Editors’ Statement:

Current Developments and Recommendations
The war in Syria is emblematic of a disastrous state-of-affairs within international relations. In the Middle East, a new chapter in international power struggles and the destruction of the fabric of society is being written. Aleppo is the most obvious example of the horrors. Bloody repression of initially peaceful protests set off an uprising in Syria. Civil war, terror and military intervention by regional and great powers ensued.

Local, regional and global conflicts merge in this war and the exodus of refugees is affecting all neighboring regions. US President, Donald Trump, reacted to the use of chemical weapons in Khan Sheikhoun by ordering the bombing of a Syrian airbase. The US punished this violation of international law, which forbids the use of chemical weapons, with a punitive action which contravened the UN Charter’s general prohibition of the use of force.

The hopes for a cooperative world order which germinated after 1989 have not been fulfilled: In Syria, the failure of the community of nations to prevent war crimes has become obvious. The assumption in the West that it would be possible to curb or contain civil war by military means or even impose democracy has evaporated after experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Yet, at the same time, the disaster in Syria should never be repeated. It calls upon us to urgently seek new ways of avoiding civil wars and war.

What needs to be done so that “responsibility” does not become merely an empty catch phrase in German foreign policy? What impetus for peace can emanate from the European Union? In this year’s Peace Report we ask how, under the changed international conditions, excessive use of force can be prevented. What concepts from the dialogue between the German government and civil society, business and the general public known as “PeaceLab” are of any value for sustainable development and for peace to prevail?

The wars in Syria and Yemen

In the current wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and the Ukraine, the US and other Western countries are playing a less dominant role than was the case in ex-Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan or, initially, Iraq. Warlike interventions in regional hotspots have not ceased but, after the failed interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq and after the chaos in Libya caused by violent government overthrows, the willingness of the West to step in with armed forces has been significantly reduced. At the same time, more and more civil wars and military interventions are taking place: Regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran, but also Russia, are intervening while voicing own claims to power. They take to heart lessons
learned in Western interventions: They intervene without deploying ground forces or make only limited use of them, as did Turkey and Russia in Syria and Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

The war in Syria demonstrates this dynamic. So far, the war, which has been going on for six years with foreign intervention, has led to half a million casualties. The destruction of the infrastructure and means for securing a livelihood has caused millions – more than half the total population – to flee. In the initial euphoria over the “Arab Spring,” Western governments demanded the resignation of Bashar al-Assad and, in this way, strengthened the resolve of the armed opposition to insist on this as a prerequisite for negotiations. But the opposition hoped in vain to rid themselves of the dictator with Western military aid without having to negotiate. The Western governments had nothing to match his support by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, and did not want to rush into a new intervention with an uncertain outcome without a clear perspective for the time afterwards. In addition, the Syrian opposition was divided and caught up in struggles against each other. Both these factors encourage the intervention of regional powers, above all Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Qatar, making matters worse: Saudi Arabia and Iran are pursuing their own interests to which neither peace nor stability belongs. The so-called “Islamic State” (IS) became the most dangerous rebel movement in Iraq and Syria and set up state-like structures. Russia is supporting the Syrian regime with air strikes, while the US and France are flying missions largely targeting IS: Surrogate wars and “the war against terror” are now fatally intertwined.

Syria demonstrates the extent of violence against the civilian population – the number of dead is five times as high as was the case in, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992–1995. There are also five times more refugees. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia being carried out on Syrian soil has fanned flames of sectarian differences between Shi’ites and Sunnis, differences the US war in Iraq had intensified. Lastly, the shooting down of a Russian aircraft by the air defense of the NATO member Turkey and the American bombing of a Syrian military airfield where Russian soldiers were based both demonstrate how close the military interventions have come to the abyss – wars between great powers can no longer be regarded as unthinkable.

Overthrowing or protecting the Syrian government, fighting terrorism, and competition over spheres of interest determine the goals of the intervening parties in Syria; the victims are mainly civilians. That is why the foremost goal has to be to end military missions by all warring parties. We commit ourselves to expanding the influence Germany has as an intermediary in Syria and Yemen and to once again substantially increasing the resources
Taking action early

for humanitarian protection and aid even further. Those are modest but, in view of the possible consequences, responsible approaches to making further atrocities less likely. Syria shows that early warnings must be followed by early action: Isolation of potentates instead of paying court to them in the interest of the “war against terror,” pressure on the NATO partner Turkey, weapon embargos against Saudi Arabia, no-fly zones and safe zones, as well as commissions of inquiry in order to take the ground away from under the feet of disinformation campaigns. Currently, there is a particular need to protect refugees who remained in the areas held by IS and are therefore suspected of “collaboration” with IS.

The war in Yemen is attracting almost no interest in Europe; very few refugees come from Yemen. There are almost no reports on the suffering of the civilian population as a consequence of the war, despite the fact that nearly half a million children are suffering from severe malnutrition. In Yemen the government has never controlled the entire country and various groups are competing for power. The military intervention by Saudi Arabia after the “Arab Spring” and the successes of the Houthi rebels made things worse. Riyadh regards the strategic gains made by Iran in Iraq and Syria, the revolt of the Shi’ite majority in Bahrain and Iran’s close relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah as a threat to its claim to power and as an encroachment by Shi’itism. When the Shi’ite Houthis in Yemen captured the capital city of Sanaa, Saudi Arabia interpreted this as an encroachment by Iran. Saudi Arabia no longer felt threatened just in the north and the east, but also in the south, too, and has since reacted with air attacks, a maritime blockade and the deployment of ground forces in some places. Iran is supporting the Houthis, but there is no proof for Riyadh’s assertion that Iran is carrying out a military intervention. In the meantime, there have been at least 10,000 deaths in Yemen, 14 million people are experiencing food shortages and in some areas the health system has collapsed. Only half the financial support the UN urgently needs for humanitarian aid has been pledged so far. The lack of international interest could result from the fact that Western countries are providing logistical support to Saudi Arabia and its allies. Germany and its European partners ought to try to broker a ceasefire in Yemen, too, stop supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, and call for a special investigator to document war crimes for possible prosecutions.
**Editors’ Statement**

**Saving human lives: Safe zones**

The financial need calculated by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to care for Syrian refugees has still not been covered. In early April 2017, at a conference entitled “Supporting the future of Syria and the Region,” the EU expressed its willingness to increase its contribution to end the war in Syria in the context of the UN. At present it is providing humanitarian aid to about 13 million people. In addition, it is willing to participate in future rebuilding, which includes the voluntary and secure repatriation of internally displaced persons and refugees.

What is lacking, however, is protection of the civil populace from violence. For as long as no political solution is found and the future of Assad’s regime remains unclear, the goal is at least to freeze the war along the existing battle lines, and to implement local ceasefires with security measures for the people. The communication between the armed forces of Russia, the US, Turkey, France and Israel in connection with aircraft movements in Syria shows that coordination is possible – so far, however, only for mutual protection, not for the protection of the civilian populace. Corridors or safe zones can, under the right conditions, make humanitarian aid for the civil population possible – such as when it was possible to evacuate survivors from East Aleppo. In May 2017 in the Kazakhstan capital, Astana, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to set up four safe zones in Syria. The way they will be set up and their prospects of success are still unclear. Agreements on safe zones are possible between opponents, as long as they do not work against their strategic interests. Whether this is the case for the four “de-escalation zones” that have been agreed upon is not yet known. Because Assad ignored earlier ceasefires and the rebels do not trust Iran or Russia, doubt is called for. Safe zones raise questions – as do evacuations – about the role of military compulsion in implementing them. For five years the UN and the Western powers neglected to set up safe zones. Now it is possible that “de-escalation zones” will be established under conditions specified by the currently stronger warring parties who are interested primarily in separating civilians from those branded as terrorists. A neutral protection force would be more helpful. An unequivocal UN mandate would increase the chances of even states that are hesitating being persuaded. And through this it would be possible to increase political pressure to deter attacks on safe zones. In addition to sanctions, this would include criminal prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. As a result, the political, moral, legal, logistical and military implications of safe zones or safe areas – a variant of humanitarian intervention – must remain on the political agenda as well as on the agenda of peace and conflict research.
The dilemma of humanitarian interventions

Experience in the most recent wars underlines the necessity of acting decisively to combat crimes on a mass scale and atrocities. The millions of deaths in the Congolese Civil War did not give rise to any broad discussion on how it could be ended. Deaths on a mass scale only seem to become the focus of attention when they affect local interests or arouse internal political controversy, as in the case of the mass exodus of those fleeing Syria. It is high time that international politics replaced such selective intervention with a systematic crackdown on crime perpetrated on a mass scale and with protection of the civil population. This must take priority over tactical or strategic calculations of the parties to (civil) wars and their foreign allies. The recourse to humanitarian values loses authenticity when they are proclaimed according to the situation. However, a policy of limitation and control of violence is easier to proclaim than to implement. This is especially the case with prevention of atrocities. Violence on a mass scale does not take place without prerequisites, but only after longstanding social and political conflicts. However, it is less risky to interrupt a conflict dynamic that may later lead to mass crimes than to act against these once they are already in progress. Coercive measures, such as no-fly zones and safe zones or safe areas, even humanitarian military interventions, are a contentious issue not only among military leaders, in politics and in public opinion, but also in scholarly studies and among the authors of this Editors’ Statement.

In some people’s view, the experience of Srebrenica and Rwanda admonishes us to prevent genocide and mass war crime as early as we can. In 1999, after three years of murder and expulsion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was convinced that the use of force by NATO in Kosovo was justified in order to prevent it from happening again. The high-ranking International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) came to the conclusion that the Kosovo intervention was not legal, but legitimate, and served as impetus for discussion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The bombing of city districts and “ethno-denominational cleansing” in Syria would be a classic case for exercising the Responsibility to Protect, especially given that chemical weapons have repeatedly been used. However, the UN Security Council was blocked on this issue by the power interests of Russia and China. The Assad regime relies on this. If the precept of bringing mass murder to an end is not to remain mere lip service, where no consensus can be reached among the parties to the conflict, it will only be possible to implement no-fly zones and safe zones established for humanitarian reasons by contravening the general ban on...
violence in the UN Charter while also risking confrontation with Russia.

In the view of the others, in principle, military coercive measures against aggressors – to the extent that they do not constitute self-defense in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter – can only be decreed by the UN Security Council; otherwise, they violate international law. It is only permissible to deviate from this principle when there are reliable guarantees that the interventions will achieve their humanitarian goals and that their risks do not outweigh their humanitarian purpose. They should not serve as a justification for military support of political interests nor be used for achieving the imperialistic goals of great powers. In addition, it must be established with extreme precision that all other possible measures have been exhausted: for example negotiations, “neutral” areas for refugees negotiated between the warring parties, or “open cities,” upon which Article 25 of Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) forbids attacks, provided that they are not defended. The prospects of preventing or reducing atrocities through military intervention must be scrupulously weighed against the risks of escalation. Whether an intervention without a UN mandate is urgently required on humanitarian grounds can only be decided in concrete situations.

Interventions to prevent atrocities raise difficult legal, political, military and moral questions. Anyone who seeks to prevent genocide and war crimes through coercive means also without a UN mandate relativizes the absolute prohibition of force by the UN and shares responsibility for the victims of the military intervention. In addition, interventions run the danger of multiplying the extent of the violence and thus worsening the situation of the civil populace instead of improving it. But responsibility must also be borne for the consequences of non-intervention: Not intervening denies urgently needed aid. And it makes it easier for those who rule by violence to make use of all possible measures against their own civil populace. The horrors of the war in Syria make it necessary for the community of states, and especially the Europeans, to engage in a discussion of the peace policy and ethical dilemmas without avoiding certain topics.

For German and European politics the overall catalogue of international humanitarian law is decisive, from the treatment of protected persons to the rules of war and the protection of cultural treasures (global common), all the way to the prosecution of war criminals. But this must be demanded in relations with alliance partners more strongly than previously, for example in connection with Turkey’s war against the Kurds. And it goes without saying that the standards must also apply to opposition groups that are supported by Germany and Europe.
The blockade of the International Criminal Court in the prosecution of war crimes by means of a veto in the UN Security Council could be bypassed by applying the principle of universal jurisdiction according to which crimes committed in other countries and against foreigners can be prosecuted in Germany. It remains to be seen how high the hurdle is for achieving this. The Federal Prosecutor's Office is considering issuing a warrant against six high-ranking officers in the Syrian Secret Service, who are accused by Syrian human rights lawyers and the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) of systematic mass torture of political prisoners.

**Local ceasefires**

In Syria, when political and military strengths were evenly matched, a few local ceasefires occurred. In some places they have reduced the level of violence and are making the supply of aid and the operation of communal facilities easier. From a humanitarian point of view that is not an insignificant contribution. In addition, local ceasefires make it possible for donor states to cooperate with Syrian humanitarian and civil society groups to take action against, for example, lucrative smuggling activities and extortion of protection money at numerous checkpoints, which are a heavy burden on the local economy. It is true that no impetus for ending the war has emerged from these local ceasefires, but future treaties at the national level can be based on inclusive local arrangements. These can reduce the pressure of economic blockades, reduce external influence and help even out inequality between armed groups and civil society. Multi-level internationally supported strategies which link national and local incentives in conflict transformation are therefore needed.

**Negotiations with violent groups**

In the wars and civil wars of the new century it is rarely possible to avoid negotiating with so-called “irregulars” or non-governmental armed groups if a violent conflict is to be transformed into lasting peace. To achieve this, both governments and irregular armed groups need incentives. The case of the Taliban in Afghanistan demonstrates that neither side can win the war using military force, but that the incentives are not yet sufficient to bring about serious negotiations. In peace talks the share of power of all relevant groups would have to be negotiated, even if they question the constitution and the government. But the Taliban believe that they no longer need to compromise with government forces, and are counting on their becoming weaker. Since the death of Mullah Omar in 2013 they have split into factions (all the way to the splitting off of the Afghanistan...
group, the so-called “Islamic State”), which has made negotiating more difficult. It is equally questionable whether the government is willing to broker a compromise peace or the lame government is capable of negotiating. Financial and military support for them from the West reduces their incentive to share power because they want to retain their monopoly on external support. Germany should support dialogue and negotiation processes from which approaches for establishing trust at the local level can emerge; to do this Germany needs patience and must be prepared for erosion of the central government.

In Colombia, on the other hand, hope is emerging that it may be possible to end the most protracted civil war of our time – with officially 220,000 dead and almost seven million displaced persons. The treaty that the Colombian government and the oldest guerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed in November 2016 is an important building block on the long path to peace. It should serve as a model, even if successful peace negotiations cannot be transferred one-to-one to other settings. The case of Colombia shows that elections and decentralization do not necessarily lead to participation and shared decision making. A power-sharing agreement can also make a short-term contribution to ending a war, but in the long term engender new violence because power sharing is not democratically legitimized. Consequently, it is necessary to always find the path appropriate to the particular context. Part of any German contribution should be to establish appropriate forums for international discussion of different conflict transformations. Peace must be justified and borne by the people involved themselves.

Negotiations with violent actors are risky for all parties involved. For the very decision to negotiate changes the self-image and the image of the other. It is necessary to warn against exaggerated expectations; failed peace processes come at a high price. Disappointed hopes and loss of credibility can stand in the way of a new beginning; the demobilization of individual groups has no significance if other armed actors advance into this territory. When a matter of social justice, conflict transformation is especially difficult in drawn out and asymmetrical conflicts. Experiences in numerous post-war societies show that reforms which affect the economic and political basis of influential elites and violent actors should be introduced as quickly as possible. Otherwise these actors organize resistance to a negotiated peace.
The fight against Jihadism

Salafism, jihadism and terrorism are not all the same. In Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan jihadism is the ideology of several militant rebel forces. Terrorism is a tactic for intimidating opponents, spreading fear and undermining the functioning of the state. In Western Europe, on the other hand, jihadist terrorism not uncommonly derives from the social alienation of a tiny minority of Muslims. Personal failure, marginalization and loss of perspective can lead to radicalization. Fascination with extremist propaganda in the internet or sympathizing with small, mostly Salafist groups – not all of which, however, advocate violence – promotes the willingness to use violence. The ideal of jihad makes it possible for perpetrators to no longer feel like victims, but as belonging to a tiny elite of determined and chosen individuals. They share the cult of the leader, willingness to self-sacrifice and committing acts of violence, and glorification of masculine strength with violent right-wing groups. Thus, although the causes of Islamic terrorism in Europe are substantially homemade, the identification of perpetrators with jihadi groups in the Middle East provides a link with the organized violence there. In the last year there has been a stronger tendency for attacks and attempted attacks to occur whose perpetrators had traveled from the Middle East.

In the Middle East jihadi groups also carry out terrorist attacks as part of the struggle for power, al-Qaeda and the so-called “Islamic State” is taking advantage of a political vacuum. In Iraq, Syria, Yemen or some of the time in Libya they have acquired substantial power, because in the eyes of their own populations the regimes have sacrificed their legitimacy and lost control of the country’s territory. The jihadists seem to many to be the lesser evil. Military action can drive them back and deprive them of their aura of victorious progress, but does not eliminate the causes of their existence, because these are not military in nature. What is required is agreement among the key actors – i.e., in addition to governments, rebel movements, war lords, ethnic and religious groups and civil society – on a political system that involves all societal actors. International politics can help to stabilize the economy of the country involved, strengthen civil society and incorporate it into reform processes, promote the capacities of state and non-state actors, and strengthen social and physical infrastructure. This can include security policy cooperation when the formation of a broadly accepted political system becomes recognizable.
Security policy, deradicalization and prevention

Projects in Germany focused on preventing extremism, combating terrorism and deradicalization call for a high level of staffing, in particular because of the necessary breadth of sustainable prevention programs across the entire education sector, but also because of the constant surveillance of strongly suspected individuals or of people returning from Syria. The police frequently operate at the limits of their capacity; more police personnel should be added. At the same time it is advisable to take action against radical right wing or racist attitudes among members of the security sector, i.e., in addition to the police also the intelligence service and the German Army. It seems that this has not been on the political radar and is not adequately taken into account in training our security forces. Information exchange needs to be improved, because information on dangerous individuals is useless if it does not reach the responsible government agencies in time. Radicalized perpetrators are the responsibility of the security agencies, but we also need long-term strategies to prevent the emergence of new perpetrators. After every attack the call for intensification of security policy measures is all that is heard. It is much more important to offer at-risk persons a perspective at the right time and to prevent their social marginalization – by obtaining qualifications, social pedagogical support and job offers; support measures should not favor or place any ethnic or religious group at a disadvantage. Although in the short term all this will not cause a single terrorist to abandon violence, in the long term it will help to dry out the social milieus from which violent perpetrators are recruited.

Deradicalization comes into play at a later stage. Its aim is to eliminate extremist orientations and it involves counseling of relatives and friends, providing a social perspective for radicalized youths, but also reintegration programs for convicted violent offenders. Prevention and deradicalization work requires professionalization and significantly more personnel. Concrete assistance in developing life perspectives must lower the threshold to dropping out. Words are not enough. Training and further education programs for skilled personnel cost money and require more knowledge and exchange of experiences with neighboring countries. Scientific evaluation of various measures and programs is also sensible.
New confrontations over power politics

The short-term hegemony of the West after the Cold War left Russia behind as the purported loser and did not open up much negotiating room for cooperation on an equal footing with the Global South. Putin is also using Russia’s military power to renew its claim to being a global actor. The Kremlin is drawing borders anew in “nearby foreign areas” and seeking to expand its scope of influence once again. Ideologically, Russia is no longer acting as though it is a part of European democratic traditions, which it castigates as antagonistic toward religion and decadent, but instead acts as its opponent. Russia is presenting an alternative “Eurasian” orientation to counter Western democracy. This is given expression in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or Shanghai Pact.

China, on the other hand, is to a greater and greater degree visibly giving up its long-cultivated restraint in terms of foreign policy for the purpose of domestic modernization. In the interest of securing resources, Peking is expanding its sphere of influence and is voicing its claim to a leadership role more and more forcefully.

Election of the new US president marks a juncture in history notable for its many uncertainties. The main characteristic of the foreign and security policy of Donald Trump appears to be his unpredictability. It is troubling to witness the declared unilateralism which places into question the standing of the United Nations and the transatlantic partnership. Trump vacillates between refuting the role claimed by the US as a superpower ensuring global order and military actions with incalculable consequences. Military operations which seem impulsive such as in Syria and Afghanistan, as well as combative threats against North Korea can easily veer out of control. In the most recent fight over North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the main effort should be focused on reviving the six-party talks and increasing the pressure on North Korea with the help of China and Russia, and offering Pyongyang a lifting of sanctions in exchange for nuclear disarmament.

With his America First slogan, Trump is giving priority to narrowly defined US national interest at the expense of more intensive commitment in international organizations and alliances. The US has long demanded that its partners make a greater commitment to their military spending in NATO: most recently at the summit meeting in Wales member states agreed to increase spending toward two percent of gross domestic product in each country by 2024 – something which is inconceivable in many EU countries and therefore not convincing. Trump is setting new standards for massive arms
increases with the planned ten percent increase of the US military budget (spending is currently at US$600 billion).

Arms increases in Russia, China and the US combined with belligerent stances and intervention in war zones all hold potential for dangerous military escalation. New visions and principles are called for to counter this relapse, principles which give consideration to varying historical and cultural predispositions and contrasting political systems while also excluding military confrontation. The signing of and adherence to international conventions and treaties have always been designed to balance out and secure varying, yes even contrary, interests. Doing so in no way relativizes our norms and values, but conceptualizes peace as a highly valued good and requirement for the unfolding of democratic self-determination.

Western countries, which with their transatlantic relations, NATO and the EU, have generally taken a joint stance on international policy issues, are running the risk of losing their trust in a liberal and open society and thus forfeiting its important cohesive force. Previously respected norms of Western society are being questioned, many people regard democracy and market forces as crass contradictions and feel overwhelmed or left behind by the globalization of goods, values and knowledge. They criticize the corruptibility of politicians and their subjection to the requirements of the market. Opposition takes form as anti-liberal, anti-democratic and nationalist movements wherever everyday experience is that democracy and social responsibility are not the prevailing rules of the game vis-à-vis market-dominating companies and dominant powers. Criticizing them does not help at all. Only participation by the citizenry can help to overcome the experience of powerlessness and the thwarting of reforms in the political and social system.

Some states orient themselves to the European concept of great powers, a pattern of order from the 19th century, while others revert to conventional nationalism. Democracy is no longer the undisputed paradigm. Although the old “ideological clash” seemed to have been ended with the end of the Cold War, it is recurring in a new guise as rivalry between pluralistic democracies and nationalist autocracies.

After the implosion of real socialism, the West was able to draw the states neighboring the EU into its orbit through its superior political, economic and military potential. Nobody was capable of forming an opposing alliance. However, in reality the EU denied Turkey its long-proposed membership perspective; NATO carried on its expansion to the east, but shied away from admitting Russia. This strengthened anti-European and anti-democratic nationalist forces in both countries. An authoritarian
system was consolidated in Russia and in Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a driving force behind a similar development. After the election of Donald Trump, US society seems to be split along lines similar to those evident in Turkey after the constitutional referendum there. The presidential election in France, with one-third of votes cast for the right-wing extremist Front National provides evidence of similar social divides. Earlier “ideological clashes” are re-appearing within many societies. Whether it will prove possible to heal these splits is a question of great significance for how countries and societies co-exist in the 21st century.

**International cooperation is possible**

The convulsions in the world order that came into existence at the end of the conflict of systems and the return of traditional great power and military politics can easily tempt us to again find a place for supposed “realism” in international relations. We oppose this on these grounds: Peace does not derive from power relationships, balance of power, strength and opposing strength or deterrence. In Europe at least, in the form of the EU, an opposing model exists which is seeking to overcome nationalism and war internally and seeking to build on cooperation and justice in relations between countries externally. This is worth defending with conviction. To do that we need new disarmament initiatives, extension of the capacity for conflict prevention, negotiating and mediation concepts, military and police measures for the various UN missions, and, not least, multilateral cooperation in the OECD.

**Collaboration and dialogue despite differences**

Cooperation also with states having differing forms of government and conflicting views on what world order entails can and must be strengthened. Peace cannot wait until there is democracy; peace proves itself in the way it deals with potential opponents. Military risks must be reduced, for example by reducing maneuvers and stationing of troops in endangered contact zones, through smoothly functioning communication channels and effective inspections, and mainly through strengthening of the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures. It is necessary to revitalize the faltering or abandoned arms control and to extend them to high-tech weapons systems such as unmanned missiles, missile defense, high-precision weapons and cyber capabilities.

In 2016, as an observer and mediator, the OECD contributed to a minimum level of stability and transparency in the war zone in eastern Ukraine. In 2016, together with the OECD leaders,
Germany at least kept the dialogue going between the parties to the conflict. The general goal was to strengthen the OECD as the only security program that included all European states including their security organizations. This meant that the topic of arms control was back on the agenda again. In addition, it was possible to schedule a so-called “structured dialogue” for 2017. In regional organizations such as ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the African Union, where the competition among the great powers has less effect than in the UN, the participating states struggle to at least prevent the emergence of violent conflicts among member states.

**UN Agenda 2030**

In September 2015, despite all the confrontations involved with the UN Agenda 2030, the 193 member states agreed upon the most comprehensive cooperation program for sustainability ever. Also surprising was the Paris Climate Agreement – introduced in December 2015 with the committed support of China, Russia and the US and already ratified in 2016 – which is intended to limit global warming to “well below 2°C.” The 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs), to which even the highly industrialized countries have committed themselves, are aimed at achieving substantial reductions in social inequity, active climate protection, and the promotion of “peace, justice and strong institutions.” For the first time in a universal agreement of this kind the political-ecological-social nexus of world wellbeing has been formulated. The discourse on the implementation of the two treaties creates the opportunity to keep global cooperation on the agenda at a time when numerous actors are on a collision course. The future of democracy will also depend on whether it is able to preserve and protect cultural treasures, which should be available to everybody. Whether the Trump administration and the Putin government will in the future continue to participate selectively in global climate policy, remain aloof or torpedo it, has not yet been decided. On the other hand, China has committed itself more unambiguously than previously to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions – a change of role which is making China a partner in the alliance for sustainable climate protection.

If German politicians wish to be a major player in the area of sustainability again, and not, as is now to be feared in the area of climate policy, to become an impediment, they must implement the sustainable development goals here at home and send a strong signal for the UN Climate Conference in Bonn in November 2017: It involves cutting poverty in half, reducing the proportion of young people who have not completed their schooling, and phasing out coal mining. In addition, it involves
minimizing the negative effects of German policies and economics in the Global South by reducing the consumption of resources such as by implementing the “Green Climate Fund.”

Finally, it is also a matter of showing solidarity with the Global South: Meeting the long-delayed 0.7% goal for development aid should not be deferred until 2020 and also not be made to look good through the inclusion of expenditures for refugees and asylum seekers. Fair trade and finance policy must be made part of a comprehensive program for conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, restriction of violence and promotion of peace. In this way, a credible contribution can also be made to combating the causes of flight. In 2016, with the “PeaceLab” process, the Foreign Office initiated a public debate, which was to strengthen violence prevention and replace the 13-year-old “Action Plan for Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Consolidation of Peace” with guidelines from the German government on coherent crisis management. However, a voluntary commitment which strongly relies on civil power and giving more priority to active promotion of peace over the use of military force is still lacking.

**Critical balance of German arms exports**

In the discussions on Agenda 2030 in December 2014, the German government committed itself to taking action against illegal arms supplies as well as to reducing German arms exports. The change of course on arms exports, which has long been called for by peace and conflict researchers and numerous NGOs, is making conceptual progress, although this has not yet had an effect on export statistics. We welcome the decision made by the German government in March of this year to suspend weapons supplies to Turkey. The Bundestag must also stop the German Bundeswehr contract with Rheinmetall based on which the company will share in the financing of the construction of a tank factory in Turkey. Germany is still ranked fifth among the world’s arms exporter. The Bundestag should toughen arms export controls, compile a list of countries to which exporting is prohibited, and call for regulation of arms exports to non-state actors in the Arms Trade Treaty. We reiterate our demand from last year that Germany should not deliver any more military materials to the Kurdish Peshmerga. Where such materiel ends up cannot be checked, nor can it be ruled out that in the future they will be used, for example, against the Iraqi government in the dispute over Kirkuk. A debate on sensitive arms exports should be held in the Bundestag and transparency should be anchored in a duty of the German government to report such matters. We support the call of the Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (GKKE,
General Conference Church and Development) for introducing the right to initiate class actions against arms export authorizations.

The G20 Summit: Focus on global inequality

If success is to be achieved in preserving international cooperation against rampant national egotism, significant initiatives are needed. The G20 Summit on July 7 and 8, 2017 in Hamburg will offer Germany an opportunity to use its role as host country to provide impetus for a more equitable world economy and fair trade and to lead the way with its own ideas regarding Agenda 2030. The member of the Executive Board of the Federation of French Industry, Bernard Spitz, proposed taking a stand “for a social Bretton Woods.” Effective financial market regulation by the G20 would reduce the risks of global financial crises for developing countries, too, and would give them easier access to financial services. Working and living conditions in the Global South would improve if, for example, the standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO) on fair trade and on the protection of human rights and of the environment were met.

We urge making Agenda 2030 a cross-party issue in the German national election campaign. This would heighten awareness that, regardless of national egotism, we are all living in a time when our own wellbeing can only be considered and achieved by keeping the wellbeing of the world in view.

New challenges for the European Union and Germany

The EU has encountered severe turbulence in recent years. Not as it was intended, the common currency did not lead to greater integration but to the opposite, because there was no economic and social policy for balancing out major economic differences. As a result, the euro – the introduction of which was based on the fiction of equal competitiveness, but which led to massive export surpluses in the strongest country in the eurozone, and to horrendous mountains of debt elsewhere – strengthened the centrifugal forces set in motion by the rapid expansion of the EU. Renationalizing tendencies are increasing, skepticism, even open rejection of the EU is spreading. That the EU does not see itself as also a social union often arouses discontent in member states, and populists and nationalists take advantage of this and undermine democratic institutions and guarantees of freedom. The insecurity about the social impositions arising from globalization and the digital revolution cuts across traditional lines of party allegiance: Not only Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, but also Jean-Luc Mélenchon and...
Beppe Grillo are battling the EU as a bureaucratic and undemocratic Moloch, with the deceptive message that wellbeing and a good life can only be achieved behind national boundaries. Brexit represents new territory for all participants; for example, for Northern Ireland and Ireland the drawing of borders could re-ignite the violent conflict that has carefully been kept in check since 1998. The fact that in France about one-third of voters voted for decidedly nationalistic programs must be a cause for alarm, even though the election of Marine Le Pen as president of France was avoided.

**Divided on the refugee question**

In the Near and Middle East the collapse of states, wars, civil wars and jihadism have triggered a veritable exodus. At the present time, more than half of all refugees worldwide come from the Arab world, although only five percent of the world’s population lives there. EU member states are deeply divided on the refugee issue and in a few countries it is impossible to overlook that xenophobia and Islamophobia are spreading. Some states are refusing to conform to the agreed distribution quotas and are revoking the European solidarity from which they benefit. In addition, they are violating the Geneva Convention on Refugees and thus violating international law. Both acts of contravention harm the EU as a community governed by mutual agreement and law. So far the EU has undertaken too little against these countries.

The situation in many African states represents a gigantic challenge for the EU. Many people are voting with their feet, because the collapse of traditional patronage brings revolts and internal wars and they have no chance of advancement. These people emigrate to Europe or South Africa, of whose comparatively rich societies they can form an impression, thanks to the Internet and television, and where they hope to find a better life. As the Balkan route is now largely blocked, Libya, Egypt and the Maghreb states have become more important as transit countries and the sub-Saharan countries as the countries of origin. The most urgent task must be helping these unstable states to stabilize, building up efficient police forces, establishing border controls, reintegrating returnees, but, first and foremost, in creating jobs for young people. The ten-point plan of the EU is inadequate, because it seeks to combat flight by strengthening external borders. To autocrats in Africa who support the business model of flight because it creates a social safety valve and generates remittances back home, it must be made clear that development aid is linked to reforms, good governance and the observance of human rights.
European security policy

At one time the European unity process was also intended to involve joint defense. But after the European Defence Community (EDC) failed in August of 1954, it shifted its focus to economic cooperation. Even though Great Britain and France developed their own nuclear weapons, the US was mainly responsible for security and defense matters. The Transatlantic Alliance also served as a framework for the development of the European Economic Community into the European Union.

Following the election of Donald Trump, Europeans can no longer count on things remaining that way. When on one day the American President says NATO is “obsolete,” but on the next day say it is “no longer obsolete,” the mutual alliance commitment of NATO, its security policy core, becomes uncertain. The Europeans could try to consolidate the transatlantic commitment of the US by increasing their military expenditures as Trump wishes – the numerous statements from European capitals that they are seeking to reach the benchmark of two percent of GDP step by step are apparently aimed at achieving this. However, the inconstancy of the US President makes skepticism advisable. We agree with the German Foreign Minister’s refusal to look at military expenditures in isolation, and instead emphasize the relevance of development aid and combating the causes of flight.

The first thing is to clarify how European security can be guaranteed in the future and what conceptual and material contributions the EU and its member states can and wish to make to the international promotion of peace. Only after that can the size of the German military budget be discussed. To want to increase it without any rational grounds to two percent of GDP – currently in Germany that would be €62.6 billion – is illusory and irresponsible. In view of the escalation of crises and violence in recent years, the purpose of the NATO strategy must be questioned and justified anew. The initiatives in the 2016 White Paper to orient the structure of the German Armed Forces more strongly to national defense and the defense of the alliance should be part of this discussion. Only after a consensus has been reached on what the security policy challenges really are and what is the best way to respond to them will it be possible to discuss the necessary financial resources in a rational way.

In the EU the realization is growing that Europe must take its security policy into its own hands. This cannot mean adapting to the rivalry between the great powers and joining their arms race. Both peace policy as well as structural arguments speak against this. One cause of the EU’s self-concept as a civilian power lies in its inter-governmental structure in security and defense matters. The principle of consensus it is based on makes it unsuitable to be a military power. Anyone now calling for a
European Army overlooks the fact that a forced communalization of security and defense policies would be too much for the narrow basis of legitimation of the EU, and would not lead to more peace but could cause greater internal conflict. The EU should reconceptualize the rudimentary Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a crisis prevention policy. It could develop into a force for the solution of regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East region and North Africa, mobilize substantial resources for establishing mediation capacity, conflict prevention and stabilization, and collectively support UN peacekeeping missions with greater intensity than up to now.

The Global Strategy tabled by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, a few days after the Brexit decision emphasizes human rights and international law, aims at strengthening the stability of the southern and eastern neighboring states, and over and above that would make joint defense the EU norm. In November 2016 the commission published the European Defence Action Plan, which calls for broader pooling and sharing in order to reduce costs, and is seeking to promote European arms research and collaboration. In March of 2017 the EU decided to set up a headquarters for joint international education and training deployments. The public debate in Germany is still lagging behind such initiatives. This debate will have to give critical consideration to the extent to which implementing the global strategy is compatible with the fundamental principle of civilian crisis prevention and the role of mediator played by the EU in regional conflicts, as we have called for.

Initiatives for arms control

The war in the Donbass region of Ukraine has brought relations between Russia and the West to a low point. We are not only experiencing a conflict of ideas between autocracy and democracy, but we are also in the midst of a newly instigated arms race. While the guiding principle of “joint security” has been on the wane, at the point of contact between NATO and Russia military chess games with troop reinforcements and arms modernizations reminiscent of the Cold War have returned. Where only with decades-long effort success was achieved in reducing mutual threats by means of arms control and disarmament and the strengthening of crisis stability, today all of that faces the threat of being wiped out. In August 2016 the Foreign Minister at that time, Steinmeier, warned of the danger of escalation through “saber rattling and cries for war”; the call by the OECD summit in December 2016 for a new start to arms control took this up. We suggest: (1) measures for increasing transparency and reducing the risk of a “inadvertent” war; (2)
faster inspections and lower notification thresholds for military exercises; (3) regional limits on weapons systems and troops, and minimum buffer distances between troop deployments close to borders, which should also include new weapon systems; (4) retention of the INF Treaty; (5) re-evaluation of NATO’s missile defense programs for Europe; (6) and abandonment of nuclear cruise missiles.

Commitment to the European Union and a German self-image

The European Union and its members must resist a return to national egotism. The ability of the EU to function is also based on confidence that jointly adopted rules and norms apply to everybody and are adhered to. Anyone who does not adhere to them and simply pays them lip service in order to conceal claims to power not only undermines this trust in the long term, but also endangers peace itself. In the EU up until now a significant majority has blocked the anti-European mobilization by populists and nationalists. The willingness to help and to integrate persecuted people and refugees continues to be impressive, even though there is less such willingness. And the EU has until now succeeded in maintaining unity regarding sanctions against Russia. Regardless of its weaknesses, the EU is the only supranational model that links economic freedom and peace in internal relations with a democratic community of values. But this is not something that happens automatically. In the 1990s it may well have seemed that a peaceful future depended on transforming authoritarian systems into functioning democracies, but this perspective has reversed itself: Nowadays the political confrontations between democracies and authoritarianism are taking place within many EU countries. The international policies of the EU can indeed only, as is stated in the Global Strategy, be oriented toward a “global order on the basis of international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons.”

The humanitarian impulse in refugee policy is still called for in terms of peace-oriented ethics and policy. It is a scandal that the agreed-upon distribution of asylum seekers accepted in Greece and Italy has not taken place. Germany must oppose ethno-nationalistic partition in the EU on the basis of the norms and values formed in the Basic Law. The EU cannot punish budget deficits but tolerate the dismantling of democratic rights to freedom in, for example, the Hungary of Viktor Orbán. We suggest, over and above the infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission, suspending Hungary’s voting rights in the EU for as long as no change of course is evident. The same holds for Poland. Part of European solidarity is that
the EU must show more courage, take action against restrictions of democratic rights and, if necessary, force individual members to see reason. Few coercive measures are available to it, but the EU can support the opposition all the same through blaming and shaming. Precisely the right wing-populist governed EU member states number among the net profiteers of EU structural policy. Solidarity is not a one-way street.

A Marshall Plan with Africa?

According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, in Germany and the EU 2017 is “the Year of Africa.” It compares the efforts that are required for the continent of Africa with those of the US in Europe after the Second World War and, under the title “Africa and Europe – a new partnership for development, peace and the future,” developed guidelines for a “Marshall Plan with Africa” and opened them for debate.

The plan accurately and self-critically highlights that the wellbeing of the industrialized nations is partly based on the ruthless exploitation of the people and resources of the African continent. European countries geared their policy toward Africa to primarily align with their own short-term economic and trade interests and destroyed local markets in Africa with subventions for the export of goods. Skepticism regarding the historical paternalism inherent in a “Marshall Plan” concept is thus understandable. Among other factors, the “ten theses” for a Marshall Plan approach takes a critical look at previous development cooperation (such as the “watering can principle”) and favors economic cooperation based on mutual interests. Against the backdrop of massive migration and demographic pressure, the focus needs to be on the goal of creating 20 million new jobs annually through economic structural change and infrastructure investment. In order to reduce deadweight loss effects, which support kleptocratic regimes, state and private co-financing in Africa should be strengthened and specifically support willingness to reform (“more for more”) without neglecting extremely fragile countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is also a region with tax loopholes caused by corruption and a grotesquely enterprise-friendly tax system. An alliance of individuals with close ties to governments and offshore multinational companies benefit from this. Eliminating these loopholes would help mobilize resources for a self-determined future for Africa. The Marshall Plan with Africa should make explicit reference to Agenda 2030 as a principle of sustainable cooperation. Current attempts to set up camps as initial collecting points in EU countries along the Mediterranean Basin and to use “military fitness training” with the help of the German Army to combat fragile statehood in the
Sahel work against the sustainability agenda. Camps for holding hundreds of thousands of Africans along the south coast of the Mediterranean and the deportation of detainees to countries ruled by despots or collapsing into chaos contradict the “equitable global structures and institutions” set out in the Marshall Plan with Africa. The ambitious plan for a new Africa policy should not become mired in “territorial” departmental thinking or election campaign tactics. It should instead be made an integral part of coherent foreign policy and government policy.

Bruno Schoch
Andreas Heinemann-Grüder
Corinna Hauswedell
Jochen Hippler
Margret Johannsen

Translation (preliminary version): Matthew Harris