

Argentina	October 2, 1995
Australia	September 29, 1983
Austria	March 14, 1983
Belarus	June 23, 1982
Belgium	February 7, 1995
Benin	March 27, 1989
Bosnia-Herzegovina	September 1, 1993
Brazil	October 3, 1995
Bulgaria	October 15, 1982
Canada	June 24, 1994
China	April 7, 1982
Croatia	December 2, 1993
Cuba	March 2, 1987
Cyprus	December 12, 1988
Czech Republic	February 22, 1993
Denmark	July 7, 1982
Ecuador	May 4, 1982
Finland	May 8, 1992
France	March 4, 1988
Georgia	April 29, 1996
Germany	November 25, 1992
Greece	January 28, 1992
Guatemala	July 21, 1983
Hungary	June 14, 1982
India	March 1, 1984
Ireland	March 13, 1995
Israel	March 22, 1995
Italy	January 20, 1995
Japan	June 9, 1982
Jordan	October 19, 1995
Lao People's Democratic Republic	January 3, 1983
Latvia	January 4, 1993
Liechtenstein	August 16, 1989
Luxembourg	May 23, 1996
Malta	June 26, 1995
Mauritius	May 6, 1996
Mexico	February 11, 1982
Mongolia	June 8, 1982
Netherlands	June 18, 1987
New Zealand	October 18, 1993

Niger	November 10, 1992	-All States accepted the three Protocols except the United States, Israel and France, which accepted only Protocols I&II, and Benin and Jordan which accepted only Protocols I&III.
Norway	June 7, 1983	
Pakistan	April 1, 198	
Poland	June 2, 1983	
Romania	July 26, 1995	
Russian Federation	June 10, 1982	
Slovakia	May 28, 1993	
Slovenia	July 6, 1992	-A State becomes Party to the Convention six months after it deposits its instrument of ratification with the United Nations.
South Africa	September 13, 1995	
Spain	December 29, 1993	
Sweden	July 7, 1982	
Switzerland	August 20, 1982	
Togo	December 4, 1995	
Tunisia	May 15, 1987	
Uganda	November 14, 1995	
Ukraine	June 23, 1982	
United Kingdom	February 13, 1995	
United States	March 24, 1995	
Uruguay	October 6, 1994	
Yugoslavia	May 24, 1983	

Total: 57

Source: ICRC

States having a moratoria on exports of antipersonnel mines (as of March 1996

Comprehensive Moratoria	**Limited Moratoria**
Argentina	Netherlands
Belarus	Switzerland
Belgium	Austria
Cambodia	-(Moratorium on exports to States which are not Party to Protocol II of the CCW)
Canada	
Czech Republic	
Ecuador	
France	
Germany	United Kingdom
Greece	European Union
Israel	-(Indefinite moratorium on the export of non-detectable and non-self- destructing APMs, plus a ban on all exports to States not Party to the CCW)
Italy	
Japan	
Korea, Republic of	
Latvia	
Poland	
Portugal	
Romania	
Slovak Republic	Russian Federation
South Africa	-(Three year moratorium on non-self destructing anti-personnel mines)
Spain	
Sweden	
Ukraine	
United States	

Source: ICRC

Sources

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1994. "The Land Mine Crisis: A Humanitarian Disaster". *Foreign Affairs*. (September) : 8-13.

Cahill, Kevin M., ed. 1995. *Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis* (New York: BasicBooks)

Hewish, Mark and Leland Ness. 1995. "Mine-Detection Technologies". *International Defense Review* (October) : 40-52.

Human Rights Watch, The Arms Project, Physicians for Human Rights. 1993. *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights)

Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Human Rights Watch/Africa. 1994. *Landmines in Mozambique* (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch)

ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), *Review Conference of the 1980 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons* (http://www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/465a.htm, 1/25/96)

ICRC, *Moratoria on Exports of Antipersonnel Mines as of December 1995* (http://www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/3886.htm, 6/12/95)

ICRC, *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, 10 October 1980* (http://www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/3872.htm, 1/31/96)

ICRC, *Angola* (http://www.icrc.ch./icrcnews/3cf6.htm, 7/11/95)

ICRC, *Anti-Personnel Mines: Basic Facts* (http://www.icrc.ch/icrcnews/3fbe.htm, 9/1/95)

Jane's Intelligence Review. Special Report No. 8. *The Mine Conundrum: The Threat to Mine-Clearance Operations*.

Jean, Barbara. 1996. "Clearing the Perilous Road to Peace". *International Defense Review* (February) : 1-5.

OneWorld Online, *Landmines Special Report* (http://www.oneworld.org/landmines/geneva_update2.html#upcoming)

Sloan, C.E.E. 1986. *Mine Warfare on Land* (Washington DC: Brassey's Defence Publishers)

United Nations, *The United Nations Demining Database: Afghanistan* (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/afghanis.htm)

United Nations, *The United Nations Demining Database: Cambodia* (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/cambodia.htm)

United Nations, *The United Nations Demining Database: Angola* (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/angola.htm)

United Nations, *The United Nations Demining Database: Mozambique* (http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/mozambiq.htm)

US Dept. of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations. 1994. *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office)

Anti-Personnel land mines in current world service

Reproduced from *Jane's Special Report: Trends in Land Mine Warfare*, August 1995, pp.122-123.

Note: The following abbreviations are used in this listing: PRC - Peoples Republic of China; CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States; UK - United Kingdom; USA - United States of America; FY - Former Yugoslavia.

FMK-1 Non-metalic Anti-personnel Mine - Argentina
APM-1 Horizontal Anti-personnel Mine - Austria
Hirtenberger APM-2 Anti-personnel Mine - Austria
Anti-personnel Mine Min AP NM AE T1 - Brazil
Anti-personnel Mine T-AB-1 - Brazil
PM-79 Anti-personnel Mine - Bulgaria
PSM-1 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - Bulgaria
C3A2 Non-metallic Anti-personnel Mine (Elsic) - Canada
FAMAE Anti-personnel Mines - Chile
Type 72 Anti-personnel Mine Series - PRC
Anti-personnel Shrapnel Mine - PRC
Type 69 Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - PRC
Portable bounding Anti-personnel Mine - PRC
PMN-4 Anti-personnel Mine - CIS
PMN Anti-personnel Mine - CIS
POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M Anti-personnel Stake Mines - CIS
PMD-6, PMD-7, PMD-7ts and PMD-S7 - CIS
MON-50 Directional Anti-personnel Mine - CIS
MON-90 Directional Anti-personnel Mine - CIS
MON-100 and MON-200 Directional Mine - CIS
PFM-1 and PFM-15 Anti-personnel Mine/Bomblet - CIS
OZM, OZM-3 and OZM-4 Bounding Mine - CIS
OZM-72 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - CIS
OZM-160 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - CIS
PP Mi-Na 1 Anti-personnel Mine - Czech/Slovakia
PP Mi-Ba Anti-personnel Mine - Czech/Slovakia
PP Mi-D Anti-personnel Mine Czech/Slovakia
PP Mi-Sb and PP Mi-Sk Stake Mine - Czech/Slovakia
PP Mi-Sr Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - Czech/Slovakia
Egyptian Anti-personnel Mines - Egypt
T/7S Anti-personnel Mine - Egypt
Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - Egypt
ALSETEX Anti-personnel Mine MAPED F1 - France
ALSETEX Anti-personnel Stake Mines M61 & M63 - France
ALSETEX Anti-personnel Mine M59 - France
PPM-2 Anti-personnel Mine - Germany
Anti-personnel Mine DM 11 - Germany
Gyata-64 Anti-personnel Mine - Hungary
M62 Anti-personnel Mine - Hungary
M49 Wooden Anti-personnel Mine - Hungary
Indian Anti-personnel Mines - India
No 6 Anti-personnel Mine - Israel
No 10 Anti-personnel Mine - Israel
No 12 (or M12A1) Anti-personnel Mine - Israel
Valsella VS-50 Scatter Drop Mine - Italy
Valsella VS-MK 2 Scatter Drop Mine - Italy
Valsella VS-MK 2-EL Scatter Drop Mine - Italy
Tecnovar TS-50 Scatter Drop-Mine - Italy
BPD SB-33 Scatterable Anti-personnel Mine - Italy
Anti-personnel Mine, Air-droppable, Maus-1 - Italy
Tecnovar VAR/40 Anti-personnel Mine - Italy
Tecnovar VAR/100 Anti-personnel Mine - Italy
Tecnovar VAR/100/SP Anti-personnel Mine - Italy
Tecnovar BM/S5 Bounding Anti-personnel Mine - Italy
Valsella Anti-personnel Bounding Mine Valmara 69 - Italy
Valsella VS-JAP Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - Italy
Valsella VS-APFM 1 Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - Italy
BPD P-25 Anti-personnel Mine - Italy
BPD-P-40 Anti-personnel Jumping Mine - Italy
Valsella VS-SAPFM3 Scatterable Bounding Mine - Italy
Anti-personnel Mine Model 15 - Korea, North
Anti-personnel Mine KM1SA1 - Korea, South
Anti-personnel Mine K440 - Korea, South
Anti-personnel Mine Model 15 - Netherlands
Anti-personnel Mine Model 22 - Netherlands
Pakistan Ordnance Factories Anti-personnel Mine - Pakistan
Pakistan Ordnance factories Bounding Mine - Pakistan
Anti-personnel Mine MGP-30 - Peru
Anti-personnel Mine m/966 - Portugal
Anti-personnel Bounding Mine M432 - Portugal
Anti-personnel Fragmentation Mine m/966 - Portugal
MAI-75 Anti-personnel Mine - Romania
MAT-6S Anti-personnel Mine - Romania
Directional Anti-personnel Mine - Romania
Non-metallic Anti-personnel Mine - S. Africa
High-explosive Anti-personnel Mine - S. Africa
High-explosive Anti-personnel Bounding Mine - S. Africa
Mini -MS S03 Directional Anti-personnel Mine - S. Africa
Anti-personnel Mine Model FAMA - Spain
Anti-personnel Mine P-S-1 - Spain
LIAB Anti-personnel Mine Type LI-11 - Sweden
Anti-personnel Mine P59 - Switzerland
Anti-personnel Mine Model 49 - Switzerland
Anti-personnel Mine M1SA1 - USA
Anti-personnel mine M26 - USA
Anti-personnel Bounding Mines M16, M16A1 & M16A2 - USA
Anti-personnel Mine M14 - USA
Anti-personnel Mine M2A4 - USA
Anti-personnel Mine - Vietnam
UDAR Fuel-Air Explosive Anti-personnel Mine - FY
PMA-3 Anti-personnel Mine - FY
PMA-2 Anti-personnel Mine - FY
PMA-1 and PMA-1-A Anti-personnel Mines - FY
PROM-1 bounding Anti-personnel Mine - FY
PMR-2A Anti-personnel Mine - FY
MRUD Anti-personnel Mine - FY
PMR-1 and PMR-2 Anti-personnel Stake Mines - FY

Appendix VII. National Military Inventories of Selected Weapons

National Military Inventories of Selected Weapons

(x = supplies of this weapon are believed to be in the inventory of the armed forces of the country indicated)

Country	Weapon type						
	Sterling L2m Mk4 sub-mach. gun (UK)	Uzi sub-machine gun (Israel)	FN FAL rifle (Belg.)	H&K G3 rifle (Germ.)	AK47, AKM rifle (USSR)	M-16, AR-15 rifle (USA)	FN MAG machine rifle (Belg.)
Algeria		x			x		
Angola		x	x	x	x		
Argentina	x	x	x				x
Bahrain	x		x	x			x
Bangladesh	x		x	x	x		
Belize	x		x			x	x
Bolivia		x	x	x		x	x
Botswana	x		x		x		x
Brazil			x			x	x
Brunei	x			x		x	x
Burkina Faso				x			x
Burma	x		x	x		x	x
Burundi			x	x			x
Cambodia			x		x	x	
Cameroon			x			x	
Cent.Afric.Rep		x			x	x	
Chad		x	x	x	x	x	
Chile		x	x	x		x	x
Colombia		x	x	x			x
Cuba					x		
Dominican Rep.		x	x	x		x	x
Ecuador		x	x			x	x
Egypt					x		x
El Salvador		x		x		x	
Ethiopia		x					
Gabon	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ghana	x		x	x		x	x
Guatemala		x				x	x
Guinea					x		
Guyana	x		x	x	x		x

Country	L2, Mk-4	Uzi	FN FAL	H&K G3	AK-47	M-16	FN MAG
Haiti		x		x		x	
Honduras		x	x			x	x
India	x		x				x
Indonesia			x			x	x
Iran		x		x	x		
Iraq	x				x		x
Israel		x	x		x	x	x
Ivory Coast				x			
Jamaica	x		x			x	
Jordan	x			x	x	x	
Kenya	x	x	x	x			x
Korea, North						x	
Korea, South						x	x
Kuwait	x		x			x	x
Lebanon	x		x	x		x	x
Lesotho	x				x	x	x
Liberia		x	x			x	
Libya	x		x	x	x		
Malawi	x		x	x			x
Malaysia	x		x	x		x	x
Mali					x		
Mauritania							x
Mexico			x	x		x	x
Morocco			x	x	x	x	
Mozambique			x		x		
Nicaragua		x				x	x
Niger		x		x			
Nigeria	x	x	x	x		x	x
Oman	x		x			x	x
Pakistan	x			x			
Panama		x				x	x
Paraguay		x	x				
Peru		x	x	x	x	x	x
Philippines		x		x		x	x
Qatar	x			x	x	x	x
Rwanda		x	x				
Saudi Arabia				x			x
Senegal				x			
Sierra Leone	x		x		x		x
Singapore	x					x	x
Somalia	x	x		x	x	x	
South Africa	x	x	x	x			x
Sri Lanka	x					x	x

Country	L2, Mk-4	Uzi	FN FAL	H&K G3	AK-47	M-16	FN MAG
Sudan	x	x		x	x		
Syria					x		
Taiwan						x	
Tanzania	x		x	x	x		x
Thailand		x				x	
Togo		x		x	x		
Trinidad & Tob.	x		x			x	x
Tunisia		x	x			x	
Turkey			x	x		x	x
Uganda	x	x	x	x		x	x
UAE	x		x	x	x	x	x
Uruguay		x	x			x	x
Venezuela		x	x				x
Vietnam					x		
Yemen			x		x	x	
Zaire		x	x		x	x	x
Zimbabwe	x	x	x		x		x

Source : *Jane's Infantry Weapons 1995-96.*

Light Weapons Production in Developing Countries

Compiled by Michael Klare (This version : October 31, 1995)

LATIN AMERICA

Country	Producer	Weapon type	Source of design	Comments
Argentina	Fabrica Militar de Arms Portatiles "Domingo Matheu" (FMAP)	FN Model 1935 GP Browning 9-mm. pistol (also M-90, Detective model)	lic./FN	185,000 produced 1969-81 for military, private sales; still in production
		FN FAL 7.62-mm rifle (and variants)	lic./FN	130,000 produced 1960-81 for military, export sales
		PAM-1 and PAM-2 9-mm sub-machine gun	variant of US M3A1	50,000 produced 1955-72 for military
		FMK-3, FMK-4 9-mm sub-machine gun	indigenous	30,000 produced by end '91 for military
		FN MAG 7.62-mm machine gun	lic./FN	In production since 1980; for military
		GME-FMK2-M0 hand grenade		For military
	Fabricaciones Militares	Model 1974 FMK-1 105-mm recoilless rifle		For military
		FMK-1, FMK-2, FMK-3 60-mm mortars	indigenous	For military
		FMK-2 LR 81-mm mortar	based on Brandt type (French)	For military

Brazil	Fabrica de Itujuba (part of Industria de MaterialBelico do Brasil, IMBEL)	Pistola Colt M-973 9-mm pistol, and variants	copy of US M1911A1	Over 50,000 produced
		Madsen 9-mm sub-machine gun	based on Madsen type (Danish)	For military, police
		FN FAL 7.62-mm rifle and variants	lic./FN	At least 2000,000 produced for military, export sales
		MD-2, MD-3 5.56-mm rifles	based on FN FAL	In development
	Forjas Taurus, S.A. (formerly a subsidiary of Beretta of Italy)	Beretta Model 92 9-mm pistol	lic./Beretta	For military, export sales (export version called PT-92)
		M972 Beretta Model 12 sub-machine gun	lic./Beretta	For military, export sales (export version called MT-12)
		.38-cal. revolver		For police, export sales
	Division FAU Guns, Bilbao S.A.	Uru Model-II 9-mm sub-machine gun	indigenous	For military, export sales
	Mekanika Industries	Urapuru 7.62-mm machine gun	indigenous	For military, export sales
	Hydroar, S.A.	57-mm M18A1 recoilless rifle	copy of US M18A1	For military
		3.5-in. M20A1 rocket launcher	copy of US M20A1	For military
		LC T1 M1 flamethrower		For military
	Companhia de Explosivos Valparaiba (CEV)	M3, M4 hand grenades; M2 rifle grenade; M3 anti-tank grenade; 60-mm, 81-mm mortar rds.		For military
		Mtr M 9 M1 9-mm sub-machine gun	indigenous	In development

Country	Producer	Weapon type	Source of design	Comments
Chile	Fabricas y Maestranzas del Ejercito (FAMAE)	M-92 pistol	lic./Bretta	
		Special .38 revolver		
		SIG SG-540 5.56-mm assault rifle; SG-542 7.62-mm assault rifle	lic.SIG (Swiss)	In production since 1960s; for military
		SAF 9-mm. sub-machine gun	based on SIG design	For military and police
		60-mm, 81-mm mortars	copies of Brandt types (French)	for military
	Industries Cardoen, S.A.	offensive/defensive hand grenade; MK-2 and mini hand grenades		For military, export sales
Dominican Republic	Armeria San Cristobal	Cristobal Model-2.30-cal. automatic carbine	designed by Hungarian exiles	Approx. 200,000 produced for military and export since 1953
Mexico	Fabrica Nacional de Armas	H&K G3 7.62-mm assault rifle	lic./H&K military	In production since 1980s for military
		FN FAL 7.62-mm rifle	lic./FN	Production ceased late 1970s
	Productos Mendoza, SA	Model HM-3 9-mm sub-machine gun		For military
Peru	SIMA-CEFAR	MGP-15 submachine gun	indigenous	For police and security forces
		MGP-79A, MGP-87 9-mm submachine guns	indigenous	For military, police
Venezuela	Compana Anonima Venezolana de Industries Militares (CAVIM)	FN FAL 7.62-mm assault rifle		Approx. 10,000 assembled from Belgian components in 1970s
		FN Model 1935 HP 9-mm pistol	lic./FN	
		S&W M10, M60 revolvers	lic./S&W	

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Egypt	Maadi Company for Engineering Industries (formerly Factory 54)	Helwan 9-mm pistol (Beretta M951)	lic/Beretta	
		Port Said 9-mm sub-machine gun (Swedish "Carl Gustaf" type)	lic/Bofors	For military
		Misr 7.62 assault rifle (AKM type)	lic/USSR	Several million produced for military and export since late 1950s
		Suez 7.62-mm light machine gun (Soviet RPD type)	lic/USSR	For military
		FN MAG 7.62-mm machine gun	lic/FN	
		Aswan 7.62-mm machine gun (Soviet SGM type)	lic/USSR	For military, export sales
	Sakr Factory for Developed Industries	PG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher; also Home Guard, Cobra variants	copy of Soviet RPG-7	For military, export sales
		Hossam anti-tank grenade	indigenous	For military
	Helwan Machine Tools	60-mm light mortar	copy of Chinese Type 63	For military
		Model M69 LMB 82-mm mortar	copy of Soviet M43	For military
Iran	Mosalsalsasi Weapons Factory, Defence Industries Organisation	H&K 63 7.62mm assault rifle	lic/H&K	Plant established with West German technical assistance
		H&K MG3 7.62-mm machine gun		
	Defence Industries Organisation	RPG-7 portable rocket launcher, 40-mm rockets	lic/USSR	
		37-mm Marsh mortar	indigenous	Developed for use in swampy areas during Iran-Iraq war of 1980s
		T1, T2 60-mm Commando mortars		
		Hadid 60-mm, 81-mm mortars	copies of Soltam types (Israeli)	For military

Country	Producer	Weapon type	Source of design	Comments
Iraq	Government factories, Ministry of Industry and Military Industries (MIMI)	Tariq 7.65-mm Beretta Model M70 pistol; Beretta 9-mm Brigadier pistol	lic/Beretta	
		Tabuk 7.62-mm assault rifle (Soviet AKM type)	lic/USSR	For military
		Al-Kadisa 7.62-mm sniper rifle (Soviet Dragunov type)	lic/USSR	For military
		Al-Quds 7.62-mm light machine gun (Soviet RPK type	lic/USSR	For military, export sales
		Al-Nassira light anti-tank weapon (Soviet RPG-7 type)	lic/USSR	
		Al-Jaleel 60-mm, 82-mm light mortars		For military, export sales
Israel	TAAS-Israel Industries Ltd. (formerly Israeli Military Industries, IMI)	Uzi 9-mm sub-machine gun; also Mini-Uzi, Micro-Uzi	indigenous	For military and export; also sold by FN of Belgium
		FN FAL 7.62-mm assault gun	lic/FN	Production underway in 1960s, now terminated
		Galil 5.56-mm, 7.62-mm rifle	copy of AK-47 (USSR)	For military and export sales
		Negev 5.56-mm squad auto. weapon	based on Galil	Production began late 1980s
		B-300 shoulder-fired anti-armour system	indigenous	In development
		52-mm mortar		For military
		assorted hand grenades, rifle grenades, mortar rounds		For military and export sales
	Soltam Ltd.	60-mm, 81-mm mortars	based on Tampella type (Finnish)	For military and export sales
		60-mm, 81-mm mortar ammunition		For military and export sales

Saudi Arabia	Al Kharj Arsenal, General Establishment of Military Armaments	H&K MP5 9-mm sub-machine gun	lic/H&K	Production facilities developed with West German technical assistance
		H&K G3 7.62-mm assault rifle		
South Africa	LIW Division, Denel (Pty) Ltd	Vektor SP1, SP2 9-mm pistols	indigenous	For military
		Vektor R-4, R-5 (short), R-6 (compact) assault rifles (Galil type)	lic/IMI (Israeli)	For military, export sales
		Vektor SS-77 7.62-mm machine gun; also mini SS light machine gun		For military
		Vektor MG4 7.62 machine gun (Browning M1919A4 type)	lic/US	For military
		AS88 40-mm automatic grenade launcher	indigenous	In development
	Armaments Development and Production Corp. (ARMSCOR)	BXP 9-mm sub-machine gun		For military, police
		FN FAL 7.62-mm assault rifle (South African designation: R-1, R-2)	lic/FN	For military; no longer in production
		40-mm grenade launcher		For military
		FT-5 light anti-tank weapon		For military
		Vektor M1, M4, M6 60-mm mortars; M3, M8 81-mm mortars and mortar ammunition	Based on Brandt types (French)	For military
	Mechem	MGL 6-short 40-mm grenade launcher	indigenous	For military
		MK-40 40-mm grenade launcher		
	Aserma Manufacturing	Protecta 12-gauge compact shotgun	indigenous	For police, security forces

Country	Producer	Weapon type	Source of design	Comments
Turkey	Makina ve Kimya Endustrist Kurumu (MKEK)	MKE 9-mm, 7.65-mm pistols	variant of Walter pp	For military
		H&K MP5 9-mm sub-machine gun	lic/H&K	For military
		H&K G3 7.62-mm assault rifle	lic/H&K	For military, export sales; 51,000 sold to Sudan in 1989
		NATO-type MG3 machine gun	lic/Rheinmetall	For military, export sales
		MKEK 60-mm Commando mortar; UTI and NTI 81-mm mortars		For military

SOUTH AND EAST ASIA

India	Government Rifle Factory, Ishapur	1A1 7.62-mm rifle (based on British L1A1 variant of FN FAL)	lic/RSAF (UK)	Production began 1963
		Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) 5.56-mm rifle, light machine gun	indigenous	In development+
	Indian Ordnance Factories	L4A4 (Bren) 7.62-mm light machine gun	lic/RSAF (UK)	
		1A1 9-mm sub-machine gun (copy of Sterling L2A3)	lic/Sterling (UK)	For military, export sales
		FN MAG 7.62-mm machine gun	lic/FN	For military, export sales
		M40A1 106-mm recoilless rifle	lic/US Army	For military, export sales
		Carl-Gustaf M2, M3 84-mm recoilless rifles; 84-mm ammunition	lic/Bofors (Sweden)	For military, exports sales
		E1 51-mm mortar	copy of UK 2-in. mortar	For military
		E1 81-mm mortar	indigenous	For military
		51-mm, 81-mm mortar rounds		For military, export sales
	Bharat Dynamics Ltd.	9K113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missile system	lic/USSR	
		MILAN M2 anti-tank missile	lic/Euro-missile	For military, export sales
Indonesia	PT Pindad	SS1-V1, SS1-V2, SS1-V3 5.56-mm assault rifles (copies of FN FAL)	lic/FN	For military
		CIS 40-AGL 40-mm auto. grenade launcher	lic/CIS (Singapore)	For military
		60-mm, 81-mm mortar rounds	lic/Soltam (Israel)	

Country	Producer	Weapon type	Source of design	Comments
North Korea	State Factories	Type 68 7.62-mm pistol (variant of Soviet TT33)		
		Type 58 rifle (Soviet AK-47)	lic/USSR	Production began 1959
		Type 68 rifle (Soviet AKM)	lic/USSR	Production began 1970; for military, export sales
		Type 63 7.62-mm carbine (Soviet Simonov SKS)	lic/USSR	At least 1 million produced since 1963
		Type 62 7.62-mm machine gun (Soviet RPD type)	lic/USSR	
Pakistan	Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF)	H&K G3 7.62-mm rifle	lic/H&K	In production since 1970s
		MG3 7.62-mm machine gun	lic/Rheinmetall (Ger.)	For military, export sales
		Chinese Type 54 12.7-mm heavy machine gun	lic/China	Assembly plant built with Chinese technical assistance
		60-mm, 81-mm mortar rounds	Based on Brandt types	For military, export sales
	Pakistan Machine Tool Factory Ltd.	RPG-7 portable rocket launcher	lic/USSR	
		M40A1 106-mm. recoilless rifle	lic/US Army	For military
		60-mm, 81-mm mortars		For military
Philippines	Elisco Tool Co.	M16A1 rifle	lic/Colt (US)	120,000 produced
	Philippines United Machinery & Foundry Co.	M75 60-mm mortar; M2 81-MM mortar	indigenous	For military

Singapore	Chartered Firearms Industries Pty Ltd.	M16A1 rifle	lic/Colt (US)	185,000 produced; 30,000 sold to Thailand
	(formerly Chartered Industries of Singapore (CIS)	CIS SA80 5.56-mm assault rifle	based on US AR-18	Production began 1980, now terminated
		CIS SA88 SA88A 5.56-mm assault rifle	based on US AR-18	Production began 1988; for military, export sales
		CIS Ultimax 5.56-mm light machine gun	indigenous	For military, export sales
		CIS 50MG 12.7-mm machine gun	indigenous	For military, export sales
		CIS 40GL 40-mm grenade launcher	indigenous	For military, export sales
		CIS 40AGL 40-mm auto. grenade launcher	indigenous	For export sales
		SFG hand grenade; S401, S411 40-mm grenade		For military, export sales
	Ordnance Development & Engineering Co.	ODE 60-mm commando mortar, 60-mm mortar, 81-mm mortar		
South Korea	Daewoo Precision Industries (DPI)	DP51 9 m-mm pistol (also DH40 variant)		For military
		M16A1 rifle	lic/Colt (US)	Some 600,000 produced in 1970s and 1980s
		K1 5.56-mm carbine; K2 5.56-mm assault rifle; K1A 5.56-mm sub-machine gun	based on US M16, M18	For military, export sales
		K3 5.56-mm light machine gun	copy of FN Minimi	For military
		KM79 40-mm grenade launcher (US M79 type)	lic/Colt (US)	For military
		K201 40-mm grenade launcher (US M203)	lic/Colt (US)	For military

Country	Producer	Weapon type	Source of design	Comments
	Kia Machine Tool Co.	KM181 60-mm mortar	based on US M224	For military
		M67 90-mm M67 recoilless rifle	lic/US	For military
	Korea Explosives Co.	K400 fragmentation grenade	based on US M67	For military
		40-mm grenade (also 40-mm multiple projective cartridge)	based on US M79/M203	For military
		M49A4 60mm, M374 81-mm mortar bombs	variants of US types	For military
Taiwan	Hsing-Ho Co. (part of Combined Service Forces arsenals)	Type 65 5.56-mm assault rifle	based on US M16	Production began mid-1970s; for military, export sales
		Type 74 7.62-mm light machine gun	based on FN MAG	
		Type 75 5.56-mm squad auto. weapon	based on FN Minimi	
		Type 57 7.62-mm machine gun (US M60 type)	lic/Saco (US)	For military
		Assorted hand grenades; 40-mm rifle grenades	based on US types	

Abbreviations:

lic = licence-produced
H&K = Heckler & Koch (Germany)
S&W = Smith & Wesson (USA)
FN = Fabrique Nationale Herstal (Belgium)
RSAF = Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield (UK)

Sources:

Edward Clinton Ezell, *Small Arms of the World*, 12th ed. (1993)
E.C. Ezell, et. al., *International Small Arms Usage and Research and Development Trends* (1993)
Ian V. Hogg, ed., *Jane's Infantry Weapons 1995-96*
John Walter, *Rifles of the World* (1993)

Appendix VIII. Voluntary Weapons Collection Efforts and Buy-Back Programs in the United States of America, Haiti and Nicaragua

Firearm exchange programs in the United States

Introduction

Firearms and their relationship to violent crime are now center stage at the local, state and federal level. Crimes committed with highly lethal and widely accessible weapons are on the rise, especially among youths. It is also clear that public opinion is now identifying the weapons themselves as a major source of the problem. As a result public policy approaches increasingly target weapons as a critical factor in ameliorating the social problem of violent crimes committed with firearms. Efforts to stem this epidemic have concentrated on both the supply side and the demand side of firearm violence. On the supply side, recent legislative acts such as the Brady Bill and the ban on assault weapons have attempted to control to some extent the type of guns available to consumers and to whom these weapons are available. Gun control proponents, however, are met with an organized, well-funded, and enthusiastic opposition, and efforts to further limit the number of firearms in circulation have met with frustration. Other policy alternatives have appeared, such as the police conducted gun seizures enacted in New York City and Kansas City, Missouri. On the demand side, recent efforts have been made towards extensive education about gun use and ownership, conflict resolution and violence prevention. Youth programs have grown around the country, sponsored by community organizations, schools, religious groups and groups of concerned public health professionals.

One policy approach that has been extensively tried in recent years has been the firearm exchange, or gun buy-back as it is commonly referred to. These programs offer cash or in-kind benefits to those people willing to exchange their firearms under conditions of full amnesty. What is different about firearm exchange programs is that they incorporate aspects of both the supply side and demand side approaches to gun violence. Those conducting gun buy-backs have expressed intent to both reduce the number of weapons in a community and educate those in the community on the tragic consequences of readily available firearms amongst conditions of poverty, drug trafficking, youth gangs, and feelings of overall insecurity. The uniqueness of these programs is their breadth and scope. Their effectiveness, however, is a matter of debate.

There has been little research conducted on gun buy-back programs to determine their effectiveness in reducing firearm violence. Case studies of the Seattle, WA and St. Louis, MO firearm exchange programs demonstrated that these programs were not successful in reducing levels of homicide and other violent crimes involving firearms over the studied time periods. However, as noted in the latter study, there are possible benefits to the gun buy-back that help explain its widespread and continued popularity. Such programs are often implemented with various goals in mind. While one such program may desire solely to reduce the number of guns in circulation and thus the number of violent crimes, another may hope to educate and bring the community's united attention to the problem of firearm violence. If a firearm exchange is implemented with this goal in mind, its effectiveness must be judged by the extent to which it satisfied the organizers' goals of education, awareness and cohesiveness and acts as a catalyst for programs which address the wide variety of root causes of violence. An example of how a gun buy-back program fits into an overall framework of gun violence and efforts to reduce this violence is provided in Figure 1 at the end of this report.

A most recent development in the role of firearm exchange programs in reducing violence is the public health approach. Organizations of medical professionals and advocacy groups have joined to address how guns kill in accidents and suicides as well as criminal activity. In gun buy-backs where the public health approach has been the focus, less emphasis has been placed on taking criminals' guns off the street, and more on the "One Gun- One Life" focus such as in the Boston, MA exchange program.

Regardless of the primary motives, research has shown that gun buy-backs have components that allow evaluation to follow a consistent format. Each program has had to:
1) Solicit funding from sponsors and donors;
2) Provide incentives for the exchange of weapons;
3) Choose a location for the exchange that coincides with the participants' trust and the amnesty feature of the program;
4) Create publicity through the media and other sources. The following sections will provide a brief overview of these factors, and a review of the research literature (i.e. Seattle and St.Louis) will help demonstrate how they interact and can be evaluated.

Funding

Funding plays two very important roles in a gun buy-back. First, funding is obviously needed to meet the costs incurred by organizing and implementing a firearm exchange program. Second, fund-raising itself helps satisfy a major goal of many programs, in that it invites various community businesses, organizations and citizens to actively participate in confronting the problem of gun violence by contributing the means to do so. One criticism of firearm exchange programs is that the money spent on their implementation could be more wisely spent on improved methods and facilities for enforcement, prosecution and incarceration. While some programs have used city and/ or county funds to partially support a gun buy-back, many have used asset forfeiture funds and private donations to help diffuse opposition to the use of tax-payers' money.

The list of organizations and individuals who cooperate in and fund any gun buy-back is usually long and diverse. Donations often consist of either cash or certificates exchangeable for goods at local stores. Those programs with more funds are able to offer either higher incentives for exchanging guns, or are able to collect a larger number of weapons. Large corporations such as Footlocker and Toys-R-Us have donated significant resources to gun buy-backs across the country and as a result have received a tremendous amount of publicity via local and national media.

Incentives

Choosing the incentives for turning in firearms in a gun buy-back has proven to be a challenging task. It is dependent on the type and quantity of sponsorship and donations. If the donations provided are from a food chain-store in the form of certificates, than the incentives are determined by the sponsor. If the donations are made in cash, it broadens the options for providing unique incentives. In Oakland, California, the organizers of a 1995 gun buy-back used $10,000 in donations and an arrangement with a local computer firm to offer rebuilt PC compatible computers for each gun turned in at the exchange.

Several questions have been raised in connection with using cash as the primary incentive. First, experiences from several buy-back programs have shown that without stringent requirements on the quality (i.e. working condition) and quantity of guns, funds can soon be depleted by exploitative private gun owners and dealers who use the exchange of outdated and poor quality weapons to purchase newer and higher quality firearms. In order to further control the exchange, program organizers usually set prices for guns based on their potential lethality and commonality in accidents and assaults. Since handguns are more commonly involved in both firearm related accidents and violence, their exchange price is typically higher than for weapons used more traditionally for sport, such as rifles and shotguns (except those that are sawed-off and used for criminal activity). Even greater incentives have been offered for assault-type rifles that are highly lethal but less commonly used in either accidents or acts of violence.

The range of incentives used in the over 80 known firearm exchange programs in the U.S. has been extensive. While most have used the certificate and cash methods noted above, some (including the computer exchange) have tried creative, if sometimes ineffective, choices of incentives. In San Francisco, doctors offered psychiatric treatment in exchange for a firearm of any kind. In the Bronx, New York, a Catholic priest offered a free crucifix for each gun exchanged. Unfortunately, he was unable to collect any weapons for his efforts. The creativity and considerable effort put forth in choosing and negotiating the „correct" incentive for a firearm exchange, as well as the impact incentives have had on final outcomes, demonstrates their significance in the overall planning and implementation of any gun buy-back program.

Location

Because one of the fundamental ideas of firearm exchanges is that of amnesty, where a gun buy-back is conducted can influence participation in and thus outcomes of the program. Previously conducted programs have used churches and other religious centers

, fire stations, community centers and police stations as sites where weapons are exchanged. The experience of several programs is that exchanges using police departments as drop-off sites may have frightened away some of the customers at whom the program is aiming its attention (i.e. criminals and those prone to violent activity). Additionally, sites for a firearm exchange should be accessible and well-known to community members, safe (i.e. easy access by the police for protection), and visible for publicity reasons.

Publicity

Firearm exchange programs cannot be successful without an extensive publicity campaign. In order to attract gun owners to the exchange, every program has employed one or more methods for alerting the public. Newspaper, television and other information agencies have both covered and sponsored gun-buy back programs. In St. Louis, considered one of the most effective programs to date, the St. Louis Dispatch Newspaper co-sponsored the exchange, ensuring its coverage in the local news. Other programs, such as those sponsored by the BASS ticket agency which gave away concert and sports event tickets for guns, have included the support of radio stations, using live publicity campaigns at the site of the buy-back to increase public visibility.

Programs across the country have used all the mediums of the media, and enlisted the publicly demonstrated support of highly visible community members and celebrities to enhance the image of the buy-back as a community-wide effort. As New York Times journalist Marc Lacy noted, "The (firearm) exchanges attract huge amounts of attention to the issue of guns."[1] Of the programs conducted thus far, those deemed "successful" by their sponsors have sought such partnerships. Informing the community of an approaching firearm exchange, covering it in progress, and reporting on its successes and failures satisfies the chief goal of many organizers: awareness of the epidemic growth of gun-violence and its tragic consequences for the communities in which it occurs.

Review of the literature

Seattle, WA

In 1994, three medical doctors with masters' degrees in public health conducted a study of the 1992 Seattle gun buy-back program. This was the first research attempted on the affects of a firearm exchange program on the incidents of firearm related violence, injury, and death. Included in the research was a public opinion poll that tested community support for such an effort and a survey that determined the demographics of those who had participated. The research attempted to answer the many questions surrounding a gun buy-back that had frequently been asked but not answered.

The mean age of the 500 surveyed participants was 51 years, 24% of whom were women. The surveys demonstrated that only 5% of the weapons turned in were exchanged by minors, the target audience of many firearm exchange programs due to their high risk of violence and accidents. The city-wide phone survey demonstrated that 86% of respondents were aware of the program, a majority of whom supported it and its use of public funds. More goal oriented, however, the study showed that the buy-back, although having taken in 1,772 guns, collected less than 1% of the guns in Seattle homes. After comparing data over the observed time period, the study concluded that firearm-related crime showed no "statistically significant change" and that the numbers of both homicides and firearm-related deaths increased.[2]

St. Louis, MO

Commonly noted as one of the most successful firearm exchanges in recent years, the 1991 St. Louis gun buy-back program collected over 7,500 weapons with $341,000 of city, county, corporate and privately donated funds. Richard Rosenfeld and Matthew Perkins, at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, evaluated this buy-back as well as the 1994 program also conducted in St. Louis. Their findings on the impact of the 1991 firearm exchange on gun-related violence were similar to those of the Seattle program. Aside from seasonal changes that affect crime rates, such as weather patterns and temperature, there was no statistically significant change in either homicide or gun assault. During the 1994 program, these statistics actually increased.[3] The demographics of participants in the 1994 program were also nearly identical to those found by the Seattle study.

In distinction from the Seattle evaluation, Rosenfeld and Perkins suggest that affects on crime rates may not be sufficient criteria for evaluating gun buy-back programs. They offer that such programs be evaluated with the goals of implementation in mind. They note correctly, however, that these goals often shift. In the context of gun buy-backs this can mean "conscious efforts of officials to replace goals they can not achieve with others they can achieve."[4]

Conclusion

Firearm exchange programs have enjoyed great popularity for a policy program that is widely questioned for its ability to attack the issue it purports to attack. What is it then that encourages its continued existence? For all the reasons noted above, gun buy-backs are an incremental and community-based approach to fighting the spread of

gun violence and the social suffering that accompanies it. The appeal draws in members of the police, city-hall, local schools, medical professionals and concerned parents to confront a community problem that affects them all.

Rosenfeld and Perkins are correct in noting the existence of "goal substitution". No doubt each of the more than 80 gun buy-backs have been conducted with the overwhelming intention to reduce gun violence in a given community. However, every policy program must defend itself on a cost-benefit basis. The "One Gun-One Life" approach to gun buy-backs is a way to assert the benefits of such a program despite all the criticism that the money and efforts ought be better directed at more concrete alternatives. The participation of the public health community has strengthened this approach by encouraging public awareness of the dangers of gun ownership. The effects on suicides and accidental deaths and injuries make every weapon turned in by law abiding citizens as dangerous as the one not exchanged by the criminal.

Voluntary weapons collection programs in Haiti and Nicaragua

Haiti

The United States Army conducted a gun buy-back program as a part of its mandate as a member of the Multinational Force. The U.S. Army set up several fixed sites in Haiti, and initially operated several mobile sites. Each site was protected by U.S. troops. Weapons were collected under conditions of amnesty. Questions were asked only to determine whether or not the visitor had been to the collection point before and if the weapon belonged to the person turning it in. Weapons were not tested, but were inspected for a firing pin. Any weapon deemed non-functional was confiscated without remuneration. Cash was paid for functional weapons.

The program was run in phases, each approximately two months in duration. During the period September 1994 through January 1995, 3,684 weapons and 6,512 munitions were bought. 15,236 weapons were seized during this period. By March 1995 the total numbers of weapons and munitions collected (both bought-back and seized) was over 33,000. As of January 1995 the total paid for weapons collected through the buy-back program was US$1,924,950.

The mobile sites were discontinued when turn-out began to wane. By September 1995 there was a single site still in operation, at the airport in the capital of Port-au-Prince.

As of September 1995 the prices being paid for weapons were: US$100 for handguns; US$200 for semi-automatic weapons and grenades; US$400 for fully automatic weapons; and US$600 for heavy- and large-caliber weapons. These prices were revised during the course of the program. In January 1995 the prices for the weapons had been double the September prices. Arms caches have been discovered and confiscated: no remuneration was offered.

Types of weapons collected include: machine guns, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, rifles, shotguns, handguns, pistols, flare guns, mortars, howitzers, high explosives, CS (tear-gas) grenades, and heavy weapons, including several tanks.

Many of the weapons collected were in poor condition. Modern weapons in good condition were passed to the U.S. Department of Justice International Criminal Investigations Training Assistance Program for use by the Haitian police. Weapons with historical value were set aside as museum pieces. The remainder of the weapons were inventoried, boxed and shipped to Pennsylvania, USA to be melted down at a destruction facility.

The goals of the program were to reduce the number of weapons, promote stability and provide monetary incentives to Haitian citizens who supported the program. The U.S. Army stated that these goals were achieved, and that the gun buy-back program helped to create a safe and secure environment to hand over to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in March 1995.

Nicaragua

A gun buy-back was conducted in Nicaragua by the Special Disarmament Brigade (BED), which was created by the government of Nicaragua expressly for the purpose. Following the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of guerrilla forces at the end of the war, some of the ex-combatants rearmed. The sources of the arms were caches left from the war. The BED was created in September 1991 to develop and implement the buy-back program. It was made up of government officials and ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict.

The first buy-backs were conducted in January 1992. The BED would approach groups known to have rearmed and offer them several incentives to hand-in their weapons. First, cash was offered for individual weapons. The average price was US$100. Approximately US$100 worth of food was also offered in addition to the cash. Finally, the Italian government sponsored a micro-enterprise program that offered $300-$500 to each participant for use as seed money for a development project.

The approach used for the buy-back was flexible, and often if the BED was negotiating with a large group, the final settlement would be cash for the weapons, food, and housing or construction materials.

In addition to purchasing weapons from individuals, information on arms caches or other individuals and groups that had rearmed was also exchanged for money and goods.

The operation ran from January 1992 through the end of 1993. During that time approximately 142,000 weapons were either bought-back or confiscated. 78,000 weapons were confiscated by police and Army personnel, 54,000 weapons were bought back in rural areas and 10,000 in Managua, in addition to the collection of over 250,000 pieces of munitions and ordnance. The buy-back process did not distinguish between functional and non-functional arms. Both were remunerated.

The weapons were destroyed by fire in an open pit in a public space. This method was chosen both for its cost-effectiveness and for the supposed psychological value.

The total cost of the program was US$6,000,000, including funding from the Italian government for the micro-enterprise project.

There is general agreement that the program achieved its objectives to remove weapons from individuals and find and collect weapons in arms caches. It was, however, one of the most expensive gun buy-backs ever conducted.

Appendix IX. Selected Bibliography of Works Relating to Micro-Disarmament

1. Adibe, Clement, and LtCol J.W. Potgieter. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995.

2. *Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda*. Washington, D.C.: The Arms Project, Human Rights Watch, January 1994.

3. Biddle, Stephen D., Julia Klare, and Jason Rosenfeld. *The Military Utility of Landmines: Implications for Arms Control*. Washington D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis Document D-1559, June 1994. IDA, Log No. HQ 94-45706. Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

4. *Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Secretary-General. „General Assembly."* Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, *United Nations, 3 January 1995. A/50/60, S/1995/1.*

5. Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, eds. *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

6. Brady, Bronwyn. „Collecting and Organising Data on the Manufacture of, and Trade In, Light Weapons." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

7. Cock, Jacklyn. „A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

8. Dikshit, Prashant. „Internal Conflict and Role of Light Weapons." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

9. Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie Goldring. „Analysing Policy Proposals to Limit Light Weapons Transfers." In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

10. Gonchar, Ksenia, and Peter Lock. „Small Arms and Light Weapons: Russia and the Former Soviet Union." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

11. Husbands, Jo L. „Controlling Transfers of Light Arms: Linkages to Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution Strategies." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

12. Jaramillo, Daniel Garcia -Pena. „Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

13. Karp, Aaron. „The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small Arms.“ *Washington Quarterly* vol. 17, no. 4, 1994.

14. _____. „Small Arms - The New Major Weapons.“ In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

15. Kartha, Tara. „Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage.“ In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

16. Klare, Michael. „Armed and Dangerous.“ *In These Times* (13 June 1994, pp. 14-19.

17. _____. „Awash in Armaments: Implications of the Trade in Light Weapons.“ *Harvard International Review* December 1994, pp. 24- 26, 75-76.

18. _____. „Controlling the Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.“ *Issues in Science and Technology*, September 1995.

19. _____. „The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold War Era.“ In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

20. _____. „Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era.“ In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

21. Laurance, Edward J. „Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint.“ In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

22. _____. „“Surplus Light Weapons as a Conversion Problem: Unique Characteristics and Solutions.“ In *Coping With Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion Research and Policy*, eds. Edward J. Laurance, and Herbert Wulf. Bonn: Bonn International Centre for Conversion, June 1995.

23. Mathiak, Lucy. „Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Angola.“ In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

24. Naylor, R. T. „The Structure and Operation of the Modern Arms Black Market.“ In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

25. Nelson, Daniel N. „Ancient Enmities, Modern Guns.“ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* vol. 49, no. 10, December 1993, pp. 21-27.

26. Posen, Barry R. „The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.“ *Survival* vol. 35, no. 1, March 1993, pp. 27-47.

27. Project on Light Weapons. *Current Projects on Light Weapons*,. Washington, D.C.: BASIC, February 1996. Working Paper 1.

28. _____. *Light Weapons Manufacture in the Public and Private Sectors*. Washington, D.C.: BASIC, February 1996. Working Paper 2.

29. _____. „Summary of Workshop Discussions.“ British American Security Information Council. Washington, D.C., 27 March 1995.

30. Rana, Swadesh. *Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995.

31. Sayigh, Yezid. „Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries.“ *Adelphi Papers* 251, June 1990.

32. Singh, Jasjit. „Controlling the Spread.“ In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

33. _____. „Light Weapons and Conflict in Southern Asia.“ In *Light Weapons and International Security*, ed. Jasjit Singh. Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

34. _____, ed. „Light Weapons and International Security.“ Delhi, India: Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, December 1995.

35. _____. „Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.“ Paper presented at *Eighth Regional Disarmament Meeting*: Kathmandu, Nepal, February 1996.

36. Smith, Chris. „Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia. In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed. Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995.

37. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. *January 1996 Progress Report*, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project. Geneva: UNIDIR, January 1996.

38. _____. „Disarmament and Conflict Resolution: The Disarming of Warring Parties as an Integral Part of the Settlement of Conflicts.“ Geneva: UNIDIR, January 1995.

Additionally, there are many sources of information on light weapons and small arms available on the World Wide Web. A list of some of the organizations follows:

- Bonn International Centre for Conversion
  http://www.bicc.uni-bonn.de
- British American Security Information Council
  http://www.igc.apc.org/basic
- Federation of American Scientists
  http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/
- Multilaterals Project at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
  http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletches/multi/warfare.html
- Nonproliferation Resources
  http://infomanage.com/np
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  http://www.sipri.se
- Center for Defense Information
  http://www.cdi.org/

Publications

BICC series such as *brief*, *report* and *paper* are published either in English (with a German summary) or in German (with an English summary).

report 1:
Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, with the assistance of Joseph DiChiaro III, *Conversion and the Integration of Economic and Security Dimensions,* January 1995

report 2:
Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und Hans-Henning Schröder, *Chancen und Probleme der Rüstungskonversion in der Gemeinschaft Unabhängiger Staaten: Konversionsprofile ausgewählter Regionen - Nizhnij Novgorod, Republik Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg, Republik Belarus [Problems and Prospects of Defense Conversion in the Commonwealth of Independent States: Conversion Profiles of Selected Regions—Nizhnii Novgorod, Udmurtiya, Yekaterinburg, and Belarus],* March 1995

report 3:
Joseph DiChiaro III, *Conversion of the Defense Industry in Russia and Eastern Europe, Proceedings of the BICC/CISAC Workshop on Conversion, 10-13 August 1994,* April 1995

report 4:
Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, *Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germany: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities*, June 1995

report 5:
Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf (eds.), *Military Conversion for Social Development,* July 1995

report 6:
Petra Opitz, *Die Konversion der russischen Rüstungsindustrie - Krisenmanagement, Eine vergleichende Studie der Regionen St. Petersburg und Novosibirsk [Conversion of the Russian Defense Industry—Crisis Management—A comparative Study on the Regions of St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk],* October 1995

report 7:
Corinna Hauswedell, Paul Klemmer and Herbert Wulf (eds.), *Konversion - Herausforderung für Wissenschaft und Forschung (Konferenzdokumentation) [Conference proceedings],* December 1995

brief 1:
Ksenia Gonchar, Yevgeny Kuznetsov and Alexander Ozhegov, *Conversion of the Post-Soviet Defense Industry: Implications for Russian Economic Development,* February 1995

brief 2:
Anke Habich, Werner Voß und Peter Wilke, *Abhängigkeit der Werften im Ostseeraum von der Rüstungsproduktion [Dependence of Shipyards in the Baltic Sea Region on Defense Production],* March 1995

brief 3:
Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf (eds.), *Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority for Conversion Research and Policy,* June 1995

brief 4:
Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers, *Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings of the IRG Workshop, Addis Ababa, 4-7 December 1994,* June 1995

brief 5:
Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska, *Eurofighter 2000: Consequences and Alternatives,* February 1996

brief 6:
Michael Renner**,** *Cost of Disarmament: An Overview of the Economic Costs of the Dismantlement of Weapons and the Disposal of Military Surplus,* March 1996.

brief 7:
Edward J. Laurance, *The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons,* September 1996

paper 1:
Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf, *Demilitarization and Conversion, World Social Summit, Copenhagen,* March 1995

paper 2:
Andreas Klemmer, *United Nations Publications Related to the Subject of Conversion: An Annotated Bibliography*, April 1995

paper 3:
Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), *Learning to Restructure: Studies of Transformation in the Russian Defense Sector*, June 1996

paper 4:
Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu, *Conversion in Africa: Past Experience and Future Outlook,* June 1996

paper 5:
Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, *Dutch Surplus Weapons,* July 1996

books:
Michael Brzoska and Werner Voss (eds.), *Auswirkungen und Alternativen des Eurofighter 2000 [Consequences and Alternatives of the Eurofighter 2000],* Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, January 1996

BICC, *Conversion Survey 1996, Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization*, Oxford, April 1996

Forthcoming:

report 8:
Jorgen Klussmann und Ulrike Lindemann, *Standortekonversion - Eine weltweite Herausforderung, Konferenzdokumentation [Base Closure—A Global Challenge, Conference proceedings]*, September 1996

About the Center

As an independent non-profit organization, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) supports and promotes the processes by which people, skills, technology, equipment, financial and economic resources are shifted from the military or defense sector towards alternative, civilian purposes.The establishment of BICC in April 1994 resulted from the initiative of the German state government of North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW), in cooperation with the Investitions-Bank and the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft (both of NRW), the state of Brandenburg, Germany, and the assistance of the United Nations.

Working as a worldwide clearinghouse on practical conversion experiences and projects, BICC provides documentation, research, information and consulting services and facilities for governmental and non-governmental organizations, companies, and individuals involved in conversion.

BICC's activities focus primarily on the following six areas of conversion:

- Analysis of the means and methods of reallocating the financial resources of the military sector to non-military purposes.
- Reorientation of military research and development (R&D) facilities and provision of this R&D knowledge and creativity for non-military purposes.
- Opportunities for and barriers to conversion of the arms industry in down-sizing its overcapacities and in reducing its dependence on arms production.
- Programs for the demobilization of military personnel and civilian personnel employed by the armed forces and their reintegration into non-military employment.
- Reallocation of military facilities and installations and their conversion to non-military purposes (base closures).
- Alternative use, disposal or scrapping of surplus weaponry with the purpose of avoiding indiscriminate exports.

BICC's publication series such as BICC *report*, BICC *brief* and BICC *paper* analyze the background of the international conversion process, report on conversion projects and experience, and offer scientific as well as practical know-how in the various fields of conversion. The BICC yearbook 'Conversion survey 1996' provides detailed information, facts and discussion on all topics related to the conversion process worldwide.

Information on BICC's work and activities can also be obtained on line via the Center's Internet service 'ConverNet' at http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

Published by

Bonn International Center for Conversion
Director: Dr. Herbert Wulf
Publishing management: Corinna Hauswedell
An der Elisabethkirche 25
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
Phone +49-228-911960
Fax +49-228-241215
E-mail: bicc@bicc.uni-bonn.de

ISSN 0947-7322

Layout: Svenja Görgens
Printed in Germany