

Innovation in reintegration programming:

Which approaches can be relevant for South Sudan?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This *Paper* offers a comparative overview of innovation found (globally) specific to reintegration programming, and it reflects upon the utility of these innovative approaches in the socio-political context of South Sudan. It intends to facilitate discussion and development of a context-specific and fit-for-purpose reintegration programme in South Sudan once peace has been restored in the country by providing a toolbox of options, which may be used by policymakers in future to make informed decisions.

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MAIN FINDINGS

Finding effective methods to transition excess forces to productive civilian lives is necessary to overcome the current crisis in South Sudan

In the Republic of South Sudan, the current situation related to armed forces and groups presents both a pressing and daunting challenge. The level of militarization in the country was troublingly high at independence in 2011 and has only increased in scope and complexity since conflict reemerged in 2013. Since that time, the Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Government (SPLA-IG) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) have both recruited significantly. Other armed non-state actors (ANSA) including splinter groups from the formal forces, informal groups encouraged either directly or indirectly by the formal groups, local militias, vigilante groups and cattle raiders, too, have proliferated and metastasized.

To achieve a peaceful and productive state, there is an imminent need for a new, coordinated and sensible path forward to reduce the militarization in South Sudan. This is without a doubt a challenging endeavour, but finding effective methods to transition excess forces to productive civilian lives while also transforming the military to a professional and accountable force are core and necessary elements if the country wishes to emerge from this crisis. This *Paper* focuses specifically on potential approaches for transitioning former fighters to productive civilians including the tools of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR), in the following referred to as DDR.

Policymakers need to rethink past DDR approaches in South Sudan, as these were largely ineffective

The approaches used to date to transform South Sudan's security sector and to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants back into society have been unsuccessful and have not effectively created stability for the country's citizens. There is, therefore, a need to rethink the approaches taken rather than to simply reapply the same. This rethink should:

- a) Bring to the discussion a fresh perspective in considering new, non-traditional or innovative approaches which may lead to better outcomes;
- b) Critically and realistically assess why security sector reform (SSR), military transformation and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) interventions in South Sudan did not achieve their goals in the past; and
- c) Take into account the lessons learned in those experiences in determining a new path forward.

Reintegration has to be an integral part-of any security and demilitarization approach.

On a global level, one such area where years of learning have resulted in a different, more effective approach is a relative greater focus on reintegration within DDR. Countries have

learned that “the sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants” is “the ultimate objective of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (IDDRS, 2006). In other words, if reintegration is ineffective, the entire exercise of DDR will fail. Therefore, this *Paper* focuses on how reintegration can and should be rethought in the context of South Sudan. While often tabled for discussion at a later time, and by default becoming an afterthought in the overall work, understanding and planning for reintegration should be part-and-parcel with the initial planning of any security and demilitarization approach to be employed.

Right now, South Sudan, however, does not seem ready to consider demilitarization. The conflict is ongoing, and government and opposition forces use violence despite various ceasefire pledges. The 2015 peace agreement has stalled, and due to constant tensions, the South Sudanese political elites have little appetite to move away from their ‘Big Tent Policy’. This policy, in essence, offers armed groups to be integrated into the security sector in exchange for political submittal. Given the lack of genuine political will to downsize the country’s security forces and to promote demilitarization, it seems untimely to address reintegration issues at the given moment. At the same time, it is never too early to prepare for that crucial moment in time when South Sudan is finally ready to deal with its large number of excess forces and the vast number of militias active in the country.

Innovation in reintegration programming is possible on many levels

A common adage in writing is that any good piece must address “who, what, where, when, why and how.” Programming developers contemplating about potential reintegration measures to be applied in South Sudan must answer these same questions but rather in the order of: “why, what, who, when, where and how.” This is addressed by exploring:

the programming objectives (Why?),

- \ the programming elements (What?),
- \ the programming implementation design
 - beneficiary service models (Who?)
 - timing and sequencing (When?)
 - service location models (Where?)
 - service delivery models (How?)

Of the wide spectrum of available options in achieving successful reintegration of former combatants, some appear to have significant potential in addressing South Sudan’s current intricate challenges while others are not a good fit due to differing realities from the places or settings in which they were successfully applied.

Programmes that only include economic measures are insufficient

Looking at programming elements (**What?**) the highest potential is to look at a programme of holistic services, hybrid models or combination programming. Programmes

that address behavioral change with wrap around additional elements show particularly significant reintegration potential in South Sudan. Programmes that only include economic measures are highly likely to be insufficient as seen both in related programming and due to the context and lessons learned from South Sudan specifically. The following stand out for having the greatest potential relevance for South Sudan (for a detailed discussion of these programmes please see the chapters below):

- \ Agricultural leaning holistic programmes such as the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) by Action on Armed Violence (AoAV) or an adjusted version of the Yo Cambio programme, which is a youth violence prevention project that combines work training, institutional strengthening, gang member rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes.
- \ Holistic and community-centred programming focused on social cohesion, rehabilitation, and economic opportunity such as the Centre Résolution Conflicts (CRC) programming.
- \ Mobile cash transfers with behavioural therapy as provided in the Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia (STYL) programme.

Additionally, specific programming elements, which have been improved through programming pilots and show potential to be incorporated into such a combination programme in South Sudan include:

- \ Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Trauma and Psychosocial Programming such as the Narrative Exposure Therapy and variants such as the FORNET programme in Burundi.
- \ Integrating entrepreneurship and financial literacy into any offered livelihood training such as in the government of South Sudan's 2013-2014 Pilot DDR's integrated training model.
- \ Youth-focused peace education, civic education, youth peace clubs and peer-to-peer discussions such as the youth peace clubs implemented in Burundi by Action for Peace and Development (APD) and the peer education programme for peace: Aware Girls.

In South Sudan there is a history of disappointment associated with the term DDR

Moving to programming implementation design a clear recommendation for South Sudan is to explore alternate terminology than DDR. DDR is simply a set of tools to be used as needed, however, in South Sudan there is a history of disappointment and complex expectations associated with the term, therefore alternate terminology may be more useful.

Flexible Sequencing wherein reintegration services are provided followed by the disarmament and demobilization could be effective

Looking at sequencing and timing (**When?**), many options could be effective in South Sudan. These include:

- \ Interim Stabilization Measures such as an ex-combatant public works scheme, which could be sequenced together with a reintegration programme, and could serve as a quick-start element of a larger programme. However, history has shown this is not equivalent to reintegration and if not paired with true reintegration programming, it can simply create a holding pattern from which the ex-combatants are easily remobilized.
- \ Flexible sequencing wherein reintegration services are provided followed by the disarmament and demobilization (for formal forces). This is particularly aligned with community-based approaches and is a way to build trust with informal fighting forces such as militias.
- \ Programming offered during ongoing conflict also has potential particularly when thinking about the less formal armed groups. However, as the conflict continues local militias continue to have the same drive for local protection and thus would be extremely likely to reform if needed and for the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO such programming may be inefficient given the large numbers of soldiers that will eventually need to be served.

Hybrid models where certain elements are targeted to the individual ex-combatants and others are broadly offered to the community have high potential

Turning to beneficiary models (**Who?**), a very challenging and delicate question emerges, as the tense social relations in the country at this time must be taken into account.

- \ Communities are less likely to be amenable to ex-combatants receiving services while communities are left out. At the same time, combatants have honed their fighting skills and will be able to repurpose those skills toward mayhem if left unaddressed. Therefore, the highest potential is found in looking at a hybrid model where certain elements are targeted to the individual ex-combatants and others are broadly offered to the community and potentially also to ex-combatants. Providing services to the families of ex-combatants is an approach that shows potential in providing a safety net for the ex-combatants and therein strengthening the likelihood of successful reintegration.
- \ For any programme, better force size estimates will be required and will need to be surveyed. In addition, different armed groups need to be profiled to ascertain their reasons for taking up arms. Some reasons for taking arms could be matched up with reintegration options/design.
- \ There will also be an important decision point in looking at how to best address youth in this programme. The large numbers of youth that have been mobilized raises an often discussed challenge of how best to serve youth – whether through a child or adult DDR programme, or through a youth-at-risk approach.
- \ For the unofficial fighting groups it will need to be determined if they are included in this programming or addressed through a different mechanism. Due to the proliferation of such groups and their impact on the country it is unrealistic to leave them unaddressed.

Services need to be, where possible, provided as locally as possible.

Regarding service location **(Where?)** developmentally it is encouraged to provide services as locally as possible. However, given the destruction of infrastructure including training facilities, the ongoing instability and encumbered access to local areas at this time, it is likely that a hybrid model of services provided at centralized facilities for targeted ex-combatant aspects of the programme and then at the communities for the services available to community members is the most realistic approach possible. The decisions made on service location have major impacts on both budget and timing and must be made with great care.

Reintegration is most effective if streamlined with other development and recovery programming

Looking at programming service delivery **(How?)**, due to the destruction of services and facilities since 2013 from already very constrained levels, models that depend extensively on referral to other services are unrealistic in South Sudan. Therefore, programming is primarily likely to need to be implemented through specifically contracted services: i.e. contracting international NGOs, local NGOs or work with civil society groups to implement the work. However, all such organizations should be encouraged to partner with government entities and facilities where feasible and any facilities or services developed for this programme should be designed to streamline with other development and recovery programming so the facilities may be handed over and utilized sustainably by the appropriate ministries in the future.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the Republic of South Sudan the current situation related to armed forces and groups presents both a pressing and daunting challenge. The level of militarization in the country was troublingly high at independence in 2011 and has only increased in scope and complexity since conflict re-emerged in 2013. Since that time, the Sudan People's Liberation Army–In Government (SPLA-IG) and Sudan People's Liberation Army–In Opposition (SPLA-IO) have both recruited significantly. In addition armed non-state actors (ANSA) including splinter groups from the formal forces, informal groups encouraged either directly or indirectly by the formal groups, local militias, vigilante groups and cattle raiders have proliferated and metastasized.

To achieve a peaceful and productive state, there is an imminent need for a new, coordinated and sensible path forward to reduce the militarization in South Sudan. This is without a doubt a challenging endeavour, but finding effective methods to transition excess forces to productive civilian lives while also transforming the military to a professional and proportional military force are core and necessary elements if the country wishes to emerge from this crisis. This *Paper* focuses specifically on potential approaches for transitioning former fighters to productive civilians including the tools of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

The approaches used to date to transform South Sudan's security sector and to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants back into society have been unsuccessful and have not effectively created stability for the country.

There is, therefore, a need to rethink the approaches taken rather than to simply reapply the same. This rethink should:

- \ Bring to the discussion a fresh perspective in considering new, non-traditional or innovative approaches which may lead to better outcomes;
- \ Critically and realistically assess why Security Sector Reform (SSR), military transformation, and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) interventions in South Sudan did not achieve their goals in the past; and
- \ Carry forward the lessons learned in those experiences in determining a new path forward.

As previous DDR and SSR programmes in South Sudan have not been effective in sustainably changing South Sudan's security apparatus and contributing to lasting peace, it is critical to draw out the lessons that were learned through those efforts, to think as creatively as possible on what approaches could be more effective, to ensure that the chosen approaches are applicable in the context of South Sudan and to pull together the best from all potential programming avenues.

One such area where years of learning have resulted in a different, more effective approach is a relative greater focus on reintegration within DDR. Countries have learned that “the sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants” is “the ultimate objective of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (United Nations, 2006). In other words, if reintegration is ineffective, the entire exercise of DDR fails. Therefore, this *Paper* focuses on how reintegration can and should be rethought in the context of South Sudan. While often tabled for discussion at a later time, and by default becoming an afterthought in the overall work, understanding and planning for reintegration should be part-and-parcel with the initial planning of any security and demilitarization approach to be employed in future.

1.1. Objectives and use of this publication

This *Paper* analyses innovative and non-traditional reintegration approaches and their applicability in the South Sudanese context by:

- a) Providing a comparative overview of innovation found specific to reintegration programming including in objectives, elements, and implementation. This could be innovation in regard to the approach used, the combination of elements, unique implementation or other aspects that identify it as a new approach. This also reflects on the evolution of knowledge and lessons learned from other countries within the field of DDR; and
- b) Critically reflecting upon the pros and cons of these approaches against the background of the current situation in South Sudan.

This *Paper* draws from the field of DDR, as well as reaching the correlated disciplines of veteran’s support, young adult and youth-at-risk, gang-member re-entry, IDP/refugee reintegration and criminal offender re-entry. It looks to provide a toolbox of reintegration options from which policy makers may make informed decisions in the development of a sustainable reintegration approach within the overarching future demilitarization strategy for South Sudan.

1.2. Evolution of knowledge within the field of DDR

As long as there have been wars, there have been various approaches suggested on how best to successfully segue to peace-time, including the return and reintegration of former combatants. In fact, DDR is widely considered a critical pillar of the international peace support and peace building architecture with more than 20 UN agencies, the World Bank and dozens of NGOs engaged in supporting country-led DDR activities. Much has been learned over the years and it is critical to build from that knowledge base when looking at a new endeavour.

The original and most traditional understanding of DDR presents a linear and orderly process by which the parties to a conflict sign on to a peace agreement and the forces are cantoned, disarmed, demobilized, provided reinsertion benefits while in or when leaving the transition facilities and provided reintegration benefits for a brief period. Since the early 1990s more than 60 (DDR) programmes have taken place around the world, the majority of which were conducted in the wake of violent international and civil wars following a definitive victory of one of the parties, or as part of an internationally mandated peace support operation (Muggah, 2010).

However, for many years governments and DDR practitioners have recognized some of the initial limitations of this traditional DDR approach. In fact, “Since the early 1990s, DDR interventions have shifted from a relatively narrow preoccupation with ex-combatants (‘spoilers’) and reductions in national military expenditure (‘peace dividend’) to a concerted emphasis on consolidating peace and promoting reconstruction and development. Likewise, the caseload of prospective beneficiaries for DDR has also expanded from ex-combatants alone, to ‘vulnerable groups’ (children, women, disabled), dependents, and others of concern (refugees and internally displaced persons)” (ibid). Particularly in recent years due to shifting conflict dynamics and questions surrounding the effectiveness of the traditional rigid approach, the body of literature on DDR and to some extent the practice of DDR has shifted and continues to shift away from the initial very structured view.

The term ‘**Second Generation DDR**’ was coined and new guidance was published by the United Nations in 2010 to inform more modern processes. This was developed to provide tools to more effectively respond to the “increasingly complex settings, which require new, dynamic models for conducting peacekeeping. These settings involve greater levels and diffusion of violence against unarmed civilians, often perpetrated by undisciplined armed elements, such as militia and gangs, operating at the sub-national level” (United Nations, 2010).

Box 1

Second Generation DDR

“Whereas traditional DDR focuses mainly on combatants that are present within military structures, the focus of Second Generation programmes shifts away from military structures towards the larger communities that are affected by armed violence. Traditional DDR involves a range of activities falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Second Generation programmes, on the other hand, include a number of different types of activities that can be implemented when the preconditions for traditional DDR are not in place in order to support the peace process, build trust, contribute to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer term peacebuilding. Instead of implementing relevant provisions of a peace agreement, Second Generation activities are programmed locally using an evidence-based approach. These efforts, reinforced by regular assessments, enable practitioners to more effectively and quickly adapt to new developments” (United Nations, 2010).

Second Generation DDR further embraces that DDR must be adapted to each country context and the result may be a slightly or very different process. Second Generation DDR programmes include initiatives that aim specifically to disarm and dismantle militias ('DDM'), transform and provide exit options for at-risk youth and gangs and develop alternative approaches to disarmament and the control of unregulated weapons, such as the 'flexible sequencing' of DDR in which reintegration precedes demobilization and disarmament (RDD) (United Nations, 2010).

Yet, even within Second Generation DDR some of the underlying parameters and assumptions continued to permeate the discussion and many practitioners saw a need to stretch beyond the 2010 work to ensure DDR tools are fit for purpose (Muggah/ O'Donnell, 2015).

This resulted in the development of the most recent iteration of DDR programming, which has been called '**DDR in New Contexts**', '**Next Generation DDR**' and '**Third Generation DDR**'. This is less formalized than traditional or second generation DDR as is still being explored. In 2015 the UN DPKO and UN University policy research launched an additional platform, called 'Building New DDR Solutions' focused on the strategic challenges that DDR programmes face in dealing, for example, with how to counter radicalization and violent extremism. Building from this work, the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR has initiated discussions on developing additional guidance on reintegration in such 'new contexts' (those characterized by protracted conflicts, generalized armed/or criminal violence, violent extremism and a lack of comprehensive peace agreements).

Box 2

DDR in new contexts

"Next generation DDR appears to be more all-encompassing than its predecessors. For one, it is often taking place earlier, even before peace agreements are achieved. In some cases DDR is preceded by interim stabilization measures while the terms of peace deals are being negotiated. What is more, DDR is also targeting groups that may not be explicit parties to an eventual peace agreement with a combination of sticks and, later, carrots. The supposedly 'voluntary' nature of DDR – a core tenet of past operations – is being reconsidered in the advent of more robust missions. Indeed, practitioners may be fielding programs in non-permissive security environments and often lack adequate intelligence and situational intelligence. This new generation of DDR puts politics – including political engagement and outreach – at the center of the picture. In Central African Republic (CAR) (IRIN 2012), Libya (UN 2014b), Mali (UN 2014c), the Niger Delta (Oluwaniyi 2011) and Yemen, DDR activities are being reconceived as dynamic political processes rather than stand-alone or one-off enterprises. DDR is thus being re-imagined as a complex bargaining process connected fundamentally to local conditions on the ground. It is also connected in complex ways to peace negotiations and robust peace operations, justice and security sector reform, and peace- and state-building. Indeed, in all these settings DDR is acknowledged as a central plank of the peace negotiations with practitioners included as key members of UN Mediation Teams, most recently in Mali (UN 2014a)" (Muggah /O'Donnell, 2015).

In summary, there has been a large amount of additional flexibility introduced in the field of DDR since its inception, and while some programmes revert to the original model, there is now significant space for flexibility and innovation to be included when designing a new programme. At a minimum it is currently recommended that DDR be treated less as a cookie cutter or defined linear process, but more as a toolbox of potential elements, which can be called upon as required to jointly meet the needs of a particular situation. This *Paper* looks to contribute to this toolbox.

2. INNOVATION IN REINSERTION/REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMING

This evolution of thinking, up through ‘Second Generation DDR’ and ‘DDR in New Contexts’ or ‘Third Generation DDR’ has been fuelled by a drive to better address the complexities of these delicate situations and to more effectively achieve the outlined goals of the programming. While this has been an important development, there remains potential for additional exploration of innovative approaches in this space.

In fact, innovation in reintegration programming is possible on many levels. A common adage in writing is that any good piece must address “who, what, where, when, why and how.” Programming developers must answer these same questions but rather in the order of: “why, what, who, when, where and how.” This *Paper* presents the varying options in this order, including:

- \ the programming objectives (Why?),
- \ the programming elements (What?),
- \ the programming implementation design
 - o beneficiary service models (Who?)
 - o timing and sequencing (When?)
 - o service location models (Where?)
 - o service delivery models (How?)

2.1. The objectives of DDR programmes

The establishment of agreed upon objectives of the programming in question is a basic but critical first step in determining what elements and design may be useful. This is to be determined on a case specific basis taking into account the country and conflict dynamics at play. While it is often assumed that there is a common understanding of DDR’s goals, in fact there are a wide number of objectives that can be expected of DDR. At times these multiple objectives are clearly outlined and agreed upon, however often there is a lack of clarity, a lack of agreement by the partners, or a lack of alignment between the programme’s objectives, which can leave the programme at odds with itself. Many programmes have learned the lesson that it is essential to have agreement at the outset between the partners on the objectives of a particular DDR programme.

Frequently a programme intends to achieve some combination of these objectives. For example, according to Muggah, “DDR activities are designed to, inter alia, stem war recurrence, reduce military expenditure, stimulate spending on social welfare, prevent spoilers from disrupting peace processes, enhance opportunities for their livelihoods, disrupt the command and control of armed groups, and prevent resort to the weapons of war” (Muggah, 2010).

The following are examples of objectives for which DDR has been utilized. For all of these objectives there are potential programming elements that can be effective, however, the programme design could greatly differ depending on the goal.

Table 1

Examples of objectives for which DDR has been utilized

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| Broad security objectives | \ | Temporary stabilization |
| | \ | To encourage defection (during conflict) |
| | \ | To support military right-sizing or down sizing |
| | \ | To address the dismantlement of militias (DDM) (groups that were left out of peace agreements) |
| | \ | To build security (through disarmament, demobilization and the neutralization of armed factions) |
| | \ | To promote reconciliation (through reintegration and the reconstruction of social fabric) |
| | \ | To contribute to peace building and a long-term conflict prevention that goes beyond the absence of violence (through the strengthening of social cohesion, trust, safety and security) |
| | \ | To maintain command structures to allow for control of the individuals in groups |
| | \ | To break command structures to discourage future reconstitution of groups |
| Broad developmental objectives | \ | To ensure a balance of benefits to vulnerable individuals between ex-combatants and non-combatants so as to avoid encouraging destructive patterns in the future |
| | \ | Temporary stabilization |
| | \ | To encourage personal acceptance, preparedness and commitment to reintegration as productive citizens |
| | \ | To promote reconciliation (through reintegration and the reconstruction of social fabric) |
| | \ | To encourage community acceptance, preparedness and commitment to reintegration of returning soldiers |
| Broad economic objectives | \ | Joint ex-combatant and community alignment and efforts towards prosperity and recovery |
| | \ | To reduce the economic burden on the national budget through military right-sizing or downsizing |
| | \ | Joint ex-combatant and community alignment and efforts towards prosperity and recovery |

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| Broad governing objectives | \ | To demonstrate immediate action to the citizenry |
| | \ | To build faith in the government |
| | \ | To meet a national obligation to Veterans |
| | \ | Supporting broader public sector programming |
| Programmatic effectiveness | \ | To encourage community acceptance, preparedness and commitment to reintegration of returning soldiers |
| | \ | To encourage personal acceptance, preparedness and commitment to reintegration as productive citizens |
| | \ | To offer a programme that meets the needs and is appealing to potential participants |

As is evident from the above examples, some of these objectives are reinforcing, some separate, while others are at odds. If left unaddressed at the initial planning phase, such opposing goals – be they overt or implicit - may tear the programme apart and made lead to failure to meet any of the objectives.

This is seen to an even greater degree in the area of reintegration, as the goals themselves are often broader and less immediately tangible. One researcher summarized, “disarmament and demobilization are finite tasks, their success is relatively easy to assess in terms of cessation of hostilities or weapons decommissioned. Reintegration is more ephemeral with its success deeply entwined in socio-economic and political reality, whilst also being about psychological rehabilitation. On top of this, the reintegration needs of combatants are dramatically variable” (Hamber, 2007).

Programming can be designed to fit the objectives as needed, so long as those are clarified and agreed at the outset. Therefore, the programming elements should be built from the objectives. The starting point in developing the programming is therefore to establish agreement on the theory of change, “to become more explicit regarding the underlying assumptions of how change is supposed to come about, and of how the chosen inputs and activities are expected to produce particular outputs, outcomes, and impacts” (Vogel, 2012).

In summary, there are a wide range of objectives that DDR has at various times been called upon to achieve including goals that fall broadly within security, developmental, governing, economic and programmatic effectiveness. Next generation DDR has been seen to even further expand these objectives. While this increase in complexity is due to the realization that DDR is a long-term process that is taking place in a very challenging environment, this at the same time also hinders the manageability of DDR programmes. That is why it is essential that any future programme begins with open agreement on some few and realistic key objectives rather than implicit expectations, which will likely lead to failure.

2.2. Reintegration/reinsertion: programming elements

Exploring not only the field of DDR but also the correlated disciplines of veteran's support, dismantlement of militias (DDM), young adult and youth-at-risk programming, gang-member re-entry, IDP/refugee reintegration and criminal offender re-entry provide a window into additional innovative programming approaches. This is not to suggest that such programming would be directly applied to a DDR context, as clearly there are potentially differences in goals, beneficiaries, or other aspects (Munive/Stepputat, 2015; Kneiss, 2013 and Hazen, 2010). Rather, these are presented to broaden the potential pool of programming options, which would then be assessed for fit to the given context or utilized as a base from which adjustments could be made to design new programming.

These types of programming innovations broadly fall under:

- a) a different combination of programming elements
- b) improvements in content aspects of the programming, and
- c) reinvigorated formerly popular programming schemes.

When examining whether a particular innovative model fits a specific situation, the foundational realities of economic and structural service delivery possibilities in different countries must also be assessed on a case-by-case basis (i.e. a specific programme may have particularly limited per capita funding allocated to reintegration precluding some models, or limited absorption capacity of the labor market or service delivery sector).

In most DDR programmes seen to date, programming elements include aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion, but rarely reach to what has been outlined for reintegration. Often this reinsertion work is called reintegration and includes a combination of one or more of the following with the intent to positively contribute to economic, political and social aspects of early reintegration:

- \ training (new vocations, literacy, life skills, education)
- \ toolkits (often correlated with the vocational training)
- \ vouchers redeemable for goods and/or training
- \ stipends or cash
- \ association or cooperative start-up support
- \ psychosocial support and/or counseling
- \ community local infrastructure (typically included as a peace dividend for the community at large and may include ex-combatants contributing labor to the project as a show of goodwill)
- \ some reintegration programmes may include other aspects such as access to land, employment assistance or additional measures of area-based trust-building (Muggah 2009)

While not innovative, many of these elements continue to be called upon, as they have proven critical to an individual's reintegration. However, many DDR programmes have been criticized for utilizing a cookie-cutter approach.

Therefore, one area of innovation is simply in the action of unique combinations of programming elements. This could be different combinations, a shifted emphasis within the programming elements themselves or more effectively linking possible elements to provide holistic support. This more holistic approach is increasingly popular, as it has become clear that approaches singularly focusing on livelihoods, or community cohesion or psychosocial support, etc. have been found to be ineffective.

2.2.1. Holistic services, unique hybrid models and combination programming

There is a wealth of examples in developmental programming that utilize holistic services including in some DDR programmes and in many correlated disciplines such as at-risk youth, veteran's services, criminal offender re-entry programming and others. The following presents a few programmes that may have particular relevance to rethinking reintegration programming for former combatants.


When discussing holistic and innovative approaches to DDR, one model must be highlighted as unique within the field. The **Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR)**¹ operates a DDR programme, which provides individualized support and employs a broadly holistic approach. Within the ACR programme, "The reintegration route is built on eight complementary dimensions that encompass specific objectives and activities" (ACR, 2015). The services delivered are determined based on the individual's needs and interests within those eight dimensions as determined by discussions with their caseworker. The following diagrams depict the reintegration route and the eight dimensions.

Finally, it is of note that after a long history of many iterations of DDR programming including group and individual focused models, the Colombians have firmly landed on the individual approach being the significantly more effective (ACR, 2010). This programme has shown great promise and, based on internal and external evaluations, has seen positive results (ACR, 2010; ACR, 2014).

¹ <http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/en>

Figure 1

The Colombian Model: The eight dimensions and attached objectives



Source: ACR, 2015

Table 2

Individualized DDR Model based on eight complementary dimensions: The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR)

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>Positives of this model include that it</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ appears to be a good and functional example of a full service reintegration programme for individuals, \ reflects the complex and interwoven needs of an individual to accomplish lasting personal change, \ embeds flexibility within the model to provide different services to different individuals per their needs (i.e. a 17-year old may be very interested in continuing school whereas an older individual may not be interested in additional education, but may require significant medical attention), \ includes milestones for the ex-combatant according to the individualized plan and case workers which follow-up on progress which together encourage individual responsibility, |
|---|--|

| | |
|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ is conducted over a longer period of time than any other DDR programming models at present reflecting literature on realistic expectations for individual change, \ encourages a positive relationship with the community through community service work and additional exposure of the ex-combatants to the community, \ utilizes existing government and non-governmental support services and programmes to provide the required services thereby supporting the country's development over time rather than creating parallel services or programming. |
| <p>Relevant negatives of this model include that it</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ is implemented in a well advanced economic environment, which is rather different from the fragile and conflict ridden contexts where many DDR programmes are being implemented, \ requires significantly higher per capita costs due to the breadth of services and the longer service time, \ requires a major field presence of caseworkers and localized offices, \ requires that government or non-governmental services are both in place for referral and provide services at equal level of quality throughout the country, \ has been criticized for being overly invasive in the lives of the ex-combatants. |

Many veterans' programmes provide examples of similar 'wrap around services'. One such programme is the **Swords to Plowshares** organization in San Francisco, USA, which operates via a drop-in centre that provides health and social services, including case-workers to provide guidance in the reintegration process, supportive housing including emergency, transitional and permanent housing pathways, employment and training services, money management and income support services, psychosocial support, supportive services for veteran families, women veterans programmes and legal services (Swords to Plowshares, 2016). In many ways this programme is similar to, although slightly less broad than that of the Colombia DDR programme. This programme has not released evaluations of its effectiveness, however has received praise from the community and anecdotally the beneficiaries have been found to see positive results.

Table 3

Veteran's wrap around services model: Swords to Ploughshares

| | |
|---|---|
| Positives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ reflects the interwoven needs of an individual to accomplish lasting personal change, \ provides different services to different individuals per their needs, \ allows veterans to access support at the drop-in centre as they require it, \ provides specialized services to women, \ includes money management training, \ includes legal services and \ includes supportive housing services. |
| Relevant negatives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ requires higher per capita costs than many DDR programmes, \ requires local drop-in centres including a staff of case-workers, \ conducted on a local scale, therefore able to provide specialized services and \ does not utilize government services therefore could create parallel service delivery if the scope was expanded. |

Another notable programme that was both more holistic and specifically for ex-combatants but not associated with a DDR programme was the **Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP)**. The programme was conducted in Liberia by the NGO, Action on Armed Violence (AoAV, 2012). The programme evaluators stated,

In post-conflict societies, the challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants and war-affected youth often outlasts the formal demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. These programmes, conducted in war's immediate aftermath, form an important part of a policymaker's post-conflict toolkit. However, without special attention to creating economic opportunities for ex-combatants, these poor and underemployed men are more likely to rejoin rebellious groups, commit crime, and otherwise threaten political stability (AoAV, 2012).

The programme itself was an intensive agricultural training programme on employment activities, income, and socio-political integration. This programme was broader and more intensive than most ex-combatant reintegration programmes and was designed to rectify some of the main failings of prior demobilization programmes: it focused on agriculture (the largest source of employment in Liberia), it provided both human and physical capital,

and it integrated economic with psychosocial assistance. Specifically, AoAV took youth selected for the programme to residential agricultural training campuses, where they received 3-4 months of coursework and practical training in agriculture, basic literacy and numeracy training, psychosocial counselling, along with meals, clothing, basic medical care, and personal items. After the training, counsellors facilitated graduates' re-entry with access to land in any community of their choice. Graduates received a package of agricultural tools and supplies, valued at approximately US \$125. The programme's total cost was approximately US \$1,275 per youth.

The programme increased participants' employment in agriculture and decreased the amount of time participants spent in illicit activities. There was a sizable increase in average wealth, driven by increases in household durable assets rather than cash income. The programme seemed to have little effect on peer groups, risky social networks, anti-social behaviours, or community engagement and leadership, which were the main aims of the counselling and life skills sessions. There was also no effect on attitudes towards violence and democracy (Blattman & Annan, 2015).

Table 4
Intensive agricultural training programme on employment activities, income, and socio-political integration: Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) by Action on Armed Violence (AoAV)

| | |
|---|---|
| Positives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ appears to be a good and functional example found of a successful centralized reintegration programme conducted following a disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion process, \ was conducted at a reasonable cost per ex-combatant when compared to other DDR programmes, \ reflects several aspects of the interwoven needs of an individual to accomplish lasting personal change including the economic, social and inter-social, \ provided market based livelihoods training, \ addressed head on the issue of land which is often avoided due to the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, and \ was tested in an environment with a challenged economic and labour market. |
| Relevant negatives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ was limited to agricultural livelihoods which may not be of interest to all former combatants, has a limited income potential and is best suited to able-bodied individuals, \ is a one-time programme therefore may or may not have a long term impact on behaviour, and |

\ does not utilize government services therefore could create parallel service delivery if the scope was expanded.

An additional programme, which has been noted for its innovative and effective work is the holistic and **community centred programming of Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC)**—a local peacebuilding organization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its international partner, Peace Direct. CRC works across North Kivu and Ituri (Gillhespy & Hayman, 2011; Hellmuller & Santschi, 2013). According to the programme, CRC emphasizes an all-inclusive approach aimed at social cohesion, rehabilitation, and economic opportunity - key ingredients to sustainable reintegration. Its work focuses on supporting the reintegration, after demobilization and disarmament, of former militia members, while creating social institutions such as task forces and radio clubs. CRC works across Nord Kivu and Ituri, negotiating with militia leaders for a return of combatants (including children) to the community, preparing communities to support their return, assisting the return of IDPs, and building social institutions to prevent conflict and stimulate development. Following the sensitization stage, where CRC negotiates with militia leaders for the release of combatants, including children, CRC’s approach includes four other key elements:

- a) Provision of a range of livelihood options, some of which are also open to members of the community.
- b) Reparation programmes are sometimes included in the reintegration process, whereby former militia members build roads or other facilities to benefit the community.
- c) Building social networks based largely on voluntary effort, which sustains the RDD process at the micro level over time.
- d) Context-specific indicators that measure success over the long term, not just at the point where a combatant leaves the militia group and disarms.

CRC has found that it is vital to understand ‘the laws of the bush’ in order to break the cycle of returning to the militia. Reintegration must connect to life experienced by the combatants (Rouw & Willems, 2010: 35). Hence CRC plans the DDR process starting with reintegration: RDD rather than DDR. Through CRC’s engagement with former combatants before, during and after their RDD work, only 10 per cent of former combatants indicated that they were considering a return to the bush, whereas 58 per cent of former combatants who did not engage with the CRC process indicated that they were considering a return (Gillhespy & Hayman, 2011: 21).

Relationships have been created that support and protect communities. Peace committees in communities help to organize the cooperatives while six task forces, made up of former combatants together with journalists and other community leaders, look out for emerging conflicts and seek to mediate before they lead to violence. In addition, some of

the radio clubs have begun community livelihood projects, such as tree nurseries. The local aspect of their work has been central to their success because two key challenges to address in fragile states like the DRC are the lack of social cohesion, and the need to restore confidence and links between civilians and their government. Much more than it damages buildings and physical infrastructures, conflict destroys trust and relationships, as well as the capacity and will of people to work together. These intangible qualities must be rebuilt if peace is to be sustainable. Restoring confidence between civilians and governance actors is needed to create forms of cooperation designed to address issues of conflict together. In conclusion (the programme feels that):

- \ Successful RDD programmes require local organizations and external organizations to work together, adopting the roles that each is best suited for.
- \ RDD programmes should be judged by indicators that are seen as relevant in the communities that receive them, not just by the number of weapons collected or participants in the programme.” (Gillhespy & Hayman, 2011)

Table 5

Holistic and community centered programming focused on social cohesion, rehabilitation, and economic opportunity: Centre Résolution Conflicts (CRC)

| | |
|--|--|
| Positives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ appears to be a good and functional example found of a decentralized locally led and community-located successful reintegration programme, \ can be conducted at a much lower cost per ex-combatant than other DDR programmes, \ demonstrated impressive reduction in re-enrolment in armed groups after participation in the programme, \ finds a balance of providing individual services and group programming, \ also finds a balance of providing targeted services to former combatants and to community members so as not to encourage involvement in violence, \ allows flexibility to conduct programming relevant to the community, \ builds resilience in communities at risk of repeated violence, \ allows a quick start-up option visible at the community level to encourage immediate cessation of violence, \ addresses proximate causes of conflict i.e. through land courts to deal with disputes related to returning ex-combatants and IDPs, and \ addresses root causes of conflict through developing livelihoods and trust. |
|--|--|

| | |
|---|--|
| Relevant negatives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ is dependent on the existence of strong local NGOs to conduct the programming, \ will very likely provide significantly different services and level of service in different areas of the country depending on the local NGO capacity in that area, and \ was limited to agricultural livelihoods which may not be of interest to all former combatants, has a limited income potential and is best suited to able-bodied individuals. |
|---|--|

Another holistic and different model was seen in **El Salvador’s “Yo cambio”** (I change) programme. This programme was formed to address gang re-entry and reduce recidivism of former members of the Mara Salvatrucha and other gangs. The programme was announced in 2013 as a new youth violence prevention project that would combine work training, institutional strengthening, gang member rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes. The project features a number of “communal programmes that include sports, art, and training in the prevention of intra-family violence” designed for at-risk youth ages 15 to 25. In addition, one of the key pieces in the programme is a rehabilitation component for prisoners—the construction of “farm-jails.” At the farm they receive specialized attention (education, workshops, sports, health and mental treatment, family union courses, etc.). Inmates participating in “Yo Cambio” were also given a two-day sentence reduction for each full day of labour performed on community service projects along with \$50 a month from the Salvadoran Government.

Table 6

Rehabilitation via farm jails and communal programmes to reduce violence: Yo Cambio

| | |
|---|--|
| Positives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ emphasizes the potential of formerly violent individuals to change and embrace different life choices by introducing different livelihood and behavioural options, \ recognizes the potentially cyclical nature of involvement in violence and takes steps to break the destructive cycle, \ utilizes the time away from society constructively to develop livelihoods, improve health, address mental challenges and hone life skills rather than solely punitively, \ includes training, services specialized for this group. |
| Relevant negatives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ requires a centralized location for provision of services, \ does not allow freedom of movement of the participants as it is tied to incarceration, \ the need to better connect government and civil society in these efforts has been noted (McAnarney, 2013; US State Department, 2015). |

The programmes outlined above are largely holistic in nature, however, many programmes, such as the following, have instead sought the perfect combination of a more limited offering of services.

The **Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia (STYL)** programme, for instance, draws from the field of at-risk youth and is an example of a programme, which has combined elements uniquely and, seemingly, effectively. The STYL programme combined behavioural therapy and unconditional cash transfers. This included an eight-week programme of cognitive behaviour therapy developed by a local community organization. The therapy, led by reformed street youth and ex-combatants, aimed to foster self-control and a new self-image as a member of the community. This programme was conducted at a fairly small scale and compared outcomes for those given none of the services, those who received cash only and those that received cash and the therapy. The therapy programme, while not affecting income, led to persistent falls in crime, drug use, and violence—especially in the group receiving cash in addition to therapy. The evaluation found that even these highest-risk young men largely invested and saved the unconditional cash transfer. Almost none was spent on drugs, alcohol, or other temptations. Yet the money only produced short-run improvements in investment and income. The behavioural therapy however, did result in longer-run improvements.

Table 7
Cash transfers with behavioral therapy: Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia (STYL)

| | |
|---|---|
| Positives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ is a strong example of programming that recognizes and responds to the behavioural aspect of change in addition to the more traditional and limited livelihood programming. \ can be conducted at a much lower cost per ex-combatant than other DDR programmes \ demonstrates impressive reduction in crime, drug use and violence. |
| Relevant negatives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ was conducted as a pilot and thus on a smaller scale. It would require further vetting to know if the programme would be effective on a larger scale. \ The cash transfers did not result in longer-run improvements or changes in behaviour, suggesting that cash transfers may not be a useful investment. |

Beyond these specific programme examples, additional new combinations of programming have grown out of what were initially **public works programmes**. The main positive here is that, while public works have been found to be ineffective at causing medium to long term improvement for the participants, they can be paired together for a powerful

combination that accomplishes the immediate poverty relief effect of public works along with the medium to longer-term impacts of more developmental programming. The World Bank summarized this development by stating,

To become a jobs ladder, public works programs need to go beyond poverty relief—a route some countries already are taking. In El Salvador and Papua New Guinea, participants in public works programs obtain additional technical and life-skills support. In Sierra Leone, the package comes with compulsory literacy and numeracy training, and in Liberia with life skills training. In Bangladesh, the beneficiaries of a rural employment scheme were referred to microfinance institutions; three years after the program closed, almost 80 percent were still self-employed in microenterprise activities. But overall, very few public works programs succeed in improving the long-run employability of participants (World Bank, 2012).

This experience provides both a guide for potential programming options and a warning against a single service approach dependent on public works.

Another alternative approach that uniquely combines cash-for-work, business planning and encourages cooperative formation is the **UNDP 3x6 model**. The model was developed as an innovative response for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants and other populations affected by conflict in Burundi and also used with at risk youth in Yemen. According to the programme, the approach is made up of three organizing principles – inclusiveness, ownership and sustainability—and six discrete steps—enrolment, rapid income generation, savings, joint-venturing, investing and expanding markets. Essentially the programming involves cash for work activities through placement by the programme in jobs or internships. This generates seed capital for a compulsory savings scheme. This savings is rolled into business planning and eventually business creation.

Phase 1: Inclusiveness - income generation and building of capital by youth through rapid employment activities. During this first phase (2-6 month), participants receive business development training twice a week in complement to their income-generating activity (e.g. public works). Half to two-thirds of the income will be saved and deposited into saving accounts at micro-finance institutions with whom YEEP is partnering.

Phase 2: Ownership – begins during the period of temporary employment, individuals are encouraged to initiate a business plan, or to form a group with others in joint ventures for the implementation of a sustainable economic activity.

Phase 3: Sustainability- the individual's/group's saved capital is tripled through a grant. A feasibility study will confirm that any proposed project ideas are economically viable and access to a local market is ensured. UNDP thus provides micro-SME's with investment support and facilitates market expansion.

Table 8

Combined cash-for-work, business planning, structured investment and cooperative formation: the UNDP 3x6 model

| | |
|---|--|
| Positives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ provides a pathway beyond public works limited programming, \ develops individual financial responsibility, entrepreneurship and business thinking and which can be particularly useful in areas with few structured job prospects. |
| Relevant negatives of this model include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ is attractive in its theory and intent but has been questioned in terms of its application in settings without a savings culture, with limited banking infrastructure and without a successful history of micro-enterprise programming, \ requires an initial matching to market applicable positions is time-and cost-intensive in settings with limited employment opportunities, \ assumes a level of literacy and numeracy to benefit from the business trainings, \ does not address the non-economic aspects of reintegration such as psychosocial and family elements. |

Box 3

RECAP: Holistic services & combination programming

- \ *Individualized DDR Model based on eight complementary dimensions: The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR)*
- \ *Veteran's wrap around services model: Swords to Ploughshares*
- \ *Intensive agricultural training programme on employment activities, income, and socio-political integration: Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) by Action on Armed Violence (AoAV)*
- \ *Holistic and community centred programming focused on social cohesion, rehabilitation, and economic opportunity: Centre Résolution Conflicts (CRC)*
- \ *Rehabilitation via farm jails and communal programmes to reduce violence: Yo Cambio*
- \ *Cash transfers with behavioural therapy: Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia (STYL)*
- \ *Augmented cash for works programming*
- \ *Combined cash-for-work, business planning, structured investment and cooperative formation: the UNDP 3x6 model*

2.2.2. Content improvements

Another area of innovation includes the adjustment or improvement of content delivered within a broad category of programming.

One area that has seen demonstrable progress of this type in recent years is within **Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Trauma and Psychosocial Programming** with the utilization of Narrative Exposure Therapy and variants. Psychosocial programming has been found time and again to be a core component of long-term transition for individuals to the civilian mindset and to a productive life. However, psychosocial programming is frequently dismissed in programming discussions or cut out as a cost saving measure, particularly with military officials, as it seems to carry a connotation of weakness among their troops. Fortunately programmes have been developed that are cost effective and can have great impact.

In this context, one example is the **FORNET programme in Burundi**. As described by the programme, “The treatment programme Formation, Orientation and Rehabilitation by means of Narrative Exposure Therapy (FORNET) is a short-term, culturally sensitive treatment approach that aims to reduce Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms as well as the risk to engage in uncontrolled violent behaviour. Addressing trauma-related mental disorders as well as emotions related to aggression by means of FORNET is expected to facilitate reintegration in civil life and reduce uncontrolled violence. In total the individuals receive 8 sessions of FORNET, every session lasting between 1.5 and two hours depending on the needs of the participant” (Crombach, 2012).

Psychosocial support in DDR has often faced challenges of duration, service delivery or cost, however, this approach may be a solution to those issues as it has shown promising results even in similarly resource and service constrained settings.

Table 9

PTSD, Trauma and Psychosocial Programming revisited: Narrative Exposure Therapy and variants such as the FORNET programme in Burundi

| | |
|--|---|
| Positives of this approach include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ Psychosocial issues have been documented to be an important element to address in reintegration programming and particularly in South Sudan (TDRP, 2014). \ The short term but intensive nature of the approach facilitates use in challenging settings. \ It is culturally sensitive and thus is more likely to be relevant to South Sudanese than some of the more academic built approaches. \ It also addresses and aims to reduce resurgence of aggressive behaviour in the future. |
| Relevant negatives of this approach include that it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ May be seen to be outside the scope of reintegration programming. |

A second element where programming has evolved is in the area of **training**. Most specifically, vocational training as a standalone has been found to have limited impact (Finn et al., 2014). Additionally, programmes which distribute livelihoods kits but not combined with training have also been found to be ineffective. Therefore, building from these and other lessons learned in former programmes, the Government of South Sudan developed the 2013-2014 pilot DDR programme to utilize a holistic training model. Here, an integrated training model offered a combination of i) entrepreneurship, associations/ cooperatives and financial literacy; ii) vocational training; iii) literacy and numeracy; and iv) life skills. The entrepreneurship and financial literacy aspect was a newly developed curriculum which encouraged participants to make livelihood and market-based decisions throughout the DDR process. The pilot also found that if training is to be offered at a transition facility or vocational centre and followed with in-field of community based reintegration trainings, these should be formulated as one holistic training course with various modules even if to be delivered by different organizations or ministries. This is critical to maximize impact and minimize confusion for the trainee. The programme further found that all XC and community trainings should emphasize hands-on, visual approaches in keeping with best practices for low-literacy adult learners.

Table 10

Livelihood Training revisited: Government of South Sudan's 2013-2014 Pilot DDR's integrated training model

| | |
|---|--|
| <p>Positives of this approach include that it</p> | <p>\ increases the tangibility and relevance of vocational trainings, allow the ex-combatants to better find and take advantage of potential gaps in the market and develop problem-solving skills, which are transferrable.</p> |
| <p>Relevant negatives of this approach include that it</p> | <p>\ can be costly to provide sufficient training to be useful. If holistic training models are not vigorously defended budget realities often result in cut backs to the model until they essentially become short term vocational training. This then leads to replication of past mistakes as the limited impact of short-term vocational training is extensively documented.</p> <p>\ can potentially push local traders out of markets in which training was offered. One example was found in an entrepreneurship programme conducted in the Lake Chad Basin which had the unintended result of pushing local traders out of those markets when programme participants utilized their newly gained knowledge and thus had a competitive edge.</p> <p>\ Associations require a level of trust among participants that may be lacking due to the degradation of social trust resulting from the recent conflict.</p> |

Another area of programming development is in the area of cooperatives, associations and partnerships. One approach that has shown potential in fragile state contexts similar to South Sudan is that of the **Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA)**. VSLAs are groups of people who save together and take small loans from those savings. The activities of the group run in cycles, after which the accumulated savings and the loan profits are distributed back to the group members. The purpose of a VSLA is to provide simple savings and loan facilities in a community that does not have easy access to formal financial services. VSLAs were, for instance, explored in Uganda's 'Establishment and Strengthening of Women's Economic Associations' programme.

Table 11

Cooperatives, associations and partnerships revisited: Village Savings and Loan (VSLA) in Uganda's "Establishment and Strengthening of Women's Economic Associations" Programme

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Positives of this VSLA approach include that it</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ lends itself particularly well to vulnerable beneficiaries who have limited to no access to credit and who are embarking on an enterprise for the first time, \ draws on the spirit of camaraderie developed in the military, \ is particularly useful in rural contexts with limited availability of microfinance institutions. |
| <p>Relevant challenges of associations or cooperatives programming even in the VSLA model include that it</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ requires a level of trust among participants that may be lacking due to the degradation of social trust resulting from the recent conflict. \ Cooperatives and associations require consistency and follow-up. If the programming model lacks these elements then history shows that the programme will be a waste. \ requires the concept of savings which is difficult to implement in a societies that have no savings culture, \ and that it may, though not intended, reinforce military command structures (e.g. though the establishment of management committees) (ILPI, 2013). |

Peace education, civic education, youth peace clubs and peer-to-peer discussions

are a broad group of programming which has been seen to differing degrees in programmes with similar goals to DDR, but often to a limited extent within DDR. One example of youth peace clubs was implemented in Burundi by Action for Peace and Development (APD), a youth group that aims to engage young Burundians and draw them away from violence. According to the programme,

“APD is setting up peace clubs in 10 high schools where students will learn the skills they need to resist political violence. The peace clubs are also a place where young people can develop their own practical ideas for how to achieve a more peaceful, tolerant and democratic society in Burundi. The young peacebuilders share this with their peers, families and communities and to a wider audience through radio shows. In 2014, APD completed a peace education project across 10 secondary schools in five provinces, working with 10 teachers and reaching 595 pupils. The Peace Clubs focused on youth leadership and community cohesion, through dialogue between

different community groups and using theatre. APD is one of three members of the new Grow Peace Fund” (Humanitarian Response, 2015).

Similarly the **peer education programme for peace, Aware Girls**, is a network of young volunteers dedicated to saving their peers from indoctrination and radicalization in Pakistan. According to the non-governmental organization Peace Direct that supports the programme, they send out teams of peace educators to villages, towns and schools, to identify and dissuade individuals likely to join extremist groups. The work is intensive and personalized: as well as study groups to spread the word, there are one-to-one counselling sessions that may last weeks until a young man or woman changes their views and choices. Aware Girls implements projects taking a holistic approach to conflict transformation in Pakistan recognizing that women are often excluded from political processes in Pakistan, and yet are critically important stakeholders in building peace. Different peer education models were used, including study circles, book groups, movie screenings with post-screening discussions, sermons and presentations, and interactive discussions (Peace Direct, 2017).

Table 12

Peace education, civic education, youth peace clubs and peer-to-peer discussions: youth peace clubs implemented in Burundi by Action for Peace and Development (APD) and peer education programme for peace: Aware Girls

| | |
|--|--|
| Positives of youth peacebuilding models include that they | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ allow and encourage youth to contribute positively, \ utilize technology which youth are anxious to learn (some models), \ reach many of the informal militias that are largely made up of youth even if they are not officially listed as combatants. |
| Relevant challenges of youth peacebuilding models include that they | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ fully support the broad objective of reduced militarization but may not be seen as within the scope of the DDR programme depending on the agreed upon goals. \ require consistency to gain momentum. \ require ownership by the youth and true engagement by youth from all backgrounds. |

Box 4

RECAP: Content improvements

- \ PTSD, Trauma and Psychosocial Programming revisited: Narrative Exposure Therapy and variants such as the FORNET program in Burundi.
- \ Livelihood Training revisited: Government of South Sudan’s 2013-2014 Pilot DDR’s

integrated training model including a combination of i) entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy; ii) vocational training; iii) literacy and numeracy; and iv) life skills.

- \ Cooperatives, associations and partnerships revisited: Village Savings and Loan (VSLA) in Uganda's "Establishment and Strengthening of Women's Economic Associations" Program.
 - \ Peace education, civic education, youth peace clubs and peer-to-peer discussions: youth peace clubs implemented in Burundi by Action for Peace and Development (APD) and peer education programme for peace: Aware Girls
-

2.2.3. *Reinvigorated older schemes*

Public works and cash for work programming: A final area of creativity in programming elements involves the more recent revival of several approaches, which were formerly popular, then no longer in vogue and is now returning to the scene.

The first of these areas is Public Works and Cash for Work programming. Essentially these programmes have long ago been found to be unsustainable both for the country and for the individual as they did not provide a path to employment but rather a short-term solution to a long-term situation. However, in recent years, such programming has received additional attention for its potential in exactly that capacity - as an initial element of programming, given the understanding that it was included as an immediate term economic element to be followed by more sustainable approaches. This could be a Civilian Service Corps, a National Works Programme, labor intensive reconstruction work or rapid employment programmes. Again, it must however be understood from the outset that the programmes are ineffective as a standalone and are not seen to improve the long-run employability of participants.

According to the World Bank, "Compared with other ALMPs, public works programs have the lowest placement rates after completion and the highest costs per placement. These programs offer short-term employment for wages or food. The evidence from impact evaluations shows that public works programs can be useful as a safety net, especially when targeted toward those in the greatest need. Careful setting of the wage level can be a self-targeting tool as has been done in Colombia's Empleo en Acción and Argentina's Trabajar programs. A similar targeting approach is being used in India's MGNREGA program, which is notable not only for its scale and cost but also for its rights-based approach in guaranteeing employment. But seldom are public works a springboard for better jobs in the future. Their productivity impact, hence, tends to be very low at best. They do however have the potential to contribute to social cohesion, especially in conflict affected countries. Soon after the conflict ended in Sierra Leone, a workfare program was launched to help rebuild infrastructure and provide short term employment opportunities to the poor and ex-combatants. Public works programs have also been launched and

scaled up in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Republic of Yemen. In Serbia, participants felt socially more included as a result of a public works program” (World Bank, 2012).

An example of the application of public works with former combatants is currently seen in the Central African Republic’s “Pre-DDR” programme:

The United Nations is trying a new approach to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (or DDR) of armed groups. The new approach, described as pre-DDR, pays former combatants to do community work. [Between November 2015 and February 2016] the U.N. mission has enrolled 481 ex-combatants in pre-DDR and is paying most of them nearly \$4 a day, mainly for cleaning up the town. To qualify they had to hand in weapons. About half of the dozens of hunting rifles handed in are listed as non-operational. Pre-DDR is a temporary arrangement, pending the launch of a full scale disarm, demobilize and reintegrate program, which will have to be planned by the government. Unlike a conventional DDR program, this deal does not involve giving each ex-combatant training for a particular occupation. The United Nations is considering benefits for communities that hand in this type of weapon. Benefits like solar panels for community use are being considered, but not pre-DDR payments for individuals (VoA 2016).

Table 13

Public works as an initial immediate term economic element to be conducted in tandem with additional sustainable approaches

| | |
|--|---|
| Positives of cash for work models include that | \ they can be implemented rapidly as they do not require physical infrastructure to implement, \ the community benefits by having work completed. |
| Relevant challenges of cash for work models include that they | \ have been shown to not address reintegration or have long term impact but rather simply provide a short term alternative option, \ can further aggrieve civilians in the area if they are excluded from a rare wage-earning opportunity, \ can result in poorly built infrastructure if those doing the work are not trained, \ require access to the locations for delivery of materials and tools. |

Cash transfers: A second element currently experiencing a renewed place in the spotlight is cash transfers – both conditional and unconditional ones. In 2006, to stimulate employment growth through self-employment, the government launched a new conditional cash transfer programme, the Youth Opportunities Program (a component of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, NUSAF). According to the evaluation,

The YOP intervention had two official aims: to raise youth incomes and employment and to improve community reconciliation and reduce conflict. The programme, targeted at youth from ages 16 to 35, required young adults from the same town or village to organize into groups and submit a proposal for a cash transfer to pay for: (i) fees at a local technical or vocational training institute of their choosing, and (ii) tools and materials for practicing a craft. Follow-up surveys two and four years later found a shift from agricultural work towards skilled trades and strong increases in income. Women in particular benefited from the cash transfers, with incomes of those in the program 84% higher than women who were not. There were no differences, however, in social outcomes such as community participation, aggression, and social cohesion. Another Ugandan conditional cash grant program for women led to dramatic increases in business and reductions in poverty: In 18 months, the women started businesses, their incomes doubled, and they got a big boost in savings (Poverty Action, 2013).

However, programming in Liberia that included a cash transfer element after time found the participants and non-participants at same level—due to theft and the lack of a banking system. The organization Poverty Action has been particularly active in researching and sharing positive impacts of such unconditional cash transfers rather than the conditional cash transfer approach, which has become more generally encouraged. In fact, one study showed that unconditional cash transfers actually yielded a 35% return on investment for groups of youth prone to violence (Blattmann & Annan, 2012).

The results of a Kenyan programme implemented by the NGO Give Directly in 2013 also supported the use of unconditional cash transfers that they found to have a substantial impact on poor beneficiaries. The study, led by Johannes Haushofer and Jeremy Shapiro, found that simply providing people with cash (average amount US\$513) and nothing else led to dramatic increases in income, assets, psychological wellbeing, food consumption, and female empowerment among the extreme poor. This evaluation was the first to show that providing cash alone can have large impacts on the lives of the poor (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016).

Table 14

Cash transfers – both conditional and unconditional cash transfers: Uganda's Youth Opportunities Programme (a component of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, NUSAF)

| | |
|---|--|
| Positives of cash transfer models include that | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ they have potential for poverty reduction and impact without loss to programming costs, \ they can be implemented rapidly as they do not require physical infrastructure to implement. |
| Relevant challenges of cash transfer models include that | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ while poverty reduction is very important, for reintegration there are also many aspects beyond poverty reduction to be addressed for which studies have not found an impact from unconditional cash transfers, \ they can further aggrieve civilians in the area if they are excluded from the cash transfers. |

Apprenticeships and job placements: Apprenticeships and job placements are further areas that fluctuate in programming popularity. These are approaches that when done well has been seen to have impressive results. However, this requires a great deal of effort and time.

Table 15

Apprenticeships and job placements including security firm employment

| | |
|---|--|
| Positives of apprenticeships or job placements include that they | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ can provide individualized support aligned with market needs, \ engage community members and, \ allow for a distribution of skilled learning rather than flooding the market with one type of profession. |
| Relevant challenges of apprenticeships and job placements include that | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> \ It is very difficult when dealing with large numbers of beneficiaries as it can be very time and resource intensive to identify opportunities and to match participants with the right positions. \ For apprenticeships, training of the tradesperson hosts, follow-up and oversight are all required. Additionally, the result depends on the commitment of the tradesperson and can result in exploitation of the apprentice if not monitored. \ For job placement, this is an idea often popularized in countries with active economies and many job opportunities (i.e. Colombia). In these settings close engagement with the private sector could provide bulk job of- |

offerings, however in countries like South Sudan where there is currently limited private sector interest and extremely low employment there can be a challenge in finding job offerings as well as in matching skill sets with the business needs. Hiring of former combatants by security firms has had varied results with the clear upside of a salaried position in line with the XCs skill set, but this is balanced with the downsides that such positions are usually only being offered in major cities which can cause migration flows of the XCs (e.g. in Uganda) as well as can delay or stop the individual from transitioning to a citizen mentality but rather continuing the armed mindset and livelihood.

Box 5***RECAP: Reinvigorated older schemes***

-
- \ Public Works as an initial immediate term economic element to be conducted in tandem with additional sustainable approaches: Civilian Service Corps, a National Works Programme, labor intensive reconstruction work or rapid employment programmes, CAR's Pre-DDR programme,
 - \ Cash transfers – both conditional and unconditional cash transfers: Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program (a component of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, NUSAF).
 - \ Apprenticeships and job placements including security firm employment
-

2.3. Programming implementation design

There are a wide variety of implementation design models, which can be mix-and-matched to create a differentiated approach. These include a range of design aspects, including: terminology, sequencing, service beneficiary models, service delivery models, location, and hybrid approaches.

2.3.1. Terminology

While this *Paper* uses the terminology “DDR” for simplicity, some countries prefer to utilize different terminology for their programming and simply draw from the toolbox of DDR elements and lessons learned in DDR. In practice DDR as a phrase can create inaccurate assumptions of benefits or associate the programme with negative historical examples. Additionally, there may be other political, public relations or programming reasons to utilize other terminology. Some critical scholars have examined how the labels and

terms of DDR are also weighted with political connotations. For example, in some countries, the concept of DDR is fundamentally rejected in favor of less 'securitized' terminology. Maoist fighters in Nepal and Moros combatants in Mindanao fundamentally rejected the 'discourse' of DDR (Colletta & Muggah 2009, Muggah, 2010). It was therefore agreed that the programme in Mindanao is a Normalization Program rather than a DDR programme. Other examples of the delicacy and potential impact of terminology was seen in Myanmar and Afghanistan. "The ethnic militias in Myanmar will not buy into the vocabulary and meaning of the concept of disarmament and demobilization, since they believe that giving up their arms amounts to defeat or surrender. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) team working on DDR issues was carefully instructed: 'If fighters are to be removed from the battlefield it is critical that reintegration is NEVER seen or profiled to them as an act of "Surrender." The terms "Surrender" and "Laying down of weapons" should NEVER be used in any conversation, discussion or reference"' (Munive & Stepputat 2015:5). Similar issues were faced in Colombia with the FARC peace negotiations and in South Sudan. In summary, the terminology is at the discretion of the country planners and DDR is again primarily a set of tools. If the name itself is not a useful tool for a particular context, innovations in terminology have been solutions to that challenge.

2.3.2. *Sequencing and timing*

One of the main differentiators of the 2nd generation DDR approach is what the UNDPKO has called 'flexible sequencing' rather than the formerly rigidly linear process of traditional DDR. Some countries have thus employed an implementation design model starting with reintegration and later coming to disarmament and demobilization (RDD). As in the case of Myanmar's ethnic militias, armed groups are often unsure that promises made in return for disarmament will be fulfilled. This reordering of the sequence allows for the development of trust through the reintegration programming to be followed by disarmament and demobilization. The community-based model utilized in the DRC is another frequently referenced version of this reordering.

A further sequencing option is the idea of interventions during ongoing conflict. This approach was the basis of many former programmes where peace treaties were unable to be agreed upon (i.e. Uganda with the Lord's Resistance Army and Colombia until the recent agreement). This approach can be used to draw some groups or individuals out of the bush in exchange for legal amnesty. It therefore allows for positive movement in situations of stalemate. This opens the option to start with those that are willing to take the risk. A challenge is that in the absence of a treaty it is very difficult to identify true combatants which can open the programme to the challenges of unqualified participants (which plagued South Sudan's large scale CPA-DDR programme). Another challenge is

that the programme offered could be very different from an eventual large scale option which has been seen to set unrealistic expectations for future participants.

The ability to implement Interim Stabilization Measures (ISMs) within the programme is another benefit allowed by additional flexibility on sequencing. In this way a programme could utilize various methods over time. One much discussed example of this within a reintegration programme is the option to offer a short-term public works element up front as an ISM while preparations are underway to then fold in more sustainable impact elements such as those discussed in the programming elements above.

Timing of the elements is another critical aspect of implementation design. Lack of realistic timing estimates, long start-up times, lack of coordination in planning and implementation between partners and programming delays have been found to massively undermine programme success. The time lags in the South Sudan CPA DDR programme as well as in the Central African Republic DDR programme are two examples of these impacts. South Sudan's CPA DDR programme, for instance, faced significant challenges to locate participants after the long time lag and in CAR militias were re-mobilized years after they had effectively faded away because their members were suddenly entitled to benefits after many years (Nicolaysen, 2012).

2.3.3. Varying beneficiary models

Determining who will receive services is a crucial element of the implementation design. Within DDR programming there are different models that have been employed, and certainly hybrid models within those choices. This is separate from the decisions of where or how those services are delivered although these are often conflated in debates over individual vs. community models. The main models include:

- \ Community focused approaches either requiring a certain balance of ex-combatant participation or that allow ex-combatant participation
- \ Ex-combatant either individually targeted or group based approaches
- \ Ex-combatant and family inclusive approaches
- \ Hybrid models where certain elements are targeted to the individual ex-combatants and others are broadly offered to the community and ex-combatants.

The main rationale for community-focused efforts is that this will promote social reintegration while avoiding negative stigma against the ex-combatants and also by not rewarding and encouraging destructive behaviour (i.e. those that joined rebel groups benefit while those that remained peacefully in their communities do not). In addition, in many post-conflict communities the level of vulnerability is staggeringly high and while vulnerable, it is difficult to say whether the ex-combatants are more vulnerable or just differently vulnerable than their community peers. The assumption is that the ex-combatant can benefit equally alongside their community peers. These programmes have

been found to be offered either blind to ex-combatant status as a general community programme allowing ex-combatant participants or through a matching model (such as one community member to every one ex-combatant). The child DDR programming in South Sudan has been utilizing this matching peer model.

The primary rationale behind the delivery of services directly to the ex-combatant in the context of a DDR programme is the need for the individual to both operationally and mentally shift from a military to a civilian existence. This is the basis of the provision of trainings (i.e. entrepreneurship, vocational, literacy, numeracy, job and life skills) to the ex-combatant, or the provision of health services for ailments and disabilities. Such activities are meant to address the individual challenges of exposure to and involvement in violence. It has often been seen that when looking at the rationale for joining armed groups (in the cases where it was voluntary), between similarly vulnerable peers some chose to join and others do not. Those individuals that chose to join armed groups may have a different threshold or personal experience, but regardless the individual aspect is factor. The Colombia DDR programme went through many iterations of their programming including attempts at both targeted and group based approaches before deciding that the individually targeted approach was much more effective. In the Colombian setting it has become clear that the group-based approaches had much less impact than the individually targeted programming that the programme now utilizes.

Another model, which has not been utilized in DDR programming to date but draws on best practices in correlated programmes, is the model of serving both the ex-combatant and their family with differentiated programming. This has been suggested as an innovative approach to strengthen the safety net for the individual and also vice versa as many of these families have been operating independently for extended periods of time and will now face new challenges by reincorporating the ex-combatant into daily life. This was also explored as a response to the reality that domestic violence has been found to increase as a negative unintended consequence of reintegration if left unaddressed. Child DDR programmes such as the reunification programming in South Sudan and Uganda have been implementing family inclusive programming for many years and the experience could quickly inform such programming at the adult level. By increasing the number of beneficiaries, this has cost as well as logistical implications as family preparation would need to be conducted at the communities of return during the period before reintegration.

As the rationales for both community and individual services are strong, a hybrid model is also an option. The hybrid approach allows for some services to be individually targeted to the individual to realistically address their unique challenges that will otherwise become barriers to their reintegration and ultimately a detriment to their communities, (e.g. through violence, alcohol addiction, lack of livelihood) while balancing the programme with community focused services to create a community benefit and broadly support peace-building and recovery.

2.3.4. Varying service location models

Another aspect of programming implementation design, which can be done in different or unique ways, is where services will be delivered. In general this can be either at 1) a centralized facility or facilities, 2) a localized centre or organization or 3) be community based.

Most DDR programmes have utilized a centralized facility model for the service location. This can be in the form of an existing military facility, a specifically built transitional facility or training centre. This model has large facilities and staff costs and generally requires significant start-up time to create liveable and learning conducive conditions. Additionally the participants must be provided room and board for the length of their stay and safety, and gender and human rights concerns are crucial to the operation. Some programmes utilize these centralized sites for periods of weeks while others keep participants for extended periods of time. In Somalia they are currently utilizing such centralized centres. Throughout their time in the programme, participants live in the centre in which they are provided vocational training, then hired on public works projects – typically building schools and clinics – and finally they are set up with a trade and ideally released. The Somalia context is important to note, however, as the participants have sought amnesty from the government and according to research, “there is limited-to-no transparency regarding entry and exit from the DDR processes, with Somali national and subnational security and intelligence services controlling both. In fact the national and local Somali intelligence and security services determine who is released from the DDR programs, and often do not release participants after their completion of the DDR programming, which means that in practice there is a strong overlap between the DDR programs and detention” (Felbab-Brown, 2015).

The use of a more localized centre or organization to provide training and services is common in various types of programming but less frequently used in DDR. This has potential benefits to the ex-combatant in that the services are likely to be more targeted than those available at a centralized facility but may be more expansive than those available in their local community. Additionally, they are likely closer to their family than at a centralized facility. For women in particular this option may be more palatable than being far from home for extended periods of time. This also has the benefit of supporting national and state capacity in a sustainable way rather than building separate facilities solely for DDR use. However, this approach includes some challenges in that it may be difficult to serve large numbers of beneficiaries through this model, it requires significant monitoring, logistics and organizational capacity to coordinate the use of such facilities, and requires local organizational capacity. Facilities are highly variable with some being much better than centralized facilities and others much worse. This would require initial assessment of the facilities as well as ongoing monitoring.

Finally, services can be delivered at the community itself. Some of the programmes discussed above (e.g. the CAR community reintegration programme) follow this approach. IDP reintegration and criminal offender re-entry programming as well place great importance on community engagement and involvement in the process. The benefits are that a programme can be truly community led and ensure relevance to the community itself. Some challenges with this model are that delivery of trainings at such a diffuse level greatly increases costs and is likely to undermine the quality of the service delivery. It is also difficult to draw the line between what is DDR and what is community development in this model.

2.3.5. Organizational service delivery model

The next aspect of implementation design that sets programmes apart is the organizational service delivery mechanism. At the most basic level any DDR programme must decide whether it is to be implemented through specifically contracted services or through government programmes. The programme could contract international NGOs, local NGOs or work with civil society groups to implement the work. The initial concept of the most recent South Sudan DDR programme was to utilize a whole of government approach, which is similar to that utilized in Colombia. There are pros and cons to each of these approaches.

Largely, when contracting services specifically through service providers or NGOs, the programme has more control over the exact services delivered, does not require large scale service delivery capacity, requires less inter-governmental politicking which can cause major delays, can ensure quality level and can more efficiently target the beneficiaries.

The most glaring con of this approach is that it may create parallel services, which is less sustainable as it does not feed individuals into a longer-term safety net and does not contribute to long-term service delivery. In addition, this requires a complete programming infrastructure of staff and facilities, which may require additional start-up time.

Utilizing a whole of government approach has the positive of supporting a system that could then serve the citizenry over time and can draw on the programming infrastructure already established. On the other hand, this requires there to be significant government and local service delivery capacity to absorb these additional beneficiaries and will require additional resources and often capacity building to ensure that adding additional beneficiaries to a programme does not simply siphon off the services from the existing beneficiaries which would leave them neglected or un-served.

The following Box compiles the implementation design approaches discussed above:

Box 6

Implementation design approaches

Terminology

- \ DDR is simply a set of tools to be used as needed
- \ Alternate terminology may be more useful depending on the context: i.e. Normalization, Pre-DDR.

Sequencing and timing

- \ Flexible Sequencing i.e. RDD
- \ Interim Stabilization Measures i.e. public works, pre-DDR
- \ Programming offered during ongoing conflict i.e. Colombia and Uganda
- \ Sequencing programming to best use remaining time under military command and then best use time under civilian or commission oversight
- \ Realistic time estimates of programming planning, start-up and implementation

Varying beneficiary models

- \ Community focused approaches either requiring a certain balance of XC participation or that allow XC participation
- \ Ex-combatant either individually targeted or group based approaches
- \ Ex-combatant and family inclusive approaches
- \ Hybrid models where certain elements are targeted to the individual ex-combatants and others are broadly offered to the community and ex-combatants.

Varying service location models

- \ Centralized facility or facilities: an existing military facility, a specifically built transitional facility or training centre.
- \ Localized centre or organization
- \ Local community based

Organizational service delivery model

- \ Programming implemented through government programmes: i.e. "whole of government" approach
 - \ Programming implemented through specifically contracted services: i.e. contracting international NGOs, local NGOs or work with civil society groups to implement the work.
-
-

3. REINTEGRATION APPROACHES APPLICABLE TO SOUTH SUDAN

3.1. Recognizing the realities facing South Sudan

When looking at the potential application of various reintegration approaches to the South Sudanese context, it is necessary to take into account the key realities that will impact which models may be applicable.

First, DDR programmes have been conducted in South Sudan and these efforts were unsuccessful. A full DDR programme was implemented in South Sudan from 2005-2011, the CPA-DDR programme. The programme had very weak mechanisms in place for screening and registration, which resulted in serious doubts on whether the participants were in fact ex-combatants. Additionally, the final number of beneficiaries was minimal in comparison to the anticipated caseload resulting in a very high financial cost per capita beneficiary and the programme faced design, operational, and budgetary challenges including significant delays and lack of coordination in planning and implementation. This experience has negatively tarnished local, government and international opinion of DDR in South Sudan. However, the government continued to face the need to right size the military and transition the excess of former combatants to a new life as productive citizens.

While facing heavy scepticism, the programme was reassessed and a new programme was designed specifically to incorporate lessons learned from the previous programme, which was then piloted in 2013-2014. This pilot was on track when the fighting began in December 2013 and while the situation clearly impacted the implementation, it appeared that the design did provide a potentially effective programme fit for purpose and context.

However, both programmes were designed for the downsizing of a single military force (the SPLA) and the participants continued to receive a salary while they transitioned to civilian life, thus many argued the programme was more an SSR programme with a major aim to reduce the financial burden of an oversized military. Regardless of titling, a critical element of any future DDR programme in South Sudan will be the alignment with any Security Sector Reform work being conducted. The alignment of these programmes will be essential to the success of either. For instance, the SPLA has to close down 'revolving doors' in which people leave the army but after few months, they are recruited back.

While the former experiences with DDR provide many important lessons for any upcoming new programme addressing militarization in the country (see the following chapter), it is also of note that the situation in South Sudan has changed significantly in many ways since 2013.

Firstly, there has been an increase in combatant numbers as well as a proliferation of various new groups. The total number of official troops is increasing by virtue of both the Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Government (SPLA) and Sudan People's Liberation

Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) recruiting, as well as the formation of splinter groups from the formal forces and informal groups. Potential participants could include: Active SPLA & other National Organized Forces loyal to the Government, active former SPLA & other National Organized Forces that have joined the opposition (SPLA-IO), Youth Armed Groups/ civilians that joined the fighting since 2013 (i.e. White Army of largely youth, Dinka youth who are recruited, etc.), recognized rebel groups, armed community vigilante groups, cattle raiders, Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFAGs) Women Associated with Armed Forces or Groups (WAAF/G) and potentially the remaining reserve forces/ “Wounded Heroes” of the SPLA & National Organized Forces. These groups have experienced different levels of engagement in fighting, have differing levels of self-identification as soldiers rather than citizens, are of different ages and genders, and likely will have a variety of reintegration needs. Therefore, the situation calls for a programme that can serve very large numbers of participants with varying needs.

Additionally, the current conflict has underscored the significant power of existing patronage networks. Any DDR programme in South Sudan will be significantly hampered by the existing patronage networks.

There are also very different social dynamics at play now than in the programming discussions before independence. At that time all potential participants were heroes who had fought and won independence for the country. At this time, there are many - fighting forces that are accused of have destroyed communities and ruthlessly killing civilians including the SPLA-IG (United Nations, 2017). Additionally, “the leadership and the country as a whole continue to fracture between and within tribes” (ibid). Thus reintegration into communities will present a major challenge. Operationally, service provision will need to take into account the potential for ethnic and regionally fuelled conflict between participants and communities that will be less likely to be amenable to former combatants receiving services while communities are left out.

There are also pressing humanitarian needs, which require attention and will divert resources. Meanwhile, the current humanitarian crisis has developed as government funds have been directed to military expenditures creating extreme frustration on the part of potential donors. The April 2017 UN panel of experts report states (United Nations, 2017), “The bulk of the evidence suggests that the famine, which had been predicted for two years, has resulted from protracted conflict and, in particular, the cumulative toll of military operations undertaken by the leadership in Juba, the denial of humanitarian access, primarily by SPLM/A in Government, and population displacement resulting from the war.”

The escalating frustration among various stakeholders suggests that any programme will have a limited window of time to begin demonstrating progress. This will mean that the programme will likely require some ‘quick start’ aspects, while also being ruthlessly attentive to the preparation and delivery timeline. However, the quality of the programme

will also be watched carefully and thus quick start aspects must be designed in tandem with more sustainable programmes as well.

Next is the general country context which includes intense logistical challenges for programme implementation due to poor infrastructure, a large geographic area to be served, low literacy, low social cohesion and trust, a limited banking sector outside of Juba (with an exception being the state capitals), and limited private sector opportunities which limits livelihood potential in relation to salaried positions. The extended fighting has resulted in the destruction of clinics, schools and facilities for service delivery, which has implications for what can be accomplished through linkages to other programmes. This may require significant rethinking of any previously designed programme as the service capacity will be largely decimated.

Beyond the physical destruction the fighting has increasingly destroyed the social fabric of the country, which will have a particularly large impact on reintegrating former combatants. This destruction of trust, inter-connectedness and support will have implications for what programming can be deployed and what that programming can be expected to accomplish in the way of peace-building and community healing.

Further, while the needs and demands on such a programme will be very high, funding is limited and cost effectiveness as well as financial management oversight will be top of mind in programme design.

Finally, many armed individuals belonging to the SPLA-IO and other armed groups are currently informally returning to the communities. Logistical challenges such as shortages of food and medicine have made it hard for people to spend time in rebellion thus many armed individuals are self-reintegrating into communities. These combatants are sources of insecurity and can easily be re-recruited by rebel or other groups, or may join community vigilante groups.

3.2. Lessons learned in previous reintegration programmes

Before discussing the applicability of the above-mentioned innovative reintegration approaches in the South Sudanese context, it is useful to recall lessons learned in previous DDR experiences both in South Sudan specifically and internationally to ensure decisions are made with full information and to avoid repeating mistakes of the past. This paper builds on a wealth of literature, which thoroughly explores and summarizes the structural, institutional and programmatic lessons learned.

In relation to reintegration of former combatants, a very brief summary of the lessons learned at the structural level that is repeated across the literature² and through field experience includes:

- \ Successful reintegration is the ultimate measure of the success of a DDR programme. This is not only a basic premise of the UN-International DDR Standards (IDDRS), but it is also well documented by field experience. Without true reintegration, programmes have been found to be very unsuccessful in achieving their goals (e.g., Liberia DDR in 1997 and Cambodia UNTAC DDR).
- \ It has therefore been found that the overall DDR effort should be planned as a single cohesive process, and that reintegration needs to be included in the initial planning and budgeting. At its root, DDR is in fact an aggregation of many individuals and communities being guided or dropped in their transition from a time of fighting to one of productively engaged citizenry. Therefore, while DDR may be implemented by a variety of partners, it must be understood as one ongoing process – a relay race requiring solid performances in each leg, but which can only be victorious if the final step of reintegration successfully reaches the goal. In fact, disjuncture between the various elements has often led to significant setbacks in timing, costs, and commander or ex-combatant interest or commitment to the programming, to say nothing of the eventual impact of the work.
- \ Reintegration is a long process and programmes must be part of a wider security sector reform strategy.
- \ Reintegration should be nationally led and take a participatory approach, including various stakeholders.
- \ Reintegration is most likely to be successful if carried out in a context of strong political will as well as local community level support.
- \ The strength and characteristics of the national and local economy must be taken into account when designing a programme.
- \ Planning for reintegration should begin early.
- \ Reintegration programmes must be well resourced.
- \ Programmes should not solely benefit ex-combatants. Rather it is important to balance benefits to vulnerable individuals between ex-combatants and non-combatants so as to reduce the likelihood of resentment in the community and to avoid encouraging destructive patterns in the future.

² Publications outlining lessons learned are available through a broad range of sources including but not limited to the World Bank's Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) general studies and documentation on the 2013-2014 reintegration pilot, the African Union DDR Resource and Research Centre and specifically the AU Operational Guidelines, the United Nations DDR Resource Centre and specifically the IDDRS and recent updates, BICC Working Papers, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Institute, The United State Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and others.

- \ Ex-combatants should not be assumed to be a homogenous group. In particular, the needs of women and children must be taken into account. In addition, ex-combatants may have a wide variation in critical demographic aspects such as age, health, education or professional experience, which can impact their reintegration needs.

South Sudan

Beyond the structural lessons outlined above, many programming specific lessons have been documented in great depth again both specific to South Sudan and more broadly. Lessons specific to each of these programming areas are available and will not be repeated here, however the South Sudan reintegration pilot conducted from 2013-2014 produced some key lessons, which will continue to be specifically relevant in considering future programming.

- \ Trainings: Vocational training as a standalone has been found to have limited impact (Finn et al., 2014). Rather, an integrated training model offering a combination of entrepreneurship, associations/cooperatives and financial literacy; vocational training; literacy and numeracy; and life skills shows much greater potential than standalone vocational trainings (TDRP, 2014). The entrepreneurship and financial literacy aspect was found to provide a particularly critical contribution given the lack of structured employment opportunities in South Sudan and encouraged participants to make livelihood and market-based decisions throughout the DDR process. If training is to be offered at a Transition Facility or Vocational Centre and followed with in-field of community based reintegration trainings, these should be formulated as one holistic training course with various modules even if to be delivered by different organizations or ministries. This is critical to maximize impact and minimize confusion for the trainee. All ex-combatants and community trainings should emphasize hands-on, visual approaches in keeping with best practices for low-literacy adult learners.
- \ Up scaling: The full DDR programme as piloted between 2013 and 2014 was found to be too costly to be brought to scale thus an alternative approach should be explored in the current context. One area with particular potential that is noteworthy to point out when considering a new DDR approach for South Sudan is that of partnering with government ministries to provide trainings. This can be an effective and sustainable approach if those entities are supported to provide the additional services required (e.g. working with the Ministry of Agriculture to provide agricultural extension trainings to ex-combatants through agricultural extension workers or providing vocational skill courses through state level institutions). Vocational expert visits or apprenticeships require high levels of individual attention and resources, which presents challenges due to the scale required.
- \ Livelihoods start-up kits: Such kits are an essential component if the ex-combatants are expected to utilize the training received. Providing start-up kits

requires significant staff, resources and attention to logistical detail to ensure full and timely distribution. Additionally, alignment of start-up kits with vocational training is critical and should include contents used during training and distribution upon completion of the vocational training.

- \ Communications with the participants: Information on benefits, trainings and services to be provided to the ex-combatants throughout the DDR process must be shared effectively not only with ex-combatants but also with all staff including trainers.
- \ Information Counselling and Referral System (ICRS): An ICRS was developed during the 2013-2014 pilot programme so that it could service a full-scale programme in the future. The ICRS provides a foundation for registration, M&E and linking participants to services. While the technical end would require some updating to exactly match to any newly designed programme, the existence of this system would allow for a much faster start-up in a technical area that often requires significant time if done well. As registration and M&E will be required in any future programme, this is a notable point of strength for South Sudan. Of note is that counselling in this context is not psychosocial counselling but rather the availability of a caseworker to counsel the individual on programme benefits and which services they require. The existence of state based ICRS caseworkers was found to be a significant positive during the pilot as the counsellors were able to ensure communications and feedback with the ex-combatants as well as coordinate and monitor the delivery of community based services. Regarding referral, this mechanism encourages sustainability and efficient use of resources by connecting ex-combatants with existing programmes and services provided by NGOs or the government. A referral mechanism can only be as strong as the services to which the ICRS is referring. Given the recent degradation of services due to fighting, the presence and capacity of such services would need to be realistically assessed to determine in what services or areas referral is realistic.
- \ Psychosocial problems and substance abuse in particular alcohol abuse amongst ex-combatants in South Sudan are factors restricting sustainable livelihoods. These are areas where services were not included in the pilot however in retrospect attention was necessary and the participants and the pilot overall suffered from not having them.
- \ Gender and child sensitive programming needs additional attention and coordination.
- \ Reinsertion and Reintegration programming are intrinsically interwoven and should be planned as such.
- \ Systemic approaches to ensure ex-combatant voice in programming are required.
- \ DDR community support projects: Such projects have high social capital returns however do increase the budget and may be beyond the mandate of DDR core competencies. This could be provided through associated greater reconciliation process programming if not through DDR.

- \ Monitoring and Evaluation (and Management Information Systems) require specific staff skills. Specifically allocated funding will be required both for capacity building and potentially embedding resources to implement the full complement of both internal and external M&E systems required for an effective DDR programme. The pilot programme utilized ICRS caseworkers as data collectors in tandem with external enumerators, which was found to be both effective and enhance ongoing M&E.

3.3. Policy implications: stand-out approaches with potential for South Sudan

This *Paper* presented a variety of programming experiences that could be applicable for South Sudan. These are offered above to provide policy makers and planners with the tools to develop a coordinated, sensible and effective approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants back into society once the political situation allows doing so.

Of the wide spectrum of available options in achieving successful reintegration of former combatants, some appear to have significant potential in addressing South Sudan's current intricate challenges while others either do not appear to be a good fit due to differing realities from the places or settings in which they were successfully applied.

Looking at programming elements (**What?**), due to the broad needs of a successful reintegration programme and the demonstrated lack of sufficiently broad impact by several narrowly targeted approaches, the highest potential is to look at a programme of holistic services, hybrid models or combination programming. Programmes that address behavioral change with wrap around additional elements show particularly significant reintegration potential in South Sudan. Programmes that only include economic measures are highly likely to be insufficient as seen both in related programming and due to the context and lessons learned from South Sudan specifically.

Of the approaches presented above, when taking into account the realities of cost and pre-requisites for success (i.e. existence of jobs for a job placement programme or existence of service providers for referral based programming) the following stand out for having the greatest potential relevance:

- \ agricultural leaning holistic programmes such as the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme (TATP) by Action on Armed Violence (AoAV) or an adjusted version of the Yo Cambio programme which is a youth violence prevention project that combines work training, institutional strengthening, gang member rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes.
- \ Holistic and community centred programming focused on social cohesion, rehabilitation, and economic opportunity such as the Centre Résolution Conflicts (CRC) programming,
- \ Mobile cash transfers with behavioural therapy as provided in the Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia (STYL) programme.

Additionally, specific programming elements, which have been improved through programming pilots and show potential to be incorporated into such a combination programme in South Sudan include:

- \ PTSD, Trauma and Psychosocial Programming such as the Narrative Exposure Therapy and variants such as the FORNET programme in Burundi.
- \ Integrating entrepreneurship and financial literacy into any offered livelihood training such as in the Government of South Sudan's 2013-2014 pilot DDR's integrated training model.
- \ Youth focused peace education, civic education, youth peace clubs and peer-to-peer discussions such as the youth peace clubs implemented in Burundi by Action for Peace and Development (APD) and peer education programme for peace: Aware Girls.

Although clearly found to not achieve long-term reintegration, a new DDR programme in South Sudan could also include an initial element of cash for public works to be implemented in tandem with additional sustainable approaches.

Approaches which were notable as innovative or new but that are not recommended given the current realities in South Sudan include:

- \ Holistic models that require extensive referral services or would be cost prohibitive due to high individual costs such as the Colombian Agency for Reintegration's DDR model (ACR) and veteran's wrap around services model such as Swords to Ploughshares.
- \ Models which require high levels of social trust such as cooperatives, associations and partnerships include BRAC's cooperative models and Village Savings and Loan (VSLA) in Uganda's 'Establishment and Strengthening of Women's Economic Associations' Programme.
- \ Models which require a strong banking sector or culture of savings such as the Cash transfers – both conditional and unconditional cash transfers: Uganda's Youth Opportunities Programme (a component of the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) or the UNDP 3x6 model Combined cash-for-work, business planning, structured investment and cooperative formation.
- \ Models which require direct transfer in physical cash due to negative experiences in South Sudan with transport of funds, kickbacks and patronage networks.
- \ Models which require a strong job market for job placements.
- \ Models which require extensive follow-up or extreme individual attention such as individual apprenticeships and cooperatives.

Finally, no discussion of programming elements is complete without including the realities of budget. Here it is important to note that the cost structure that has been utilized to date for DDR is more accurately based on DD& reinsertion but has not included realistic funding for reintegration. Reintegration requires a longer and more distributed service delivery, and will have associated costs. Hence it is particularly important 1) to be realis-

tic about budgeting needs in fundraising and allocations and 2) to choose from effective programme options those that minimize costs. The programming suggested prioritized examples that were implemented with reasonable costs.

Moving to programming implementation design a clear recommendation for South Sudan is to explore alternate terminology than DDR. DDR is simply a set of tools to be used as needed, however, in South Sudan there is a history of disappointment and complex expectations associated with the term, therefore alternate terminology may be more useful.

Looking at sequencing and timing (**When?**), many options could be effective. These include:

- \ Interim Stabilization Measures such as an ex-combatant public works scheme could be sequenced together with a reintegration programme, and could serve as a quick-start element of a larger programme. However, history has shown this is not equivalent to reintegration and if not paired with true reintegration programming, it can simply create a holding pattern from which the ex-combatants are easily remobilized.
- \ Flexible sequencing wherein reintegration services are provided followed by disarmament. This is particularly aligned with the community-based approaches and is a way to build trust with informal fighting forces such as militias. As the fighting forces continue to change this may be a useful tool in addressing the expansion of less structured groups.
- \ Programming offered during ongoing conflict also has potential particularly when thinking about the less formal groups. However, as the conflict continues local militias continue to have the same drive for local protection and thus would be extremely likely to reform if needed and for the SPLA-IG and SPLA-IO such programming may be inefficient given the large numbers of soldiers that will eventually need to be served.
- \ Finally, a note on timing is that many programmes fail as they are based on unrealistic time estimates of programming planning, start-up and implementation. Careful attention should be given to this or it can lead to serious problems in both funding and participant intake.

Turning to beneficiary models (**Who?**), a very challenging and delicate question emerges. As outlined in the section on the current realities of South Sudan, the tense social relations in the country at this time must be taken into account. Communities are less likely to be amenable to ex-combatants receiving services while communities are left out. At the same time, combatants have honed their fighting skills and will be able to repurpose those skills toward mayhem if left unaddressed. Therefore, the highest potential is found in looking at a hybrid model where certain elements are targeted to the individual ex-combatants and others are broadly offered to the community and potentially also to ex-combatants. In the community-focused aspect, the design could draw on the approach of requiring a certain balance of ex-combatant participation or allow ex-combatant partici-

pation. Services provided at the community level and involving the community reflect best practices in many fields. However, limiting programming to community inclusive/non-targeted services has been seen to be ineffective. Providing services to the families of ex-combatants is an approach that shows potential in providing a safety net for the ex-combatants and therein strengthening the likelihood of successful reintegration.

For any DDR programme in South Sudan, better force size estimates will be required and will need to be surveyed. In addition, different armed groups need to be profiled to ascertain their reasons for taking up arms. Some reasons for taking arms could be matched up with reintegration options/design.

There will also be an important decision point in looking at how to best address youth in this programme. The large numbers of youth that have been mobilized raises an often discussed challenge of how best to serve youth – whether through a child or adult DDR programme, or through a youth-at-risk approach.

For the unofficial fighting groups it will need to be determined if they are included in this programming or addressed through a different mechanism. Due to the proliferation of such groups and their impact on the country it is unrealistic to leave them unaddressed.

Regarding service location (**Where?**) the basic options include providing services at a centralized facility or facilities such as an existing military facility, a specifically built transitional facility or training centre, at localized centres or organizations, or provided at the individual communities. This determination can only be made with significant up to date details including: current state of central and local facilities, current state of the roads and access to either central facilities or local centres, current state of the roads and access to local areas, equity of services available for all groups if a certain location design is chosen, and any agreements by the political parties on any cantonment to be employed. The decisions made on service location have major impacts on both budget and timing and must be made with great care.

Developmentally it is encouraged to provide services as locally as possible. However, given the destruction of infrastructure including training facilities, the ongoing instability and encumbered access to local areas at this time, it is likely that a hybrid model of services provided at centralized facilities for targeted ex-combatant aspects of the programme and then at the communities for the services available to community members is the most realistic approach possible.

Looking at programming service delivery (**How?**), given the geographic spread, large number of potential participants, and duration of need a whole of government approach should be encouraged and utilization of ministry services should be utilized where possible. Unfortunately, due to the destruction of services and facilities since 2013 from already very constrained levels, models which depend extensively on referral to other services may be unrealistic given the scale and time pressure that will face this programme.

Therefore realistically, programming is primarily likely to be implemented through specifically contracted services: i.e. contracting international NGOs, local NGOs or work with civil society groups to implement the work. However, all such organizations should be encouraged to partner with government entities and facilities where feasible and any facilities or services developed for this programme should be designed to streamline with other development and recovery programming so the facilities may be handed over and utilized sustainably by the appropriate ministries in the future.

Through this exploration of a wide variety of innovative reintegration options and their potential fit and use for South Sudan the above outlined approaches show the greatest potential for consideration by South Sudanese policy makers when looking to answer the why, what, who, when, where and how for any potential transition of forces to civilian lives.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| ACR | Colombian Agency for Reintegration |
| AF | Armed Force |
| AG | Armed Group |
| ANSA | Armed Non-State Actors |
| AoAV | Action on Armed Violence |
| APD | Action for Peace and Development |
| BICC | Bonn International Center for Conversion |
| CRC | Centre Résolution Conflicts |
| DDM | Disarmament and Dismantlement of militias |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DDRR | Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration |
| FORNET | Format, Orientation and Rehabilitation by means of Narrative Exposure Therapy |
| ICRS | Information, Counseling and Referral System |
| IDDRS | Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| ISMs | Interim Stabilization Measures |
| JMCC | Joint Military Ceasefire Commission |
| PTSD | Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder |
| RDD | Reintegration, Disarmament, Demobilization |
| SPLA-IG | Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Government |
| SPLA-IO | Sudan People's Liberation Army – In Opposition |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| STYL | Sustainable Transformation of Youth in Liberia |
| TATP | Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme |
| TDRP | Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program |
| UN | United Nations |

| | |
|------|---------------------------------------|
| WB | World Bank |
| VSLA | Village Savings and Loan Associations |
| YOP | Youth Opportunities Program |

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