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paper⁵

Dutch Surplus Weapons

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DUTCH SURPLUS WEAPONS

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1. INTRODUCTION

As in most Western countries, the shift in East-West relations in the early 1990s led to a major restructuring of the Dutch armed forces. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its accompanying reduction obligations were soon followed by the realization that further cutbacks were possible due to the new European security environment. In March 1991, therefore, the Dutch Ministry of Defense presented a defense white paper with plans for the next ten years. Based on an adjusted threat assessment, reductions in the defense budget, personnel and material were announced.

The speed with which the international security situation continued to change after 1991 led to significant readjustments in this white paper and to the publication of a follow-up paper in January 1993. More extensive financial cutbacks and greater, earlier reductions in material were included. In addition, the mixed conscript/professional army with its high dependence on mobilization will be transformed into a professional-only army after 1996. As a result of this decision, the effective wartime strength of the Dutch armed forces will decline from around 260,000 (peacetime 105,000) to around 110,000 (peacetime 70,000). This alone means that the large amounts of equipment necessary under the old standing army and mobilization system are no longer required. Thus, many items that were given reserve status in the 1991 plan became surplus under the new plan (see Table 1).

Under the new defense policy, the main body of the army will still be directed toward cooperation within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the defense of NATO territory. In order to cope with an expected higher participation in peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations all over the world, however, the Dutch armed forces will place more emphasis on rapid deployment, air-mobility and light forces. This emphasis indicates that some of the equipment previously in use will be replaced with systems more suited to the new requirements of air-mobile forces. Investments in new material, such as combat and transport helicopters, transport aircraft, light armored vehicles and an amphibious transport ship, were therefore announced, while the older, outdated equipment became surplus.

Table 1: The reduction of existing equipment in the Dutch armed forces

Selected items

	<i>Pre-CFE</i>	<i>CFE</i>	<i>1991 plans for situation in 2006</i>	<i>1993 plans for situation in 2006</i>
MBTs	913	743	445	330
ACVs	1,467	1,080	669	382
Artillery	837	607	478	290
Combat aircraft	196	196	154	122
Helicopters	91	69	69	29
Frigates	22	22	16	16

Note: The table shows only the (planned) level in 1989 and the numbers of units and equipment left over from this original number under subsequent plans. It does not include plans for purchases after 1989.

Sources: The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1991; The Netherlands, Parliament, 1993b.

In the past, the typical Dutch policy for disposal of older, mostly outdated equipment was export (see Appendix II). The situation today, however, contains some new elements. First, the restructuring has resulted in much higher numbers of equipment requiring disposal in a very short period. Second, in contrast to the past, this will be relatively modern material that is by no means at the end of its useful life, and in the case of unchanged defense plans would have remained in service for a considerably longer time.

2. REASONS FOR DISPOSAL

A number of specific reasons for disposal of equipment are mentioned in official Dutch documents:

- *CFE obligations.*
- *Redundancy*—disposal of material that was originally planned to be kept in service for a considerably longer period, but that has become redundant as a result of the new defense policy. This includes both relatively new equipment (such as Leopard 2 tanks of about 10 to 15 years old) and older equipment already close to obsolescence (such as 25-year-old, but upgraded, Leopard 1 tanks), but for which replacement is no longer considered.
- *Disposal due to changes in tasks*—for example, drastic reductions in heavy equipment such as tanks, tracked armored vehicles (partly replaced by wheeled armored vehicles), heavy artillery and fighter aircraft (more emphasis is now placed on airlift capability and attack helicopters).
- *Obsolescence*—material that has reached the end of its useful life within the Dutch armed forces and is replaced by more modern equipment. Of course, this is an ongoing process normal to every army. As the Dutch armed forces are designated for use in operations demanding technologically advanced weapon systems, obsolescence within the Dutch defense structure does not necessarily mean obsolescence per se.
- *High exploitation cost* In a few cases, equipment is phased out due to the high costs involved in operating it—either within the Dutch force structure or because the systems have just become too expensive to operate and maintain.

2.1 CFE obligations

With the signing and ratification of the 1990 CFE Treaty, the Netherlands became obligated to dispose of a number of tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery and attack helicopters (see Table 2). As the number of combat aircraft still allowed under the treaty (230) was higher than the number in service (around 200), no combat aircraft had to be eliminated.

Table 2: CFE levels for the Netherlands

	<i>MBTs</i>	<i>Artillery</i>	<i>ACVs</i>	<i>Combat aircraft</i>	<i>Attack helicopters</i>
In service	913	837	1,467	196	91
Cuts	170	230	387	0	22
CFE	743	607	1,080	230	69

Source: The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1991, p. 46.

Before CFE reductions could become effective, they were overshadowed by the more substantial cuts resulting from the restructuring plans; in fact, the CFE obligations have no real influence on the number of Dutch surplus weapons. The CFE obligations do have influence on the method of disposal of certain weapons, however. According to the treaty provisions, treaty limited equipment (TLE) can only be destroyed or given ('cascaded') to NATO allies. Other methods of disposal are barred; sales or gifts to non-NATO states are not legitimate options.

By November 1995, the Netherlands had fulfilled all its CFE reduction obligations through either 'cascading' or destruction (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1996, p. 13). The reductions were accomplished through the disposal of the following:

Tanks: 170 Leopard 1Vs

ACVs: 104 M-113A1s

283 YP-408s

Artillery: 230 M-30 and MO-120-RT-61 mortars, M-101 and M-114 howitzers

Attack helicopters: The Dutch helicopters (SA-316B Alouette III and Bo-105C) were included in the category 'attack helicopters' because of their similarity to armed helicopters in service in other countries (France and Germany). Reductions could occur in a purely administrative way— simply by declaring them unarmed helicopters and thereby moving them out of the attack helicopter category (so-called 'recategorization').

3. DISPOSAL POLICY ON SURPLUS WEAPONS

The Dutch government offers three options for the disposal of surplus material:

- Donation (including to NATO allies)
- Destruction
- Selling or trading in for new equipment

3.1 Donation

The first option has been used primarily for TLE made surplus by the CFE Treaty. The Netherlands has provided NATO allies Portugal and Greece with substantial numbers of main battle tanks (MBTs), armored personnel carriers (APCs) and artillery. These donations were part of agreements within NATO to transfer TLE to the less well-off NATO members, under the so-called ‘cascade’ program. The donations are accounted for in the budget by a special convention for NATO southern flank states (Colijn and Rusman, 1994a, p. 199). Transport costs for the ‘cascade’ program are paid from the NATO Maintenance and Support Agency funds (*Defense News* 16–22 November 1992).

Apparently, this type of disposal is considered to be a special case, more or less forced by the provisions of the CFE Treaty. It is now explicit policy to avoid additional free transfers; in principle, further donations of surplus equipment will only occur when it has a very low value but is still welcome as humanitarian aid (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1996, p. 40; The Netherlands, Parliament, 1992a). Nevertheless, this ‘principle’ seems to have been set aside in some cases. On 15 May 1993, a small amount of military equipment was quickly flown to the former Dutch colony of Surinam, possibly as part of the aid given to the government to prevent a new coup by part of the armed forces. More surplus equipment is planned to be transferred as part of normal military aid to Surinam (Colijn and Rusman, 1994a, pp. 198–199). Early in 1996, Estonia received a donation of 10 field kitchens, 30 generators and over 100 handguns, probably Browning 9mm pistols. The Estonian army made a further request for transport equipment and ammunition (*NRC Handelsblad* 26 February 1996).

Table 3: Donated surplus equipment

<i>Receiver</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Reason</i>
Greece	1V MBT	170	CFE cascade
Greece	1V MBT	2	Gift
Greece	M-30 107mm mortar	171	CFE cascade
Portugal	M-113A2 APC	104	CFE cascade
Portugal	YP-408 APC	22	CFE cascade
Portugal	YP-408 APC	6	Gift
Surinam	Unknown	-	Emergency military aid
Sea cadet corps	Dokkum minehunter	1	Gift
Technical school	SA-316B helicopter	1	Schooling

Sources: The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994b; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1994, 1995; United Nations General Assembly, 1993.

A small amount of equipment has been donated to private organizations—for example, one SA-316B Alouette III helicopter was transferred to a higher technical school and a Dokkum-class minehunter was given to the sea cadets corps. Two Leopard 1V tanks will be used for static display (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995). One F-27M transport aircraft has been kept for an air force museum (*Air Forces Monthly*, May 1996, p. 3).

3.2 Destruction

Destruction within the CFE framework has been limited to the oldest systems (see Table 4). The systems selected for destruction either have seen so much service that they are no longer fit for transfer (even to other NATO partners) or cannot be transferred to allies because they do not have room under their own CFE limits.

Table 4: Items destroyed under CFE obligations

<i>Number</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Destruction year(s)</i>
261	YP-408 APCs	Early 1993–1995
32	M-101A1 105mm towed guns	1993
13	M-114A1 155mm towed guns	1993
7	Thomson Brandt 120mm mortars	1994
7	M-30 107mm mortars	1994

Note: The last two groups of mortars were not originally planned for destruction. However, in 1993 it was found that some of the modernized M-114/39 155mm guns scheduled to remain in service were dangerous to use. Therefore, the last (unmodernized) 14 M-114A1s scheduled for CFE destruction were kept in service, and 14 mortars were destroyed instead.

Sources: The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994b; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1994, 1995; *Algemeen Dagblad*, 30 April 1993.

Another reason for destruction of surplus equipment, in addition to CFE obligations, is that the sale of some items has appeared to be too controversial. This is true for landmines, for example. In 1992, Dutch surplus landmines were offered on the international market for prices ranging from 5 to 80 Dutch guilders (Fl) (Colijn and Rusman, 1993b). As landmines are the subject of a widespread international debate, it was not surprising that on 24 September 1993, the Dutch Foreign Ministry instituted a selective ban on mine exports after questions from parliament. Only countries that had ratified Protocol 11 of the Inhumane Weapons Convention were deemed eligible buyers. Several days later, the Dutch Defense Ministry suspended all sales (Colijn and Rusman, 1994b, pp. 117–139), and early in 1995 it was decided to destroy the surplus landmines. Some problems remained regarding how to destroy them cheaply and in an environmentally friendly manner (Bommels, 1995). Late in 1995, the defense ministries of Belgium and the Netherlands decided to jointly dispose of 393,000 anti-personnel landmines; of these, 180,000 are Dutch AP-22 mines. Costs were expected to be Fl 900,000 for the Netherlands. About 220,000 more Dutch mines—mainly AP-23 anti-personnel mines and some anti-tank mines—were to be destroyed through the ammunition support partnership of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). The total costs for the disposal of the Dutch mines will be around Fl 10 million (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 16 December 1995, p. 10). About 60,000 modern anti-tank mines (of a total inventory of about 140,000) were to be destroyed by the original producer, Bofors (Sweden); however, Bofors found a client for 12,000 of these mines—Canada. The Dutch parliament (despite opposition from the Green left party and the Christian Democrats) gave permission for the deal, which would earn the MoD Fl 4 million (*De Volkskrant*, 28 March 1996).

A third reason for destruction is a lack of interest on the international arms market. This is mainly due to obsolescence, but may be combined with the fact that such weapons have seen heavy use. Of a total of 76 M-110A2/A3 203mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 have been destroyed because they were in very poor condition; it is likely that another 15 will follow (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995). Interestingly, these guns were acquired in the early 1980s or were extensively modified and rebuilt during that period, and were taken out of service only a few years ago. It seems that even those few years of storage were enough to reduce the fairly robust guns to useless scrap iron. Most of the older small arms, such as 50-

year-old M-1 Garand rifles and Bren machine guns and 30-year-old UZI sub-machine guns and FAL rifles, also fall into this category. Apparently no acceptable customers can be found for these weapons, despite very low prices (see Table 8) and reported interest from arms dealers. They are now likely to be destroyed (see Table 5).

Table 5: Items for (probable) destruction

<i>Number</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Reason</i>	<i>Status</i>	<i>Destroyed by mid-1995</i>
45	M-110A2/A3 203mm gun	In poor condition	1995	30
15	Lance carrier		prob./1995	
47	40L70 AA gun	Old; no buyer yet	prob.	
74	M-40A1 106mm RCL	Old	prob./1995	35
141	Mortar 2 inch	Old; no buyer yet	prob./1994	19
436	Machine gun .30	Old; no buyer yet	prob./1995	21
1,949	Bren machine gun	Old; no buyer yet	prob.	
26,600	FAL rifle	Old; no buyer yet	prob./1995	?
8,403	Garand M-1 rifle	Old; no buyer yet	prob./1994	2,860
30,693	Carabine M-1 rifle	Old; no buyer yet	prob./1994	5,092
38,936	UZI sub-machine gun	Old; no buyer yet	prob.	
39,000	Browning 9mm pistol	Old; no buyer yet	prob./1994	21,048
423,779	AP-22/23, AT-26 and DM-31 mines	Export unacceptable	1995	
11,800	Hand grenade incendiary	Export unacceptable	1997	

Note: The 'status' column reflects comments made in the information given to Parliament. 'Prob.' for 'probable' indicates that these weapons were considered difficult to sell, and destruction is probable. The years give the first year of destruction. In the case of the FAL rifle, the information given to Parliament is contradictory, as figures given on FALs for disposal in 1994 and those given in 1995 do not match. Some equipment earmarked for destruction could still be transferred, following the examples of Browning pistols to Estonia or AT-26 mines to Canada.

Sources: The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994b; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1994, 1995

For example, negotiations with a Finnish firm were called off when the Finnish government gave a negative report on the company *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 April 1995, p. 20).

Considering the age of these weapons, it is unavoidable that interest from acceptable customers—such as NATO partners—is minimal. In a world in which plenty of newer, more modern small arms are easily available at relatively low cost, the most likely end-customers for these weapons are cash-ridden, desperate rebel forces or warlords. These are not the kinds of customers the Dutch government would like to supply, and it is surprising that these weapons

were put up for sale in the first place. A similar position to that taken on landmines—i.e., surplus small arms are not for sale—would have been more appropriate.

3.3 Sales

The most common and preferred method of disposal of surplus material is sale (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995). Most of the equipment on offer is 10 to 15 years old and is certainly not technically obsolete. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) strives to recover as much of the investment in now surplus equipment as possible. Although it realizes this is no easy task given the large amounts of used defense equipment currently offered on the world market, the MoD has concluded that efforts to sell surplus weapons must be increased. Specific attention will be placed on the sale of major items such as 3 S frigates (over and above the three already sold to Greece), 36 F-16 fighters, 12 F-27 transport aircraft and Alouette helicopters (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1993b, p. 111).

Toward this end, the Dutch government—or, more precisely, the Ministry of Defense—has been actively promoting its surplus material on the international arms market. Potential buyers (governments acceptable under Dutch arms export regulations) are approached directly via Dutch embassies and defense attaches. Since 1993, potential buyers have received detailed information in the form of an illustrated sales catalogue, “defense equipment for sale” (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994a, p. 42). The Dutch State Secretary for Defense acted as a vendor of surplus equipment during visits to South Africa and several Gulf states, among others (*Die Burger Bladsy*, 11 October 1995; *ANP telex*, 31 March 1994). Only for the 97 Leopard 2 tanks has it been agreed with parliament that there will be no active sales attempts, although it is not clear if this prohibits all sales attempts (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995).

There are several ways to make equipment more attractive. First, there are sales through the defense industry, despite the stated policy of preference for government-to-government sales. If government-to-government sales do not seem to be possible, the defense industry will now be accepted as a buyer of surplus weapons under the condition that companies provide an acceptable end-user. This facilitates more attractive sales packages, including surplus

weapons, technical services and modification. Surplus weapons can also be used as a special offer to enhance new equipment produced by the Dutch defense industry. An example of this is the sale of two Zwaardvis submarines to shipbuilder Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij (Rotterdam Dry-dock Company, RDM), who apparently plans to use them as a kind of free or low-price bonus for potential buyers of their new submarines.

Instead of direct sales to the defense industry, exchanging surplus weapons for other weapons is also considered. To date, this option has been considered only in the cases of the I-HAWK SAM system and some of the SA-316B Alouette III helicopters. The plan is to trade in the I-HAWK SAM system for a number of Crotale NG SAM systems from the French company Thomson-CSF, but this arrangement will only occur if and when Thomson-CSF manages to find a buyer for the ex-Dutch I-HAWK system. Thirty SA-316Bs will be used as partial payment to the French company Eurocopter for the acquisition of 17 AS-532U2 Cougar helicopters by the Dutch Air Force (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995). In both cases, the exchange is just another way of selling, with one possible difference: unlike in the case of a direct sale from the Netherlands, it is unclear what influence the Dutch government has on the final destination of the weapons exchanged and how a sale of ex-Dutch equipment by Thomson-CSF or Eurocopter would be affected by Dutch arms export regulations.

Another method of increasing sales is the MoD's facilitation of refurbishment of weapons for sale, training and initial logistic services. This has become an important element in negotiations with possible buyers (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1995, p. 43). An example is the sale of M-110A2/A3 203mm self-propelled howitzers to Bahrain in 1994, which included the deployment of a six-person Dutch army team to provide the Bahrainis with six months of in-country instruction and technical support. Furthermore, a 16,000-page English language syllabus including 300 slides was produced by the Dutch army to replace a large part of the documentation for the M-110 that had been lost after the gun was decommissioned in 1991. The howitzers also received a major overhaul in army repair shops before delivery (*Defence Weekly*, 2 July 1994). In another example, the sale of Leopard 1Vs to Botswana included training of Botswana military personnel in the Netherlands by the Dutch army (*Telegraaf*, 24 January 1996). Likewise, the sale of 2 Kortenaer frigates to the United Arab

Emirates includes a training package involving the Dutch Navy and retired navy personnel (*Het Parool*, 2 April 1996).

A third method of supporting sales is the possibility of selling reserve equipment before the officially planned disposal date, therefore increasing the flexibility to react to market demand (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1992a). In 1995, it was announced that two Dokkum-class minesweepers were to be removed from the reserve earlier than planned because there were potential buyers. In the case of potential buyers' interest in material planned to be eliminated but still in active service, earlier deactivation may be considered if it is possible (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995; The Netherlands, Parliament, 1993, pp. 64).

In a fourth attempt to make sales more likely, the MoD offers to sell components instead of whole systems. Thus, M-113C&R tracked armored vehicles are offered as the entire vehicle for Fl 150,000, but it is also possible to obtain the turret with its 25mm gun for Fl 75,000, or even the turret without the gun (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 April 1995, p. 20). In 1995, the MoD also considered the option of breaking down surplus F-16 fighter aircraft and selling the parts (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995).

3.4 The Ministry of Defense as an arms dealer

For the MoD, the driving force behind these sales attempts is the fact that revenue proceeds directly to the MoD and will be used to finance part of the investment plans announced in the 1991 and 1993 defense white papers. This was agreed in 1992 with the Ministry of Finance, which normally receives the revenue from the sale of surplus state property. Only Fl 30 million of the yearly revenue from the sale of surplus defense equipment is directed toward general government means. Accordingly, lower than planned revenue will lead to a decrease in the defense budget, whereas higher revenue will benefit the MoD (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1992b, p. 21). This dependency on surplus equipment sales revenue for part of its investment capital has made the MoD very eager to sell. Without these sales, it would not be possible to implement all the defense plans and pay for all the new equipment.

Moreover, it was agreed that the MoD could negotiate independently for all surplus strategic goods with potential buyers, within a price range decided by the Ministry of Finance (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1993a, p. 42)—the MoD was considered the most appropriate body in the light of its technical expertise and its contacts with potential buyers. Within the armed forces, the Directorates of Material act on behalf of the Dutch Treasury to sell the army's surplus weapons (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 April 1995p. 20). Non-strategic goods are turned over to the Ministry of Finance, which sells them through its property management agency (*Dienst der Domeinen*).

Approval for the sale of surplus material must come from the Commission of Sales of Defense Material (*Commissie Verkoop Defensiemateriaal*), in which the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Defense are represented (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1992a). In a limited number of cases the parliament must give approval before sales, but in most cases it is not informed in advance and sales are concluded without parliamentary approval (Van den Berg, 1995).

4. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF DUTCH SURPLUS WEAPON SALES

Financial predictions have been made by the MoD of the expected revenue from the sale of surplus defense goods (see Table 6). These include the sale of such properties as buildings, training grounds and barracks as well as non-strategic goods such as trucks, trailers and food-rations; the division between expected revenue from strategic and from non-strategic goods is not available from official documents. The division between actual revenue from strategic and from non-strategic goods is partially known and is provided in Table 7.

Table 6: Expected revenue from sale of surplus defense property

Figures are in Fl millions

Year in which estimation made ↓	<i>Year for which estimation was made</i>								
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
1992	35	75	260	150	110	-	-	-	-
1993	47.4	119.9	176.5	213.3	217.3	133.5	-	-	-
1994	-	-	87	140	238	219	194	-	-
1995	-	-	-	153	237	219	194	125	-
1996	-	-	-	-	287	244	194	125	130
Franchise	30	30	154	30	30	30	30	30	30

Note: The figures include expected income from all surplus military equipment and real estate. The expected income since 1993 is calculated on the basis of actual sales and principle agreements and on the situation concerning ongoing negotiations (The Netherlands, Parliament, 1995, p. 53). 'Franchise' is the money that will flow to the Ministry of Finance.

Sources: The Netherlands, Parliament, 1993a, 1994a, 1995, 1996 (defense budget proposals)

Table 7: Real revenue from sale of surplus property

Figures are in Fl millions

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Strategic goods only</i>	<i>Value of contracts signed (strategic goods only)</i>
1991	128.3	Total unknown; 33.7 from sales of ammunition to UK during Gulf conflict	
1992	35.3	±8.5	375 ^a
1993	89	38	Much lower than 1994
1994	165	74	277

Notes: ^a For three Kortenaer-class frigates; *Helderse Courant* 2 April 1994. The 'total' column includes non-lethal items such as real estate and trucks. The 'strategic goods' column includes all equipment for which an export license is needed under Dutch export regulations, namely, those systems considered to be real weapons or ammunition.

Sources: The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994b; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1994, 1995

4.1 Prices of items

In several publications, prices have been given for the equipment destined for sale. Table 8 provides target prices that are not exact; in some cases, no target prices have been published due to commercial considerations. It is interesting to observe the decline of target prices over the years and the differences between target prices and real prices. Market conditions apparently forced the MoD to lower its asking prices; in some cases, these decreases have been substantial.

Table 8: Target prices for equipment on sale

<i>Weapon</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>Real price</i>
Zwaardvis		88 million	88 million	- ^a	?
Potvis		(1.5 million) sold	sold	sold	?
Poolster		15 million	sold	sold	9.65 million
Kortenaer		150 million	150 million	150 million	? ^b
Dokkum		500,000 ^f	sold	sold	?
		500,000 ^f	100,000	sold	0 ^d
		300,000 ^e	300,000	300,000	-
				400,000 ^f	-
Leopard 2		(3.75–5.6 million) ^g	-	(2.3–2.7 million) ^h (3.5–4.4 million) ⁱ	-
Leopard 1V	200,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	?
Leopard ARV		1 million	1 million	1 million	?
Leopard BL		1.4 million	sold	sold	1.4 million
YPR-765		400,000– 700,000 ^j	400,000– 700,000	400,000– 700,000	700,000 ^k 400,000 ^l
M-577		120,000	75,000– 120,000	sold	75,000 ^m
M-113A1		30,000 7,500 ⁿ			≈25,000
M-578		..	300,000	300,000	-
M-110A2	300,000– 400,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	?
M-114/39		(400,000)	-	-	-
M-114A1		(70,000)	-	-	-
M-101A1 105mm		(30,000)	-	-	-
MO-120-RT- 61		(100,000)	-	-	-
40L70		100,000	100,000	- ^o	-
M-113C&R		200,000	200,000	200,000 (150,000) ^j	-
M-113C&R turret with 25mm gun		-	-	75,000 ^j	-

F-27M transport	2 million	1 million	1 million	1 million	-
SA-316B	750,000	500,000	500,000	300,000	?
81mm		1,000	1,000	1,000	-
106mm RCL	5,000	2,000	-	-	?
51mm		500	500	500	-
.50*4		5,000	5,000	- ^p	-
.50		5,000	^q	5,000	-
.30		500	500	500	-
Bren		100	100	100	-
YA-440		10,000	9,000	12,500	-
FTF		(50,000)	-	-	?
FTF trailer		(25,000)	-	-	-
YB-616		(15,000)	-	-	-
YB-626		(15,000)	-	-	-
NEKAF		5,000	4,000	5,000	-
Landrover		5,000	5,000	5,000	-
Trailers		(250)	-	-	-
Carabine M-1		100	100	100	-
Browning		75	75	75	-
FAL		250	250	250	-
Garand		100	100	100	-
UZI		200	200	200	-
Mine AP-23/AT-26		(80)	-	-	?
Mine AP-22		(5)	-	-	-
Demolition charge		(30–195) ^f	-	-	-
203mm shells		(500–2,000) ^g	-	-	-
105mm shells		(85–125) ^h	-	-	-
105mm tank shells		(325–1,000) ⁱ	-	-	-
25mm shell		(58)	-	-	-

Notes:

a In October 1995 their value was estimated to be some tens of millions in the case of a sale to South Africa; *De Telegraaf*, 11 October 1995.

b Three ships were sold earlier to Greece for Fl 30 million, 125 million and 120 million each, about 35 percent of the original new price (*Helderse Courant*, 2 April 1994). The quoted price for all three frigates and two Zwaardvis submarines to South Africa is only around Fl 300 million for all, which means—subtracting a few tens of millions for the submarines—about Fl 80 million per frigate (*De Telegraaf*, 11 October 1995). Before anything could come from this offer, two of the three frigates were sold to the United Arab Emirates for Fl 600 million. This price includes a complete refit, new radar, training and other equipment, making the exact price for the two ships unclear. Nonetheless, it seems that the price is much higher than the ‘final offer’ made to South Africa, and is probably around the target price of Fl 150 million per ship (*Het Parool*, 2 April 1996).

c For ship to be disposed of in 1994.

d One ship given away.

e For ships to be disposed of in 1997–1998.

f For two ships originally to be disposed of in 1997–1998, but rescheduled for disposal in 1996.

g Reported as price asked for sale to Sweden (*Svenska Dagbladet*, 27 January 1994).

h As mentioned for possible sale to Austria, although this price was called absurd by a spokesperson of the Dutch MoD (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 26 August 1995, p. 11; *De Telegraaf*, 18 August 1995).

i *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 April 1995, p. 20.

j There are several different versions of the YPR-765.

k For 25 sold to Bahrain (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 April 1995, p. 20).

l For 599 sold to Egypt (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 April 1995, p. 20).

m For 16 sold to Norway (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 April 1995, p. 20).

n For 16 ex-Military Police M-113A1s that have seen heavy use.

o No price given as destruction is probable.

p In the 1993 and 1994 lists, the prices are supposedly for one mounting, but the prices given suggest a per machine gun basis. In the 1995 list, the .50*4 is still mentioned, but with a comment that the machine guns are taken from their mountings and sold separately.

q Not listed in 1994.

r Five different types are offered. Price depends on type.

s Three different types are offered. Price depends on type.

t Five different types of 105mm shells for guns and howitzers are offered. Price depends on type.

u Six different types of 105mm shells for tank guns are offered. Price depends on type.

Sources: Unless otherwise noted *NRC Handelsblad*, 21 December 1992; Colijn and Rusman, 1993b (for 1992 column) and 1994a (for figures in brackets); The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994b; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1994, 1995

5. EXPORT REGULATIONS

Of course, the sale of surplus weapons is restricted by the Dutch regulations on arms exports. Before sales can be made, the human rights situation in the recipient country, potential conflicts in the area and international embargoes must be taken into account. There is also a preference for government-to-government sales.

5.1 Transparency

It is stated Dutch policy that openness in arms imports and exports is of the highest importance. The Netherlands has been a driving force behind the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and in reference to the Register has repeatedly expressed its dedication to the process of transparency. In 1991, the Dutch government agreed to supply the parliament with information on exports of conventional arms earlier and in greater quantity than was formerly the case. The parliament was to be informed of the total value of goods exported, by country (excluding NATO countries), and of large-scale transactions with these countries; it was also supposed to receive detailed reports of every sale of surplus defense material to non-NATO countries. This information was to be provided only on the basis of confidentiality, however (for a more detailed description of Dutch arms export regulations, see Anthony, 1991).

Currently, the parliament receives an overview of items to be disposed of annually. This does not mean that the parliament must be notified of the sale of most surplus equipment prior to an actual deal, however; it must only be informed beforehand in the case of the sale of surplus Zwaardvis submarines, Kortenaer frigates, F-16 fighters and Leopard 2 tanks. In general, details on exports and prices can be kept secret, to protect both the buyers (who do not want publicity) and the business interests of the state by not publishing prices. The parliament has been informed confidentially on several occasions (Buskens, 1995); in most cases, however, it does not have to be informed until one year after a transaction in the case of sales to non-NATO countries and two years after sales to NATO partners. Even then, the information must remain classified (Van den Berg, 1995).

In direct contradiction to its commitment to the UN Register, the Dutch government was unwilling to disclose even the number of Leopard 1Vs sold to Botswana, citing Botswana's desire to keep this information secret (*Leeuwarder Courant* 24 January 1996; *De Telegraaf*, 24 January 1996). This attitude of secrecy is inexplicable, however; regardless of these restrictions, the Leopard 1V requires a report to the UN Register and the numbers sold would be disclosed in the next round of reporting in April 1996.

Even if information on the export of weapons is given openly, the parliament has not demonstrated alertness, and the subject of arms exports apparently is not a favorite of parliamentarians. When in early 1996 several parliamentarians—with arms export matters as part of their assignments—were asked about the export of 611 armored vehicles to Egypt, they reacted with surprise. Although the deal had been concluded in the summer of 1994, they stated that they either had no knowledge of it or had learned of it only recently, and that they would have questioned it had they known earlier. Nonetheless, the second chamber had been asked for approval by the MoD. The parliamentarians' ignorance, although inexcusable, is not a complete surprise: the secretary of defense, in asking for parliamentary approval, had provided full information about the deal in a letter at a rather awkward, or maybe strategic, moment—during the parliamentary summer recess in which those parliamentarians not on vacation were attempting to form a new cabinet. Approval of the deal came automatically when after two weeks the secretary of state had not received an answer from the second chamber (Termeer, 1996).

6. ACTUAL MARKETING AND SALES

Active marketing by the MoD has led to the offer and sale of Dutch surplus defense equipment in almost all corners of the world. A detailed description of the most significant sales attempts is given below. A complete overview of the weapons offered and actual sales may be found in Appendix I.

6.1 Submarines

Several attempts have been made to sell the two Zwaardvis-class submarines, which were decommissioned in 1994 and 1995 and have been put into dry storage. Both boats received a mid-life modernization in the late 1980s, mainly consisting of an upgrade of their electronic systems. The boats are in good condition, and are by no means out-dated. A buyer would have to take into account that the submarines are due for a maintenance overhaul, but both could be ready for service within six months of the contract signature. Their remaining lifetime is estimated to be at least 15 years (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 8 April 1995, pp. 25–26).

The effectiveness of these submarines may be illustrated by a description of one of the last trips of the *Tijgerhaai* in early 1995. In an exercise, it managed to approach an 'enemy' UK-Portuguese task group undetected and cause a 'devastating blow' to it. The subsequent contemplation of this action by the commander of the submarine, Lieutenant-Commander Veen, was piquant: "This shows the effect a relatively cheap diesel-electric submarine can have on a naval force worth over a billion dollars. Think about the threat which is represented by the proliferation of new submarine operators across the world" (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 8 April 1995, p. 25). The Dutch government should indeed consider this threat carefully before selling Veen's submarine for a bargain price.

A number of potential new submarine operators have been offered the Zwaardvis boats. Discussions with Indonesia took place on the sale of the two submarines, together with two newly built Moray submarines from the Dutch shipbuilder RDM. These negotiations had their ups and downs, however, with financing and insuring of the order as the main problems

(*Het Financieele Dagblad* 23 August 1995; *Helderse Courant* 5 July 1994; *De Telegraaf*, 10 June 1994; *Jane's Defence Weekly* 8 October 1994, p. 12). In October 1995, South Africa was said to be interested in replacing her old Daphne-class submarines with the two Zwaardvis-class boats (*De Telegraaf*, 11 October 1995). Reportedly, Taiwan was also interested in the two submarines, as it already has two similar Dutch submarines. Since the 1984 sale, however, the Netherlands has instituted a policy of not supplying Taiwan with more military equipment in order to avoid damaging relations with mainland China. Despite positive comments from some parliamentarians, the Dutch government has stressed that it does not intend to change that policy (*De Volkskrant*, 27 December 1995; *Trouw*, 28 December 1995).

In December 1995, the two submarines were sold to the Dutch submarine-builder RDM for an undisclosed sum. The exact plans RDM has for the submarines are unknown; however, it was suggested that RDM may offer the boats to Thailand as part of its combined bid with the UK company VSEL to supply two or three newly constructed Moray submarines. The older Zwaardvis could immediately be used for training, thereby easing the introduction of the Moray at a later date (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 31 January 1996). In a similar way, Sweden recently sold a used submarine to Singapore (*Military Technology*, November 1995, p. 69)

6.2 Frigates

In the first round of reductions in 1991, two Kortenaer-class frigates were cut from the force. One more was cut in 1992, while three were earmarked for early retirement (*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 21 September 1991, p. 500). The first three were sold to Greece in 1993 for Fl 375 million, payable over eight years—starting with Fl 20 million in 1993 and increasing to Fl 90 million in 1995. This sale is reported to include Seasparrow surface-to-air and Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles, but did not include the Goalkeeper CIWS (*Defense News* 16–22 November 1992; *Financial Times*, 10 November 1992; *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 August 1992). As mentioned above, Greece has bought and has been given large amounts of Dutch surplus weapons; little consideration was given to the possible impact of sales of military equipment to an area of tension.

Of the other three frigates, one was taken out of service and mothballed in 1995, while the last two were to follow in 1996. In October 1995, the Ministry of Defense announced that South Africa was interested; the ships were offered with most weapon systems on board, including the US-produced Harpoon missile launchers (*De Telegraaf*, 11 October 1995; *NAVINT*, 3 November 1995, p. 1). In February 1996, the ministries involved agreed in principle to give an export license if the three remaining frigates were sold to South Africa for a reported price of around Fl 80 million each, including training (*De Telegraaf*, 10 February 1996).

Reported interest from the United Arab Emirates for two of the ships at first led to nothing (*ANP telex*, 31 March 1994; *Helderse Courant*, 1 April 1994). In April 1996, however, it came to light that negotiations had been ongoing, and that on 4 April a contract had been signed for the sale of two frigates at a total of around Fl 600 million. This price includes a major refit and modification by RDM (creating 250,000 man hours of work), simulators and new radar from Hollandse Signaal, two small tugs from Damen Shipyard, and training of the Emirates' crews by the Dutch Navy and retired navy personnel. With this order, RDM may be in a good position to obtain a follow-up order for several new frigates for which US, French and British companies are also competing (*De Volkskrant*, 4 April 1996; *Parool*, 2 April 1996; *De Telegraaf*, 4 April 1996). The sale of the frigates is a good example of how the defense industry and the MoD can cooperate and combine the sale of surplus and new weapons. The Dutch parliament was not informed about the sale beforehand.

6.3 Leopard 1V

After 172 Leopard 1Vs were given to Greece, 265 remained to be sold. An undisclosed number, assumed to be about 52 (including two training tanks without turrets), was sold in 1995 to Botswana. This deal also included 50 M-40A1 106mm recoilless guns, 279 DAF YA-4440 4-ton trucks and ammunition. It also involved a non-disclosure arrangement, and parliament was not officially informed of the transaction. Reportedly, the deal is worth Fl 23 million, although no official information has been released (*The Netherlands Defence Weekly* 10 January 1996; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995). The ministers of defense, foreign affairs

and economic affairs agreed on the deal, while Minister of Development Cooperation Pronk disagreed. Although he is not a member of the Commission of Sales of Defense Equipment—and therefore has no say in defense exports—he protested the fact that the costs would be higher than the development aid given to Botswana by the Netherlands in 1994. In his opinion, and in those of several members of parliament, developing countries should restrain their defense expenditures.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Mierlo, on the other hand, argued that there were no real objections to supplying weapons to Botswana. The country is not in an area of potential conflict, and there is little risk that the Botswana government will use the weapons against its own people as the country is believed to be a relatively stable democracy. Furthermore, Van Mierlo argued that if African countries were to take more responsibility for peace operations in their own region, it should be possible for them to acquire the means to do so (*Algemeen Dagblad*, 5 October 1995). He did not explain how MBTs could be of use in such peace operations, and he did not mention the fact that the Dutch army is specifically procuring light-wheeled vehicles because they are much better suited to the new peace-keeping tasks than are MBTs.

When members of parliament discovered the deal through unofficial channels, they asked for an explanation from the cabinet and a decision on the deal was briefly postponed. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation were supposed to discuss the deal before a ‘green light’ would be given (*Algemeen Dagblad*, 5, 6 and 7 October 1995). In December 1995, the cabinet gave its approval for the transaction and the weapons are due to arrive in Botswana after early 1996 (*NRC Handelsblad*, 7 December 1995).

Another potential client for a large portion of the Leopard 1V tanks was Brazil. Early in 1995, a ‘tank battle’ between Belgium and the Netherlands raged: both countries tried to fulfill a Brazilian order for an undisclosed number of tanks by offering their surplus Leopard 1Vs. The Dutch offer was made in cooperation with RDM Engineering, a Dutch company involved in upgrading armored vehicles and howitzers among other things. In the case of a sale, RDM would have performed the modernization, which presumably would have cost much more than

the approximately Fl 100,000 the Dutch MoD wanted for the tanks (*De Volkskrant*, 18 January 1995; *Jane's Defence Weekly* 28 January 1995). In mid-1995 it was reported that the Brazilian army was planning to accept a Belgian offer (*Defense News*, 31 July-6 August 1995), although by late 1995 there was still no confirmation. Malaysia and Thailand were also reported to have shown interest in the Leopard 1Vs (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 April 1995).

6.4 Leopard 2

There is no active sales policy for the Leopard 2 tank, as has been agreed with the parliament. Nevertheless, there have been reports of interest in these relatively new and modern tanks. The hope of selling the 115 tanks to Sweden was quickly shattered when Germany undercut the Dutch offer by about 80 percent—they asked only 2.5 million Swedish Krona (SEK) as opposed to the SEK 16–24 million offer for the Dutch tanks, an excellent example of the fierce international competition that exists (*Svenska Dagbladet*, 27 January 1994). Denmark was mentioned as another interested candidate (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 15 April and 26 August 1995). Several times in 1995 it was reported that Austria was negotiating over the acquisition of all 115 Leopard 2s; the deal was said to be worth about Fl 310 million. It is still unclear whether Austria would buy the tanks from the Dutch government or the original German producer, Krauss Maffei, would buy them from the Netherlands and resell them to Austria; Krauss Maffei could also act as an agent between both governments, with the idea of selling services and updates to Austria (*Military Technology*, October 1995; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 and 26 August 1995). The extent of the Austrian interest is also ambiguous. According to a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, Austria was interested early in the year, but nothing has been heard since then (*De Telegraaf*, 18 August 1995).

During the year, the number of Leopard 2s that needed to be disposed of, and therefore the maximum amount sellable to Austria, was brought down to 97. Eighteen surplus tanks will be rebuilt for use in the Dutch army as mine-clearing tanks (The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1995; *Jane's Defence Weekly* 31 January 1996).

6.5 M-109

In 1995, 87 surplus M-109 self-propelled guns were sold to the United Arab Emirates. The contract was secured over competition with Belgium, which had also offered surplus M-109s. Under a Fl 53 million contract, the Dutch company RDM Technology will overhaul and upgrade 85 M-109s. The upgrade includes new Swiss ordnance and a nuclear, biological and chemical warfare (NBC) system. The work is scheduled to be completed in 1999. *Jane's Defence Weekly* 9 September 1995, p. 23). It has been called a prime example of how the Royal Netherlands Army wants to arrange the sale of surplus equipment, because it is a government-to-government sale with strong involvement by Dutch industry. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 April 1995, p. 20). The only M-109s remaining for sale are five training vehicles.

6.6 YPR-765

A large number of YPR-765 armored vehicles in different versions (APCs, PRAT with TOW anti-tank missiles, etc.) were disposed of by the MoD. They are between 10 and 20 years old and many are in good condition, despite being stored for several years. *Military Technology* September 1994). The target price for these relatively new and modern vehicles is about Fl 400,000–700,000.

In 1994, 599 were sold to Egypt. Although Egypt lies in a conflict area and is plagued by internal unrest—and therefore was not an accepted recipient for Dutch weaponry in the past—the reactions in the parliament to this sale were minimal. The main objection was made by the Christian Democrats, who were worried that the Dutch army would lose too much military hardware “when geopolitical instability is causing increased concern about potential conflicts” (*Jane's Defence Weekly* 5 March 1994). The same lack of parliamentary interest was shown in the sale of 25 AIFVs to “an undisclosed Arab state,” apparently Bahrain. This is yet another example of secretiveness that would be undone by the 1996 Dutch report to the UN arms register.

6.7 F-16

In early 1996, it was reported that the Dutch government had offered its surplus F-16 fighters to Poland in mid-1995. According to the Dutch embassy in Warsaw, the Netherlands was prepared to sell the aircraft for only about Fl 10 million each. With its offer, the Dutch government undercut a US F-16 offer to Poland of about US \$10 million each by roughly 50 percent. In early 1996, the Dutch offer had been repeated but negotiations had not yet started (*Twentsche Courant* 12 February 1996).

6.8 Non-strategic surplus equipment

Large amounts of surplus non-strategic equipment were sold via the Ministry of Finance through auctions open to the general public. This equipment included trucks, landrovers, and jeeps. Most of this equipment was sold within the Netherlands to private persons for civilian use. Nonetheless, some of it ended up in Croatia in early 1992—via a Dutch second-hand dealer and German intermediaries—and was used for military purposes (Colijn and Rusman, 1993a, p. 160).

7. CONCLUSION

In the last few years, significant amounts of the Dutch armed forces' equipment have become surplus. Only relatively small quantities of mainly obsolete small arms have been destroyed. Some of the equipment has been given away to NATO allies, but most of it has been offered for sale on the international arms market. Customers are sought all over the world, and a significant portion of the surplus material has already been sold.

Nevertheless, it is not easy to sell in today's overcrowded arms market, in which demand is low, industry is frantically trying to sell new equipment and many governments are attempting to sell massive amounts of surplus weapons. The pressure rises even more when the revenue is needed for future investment plans, as is the case for the Dutch MoD. In order to sell its equipment, the Dutch government has already reduced prices. Given that Egypt and Bahrain are among the buyers of Dutch surplus weapons, it also seems that the restraint shown in the past regarding exports to areas of possible conflict has diminished. In addition, the ideas that arose during and immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—i.e., one should avoid destabilizing or excessive arms build-ups such as that witnessed in Iraq during the 1980s—also seem to have been overpowered by the push for sales.

In sum, Dutch foreign policy, while on the one hand trying to promote the principle of restraint in arms exports, has on the other hand had no qualms about selling massive amounts of weapons to tension areas or trying to get rid of equipment considered dangerous for proliferation. Parliamentary control has proven to be largely ineffective due to the lack of both interest and timely information on sales¹.

¹ The authors would like to thank Mr. E. A. Buskens for his help in obtaining official Dutch documents.

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Appendix I: List of Surplus Equipment for Sale

Numbers destroyed as of mid-1995; numbers sold as of April 1996; years in parentheses are uncertain

<i>Item</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Production year</i>	<i>Available for sale</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Air Force				
F-16A/B fighter	36	1978–1981	1996 + 2000	Also offered in parts
F-27M transport	12	1959–1960	1994–1996 + 1999	1 given to museum
SA-316B Alouette III helicopter	61	(1964–1966)	1994–1999	30 traded in with French Eurocopter; 1 given to a school; 2 or 3 sold to Chad
HAWK SAM system	8	1962–1976 ^d	1994	Possible trade-in with French Thomson-CSF
Navy				
Zwaardvis submarine	2	1972 ^b	1995	Sold to RDM shipyard
Kortenaer frigate	6	1975–1983	1993–1996	3 sold to Greece, 2 sold to United Arab Emirates
Dokkum MCM ship	8	1954–1956	1994–1998	1 sold to Peru; 1 given to sea cadets corps
Poolster supply ship	1	1964	1994	Sold to Pakistan
Tromp frigate	2	1975–1976	(2002–2003)	
Army				
Leopard 2 MBT	97	1982–1986	1996–1998	
Leopard 1 MBT	436	1969–1972 ^e		172 given to Greece; 52 sold to Botswana; 2 kept for static display
Leopard 1 ARV	21	1972	1993–1996	14 sold to Denmark; 5 to unknown buyer
Leopard AEV	8	1972	1996–1998	
Leopard 1 bridge-laying tank	8	1972	1994–1995	8 sold to Denmark
PRTL/Gepard	25	1972–1979	1995–1996 + 1998	-
YPR-765 ACV ^d	664	1974–1987	1994–1996 + 1999	25 or 27 sold to Bahrain; 599 sold to Egypt
M-113A1 APC	281	1965–1974	1992–94	104 given to Portugal; 177 sold to Greece
M-113C&R reconnaissance vehicle	266	1966–1967 ^e	1994 + 1996 + 2000	Turrets and 25mm guns also offered separately
M-577 APC	38	1965	1994–1995	16 sold to Norway; 12 sold to Egypt; 3 sold to Bahrain; 7 sold to unknown buyer
M-578 ARV	25	1965		2 sold to Bahrain
YP-408 APC	289	1964–1968	1992–1994	28 given to Portugal; 261 destroyed
Lance carrier	15	1975–1976	1994	For destruction
FTF truck	38	1973–1975		
FTF trailer	43	1966–1967		Some sold to civilians
YA-4440 truck	3,100 ^f	1978–1979	1994–1998	279 sold to Botswana; others sold to civilians
YB-616 recovery vehicle	242 ^f	(1961)		
YB-626 recovery vehicle	68	(1961)		
Land rover light vehicle	1,750	(1980)	1994–1997	Some sold to civilians
NEKAF M-38A1 light vehicle	2,000	1955–1962	1994–1997	Some sold to civilians
Trailers	6,143	(1960-1970)		Some sold to civilians
Water trailers	1,013	(1960-1970)		Some sold to civilians
M-106A1/107mm APC/mortar carrier	53	1965	1992	Sold to Greece
M-114A1 155mm towed gun	38	1943–1946	1993–1994	13 destroyed under CFE
M-114/39 155mm towed gun	30	1990 ^e	1993–1995	1 sold to RDM

M-110A2 203mm self-propelled gun	76	1966–1983 ^d		30 destroyed; 13 sold to Bahrain
M-109A2/3 15mm self-propelled gun	92 ⁱ	1963–(1983) ^j	1995–1996	87 sold to United Arab Emirates (Dubai ?)
M-101A1 105mm towed gun	41	1942–1945	1993–1994	32 destroyed under CFE; 4 sold to Brazil through RDM
MO-120-RT-61 120mm mortar	74	1966	1994–1997	7 destroyed under CFE
M-30 107mm mortar	178		1992–1993	171 given to Greece under CFE; 7 destroyed under CFE
2 inch mortar	141	1942–1945	1994	19 destroyed
81mm mortar	155	1958	1994–1997	
M-40A1 RCL	182	(1955)	1994–1996 + 1999	35 destroyed; 50 sold to Botswana; 48 sold to unknown buyer
40L70 AA gun	47	(1957)	1994	
.50 M-55A1 AA gun	92	1942–1945	1994	2 sold to unknown buyer; 90 mountings destroyed, but .50 machine guns still on sale
.50 machine gun	300	(1942–1945)	1994	
.30 machine gun	436	1942–1945	1994	21 destroyed
Bren machine gun	1,949	1942–1945	1994–1998	
FAL rifle	15,000	1960–(1965)	1994–1998	Unknown number destroyed
M-1 Garand rifle	8,400	1942–1945	1994–1998	2,860 destroyed
Carabine M-1 rifle	30,693	1942–1945	1994–1998	5,092 destroyed
UZI sub-machine gun	25,000	1964–1965	1994–1998	
Browning 9mm pistol	39,097	1946–1948	1994–1998	21,048 destroyed; 100+ given to Estonia
Mines	423,779	(1973)	1996	12,000 AT-26s sold to Canada; rest for destruction
Demolition charges	54,020	1973–1979		
105mm howitzer shells	14,970	(1973)		
25mm shells	745,000	(1974)		
105mm tank-gun shells	105,200	1973–(1985)		Large numbers sold to Botswana, Greece, Italy, Denmark and Germany
105mm practice shells	16,500	(1973)		
203mm shells	59,155	1973–1988		# sold to Bahrain
203mm charges	43,974	(1973)		# sold to Bahrain
203mm fuses	44,200	1983–1987		# sold to Bahrain
Hand grenades	11,800		1997	For destruction
KL/MSS-3012 AA gun	42	(1963)	(1993)	
fire control radar				

Notes:

a All systems were modernized several times during the 1970s and 1980s.

b Extensively modernized in 1988–1989.

c All modified from Leopard 1 to Leopard 1V in 1980s.

d Including around 325 in AIFV version, and 150 PRAT version with TOW anti-tank missile turret (Het Parool, 22 July 1994).

e All modified with new 25mm turret in mid-1970s.

f This is the figure given in 1993. In 1994 and 1995, changes were made, but the new figures are not clear.

g Original M-114A1 guns completely rebuilt to M-114/39s around 1990.

h The older M-110s were modernized and modified to M-110A2/A3s in the early 1980s.

i Including around 7 M-109s without turrets, used for driving lessons.

j The older M-109s were all modernized to M-109A3s in the early 1980s.

Sources: Colijn and Rusman, 1994a; The Netherlands, Parliament, 1994b; The Netherlands, Ministry of Defense, 1994, 1995; other sources as given earlier in the text and notes.

Appendix II:

Dutch Exports of Surplus Major Conventional Weapons, 1970–1990

Year(s) of deliveries include aggregates of all deliveries since the beginning of the contract

<i>Recipient</i>	<i>No. ordered</i>	<i>Weapon designation</i>	<i>Weapon description</i>	<i>Year of order</i>	<i>Year(s) of deliveries</i>	<i>No. delivered</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Austria	120	Centurion Mk-5	Main battle tank	1984	1985–1986	(120)	Ex-Dutch Army; deal worth \$16 million; for use in static fortress role
Ethiopia	1	Dokkum class	Minesweeper	1973	1973	1	Ex-Dutch Navy
France	6	Atlantique 1	ASW/ maritime patrol	1985	1986	6	Ex-Dutch Navy
Greece	10	F-104G Starfighter	Fighter	(1982)	1982	10	Ex-Dutch Air Force; aid
	6	F-84F Thunderstreak	Fighter/ ground attack	(1969)	1971	6	Ex-Dutch Air Force; aid
	11	NF-5A Freedom Fighter	Fighter/ ground attack	1991	1991	11	Ex-Dutch Air Force; incl. NF-5B trainer version; aid
	3	T-33A T-bird	Jet trainer	(1971)	1972	3	Ex-Dutch Air Force; aid
Indonesia	10	Wasp HAS-1	Helicopter	1981	1981–1982	10	Ex-Dutch Navy
	(50)	AMX Mk-61 105mm	Self-propelled gun	(1984)	1986–1987	(50)	Ex-Dutch Army
	(130)	AMX-13-105	Light tank	(1978)	1978–1979	(130)	Ex-Dutch Army; refurbished before delivery
	(199)	AMX-VCI	APC	(1976)	1977–1978	(100)	Ex-Dutch Army; refurbished before delivery
	4	Van Sepijk class	Frigate	1986	1986–1988	4	Ex-Dutch Navy
	2	Van Sepijk class	Frigate	1989	1989	2	Ex-Dutch Navy
Mexico	7	T-33A T-bird	Jet trainer	1972	1972	(7)	Ex-Dutch Air Force; incl. 3 attrition replacements and 4 for spares
Oman	2	Dokkum class	Minesweeper	1974	1974	2	Ex-Dutch Navy
Peru	1	De Ruyter class	Cruiser	1976	1977	1	Ex-Dutch Navy; refitted to helicopter cruiser before delivery
	1	De Ruyter class	Cruiser	1973	1973	1	Ex-Dutch Navy
	1	Dokkum class	Minesweeper	1994	1994	1	Ex-Dutch Navy; for use as survey ship
	7	Friesland class	Destroyer	1980	1980–1982	7	Ex-Dutch Navy
	1	Holland class	Destroyer	1978	1978	1	Ex-Dutch Navy
	2	Van Straelen class	Minesweeper	(1985)	2985	2	Ex-Dutch Navy

Surinam	5	YP-408	APC	(1975)	1975	5	Ex-Dutch Army; aid; handed over upon independence
Turkey	53	F-104G Starfighter	Fighter	(1980)	1980–1983	(53)	Ex-Dutch Air Force; aid; incl. 10 TF-104G trainer versions
	24	F-104G Starfighter	Fighter	1987	1988	24	Ex-Dutch Air Force; aid
	60	NF-5A Freedom Fighter	Fighter/ground attack	1987	1989–1992	(60)	Ex-Dutch Air Force; aid; incl. NF-5B trainer version
Venezuela	1	NF-5A Freedom Fighter	Fighter/ground attack	1988	1991	1	Ex-Dutch Air Force; deal worth \$66.8 million incl. 6 F-5B fighter/trainers; refurbished before delivery
	6	NF-5B Freedom Fighter	Fighter/trainer	1988	1991	6	Ex-Dutch Air Force; deal worth \$66.8 million incl. 1 NF-5A fighter; refurbished before delivery

Source: SIPRI database

Appendix III: Acronyms

ACV	Armored Combat Vehicle (CFE term)
AEV	Armored Engineer Vehicle
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
ARV	Armored Recovery Vehicle
CIWS	Close-In Weapon System
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe (treaty)
Fl	Dutch guilder
MBT	Main Battle Tank
MoD	Ministry of Defense (Dutch <i>Ministerie van Defensie</i>)
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (warfare)
RDM	<i>Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij</i> (Rotterdam Dry-dock Company)
TLE	Treaty Limited Equipment (CFE term)
VSEL	Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering Limited