8 Policies in Sudan and Peasant Livelihood: Correspondences and Contradictions

Whereas throughout the previous chapters the focus of the analysis has been on the yardsticks determining peasant actions, in this chapter the livelihood approach is set against the Sudanese policies. Policy sectors relevant for peasant livelihood are agriculture, protection of the environment, trade, food distribution, women, labour markets and migration, social services and administration. Three questions must be considered concerning policy on these sectors: Did it extend peasant livelihood options? Did it reduce them? Or did it have neither of these two effects?

SUDANESE POLICIES BETWEEN 1956 AND 1989

The three decades between Independence and 1989 correspond with three major policy shifts. Between 1956 and 1969, two parliamentary and one military government directed their economic policies primarily to developing industries and infrastructure. During the 1970s, the Nimeiri government established an open door policy to attract foreign investors. The crises of the 1980s brought immense policy challenges on all levels.

Policies Between 1956 and 1969

During this period the state ran a few large-scale industries based on raw materials, whereas light industries were managed privately. Two-thirds of the manufacturing value added consisted of consumer goods such as food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing and leather, only 7 per cent were capital goods, and more than one-quarter were intermediate goods such as chemicals, petrol, plastic, metal products, machinery, mineral and wood products. Tax exemptions, release
from customs duties for machinery and spare parts, loans from the state-owned Industrial Bank, and import barriers were the main policies directed to industrialization (Mahmoud, 1984, p. 58). However, as a whole the industrial sector has never exceeded 15 per cent of the GDP. Dependence on import of industrial goods increased (Hansohm, 1993a, p. 398).

Investments in infrastructure and social services favoured the urban areas and the Gezira. The inhabitants of the rural areas frequently helped themselves, constructing clinics and schools, but they suffered from lack of equipment, medicines, and qualified personnel. The literacy rate of rural children rapidly rose after Independence. With regard to health services, however, the majority of the rural population depended on traditional healers (Statistikhes Bundesamt, 1985, p. 31).

To get a financial basis for industrialization, the governments promoted exporting agricultural raw materials, primarily sorghum, oilseeds, livestock, cotton and gum Arabic. The state itself mainly engaged in developing irrigated agriculture. It also stimulated expansion of mechanized rainfed agricultural schemes supplying commercial producers with roads, technical advice and subsidized oil and facilitating imports of equipment. The state-owned Agricultural Bank provided loans and assisted the scheme owners in storage and crop marketing. Input costs were low, because the crops were mostly produced with low-paid seasonal labour and without fertilizers. If the soil of one scheme was exhausted, another scheme was opened up. Large areas outside the land allotted by the government were also put under mechanized cultivation without official interference (Mahmoud, 1984, p. 48). Sorghum and sesame exports brought much foreign currency to Sudan. Many government officials were involved in this lucrative business (Oesterdiekhoff, 1983, pp. 146–57, and 1988). Nomads and peasants who customarily used these areas were compelled to shift their pastures and fields to unoccupied, less fertile areas. The supply of the 'traditional' agricultural subsector with finance, equipment and infrastructure was negligible.

Political rule was in the hands of the riverain elite who tried to impose an 'Arab' and 'Islamic' identity on the heterogenous population. The socio-cultural identities of the peasant population on the periphery of Sudan were not reflected in the power apparatus, which was based on traditional loyalties of Muslim Sudanese towards the Umma and Khairiyah sects. The riverain dominance was the ultimate reason for the civil war in south Sudan between 1955 and 1972. Also
other non-Muslim and ethno-regional groups as well as the ‘modern forces’ – the intellectuals, professionals and workers – became disillusioned with the riverain-based system of rule. They rose in opposition against the regimes of the 1960s. In 1969 a military coup led by Jaafar al-Nimeiri opened the second phase of Sudanese development after Independence.

**Policies during the 1970s**

After nationalizing private enterprises between 1969 and 1972, the Nimeiri government shifted to an open door policy for private investment. The conditions were favourable, since Nimeiri had fixed the end of the civil war in the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. The new economic policy was intended to diversify agricultural production by increasing wheat and groundnut cultivation in the irrigated subsector. Foreign capital to be invested preferably in export-oriented industries was attracted, guaranteeing exemptions from tax on imported raw materials and free repatriation of capital. Although the government declared that it aimed at developing the rural areas, the bulk of investments took place in those areas where infrastructural facilities already were available, that was in Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Medani. Development was regarded as a matter of large funds and high technology during the ‘breadbasket strategy’. Supported by Arab funds, the state made huge investments in sugar refineries, animal fattening schemes, and meat and dairy production. Joint ventures between Sudanese private and public companies and foreign enterprises emerged. Frequently, members of the government privately entered this business (Oesterdiekhoff, 1983, p. 67). The government guaranteed the companies cheap access to land, water, and electricity, and long-term tax exemption. The agricultural export commodities could compete at the world market, because the wages of the agricultural labour force were kept low. Unions for land labourers were not permitted (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 13).

Still, apparently the open door policies of the 1970s were not open enough. According to criticism from the World Bank (The World Bank, 1986, 1987) and several economists, the private sector did not expand sufficiently. Producer price controls (Ibrahim, 1989, p. 6) and a ‘web of regulations’ (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 9) hampered investment and production and stifled the initiatives of private entrepreneurs. Overvalued exchange rates and a lack of credit facilities, partly because credits were drained away by the government, deterred
potential investors. The dependence of private enterprises on imports remained very high, because the public sector industries did not provide inputs. The 'bread basket strategy' was regarded as a failure (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 10).

The development policies of the Nimeiri government cared only little for the 'traditional' agricultural subsector where small peasants produced 55 to 60 per cent of the domestic food crops of sorghum, millet, fruit, and vegetables and 30 per cent of the export crops of livestock and gum Arabic. The budget for this sector was only 3 per cent of the total agrarian investments. What is more, this little share was mainly invested in mechanization and the establishment of ranches, not in peasant production (Hansohm, 1993a, p. 399). This was facilitated by the Unregistered Land Act of 1971. Peasants were repeatedly driven away from their customary fields, pastures, and watering places. Both clearing the land for mechanized farming and opening up peasant agriculture on precarious soils accelerated deforestation. Dwindling bush and forests changed the local humidity level and contributed to reduced rainfall. Clearing huge areas exhausted soils and accelerated topsoil erosion (Mahmoud, 1984, p. 50). Peasant access to fertile land and wood was reduced further. Droughts became more frequent and more intensive. Supply of wild fruit decreased. In many parts of Sudan, gum Arabic could no longer be tapped, because the trees had been felled. Persistent erosion of the peasants' productive basis enhanced the necessity to secure livelihood through markets, the labour market as well as commodity markets. Agricultural commercialization tightened the governmental grip on the peasants' produce (Oesterdiekhoff, 1980, p. 151). Especially the price policy with regard to export crops was a means by which the state class extracted and appropriated an economic rent from the peasantry (Oesterdiekhoff, 1988, p. 67). The peasants benefitted little from selling their surplus. They had to provide their cash needs increasingly by migrant labour. Nevertheless, the government did not implement particular policies to deal with the rapidly increasing potential labour force agglomerating around the high-technology agro-industries, which could not absorb them. The purchasing power of the peasants, be they engaged in cash crop production or as low-paid seasonal labourers in agricultural schemes, remained low. A substantial domestic market for mass consumer goods could not emerge (Hansohm, 1993a, p. 398).

Also with regard to skilled labour, the investments of the 1970s did not initiate a major turnaround. Most of the skilled labour and
managers needed were imported from the industrialized countries. Many Sudanese who were trained in the new firms, after a short period of practical work left Sudan for the Arab oil-exporting countries. The government did not significantly intervene to stop the brain drain. It was much more interested in gaining foreign exchange through remittances and in obtaining an increase of national per capita income (Hansohm, 1993a, p. 28).

During the 1970s investments in primary health care and education services in the rural areas continued. In 1973, 32.0 per cent of the male and 11.8 per cent of the female population were literate, and in 1977/78 4964 primary, 850 secondary, 102 high secondary, and 30 technical schools existed in Sudan. In addition, 1944 medical doctors, 2355 medical assistants, and 12 649 nurses were active in the country, most of them, however, in Khartoum (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1985, p. 35).

The Nimeiri government implemented its policies by centralized rule. The only political actors admitted were the Sudanese Socialist Party and dependent mass organizations, such as the Sudanese Women’s Union, the youth organization, the regimental forces, pastoralists, farmers, and the trade unions. In the course of his rule, Nimeiri coopted the leaders of the former main parties *Umma* and DUP and in 1983 also those of the Muslim Brotherhood in his regime. Local, district, and regional councils replaced the traditional administrative system. They were largely staffed with civil servants originating in the riverain urban areas. Like the former rulers, the Nimeiri government intended to build the nation on the basis of ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ values. Because of the top-down approach of this system, peasants had no word in it. They did not benefit from it and therefore they frequently avoided contact with the new institutions or utilized them for their own purposes. If rural groups formed political movements, the government branded them as divisive and even as racist. The suppression of cultural identities in favour of an artificial common culture laid the foundation for violence among ethnic groups and against the state (Harir, 1994b, p. 45).

**Policies of the 1980s**

The ‘bread basket strategy’ rapidly increased the bill for imports of capital goods. In 1978 the high deficit in the national balance of payment pushed the government to apply for an IMF loan. The IMF in turn demanded structural adjustments in order to get the
Sudanese economy stabilized. The programme aimed at increasing cotton production, raising the producer prices, improving capacity utilization in the agro-industries, and making Sudan self-sufficient in refined sugar and textile production. It was financed by foreign aid and loans from the World Bank and the International Development Association.

However, whereas in the beginning of the 1980s the productivity of cotton could be increased, from 1983 onwards it stagnated and later on fell (Ibrahim, 1989, p. 3). Cotton, sesame, gum Arabic and ground-nuts lost international competitiveness. Sudan's world share of merchandise exports decreased by 46 per cent. Dependence on imports of capital goods, intermediate commodities, and consumer goods continued to grow. Hence the national economy became more and more vulnerable to the fluctuations of the world market prices. Foreign debt increased and the balance of payments remained highly negative (Wohlmut, 1992, p. 3).

Restrictive regulations of the Sudanese governments hampered production not only in large industrial companies, but also in small private enterprises and workshops. Moreover, the industrialized countries maintained high import barriers for processed goods, thus constraining further the development of processing industries in Sudan. However, the contribution of small investors to the industrial value added was more than 50 per cent by the end of the 1980s (Hansohm, 1991). This indicates that the small and labour-intensive industries, which were mostly active in the informal sector, were better at matching the Sudanese economic conditions than large-scale capital-intensive industries. They had the capacity to provide inputs for agricultural production and to process agricultural outputs and they absorbed peasant wage labour (Hansohm, 1993b). Nevertheless, promoting small-scale manufacturing was not on the agenda of policymaking in the 1980s. The share of industrial production in the GDP declined during the decade.

The adjustment policies, intending to modernize the 'traditional' sector, targeted only commercial farmers. The World Bank channelled 80 per cent of its financial assistance into the irrigated, 18 per cent into the 'traditional', and 2 per cent into the mechanized sector (Ibrahim, 1989, p. 6). Measures to improve peasant methods of production and to secure their subsistence by raising their productivity were not applied. An attempt to raise the producer prices did not reach the small rural producers due to the biased distributive system. Between 1976 and 1989, the income per capit decreased by 18 per
cent (Wohlmut, 1992, p. 3). The continuous promotion of exporting agricultural raw materials hindered horizontal and vertical diversification of the national production. Moreover, the export priority had a damaging effect on national food security.

From 1978 onwards, the state boosted exporting the staple crop of sorghum in order to improve the balances of trade and payment and, at the same time, to prevent producer prices from falling during the years of bumper crops. It encouraged private banks to provide the respective finance for the mechanized scheme owners. As a consequence, between 1979 and 1983, sorghum exports were three times as high as during the four years before, although production had increased only marginally. The grain mainly went to Saudi Arabia, which subsidized sorghum imports from Sudan until 1982. Abroad, a large share of sorghum was used to feed animals (Shepherd, 1988, pp. 61, 64). Even in 1983, when the crop failure due to the drought was already visible in west Sudan, sorghum was exported and not stored. The government did not prepare for an emergency. In contrast, in 1984 Nimeiri even tried to keep secret the famine.

Also at this time a small amount of sorghum was exported for a price per ton which was 375 per cent of the price of 1979 (Shepherd, 1988, p. 63). This indicates that the lobbies of the bankers, farmers, and merchants had the main influence on state actions. Only between July 1984 and September 1985 did the regional government of the Eastern Province, where the centre of sorghum production Gedaref is located, impose sorghum export controls on the merchants in order to keep the grain in the area for consumption. However, the other regional governments and the central government opposed this measure and nearly two million sacks of grain were illegally transported out of Gedaref. The main receiving areas were the centres of purchasing power in Sudan, that is Khartoum, Eastern and Central Region, whereas only a tiny amount of the grain was traded in Darfur. Only during the 1984/5 season was part of the irrigated crops replaced by sorghum, and its production doubled.

This shift in crop cultivation largely occurred due to the pressure of the Tenants’ Unions and the regional government of the Eastern Province against the Agricultural Bank of Sudan, which still demanded the cultivation of foreign exchange earning crops (Shepherd, 1988, p. 51). Food aid was distributed according to the availability of stored grain, but the deliveries were too little and reached only a minority of those in urgent need. After the overthrow of Nimeiri in April 1985, international relief organizations took over
the management of aid distribution. The main food securing policy of
the transitory government of 1985/6 was an export ban on sorghum.
Soon after, this was removed according to a policy recommendation
of the World Bank (Ibrahim, 1989, pp. 11, 24). This survey shows how
contrasting interests of merchants, regional governments, and banks
determined the Sudanese food policies. The uncoordinated policies
favoured the interests of the urban consumers and neglected those of
the rural ones.

The austerity policies had a devastating impact on health services.
Between 1980 and 1985, expenditures fell from 10 to 4 per cent of the
GDP, and the numbers of medical personnel, clinics, and hospitals did
not rise significantly. The urban bias of health supplies increased,
leaving large areas in rural Sudan without medical services. Educa-
tional services, however, were still extended. Between 1977 and 1985
the number of primary schools grew by more than one third, 58 per
cent of the Sudanese boys and 41 per cent of the girls were enrolled. In
addition, 3120 qor'an schools were available. Still, in rural Darfur and
south Sudan only one third of the children went to school. Hence,
nationwide only 61 per cent of the pupils finished primary school. The
number of secondary schools more than doubled, that of high
secondary schools more than tripled in this period (Statistisches Bun-
desamt, 1990a, pp. 27). However, due to the squeezed national budget,
the salaries of the teachers were kept very low. Therefore, during the
1980s the quality of education decreased.

Parallel to the austerity policies, the Nimeiri government took a
new turn in constructing a nation-state. Afraid of the power of the
combined interests of the south against the dominance of the riverain
north, it removed the relative autonomy guaranteed to the south in
the Addis Ababa Agreement. It split the south into three provinces
and made them dependent on the central government. Furthermore,
pressed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been coopted into
the government in order to be kept under control, Nimeiri made the
Islamic shari'a laws the penal code of Sudan. The result was the
second outbreak of civil war between the southern liberation army
SPLA and the government in 1983. Since then, the government has
spent about US$ 1 bn annually on the war against the SPLA, besides
financing the administration on province, regional, and district levels,
and the public corporations (Wohlmut, 1992, pp. 3, 10). This con-
tinued between 1985 and 1989, during the rules of the transitory and
democratic governments. At that time, state expenditures were about
twice as high as its revenues.
Policies in Sudan and Peasant Livelihood

The war in the south created new economic, social, and political problems. Hundreds of thousands of refugees moved north, concentrating in slums around the capital and the towns in the northern provinces. All three governments of the 1980s occasionally destroyed the informal settlements with bulldozers. Against the rising opposition of southerners and other ethno-regional groups, the state equipped tribal militias with weapons. The 'process of decentralization of violence' (Harir, 1994b, p. 50) was thus intensified.

The class which determined Sudanese policies comprised merchants, officers, and the educated bourgeoisie of the urban and riverain areas of the country. Their power base were the urban middle classes, the army, and, during the democratic phases, those parts of the rural population which traditionally were loyal to the Umma Party and the DUP. Also during the periods of democratic rule the governmental policies clearly favoured the urban and the riverain rural constituencies, whereas they passed over the needs of the rural periphery. Hence, industrialization and agricultural development remained concentrated in the capital (Khartoum-North), in Central Sudan along the Niles, and in Port Sudan. Although some small industries were spread to regional centres, the major part of the country remained rural, hardly industrialized, and with comparably little opening up by material infrastructure, schools and health services. The governments subsidized urban social services, mass consumption goods and semi-luxuries. The public sector rapidly expanded, accompanied by costly privileges for its employees. Mismanagement and inefficiency mounted, productivity decreased while the cost rose.

The adjustment programmes failed to bring the economic decline of the country to a halt, because they did not touch the structural problems of the Sudanese economy. Not only the Sudanese governments, but also IMF and World Bank experts have to be blamed for the rapid economic decline in Sudan. The economic programmes rather put the emphasis on price policies and export liberalization than on combatting the 'constancy of structural malformation' (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 12) of the economy and on securing food. Disagreements between IMF and the Sudanese governments frequently occurred, and for a time Sudan was even excluded from IMF membership. The reason of the quarrels was not that the governments queried the policy priorities of the IMF-imposed programmes, but mainly that they hesitated to cancel subsidies and devalue the Sudanese pound. Such measures would mainly have hit the urban
population and the subsequent political unrest might have endangered the power of the ruling class (Wohlmuth and Hansohm, 1987; Wohlmuth, 1992). In general, the economic policies of the 1980s failed to include the majority of the Sudanese in a beneficial development and even pushed many of them into poverty.

**Policy Impact on Peasant Livelihood**

The uncontrolled spread of mechanized agriculture forced peasants off their land. Most of them were not compensated at all. Many of them were driven to areas not appropriate for cultivation. Environmental problems mounted. The agricultural policies reduced the livelihood options of peasant crop production and animal husbandry.

These same policies together with industrial development in the capital and Central Sudan produced a large seasonal labour market for weeding and cash crop harvesting and a smaller one for unskilled industrial labour. On the one hand, these job opportunities were an extension of peasant livelihood options. On the other hand, the income was not sufficient to replace peasant agricultural production.

The loss of labour in the migrants’ home areas compelled those family members who remained there to produce cash crops and to engage in more diversified fields of production. The policy of governmental neglect forced many peasants to struggle for survival under adverse conditions. It could be argued that peasant livelihood options in the home areas were extended due to migration, but these options were rather niches of the economy, last resorts, which many people exhausted, but only with a huge effort. Only rich and middle-class families could improve livelihood security through considerable remittances from a male migrant household member.

Due to the hesitant supply of rural areas with schools, health, and infrastructural services, many young members of peasant families were attracted to migrate to these privileged areas. The educational and health gap between central Sudan and the towns, on the one hand, and rural areas, on the other hand, increased. The decline of the services since the 1980s has further aggravated the problem, which became most obvious during the famine of 1983–85. Most of the deaths occurred due to lack of clean water and health services in the drought centres. So the biased policies with regard to social services in the rural areas increased mortality and diseases. They ultimately reduced peasant livelihood options.
The policy of subsidizing consumer goods primarily benefitted the urban population, because in rural areas the diet was very simple and its components were largely self-produced. Only in the case of emergency deliveries of subsidized grain was peasant livelihood positively affected, if the grain was not diverted but distributed to them.

Producer price controls affected the commercial farmers in the parastatal schemes of the irrigated subsector. Prices for peasant products were determined by merchants' oligopsonies as soon as they left the local markets. The governmental policy of neglect towards market structures in rural areas thus deprived peasants from obtaining fair producer prices for cash crops. Nevertheless, increased engagement in trade was an extension of peasant livelihood options which also benefitted women. Low producer prices, though, maintained dependence on subsistence production and required continuous involvement in other spheres of production and income acquisition. Cash crop production alone was not sufficient to secure livelihood in rural areas.

POLICY CHANGES SINCE 1989

In June 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power after a coup d'état, led by General Omar al-Bashir. The programme of this regime promised a turnaround in national development. Based on an Islamic social and political framework and on the principles of an Islamic economy (Choudhury and Malik, 1992), self-reliance, regionally integrated development, preservation of the environment, and fair distribution of wealth were among the main policy objectives. Agriculture was proclaimed as the backbone of the economy and the small farmers were to benefit first. The ‘Statement on Behalf of the National Conference for Economic Salvation’ of November 1989 propagated policies towards self-sufficiency and aimed at improved infrastructure and food security as well as production with local resources for local demand (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 22). Agro-based small and rural industries were planned to be supported with priority. Increasing production and investment and diversifying exports were announced as important targets of economic policies (Wohlmuth, 1993, p. 426). In 1990–91, the aims to liberalize, privatize and deregulate the economy were added to the programme (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 25). First steps, allegedly leading towards these ends, have been taken. The sectoral policies of the Bashir government are pointed out in the following sections.
A New Administrative Framework

The new political system, which is in the process of implementation now, is called *shura* and based on Islamic principles. It implies a profound transformation of political life. The administrative body is composed of congresses and committees, ranging from the local up to the central level. The president will be elected directly by the people. Sectoral conferences comprising delegates of the economic sector, the social and cultural sector, of the youth and students, and of women, have been established on the level of the federal states. Four further sectoral conferences, covering defence and security, diplomacy, administration and law, have been placed on the central level. The national congress elects the national assembly which includes delegates of the regional electoral districts and of the sectorial conferences of the federal states. Additional delegates, among them members of the national sectoral conferences, ministers, governors and the heads of people's committees, are appointed by the president. According to this system, the national assembly will have the legislative power and control over the head of the executive, who will be appointed by the president. However, also in this system the main power remains concentrated in the hands of the president, thus perpetuating central rule (Tetzlaff, 1993, p. 172).

In February 1992, the transitional National Assembly, which consisted of 300 members, convened for the first time. At the beginning of 1994, Sudan was divided into 26 states according to the new system.¹ New governors were elected. Voter registration for election of the state assembly started in January 1995 (*Horn of Africa Bulletin*, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan.–Feb. 1995). According to recent publications, the candidates for elections are carefully screened by the NIF organs (Harir, 1994b, p. 53). Also during local elections, it is apparently a common practice to accept the results only if they comply with the aims of the NIF. Reportedly, after defeats of NIF candidates, the winners of elections were arrested (*Sudan Human Rights Voice*, vol. 3, no. 12, December 1994).

Within the new system, formal authority has been returned to the native administration (Gray and Kevane, 1993, p. 15). The background for this policy could be an interest on the part of the government to replace the secular and urban class of council leaders and judges by conservative rural and locally influential leaders. The traditional leaders seem to have succeeded in formally filling the previous power vacuum. Their new legitimacy, however, is not based on their
tribal history and charismatic personalities, as it was in former times, but on the obligation to exercise the Islamic religion in the sense prescribed by the government (Gray and Kevane, 1993, p. 19). Apparently, the government tries vigorously to implement relations of hierarchy and loyalty between traditional local and national authorities. Considering the dwindling respect among many, especially younger, peasants towards the traditional leaders, it is questionable whether this policy will be successful.

The previous political organizations and institutions have been banned. Many judges have been replaced by supporters of the government's ideological programme, which since 1991 has obliged Muslims to fully obey the shari'a laws (Amnesty International Focus, vol. 25, no. 2, Feb. 1995). Most of the newspapers have been closed down. The trade unions have been unified into one single union under the supervision of the Minister of Justice. Many members of banned organizations, among them a high share of professionals, have withdrawn from Sudan and try to work in exile. The number of medical doctors in Sudan has dropped to less than 1000 persons due to detentions and emigration (Sudan Human Rights Voice, vol. 3, issue 12, Dec. 1994). Other oppositional people have become underground activists inside Sudan. Resistance of mainly urban-based groups, pupils, students, and women is suppressed cruelly. Violent attacks by oppositional groups have been targetting banks, buildings of the NIF, and security officers (Sudan Update, Chronology of January–April 1994).

A high degree of state-sanctioned violence is committed in order to streamline the population throughout Sudan in the direction ideologically wanted by the government. Whereas as early as 1989–90, 24.5 per cent of government spending went to the military, the expenditures for military and paramilitary armed forces and militias have since been increased even more (Gray and Kevane, 1993, p. 25). Even al-Bashir recently admitted that the war hinders development throughout Sudan (Reuter of 21 Dec. 1994, quoted in Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan.–Feb. 1995). On the other hand, payments of public employees' salaries again have been delayed for months (Sudan Update, vol. 5, no. 16, 30 September 1994). This indicates that dealing with the state's financial resources continues to be biased.

The formation of ethno-regional interest groups in the periphery of Sudan points to a high degree of dissatisfaction and a feeling of being misrepresented by the new system on the part of the rural population. Whereas inter-ethnic violence flared up again between the Fur and the Baggara, the Zaghawa and the Arabs in Darfur (Sudan Update, vol. 5,
no. 20, 30 Nov. 1994), and between two sub-groups of the Nuer in southeast Sudan (*Horn of Africa Bulletin*, vol. 6 no. 5, Sept.–Oct. 1994), armed resistance against the government broke out in the Beja hills (*Sudan Democratic Gazette*, Nov. 1994), the Nuba mountains, and the Ingeressa hills, where mechanized schemes were attacked and burnt (Mohamed Salih, 1989, p. 109). The retaliation of the government forces combined with Arab militias was cruel and seemingly intended to wipe out the resisting population (recent issues of *Sudan Update, Africa Watch, Horn of Africa Bulletin*, and Amnesty International reports).

**Agricultural Policies**

According to the proclamations of the Bashir government, the sub-sectors directly relevant for peasant livelihood will become the heart of the Sudanese policies. One of the first changes was implemented in the irrigated sector though. Wheat production was extended at the expense of cotton (issues of *Sudanew* between 1989 and 1994; Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 29). However, peasants mainly eat sorghum or millet or root crops, whereas wheat is the staple food of the urban population. Propagated under the slogan ‘we eat what we grow’, this background rather points to a policy of ‘we grow what we eat’, which is just another expression for food import substitution. ‘We’ does not refer to the principle of ‘small farmers first’, but, as was common before, to the urban citizens who are strategically more important than other groups, because they are more likely to overthrow governments than peasants.

The policy of producing previously imported crops in the country is pursued without considering comparative advantages or cost. Besides wheat, also rice, lentils, and maize production have been increased. These crops, except for lentils, need a lot of water, an extremely scarce resource in Sudan, and, produced in monocultures as they are, a lot of fertilizers, which have to be imported (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 29). Nevertheless, the government gets some foreign assistance for restoring the irrigated subsector. The Islamic Development Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development agreed on a loan of US$ 27 million to restore irrigation canals, provide crop protection, improve seeds, and further agricultural research and rural development. The OPEC granted a loan of US$ 5 million for restoring irrigation projects in northern Sudan (*Sudan Update*, vol. 5 no. 16, 30 September 1994). American businessmen, potential investors in sugar production, sugar
processing and grain production, were welcomed by the Minister of Industry and invited to start business in the White Nile or Northern state. The aim of increasing production of export crops by attracting foreign investors and, thus, a move towards liberalizing the economy, is clearly visible from these examples.

Sorghum production has also been stimulated, yet not by improving the means of production in the 'traditional' sector but by further extending mechanized rainfed farming, mainly to the west and south of Sudan. Credit has been allocated to commercial farmers and not to peasants (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 26). The area of mechanized rainfed production has been increased to 7.5 million hectares, whereas the area under 'traditional' rainfed cultivation comprises only 3.8 million hectares (Suliman, 1993). This is not a policy change compared to previous governments, but the bias towards commercial medium- and large-scale farmers is even more pronounced. The displacement of peasants continues more violently than before.

Although information is scarce on the implementation of rural development policies, the available evidence admits the preliminary conclusion that the main agricultural policies are not directed to improving peasant livelihood. From the peasants' perspective, they might not even deviate significantly from the policies of former governments.

**Policies towards Food Security**

Before 1989, some rural development projects had been run by foreign donors in western Sudan, but they were scattered and lacked a comprehensive concept. The Bashir government forced several aid organizations out of the country. Due to human rights violations by the present government, international donors also reduced aid flows to Sudan. Only humanitarian and food aid have been continued in some parts of the country, especially in the south, mainly by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the European Union.

At the beginning of 1994, among others the FAO warned that famine was impending in Sudan (Sudan Update, Chronology of January–April 1994; FR, 4 August 1994; Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 4, Aug.–Sept. 1994). The WFP reported that its food deliveries by air into southern Sudan through Khartoum, Kenya or Uganda had been interrupted and severely reduced by fighting and lack of funds (Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 4, Aug.–Sept. 1994). Because of continuous involvement in the war, the present government was held

Information on the distributive policy of the present government is highly contradictory. Whereas on the one hand the government gave out that it would establish strategic stocks of grain with surplus sorghum, on the other hand it declared that it would retreat from interventions in the grain market. At the same time, the government continued bartering sorghum for Libyan oil (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 31).

Even the leader of the Sudanese Islamists, Turabi, has admitted that economic distress in Sudan is still worsening. Members of the government said that poverty was spreading and ordinary people could not afford basic necessities, although wages have increased (Radio Omdurman, quoted in Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan.–Feb. 1995). Malnutrition is said to exceed 35 per cent among children under five (Sudan Human Rights Voice, vol. 3 issue 12, December 1994). To facilitate importing consumer goods, the Sudanese government has lifted nearly completely the import ban which it had gradually introduced during its first years of rule. At the beginning of 1995, the cost of imports was twice as high as export earnings (Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan.–Feb. 1995).

Apparently, consistent policies of improving food security of the rural population have not been carried out. The government seems rather to consider food security as a local or regional policy issue and shifts responsibility for food security to the new administrative units. The government does not seem better prepared to cope with famine than governments before. Neither a policy of carrying on the war, nor central grain storing, nor leaving grain trade to the merchants’ oligopoly has a livelihood-securing effect on peasants, except maybe on those living in central Sudan.

**Policies to Preserve the Environment**

According to its declarations, the government is conscious of the need to protect the environment. At the beginning of its rule, it intended to launch a programme to combat disasters and drought (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 40). It is not known whether this has started. A first step to
reduce deforestation has been the establishment of a National Forest Company which is responsible for environmental control, fuel wood supply, and provision of timber. The United Nations Organization has started a project of rangeland rehabilitation in cooperation with local farmers and nomadic herders, aiming at restoring the plant cover and protecting natural species. The government has planned to spend US$ 100 000 over five years for water development, soil analysis and the construction of local pharmaceutical stores (Sudan Update, vol. 5, no. 19, 10 November 1994). However, the areas where these projects are planned have not been indicated.

These programmes do not touch the roots of the environmental problems in Sudan. Continuing expansion of mechanized schemes highly contradicts policies to protect the environment and gives rise to the impression that these measures will be a drop in the ocean. However, the approach apparently favoured by the present Sudanese government to tackle the environmental problems within small regional units corresponding to the new federal system might have some practical advantages. Up to now, however, no livelihood-securing effects of the environmental policies can be identified for the peasants.

Migration Policies

The migration policies of the Bashir government can be divided into direct and indirect ones. Because the indirect policies could be interpreted as causes for increased migration, they are presented first.

1. By intensifying the war against the SPLA, the Bashir government induced more mass flights across the southern borders and to north Sudan. Most of the internal refugees live in spontaneous settlements in the capital and other bigger towns, in south Darfur and south Kordofan, along the White and the Blue Niles, or in refugee camps established in these areas. The living conditions of the refugees are the poorest to be found in the country (Ibrahim 1990, 1991b; Grawert, 1993).

2. The regime of Bashir supported Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis of 1990–91. The tension between the Sudanese government and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait led to the large-scale expulsion of Sudanese labour migrants from these countries and to withdrawal of financial assistance from most of the Arab oil-exporting countries. Because the most important development plans elaborated with the IMF had been based on Arab financing, an agreement

3. The continuous neglect of the rural areas with regard to social services and improvement of livelihood security increases internal migration in search of income in towns and agricultural schemes.

4. The contradictory industrial policy, which includes proclamations of liberalization and, at the same time, persistent administrative and bureaucratic constraints like price regulations, credit rationing and foreign exchange regulations, has made entrepreneurs and potential investors wary. Furthermore, the Investment Act of 1990 has been directed only at large companies, whereas the largest potential of appropriate industrialization exists within the small-scale industries sector. Low capacity use in the main industries due to inappropriate incentives like high protection rates and insufficient supply of raw materials have led to a shrinking demand for labour (Wohlmuth, 1992, p. 32). Unemployment has been rising among all sections of the society including the labour migrants.

The government implemented selective policies to cope with the problems the society faces due to large-scale migration. The following offers a more detailed explanation of the preceding points.

- **addendum 1** The direct policies towards the war refugees have been large-scale enforced resettlements. Many refugees who had come to the capital repeatedly have been transported to places at a radius of about 40 km around Khartoum where there is lack of water, health services, education, and job opportunities (Sudan Update, vol. 5, no. 19, 10 November 1994; Africa Watch, vol. 6, no. 9, November 1994). Peasants have been resettled from so-called ‘unstable’ areas to agricultural production schemes. Acts of brutality in the Nuba mountains and subsequent large-scale resettlement of Nuba to North Kordofan as well as compulsory work in mechanized agricultural schemes have been reported by human rights’ organizations (Africa Watch, vol. 6, no. 9, November 1994).

- **addendum 2** Clear information on policies with regard to labour migrants who returned from the Gulf is not available. Reportedly, skilled Sudanese labour is again in demand in the oil-rich Arab countries. The government made it known that it intends to mobilize remittances of international labour migrants for investments. However, until recently the prevailing exchange rates have not been
Policies in Sudan and Peasant Livelihood

attractive to potential investors in the productive sectors (Wohl- muth, 1993, p. 429). In mid-1994, the central bank of Sudan issued deregulation of the hard currency exchange rates (Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 4, Aug.–Sept. 1994). Apparently only construction is booming again. Large private villas mushroom in Khartoum, possibly financed by expatriate revenues and probably by government officials who got favoured access to loans. According to estimations, every Sudanese migrant to the Gulf supports an average of ten people inside Sudan (Sudan Update, vol. 5, no. 19, 10 November 1994).

- addendum 3 and 4 Direct policies concerning the internal labour migrants have not been announced. But the policies of neglect of the ‘traditional’ and support of the ‘modern’ sector have an impact. Whereas the first produces causes of migration due to lack of income opportunities, decline of agricultural production, and lack of social services, the second promises income opportunities and better services. However, it is doubtful whether the livelihood options in the Sudanese receiving areas of internal migrants have been improved, given the huge competition of the refugees and displaced people and the decline of the industrial sector. At least, unskilled labour migrants probably have less chances than before 1989.

To conclude, the negative impact of the migration policies of the Bashir government outweigh the positive implications on peasant livelihood.

Policies Regarding Women

Women have been one of the first targets of the Bashir government. According to Bashir ‘...the ideal Sudanese woman...took care of herself and her reputation, cared for her husband and her children, did her household duties, and was a devoted Muslim’ (presentation of President Al-Bashir to the Women’s Conference, Khartoum, January 1990, published in Africa Watch, vol. 2, no. 12, April 1990).

Policies towards women started with the dismissal of thousands of government employees, who had been working in public offices, during purges in the public sector soon after the coup of June 1989. From then on the government has been issuing various decrees and orders by which women’s appearance and behaviour in public is to be controlled. Women are prohibited from working outside the house after 5.00 p.m., they have to take the back seats in transport in order to
avoid sitting in front of men, to stay apart from men in public meetings, and to cover body and head by loose garments. These rules are controlled by several institutions, including the Public Order Police, the Popular Police Forces, the Popular Committees, and the Guardians of Morality civic group. Women who do not obey these orders in the opinion of these guards have been arrested or lashed. Most of the victims of the cruelties of the militias have been women and children who were displaced by the war. If these mostly southern Sudanese or Nuba women try to eke out an existence by selling beer or by prostitution, they are imprisoned, lashed and frequently tortured (Africa Watch, vol. 6, no. 9, November 1994).

In most of the rural areas, women have been used to working outside the house in tea and food stalls, in the fields and at the markets. These occupations were most important in order to compensate for crop failures, to bridge income gaps caused by the economic decline or men’s labour migration, and to cope with other adverse conditions. The governmental decrees saying that women’s work is restricted to day time before sunset thus strongly constrain women’s opportunities to secure their and their families’ livelihood. Agricultural work during the peak seasons, for example, cannot be completed during day time. Sale of food and drinks is usually most profitable not only during breakfast time, but also after sunset at dinner time. If wood needs to be collected, women now have to return earlier from the fields. The national government has not really tried to implement these decrees forcibly, but in some areas, local forces shut down women’s market activities and intervened in beer brewing (Gray and Kevane, 1993, p. 19).

Also some of the structural adjustment policies carried out by the government particularly affected women. Being responsible for providing food for their families, women, urban rather than rural women, were the first to feel the effects of higher prices of basic food due to reduced subsidies. They felt it the more, if the family income decreased due to unemployment of family members. Especially hard hit were those women who came to town as drought or war refugees and did not find relief but again problems in access to food. As responsible persons for upbringing children, women have been directly affected by the decline of the health system, expensive medicines, and costly medical treatment. Many women have participated in demonstrations against the high cost of living.

Increased food prices as well as poorer but more expensive health services occurred without a corresponding extension of entitlements
for women. As a consequence, the state functions of providing social security have been shifted to the unpaid labour of women. For example, the sick, instead of being in hospital, are frequently cared for at home. Food consumption within poor households is reduced or people change to food with a lower nutritional value. The ability of women to care for their families has shrunk. This might already have adversely affected the ability of the labour force to carry out economic activities (Elson, 1991).

Probably to counterbalance these adverse effects, the government has not opposed local development projects with a woman-oriented approach. In the village of Bireka in Kordofan, the Regional Ministry of Cooperatives and UNICEF organized a women’s grain bank project in 1989 (Gray and Kevane, 1993, p. 10). SOS-Sahel started a natural resource management project in El-Ain area in Kordofan in cooperation with peasant women and local authorities at the beginning of the 1990s (Myers and Hamid, 1994). In Kutum a GTZ-sponsored rural rehabilitation project has put an emphasis on women in horticulture (oral reports of Holter and Iken).

Restrictions on women’s movements and activities and ideologically biased decrees designed to force women’s behaviour into officially prescribed patterns have significantly hampered women’s efforts to secure their families’ livelihoods. The frequent reports on violations of human rights affecting Sudanese women and on large-scale displacement and aerial bombing of refugee camps raise severe doubts about the real intentions of the present government with regard to women’s livelihood security.

**Policies with Regard to Social Services**

The background on which social services are rendered under the Bashir government is Islamic society, ruled by the *shari‘a* laws and spearheaded by a government which allegedly has been formed according to the decisions of the *shura*. Within this framework, the government has announced a new Islamic social welfare system. It consists of Islamic funding principles, support of Islamic relief and self-help initiatives, and of the attempt to forge an Islamic society according to the ideological priorities of the fundamentalists.

Islamic funding has been based mainly on *zakat*, a tax which is imposed on Muslims who have capital savings, assets, or livestock. Investments or social expenditures like housing or medical treatment can be deducted from the *zakat* obligation (Choudhury and Malik,
1992, pp. 43, 95). Zakat is collected by the state administration and annually redistributed to the poor. No figures about the amount distributed so far nor information on the addressees are available though.

The Sudanese health services have further declined between 1989 and today. According to the Sudan Doctors’ Union, the current health service budget amounts to less than 1 per cent of the GDP. Immunization campaigns dropped from covering 82 per cent of the children in 1989 to 20 per cent in 1993. The distribution of oral rehydration solution decreased from 7 million to 2 million sachets in the same period. Fees are charged for basic medical services, whereas until 1989 they had been free (Sudan Human Rights Voice, vol. 3, issue 1, December 1994). Islamic NGOs carry out relief work and medical treatment in the refugee camps and quarters inhabited by displaced people. However, several reports of Christian southern Sudanese say that converting to Islam is the precondition to obtaining aid from these NGOs.

Education apparently takes on a new shape under the Bashir government. According to scattered reports, militarization of the society has been promoted on a large scale. Many displaced children have been kidnapped and brought to so-called jihad ('holy war') education schools where they are trained to be the future mujahidin (warriors) of the Islamic state. Also higher education has been closely linked with participation in military training. In autumn 1994, a decree was released saying that the 33 000 Sudanese university students had to undergo six weeks of compulsory military training. The Ministry of Education announced that popular defence training would be the precondition for future university admissions (Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 5, Sept.–Oct. 1994). This points to an intensified strategy of the government to form an Islamic nation-state. According to Harir (1994b, p. 49) '...Islamic culture...is [regarded as]...the absolute value and the only "correct" culture that, if necessary, should be guarded and furthered by the mobilization of the body politic of the faithful by Holy War, Jihad...Citizenship is not coextensive with the political boundaries but with cultural boundaries.' Those who are not Islamic are practically – and, as Harir proves, also theoretically – considered non-Sudanese.

Austerity programmes primarily hit the displaced people and thus mainly southern Sudanese, because they are the poorest in Sudanese society. The primary, secondary, and high secondary schools previously open to displaced children have all been closed for this
group. Students' hostels have been shut as well, and free education and free feeding of students have been abolished (*Southern Sudanese Call*, Cairo–Egypt, October 1994).

The foundation of a multitude of civil and paramilitary organizations, many of them with control functions on other members of society, could be understood as a broad campaign to mobilize society towards the ideological aims of the government. By preoccupying so many young people with war, war-like activities, and obligatory military exercises, the government apparently tries to get people under its influence and to keep them active without commitment to substantial economic improvement. Bearing in mind the disastrous conditions of the national economy, it is questionable whether the Sudanese can be held under control this way for long.

**CHANGES OF PEASANT LIVELIHOOD: A SUMMARY**

A summary of the changes in peasant livelihood is presented with the help of the model. In Figure 8.1 the conditions of peasant livelihood in the north-western periphery of Sudan during the 1960s are shown, in Figure 8.2 a tentative visualization of the conditions at the beginning 1990s is provided.

By demarcating the respective areas white, the model shows that subsistence production, reciprocal redistribution and animal husbandry were main options available within peasant communities. Nomads crossed the borders of the communities into the ‘broader society’ in order to tend their flocks. Again this is indicated by a white area.

Cash crop production was rare due to lack of demand. Thus this segment is shaded. Access to consumer markets was still limited after Independence, and accordingly this area is shaded, too.

Seasonal wage labour was taken up only occasionally in the ‘broader society’, as is shown by the heavily shaded area on the community level and the lightly shaded sectional planes between seasonal wage labour and the ‘broader society’.

Women participated in economic activities on the community level, though to a relatively limited extent. The respective area is therefore shaded. Social services were rarely available in the rural areas, indicated by the shaded segment.

After three decades of formal independence, the livelihood conditions of the peasants in the periphery have changed considerably.
At first sight, the picture shows no white areas and has expanded. Nearly all areas indicating economic options are shaded. The background to this reduction of each single option is complex, as the previous sections revealed. A new mark in this figure is the cross. It represents a sign of conflict.

The model shows that at the beginning of the 1990s, subsistence production is no longer a secure livelihood option. Droughts, exhausted or marginal soils, and top soil erosion make cultivation a risky enterprise in north-western Sudan. The fertile soils further south are used by the indigenous peasants or occupied by privately or state-run mechanized schemes. Those who seek a new basis for peasant production in the sphere of the ‘broader society’ are in danger of running into conflicts with other people, as the crossed areas indicate.

Many peasants can no longer participate in reciprocal redistribution due to poverty. Instead, forms of dependent redistribution prevail. A formalized type of redistribution from rich to poor people is
zakat, informal types are the Islamic duty to give alms and political loyalty in exchange for loans or food. Joint saving, which had been common among women entrepreneurs, has declined, because women's small-scale enterprises have been limited to day time or completely closed down in the course of Islamization.

The nomads pursuing the option of animal husbandry face problems due to environmental degradation in the home areas and clashes with peasants or scheme owners in the sphere of the 'broader society'. This is indicated by the shaded and crossed areas.

Cash crop production and petty trade have been extended. However, these options cannot make good the losses which have occurred in the other sectors of livelihood, because a considerable share of the
profits is taken by middlemen and wholesalers. A number of peasants have left their home areas to produce cash crops elsewhere in the sphere of the 'broader society'. This option is limited, though, therefore the respective area is shaded.

The supply of consumer markets has been extended. But because the purchasing power has declined, access to these markets is limited. Thus the segment is shaded.

Unskilled wage labour in the 'broader society' has been extended. Although wages are still low and this option thus is not sufficient to secure peasant livelihood, at least seasonal employment in agriculture or jobs in the informal sector are available. Still, due to competition from displaced people, the supply is limited, and the risk of unemployment has increased. The reason for shading in this area is the reduced demand, not as in Figure 8.1 the short supply of labour.

Women's economic activities on the one hand have expanded to areas which had not been women's domain before, such as cash crop production and trade. However, recently these activities have been curtailed by the government. The time when work is allowed has been limited, and activities which are performed in public have become subject to harassment. To express the reduced access to this option it is presented as a shaded area.

Diverse economic activities in the informal sector have increased. They include day labour, small-scale services and manufacturing, small-scale intermediary trade, charcoal burning, sale of wood and fodder, and similar activities. These occupations do not receive governmental support nor do they provide sufficient income to secure peasant livelihood. Therefore this area is shaded.

Subsidized food was provided during the 1970s and 1980s, but it generally included mainly the staple food of the urban population. An exception was in time of emergency, when the rural population received food aid or subsidized food. Recently, food subsidies have been reduced. The area is therefore shaded.

Access to social services, something which had improved during the 1970s, has since deteriorated. Therefore the area is shaded.

As a last new option, criminal activities have been added to the model. They are the consequence of increased deprivation of the peasant's livelihood base and the erosion of the social system. Because only a minority pursues the option of armed robbery, plundering, and killing, the respective area is shaded. By militarizing society and arming certain ethnic groups against others, the government seemingly supports this option.
On the whole, at the beginning of the 1990s, more options are pursued for a broad variety of reasons, but none of them can be fully exhausted. The policy of neglect towards the peasant sector of the economy, the appropriation of resources peasants provide, by merchants and the state, and the deterioration of the conditions of peasant production through measures which continuously degrade the environment, make the basis of peasant livelihood dangerously narrow.

CONCLUSION

The policies of the new regime have not deviated from specific issues so far, most of them with historical roots, which played key roles in Sudanese policies for many decades. These were in brief:

1. The political and economic dominance of the Arabized and Islam-ized northern and central parts of Sudan over the southern, western and certain areas of the eastern parts of the country, which at the beginning of the 1990s is subject to a process of violent extension.

2. The weakness of the state, indicated by the coexistence of a more or less rudimentary local traditional leadership, administration and communal law with a formal superstructure of central leadership, administration and law, as well as by the emergence of more and more resistant groups.

3. Politicization of ethnic belonging, which during the last decade has created an unprecedented level of interethnic hostility (Mohamed Salih and Harir, 1994).

4. Politicization of Islam, which started during the Mahdist rule, was taken up vehemently again by the Muslim brothers since 1983, assumed an institutionalized form by the foundation of the NIF party on 9 May 1985, and has been determining Sudanese politics since June 1989 (Maties, 1993a, p. 31).

5. The mining of the country’s human, natural, mineral and agricultural resources for the enrichment of the ruling classes.

The constant neglect of the development of the ‘traditional’ sector and the upsurge of repressive measures against peasants is rooted in extremely divergent interests. From the point of view of the Sudanese governments, the persistence of the social patterns prevailing in the
peasant societies has been undesirable, because these peasant relations enable part of the rural population to divert incomes, surplus produce, and resources which the state class is eager to appropriate. The solution the governments have been striving for is to put the peasant society under the control of the state. The Nimeiri government tried this by implementing a policy which reduced the authority of the native administrators to a minimum and set up new administrative organs. However, this did not have the desired effect of better control and better access to resources to be extracted from the peasants. Instead, this policy created a power vacuum which enabled the peasants to extend their social livelihood securing options into uncontrolled spheres. Also, after the Nimeiri era, the Sudanese governments never succeeded in establishing power over peasants to the same extent as the hierarchy of local leaders had maintained for a long time. The counteractive effects of the disempowerment of the native administration have instead provided a new chance for the local leaders to pursue their primary interest, to regain power and to control peasant resources.

Structurally, a system of councils and congresses like the one formed in Sudan under Nimeiri and again under the present government might be appropriate to transmit peasant needs from the base to the top. However, this apparently has never been seriously intended. The first system failed, among other reasons, because it was not built on the locally grown social structures and did not provide scope for decentralised units to act. The one implemented under Bashir is apparently also a central system, which is not ready to take issues coming from the base seriously. Moreover, the government has used the system to implement an Islamicistic ideology on the Sudanese by force. Thus, the reality of the congress system is rather that of an organ to exert control and to force into line the units at the base of the hierarchy. In short, it is used to implement governmental policies by a top-down approach. No chance is left for peasants to bring in their demands within this system.

A second attempt to get control over the peasants has been to modernize them. Modernizing the peasants means dissolving them into several social classes, favourably into commercial farmers and agricultural labourers. By concentrating agricultural development on the irrigated and mechanized farming sectors, the stock of commercial farmers producing in these two sectors has been stabilized and slightly extended. The expansion of the agricultural labour force, on the other hand, has been pursued with violent means under the present govern-
Peasants have been uprooted by military and paramilitary forces and forced into seasonal labour under the pretext of Islamization. Thus they have been deprived of the choice to add agricultural wage labour to the livelihood options pursued by their networks. Absorbing the loss of the migrants' socio-economic contributions in the home areas has been left to the peasant networks, insofar as they have not also become victims of governmental violence. Women probably have been the ones most significantly affected by this type of forcible labour recruitment.

On the part of the peasants, the policies which deprive most of them of livelihood options which they previously had more secure access to, have enhanced the tendency to cross borders drawn by previous generations. As a consequence, the social bonds of the 1990s no longer include the same communities as before, they are less reliable, and the privilege of 'belonging' has been connected with different obligations. More people than in previous generations have been left to their own devices. A tendency of dropping out, that is, individualization of weak members of the society, can be observed. The Sudanese society of today has been caught in a process of dissolution.

The governments which have ruled in Sudan so far apparently have not been interested in implementing policies which would secure peasant livelihood. In the conflicts about resources, the government and the owners of the mechanized schemes have sided together against the peasants. Removing these conflicts by a fair regulation based on a broad consensus would be the most urgent precondition for peace. Whether the ideological mobilization of the Sudanese towards a 'modern Islamic nation' and the shift back to native leadership under the umbrella of the violent, undemocratic, and ideologically extreme regime that is in power today can solve the basic problems of Sudan has to be severely doubted. The growing tension throughout the Sudanese periphery is a sign that cohesion within the country is at stake. Some ideas for first measures against the further decay of Sudan have been proposed in Chapter 7, where the requirements to implement a livelihood approach have been translated into policies for peasants' needs. A government which would take the needs of the majority in Sudan seriously is desperately needed.
Appendix A: Glossary of Arab Words

The spelling of the Arab words applied here does not correspond to the rules required for writing in the Arabic language. This transcription puts priority to easy pronunciation for English-speaking readers.

*abd:* slave  
*adar:* sorghum sudanensis  
*angareb:* bed made from wood and ropes  
*asida:* millet porridge  
*bania:* okra, ladyfingers  
*berseem:* fodder clover  
*birish:* mat  
*burma:* cooking place  
*chudra:* green leafy vegetable  
*dalu:* leather bucket  
*dar sabah:* home of the morning, that is the east  
*dar:* home  
*difra:* echinochloa colona  
*dukhn:* millet  
*durra:* sorghum  
*ful:* groundnuts  
*gabila:* tribe  
*gao:* aristida grasses, e.g. dactyloctenium aegyptium  
*gizzu:* rainy season grass  
*haditha:* here: type of circumcision  
*hakura:* estate  
*harisha:* cassia tora  
*hihlij:* balanites aegyptiaca  
*hosh:* yard  
*id al adha:* Muslim feast  
*id al fatur:* Muslim feast after the month of ritual fasting  
*jihad:* holy war  
*karkadé:* hibiscus  
*kwala:* cassia tora or cassia occidentalis  
*kisra:* fermented sorghum cake  
*koreib:* brachiaria deflexa  
*kursan:* boscia senegalensis  
*lalob:* balanites aegyptiaca  
*ligemat:* fried and sugared dough balls  
*lubia:* cow peas  
*magdoum:* leader of a region, comprising the constituencies of several *maliks*
magdouniya: empire of the magdoum
malik: leader of a larger unit, comprising the constituencies of several omdas
mareg: red millet
maimura: underground store
moulochiya: green leafy vegetable
mujahidin: warriors
mukheit: boscia senegalensis
mulah: sauce
nabog: ziziphus spina christi
nafir: work party
nazir: leader of several omdiyas
omda: district leader, comprising the constituencies of several sheikhs
omdiya: constituency of the omda
qoran: the holy book of Islam
qoz: sandy soil
rigla: green leafy vegetable
sandug: revolving saving fund
sene: cassia occidentalis
shari'a: Islamic law
shata: red pepper
shayl: informal credit system
sheikh: local chief
shura: Islamic system of governance
sidir: ziziphus spina christi
simsim: sesame
sultan: king
sultanate: kingdom
sunna: here: type of circumcision
sureb: cassia occidentalis
tabak: food cover made of raffia
tabich: melon
tawiza: work party
tob: veil
tundub: capparis decidua
ushur: tithe
wadi: valley
wakil: ward
weika: powdered okra
zakat: Islamic tax
Appendix B: Maps

SUDAN: Internal Boundaries/Administrative Units, 1994

LEGEND
- National boundary
- Disputed boundary
- State boundary
- Khartoum National capital
- JARJO State capital
Appendix C: Questionnaire for Women in Kutum and Villages Around (translated from Arabic)

Study on the economic and social situation

1. Material of house:

| mud | grass | stone | big | small | number of rooms |

2. Head of the family:

| man | woman | age | tribe | place of birth | date of arrival at Kutum | occupation |

3. Interview partner (woman only):

| head of the family | wife of f.h. | sister of f.h. | daughter of f.h. | other woman f.h. |

| age | tribe | place of birth | date of arrival at Kutum | occupation |

4a. Family members (please, fill in occupation only):

| wife of f.h. | grand parents | brothers | sons | daughters | others |

4b. Do the family members use one or more fireplaces?
5a. Family members working elsewhere in the country or abroad:
(please fill in married/unmarried/divorced/widowed/age/number of migrants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>family head</th>
<th>grandparents</th>
<th>brothers/sisters</th>
<th>sons/daughters</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>place</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5b. Occupation and length of absence of the migrants
(please fill in number of years or months of absence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>migrants</th>
<th>family head</th>
<th>grandparents</th>
<th>brothers/sisters</th>
<th>sons/daughters</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>length of absence</th>
<th>occupation</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6a. Migrants who returned and period of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>date of return</th>
<th>period of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6b. Has the migrant finally returned or not?

7a. Did the migrant send anything home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>money</th>
<th>clothes</th>
<th>food</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>nothing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7b. After how many months did the migrant send anything to you for the first time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>after 1 month</th>
<th>after less than 6 months</th>
<th>after less than 1 year</th>
<th>after 1 year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7c. Were the sendings satisfying?

7d. What work did the migrant do before and what after migrating?
8a. Who is responsible for providing the family with its needs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>woman</th>
<th>brother of</th>
<th>brother of</th>
<th>son</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>herself</td>
<td>husband</td>
<td>woman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8b. Who is responsible for the migrant’s wife (in respective cases; please, fill in the degree of family relationship)

9. Is any family member married to more than one woman?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>degree of affinity</th>
<th>number of wives</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10a. Ownership of fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>place</th>
<th>distance from</th>
<th>size</th>
<th>date of acquisition</th>
<th>owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kutum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10b. Labour in the fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sex</th>
<th>family members</th>
<th>relatives</th>
<th>labourers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11a. Ownership of gardens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>place</th>
<th>distance from</th>
<th>size</th>
<th>date of acquisition</th>
<th>owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kutum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11b. Labour in the gardens (please fill in degree of affinity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type/affinity</th>
<th>woman</th>
<th>husband</th>
<th>parents</th>
<th>grand parents</th>
<th>relatives</th>
<th>labourers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>man</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>child</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11c. Did any household member lease a garden during the dry season?

11d. From whom did she/he get the plot?
11e. Method of irrigation

| pump | bucket | other |

12a. Woman interviewed: Do you sell any goods at the market?

| fruit | vegetables | manufactured goods | processed food | millet/sorghum | other |

12b. Does any family member trade? (please fill in degree of affinity)

| fruit | vegetables | processed food | imported goods | animals | other |

13. Livestock ownership (please, fill in few or many)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>species</th>
<th>camels</th>
<th>sheep</th>
<th>goats</th>
<th>donkeys</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>place of herding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsible person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Other assets

| car | lorry | bus | house | shop |


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