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In the eighteen years since it was founded, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) has gained an international reputation as a research institution in the field of peace and security policy and as an organization that implements projects to provide advice and build up capacities in the area of conventional arms control, security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The German Foreign Office has made continuous and increasingly intensive use of BICC’s expertise within the framework of practical disarmament measures in recent years. Central areas of our cooperation are the field of small arms and light weapons, international public relations events connected with peace and security policy, and specific contracts to advise governments on arms control. I am delighted that BICC’s involvement in several projects conducted by the Verification Center of the Bundeswehr (ZWBw) means that it is now also working for the Federal Government on an interministerial basis.

Germany’s networked approach to arms control policy benefits from BICC’s broad-based approach to peace and conflict research, which links cutting-edge research with practical advisory work and on-the-spot experience in conflict regions. The control of small arms and light weapons—an area in which BICC commands particular expertise—is a textbook example of preventive security policy. On the one hand, it represents a central aspect of conventional arms control. On the other hand, it is a decisive stabilizing element in post-conflict situations because the unhindered proliferation of small weapons can disrupt or prevent peaceful rebuilding measures, particularly following armed conflicts. The German Foreign Office is therefore currently involved in the control of small arms and light weapons, ammunition and mines in Libya. Recent developments in Mali are again illustrating the destabilizing effects of the flow of small arms and light weapons on entire societies. In this context, small arms control is also part of a preventive concept that tries to preempt the outbreak of violence. BICC’s work in the projects, which it is conducting on behalf of the German Foreign Office in Sudan and South Sudan, reflects both these aspects. It is advising the governments of these countries on disarmament and demobilization as well as on the storage of arms and ammunition.

Transparency and confidence-building are also essential elements of a preventive security policy. Germany enjoys a good reputation in this field. It is advocating the meticulous implementation of the resolution on reporting military expenditures both in a joint initiative with Romania in the General Assembly of the United Nations and bilaterally. The German Foreign Office is also arguing in favor of strengthening the UN Register of Conventional Weapons as a second important global instrument for transparency. Extending the Register to include small arms and light weapons would represent a significant boon for transparency in states experiencing armed conflicts. The important interplay between governments and independent organizations such as BICC is also demonstrated in this context: The data generated within the framework of the United Nations provide the main basis for BICC’s clear and easily comprehensible depiction of global comparisons in the field of arms control such as BICC’s Global Militarization Index (GMI). These publications give the transparency measures the publicity they need to make them such powerful instruments.

BICC’s current Annual Report reflects the entire breadth of its activities—ranging from studies with a development policy bias, links between migration patterns and armed conflicts, to analyses of the effectiveness and success of UN peace missions.

BICC is making an important contribution to German peace policy with its well-networked and holistic analytical approach, its expertise in the fields of security and development policy, its combination of research activities and practical advisory work, and its highly motivated team of staff. The German Foreign Office will continue to avail itself of BICC’s services. I wish BICC the continued success that it deserves.

Ambassador Rolf Nikel
Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament
German Foreign Office
The year 2012 is a special year—both for BICC and for me personally. BICC celebrated its 18th birthday in April; that is to say, it came of age. I for my part celebrated my official farewell as Director of BICC on 3 May 2012, after more than ten years in office.

Our mission statement is: “Peace, security and development through research, advisory services and capacity development.” In other words, security and the transformation of conflicts can only be achieved by simultaneously promoting both peace and development. This normative approach is also included in the general concept of ‘conversion’, which is devoted to reducing and transforming military stockpiles, military processes and capacities. BICC has actively developed this concept over the last eighteen years.

Seen from this point of view, ‘conversion’ is thus a perception of peace and security that extends beyond the narrow focus of the military security of nation states. BICC has identified six program areas in reply to some of the challenges facing peace and security in the 21st century. This will encourage greater overlaps and synergies in BICC’s fields of research, advisory services and capacity development. This development is reflected in the current Annual Report 2012.

Let me begin with the program area of Arms—Global trends, exports, control: Since as far back as 2002, BICC has drafted and constantly updated country portraits on security, arms and development in states receiving German arms exports. The current Annual Report presents the latest results with regard to the Asian states of India, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. It also contains an updated map of the Global Militarization Index (GMI) 2012, showing the relative size and importance of a state’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole.

The Annual Report considers the topic of small arms and light weapons (SALW) within the framework of three projects. On the one hand, it reports on the development of new portable air-defense systems, so-called “MANPADS” (“Man-portable Air Defense Systems”). On the other hand, it presents an interactive database on the recognition and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The third SALW project is at the interface with the program “Security—Stakeholders, systems, threats”. The project deals with efforts by South Sudan to improve the storage and control of small arms and light weapons in the security sector. Both projects will be presented at the Second United Nations Review Conference on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in August/September 2012 in New York.

BICC researchers have studied private security providers in East Timor, Liberia and Peru. They were particularly interested in the relationship between private security and development cooperation. Although the latter deals with the reform of the security sector, it is also often the ‘client’ purchasing private security services.

The article entitled “The political economy of security—Commercialization, arms industry and migration control” deals with the thematic overlaps of “Arms” and “Security” and the program area of “Migration, conflicts and security”.

The Annual Report presents a project on the local effects of oil production in Melut County, South Sudan under the program area of “Resources and conflict”. Another BICC research project asks whether ‘fair’ gold is to be had from artisanal and small-scale mining operations in Peru and DR Congo.

“There are likely to be major changes in the landscape of military bases in Germany” is the view put forward in an interview with representatives of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Energy, Building, Housing and Transport of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and a BICC expert, and which comes under the program area of “Base conversion”.

The program area of “Data and GIS (Geographic Information System)” is obviously involved in a number of individual projects such as databases, maps, and infographics. One project that deserves special mention here is the modular information portal on war and peace, sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de, which BICC has...
developed in association with the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb).

“In view of the many theaters of war in this world, one thing is clear: The work of BICC has to continue. The people living in the many areas of conflict need exit strategies towards security and sufficient supplies,” said Helmut Dockter, State Secretary at the Ministry for Innovation, Science and Research of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and Chairman of BICC’s Supervisory Board, speaking at the farewell event on 3 May. In future, BICC will have a dual leadership; that is to say, a Managing Director for Administration and a Managing Director for Research. The latter’s position will be linked to a professorship in Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Bonn. BICC and Bonn University have signed a cooperation agreement to this effect. This ensures that BICC’s work will be continued and expanded.

As in previous years, I would like to use the foreword to the Annual Report as an opportunity to thank not only the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia for its support for BICC but also all our clients and cooperation partners. My special thanks go, of course, to my colleagues at BICC, with whom I share the insight that: “Conversion begins in the mind.” I would like to give them the following words of advice: “Remain grounded in the real world and try to move minds.” This has always been my maxim.

I would also like to take this opportunity to bid you, the Reader, farewell. I will continue to join you in supporting the cause of ‘conversion’. I hope that you will find BICC’s Annual Report 2011/2012 stimulating reading and invite you to send us your comments.

Peter J. Croll
Director BICC
On the basis of applied research at the nexus of peace, security and development, BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) deals with all questions that contribute to implementing disarmament worldwide. It perceives itself as a research institute, a center of knowledge management, a service provider and policy advisor with a national and international sphere of activity. The German government, the European Union, foundations as well as various non-state institutions from science, research and politics and others are BICC’s partners, supporters or clients.

BICC was founded in 1994 as a non-profit private limited company and has two Trustees—the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the Land Brandenburg. The Center stands for the commitment of the Land NRW to Bonn as the center of international cooperation and development policy.

The BICC Supervisory Board oversees the management and advises the Trustees. It consists of up to seven members who are appointed by the Board of Trustees and are responsible inter alia for approving the Center’s annual work programs and financial plans.

In 2012, upon the department of the current Director, BICC’s management structure will change: In future, both a Managing Director for Research and a Managing Director for Administration will lead the Center. The position of Managing Director for Research will be linked to a professorship in Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Bonn. The Managing Director for Administration will control all business operations and legal matters with respect to working areas and projects at BICC. This dual leadership strengthens the content- and research-related work on the one hand and its administration geared to acquisition, efficiency and effectiveness with its respective procedures and services on the other.

BICC, and its management in particular, are advised by an International Board on all questions concerning research, policy and project acquisition. It puts forward suggestions concerning the Center’s work program, comments on BICC’s publications and

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Director: Peter J. Croll
Authorized representative (Prokurist): Michael Dedek
Commercial Register: Bonn HRB 6717
Tax ID No.: 5202/5783/0483
VAT ID No.: DE811913398

BICC Trustees:
Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf: 85%
Land Brandenburg, Potsdam: 15%

Members of the BICC Supervisory Board in June 2012
1. Helmut Dockter, Chair of the Supervisory Board, Secretary of State, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Research of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf
2. Dr. Lale Akgün, Premier’s Department of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf
3. Prof. Dr. Armin B. Cremers, Deputy Rector, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität, Bonn
5. Franz Meiers, Director, NRW.URBAN Service GmbH, Dortmund
6. Dirk Reitemeier, Ministry for Economic and European Affairs of the Land Brandenburg, Potsdam
7. Helmut Rubin, Ministry of Finance of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf
## An overview of the most important projects 2011/2012

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<tr>
<th>Applied research</th>
<th>Selection of products / further information</th>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign affairs and security politics of European states in the Middle East</td>
<td>Sub-project within a project led by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) of the University of Hamburg on terrorism and radicalization: Indicators for external influences (TERAS-INDEX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial provision of security in development countries</td>
<td>Research project with field research component, financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) cf. BICC brief 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisanal miners of natural resources in development countries</td>
<td>Research project with studies on the DR Congo and Peru in cooperation with Südwind Institute, financed by the Church Development Service (eed), Misereor, Stiftung Umwelt und Entwicklung NRW and the Foundation International Dialogue of the Savings Bank in Bonn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese oil investments in South Sudan</td>
<td>Research project with field research component financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITAC—Development of a European curriculum for international crisis management</td>
<td>Project with an international consortium in the framework of the 7th Research Framework Programme of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic interests and actors in Arab countries and their role in the Arab Spring and after</td>
<td>Research cooperation with researchers from Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Jordan, financed by the Volkswagen Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of BICC in the annual Friedensgutachten (Peace Report)</td>
<td>Book publication cf. <a href="http://www.friedensgutachten.de">www.friedensgutachten.de</a></td>
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### Advisory services

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<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security, armaments and development in countries receiving German arms exports and Global Militarization Index (GMI)</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Data bases and country reports with basic data on armaments, military, security, human rights and governance in 170 countries, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), cf. <a href="http://www.ruestungsexport.info">www.ruestungsexport.info</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing advisory services on matters of base conversion</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>Advisory services provided to the government of the Land of NRW in cooperation with NRW.URBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support and capacity-building in stockpile management of SALW, ammunition and surplus weapons in South Sudan</td>
<td>May 2011</td>
<td>In cooperation with the Southern Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (SSBCSSAC), financed by the German Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study on security-relevant risks of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS)</td>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>Study financed by the German Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultancy mission to support the civilian component of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>Expert mission on behalf of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information portal small arms: A web-based data base for practitioners—Classification, properties and global proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
<td>In cooperation with the Verification Center of the Bundeswehr, financed by the German Foreign Office</td>
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</table>

### Capacity development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Since</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan (Capacity-building component)</td>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>In cooperation with the South Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) on behalf of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facts and figures on war and peace—Interactive online portal</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>Concept, development and implementation on behalf of the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cf. sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources for a fair world—Photo exhibition</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>Contribution to development policy education, funded by MISEREOR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cf. <a href="http://www.rohstoffgerechtigkeit.de">www.rohstoffgerechtigkeit.de</a></td>
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makes proposals regarding the content of BICC’s work. Its members are appointed by the Board of Trustees.

To perform its diverse tasks and services, BICC relies on an international and multi-disciplinary team consisting of BICC staff and various partners. It continued to grow in 2011 so that on average, it employed 35 members of staff; 14 of whom on a full time and 21 on a part-time basis.

BICC also offers interns an opportunity to work at an international center. Between January 2011 and April 2012, nine interns from seven countries worked at BICC.

Financial development

BICC’s finances are based on two pillars: The first is the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, which provides the Center with basic funding as Principal Trustee. This enables BICC to acquire orders and funding from other donors within the framework of so-called third party operations that cover the entire range of BICC’s activities.

The positive trend of BICC’s economic development in 2010 continued in 2011 and it was up to the Center to stabilize the positive development in third party funding and to pursue the consolidation targets further. BICC successfully succeeded in this; basic funding amounted to one million euros, and revenues from third party funding increased by yet another euro 210,000 (22.5 percent) to euro 1.141 million. Like this, a considerable 52.8 percent of revenues arose from third party funding.

The enforced external project activities went hand in hand with increased demand for staff so that total staff costs increased by 17.3 percent to euro 1.397 million. Because of the continuing positive trend, BICC was able to present an annual surplus of nearly euro 91,000. This surplus is part of BICC’s self-generated active provisions and will be used for statutory purposes.
Through the success of the last years, BICC has gained and secured the necessary leeway to sustainably fulfill its tasks to “facilitate peace, security and development through research, advisory services and capacity development.”

Michael Dedek

Excerpt from BICC’s Articles of Association:

“The purpose of the association is
• to promote science and research;
• to promote the idea of creating understanding between the peoples;
• to promote development cooperation.”

The BICC GmbH is a recognized non-profit association and its pursuits are completely non-profit in accordance with the German tax code’s article on tax-privileged purpose.

Profit and loss account for the financial year from 1 January to 31 December 2011 (in euro)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual 2011</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Main funding from the Mistry of Innovation, Science and Research of the Land NRW</td>
<td>1,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Revenue from completed projects</td>
<td>805,300.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Reimbursement of costs and other income</td>
<td>11,420.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,816,721.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in totals in the case of unfinished products</td>
<td>324,314.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other operating income</td>
<td>19,729.75</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operating performance</td>
<td>2,160,766.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material costs of projects</td>
<td>344,960.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff costs</td>
<td>1,396,548.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned depreciation</td>
<td>15,267.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous operating expenses (office space, etc.)</td>
<td>313,232.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenses</td>
<td>2,070,008.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial result</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>90,761.38</td>
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</table>
www.ruestungsexport.info—What is the security situation like in India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand?

The website www.ruestungsexport.info (in German only) offers data and facts on the situation of recipient countries of German arms exports. Not only does it offer a categorization of 170 countries according to the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct but also 27 detailed country reports on security, armament and development in recipient countries, which are updated on a regular basis. This information service, which is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), allows for an informed assessment of the effects of German arms exports on the security situation in recipient countries. It also enhances available information that feeds into the discussions on German arms exports. Especially in regional contexts, such as Latin America or Asia and with regard to the emerging BRIC economies this becomes ever more important.

In the first half of 2012, tensions in parts of Asia have markedly increased. The threatened, planned, launched—and failed—rocket test by North Korea, the launch of the long-range Type Agni-5 missile in India that can also be used with a nuclear warhead, as well as the confrontation between Philippine and Chinese warships near Huangyan Island (a territory which is claimed by both countries), are only a few examples of a dangerous development. The situation is exacerbated by the decision of the US government to increase its influence in the region. In view of numerous unsolved territorial conflicts, lack of transparency in military expenditures and reported grave human rights issues in many states of the region, recent and future arms deals are highly problematic.

The following section provides abstracts of country reports on India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand (last updated in 2011).

India

India continues to show major deficits in its adherence to human rights, even though regional differences within the country are great. The situation is problematic in regions with internal conflict. The most prominent regional conflict with a potential for nuclear escalation is the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It is true that the situation has somewhat improved due to diplomatic initiatives in the past few years but numerous terrorist attacks keep destabilizing the region. Besides the conflict and confrontation with Pakistan, New Delhi’s rearmament as a reaction to the Chinese security policy is a cause for concern. As a rising pan-Asian power with continuing economic growth, India is repositioning itself with regard to its foreign- and security policy within South Asia—and in particular with its competition with China.

India is a recipient of German arms exports, but the main share of their weapons originates from Russia. In the past few years, India not only received communications and navigation equipment, spare parts for armored vehicles and submarines, but also missiles and torpedoes as well as small arms and light weapons. The country also imports German diesel engines and light transport aircraft, type Do-228.

Pakistan

Numerous human rights violations and continuing political disputes after the end of the military regime of former President Musharraf in 2008 are characteristic for today’s situation in Pakistan. On the one hand, is the smoldering conflict over Kashmir; on the other, Islamabad is confronted with numerous internal armed conflicts, in particular the intensified fighting with the Taliban in South Waziristan. The military—traditionally an important actor in Pakistan’s society—plays a major role in this conflict. Its influence on politics is great and it is well connected to economic players in the country. Even though the number of its armed forces is high, it lacks modern weapons and arms equipment. In their fight against international terrorism, the United States considers Pakistan as a close and important ally and has equipped the country with modern war material. The United States is, however, not the only country that provides Pakistan with arms: China, France, Russia and Ukraine are also among its weapons providers. In the past, Germany delivered torpedoes type Seehecht, diesel engines for speedboats from Turkey as well as armored personnel carriers type Dingo-2. Negotiations between
Pakistan and German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems on the sale of a submarine type U-214 however failed, also due to a critical public.

The Philippines

Basic human rights violations continue to occur in the Philippines, particularly in connection with internal violent conflicts, the secessionist movements and the fight against terrorism. The entire country suffers from internal conflicts some of which have been ongoing for decades. In the past few years, the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf has been keeping the island on edge. In its fight against Islamic terrorism, the government in Manila has found a close ally in the United States. Outside of its borders, the unsolved territorial conflict over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are also claimed by China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam, is also fraught with a high potential of violent conflict.

The role of the military in society is ambivalent. The armed forces are extremely politicized and characterized by corruption and a system of patronage. Technical modernization has mainly been the purchase of up to 12 US F-16 combat aircrafts. Germany delivers communication technology as well as small arms and light weapons. Philippine Special Forces are already equipped with the Heckler & Koch G-36 gun, which is soon to become the standard weapon of the army.

Thailand

Violent conflict and disputes between government and opposition have been ongoing for years. These climaxed into an escalation of violence between the ‘Red Shirts’ of the opposition and the military in Spring 2010. Parliamentary elections in July 2011 abated internal disputes but border conflicts with Myanmar and Cambodia as well as the conflict with Islamist rebel groups (which is extremely violent) threaten the stability of the country.

The role of the military in these conflicts is ambivalent. It is rather part of the problem than a means to solve it due to its partial involvement in illegal activities. In addition, the human rights situation is questionable. Extrajudicial killings, assaults by members of the armed forces and forced repatriation of Burmese refugees are common incidents.

Bangkok watches China’s armament efforts with great concern and considers them to be a danger to regional stability. Even though Thailand’s army is comparatively well equipped, the government is eager to modernize all parts of its armed forces. The air force will be receiving new Swedish fighter planes type Gripen and put one reconnaissance aircraft type Saab 340AEW in service. Against the background of the conflict regarding the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the government in Bangkok also intends to substantially modernize the navy. However, according to information provided in May 2011 by the German Defense Ministry, negotiations on the purchase of up to six used class 206 submarines lie dormant. Besides delivery of aircraft type Do-220-200MP in the past, Germany has recently focused on the export of navigation and communication technology.

Jan Grebe

Project title: Security, armaments and development in recipient countries of German arms exports
Duration: since May 2002
Financed by: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Project leader: Jan Grebe
Project collaboration: Melanie Dederichs, Susanne Heinke, Alexander Strunck, Lars Wirkus
Publications: cf. List of publications
Website: www.ruestungsexport.info
Program area: Arms—Global trends, exports and control
Project category: Advisory services
Global Militarization Index (GMI) 2012—High militarization in the Middle East continues

This is the third time that BICC is publishing its Global Militarization Index (GMI). The GMI 2012 not only depicts levels of global militarization but also documents the development since 1990. The GMI is financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). This year’s GMI shows, once more, that the Middle East is the highest militarized region in the world.

BICC’s GMI not only depicts the amount of funds being allocated to the military of one state. It also defines the degree of militarization of a country by comparing military expenditures with its gross domestic product (GDP) and/or other state expenditures, such as health. It thus reflects the relative weight and importance of the military apparatus of a state in relation to its society as a whole.

The fact that Israel, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, five countries of the Middle East, are amongst the top ten shows that the high militarization of states in the conflict-ridden region further exacerbates instability. Against the background of a general increase in armaments in many countries of the region and the continuing conflicts, for instance in Syria, it is particularly critical that (with the exception of Qatar) all other states can be found within the top 40 of the GMI. High degrees of militarization can, indeed, contribute to violent internal and external conflicts.

The map shows the degrees of militarization of individual countries and illustrates the sometimes high degree of militarization in certain regions of the world. At the same time, it becomes clear that despite a low level of militarization, some states, in Sub-Saharan Africa for instance, are still affected by conflict. Mali, as an example, is ranked number 107, yet its situation is extremely unstable and volatile.

Jan Grebe

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1 The GMI uses data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organization (WHO), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and BICC. The ranking shows the militarization of 161 states since 1990. It is updated by BICC on an annual basis.

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Project title: Global Militarization Index (GMI)
Duration: since May 2002
Financed by: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Project leader: Jan Grebe
Project collaboration: Jan Hartmann, Vera Klöftschen, Alexander Strunck, Lars Wirkus
Publications: cf. List of publications
Website: www.bicc.de/our-work/gmi.html
Program area: Arms—Global trends, exports and control
Project category: Advisory services
The Global Militarization Index (GMI)

**TOP 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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</tbody>
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**GMI - Level**

- Very low
- Low
- Medium
- High
- Very high
- No data available
- Countries with armed conflict
South Sudan became a sovereign state last year. Recent months have shown just how fragile progress towards development and peace actually is. The high proliferation of small arms and light weapons is also a problematic legacy of the former civil war. BICC is conducting a project financed by the German Foreign Office to support the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSSAC) at the South Sudan Ministry of the Interior. The aim is to help improve the storage of weapons and ammunition.

Small arms and light weapons are omnipresent in South Sudan and play a key role in the bloody conflicts between the state and armed groups as well as among the civilian population. The government of South Sudan has therefore set itself the goal of limiting the proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and improving control over these weapons. This is a great challenge for this huge country, which has a poor infrastructure and whose security sector needs to be developed and reformed in order to be able to effectively guarantee the protection of the civilian population.

The Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSSAC) at the South Sudan Ministry of the Interior is one institution, which is already working with some success to improve small arms control. The German Foreign Office is financing a project under which BICC will support the Small Arms Control Bureau and the security sector (police, prison authorities and fire brigade; to a certain extent also the army) in improving the practice of storing arms and ammunition. The most important areas are first of all raising the awareness of senior personnel, teaching basic technical know-how, and presenting options for action. This task also entails work at the political level, cooperation with other non-governmental organizations and the United Nations, and the provision of specific technical advisory services.

Technical study shows deficits in the storage of weapons and ammunition

The starting point for the project was to consider the practice of storing weapons and ammunition in the security sector following the civil war and to develop options for further action on this basis. As a first step, BICC conducted a technical assessment on behalf of the Small Arms Control Bureau in May/June 2011. This assessment revealed serious security deficits in the storage of SALW in the security sector. The structures used for storage purposes such as corrugated metal huts, abandoned buildings and clay huts are often ramshackle and falling to pieces and are inadequately secured. Inventory books are not always available and often fail to provide full records of stocks. Theft and misappropriation cannot be ruled out as long as there are no possibilities and procedural regulations for conducting clear inventory controls to uncover losses, and measures to secure the storage buildings do not meet the most basic demands. The distinguished Geneva research institute Small Arms Survey speaks of poorly secured government stockpiles of weapons as being one of the major sources of weapons for unauthorized persons and groups.

A further aspect of the technical assessment revealed the problem that weapons and ammunition in South Sudan are often stored in such a way that the risk of unintentional explosions cannot be ruled out. Heat and damp have a damaging effect on the ammunition and destabilize explosive materials. The catastrophe in the Republic Congo (Brazzaville) in early March 2012 shows just how devastating the effects of poor storage can be: an explosion at an ammunitions store killed almost 200 people and injured around 1,000.

South Sudan has declared the professional management of weapons and ammunition storage a priority in the professionalization of its security sector as a whole. It has recognized that the risks involved in stockpiling weapons can be significantly reduced by taking targeted measures. However, South Sudan is beginning this undertaking with a very low level of technical know-how and many soldiers and officers still fail to grasp what safe storage actually means.
Workshops increase awareness and trigger initial measures

The technical assessment was followed by initial concrete steps to tackle the problems. For example, various workshops were held over the last few months involving senior officers from all parts of the security sector. The aim was to convince the officers of the advantages of safe storage and to allay their fears that these measures could reduce their powers and resources. The series of workshops ended in mid-April 2012 with a high-ranking conference under the patronage of Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny.

BICC was supported by the Bundeswehr Verification Center (Geilenkirchen), the Small Arms Survey (Geneva) and the Institute for Strategic Studies (Pretoria) in organizing the workshops.

BICC’s work has contributed towards strengthening the political will and the technical know-how needed to improve small arms control at the highest level. Further measures will follow in the coming months. These will be based on the three most important areas for an efficient system to store and manage weapons and ammunition: infrastructure (external building security and internal organization of storage management), training and instruction, and the preparation of procedural regulations. Workshop participants agreed among other things to set up a working group for the management of weapons and ammunition, which will be an integral part of the future management structure of small arms and light weapons in the whole of South Sudan and will prepare the next concrete steps.

The management of SALW in the security sector needs international support

All in all, BICC was able to make a significant contribution to enhancing the efficiency of the Small Arms Control Bureau. It also cooperated on the preparation of regulations and draft legislation such as procedural instructions on marking weapons and electronic inventories as well as regulations for the National Armaments Law. BICC also supported the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMISS) in providing the army with modified containers for the safe storage of weapons and procuring special new machines to mark weapons together with the relevant registration software.

Many measures can be initiated without great financial expense and far-reaching changes in infrastructure. For example, the construction of sun protection roofs can help to reduce the danger of explosions. The risk of fire can be diminished by removing nearby vegetation. Modified containers can be used to store weapons and ammunition until sound concrete buildings are available. Fences can help to control access and to protect against thieves. Finally, steps must be taken to create inventories of stocks and to implement controls.

The introduction of an efficient system to manage SALW and ammunition at all levels of the security sector in South Sudan represents a very complex and challenging undertaking. One thing is certain: it cannot succeed without further support from the international community. The most important factor, however, is the peaceful coexistence of South Sudan with its neighbors.

Marius Kahl

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title:</th>
<th>Improvements in SALW and ammunition storage in the Republic of South Sudan in 2012</th>
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**New threats through MANPADS?**

**MANPADS** (Man Portable Air Defense Systems) are relatively small weapons with potential huge effects. They can be used especially for asymmetrical warfare and terrorist attacks, for instance on civilian aircraft, with devastating results. On behalf of the German Foreign Office, BICC investigates the effects of these weapons to contribute to a threat analysis and the evaluation of international control regimes and the international security discourse.

**MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense Systems)** represent a relatively new type of weapon. Developed in the 1950s in parallel in the United States and the Soviet Union, MANPADS are small guided missiles, fired by a single operator or small crew, to defend against low-flying ground attack aircraft. While the effectiveness of MANPADS in military action is not too high, these systems are very effective against civilian aircraft—hit probabilities are high, though there are cases of civilian aircraft surviving a hit by a MANPADS missile—and have, indeed, claimed a number of civilian, as well as military victims. There are around a score of types of MANPADS from different manufacturers. There is also clear evidence that MANPADS have entered the arsenals of terrorist organizations, and have been used against civilian airplanes.

The first MANPADS were deployed by the US army in the late 1950s. This weapon, named ‘Redeye’ was soon followed by a Russian variant, the ‘Strela’ [Arrow]. Since then, the Russians have developed two additional types of these weapons of growing sophistication: the ‘Igla’ [Needle] and ‘Igla-S’. The Americans have in turn developed several variants of their ‘Stinger’ family of MANPADS. Sweden, South Korea, France, and Britain have developed MANPADS of their own. Other countries—China, Japan, Iran, Egypt and Poland—have copied and modified originals mostly from Russia and the United States and now manufacture their own variants.

There is a great deal of disagreement over whether MANPADS are effective in the battlefield. In the 1980s, the United States gave Stinger MANPADS in large numbers to Afghan Mujahedeen to fight the Russians. Some 200 to 300 Russian and Afghan air force planes were hit over a period of two years. In the war between Peru and Ecuador, several fighter planes were reportedly shot down. A small number of Sri Lankan fighter planes were shot down by Tamil Tigers. These numbers are all in dispute. There are, however, confirmed reports of MANPADS shooting down airliners in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) in 1978, the DR Congo, and Iraq or attempting to do so (Kenya).

**How does a MANPAD function and what does it consist of?**

Typically, a MANPAD consists of three parts. A small (around 180 cm x 7.5-9.0 cm diameter) missile is housed in a disposable tube. To fire the missile, the tube is fitted to a gripstock, which can be fired by an individual gunner. The gripstock contains sights for the gunner and a trigger for the missile and can be reused once a missile is fired by detaching the tube. MANPADS missiles are usually composed of the following parts: a seeker head, which has sensors that track an airplane. Simpler sensors follow the infra-red signature of a plane’s engines. More complex modern ones can follow a laser beam directed by the gunner, or can identify a plane by its heat-shape against the cooler sky. The sensors pass information to a processor, which controls winglets, which allow the missile to maneuver as it pursues its prey. A rocket motor provides motion power for the few (less than fifteen) seconds it takes the missile to hunt down its target. Then a warhead, usually of about 1.5 kg high explosives, explodes and sends shrapnel of small steel balls into the airplane. The action is typically very fast: from identifying a target to hitting it may take around 20 to 30 seconds at most.

**Export product with threat potential**

MANPADS manufacturing nations have often exported MANPADS to other countries. The weapons have been identified in places as separate as Kazakhstan, Yemen, South Sudan, Libya and Nigeria, to name but a few. Given the often poor storage conditions in those countries, some of these weapons may have deteriorated beyond use. However, many of those countries do not store the weapons safely, as result of which some may have been stolen and...
passed to terrorist hands. The case of Libya, which bought some 20,000 MANPADS is particularly important. After the recent Libyan revolution, US and British experts managed to retrieve and destroy 5,000 missiles. The other 15,000 are de facto unaccounted for and may have made their way to non-government armed groups in the Sahel and Middle East as well as to local Libyan militias.

Certain factors contribute to the potential threat posed by MANPADS: the range of existing models; functional efficacy; operational ease; portability; transfer trends contributing to the wide proliferation; national holdings and distribution; national stockpile management standards; (non-)existence of legal instruments; and actor posture. Recent international events and reports of unaccounted-for stocks of MANPADS contribute greatly to the fears of black market transfers, terrorism and further regional as well as international repercussions.

**A project for comprehensive analysis**

Considering these factors, an extensive study such as this project cannot be deemed more timely and relevant.

The objects of the German Foreign Office funded BICC MANPADS project are to provide a comprehensive map and analysis of MANPADS use. The project is intended to feed into related security discourses and serve an analytical role for international threat determination and assessment.

Primarily, desk research is to assemble, annotate, and evaluate open-source data on MANPADS, such as technical and military specifications; manufacture and manufacturers; transfers; stockpiles doctrine, uses, and legal environment in all states about whom there is information. Then, further sources are analyzed and experts interviewed. The objective is to show, using case studies, the total picture of MANPADS possession in some select states. This will include the legal regime the weapons are held under, national policies and practices on import, manufacture, storage, and export.

MANPADS represent one of the major threats to civilian infrastructure—air travel and air freight—in the world today. The information and knowledge collected in this project are to advise policymakers and contribute to an improved threat analysis. They will be documented in a BICC brief.

Dr. Michael Ashkenazi

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**Project details**

- **Project title:** Analysis on MANPADS
- **Duration:** until December 2012
- **Financed by:** German Foreign Office
- **Project leader:** Dr. Michael Ashkenazi
- **Project collaboration:** Princess Amuzu, Jan Grebe, Christof Kögler, Elvan Isikozlu
- **Publications:** cf. List of publications
- **Program area:** Arms—Global trends, exports and control
- **Project category:** Advisory services
Interactive database as a new tool for the verification and control of small arms

What types of small arms and light weapons are there and in which countries? Where are which types of small arms produced? What are the different categories of small arms and light weapons? How can small arms be distinguished from one another? An English-language database on small arms and light weapons, which BICC is currently developing in close cooperation with the Verification Center of the Bundeswehr (ZVBw) and with funding from the German Foreign Office, sets out to answer these and similar questions.

The Verification Center of the Bundeswehr (ZVBw) performs various tasks in the field of arms control on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany. Among other things, it is responsible for planning and implementing the national tasks that Germany has to perform within the framework of treaties, agreements on arms control, and confidence and security-building measures.

The cooperation between the Verification Center and BICC is an opportunity to combine BICC’s international expertise in the fields of small arms and light weapons and the interactive processing of the relevant data and facts with the responsibilities of the ZVBw as described above. Cooperation on small arms began in 2011 and aims, among other things, to develop a unique information portal on small arms and light weapons for use by arms experts.

The beta version of the interactive database will be presented to a wide group of experts for the first time at the Second Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons in August/September 2012.

Small arms and light weapons—Control is essential

The United Nations’ definition of small arms differentiates between “small” and “light” weapons (Small Arms and Light Weapons – SALW). Accordingly, “small arms” include revolvers and semi-automatic pistols, carbines and rifles, assault rifles, machine pistols and light machine guns (all of which can be operated by a single person). As a rough guide: small arms have a caliber (internal diameter of the barrel) of less than 12.7mm. ‘Light weapons’, on the other hand, are heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable missile-launchers and mortars with a caliber of up to 100mm. They can be carried by two people as a team, transported by a small vehicle or pack animal, and operated by a crew. With the exception of grenades, which are a weapon and ammunition all in one, all SALW need ammunition. The bigger the caliber, the more likely that the ammunition is explosive.

An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people are killed by SALW every year. This is due primarily to their enormous proliferation, both inside and outside conflict regions. It is estimated that between 600 million and 850 million SALW are currently circulating in the world. However, it is difficult to verify these figures because the production and sales statistics for SALW are, by their nature, not particularly transparent. The terrible ‘effectiveness’ of SALW is due to some of their basic characteristics. They are relatively cheap and easily available, easy to transport, smuggle, and hide. They are generally resistant to dirt and corrosion, extremely low-maintenance and durable—which means that they are still fully functional even after several decades.

SALW are widespread throughout the world, particularly in fragile states or states that are inclined towards conflicts. At the same time, it can be observed that more and more states are producing and exporting sophisticated SALW. Against this precarious background, the international community has approved a number of agreements, UN protocols, regional conventions and other measures to limit the use of and trade in SALW, to regulate marking, and help countries to trace weapons used for illegal activities.

Most UN Member States have signed the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (UN PoA), which was published in 2001. It demands that each state reports annually on its stocks of SALW. In 2006, the UN Member States agreed on an international legal
instrument to enable the timely and reliable identification and tracing of illegal small arms and light weapons by the states.

Increase transparency—Spread knowledge

BICC is receiving funding from the German Foreign Office and working in close cooperation with the Verification Center of the Bundeswehr (ZVBw) to develop an interactive information portal on SALW using WebGIS components. The portal is based on the ZVBw’s Small Arms and Light Weapons Guide and is intended not only to make existing information on small arms and light weapons more easily accessible and propagate such information, but also to support the measures and efforts of the international community to implement controls and combat the illegal proliferation of SALW.

The portal will contain technical details on individual types of weapons, their different versions, and their proliferation. Interested parties will be able to retrieve information that could be decisive for many arms control procedures and projects, including photos of weapons, detailed photos of differentiating criteria as well as photos and sketches of the markings used by producers and countries of origin and their position on the weapon. The portal will also provide information on the ammunition used in SALW.

The database has a wide range of potential uses—from helping to prepare missions involving soldiers or arms control officers in post-conflict countries, to determining small weapons “in the field” or training up-and-coming disarmament experts.

The Internet portal is not only aimed at arms control and disarmament experts but also at supporting people in the fields of politics, research and NGOs in their efforts to prevent, combat and eliminate the illicit trade in SALW.

The data and information on the technical details of individual types of weapons, their different models, and their global proliferation enable the user to find out more about specific types of weapons and their proliferation or about the presence of certain types of weapons in individual countries.

One important aspect of the portal’s interactive design is that selected, internationally renowned experts will be able to access the database in order to add information. This means that new types of weapons or new models of existing types of weapons can be constantly added to the database and existing sets of data updated to provide information on new stocks. This external data will be included in the database following careful study and validation by experts from the ZVBw and BICC. It will then be made available to all the other users of the portal on SALW.

Lars Wirkus

Project title: Information portal small arms: A web-based data base for practitioners—classification, properties and global proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)

Duration: until December 2012

Funded by: German Foreign Office

Project partner: Verification Center of the Bundeswehr (ZVBw)

Project leader: Lars Wirkus

Project collaboration: Jan Hartmann, Alexander Strunck

Publications: cf. List of publications

Website: URL under construction

Program area: Data and GIS

Project category: Advisory services

1 Web-based Geographical Information System
"A real alternative to Wikipedia"— A student’s experience with sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de

BICC is cooperating with the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb) in developing a modular information portal on war and peace for the latter’s online service: sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de. The portal will eventually offer a total of nine thematic modules that are intended to give individual target groups, such as politically interested members of the public, teachers and learners, policymakers, representatives of the media and researchers, interactive access to the particular information that they require on war and peace in a global comparison. The portal offers a broad spectrum of different, mainly interactive, presentation forms. Its central feature is an interactive collection of maps and tables providing a wide range of data and information regarding individual countries and years based on WebGIS (Web-based Geographical Information System) in combination with a relational database.

Philip M. is a student at a grammar school in Cologne. “Globalization” is a topic on the syllabus of his course in Geography. His class is studying issues of food prices, deposits of natural resources, and societal conflicts over the distribution of resources. Philip’s assignment is to search for information on the Internet. And he finds just what he’s been looking for—at sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de, the joint information portal run by the Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb) and BICC.

The online module “Natural resources and conflict” is brand new. The questions posed on the landing page immediately catch Philip’s attention: “What does one understand by resource conflicts and where are such conflicts taking place? Which countries are dependent on imports of oil or gas? What does the term ‘blood diamonds’ mean? What is the Kimberley Process? Are there resource conflicts at the North Pole? What attempts are being made to prevent resource conflicts?

Maps and sources for Geography lessons

“First of all I wanted to get an overall view of the problem,” Philip explains. “The topics of deposits of natural resources and their distribution, conflicts over natural resources and control regimes were just what I was looking for. I was particularly excited about what maps I would be able to find—after all, I need input for my Geography course.”

And indeed—the website’s central element is its maps window. A menu tree next to the maps window shows the user the information he can select. For example, a click on the heading “Deposits and distribution of natural resources” provides a cartographical overview of deposits of fossil and mineral resources (mineral oil and gas, diamonds, other minerals) as well as of agricultural resources (cocoa, palm oil, timber) and drugs (cannabis, coca and opium).

Philip finds it particularly exciting to combine the areas of “Oil production” with topics such as “Reliance on natural resources” or “Mining of selected minerals” and “Conflicts over natural resources according to their intensity”. Some results, however, are puzzling. For example, he discovers that Russia, Canada and the United States are “highly active” or “active” in mining certain resources (bauxite, iron ore, gold, coal, cobalt, copper, rare earths, silver, tungsten, uranium, and tin). What surprises him, though, is that all three countries are claimed to be involved in a “manifest conflict over resources”. What on earth is happening—conflicts over resources in peaceful Canada?

The answer is to be found upon closer study—just what a grammar school teacher who is trying to teach his students the critical and meticulous use of sources and information wants to see. Philip’s investigations lead him to the pop-up box “Conflicts over natural resources according to their intensity” and refer him to the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), where he reads: “The first two levels, so-called ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ conflicts, comprise non-violent conflicts. The three further levels are ‘crisis’, ‘serious crisis’ and ‘war’.” It’s good to know that not every conflict over natural resources involves violence. Nevertheless, who is involved in the conflicts in the three countries mentioned? The Conflict Barometer 2010 informs Philip that the conflict over mineral deposits in the Arctic involves not only Russia, Canada and the United States but also Norway and Denmark.
It is the combination that counts—Layers of maps complement one another

Philip’s Geography course focuses strongly on global food problems and he is therefore very interested in seeing what he can find at “Agricultural resources”. Cocoa trees, oil palms and tropical timber are important commodities on the world market. Data on these three products is collated and published by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) and the ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization). The explanation under the map showing the production of agricultural resources in different countries states, “(…) In many cases, conflict parties receive their funding from sales of these natural resources, which thus prolongs conflicts. They are grown primarily in tropical regions.”

“Bitter cocoa” is the heading of a text that appears by clicking on the pop-up menu. Can the resource used to make delicious chocolate really involve conflicts? The text explains, “The cultivation, smuggling and sale of cocoa not only contributed to the income of the conflict parties in Côte d’Ivoire, but shortcomings in the governance of the cocoa sector also heightened social divisions and led to the 2002 rebellion.”

Needless to say, Philip’s Geography course is also studying the role of the international community and the question of how resource depletion can be controlled, e.g. in the field of timber. Below the heading “Natural resource control regimes”, students can click onto a layer of maps showing the membership of the countries concerned in the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade), which sets out to deal with the serious ecological, economic and social consequences of illegal timber harvesting for both the population and the environment.

Callation of facts and modules—Not only on natural resources and conflicts

What Philip likes most about sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de, however, is its extensive collection of facts. “This is a real alternative to Google or Wikipedia. After all, the portal has not been set up by just anybody but by the Federal Agency for Civic Education and a renowned peace and conflict research institute, BICC.” For example, the collection of links in the module on “Natural resources and conflict” contains articles on individual topics such as “Deposits and distribution of natural resources”, “Natural resources—sources of finance and cause of conflicts”, “Conflict mineral—diamonds” as well as “Drugs and armed conflicts” and provides links to even more sources.

The collection of data also includes the portal’s other modules. These are currently “Wars and violent conflicts”, “Peace and demobilization” and “Military capacities and means”. Each individual module functions in the same way as “Natural resources and conflict” via a maps window, mutually complementary layers of maps that can be accessed by mouse click, and pop-up functions. The collection of data contains well-researched background and factual information. Furthermore, it also includes tables of data on various topics, a glossary and extensive country portraits. In short—sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de is not just of interest for students taking a Geography course.

The designers of the portal want to know what the users think and have installed a feedback button. And what is Philip’s feedback on sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de? “Like it!”

Susanne Heinke

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**Project title:** Facts and figures on war and peace—Interactive online portal

**Duration:** since July 2010

**Funded by:** German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb)

**Project leader:** Lars Wirkus

**Project collaboration:** Jan Hartmann, Susanne Heinke, Vera Klöttschen, Alexander Strunck

**Website:** sicherheitspolitik.bpb.de

**Program area:** Data and GIS

**Project category:** Capacity development
South Sudan, the world’s youngest state, is facing enormous challenges following its official foundation on 9 July 2011. The military and security sector currently accounts for more than half of the state’s expenditure, leaving little money for development projects. The South Sudanese government has recognized this problem and has declared the long-term reduction of the defense budget one of its major development goals. The program for the disarmament, demobilization and socio-economic reintegration (DDR) of former combatants plays a significant role in this context. It is being supervised by the South Sudanese DDR Commission. The German Foreign Office and the KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) are sponsoring a long-term BICC expert advisor to provide the Commission with technical support and assistance with capacity-building.

Steps to disarm, demobilize and integrate former combatants in Southern Sudan were already introduced in 2009. However, disarmament and demobilization were suspended in 2011 because the program failed to meet expectations and demands for various reasons. Between 2009 and 2011, it only proved possible to demobilize around 12,500 of the originally intended 90,000 combatants. Furthermore, there were serious management errors on the part of the United Nations within the framework of the program—these were also discussed in public—and claims of corruption against the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) in selecting participants. In addition, the reintegration payments were not adequately adapted to the situation in Southern Sudan and were thus not very attractive to prospective candidates for demobilization compared with the relatively high wages paid to SPLA soldiers.

Lessons learned from the past

In Summer 2011, the government of South Sudan presented a concept for the second phase of the DDR program, which was to begin in 2012. The South Sudanese DDR Commission was supported by a BICC long-term expert advisor in preparing its plans. In September, the Council of Ministers finally approved the DDR Policy, which foresees the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 150,000 members of the security sector (80,000 SPLA soldiers and 70,000 members of the other uniformed services such as police, prison authorities, wildlife protection authorities and fire brigade) within six to eight years. The DDR program is thus aiming primarily to reduce the size of the security forces and cut expenditure on the security and defense sector. Apart from the program for members of the SPLA and the uniformed services, smaller special programs are to be established for child soldiers, wounded war veterans, members of foreign armed movements (particularly the Lord’s Resistance Army—LRA), and women associated with the armed forces and armed groups.

This focus of the new DDR program on active members of the security apparatus is intended to implement a key demand made by the international community. The initial DDR program primarily covered the demobilization of children, women and disabled soldiers, most of whom were not necessarily in the pay of the SPLA. The new program will change this situation as the central criterion for the selection of members of the security apparatus is that their names should be on the government’s payroll. Military identity cards are intended to ensure the conclusive identification of participants (a major problem in the previous phase of the DDR program). Such cards have already been issued to the majority of SPLA soldiers and members of the other armed forces.

Key characteristics of the new DDR program

In contrast to the previous phase of the program, the new DDR strategy also includes a disarmament component. Participants are to be disarmed by the SPLA/SSAF before entering the demobilization camps. Another significant difference is the way in which demobilization is organized. Whereas this used to take place in the course of a single day, the new strategy includes a three-month demobilization phase. Following registration and a medical check-up, the new program focuses on providing participants with intensive vocational guidance, specific literacy courses and civil skills. This feature takes up a central demand of the SPLA/SSAF for a longer period of transi-
tion between military and civilian life. This will involve more intensive training and improved material security for the participants.

The three-month demobilization phase will be followed by a nine-month phase of individual economic and social integration into civilian life. Here, there are two major differences compared with the previous DDR program: On the one hand, the government has stated its willingness to continue to pay the wages of the participants for a total period of twelve months, thus ensuring the economic survival of former combatants and their families. On the other hand, reintegration measures will pay closer attention to the individual wishes and needs of the participants. For this purpose, a network of advisory offices is being set up on the basis of existing structures of the DDR Commission in the individual states of South Sudan. The new program is thus aiming to develop an individual reintegration plan for each and every participant.

Preparing the pilot phase of the new DDR program

The new approach adopted by the DDR program called for intensive discussions between the South Sudanese DDR Commission, the SPLA/SSAF, the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the international partners involved in the DDR process. The BICC advisory project accompanied this process on behalf of the German Foreign Office and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) in 2011 and supported the preparation of the strategy paper for the new DDR process. This advisory approach will be continued in 2012.

There are plans for a pilot phase involving 4,500 participants in 2012. These people will be prepared for their return to civilian life in demobilization camps in three locations in South Sudan. A long-term BICC expert advisor working on-the-spot will provide the DDR Commission with technical support in planning and implementing the pilot phase.

Difficult political environment

The political environment continues to be a huge challenge for the entire DDR process. Disputes between South Sudan and Sudan over issues such as oil production, border demarcation or the status of the Abyei border region remain unsolved and were the cause of warlike conflicts along the border and renewed mobilization on both sides in early 2012. It now seems that the implementation of the planned DDR activities will depend on improvements in relations between South Sudan and Sudan.

Claudia Breitung

Project title: Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in South Sudan (Capacity-building component)
Duration: since October 2009
Funded by: German Foreign Office and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
Project leader: Wolf-Christian Paes
Project collaboration: Claudia Breitung
Program area: Security—Stakeholders, systems, threats
Project category: Capacity development
Development cooperation and private security companies

Between 2010 and 2011, BICC researchers examined the private security industries in Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru. They were particularly interested in the relation between private security and development cooperation and found that security companies challenge development actors in two significant ways.

On the one hand, they make up a significant part of the economy and the security sector of many developing countries. Private security has an immediate impact on a number of development-related factors. From a perspective of development policy, security companies should therefore be included in security sector reform (SSR) processes from the very outset.

On the other, development agencies themselves increasingly rely on the services of private security companies. In some partner countries, United Nations (UN) missions, bilateral donors and international non-governmental organizations are even among the principal customers of security industries. In this sense, they are often directly implicated in the wider social and economic effects of commercial security.

Development and private security in the context of SSR

Development organizations frequently assist partner countries in establishing and maintaining an effective and legitimate security sector. However, our findings from Timor-Leste and Liberia confirmed that these efforts tend to be concerned almost exclusively with state bodies. Whereas there is certainly nothing wrong with helping public institutions in this manner, such one-sided focus neglects the fact that the private security industry often constitutes an even larger—and possibly equally significant—part of the security sector as a whole. Yet, the government’s involvement has been either at a very late date in the SSR process (Timor-Leste) or not at all (Liberia). In both countries, government regulation of private security companies is weak to non-existent. This sometimes creates real problems, since rampant urban crime coincides with a largely unprofessional security industry.

Professionalism is only part of the picture, however. Private security companies have an impact on a broad range of factors, including social and economic development. For this reason, assistance in improving regulation and oversight ought to involve government ministries in the field of security as much as those (public and private) bodies concerned with labor issues and the domestic economy. Assistance also ought to extend to measures for empowering communities and civil society organizations to monitor and publicize the conduct of security companies.

Development agencies as customers of private security

The outsourcing of security requirements to private companies is a recent, yet major trend across large parts of the development community. In many places, development agencies are spearheading a process toward the corporatization of private guarding. Agencies need to seriously reflect on how these dynamics may affect the communities in which they operate, and—by extension—their developmental objectives.

Timor-Leste is a particularly extreme case in this regard. Not only is the security industry the largest employer in the country; development agencies are also amongst the largest customers of commercial security services. Development cooperation has thus created local dependencies that countermand the often-stated goal of promoting sustainable and self-reliant economies.

Whereas a diversification of its client-base would make the East Timorese security industry more sustainable, this may also come at a high price to the maintenance of social peace. That is to say: the commercialization of security services could exacerbate social tensions in the wake of an increasing economic stratification of society.

One way out of this dilemma would be to simply abstain from contracting private security services altogether. Development agencies could finance projects, which benefit the communities living in immediate proximity to their offices and residencies—
thereby earning the trust and acceptance of local people. Such endeavor may well turn out to be a viable security strategy.

Yet, these ‘ideal’ arrangements are not always possible. Whereas they might work well in Timor-Leste, where crime rates are generally low, the operating context of development cooperation in Liberia is far more insecure and few donor agencies will feel comfortable without relying on some form of guarding service. With private protection deemed necessary, the best option for development agencies is to hire their own in-house guards.

In all three cases examined by us, the working conditions of guards in the private security industry were far worse than of those directly employed with the clients they protected. Paying decent salaries and extending certain social benefits to one’s own guarding staff is an issue of social responsibility, which donor organizations should take seriously.

**Recommendations for development cooperation**

As an overall rule, the hiring of private security companies should be the last resort for development agencies in search for security. If they decide to do this, cost efficiency should not be the central criterion when deciding which company to hire. Particularly in dangerous environments, such as Liberia, going for the cheaper bidder might put the contracting agencies at great risk. Yet, neither should the professional quality of services—although certainly important—be the sole factor when purchasing commercial security services. As part of the contracting process, donor agencies ought to take additional account of:

- **Working conditions within the security company.** Do security guards receive decent salaries and social benefits? How long are their shifts and working hours? Does the company enable and promote individual development of guards, for example by allowing them to combine their job with pursuing further education? Many security firms in Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru displayed serious deficiencies in these regards.

- **The relation between the security company and local communities.** How is the perception of a security company in communities in which it operates? Does it respect and adhere to local expectations and customs? In Timor-Leste, for instance, development agencies should insist on being protected by guards who come from the communities in which their offices are located.

- **The human rights record of the security company and the guards it employs.** Was the security company involved in human rights abuses in the past (maybe trading under a different name)? Does it check whether the people it hires have been involved in possible human rights violations? How thorough are these background investigations? These questions are particularly crucial in post-conflict surroundings.

Marc von Boemcken

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<th>Project title:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Duration:</td>
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<td>Funded by:</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project leader:</td>
<td>Marc von Boemcken</td>
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<td>Project collaboration:</td>
<td>Dr. Michael Ashkenazi, Clara Schmitz-Pranghe</td>
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The BICC research project “Socio-economic consequences of Chinese oil investments in South Sudan”, which is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ), analyzes the consequences of oil production at the local level in Melut County, Upper Nile State. In the first of two four-week phases of field research, two BICC researchers studied the community development projects of the oil consortium PDOC—of which different Chinese parastatals hold almost the majority of shares—and interviewed the local population about the positive and negative effects of oil production.

Peace and conflict research has devoted quite an effort to improving our knowledge of the correlation between revenues accruing from oil exports and violent conflict on the national or macro level. The micro-level, however, i.e. the local impact of oil production and the potential for conflict resulting from it, has so far received far less scholarly attention. This neglect of the local level is the starting point of BICC’s research project on the “Socio-economic consequences of Chinese oil investments in South Sudan”.

The economic situation in South Sudan and the role of the oil sector

South Sudan became independent in July 2011. It is not only the world’s youngest country, but also one of its poorest. Despite high macro-economic growth in recent years, more than half of the approximately 8.3 million South Sudanese people still subsist on less than one US dollar a day. Infant mortality is very high (102 per 1,000 live births), average life expectancy is only 42 years, and the illiteracy rate stands at almost 75 percent.

Many South Sudanese are helpless in the face of inflation and rising prices that come along with macro-economic growth. So far, only few have been able to find jobs in South Sudan’s formal economy—not least because it is anything but diversified. In recent years, oil production has accounted for 90 percent of the value of all South Sudanese exports and has generated almost 98 percent of the national budget.

At the same time, the oil sector is only sparsely linked with other economic sectors and does not offer many jobs for the local population.

The oil sector in South Sudan is currently dominated by four Asian state-owned oil companies which, as consortia, operate the oil fields. These consortia vary in their exact composition, but always also involve the South Sudanese parastatal Nilepet. There are two different types of oil in South Sudan: The higher quality Nile Blend, whose production has been declining in recent years and the poorer quality Dar Blend, which fetches lower prices on the world market and whose production rates probably already reached their peak last year. All in all, South Sudan exported 33.4 million barrels of oil worth US $3.2 billion between July and December 2011.

The oil sector already played an important role during the civil war between the central government in Khartoum and Southern Sudan. During the 1990s, the refineries and pipelines necessary for oil exportation were built only in Sudan’s northern half, leading to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. In order to continue exporting oil after its independence in July 2011, South Sudan had to use Sudan’s oil infrastructure. The Sudanese government, however, demanded exorbitant transit fees and, when Juba refused to pay, confiscated some of the oil passing through the pipelines. Because of this controversy, in January 2012, the South Sudanese government stopped all oil production—although the state budget can hardly withstand the loss of the oil revenue.

At the moment, tensions between South Sudan and Sudan remain heightened. There have been bombings and violent attacks in the border regions where the oil plants are located. The African Union-mediated negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan have repeatedly been suspended. South Sudan entertains plans to construct alternative pipelines to the Kenyan or the Eritrean coast, but implementing such plans would cost a lot of time and money. There are many signs that the oil sector in South Sudan will continue to harbor great potential for conflict in future.
Oil production in County Melut—Conflicts at the micro-level

Before the civil war, Melut Town was a market town and the seat of the local government. Throughout the war, it was a garrison town of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). During this time, large parts of the town were destroyed and many of its inhabitants fled or were expelled by the SAF. Most people in Melut County are agro-pastoralists. Many of them lost their animals during the war and are now trying to make a living from agriculture. However, following the end of the civil war and the expansion of the oil industry, it was not only the former population that returned to the County. Other war refugees also settled there in the hope of finding employment. According to a 2008 census, Melut County has almost 50,000 inhabitants.

Melut County is situated in the drilling area Block 7. Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC) has been exploring Block 7 since 2001 and has been producing Dar Blend since 2006. China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) holds 41 percent of PDOC’s shares, the Malaysian firm Petronas holds a further 40 percent, and the remaining shares are held by Sinopec from China, a firm in the United Arab Emirates, and by Nilepet.

During the civil war, PDOC profited from the violent expulsion of the civilian population of Melut County by the SAF in that it could explore oil and construct oil installations without much hindrance. Many of these installations are still used today. The field research also found that the expectations of the local population continue to be disappointed by both the government of South Sudan (which is almost entirely absent at local level) and by PDOC. Petrodar neither offers employment opportunities to the local population, nor is it making any contribution to the revival of the local economy and thus to the development of Melut County more generally. The only ‘visible’ local consequences of oil production are environmental problems. The conflict between the local population and Petrodar is also fueled by the fact that North Sudanese nationals still hold many key positions in PDOC’s oil operations. The population’s frustration over disappointed expectations expresses itself in acts of sabotage or in apathy.

Moreover, there are not only conflicts between local communities and Petrodar and between local communities and the South Sudanese government, but also conflicts within the local population. Conflicts occur both between various tribal sub-groups and between long-term residents, returnees and newcomers.

Against this background, all sides have shown great interest in a proposal put forward by the BICC researchers to bring together representatives of all levels of government, representatives of Petrodar, community leaders, local elders and concerned citizens at a Stakeholder Workshop. Such a workshop could be valuable as soon as negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan have resumed and an interim solution for the distribution of the oil revenues has been found.

Christine Andrä and Dr. Elke Grawert

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1 All details of the situation in Melut County refer to the period November/December 2011 prior to the production stoppage.

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Project title: Chinese oil investments in South Sudan
Duration: since August 2011
Financed by: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Project leader: Lena Guesnet, Dr. Elke Grawert
Project collaboration: Christine Andrä
Publications: cf. List of publications
Program area: Resources and conflict
Project category: Applied research
‘Fair’ gold from small-scale mining in Peru and the DR Congo?

The economic and financial crisis has boosted the demand for gold. High gold prices are encouraging hundreds of thousands of small-scale miners throughout the world to turn to gold mining and to extract this precious metal using the simplest of tools. Against this background, BICC and the Südwind Institute have launched a joint project which uses the examples of Peru and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to study the question of what measures can be taken to improve conditions for artisanal and small-scale miners—including in particular the certification of ‘fair’ gold. The two country studies are funded by Misereor, the Church Development Service (EED), the Foundation Environment and Development North Rhine-Westphalia (SUE), and the Foundation for International Dialogue of the Savings Bank in Bonn.

The number of small-scale miners is estimated to have risen to at least 25 million people worldwide in recent years. Their work in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) feeds 150 to 170 million people. Different sources state that artisanal and small-scale miners account for between 12 and 25 percent of gold production worldwide. These people are endeavoring to secure their own livelihood and that of their families under what are usually extremely miserable conditions.

Peru

With economic growth standing at 8.8 percent in 2010, Peru is currently considered one of the most successful countries in Latin America. Exports of gold—around 170 tons per year in 2011—accounted for 37 percent of export revenue. Apart from large-scale mining projects, which are causing various social and ecological conflicts, Peru is also witnessing an increase in the importance of ASM and medium-scale mining. The number of artisanal and small-scale miners rose from 22,000 in 1991 to more than 100,000 in 2010. By 2010, ASM accounted for 31 percent of Peru’s total production of gold. In some communities, gold mining has been the traditional livelihood for generations. In recent years, however, the rising price of gold and the poor conditions for arable farming have encouraged many people to leave agriculture and fishing and move to the prospecting areas.

Although Lima has issued legislation regulating ASM, many of the miners are still in a state of legal limbo and are constantly facing the risk of losing their source of income. As long as they have no formal basis they do not satisfy the conditions for acquiring a mining concession. This situation means that they can easily become the victims of corruption, persecution and blackmail.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Artisanal mining activities account for an estimated 90 percent of the production of minerals in the DR Congo, where between 500,000 and two million people work as artisanal miners. There are alluvial deposits of gold along rivers as well as underground deposits; here too often with a decades-long tradition. 1982 saw a real ‘gold rush’ when President Mobutu liberalized the mining sector and practically permitted artisanal mining activities.

Artisanal miners in the Congo work with far simpler tools than their colleagues in Peru who can at least use simple motorized equipment. The major part of the work is performed by hand or with the simplest of tools such as pick axes, shovels, buckets and wash bowls.

Nevertheless, the problems associated with artisanal mining in the DR Congo are largely the same as those in Peru. Lack of occupational safety, child labor, prostitution, and environmental damage are just as much the order of the day as the absence of legal protection. A large proportion of the Congolese artisanal miners work on an informal basis; that is to say, they are not registered.

Self-organization of the miners

In some cases, artisanal and small-scale miners in Peru have managed to organize themselves. For example, prospectors working on an informal basis in Santa Filomena formed the organization SOTRAMI (Sociedad de Trabajadores Mineros SA) as far back as in 1989. They were prospecting for gold on the premises of a mine belonging to a US-American mining company, which had previously operated on an
industrial scale. SOTRAMI is currently seeking the introduction of safe working conditions and an end to the use of chemicals such as mercury and cyanide in gold mining. In January 2011, 88 associated shareholders and 30 self-employed small-scale miners were working 1,000 hectares of land.

A fair trade certification system designed by the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM), an alliance of Latin American and international non-governmental organizations, is now aiming to develop the small-scale mining region, achieve more equality and access to education, and put an end to child labor. This experience shows that the self-organization of small-scale miners is a necessary precondition for certification processes.

In the DR Congo too, artisanal miners are organizing themselves in most mining regions—be it in small units, so-called “cells”, in committees, associations, societies or cooperatives. However, the self-organization efforts in the Congo are confronted with numerous conflicting interests and administrative hurdles, such as from state institutions or traditional authorities such as village chiefs.

The issue of certifying minerals is particularly controversial in the DR Congo because mining activities and trade with minerals helped to fund the wars between 1996 and 2003. In the United States, the 2010 Dodd Frank Act on financial markets requires companies that are quoted on the stock exchange to publicly report how they avoid even indirectly providing funds to the militias in the DR Congo when purchasing metals such as gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten.

The very announcement of this new ruling had a tremendous effect on artisanal miners in the east of the DR Congo. The Congolese government attempted to solve the problem by introducing a compulsory system for the mineral trade in March 2011. This system is based on certified trading chains (CTCs). These are modeled on the scheme in neighboring Rwanda, where the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) was involved in a similar project. The CTC certification in the Congo is intended to correspond to the regional regulations applying in neighboring countries.

It will hardly be possible to introduce the certification system in the whole of the DR Congo in the short- to medium term. Obstacles include the fragile security situation, limited state capacities, and a strong economic interest in the illegal resources sector.

In principle, certification can contribute towards improving the living standards of poor artisanal miners and to encouraging better environmental protection, the observation of human rights, and basic standards of ethically acceptable working conditions. The preconditions vary from country to country, however. The research project on artisanal and small-scale miners is considering this aspect in its aim to promote a dialogue on fair supply chains between industry, representatives of small-scale miners, development and research institutions and civil society both in Germany and the producer countries. A start was made with expert talks that took place in Bonn on 29 February 2012. The initial results of the research trip were presented for discussion and small-scale miners from Peru and the DR Congo had an opportunity to put forward their positions.

Marie Müller

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<td>Duration:</td>
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<td>Funded by:</td>
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Although there has been a lot of research into the ‘extension’ of security in recent times, the commercial dimension of this development has been largely ignored. Security involves a huge variety of practices that are no longer the preserve of national states and their armed forces. Whether they are private companies or non-state armed groups, the most diverse stakeholders are now offering security services. Complex, usually transnational security markets are emerging. The distinctions between public and private, domestic and foreign, civil and military are becoming increasingly blurred. The new security practices also represent a great challenge to future conversion research.

BICC’s work has been focusing on resource conflicts and civil war economies in the Global South for more than a decade now. Parallel to this, the Center is now also turning its attention to security markets in the urban social areas of the South. For example, between 2009 and 2011, BICC conducted a research project on the effects of private security firms on development-related factors in Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru (cf. page 26).

The security markets of the South are by no means restricted to private companies, however. States are probably just as much involved in the commercialization of security services as armed gangs, ‘warlords’, militias and vigilante groups. One important research question refers to the particular logic of capital accumulation behind the actions of the various producers of security. The theory is that variations in social and political order are often closely linked with the political economy of security. Empirical studies must be conducted into the various scenarios in future. When is security a commercial product and when is it a ‘public good’? How is access to security as a public good regulated? Who is excluded? What are the societal effects of different forms of security production?

The European arms and security industry

The study of arms exports and export controls has been a particularly important pillar of BICC’s research and advisory work for many years (cf. page 12). However, the traditional picture of a nationally based defense industry that specializes solely in producing military weapons systems that are primarily supplied to its own national armed forces hardly applies today. What used to be national arms industries are developing into a transnational arms and security sector that sells both products and services to military as well as civilian clients. These changes in the security market are also reflected in the formation of new lobby associations, which are exercising an increasing influence on policymakers both at national and international level.

Industrial diversification should not be confused with arms conversion as sought by peace policy. Civil surveillance technologies and border security systems raise just as many ethical questions as the production of tanks or submarines, for example. What is more, exports of these products—unlike exports of war weapons—are hardly subject to state controls.

BICC is facing three major research questions with regard to the security markets of the Global North. First of all: What does ‘conversion’ mean against the background of industrial transformation processes? What potential does a transnational arms and security industry have for conversion? Secondly: What national and international regulatory measures can be introduced to deal with these changes in the arms industry? Thirdly: In how far is the industry a ‘reactive’ supplier of products and services, which merely serves the ‘objective’ security needs of its clients—or is it possibly involved in establishing (in)security dialogues?
Security markets and migration control

Since 2007, BICC has been studying the field of migration and in particular the many various links between migration movements and security or violent conflicts. In future, BICC intends to add the dimension of political economy to this security–migration nexus. In concrete terms, this means that the migration policy of the European Union and its Member States cannot be seen distinct from economic interests. Whereas the economic aspects of migration itself have been studied extensively, relatively little attention has been paid to the security markets involved in migration policy.

In fact, the example of migration control illustrates the changes in the European arms and security industry mentioned above. In the process of diversifying their product portfolio, the traditional arms firms have also become suppliers of technologies, which are used to control, steer and perhaps even prevent migration movements.

The blurring of the distinctions between civil and military security is also reflected in the European Union’s reactions to migration, particularly from African states to the European Union. One example is the EUROSUR civil military border surveillance system, which is now in its test phase and in which the EU Security Research Programme has already invested over euro 100 million. EUROSUR aims to link up all the border authorities of the Member States. In future, various types of information from satellites, radar systems and drones will be compiled in a joint database. This will represent a decentralized surveillance and communications system and will, among other things, also have recourse to military reconnaissance systems, including NATO capacities. The EU’s Frontex Border Security Agency in Warsaw will serve as headquarters. In particular, it is the major European arms manufacturers such as EADS Cassidian, Thales and BAE Systems that are involved both in the development and the production of the necessary technologies and in research into possible applications and interoperability.

Since about the turn of the millennium, EU strategies to stem migration movements have also been focusing on involving the migrants’ countries of origin and transit states on the African continent. The planned arms deals between large German companies and the Algerian security forces are probably to be seen against this background. The deals involve supplies of naval technology, military vehicles and security electronics worth up to euro ten billion.

Both EUROSUR and the deals with Algeria illustrate that a security policy approach towards migration movements can create a lucrative market for European arms producers. A central issue in this context is the mingling of commercial interests and politics. Private companies and trade associations in Brussels have many different ways of influencing the contents of the EU’s research programs in the field of security. One should therefore study the question of in how far arms and security companies have not only become involved in an EU migration policy aimed at stemming migration and sealing off Europe, but are even actively involved in shaping this policy.

Marc von Boemcken and Ruth Vollmer

The closure of military bases and troop reductions both by the Bundeswehr and leaving NATO partners are raising the question about base conversion all over Germany, but particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia. Representatives from the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Energy, Building, Housing and Transport of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia Ulrich Burmeister, Group Leader in the urban development department, and Michael Deitmer, Group Leader in the structural policy and business development department, as well as Lars Wirkus, Conversion Expert at BICC, explain their positions.

The federal government has set as a target savings of euro 8.3 billion in the defense budget. To this end, Defense Minister de Maizière announced in October 2011 that 31 of the current 400 military bases of the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) were to be closed and another 90 to be drastically downsized. Plans of the British armed forces to withdraw from Germany add to the difficult situation. What will be the effects of this troop reduction on the landscape of military bases in Germany?

Lars Wirkus: There are indeed likely to be major changes in the landscape of military bases in Germany—even if this structural reform of the Bundeswehr is a little smaller considering the number of closures compared to that of 2004. Many regions and communities will feel the effects of base closures or downsizings. One result is that the Bundeswehr’s presence in total will be reduced, even if the Minister tries to maintain its nationwide presence.

What is decisive for this wave of conversion is, however, that the Minister of Defense’s efforts for reform will coincide, both in timing and in effects, with those of other countries. Many regions and communities have to cope with the partial withdrawal of US forces or, like in NRW, the total withdrawal of British armed forces. Besides closures and downsizings in larger cities, it is rural communities that will be particularly hard hit. These are often regions, which due to the economic and demographic change, are already amongst the less fortunate.

Many bases in North Rhine-Westphalia are badly affected. The bases in Kerpen and Königswinter have been closed completely and the reduction from 1,820 to 120 posts at the base in Rheine can be considered a de facto closure. How do communities and cities deal with these, sometimes massive, structural changes?

Ulrich Burmeister: Dealing with structural change is in itself a continuous task for communities, and communities in NRW have been doing this for a number of years. One also has to differentiate. For some sites, reuse will be easy. Yet, in most cases the impending wave of conversion will indeed be a great challenge for the affected communities as the withdrawal of the military coincides with an already widespread low demand for accommodation and commercial premises. More than ever, this needs careful planning, which takes into account regional interrelations. All in all, however, in our experience the communities are very committed and target-oriented in dealing with this.

To support communities affected by the troop withdrawals, the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia already made funds available in 2010 and 2011, amounting to euro 300,000 and euro 350,000 respectively. With these resources, communities could task the state-owned NRW.URBAN to work out a foundation for urban development planning and the organization of community planning activities. In the draft of the 2012 budget, too, a corresponding approach is foreseen. This is to help communities improve their knowledge about sites in their area that will be freed and to develop their own strategic objectives for reuse.

There is an obvious conflict of interest between the federal government, represented by the BImA (federal authority for real estate management), which wants to achieve as large a profit as possible from the sale of the freed real estate and the individual federal states and communities that want, if at all, to purchase the property for as little money as possible. How can a proper balance between these two interests be found?
Michael Deitmer: To facilitate such a balance between the two interests, it is necessary that the marketing of the properties by BImA not exclusively follow business or fiscal parameters. For this, BImA has to be allowed to realize a reuse envisaged by the community even if it cannot be marketed at its ‘full value’ or a positive economic return cannot be realized.

For this purpose, the Land NRW presented a motion for a change in paragraph one of the law on the federal agency for real estate management to the Bundesrat (Federal Council). Through an opening clause of §1 BImAG, BImA is to be put in the position—and is urged—to carry out the reutilization process of military sites in the framework of a holistic approach. The economic reutilization of the bases on the one hand and the taking into account of structural policy objectives of the federal government, the federal states and the communities on the other are to be given equal priority.

Which financial and structural policy tools do you think are necessary in the medium and long-term to support communities in implementing the civilian reuse of former military sites?

Ulrich Burmeister: Successful conversion needs money; but what it needs even more are good ideas and courageous decisions. Besides careful planning on the part of the community, a precondition for successful conversion is that the federal government takes its structural political responsibility seriously—especially what concerns the remediation of contaminated sites, targeted prices and process management. Only then, in my view, can supporting financial aid of the state be considered. Communities can, for instance, be supported with funds for urban development when establishing sustainable structures in regions that are particularly hard hit by needs for conversion. As these programs were cut last year by the federal government, all heads of state governments in their meeting of 15 December 2011 demanded additional funds for the support of urban development to cope with conversion demands. In other policy fields, too, supporting financial aid is a possibility. First of all, however, convincing concepts have to be presented.

In the past few years, North Rhine-Westphalia has proven beyond doubt that base conversion, as a joint task of the state and the communities, can make a positive contribution to structural change. How can NRW build on these previous experiences today?

Michael Deitmer: The structural reform of the Bundeswehr of 2011 and the announced withdrawal of all British armed forces from Germany by 2020 are only one part of a number of steps in the past years. The structural reforms of the Bundeswehr in 2001 and 2004, too, were great challenges to the state and the communities.

The process of conversion can be considered as a special kind of structural change. Through the structural change in the Ruhr area, the Land NRW has—for the past 40 years—been able to gain a wealth of experience on how to deal with such change. Various approaches to solutions and best-practice methods have been developed with which diverse challenges of conversion, too, can be met.

The experiences made in the past have taught us that as concerns conversion it does make sense to elaborate coordinated strategies in the individual fields of action early on in the process. For this purpose, the Ministry for Business, Energy, Construction, Living and Traffic (MWEBWV) as interministerial contact for conversion issues tasked the 100 percent state-owned NRW.URBAN to support and expertly advise the affected communities in developing perspectives and strategies for viable civilian reuse of military sites. The subsidiary can, for instance, be asked to carry out community planning activities, to collect and evaluate data on the affected real estate, conduct preliminary urban planning and to control the entire process.

It is important to not only see the risks involved in conversion but to understand such a process as a chance. There is no universally applicable strategy for
the reuse of former military sites. Each site, each community has its strengths and weaknesses. Fallow land in or near the city center, for instance, can contribute to a space-saving urban and settlement policy. Resources can be saved and suburbs made more attractive. The direction of land policy towards revitalization of fallow land is a sustainable guiding principle of regional planning, urban development and environmental policy of the state.

State Premier of NRW, Hannelore Kraft, demanded a five-point program from the federal government to ease the affected regions’ transition from military to civilian use. Other State Premiers supported this call for a federal conversion program. Which chances does such an initiative have?

Lars Wirkus: The demand of such a federal conversion program is not new. At every wave of conversion, this has so far been suggested, either by individual politicians or by individual groups. What is new here is that this is a joint demand by State Premiers, which lends it the necessary weight.

If you ask me as expert on conversion, the demand put forward by State Premier Kraft is fully justified, as often regions and communities have to bear the effects of a federal decision to withdraw, which is based on security policy, structural policy and military-economic considerations on which they themselves have no influence. In fact, today, often these communities are affected by the closure or downsizing of bases that at times of their foundation in the 1960s to 1980s had been chosen not only for military reasons but also for the fact that they were structurally weak areas that were to be strengthened by becoming a host community for a military base. Furthermore, experiences from the heyday of base conversion in the 1990s show that support programs, such as the then EU Joint Initiative KONVER, had a large share in the success of conversion projects. As the economic situation today is much worse than it was then, it also stresses the necessity of such a program.

In my view, one could convince the federal government with a good proposal of what such a program should look like and of how it could be implemented. The government itself ought to be interested in the fact that as many conversion sites as possible are reused in a timely and sensible fashion, too, so that corresponding gains from the marketing and development can be generated as tax income. As a matter of course, BICC is, if desired, willing to share its long years of experience in the design of such a federal conversion program.

The questions were posed by Susanne Heinke

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<th>Project title:</th>
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<td>Duration:</td>
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<td>Project leader:</td>
<td>Lars Wirkus</td>
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Impact of the structural reform of the *Bundeswehr* 2011 and the planned troop withdrawal of British forces in North Rhine-Westphalia

Legend

- German locations
  - closure
  - reduction
- British locations
  - closure

Sources: German Ministry of Defense, British Ministry of Defence
Briefs


Occasional Papers


Bulletins

**BICC bulletin, No. 60, April–June 2012**

**BICC bulletin, No. 59, January–March 2012**
Feature: Half-truths, myths and lies (Reflections on the nuclear dispute with Iran). Jerry Sommer.

**BICC bulletin, No. 58, October–December 2011**
Feature: Peace policy implications of maritime re-armament. Jan Grebe and Christoph Schwarz.

**BICC bulletin, No. 57, July–September 2011**
Feature: Re-defining the human security debate through social media. Katherine Prizeman.

**BICC bulletin, No. 56, April–June 2011.**

Focus

**BICC Focus 10**

Features

**BICC Feature 1**

**BICC Feature 2**

Other BICC publications


Further publications


Lex und Frieden, Vol. 29, No. 4, Guest co-editor.


BICC Annual Report 2012
As an independent, non-profit organization, BICC (Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn – Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH) deals with a wide range of global topics in the field of peace and conflict research.

The promotion of peace and development is the most important precondition for security and the transformation of conflicts. BICC takes a comprehensive view of ‘conversion’ as the reduction and transformation of military stockpiles, capacities and processes. This perception of conversion comprises an understanding of peace and security, which goes far beyond the narrow focus that national states place on military security.

Program areas
The six following areas form the framework for BICC’s work:
- Security—Stakeholders, systems, threats
- Arms—Global trends, exports, control
- Resources and conflict
- Migration, conflicts and security
- Base conversion
- Data and GIS (Geographic Information System)

These areas are mutually complementary and enable diverse thematic and methodological synergies.

BICC’s work
BICC’s portfolio includes:
- Applied research (research reports, background and evaluation studies, impact evaluations, development of indicators, data collection and analysis, as well as feasibility studies to support program implementation).
- Advisory services (background analysis, feasibility and evaluation studies, training and expert workshops, and allocation of long- and short-term experts).
- Capacity development (preparation of concepts and modules for the further education and training of stakeholders in peace processes).

Partners, donors and clients
BICC receives institutional funding from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). As of Autumn, the Director for Research will hold a professorship at the University of Bonn; one result of BICC’s close cooperation with the University.

Other partners, donors and clients
International and German research institutes; international and German foundations; the United Nations and other international organizations; Federal Ministries such as the German Foreign Office (AA) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and institutions such as the Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb); international and German NGOs; international and bilateral organizations in the field of development cooperation.

BICC
BICC makes use of its research to operate as a think tank, offer (policy) advice, and help develop capacity.

BICC collects and publishes information, brings out expert reports and other publications, and thus offers its services to NGOs, governments, private organizations, research institutes and universities as well as to the interested public. BICC is co-editor of the annual “Friedensgutachten” (Peace Report) and of a series of international research publications (Sustainable Peace and Global Security Governance).

BICC organizes regular exhibitions, conferences, workshops, and discussions with experts. The Center sets out to make more people aware of its central topics through its public relations activities.

BICC was founded as a non-profit limited company in 1994 with the support of the Land of NRW. With effect from September 2012, a Managing Director for Research and a Managing Director for Administration will lead BICC. Shareholders are the States of NRW and Brandenburg. The Center’s governing bodies are the Supervisory Board, the Board of Trustees and the International Board.
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