The Republic of Angola’s rough diamond mine production for 2011 is valued at US $1.16 billion. The latest facts and figures available rank Angola in the group of the five most important diamond producers worldwide, headed by Botswana (US $3.9 billion p.a.), the Russian Federation (US $2.7 billion p.a.), Canada (US $2.5 billion p.a.), and South Africa (US $1.7 billion p.a.) (see Figure 1; KPCS, 2011a).² Angola was a founding member of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), launched in 2003 as an initiative of governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the diamond industry, endorsed by the United Nations (UN). Its main aim is to certify diamonds as “conflict-free” (KPCS, 2006: 14) by the respective governments to thereby stop the circulation of ‘conflict diamonds’.

Angola was strongly involved in the establishment of the certification scheme, largely due to its own experience with ‘conflict diamonds’. In 2002, Angola concluded a decade-long civil war opposing the government against Jonas Savimbi and UNITA, a rebel force that received revenues from diamond mining. This experience directly informed the government’s political strategy at that time (Marques 2011: 49). The KP is currently under review. Its 10th anniversary takes place under the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa. It coincides with a formal review process, agreed to in November 2011, during which the core objectives, definitions and functioning of the KPCS during 2012/13 will be examined.

Figure 1: Global rough diamond production 2011

Source: https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/public_statistics
During the launch of the KP at the beginning of the millennium, Angola was governed by President José Eduardo dos Santos. A decade after, dos Santos and his ruling party People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola, MPLA) continue to hold power (Vigil Adolfo, 2012). Human rights organizations have repeatedly criticized the living and working conditions in the Angolan mining and oil sector. Accusations range from arbitrary detentions through mass torture to systematic rape and murder by state- and privately owned Angolan security agencies (HRW, 2012; 2009). The question that poses itself is: How does the Kimberley Process deal with such accounts of violence in Angola’s diamond sector? How does it deal with the legacies of a diamond-fueled war, which manifest themselves in the powerful position generals of the Angolan army occupy in the country’s diamond industry—through stakes in diamond businesses as well as in security businesses that police the diamond fields?

After a sketch of the current need for reform in the Kimberley Process, this Focus scrutinizes the role that generals of the Angolan state armed forces FAA play in Angola’s mining sector to date, against the backdrop of the country’s diamond-fueled civil war. The case will focus on the Lunda provinces, for approximately 90 percent of Angola’s diamonds are sourced from Lunda North (Lunda Norte) and Lunda South (Lunda Sul), both of which are situated in the borderlands with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (see Map 1) (DeBoeck, 2008).

To provide a better picture, we have divided the paper into three parts. First, a short historical introduction will trace the evolution of the present landscape of actors in the Angolan diamond sector in the course of the country’s civil war. Second, we sketch the current business and security network connecting the MPLA government, the generals and international businesses in the Angolan diamond sector. Third, we address the record of massive human rights violations in the Lundas, associated with this network of security and mining actors.

Finally, the recommendations will deal with the question of how to react appropriately to the outlined situation in Angola’s diamond mining areas. They will handle the issue of international leverage, with regard to the KPCS and more generally. As the Federal Republic of Germany is an interested economic partner to Angola in the area of infrastructure and the resource sector (see Box), the Focus will also draw out possible consequences of the findings for the German government.
Reforming the Kimberley Process: What’s the fuss about ‘conflict diamonds’?

On 28 December 2012, the Chair of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (KPCS) issued a vigilance notice to its members to warn their respective customs authorities of potential ‘conflict diamonds’ coming from the Central African Republic (CAR). What had happened? A coalition of rebel groups called Seleka had marched towards the capital Bangui and was threatening to overthrow the central government, occupying several diamondiferous areas in turn. In 2010, a report by the International Crisis Group had detailed how several armed groups in the CAR, among them the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP), which is part of the Seleka rebel coalition, were based in areas of diamond exploitation and most probably gained income from the diamond trade (ICG, 2010: 1–19).

The Kimberley Process aims at stopping the circulation of ‘conflict diamonds’, defined by the KPCS as “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments” (KPCS, 2003: 3). Effectively, the Kimberley Process only started considering to temporarily suspend CAR after the Seleka coalition had toppled former President Francois Bozize on 24 March 2013 and proclaimed a transitional government.3 One could wonder why then, in the case of the CAR there was little and belated reaction from the Kimberley Process to the advancement of the rebel groups? Was the KP not supposed to block ‘conflict diamonds’ from entering the global diamond supply chain?

One answer is that there was no immediate evidence that the current rebel coalition directly financed themselves through the trade in rough diamonds. However, in early May 2013, the KP President Welile Nhlapo told the press during a World Diamond Council meeting in Israel: “There is sufficient evidence that diamonds have been used by the rebels who have been extracting and trading them to acquire the necessary resources that they managed to get in order to overthrow the elected government that was in place” (Hall, 2013).

A second answer is the official reason given by the KP on why it did not respond to earlier reports on armed groups occupying diamond areas: Its restrictive definition of conflict diamonds only allows for intervention should rebel groups attempt to overthrow a government—the armed groups mentioned in the ICG report were not recognized as a rebel force by the CAR government at that time. This is revealing for the problems of the current KP definition of ‘conflict diamonds’. In the same vein, US Assistant Secretary of State Jose Fernandez was quoted as saying at the meeting in May: “The Central African Republic is an example of why we need to take a more expansive view of what is a conflict diamond” (Larson, 2013).

A third answer is that there was no public outcry by international human rights organizations. Arguably, this is because there are far fewer reports on egregious human rights violations in CAR than there were, for example, about atrocities committed by rebels in the diamond-fueled civil war of Sierra Leone in the 1990s. It is for these atrocities that the preamble of the KP recognizes “the systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts”, although human rights violations are not included in the legal definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ enshrined in the KP (KPCS, 2003: 1).

For the same reason, namely that of gross human rights violations, the KP reacted to the situation in Zimbabwe when in late 2008 the Zimbabwean army dispelled artisanal miners from the Marange diamond area, killing over 200 civilians in a military operation (HRW, 2009a: 3). In November 2009, the KP launched an embargo against rough diamonds from the Marange diamond fields, sanctioning the Zimbabwean government for violation of human rights in the mining areas and for non-

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3 On 23 May 2013, the KP temporarily suspended CAR from the KP: http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/10540/84771/Administrative%20Decision%20CAR%2023%20May%202013.pdf. At the time of publication, the issue is being discussed by the Intersessional meeting of the Kimberley Process in Kimberley, South Africa, 4-7 June 2013.
compliance with the minimum standards of the KP (PAC, 2012). The response led the KP’s Civil Society Coalition to call for a revision of the ‘conflict diamond’ definition, arguing that “implicit in the KP’s response to Marange was the acceptance that rights violations by those other than rebel movements not only matter to the KP, but that the KP has the moral authority to investigate and take remedial action” (KPCS, 2012: 2). Still, many participants to the KP deny that the matter of human rights violations is within its mandate.

Among them is the government of Angola, which opposes an extensive interpretation of ‘conflict diamonds’ (Marques, 2011: 50). Angola functioned as the leader of those countries opposing the ban on Marange diamonds, calling the embargo a “sinister” attempt to undermine World Trade Organization rules (ibid.: 57). Angola presides over the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA), which represents the interests of African diamond producing countries and achieved observer status within the KP in 2012.

The KP’s 10th anniversary, coupled with the ongoing review process, is the right moment for an honest assessment—by itself and external observers. So far, the KP has produced mixed results. On the one hand, it is seen as a success for its wide international reach, covering approximately 99.8 percent of world rough diamond production. Additionally, the KP is lauded for its binding element that member states implement it through national legislation. In principle, no rough diamonds can be traded among its 54 participants unless they are accompanied by a government-issued KP Certificate (www.kimberleyprocess.com).

Nevertheless, in reality, not all traded diamonds are accompanied by KP certificates: A large, but unknown, quantity of illicit diamonds is illegally exported—that is smuggled per se, or traded unofficially via other countries. This is partly due to the huge amount of Zimbabwean diamonds, which have reached the international markets through shady deals over the last years. The unknown whereabouts of an estimated 2.5 million carat stockpile of Marange diamonds—more than Angola’s annual production—illustrates the dimension of the stakes at hand (PAC, 2012: 5–8).

This problem is related to one of the KP’s shortcomings: The system of internal controls in-country, which is supposed to ensure that no conflict diamonds enter the supply chain, is ill-defined and poorly monitored. Another of the KP’s failings is its limited definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ which only applies to one type of conflict actor, i.e. rebel groups, and excludes abuses by state actors or private security companies. The lack of action in adapting this definition is underscored by a resolution adopted by the 67th session of the UN General Assembly in December 2012, which only noted the “discussion” within the KP during 2012 on whether or not to change the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ (UN-GA, 2012: par. 24). Resistance to reform was highlighted by comments made by the Russian Federation’s Ambassador to the United Nations who urged KP participants not to press ahead with hasty reforms, and specifically referenced “persistent attempts to redefine ‘conflict diamonds’.”


* The WTO has granted a waiver to several KP participants, for they are not allowed to trade in rough diamonds with non-participants, thereby acknowledging that concerns of international security, as enshrined in UNSC and UNGA resolutions on ‘conflict diamonds’, justify exceptions to its trade rules.

5 The 54 participants represent 80 countries, with the European Union (EU) and its member states counting as a single participant.
The Republic of Angola is a much sought-after commercial partner for international companies, with an enormous gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in the last decade (see Figure 2) and a position as second largest oil exporter in southern Africa. In the past years, Angola has quickly moved to the position of third-largest trading partner with Germany in Sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa and Nigeria: Imports from Angola jumped from euro 228 million in 2010 to euro 883.5 million in 2011. A plethora of German banks, including Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, DEG (Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft) as part of the KfW Group, and several Federal State Banks (Landesbanken), are among the leading credit loaners to Angola and its state company for oil and gas production, Sonangol, in particular. In 2009, a German export credit guarantee via Euler Hermes Covers (Hermesbürgschaften) set up euro 300 million for exports involving credit loans with a time span of more than one year.

After a state visit to Angola by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in July 2011, Sonangol awarded Siemens Energy a contract to supply a 11.5 MW steam turbine for a new combined cycle power station for the Lobito refinery. Also on this occasion, the creation of a German–Angolan Partnership was decided and working groups with the themes “Foreign and Security Policy”, “Economy” and “Energy” set up in February 2012. German companies are also important players in the booming construction sector of the country. The Franconian Gauff GmbH & Co Engineering KG, for example, acts as the Angolan government’s official supervisor for large infrastructure projects since 2004, which are mainly constructed by Chinese enterprises (www.auswaertiges-amt.de; Africa Energy Intelligence, 2013; CIA World Factbook 2013; issa, 2011).

At the same time, there is also a vivid public debate in Germany on Angola becoming part of an emergent German security strategy: “Arms deals in Africa: Merkel supplies Angola with patrol boats” (Spiegel), “German Chancellor in Angola: Merkel stimulates arms trade” (Stern)—the support expressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel for an export of patrol boats built by the Bremen Luerssen shipyards to Angola, expressed during her state visit to Luanda, sparked fierce criticism in the German media on 13 July 2011. Representatives of the German defense industry had accompanied the chancellor on her encounter with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. The German government politically justifies German arms exports to Angola with the argument of bolstering a strong regional power to make it an ‘anchor of stability’—following a doctrine of “strengthening instead of interfering” (on the so-called Merkel doctrine see Krause, 2013; Spiegel, Der, 2012).

**Figure 2: The development of Angola’s GDP, 2000–2010**

![Graph showing the development of Angola’s GDP, 2000–2010.](source: BICC data.)
The legacy of a diamond-fueled civil war

History: The mining network

In the early years of Angola’s diamond exploitation, DIAMANG, the National Company of Angola Diamonds (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola), was the most important player. DIAMANG, in which the South African diamond ‘giant’ DeBeers held a substantial interest, controlled the local diamond deposits before Angola’s independence in 1975 (Marques, 2011, 26). Founded in 1917 by the colonial Portuguese government, the diamond mining output of DIAMANG under the colonial administration equaled 2.4 million carats per year (DeBoeck, 2008: 44). After the end of the Portuguese rule, DIAMANG was soon nationalized and diamond output dropped to less than 500,000 carats, but stabilized at a yearly output of 1.48 million carats around 1980 (ibid.).

Meanwhile, the conflicting Angolan independent movements had, more or less, coalesced around two groups—the MPLA as the dominant military force in Luanda, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA). While UNITA was initially backed by the United States and South Africa, the MPLA was allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba. In 1977, the MPLA formed a socialist government of the newly independent People’s Republic of Angola. After the MPLA’s initial military victories, the charismatic UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi established himself in the Angolan hinterland, pursuing a guerrilla strategy (Paes, 2009: 142f.). When UNITA started attacking several diamond mines in the 1980s, nationalized DIAMANG pulled out of the business and later dissolved itself. The also state-owned enterprise Endiama (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes) followed in its footsteps, equipped with a quasi-monopoly on diamond exploitation in Angola which it pursued alone or in joint ventures with companies from the United States, Portugal, Brazil, Canada, and Russia (DeBoeck, 2008: 44). Apart from Endiama and the foreign mining companies, the joint ventures also included local Angolan partners, which are allocated 15 to 25 percent of every alluvial project and five percent of kimberlite projects. The local partners were always private companies with close political connections to the government (PAC, 2007: 6-8).

Just after independence, in 1976, the international enterprise ITM International entered the Angolan market, making it the diamond mining company with the longest presence in Angola today (Marques, 2011: 84). In 1984, ITM International accepted an offer by the Angolan government to substitute the DeBeers branch office of Mining and Technical Services (MATS) in its official diamond mining contracts, as the connection to a diamond company from the then Apartheid South Africa did not fit the MPLA’s Marxist–Leninist ideological foundation. From 1986 onwards, ITM International—initially via its branch Roan Selection Trust International Ltd. (RST) and later replaced by ITM Mining—extracted diamonds especially from the Kwango River area (Marques, 2011: 82–84). ITM Mining has been registered in the Bermudas since 29 April 1993. Although ITM Mining maintains offices in Luanda and London, today’s only owner is KNR Mining, registered in the tax haven of Turks and Caicos Islands since 4 June 1991 (ibid.: 82).

ITM Mining and connected companies have a historical record of corruption and illegal business activities, if one follows an official investigation of Angola’s Ministry for State Control and Inspection. Fifty cases of corruption, theft and fraud during the second half of the 1980s were unveiled in a Ministry’s report in which all three directors of ITM Mining, as well as the then-director of Endiama and president of the Angola Diamond Selling Corporation Ascorp in 2011, were accused of causing a total loss of approximately US $200 million to the state of Angola (ibid.: 85f.).

Ascorp was established in 1999 and given the exclusive right to market Angolan diamonds until the end of the civil war in 2003. It was set up with the support of arms dealer Arkady Gaydamak—at the director of RST and its Director for mining operations, Renato Herculano Teixeira Herminio and Andrew John Smith respectively, have stayed directors of ITM Mining up to this very day. The third director of ITM Mining, Sergio Eduardo Monteiro da Costa, was a member of Endiama’s Negotiation Commission in the 1980s (Marques, 2011: 84f.).
least by his own account (Ferreira-Marques, 2012). Gaydamak sold helicopters and other military equipment to the MPLA government at the height of the war in 1993. He represented a key figure in what was to become “Angolagate”, an international scandal concerning the financing of arms deliveries with oil-backed loans (Hodges, 2007: 189). Gaydamak’s confidant in Angola at that time, the diamond trader Lev Leviev, functioned as his shareholder when in 1999 Sodiam, the Sociedade de Comercializacao de Diamantes de Angola was founded (Marques, 2011: 31f.). Sodiam is a subsidiary of Endiama and responsible for all internal marketing and exporting of Angola’s diamonds.

The diamond war

“[F]rom the mid-1990s to early 2002, Angola was viewed as a quintessential resource conflict, a power play over access to valuable commodities such as diamonds and crude oil”, a battle which international observers understood to be “motivated by the implicit complicity of government forces and rebels using the war as a pretext for the continued looting of Angola’s vast mineral resources” (Paes, 2009: 139;138). As of 1983, an exclusive mining and smuggling network began to establish itself in the Lundas, then controlled by UNITA forces, where informal mining activities were carried out on a large scale (see Map 2). The network involved local villagers and traders crossing the border from Angola to the DR Congo and back (DeBoeck, 2008: 45)—“the network of private contractors, warehouses, and foreign offices established during [the 1980s] allowed UNITA to survive in later years, even after UNITA lost official support from South Africa and the United States” (Paes, 2009: 144).

Illegal mining in Angola’s Lunda provinces reached its peak in 1991/92 (DeBoeck, 2008: 46). The year 1992 has also been pinpointed as the beginning of “the struggle in the mining zones for personal enrichment by high-ranking members of the military and the regime” (Marques, 2011: 71). The ‘War of Lunda’ was unleashed whose main objective was the military control over the Kwango valley in Lunda Norte (Dietrich, 2000: 174).

Under UNITA’s control, life in the mining camps had become organized: Over 10,00 Congolese who poured into the Angolan Lundas were channeled by a complex border control system including checkpoints and written mining permissions (DeBoeck, 2008: 46). Diamonds from UNITA territory, mined mainly by young Congolese men, flooded the international market channeled from Lunda North via Kinshasa or Brazzaville to Antwerp. They either passed the DeBeers-controlled Central Selling Organization (CSO) or travelled through other channels.

The UN-brokered peace treaty of Lusaka in November 1994 could not stop UNITA from diamond mining and smuggling (ibid.: 48). Only after the government’s troops renewed warfare in the second half of the 1990s—massively armed by tapping revenues from oil exports estimated at more than

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8 All quotations from (Marques 2011) translated by authors.

Map 2 : Angolan diamond deposits

Source: PAC, 2007:3.

The UN-brokered peace treaty of Lusaka in November 1994 could not stop UNITA from diamond mining and smuggling (ibid.: 48). Only after the government’s troops renewed warfare in the second half of the 1990s—massively armed by tapping revenues from oil exports estimated at more than
US $3 billion per year—did UNITA lose its grip on important diamond fields. Additionally, UN sanctions decisively weakened UNITA (Paes, 2009: 138). In a 1997/98 MPLA offensive against UNITA posts at the Kwango River, the rebels' stronghold in Northern Lunda, Luremo, was taken. It was cleared of all inhabitants with the help of private security companies (PSC) and declared a neutral domain afterwards (DeBoeck, 2008: 49).

When the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi died in battle in March 2002, UNITA decided to return to the negotiation table which led to a stable peace at the end of the year. UNITA’s remaining leadership was incorporated into the political oligarchy (Paes, 2009: 138). The civilian population got off less lightly, with hundreds of thousands refugees on the run—many of them victims of expulsions by Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) from Lunda Norte to Kahemba territory in the DRC. Thousands of Congolese reported being raped and extorted by FAA soldiers—a process that continues today (DeBoeck, 2008: 50f.; HRW, 2012), as it is shown later in this article.

The MPLA’s patronage system: Rewarding the generals

The border region between the Angolan Lundas and the Kasongo Lunda and Kahamba Territories in DRC constitutes a central area for the narrower region’s diamond economy. During the civil war, FAA strongmen in the Lunda provinces gained uncontested financial and strategic autonomy, first and foremost through rewarding themselves with revenues from the diamond mines (Fandrych, 2005: 90).

To counterbalance the FAA strongmen’s financial and strategic autonomy in the Lunda provinces, the presidential office decided from 1996 onwards to bring the diamond commerce under control of its own patronage network (Fandrych, 2005: 91). The Angolan Diamond Law of 1994 had already decreed all of the Lundas outside of formal mining concessions to be special reserve zones, making it a criminal offense to sell, buy or possess rough diamonds (PAC, 2007: 10–11). With the end of the civil war, the victorious MPLA started to implement the law by stamping out artisanal diamond mining and by developing formal diamond projects instead, encouraging foreign investment in the sector. It rewarded its generals with the opportunity to purchase interests in mining ventures. The generals participate in the mining joint ventures through the private Angolan partners (PAC 2007: 6–8) and own shares in private security companies (PSCs).9 Furthermore, from the mid-1990s on, international mining companies were required to contract one of the PSCs held by the generals. Through this process, the generals were able to consolidate zones of influence in the region.

The overwhelming practice of political patronage in Angola is reflected by the country ranking 168 out of 183 in Transparency International’s (TI) corruption perception index (Vigil Adolfo, 2012: 3; Wiig and Kolstadt, 2012: 148). Rafael Marques even reports the existence of a special department inside the state’s secret service where suggestions are made directly to President dos Santos on the distribution of shares in business joint ventures (Marques, 2011a). The journalist pressed charges of crimes against humanity against several generals holding interests in private firms active in the diamond economy, among them General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Junior aka “Kopelipa” who is the head of the presidential guards (Casa Militar do Presidente da Republica de Angola) and six other generals with high-ranking positions in the army, ranging from inspector general of the general chief of staff of the FAA to head of the general chief of staff. All of these generals are limited partners in one of the private companies Lumanhe or Teleservice—the majority in both of them—and are thereby involved in the Kwango Mining Company SMC’s (Sociedade Mineira do Cuango) endeavors, as the following paragraphs show in detail.

9 Angolan Law prohibits state officials from economic activities with state institutions (Lei dos Crimes Cometidos por Titulares de Cargos de Responsabilidade (Lei n° 21/90, Art.10, 2) and criminalizes the use of economic advantages by state officials through holding stakes in businesses (Lei da Probidade, Art. 25°, I, a) (Marques, 2011: 71). Additionally the Decreto Presidencial No. 182/10 on a New Model of Diamond Commercialization in Angola states the duty to “improve the image of the Angolan diamond; to discourage illegal practices such as money laundering, financing of conflict diamonds, and violation of human rights” (Art. 3, d) (Marques, 2011: 58).
SMC is composed of three entities: 41 percent of the company belong to the state-owned Endiama, 38 percent to the private enterprise Lumanhe, and the remaining 21 percent to ITM Mining, the operating company of SMC and Angola’s oldest diamond mining contractor (see above). Publicly known are the owners of Lumanhe Extracao Mineira Importacao e Exportacao, short Lumanhe or—as it is often referred to—“the generals’ company” (PAC, 2007: 7). Lumanhe was founded in late 1995 after the FAA gained access to the Lundas’ diamond fields. It has six equal partners, all with military backgrounds. From 1997 to 2007, the cumulative net income of these “Lumanhe generals”, after taxes, reached US $120 million, or US $2 million, per general, per year (PAC, 2007: 7).

A similar pattern is revealed when looking at Luminas Mining Company (Sociedade Mineira de Luminas), of which 13 percent belong to General Antonio dos Santos Franca, aka “Ndalu”—via the enterprise Twisted Ltd. The General also presides over DeBeers Angola and is additionally a stakeholder in the private security company Teleservice. Luminas’ security is in turn run by the private company K&P Mineira (see below). Likewise, Lapi Mining Company (Sociedade Mineira do Lapi) is owned in large parts—via the private enterprise Mombo—by high-ranking members of the FAA (Marques, 2011: 73f.). Investors in Lapi Mining Society and in Catoca Mining Society (Sociedade Mineira do Catoca) are the Russian multinational Arosa, the Israeli Lev Leviev Holding, Brazilian Odebrecht and Endiama (32.8%) (ibid.: 73).

The security network

Private security companies (PSCs) started to hold ground in Angola during the civil war, contracted by UNITA and by government forces alike. In the early 1990s, Angola was one of the first countries where the emergence of PSC’s linked to mineral interests was observed (Joras and Schuster, 2008: 38). One of the international PSCs active on behalf of UNITA in the mining areas, International Defense and Security Resources, even turned into a diamond company, IDAS Mining Resources Inc., itself. The Angola Diamond Law of 1994 delegated extensive policing powers to the holders of diamond concessions, including the right to stop and search anyone within their concession area, something they delegated to private security companies in turn. The usual development after 1994 was the replacement of foreign PSCs through companies owned by Angolan senior officers, leaving only highly specialized and less visible areas of activity for international PSCs (ibid.: 45f.).

The “post-war boom of PSCs in Angola” led to a total of 307 companies operating in the country by 2004, albeit with a high geographical concentration—with 90 percent operating in the capital Luanda, and the Lundas’ diamond areas presenting another major area of focus (Fandrych, 2005: 90; Joras and Schuster, 2008: 47; Marques, 2007: 3). The largest among them is Teleservice Sociedade de Seguranca e Servicos Lda., established on 16 December 1993. The majority of Teleservice’s shareholders are senior or retired FAA generals. Another Angolan PSC is K&P Mineira, which is responsible for security at Luminas Mining Company. It is part of V.S.S.B. (Vigilancia e Sistemas de Seguranca Bancaria SARL) and mostly owned by senior officials of the Angolan police. K&P also operates for state-owned companies Ascorp and Sodiam and is accused of violence and torture in the Lundas together with Teleservice, the FAA itself and other armed Angolan forces (Marques, 2011: 13). Other important PSCs in Angola owned by senior officials are Alfa 5 Seguranca Industrial e Patrimonial SARL, registered in 1993 and owned by Endiama (30%) in partnership with high-ranking companies.


11 Mombo is in the hands of the Generals Vaal de Silva, da Cruz Neto, Makevela McKenzie, as well as of General Marques Correia, Head of the FAA 8th Military Region; General Jacques Raul, former Head of the FAA Military Region East; General Jacques Raul, former Head of the FAA Military Region East; General Jacques Raul, former Head of the National Police; and Raul Luis Fernandes Junior, the administrator of Saurimo municipality, the capital of Lunda South where the enterprise itself operates (Marques, 2011: 73f.).

12 The company was advised by the South African PSC Gray Security, today integrated in the world’s largest security service provider Group 4 Securicor (Joras and Schuster, 2008: 48).

13 More than half of the stake holding generals are personally known: General B. de Matos, the brothers Faceira, General C. de Neto, and General Paulo Plufer Barrefo Lara, former Head of the organizational board of the FAA general staff; as well as Jose Carlos de Sousa Figueiredo of the enterprise Gemini which does cargo flights on behalf of the diamond industry (Marques, 2011: 70; 79f.).
military officers or their close relatives, and Mamboji SARL as well as Angu Sedu Lda (Joras and Schuster, 2008: 48f).

Altogether it can be said that the Angolan security sector has a “double function” in the mining areas (Marques, 2011: 75). On the one hand, it protects the extractive activities through maintenance of control while on the other hand, security agencies suppress dissent. Given the structure of the Angolan security landscape in which high-ranking appointments are made to ensure the loyalty of the security forces it comes as no surprise that “a culture of impunity in terms of holding security personnel to account for human rights violations” prevails (GFN-SSR, 2010: 15). The issue of human rights violations will be looked into in the following pages.

Cleaning up the diamond fields vs. human security

The nepotistic distribution of shares in diamond joint ventures to FAA generals followed “the periodic implementation of massive ‘cleanup campaigns’ with the expulsion of illegal diamond diggers and the expatriation of tens of thousands of foreigners involved in illegal exploration or trade” (Fandrych, 2005: 91). Endiama pursued a strategy of dislocating garimpeiros—unlicensed miners working with simple equipment—and developing formal diamond projects instead.

In 1996, operation Cancer II rounded up and deported around 4,000 Malian, Lebanese and Gabonese miners (Fandrych, 2005: 91, fn. 27). After the end of the war in 2002, the government’s grip tightened with continued follow-up sweeps (DeBoeck, 2008: 50; PAC, 2007: 10). During the so-called Operation Brilhante that began in 2004, units of the army, police and the immigration office Servico de Migracao Estrangeiro (SME) rounded up nearly 300,000 illegal immigrants from other African nations and shipped them back to their countries of origin. Although “the brutality with which the operation was conducted lead to widespread complaints”, Angola continued with it in the following years, using the same method and even the same codename (PAC, 2007: 10). Consequently, artisanal diamond production decreased by about 39.3 percent to 0.7 million carats in 2008 compared to 1.2 million carats in 2005.

However, migration from DR Congo and other neighboring countries persisted (DeBoeck, 2008: 51), for mining and other purposes—and so did the expulsions by Angolan authorities. A monitoring project initiated after the 2011 visit of Margot Wallström, the UN Secretary General’s special representative on sexual violence, recorded 55,590 expulsions from 29 March to 31 December 2011. Of these expulsions, the project registered 3,770 reports of sexual and gender-based violence and 12,647 instances of physical abuse—torture, beatings, imprisonment in degrading conditions and deprivation of food (HRW, 2012: 13). A recent HRW report stated, the most serious abuses that were reported by expelled migrants, including sexual violence, torture and inhuman treatment, took place in detention facilities that are under supervision of Angola’s Interior Ministry, and are being routinely committed by a broad range of Angolan security forces, including agents of the Rapid Intervention Police (PIR), the border police (GPF), prison guards, as well as Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and immigration officers (SME) (HRW, 2012: 2).

The Corpo de Seguranca de Diamantes (CSD), a new security force for the diamond sector introduced in late 2003 (Fandrych, 2005: 31), bringing together police, immigration, customs and military services, has been involved in expulsion operations since 2004. Its function is to ensure the security of diamonds transported from the mining area to the point of export in Luanda, and to curb illicit mining. It is part of the KP National Commission of Angola (KPCS, 2011: 1).

In addition to violent expulsion of foreign garimpeiros, violence against local artisanal miners who are caught trespassing by private or state security agencies is another concern that warrants further investigation. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Angolan Advocates’ Commission OAA (Ordem
dos Advogados de Angola) conducted a verification mission in 2005, which produced the Lun-
Gas Field Mission Report as an outcome (Marques,
2011: 54). Although the Kwango River Basin was
excluded from the field visits, the report unveils
severe forms of human rights violations including
systematic torture, the murder of artisanal miners
by the guards of security services, rape and plun-
der—revealing a “permanent and institutionally
maintained situation of violence against the local
population” (ibid.).

Consequentially, Marques led an interview pro-
ject in Lunda North from June 2009 to March 2011 in two
mining districts—Kwango (inhabited by a popula-
tion of 150,000) and Xa-Muteba on the other shore
of the Kwango River. Information gathered from
interviews with victims of violence connected to
diamond mining—or relatives (in cases of death)—
were accompanied by additional testimonies from
traditional authorities, civil society, members of the
security services and official state and army enti-
ties (2011: 11ff.). 119 cases of murder and 500 cases
of torture were documented for the one year and
eight months-long research period (ibid.: 18). One
finding stands out: The identification of a “division
of labor” between the FAA and PSC Teleservice in
Kwango (ibid.: 90). To quote one of the many ex-
amples collected by the research team, together
with 150 other miners, a local miner from the dis-
trict of Kwango was tortured with a whip made
out of cut up combustible hoses by members of
Teleservice, and was subsequently sent away to
get a sum of money equaling US $50 to pay a pen-
alty fee. He was accompanied by two FAA soldiers
who collected the fee—the transfer of prisoners of
PSCs by regular soldiers being strictly forbidden by
Angolan law (ibid.: 91).

By contrast, an earlier report by PAC in 2007 ob-
served a general improvement of the human rights
situation in Lunda Norte, noting that the “hunting
and shooting of locals by security companies ap-
ppears to have ceased altogether” and that se-
curity firms generally handed over apprehended
artisanal miners to the national police, after the
then governor of Lunda Norte had intervened on
behalf of the local population (PAC, 2007, 12).

The KP in Angola

Marques criticizes the Kimberley Process harshly, al-
leging that “with the exclusive power to certificate
its diamonds as ‘clean’ the Angolan government
now feels internationally legitimized and freed of
any constraint on its institutionalized breaches of
human rights in the diamond mining areas” (2011:
50). While the KP is a voluntary agreement partici-
pants enter into, its peer-review monitoring system
should be able to ensure that governments and
industry are not just “freed of any constraint” but
comply with the commonly set rules. Review visits
to Angola by other members of the Kimberley Pro-
cess took place in 2005 and 2009. The report of
the last visit from August 2009 was confidential
according to KP requirements at that time.

The state diamond institutions Endiama and its
subsidiary Sodiam both have regulatory functions
in the Kimberley Process National Commission in
Angola (KPSC, 2011: 1). Executive Secretary of
Endiama Paulo Mvika has chaired the KP’s Work-
ing Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production
(WGAAP) since 2006. Paradoxically, Sodiam, which
profits from the marketing of rough diamonds, is
also responsible for certifying Sodiam’s own dia-
monds under the Kimberley Process (for the value
of Angola’s diamond production see Table 1; PAC,
2007, 14). Formally, the Ministry of Geology, Mines
and Industry (Ministerio da Geologia e Minas e In-
dustria, MGMI) issues the KP certificates, and the
Ministry of Commerce (Ministerio de Comercio,
MINCO) validates the certification process. How-
ever, the whole process of valuing and screening
the diamonds for exports is done under the aus-
pices of Sodiam (KPCS, 2011: 3ff.). This conflict of
interest also extends to the military, which has in-
terests in the diamond sector and is represented
on the National KP Commission through the Dia-
mond Security Body CSD. This raises questions of
whether security agencies should be represented
on national KP commissions, and if so, why.

The Angolan government claims to have imple-
mented “all recommendations” from the KP review
visit of 2009 (KPCS, 2011: 5). The next review visit to
Angola will have to assess this. One central recom-
mendation of the 2009 review visit report was for Angola to regulate the artisanal diamond sector and give out licenses to artisanal miners, instead of criminalizing them. In 2009, specific regulations for the artisanal diamond sector were approved. But regularizing artisanal miners remains a work in progress, as these regulations have only been implemented in one pilot area.

Table 1: Angolan rough diamond production by volume, value and average price, 2004–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume, cts</th>
<th>Value, US $</th>
<th>US $/cts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6,146,361</td>
<td>788,138,694</td>
<td>128.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7,079,121</td>
<td>1,089,170,956</td>
<td>153.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,175,061</td>
<td>1,132,514,826</td>
<td>123.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9,701,709</td>
<td>1,271,955,353</td>
<td>131.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8,906,974</td>
<td>1,209,789,970</td>
<td>135.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,238,271</td>
<td>804,094,821</td>
<td>87.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8,362,139</td>
<td>976,318,204</td>
<td>116.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8,328,518</td>
<td>1,162,625,477</td>
<td>139.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/public_statistics

Evaluation and assessment

As has been pointed out in this focus, high-ranking generals of the Angolan Armed Forces FAA have achieved a very influential position in the country’s diamond industry. They hold large interests in mining enterprises in the diamond sector, and they own huge shares in a variety of private security companies that have a monopoly on security services for joint ventures in the Lunda Provinces (Marques, 2007; Joras and Schuster, 2008; PAC, 2007). Through this, they hold a largely unchecked power.

The ownership of PSCs by senior military and government officials and the serious conflict of interest resulting from such ownership patterns (...) not only reflect poorly on the accountability of PSCs, but also of the public sector forces and the Angolan government towards the citizens (Joras and Schuster, 2008: 60).

This influential position of the generals evolved directly out of the diamond-fueled period of the Angolan civil war. The generals took control over the diamond regions from UNITA, adopting the diamond business and its security system in place—except for the fact that the generals worked with the permission of the Angolan government and have managed to formalize their businesses. These activities contravene Angolan law, which criminalizes state officials that gain economic advantages and forbids public office holders to conclude business deals involving state institutions—as in joint ventures between private mining companies and state company Endiama and in business arrangements between private security companies and joint ventures including Endiama.

Artisanal miners or garimpeiros on the other hand have been criminalized and have thus been prey to manifold abuses by private and state security services. The gross human rights violations perpetrated in the past by members of the FAA and by private security companies merit serious debate on the involvement of military personnel in mining ventures and PSCs guarding mining projects. Members of public security forces should not be allowed to hold substantial stakes in the mining industry.

Crimes committed by Angolan Armed Forces and private security companies in the mining regions need to be investigated and put on trial with the Angolan judiciary, as recently advocated by Marques. As it is highly unlikely that justice will be done in Angola at the current state of affairs, international partners, including the German government, should follow-up closely with the Angolan government on whether due process is met in these proceedings.

With Angola being a member of the UN Human Rights Commission since 2007, and having been its vice-president from 2010 to 2013, the UN Human Rights Commission is also not in a position to put the spotlight on Angola. As Angola has not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), one option left is for signatories of the ICC’s Rome Statute to start criminal proceedings.
against Angolan perpetrators of crime before their national courts, as recently undertaken by South African persecutors who investigate political rapes after the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe as possible crimes against humanity.

Private businesses investing in Angola have the corporate responsibility to protect the human rights of the local population affected by their operations, as enshrined in the so-called Ruggie Framework (UN, 2009). If both the domestic government and the international community fail to cater for the well-being of the national population, as in the Angolan case, international corporations operating in the country have an even more pronounced responsibility (Wiig and Kolstad, 2012: 148–51.) Particular attention to due diligence with regard to human rights by companies is warranted if there is a risk—like in Angola—to indirectly assist in committing crimes against humanity. In such a case, international criminal liability applies and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is ready to start investigating international crimes committed by private individuals (“silent presence in a particular serious case”; Lukas and Steinkellner, 2012: 28).

Concerned observers blame the “silence and consequent complicity of the international community” and the shortcomings of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for “the impunity of the responsible persons” (Marques, 2011: 55; GFN-SSR, 2010: 15). The Kimberley Process is not charged with bringing perpetrators of crimes to justice. However, it still is a highly reputable international institution, which needs to confront the major ills of the diamond industry, which are linked to violent conflict. The KP’s limited perspective of conflict actors, which only looks at rebel groups, shields other armed actors who perpetrate violence from international public attention—these can be militia groups, mercenaries, warlords without any discernible political agenda, private security companies or state security forces who abuse the state’s monopoly of violence.

International security can potentially be threatened by any of these violent actors. As violations of human rights connected to the diamond sector which are committed by private organizations and governmental actors do not fall under the KP, a broadening of the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ in a manner that also incorporates these players would be a logical adaption to the changed environment.

For this to happen, the United Nations must also recognize that the security environment since 2003 has changed. Each year, the UN General Assembly recognizes in a resolution the threat posed by ‘conflict diamonds’ (UN, 2012) “that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council” (UN, 2000). If the United Nations took seriously its own concept of human security, proclaimed by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2001 (UN, 2001), it would long have adapted its concept of ‘conflict diamonds’ accordingly, to reflect the threats posed to the human security of people working in the global diamond industry.

The current security situation in Angola has already been classified as “very violent” by a UN body, referring to the repeated waves of expulsions and the human rights violations associated with it (UN-OCHA, 2010). The KP would do well to pay close attention to Angola and to to have the events highlighted in this focus followed up through its peer-review monitoring system. As to the membership of state security forces representatives in KP national bodies, the Kimberley Process should establish rules for membership in national KP bodies. At a minimum, KP participants have to be transparent about the membership in their national KP Commissions.

It is worth noting that Angola is part of another international grouping, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which has signed a protocol on the illegal trade in natural resources. As part of their regional certification for other high value, conflict prone minerals—tin, gold, tungsten and tantalum—all countries are required to adopt national laws that accept a
broader view of conflict as a basis for certification. The ICGLR Mineral Tracking and Certification Scheme targets illegal businesses not only of non-state armed groups but also of public and private security forces, as well as serious human rights abuses, including “any forms of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” and “other gross human rights violations and abuses such as widespread sexual violence” (ICGLR, 2011: 4). This is consistent with the concept of conflict-affected areas of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Annex II, paragraph 3; OECD, 2012: 21).

Policy recommendations

From the above, the following recommendations to the international community of states are warranted:

- As shown in this focus, the German government needs to apply heightened due diligence in its licensing procedures regarding arms exports to Angola because of serious human rights violations perpetrated there. The German government should stick to its restrictive arms export control policy. Like any other government signatory to the main UN human rights conventions, the German government has the extraterritorial obligation to not assist in the violation of human rights abroad through its own policies (“compliance”; Lukas and Steinkellner, 2012: 19). Additionally, the German and European guidelines on arms exports demand that the government carefully assess the human rights situation in the recipient country in its decision-making process on arms exports.

- The German government, and any other home country to private companies investing in Angola, should provide guidance to German companies on how to avoid being complicit in committing serious human rights violations. In consequence, the government should deny support to companies that refuse to cooperate on human rights matters (Lukas and Steinkellner, 2012: 18; UN, 2009). With regard to public funds, such as the Hermesbürgschaften and the state development bank Kfw, it should apply human rights impact assessments itself, and have clear rules on how to conduct such assessments respectively.

- The European Union, as a member of the KPCS, and the German government should actively support efforts to change the definition of ‘conflict diamonds’ of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to embrace other actors of violence than rebel groups. The German government should press for a changed understanding of ‘conflict diamonds’ at UN level to make this happen. The United Nations has endorsed the KP, recognizing the threats posed to international security by the illicit trade in rough diamonds; it should also be the place to adjust the KP’s shortcomings with regard to international security.

- Should these endeavors fail, other international instruments like the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas that have a broader concept of ‘conflict diamonds’ should be applied to the world diamond sector to start filling the KP’s gaps.

- Building on its commitment to transparency in its National Resource Strategy (BMZ, 2010), the German government should use its leverage on the government of Angola to have it sign up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which should be extended to the diamond sector, in order to improve general accountability in the management of the country’s resource sector.
Literature


Lukas, Karin and Astrid Steinkellner. 2012. „Unternehmen in Konfliktregionen“. INEF Forschungsreihe Menschenrechte, Unternehmensverantwortung und Nachhaltige Entwicklung, December.


