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    <identifier>opus4.bicc:12959</identifier>
    <datestamp>2012-02-01</datestamp>
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                                Conrad Schetter
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                    <title>Counterinsurgency, anthropology, retreat – The US military&#039;s COIN ‘Strategy’ in Afghanistan. Orient 53 (2), 24-34.</title>
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                <publicationYear>2012</publicationYear>

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                    <description xml:lang="" descriptionType="Abstract">The COIN strategy of the US Military was conceived as a response to the lack of strategy in the intervention in Afghanistan. An analysis of the core elements and a presentation of the major political connections of the intervention suggest that on this basis they cannot provide an answer for the internal contradictions and in addition, that the guidelines of warfare have more meaning than legitimate discourse.</description>
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