Agency and livelihood-making in protracted displacement

Key insights and recommendations for development cooperation—Synthesis report of the research project "Protected rather than protracted"

Ruth Vollmer \ BICC
SUMMARY

This project’s approach of analysing protracted displacement through the perspectives and experiences of the displaced persons themselves has proven key to understanding the actual dynamics, complexities and possible solutions to it. It uncovered and documented a wealth of different coping strategies across diverse contexts, thus providing new insights into what living in protracted displacement means for people affected by it and into which kind of support they require. The project points out new research avenues on protracted displacement, such as the impact of social relations and interactions on displaced peoples’ livelihood options—both locally and trans-locally—or the various types and patterns of mobility representing livelihood strategies of the displaced.

People in protracted displacement face multiple exclusions from access to livelihood-sustaining resources and services. Such exclusions are not only layered on top of each other in terms of generalised marginalisation but can also condition each other, in that a lack of access to certain realms of societal life may block access to others. Moreover, this research has found that the living conditions of people in protracted displacement often do not improve after the initial emergency phase is over; lack of access to vital resources and services may be a constant feature of protracted displacement or even become worse over time. Peoples’ de facto (re)integration strategies, i.e. livelihood-making in contexts of displacement or return, take place in highly fragmented and disintegrated societies and are confronted with deliberately disintegrating forces, such as legal exclusion, discrimination and violence.

National and international legal regulations and government action provide a crucial framework condition for the chances of displaced persons to (re)integrate and can be supportive or disruptive. However, their actual effects on the displaced persons and local level are mediated by alternative social norms in the respective context and can be stronger or weaker depending on a person’s positionality in society.

Due to the multiple exclusions and insecurities of protracted displacement, the diversification and re-combinations of livelihood sources through spatial mobility is one of few chances for the displaced to sustain themselves and their families and is thus essential to their livelihoods. Mobility is, however, not automatically a resource in itself; it can simply be the permanent search for safety and livelihood opportunities. Social relations and interactions at the place of residence are perhaps the most important resource for displaced persons’ livelihoods. Pre-existing ties between communities often help to facilitate local integration of displaced persons. However, a marginal status of local residents, poverty and scarcity of resources in receiving areas and external influences can have a negative impact on community relations, lead to tensions and reduce livelihood options for the displaced.
CONTENTS

Main findings 5

Introduction 7

Overview of main findings and recommendations 18

Impacts of protracted displacement 19
Access to physical security 20
Access to food, land and housing 21
Access to basic services: Health care and education 22
Access to income by employment 23

Livelihood and legality 25
Awareness of and opportunities to claim rights 26
Political framework conditions 27
Access to and meanings of legal documents 28
Implications of being undocumented and forced return 28

Livelihood and coping strategies of displaced persons 30
(Im)mobility between protracted conflict and livelihood opportunities 31
Trans-local networks 33
To return or not to return? 33
Self-organisation and adaptation 34

Empirical findings: Social relations 36
Diversity 36
Social and intergroup relations 38

Lessons learned: International interventions and reform of the refugee regime 39

Conclusion 42

Annex 45

Bibliography 51
Acknowledgements

This *Synthesis Report* is part of the comparative research project “Protected rather than protracted—Strengthening refugees and peace” which was funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and draws on 30 months of field research in seven world regions that are affected by protracted displacement.

All views expressed in this report are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to BMZ or any other institution or person.

Special thanks go to all colleagues at BICC for their valuable input and reviews. Especially to Elke Grawert, Katja Mielke, Conrad Schetter, Clara Schmitz-Pranghe, Markus Rudolf for their contributions, all colleagues of the BICC colloquium for their critical reviews, Heike Webb for copyediting and layout, Lars Wirkus and his team for the map.

*Ruth Vollmer*
Main findings

Displacement disrupts and changes people’s options to access life- and livelihood-sustaining resources and services.

Available livelihood options may change repeatedly during protracted displacement, during and after return and in cases of renewed displacement.

The exclusion from resources and services that sustain affected groups’ livelihood often goes along with and is enforced by a lack of legal and political representation of these groups.

The respective legal and political framework can open or close up opportunities for access to work, services or a legal status. How legality shapes livelihood options is highly dependent on the specific local contexts.

Different immigration and refugee policies of inclusion and exclusion do not only affect displaced persons but often other social groups, too.

These include recent and long-settled immigrants, ethnic minorities, nomads, etc. and often interrelate with socio-economic status or class dispositions. Legal limitations set by policies in the respective destination countries frame but do not determine the endeavours of affected persons.

Spatial mobility and engagement with trans-local social networks are two of the most important strategies adopted by displaced persons to deal with the various constraints and uncertainties they face to sustain their livelihoods.

Spatial mobility has emerged not only as a constant feature of protracted internal displacement for people who need to flee from the shifting hotspots of violence but also as an expression of displaced persons’ permanent search for livelihood opportunities in exile.

Receiving communities play a crucial role in hosting and supporting displaced persons.

Displaced persons and local residents are not homogenous and static social entities. Local inhabitants may also belong to marginalised groups and experience disruptions of their livelihood, violent conflict or may have a history of displacement themselves. Yet, across contexts, receiving communities play a crucial role in hosting and supporting displaced persons, many of whom find shelter in local people’s private homes or religious institutions.
Introduction

“[P]rotracted displacement cannot be understood—much less resolved—without first comprehending the interests and hopes that the displaced themselves invest in the idea of ‘solutions’”. (Long, 2011, p. 3)

This Synthesis Report summarises the results of four years of research (2015–2018) in seven world regions where large numbers of people have been living in protracted displacement due to armed conflicts. With the research project, “Protected rather than protracted”, BICC aimed to achieve a better understanding of the nature of protracted displacement and the strategies displaced persons are using. The findings are meant to inform “adapted, participative, coherent and sustainable strategies of humanitarian and development aid agencies” (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018, p. 8).

The project addressed the following research questions:

\( \begin{align*} \)
- Which challenges and opportunities can be observed during the reintegration of refugees and IDPs, and what are the preconditions for successful reintegration?
- What are the challenges to local integration, and which practices of local integration are there?
- Under which conditions does the participation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in peace processes play a key role in the sustainability of their return and peace?
\( \end{align*} \)

To answer these three questions, the research focused on individual and collective practices of livelihood-making in contexts of protracted displacement, return, reintegration and local integration. Rather than focussing on the classical durable solutions of repatriation/reintegration, local integration and resettlement, the research shed light on the practices and the agency of people living in-between and beyond those durable solutions. The specific value of this research is that it took into account the heterogeneity of displaced people and the disparity of the social contexts and structural constraints they live in.

Protracted displacement and failing “solutions”

“Protracted displacement is the new normal” (CGD-IRC, 2017). This situation currently affects 78 per cent of all refugees—that is, around 15 million people—worldwide (UNHCR, 2019) as well as around two-thirds or more of the over 40 million people who are displaced within their countries of origin due to armed conflicts (Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012, p. 9). UNHCR (2004, p. 1) speaks about a protracted refugee situation (PRS) when refugees “find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance”. It is increasingly recognised that this affects people in internal displacement as well (see Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012).

Displacement starts with an initial experience of expulsion or flight from violence or the threat of violence. It becomes protracted when displaced persons are not able to return to their homes for long and unforeseeable periods of time and are forced to stay either elsewhere within the country or abroad, facing the problems mentioned above. Initial displacement may turn into forced immobility, for example, for people who are confined to camps for a long period of time. Protracted displacement can also appear as repeated back-and-forth movements between a safe place of staying and an unsafe place of production, e.g. in the case of land for cultivation that is located in a war zone, when employment is found in large cities where there might be higher risks of attacks, or when accessing labour markets abroad entails the

\( \text{1 According to UNHCR and World Bank data, since the mid-1990s, a rather stable population of five to seven million refugees has lived in protracted refugee situations. The average duration of exile gradually increased from around nine years in the early 1990s to over 20 years by the end of 2015 (Devictor & Do, 2016, p. 16), and in the last few years, the number of people affected has more than doubled.} \)
These ‘durable solutions’ comprise the permanent return of a person to his or her country of origin, local integration in a neighbouring country and their resettlement in a third country and form an essential part of the humanitarian refugee regime. The underlying belief is that each “durable solution restores what refugees—by definition—lack: legal and social membership in a national community” (Aleinkoff & Poellot, 2014, p. 2).

Yet, this set of durable solutions only works for a small share of displaced persons and a lot less than those who are newly displaced each year (16.2 million in 2017; 13.6 in 2018 according to UNHCR, 2018 & 2019). Less than 600,000 persons returned to their countries of origin in 2018; about 650,000 refugees had returned in 2017. UNHCR stated that the circumstances were adverse to reintegration so that “thresholds for voluntary, safe and dignified return” were often not met (2018, p. 28).

Resettlement to third countries is based on official quotas set by governments. Around 100,000 people were received by third countries through this channel in 2017 and above 90,000 in 2018 (UNHCR, 2019).

Risk of deportation. Moreover, it may become a long fragmented journey with repeated expulsions and rejections. Over time, not being able to fully arrive anywhere becomes characteristic of displaced people (Schmalz, 2017, p. 15).

The ever-growing number of displaced persons worldwide consists of those who live in protracted displacement, including their offspring as well as newly displaced persons. PRS recognised as such by UNHCR range from the Syrian displacement crisis with the conflict entering its 8th year in 2019 to Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan for around 40 years because of recurrent violent conflicts (Devictor & Do, 2016).

Research on PRS has often been policy-driven, taking a perspective that portrays protracted situations as static (e.g. Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, 2008). Notions like “state of limbo” (UNHCR definition), “warehousing of refugees” (Smith, 2004) or “waste of human potential” (UNHCR, 2008, p. 2) conceal the multiple activities that displaced persons engage in to carve out a livelihood. Policy responses tend to treat PRS as a temporary phenomenon that can be solved via three pathways leading out of displacement.

---

2 The Annex provides an overview of the changes in the global refugee regime and other factors contributing to the growth in protracted displacement over time.
Local integration implies that refugees receive the citizenship or a comparable status in the country of residence and are able to “pursue sustainable livelihoods and contribute to the economic life of the host country and live among the host population without discrimination or exploitation” (UNHCR, 2017, p. 30). Reliable data on the numbers of locally integrated people are not available. In fact, receiving countries often constrain or prohibit local integration so that it does not become a ‘durable solution’ according to UNHCR’s definition. Figure 1 shows the proportions of refugees benefitting from the three durable solutions (UNHCR, 2019). It reveals that the vast majority of displaced people do not have access to any of them. Instead, they lead their lives under conditions of protracted displacement. Understanding the ‘normalcy’ of living and livelihood-making under such conditions was the aim of the empirical studies conducted within the research project “Protected rather than protracted”.

Structure of the Report

This Report first highlights our research approach and key terms (cf. project publications, Annex: Table 4). A brief overview of the empirical study sites follows. The key findings from a comparative analysis of the research in seven world regions are then presented in four chapters, complemented by recommendations for action addressed to humanitarian and development agencies. The first chapter highlights the research results on displaced people’s access to basic livelihood necessities (food, land, housing, health services, education and income opportunities). The second chapter presents the findings on displaced people’s access to a legal status and documents and how this relates to possibilities for claiming rights and political participation. The third chapter outlines the main findings relating to the particular livelihood and coping strategies that displaced persons employ to manage a life characterised by uncertainty. The fourth chapter presents the research results regarding the diversity and heterogeneity of displaced people / returnees as well as local residents and explains how social relations in contexts of protracted displacement and return shape livelihood options. The final chapter highlights two new approaches that the international community introduced during the project period (2015–2018) that will have a significant impact on the international refugee regime—the pilot phase of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and the EU–Jordan Compact. Based on first experiences with these two instruments, the Report presents lessons that can be learned to improve such interventions in the future.

Project approach and key definitions

From the outset, the research project stressed the ‘process’ character of protracted displacement. It avoided taking protracted displacement as a static ‘situation’ but considered it as a set of actions and dynamics that developed over the long period of time during which persons remain displaced. The research interest was to explore the strategic choices of displaced people—for example, to generate and diversify income sources—and the social local and trans-local networks they established under challenging conditions. Activities and choices were, therefore, at the heart of this research endeavour while always considering contextual and structural constraints to them, too. This focus was captured by the notion of agency which means, in a nutshell, the ability of a person to act. Agency encompasses “the possible scope of action as a function of (a person’s) ...own capacities vs. desires on the one hand and the external structural factors framing his or her everyday existence on the other” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 9).

The term ‘trans-local’ (networks or relations) signifies network relations between individuals at several locations which potentially transgress international borders but might also be limited to one nation-state context. Any displacement (whether internal or across borders) exposes displaced persons to new contexts and experiences that can transform the individual or family and other social grouping. The ‘local’ in the term ‘trans-local’ stresses that agency takes place in a local context (Grawert & Mielke, 2018). The use of ‘trans-local’ does not contradict scholarly work that prefers to use the term ‘trans-national’ to highlight the cross-border dimension of displaced persons relationships (Harpviken, 2014; Rouse, 1991; Monsutti, 2005).

3 Detailed and comprehensive accounts of the findings from each region studied are accessible in Working Papers, Policy Briefs and Journal Articles at https://www.bicc.de/research-clusters/project/project/protected-rather-than-protracted-strengthening-refugees-and-peace-122/
The ‘external structural factors’ range from legal, political and economic framework conditions to immediate social group dynamics (Grawert & Mielke, 2018). For displaced people, in particular, the existing (and changing) refugee policies, the policies towards internally displaced people (IDPs) and towards so-called ‘irregular migrants’—who are often (undocumented) displaced people, too—are important framework conditions that constrain or widen their agency. This definition of agency enabled the researchers to consider the different positionalities and to analyse how the socio-economic status of a person framed an individual’s aspirations and opportunities before, during and after forced displacement.

Crises causing protracted displacement are hardly ever limited to individual states. Therefore, this research took a regional and trans-local approach, enabling the researchers to capture perspectives and practices of displaced persons in contexts of refuge, return, transit, forced (im)mobility and local integration. This justifies once again the focus on the process dimension of displacement and return, i.e. their contingency and non-linearity, by which this research project contrasts the commonly found rather static and linear accounts (Bohnet, Mielke, Rudolf, Schetter & Vollmer, 2015). The process-oriented perspective also entailed embedding the research in a historically based understanding of conflict and inter-group dynamics.

Key definitions of terms

This project defines protracted displacement as a condition where people themselves or previous generations in their families have experienced forced displacement at least once and have to deal with partial or total exclusion from essential livelihood-sustaining aspects of social life as a result thereof. This definition comprises all persons who are unable to re-access losses (such as human rights and dignity, homes, properties, livelihoods and others) after displacement and includes persons born into such conditions. The term ‘protracted displacement’ (differently from PRS) thus includes displaced persons regardless of their legal status. It covers not only those in camps, detention centres and official statistics but also those who self-settled in urban or rural spaces inside or outside their countries of origin. Moreover, it comprises people who are hiding, in transit or permanently moving between places, including (repeated) attempts of return and those subjected to secondary or multiple displacements. Thus, our understanding of protracted displacement captures dynamics like the very common turnovers among registered population groups as well as the mobility of displaced persons.

Protracted displacement in this understanding can best be captured as life in liminality, where people are systematically subjected to marginalising and excluding forces. Importantly, it is not people’s long-term physical dislocation per se, which defines protracted displacement, but the multiple exclusions, insecurities and denials of rights they have to deal with, given that these continue to shape their livelihood for long and unforeseeable time periods (cf. Long, 2014), often also during onward mobility or return. These define the framework conditions under which displaced people, through their agency, manage to (partially) participate in the social, economic and political life around them and unlock livelihood opportunities, often in their immediate social environments and/or through trans-local connections. Focussing on people’s agency under these challenging conditions allowed the researchers to approach protracted displacement not as a state of exception or transition, but as a social phenomenon in its own right.

The term displaced persons (DPs) denotes persons who regard themselves as forcibly displaced. The term emphasises the experience of forced displacement as the starting point of analysis. As large numbers of people are born into protracted displacement, it can also be the forced displacement of their parents or grandparents that still defines their living conditions. Hence, the research approach did not

5 | Exclusion from livelihood-sustaining resources and rights is often shared between displaced persons, parts of the residential population and immobilised groups, like displaced-in-place, who are prevented from escaping dangerous conditions by armed groups.
adopt legal categories as units of analysis (refugees, IDPs, people in refugee-like situations, stateless and/or undocumented persons, labour and educational migrants, etc.). Instead, the approach took into account that the legal status is attributed to a person after movement (across a border, within a country, to a camp, etc.) and that the allocation of legal categories may follow politically motivated criteria. Rather than defining the field of research (refugee studies, IDP studies, migration studies), the legal categories were taken as a subject of research. This allowed for critical reflections on the interrelation of everyday realities of displaced persons and national as well as international refugee policies (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018).

Due to the focus on DPs’ agency during the process of protracted displacement, the units of analysis were individuals and groups, who perceived themselves as experiencing protracted displacement, selected according to the principle of maximal structural variation. Therefore, all the legal categories occurred in the sample, but beyond that, the research included groups not covered by any of them and accounted for the fact that individuals may belong to different legal categories over time.

Beyond DPs, the project examined the lives and livelihoods of local residents, as these become affected in various ways when large numbers of newcomers or returnees move into an area and possibly receive international assistance. Many regions and countries that receive displaced persons are ethnically and socially diverse so that the arrival of a high number of displaced persons can affect a delicate social balance. Some receiving societies have a history of armed conflict, and the inhabitants have faced economic, environmental or other hardships before the arrival of displaced people. Parts of the residential population may already consist of immigrants or DPs. Last but not least, the capacity and willingness of the government to provide material resources, services and protection to its citizens, to its population or only to parts thereof are crucial determinants of living conditions of both, the displaced and local residents. Thus, characteristics of persons in protracted displacement, such as a lack of rights, perspectives and security (Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, 2007) may equally apply to (some or large) parts of the residential population. In other contexts, there may be clear distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, such as high hurdles or lack of access for non-citizens to the formal labour market (Betts, Bloom, Kaplan & Omata, 2017, p. 201). This project, therefore, included the border- and boundary-making between displaced people and communities receiving them in its empirical research and avoided replicating the common refugee-host-dichotomy.

The project dissected the social context of displacement and return according to different levels and scales, as displacement affects individuals, households, communities, municipalities, other local institutions, the larger society as well as the state and government in different ways. Interactions of the respective actors with the displaced people and their contributions to accommodating displaced persons or returnees tend to differ between these levels (Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 22).

Moreover, among the groups that have not fled, there may be people who are unable to move despite being confronted with violence that drives others into displacement, e.g. ‘trapped communities’ (Black & Collyer, 2014) or ‘displaced-in-place’ (Lubkemann, 2008). Their situation might be more akin to the DPs than to residents who have not been affected by armed conflict (cf. Rudolf, 2019b). The holistic

---

6 The distinction between refugees and IDPs is owed to the role of states as sovereign subjects in international law, leading to different legal regimes for the two categories of displaced people. The ideal-typical distinction between refugees and migrants relates to how compelling the drivers to leave were: Refugees flee from a threat or fear of physical violence against themselves, close relatives or their property and experience a rupture in the relationship between their status as citizens and the state or government. Migrants are those who have left for all other reasons (Grawert, 2018). The long-standing debate between scholars suggesting to subsume refugees and IDPs under ‘migration’—in this case caused by conflict (for example Van Hear, Bakewell & Long, 2017)—and scholars arguing that a refugee is qualitatively different from a migrant, because the movement was caused by “a break of a basic relationship between state and citizen” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long & Signa, 2014, p. 4) cannot be unraveled in this context.

7 States have very different, sometimes arbitrary and sometimes no mechanisms at all to grant individuals refugee status. Also, a legal status can be withdrawn, for example to compel people to return before the causes of displacement have been overcome, which leaves people no less displaced, but without being recognised as such.

8 “Displacement-affected communities” has been introduced as a term to address displaced and local inhabitants together (ReDSS, 2018, p. 5).
research approach that tried to shed light on all facets of protracted displacement hence also included such groups of ‘non-displaced persons’.

Across all case studies of this project, **protracted armed conflict** was the main driving force that pushed people into displacement and prevented them from returning in safety for long periods. Frequent re-occurrences of violence, disparate regional developments within countries (e.g. between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’) and increased control of non-state armed groups over certain areas ‘post-conflict’ are much more likely than a linear transition from war to peace. Frequently, this is linked to the continuation of the war-time economy whose beneficiaries defend their territories, or the establishment of a repressive or sectarian system of governance by the winning party. Conflict lines and regional hotspots of violence shift rather than disappear during a perceived ‘end of war’, and impunity for the perpetrators of violent acts as well as systematic extrajudicial killings often persist after the fighting ceased. Protracted violent conflicts are therefore conceptualised as processes that oscillate between so-called peace and war (Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 24). The focus of the research was on displacement caused by such violent conflicts and political factors like persecution and state repression. Displacement mainly caused by natural disasters, environmental degradation or development projects was not included.

Due to the protracted nature of conflicts and displacement, **local integration** is the option most commonly available to DPs. However, de jure local integration, defined as the successive granting of rights and opportunities by the government of the receiving country—such as political, economic, social and cultural rights—ideally culminating in the granting of citizenship (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019) is hardly ever achieved. Often, these rights are deliberately restricted in the receiving country context.

Against this backdrop, this research focused on de facto local integration.

**De facto local integration** is defined here as DPs’ own, individual or collective, strategies to make a living through accessing the political, social, economic, legal and cultural options existing at their place or places of residence. The degree to which this is possible varies widely and sometimes benefits from DPs’ trans-local connections. De facto local integration hence is a “somewhat informal, limited everyday practice” (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018, p. 7.).

The project emphasised the process-nature of integration rather than some kind of end-result of ‘successful integration’. De facto integration hence does not fulfil the criterion of being a ‘durable solution’, but describes coping strategies of displaced persons under the condition of continuing displacement, which can involve setbacks, ruptures and changes of plan. Unlike de jure local integration, which builds on ‘national’ belonging or an official acknowledgement by the state through a political and formalised process, de facto local integration is very much about the place(s) and the social context(s) displaced persons find themselves in (Kuch, 2016, p. 474). As a result of mobility or trans-local connections, this type of local integration may take place in more than one place at a time.

Despite significant obstacles to safe return and numerous failed or premature return programmes, **repatriation** is considered the ‘preferred durable solution’ (see Annex for the changing prioritisation of durable solutions over time). However, the number of people who return is small compared to those who are newly displaced or stuck in protracted displacement, and in many cases, return is not durable. Due to a lack of long-term data on return and reintegration, the proportions of temporary and permanent return are unknown.

---

9 This project hence does not subscribe to any dichotomy between violent and civilian actors / perpetrators and victims. It also does not take up categorisations of countries into ‘peace’, ‘war’ or ‘post-conflict’ as these are often misleading. For example, the number of homicides in countries considered to be ‘at peace’ (e.g. in Central America) can be higher than in countries at war (Rudolf, 2010b).
The project considered reintegration after return to the country of origin as a new beginning and a process as drawn-out and complex as integration in a new place (Bohnet et al., 2015). People may settle in a place other than their previous home. After decades of displacement, new generations have been raised in exile and have never seen their ‘country of origin’. Livelihood opportunities and legal, political, economic, social and cultural conditions may have changed tremendously due to the conflict. Antagonistic identity dynamics between returnees and those people who never left may emerge (cf. Warner, 1994). In short: While repatriation as official durable solution is achieved by simply crossing the border, return is not just a reversal of displacement. Many returnees, therefore, move on or become displaced again (Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 24). For this reason, the project looked at reintegration as a gradual and largely self-organised process and examined the everyday practices applied by returnees to establish and increase livelihood options.

Humanitarian and development agencies usually do not distinguish between de jure and de facto reintegration since returnees are considered de jure re-integrated through their citizenship. However, scholars emphasised that reintegration requires a political community, which returnees can re-integrate into with all their rights as citizens (Long, 2013), which is not automatically given. Just like IDPs, displaced-in-place, members of minorities or indigenous groups, many returnees make the experience that their de jure citizenship does not entail the willingness or capacity of the government to protect or even respect their rights as citizens. The fact that returnees and IDPs have de jure full access to citizenship rights while people who are displaced and stay outside of their countries of origin are subjected to legal constraints and exclusions as non-citizens may or may not affect their livelihood options differently, depending on the context. Due to the similarities in having to establish a new livelihood—whether when integrating elsewhere after displacement or after return—this project subsumes both under the term (re)integration where appropriate.

In sum, this project aimed to overcome the ‘sedentary bias’ inherent in classic definitions of durable solutions (cf. Bakewell, 2008) and it also did not consider local integration and reintegration as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, we acknowledged that both processes may coincide and support each other. Importantly, neither local integration nor reintegration are linear processes leading to a better life. There may well be contexts where the situation of displaced persons was a lot better during displacement than before displacement or after return (Bohnet, 2016, p. 12).

**Analytical framework**

To understand the impact of protracted displacement on people in different contexts, this research initially focused on the question of which resources, means of participation and realms of social life displaced persons had access to. Rather than focusing on legal entitlements, which should come with certain rights or benefits, attention was paid to de facto access.\(^\text{10}\) As an entry point, the project applied (and successively extended) the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model (IRR) (see Cernea, 2000) to trace the impoverishment risks people in protracted displacement and their resident neighbours were facing across the different contexts. The model contains risks ranging from the loss of physical security to the loss of education opportunities.\(^\text{11}\) The project team complemented the IRR model according to new insights from field research and included the loss of protection, deprivation of political participation, human rights and voice (see points a, l, m, and n in Box 1). The extended IRR model includes the risks to be prevented as well as risk reversal strategies for each aspect.

10 Following Ribot & Peluso (2003), access is defined as the ability (and hence power) to benefit from a certain resource in the widest sense, i.e. not only concerning material resources, but also different rights, such as civil and political rights.

11 Initially, the IRR was developed and tested for application in the context of development-induced relocations during the 1990s. Then the model was adapted to measure and potentially reverse impoverishment risks of people after conflict-induced displacement and subsequent return (IDMC, 2010). Its underlying assumption is that resources or capital in the broadest sense are usually place-bound and can thus become unavailable due to displacement. The ensuing impoverishment risks are understood as a loss of natural capital, human-made physical capital, human capital and social capital (Kälin & Schreper, 2012, p. 4).
To go beyond the deprivation that displaced people face, the project applied an analytical livelihood approach and adapted it to contexts of protracted displacement (Grawert & Mielke, 2018; Grawert, 2019c). This approach also allowed the researchers to understand who or what shapes, restricts or mediates a (lack of) access to livelihoods and which strategies displaced persons apply to overcome constraints and risks. The approach is based on the assumption that it is the “secure control by the people over resources that can provide them with adequate livelihoods” (Chambers, 1988, p. 11). Both the concepts of ‘access’ and ‘livelihood’ emphasise power relations. As individuals are part of social relations in which power manifests itself, they rely on bundles of power to claim and enforce access. This can explain differential access patterns and their dynamics (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 158; Mielke, 2015). With its broad notion of access (access to and control over resources) and the broad definition of resources, which includes social capital (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 51), the analytical livelihood approach ties in well with the IRR, but also goes beyond it in several crucial points.

1. It defines a livelihood as “maintaining a way of life” in the sense that ensures bearing “a life in dignity according to the particular social group’s own measure” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 9). The concept thus extends beyond basic needs and includes people’s own (social, cultural) values and preferences.

2. The concept establishes that securing one’s own or a family’s livelihood requires the agency of a collective, like a family or extended family, and thus emphasises the strategies individuals and groups apply towards their own ends.

3. Rather than taking the legal, political, social or economic structures as given constraints towards people’s scope of action, it puts people and “their perceptions of constraints and opportunities in the centre” (Grawert, 2019c, p. 10). It thus provides a comprehensive and suitable framework to “analyse hardships and coping strategies of displaced persons and contribute to the debate on solutions to protracted displacement situations (PDS) by focusing on perspectives of agency of the displaced persons” (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018, p. 7).

4. The range of activities people engage in to retain or regain their “way of life” is related to the social environment and social interaction (Grawert & Mielke, 2018). The project incorporated the “established-outsider figuration” (Elias & Scotson, 2013) to study the social interaction and interrelations of displaced persons with the receiving communities, examine the repercussions on livelihood options and explain difficulties in processes of (re)integration (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 54).

5. Agency is influenced by attributes of positionality (age, gender, socio-economic status, ethnic belonging, education, legal status/citizenship, experience of voluntary or involuntary return or migration, etc.) (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 11). In particular lower-class groups encounter exclusionary practices when trying to organise their
livelihoods, so that a livelihood analysis needs to consider power relations and impeding structures for different groups and individuals. Social class is thus a “determining factor for the extent and quality to which livelihood can be secured ... (It) contains power relations that establish and consolidate inequality in ownership and access to land, capital, influential positions and sustained employment” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p.11). Whereas some of the case studies explicitly undertook to “establish the influence of socio-economic class dispositions on the displaced persons’ ability and agency” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p.1), other case studies confirmed the relevance of the socio-economic background and positionality for the livelihood of displaced people and the social dynamics they were part of (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019; Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018).

Study regions

The research covered seven world regions over a period of four years:

- Upper Guinea Coast (Sierra Leone, Liberia)
- West Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran)
- Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand)
- Northern South America (Colombia, Ecuador)
- Eastern Africa (South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia)
- Great Lakes Region (Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya)
- Middle East ((Syria,) Jordan, Turkey, northern Iraq).

The researchers visited each region several times and supervised continuous research by trained local assistants. One of the regions, Upper Guinea Coast (Sierra Leone, Liberia), had been at peace for more than 15 years, and most of the formerly displaced people have returned long ago. Therefore, this was the only case that offered the researchers the opportunity to draw lessons regarding the reintegration process in hindsight. In all other regions, the factors that caused the displacement are still present or have been substituted or added upon by more recent ones. Protracted conflicts formed the backdrop of displacement across the case study regions as well as within the countries of origin of DPs. The regions in focus (other than Upper Guinea Coast) all consist of the main conflict country and one or several neighbouring countries accommodating the majority of the displaced people.

In Myanmar, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Burundi and Colombia, armed conflicts have been going on for several decades, producing large numbers of IDPs, refugees and returnees over time. In all four cases, there were high-profile events promising peace and stability (democratic elections and a ceasefire agreement in Myanmar, the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and subsequent independence of South Sudan, the Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–FARC). These agreements and interventions increased the pressure on the DPs to return but at the same time failed to end armed violence or did so only temporarily. Regardless of the continuing violence and lack of physical safety, in three of these four regions (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran; Myanmar, Thailand; South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda) processes of return, mostly self-organised and often temporary, both from inside the conflict countries as well as from abroad, were observed. Simultaneously, there were processes of de facto local integration of DPs, sometimes with onward or circular mobility and new and repeated displacements. In the northern South America region (Colombia, Ecuador), part of the research focused on trapped communities in Colombia, i.e. those unable to flee from areas experiencing high levels of violence. Research in all four regions confirmed that intensity and scale of violence varies in time and space transcending any clear delineation between war and peace.

Research in the Middle Eastern region (Jordan, Turkey, Iraq) concentrated on the receiving countries of Syrian displaced people who stayed in protracted displacement outside Syria and examined the local integration of Syrians in the neighbouring countries. Part of the research also covered previously displaced people from Iraq and Palestine and established how the experience of previous displacement shaped their
Methods of field research

The research methodology was largely qualitative and field-work based. Data was collected through in-depth and narrative interviews, which included the use of semi-structured interview guidelines for different target groups where appropriate, focus group discussions, participant and on-the-spot observation and visual documentation. The research team conducted interviews and focus group discussions with displaced persons and returnees, stayees and local residents, former fighters, government authorities in charge of refugees, IDPs and returnees, local academics and other experts, as well as representatives of national and international organisations. The approach

interaction with the more recently displaced Syrians taking refuge in Palestinian Jordanian and Iraqi communities. Another part of the research investigated how displaced Syrians and Iraqi IDPs experienced the conditions of de facto autonomy in northern Iraq some 15 years after the violent and externally induced regime change and civil war(s) in Iraq. Extensive research in receiving areas not only in the Middle East, but also in Eastern Africa (Uganda), the Great Lakes Region (Tanzania), Thailand and northern South America (Ecuador) allowed the project team to uncover the similarities and differences of displaced persons’ livelihood strategies and the social contexts they encounter across very different political, geographical and conflict settings.

Box 2

Protected rather than protracted—Strengthening refugees and peace: Areas of study
taken was dialogue-oriented and participatory. The researchers organised workshops in the field beforehand to discuss the research approach and focus with relevant actors and again at the end of the fieldwork to discuss the preliminary findings with stakeholders in each country or region.

Randomisation of interview partners and representative sampling proved difficult for different reasons. In some cases, the security situation was very challenging, e.g. in South Sudan and Afghanistan. Also, in different research settings, village heads, refugee councils or aid organisations presented a pre-selection of interview partners. In all case studies, however, maximal structural variation and diversity of interviewees was emphasised (regarding age, gender, religion, ethnic belonging, socio-economic situation, rural vs. urban, camp and non-camp, legal status and composition of the population in the respective study areas). The team triangulated perspectives with the help of research assistants, expert interviews, workshops with stakeholders and interview partners to gather feedback on findings and impressions, country-specific secondary data, academic and grey literature (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019, p. 12; Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018, p. 10-12). Generally, the research was based on close cooperation with local research assistants, who were first trained and then constantly supervised during the research process. As to location, the researchers followed a multi-sited and regional approach, guided by DPs and members of receiving communities and their trans-local networks in as well as outside of camps and settlements. The approach was continuously adjusted according to the feedback and results from all team members. A systematic serendipity routine to collect and process information outside of the box was included. This participative and dialogical research provides representative, ideal-typical cases without claiming statistical representativeness. Finally, in line with the grounded methodology approach, preliminary results were regularly acknowledged and integrated into the research design. Thematic coding and content analysis were most commonly used to analyse the data collected.
Overview of main findings and recommendations

The following four chapters present the main findings of this extensive research structured thematically and list the key recommendations for action emanating from them for each subject. Thematically, the structure of this overview reflects the dimensions, which have been identified as relevant to the livelihood-making of people in protracted displacement and return as outlined in the analytical framework above (i.e. drawing on the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model complemented by findings from this project’s case studies). Accordingly, the first chapter draws together findings regarding people’s access to basic livelihood necessities like security, food, land and housing, basic services (health and education) as well as work. The aim was to analyse which livelihood options people managed to retain or regain under conditions of protracted displacement, which options they lacked and how the options of local residents were affected by displacement. The second empirical chapter provides an overview of findings on access to political participation, awareness of and opportunities to claim rights as well as access to valid documents. This chapter summarises findings on how political framework conditions, legality and access to justice shape livelihood options of people in different contexts. The third empirical chapter presents findings and recommendations on additional livelihood and coping strategies that displaced persons have been found to employ, including mobility, self-organisation, adaptation and various ways of dealing with the question whether and when to return. Thus it adds results which have been gained through the focus on agency and livelihood-making and which are not covered in any of the other chapters. In the fourth empirical chapter, the report provides main findings on the social context of displacement, regarding (a) the diversity and heterogeneity of the displaced/returnees themselves and (b) their social environment. This chapter thus accounts for the dimension of (overcoming) social disarticulation from the IRR table and combines this with the question of displaced persons’ positionality in their social environment and how these influence livelihood options during displacement and after return. It also accounts for the fact that social relations and interactions have emerged as one of the strongest of displaced persons’ livelihood options, both facilitating and potentially constraining them.

All four empirical chapters are based on a thorough comparative assessment of the empirical findings from all case studies, which have been collected, structured thematically and then analysed for similarities and differences. For reasons of space, only the generalised findings and recommendations resulting from this process are presented here. For a more detailed understanding of the situation in each of the case study regions, we recommend the published case study findings, which are all made available here: https://www.bicc.de/research-clusters/project/project/protected-rather-than-protracted-strengthening-refugees-and-peace-122/
Empirical findings: Impacts of protracted displacement

As Naila’s story below illustrates, displacement disrupts and changes people’s options to access life- and livelihood-sustaining resources and services, often in the long run. The available livelihood options may repeatedly change during protracted displacement, during and after return and in cases of renewed displacement. This chapter provides an overview of the findings on displaced people’s access to: a) physical security; b) food, land, housing; c) basic services like education and health care, as well as d) income opportunities and employment, following the dimensions outlined in the analytical framework. It thus

A long history of mobility and displacement

Naila®, 60 years old, unemployed, Kabul, Afghanistan

Naila, 60, lives in an unofficial settlement in an industrial area in Kabul—together with another 150 families or so. She came to Kabul in 2010 with her ageing husband and two sons where she joined her relatives, who had come from Pakistan and other parts of Afghanistan and settled on unregistered plots owned by the Ministry of Finance. “Police had driven us away from our previous settlement across the road. But here, too, we are in perpetual fear of being forcibly removed”, Naila explains.

Naila has a long history of mobility and displacement. She and her family fled to Kunduz from their home north of Kabul during the civil war (1992–1996). Mujahidin fighters came to the house and forced the men to join the jihad. “Two brothers and one of my nephews were killed in the war. Together with the rest of the family, I fled to northern Kabul”. During the Taliban rule (1996–2001), her husband did every kind of casual work, whereas she grew vegetables on the land of other people. During winter, the family would move close to Jalalabad to find small jobs, and during summer back to northern Kabul and up to Parwan and Kapisa provinces where they would work on the fields of other people, living in a tent.

Under President Hamid Karzai (2004–2014), the war between the US-led coalition forces that supported the Afghan Army and the Taliban and mujahidin fighters intensified and reached Kapisa, where Naila was injured during a bomb attack. The family fled to Kabul.

“My sons wash cars along the main road near the camp to make some money. Workers from the nearby carwash centre repeatedly called the police, beat the boys and warned them not to do it again. Once they stabbed my son and injured him badly”, she explains and continues: “Drug addicts come and fight with our youth. It is not a safe area to live in. They do not allow us to build our houses here. When we repair the walls after rain, neighbours come here and beat us. I am not feeling safe here. We are living in a bad situation”.

Naila complains: “There are no job opportunities for my sons. The government should provide places for work, vocational training, for example, tailoring. I am old, but I want my sons to have a better life in the future”. During the election campaign, Ashraf Ghani had promised that the refugees could stay on their land legally. “Why did he lie?”, she asks. “He made a promise but did not do anything”.


Map layout: Marianne Wargenau, Hannes Blitza, September 2017

©BICC
moves from a focus on access (or lack of access) to the most basic requirements for survival like security, food and shelter to access to services, which can help to overcome the conditions of protracted displacement in the longer term. Finally, it summarises findings on income-generation opportunities, which are key to achieving self-reliance. Drawing on the comparative analysis of the research results, the chapter carves out what it means for people to live in protracted displacement by looking at the livelihood options they manage to retain or regain and the exclusions they face. It also looks at how livelihood options of local residents are affected.

Access to physical security: Key insights

- The loss of physical safety and security is not only the main driver that induces displacement; lack of safety continues during protracted displacement and after return, takes different forms, and may become more or less pressing over time. Most common forms of unsafety during displacement stem from sexual and gender-based violence, armed groups attacking refugee or IDP camps, forced recruitment of minors and youth into armed groups and forced relocation or deportation to the still unsafe areas of DPs’ origin.
- Conflict spill-overs or civil wars ravaging the receiving country threaten in particular refugee camps and villages where DPs seek refuge. Instead of protection, DPs witness or become victims of random killings, rapes and torture, the burning and looting of villages and camps, and forcible recruitment of minors and youth.
- Armed groups or state forces often coerce DPs to relocate to the country or area of origin where armed fighting continues, and land mines and unexploded ordnances have not been removed. DPs also return into dangerous conditions due to a lack of alternatives, either without assistance or because supported return and attempts to push people to return begin prematurely.

Recommendations for action

- **Regularly assess the protection needs of people in protracted displacement.** Border areas and camps, as well as communities with a large proportion of DPs, require particular attention, preparedness and rapid assistance or evacuation when violent attacks increase.
- **Prevent sexual and gender-based violence by introducing particular protection measures for threatened groups of DPs.** Camps, in particular, are places that attract sexual violence due to the (long-term) congestion, physical settings that are not culturally embedded, and living conditions that encourage the transgression of culturally-informed gender-related protection measures. Therefore, camps must be rapidly disbanded and DPs must be assisted in settling (at least temporarily) among local inhabitants besides establishing transitional protection of endangered DPs that should be adjusted to the specific needs and changes of context, based on a participatory process.
- **Offer alternatives for DPs threatened by forced relocation and negotiate with governments to avoid mass deportation into unsafe areas.** Humanitarian protection must have priority in situations where armed groups or government forces coerce DPs into moving to unsafe areas or countries of origin. Pogroms, ethnic cleansing, making DPs the scapegoat for economic problems and social tensions are among the main causes of coercive relocation. These problems need to be addressed and the required support provided early on so that DPs do not become threatened. Tripartite agreements between UNHCR, the country of origin of DPs and the receiving countries are the framework for solutions; however, rapid assistance also needs to be prepared for before DPs are forced to move into life-threatening conditions.
Access to food, land and housing: Key insights

- Lack of sufficient food, drinking water or shelter is not limited to the ‘emergency phase’ after expulsion but may re-occur at any point during protracted displacement, be a continuous feature thereof or become worse over time. The main reason is that the regions where people are displaced to and (temporarily) return to (the receiving areas) are sites where people are already struggling with little food, water and (access to) fertile land. Insufficient or even non-existent aid to cover basic needs, and governments that deliberately cut down DPs’ livelihood options through legal and political constraints, contribute to their plight. Finally, tensions between DPs and local residents—often due to (perceived or real) inequalities in aid distribution—, reoccurring and shifting violence as well as slow recovery from the destruction caused by armed fighting are creating unsafety, food and water scarcity and a lack of shelter.

- Access to land is a particularly contested and conflictive issue during protracted displacement as well as upon return. During DPs’ long-term absence, others frequently claim and take control over their land; sometimes armed groups, local power holders or investors appropriate it during or after armed conflicts. Hybrid and overlapping systems of land tenure and land governance or (selective) non-enforcement of legal regulations by governments complicate re-accessing the land. This results in limited or no access for DPs, returnees and marginalised groups of local residents to their former place of settlement and could, potentially, spark new conflicts.

- The lack of access to land and housing forces DPs to settle in areas where income-generation opportunities are lowest or where organised crime prevails. Areas prone to natural disasters (drought, flooding or landslides) and areas where DPs compete with local marginalised groups put them at constant risk of eviction. The lack of tenure security significantly increases DPs’ vulnerability and reduces their chances of self-reliance.

- Most DPs, returnees and marginalised local residents suffering from a lack of or highly volatile access to basic livelihood-sustaining resources also suffer from social and political exclusion and tend to be cut-off from international assistance. Different dimensions of (non-)access are entangled with each other and add up to multiple exclusions. These findings confirm that the deprivation from one asset must never be seen in isolation from other deprivations, as has been conceived in the notion of access as a ‘bundle of powers’.

Recommendations for action

- Be attentive to displacement-related ‘invisible emergencies’ and provide adequate support. For many, protracted displacement means life in extreme poverty or permanent emergency-like conditions. The need for assistance during protracted displacement and upon return may be as urgent as in newly occurring displacements, even though people’s distress may be less obvious.

- Consider the needs of the local inhabitants and the DPs, assist them equally and be transparent about who receives what. Unfulfilled expectations of local residents and perceived or real inequalities in aid distribution can create tensions between them and the DPs resulting in reduced livelihood options for the DPs.

- Encourage and support government initiatives improving access to land for DPs and returnees. Such initiatives can contribute significantly to conflict prevention and self-sufficiency if they are based on adequate participation of the stakeholders (landowners, DPs/returnees) and clearly determine rights and responsibilities of all parties involved, especially in the long-run.
Measure successful (re)integration in the light of human, economic, social and cultural rights. As displacement and return tend to take place in impoverished and marginalised areas, comparisons between the standard of living of DPs/returnees and local residents are inappropriate to measure the success of (re)integration. Consequences of inadequate assessments of (re)integration can be insufficient assistance, tensions, violence and renewed displacements.

Access to basic services—Health care and education: Key insights

Armed conflict and protracted displacement both increase the need for medical assistance and good quality and accessible health care. Many DPs, having experienced traumata or suffering from depression or severe physical injuries also need psychological support and trauma healing. DPs’ access to health care tends to be restricted, however, either due to the general unavailability of health services in areas affected by armed conflict or due to high costs, which DPs in need cannot afford. Undocumented persons are the most at risk as they usually have no legal access to health care. Among this group, untreated diseases inevitably lead to worsening health conditions, a multiplication of health-related problems and higher mortality.

For DPs, access to education is linked with the hope that at least the next generation will be able to overcome the conditions of protracted displacement. Often, however, high fees, the lack of documents required for enrolment and language barriers restrict access to education for DPs, especially if they also lack access to income. Further restrictions occur due to a general lack of schools and teachers in receiving areas and, in particular for girls, lacking safe transportation to and from schools as well as a lack of sanitation in schools. Early and child marriage as a means to cope with impoverishment or the need to send children to work are additional obstacles. Discrimination and low quality of teaching further lower the chances of displaced students to benefit from education.

When displaced persons have access to education, degrees are often not transferable or recognised in public, private and even self-organised education. Vocational training offered by international organisations often disregards local labour market needs as well as people’s preferences and capacities.

The lack of access to education and health care undermines people’s chances to overcome conditions of protracted displacement, possibly for several generations. The research revealed how different dimensions of exclusion interact with and induce each other. Lack of access to health care, apart from creating a multiplicity of problems in the longer term, is a reason why people are unable to take up jobs or employment, and the lack of income forces parents to keep the children out of schools. This combination of factors prolongs protracted displacement as it prevents (re)integration.

Recommendations for action

Assess the health needs of people in protracted displacement and provide the necessary treatment. This must be a priority in any intervention aiming to end protracted displacement. Lacking access to health care may be an underlying obstacle for people’s ability to (re)integrate, for example, into the labour market.

Establish lasting and inclusive health care structures. When supporting the establishment of health care services, agencies should make sure that these services are accessible across the country to everyone in need—displaced persons/returnees and locals alike. Funding has to be
Lack of income is one of the main reasons for onward and circular mobility of DPs and families (or individuals on behalf of their families). In other cases, lack of income forces families to send their children to work, and in some cases, it drives young men to join armed groups.

Highly-skilled DPs rarely get the chance to use their qualifications after displacement, due to a lack of (legal) opportunities, language barriers, lack of (recognition of) certificates, discrimination, or laws confining non-citizens to low-skilled sectors. Owing to good personal networks or a reputation for being highly skilled, some DPs have succeeded in getting jobs that match their qualifications.

In the large informal economies of many middle-income countries that receive refugees, employers benefit from the surplus of labour through displacement. This allows them to pay lower wages and bypass workers’ rights and regulations, often with adverse effects on the local workforce, depending on the degree of stratification of the labour market. The reduction of wages and salaries also affects previous generations of labour migrants and DPs who may be replaced by these newcomers—who, in turn, may be rejected by former jobholders. Although DPs may find relatively flexible opportunities to earn some money in the informal economy, these are often associated with having to accept challenging and sometimes dangerous working conditions, no labour rights, low income, no planning security, etc.. While formal employment offers some protection against exploitation, the conditions often do not differ much from those in the informal economy.

Under such conditions, DPs’ attempts to become self-reliant by earning an income do not go along with actual integration. In the common context of legal uncertainty, DPs are often only taken on under the condition that they accept a treatment that differs from that of local workers. Many fill certain niches at the lower end of income scales at the margin of the
receiving societies who often look down upon them as a result. Hence, informal employment allows people to survive but prevents social upward mobility and limits opportunities to interact with and become a part of the local social context. These social effects occur even though entire industries may depend on the cheap labour of DPs.

**Recommendations for action**

- **Focus on the establishment of value- and production chains grounded on local resources and products.** Where a formal economy is yet to develop, locally-based value- and production chains, for example, by processing and conserving agricultural products, can provide people with much-needed work and a long-term perspective.

- **Assess DPs’ qualifications and support the opening of entrance possibilities in the formal labour market.** DPs have all kinds of skills and qualifications. To increase the benefits they can bring to the local economies in receiving areas, avenues to identify and use their qualifications in the formal labour market should be explored and supported.

- **Assistance for DPs requires a careful and realistic appraisal of its repercussions for the local labour supply, labour rights and wage scales.** Contexts with high numbers of DPs often experience a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding labour rights, standards and wages. While DPs who receive assistance may be in a position to live off lower than average salaries, their competition affects local workers, (undocumented) migrants and other groups that are not beneficiaries of assistance. The potential of this unequal competition to create tensions and even worsen conditions for everyone once assistance runs out is high. When external support is given to DPs to integrate into the labour market, standards should remain at the same level to avoid long-term harm.

- **Keep viable options for DPs’ income-generation in the informal economy open as long as no alternative income sources are available.** The informal labour markets have to be seen for what they are: They provide opportunities for de facto (re)integration and chances to sustain a livelihood, however marginal, in contexts where alternatives are rare or non-existent. Therefore, programmes attempting to increase employment opportunities for DPs need to make sure to not close down these options including, for example, unregistered home-run businesses by women, before viable alternatives have been created for all people concerned.
The chapter also highlights the implications arising from these four aspects for a DPs’ livelihood. It thus covers the impoverishment risks of being “outlawed” in the sense of having no access to opportunities to claim rights, being politically voiceless, being without valid documents and being unaware of one’s rights (risks k–n from Box 1 - p. 14).

This chapter presents the research results regarding
- DPs’ awareness of and opportunities to claim rights,
- political framework conditions,
- DPs’ access to and significance of legal documents, and
- implications of being undocumented and forced returns.

Empirical findings: Livelihood and legality

Economic migration and displacement from Syria

Aziz*, 45 years old,
worker, refugee camp Qusthapa, south of Erbil

Aziz lives with his wife and children in one of the houses built by the United Arab Emirates in the camp. “Our house consists of a small courtyard that is used as a kitchen, a terrace and storage facility, a living room and a bedroom. It has water, electricity and a toilet. The camp is entirely made up of Syrian Kurdish refugees”, Aziz explains. It is rather crowded but offers all amenities typical to such camps: Training and meeting facilities for the women and elders, sports grounds for youth, some shacks turned into shops and restaurants, child-friendly spaces, NGO and camp management offices. It is situated less than an hour’s drive from Erbil, Iraq-Kurdistan. “Many of us had found work in nearby factories upon arrival, but most have lost them again”, Aziz describes the situation.

Many of the workers complain about low salaries, and especially the women report harassment in the workplace.

Aziz used to be an electrician fixing meters in the Kurdish part of Syria. As a Kurd, he had problems with being recognized as a full citizen of Syria. He recounts: “I was neither allowed to own land nor buy a house or a shop. I was harassed and threatened repeatedly by the Syrian regime for being active in Kurdish cultural activities such as theatre and dancing groups”. Though he had obtained a degree, he explains: “I did not get permanent employment and had to live on day jobs”. Without the necessary documentation, he was neither offered proper employment nor was he allowed to buy a shop, so he rented a workshop to get along. “When the economic situation in Syria got unbearable I went to Iraq to find a job there to come back and pay the workshop’s rent”. He indeed found a job and was hired in Slemani. His family stayed behind in the ‘Syrian war’. “An explosion hit the neighbourhood of my family’s home in Syria. My wife and the children fled to Iraq”. Finally, they ended up in a refugee camp close to Erbil.

Even though his boss offered to raise his salary significantly, Aziz decided to move into the refugee camp with his family and to become a registered refugee himself. He asserted: “Before my family came, I was not a refugee”. Instead, he considers himself a worker. Despite experiencing human rights violations, threats, and war discrimination, despite leaving his family behind in a war zone, he does not consider these issues but economic reasons to be the cause of his migration.

It is 2018; Aziz and his family are still living in the camp. He has managed to get a position in a Kurdish TV station. One of his daughters won a scholarship by an international organization and is about to start studying abroad.

Name changed

Sources:
Natural Earth Data 2018, liveuamap.com 2018.
Map layout: Hannes Blitza, November 2018
Awareness of and opportunities to claim rights: Key insights

- De facto opportunities for people in protracted displacement and returnees to claim their rights may differ largely from the rights guaranteed to them on paper. The reasons are that states’ executive and judicial institutions are often weak in contexts of protracted armed conflicts, and social and political orders are violently contested.

- DPs do not even try to claim their rights for these most commonly mentioned reasons: (a) fear from and concrete threats of violence and revenge, linked with a climate of impunity for perpetrators and (b) lack of trust in the police and judiciary due to widespread corruption, clientelism and discrimination.

- Access to justice is distributed very unequally. Factors impeding justice for DPs and receiving community members are socio-economic marginalisation, living in areas controlled by or contested between non-state armed groups, or having the ‘wrong’ ethnic background, especially during and after ethnically charged conflict. The loss of a protective extended family or patron–client relations can also lead to a lack of rights to protection and their enforcement.

Recommendations for action

- Projects involving people in protracted displacement need to be based on a context analysis detailing de facto opportunities for different groups of people to claim their rights and get access to justice. The lack
of the rule of law and predatory behaviour of officers of the judiciary and government impinge on the longer-term livelihood options of DPs and hence, impede (re)integration. Moreover, these conditions can limit possible positive effects of any project supporting the income-generation for DPs by simply diverting the money put into it or by taking it from the intended beneficiaries.

\Support the establishment of accountable public institutions and the rule of law after armed conflicts in the long run. To eradicate the adverse impact of large-scale corruption that prevents DPs from gaining access to rights and justice, a high degree of donor coordination, alignment with state actors and long-term commitment after the end of a war is required. Such measures need to be repeatedly evaluated against the de facto performance of the judiciary.

Recommendations for action

\Offer initial and temporary support for interest-based grassroots organisations whose members are a mix of DPs and the receiving community. Mixed organisations can facilitate the mutual understanding of DPs and local community members and the recognition of similarities in deprivation and exclusion. Such local organisations can represent the common interests of DPs and groups from the receiving communities towards local councils, other institutions and aid agencies. The joint activities can facilitate (re)integration in the long run.

\Encourage participation in planning and implementing humanitarian and development projects in contexts of (re)integration. Development cooperation can benefit greatly from allowing beneficiaries and target groups to genuinely participate in such projects. This will, at the same time, contribute to giving them a voice on matters that concern them (see also BICC Policy Brief 9/19 for more details on this).

\Increase community awareness about the situation of DPs living among them. Development cooperation can and has contributed—by education guidelines, information campaigns and exchange programmes—to reducing stereotypes and misinformation about DPs. These measures can also prevent the politicisation of DPs’ situation.

Political framework conditions: Key insights

\DPs are mostly cut-off from opportunities of political participation and representation, both inside and outside their countries of citizenship. They have hardly any influence on political decision-making regarding their situation and political responsiveness towards their living conditions and needs. Partial or non-implementation of internationally endorsed refugee and human rights instruments is common.

\Living in territories controlled by non-state armed groups is often worse in terms of access to services and rights for DPs than living in state-controlled areas.

\As a result of their politically marginalised position, DPs can easily become politically instrumentalised. Moreover, the political climate can change significantly over time, affecting DPs adversely or positively. Sometimes, the political climate responds to global trends in refugee protection, for example, changing practices of burden-sharing and -shifting among states. Often, domestic factors are crucial for the conditions under which DPs have to secure their livelihood. Examples for factors that strongly impact on DPs are the type, outreach and stability of the government, economic crises, security threats, international geopolitical considerations with subsequent changes in alliances, strategies or power relations, and even personal career ambitions of politicians.

\An adverse political climate makes (re)integration attempts extremely difficult and can undermine any chance of pursuing a livelihood legally. Favourable political and legal framework conditions tend to be ideologically based and can, but do not necessarily translate into tangible improvements for DPs on the ground.


Recommendations for action

Humanitarian and development assistance should not be tied to a certain legal status but be indiscriminately provided for people in need. Humanitarian and development agencies must recognise that the legal status of a person reflects the (changing) legal and political opportunities and constraints at the current place of residence rather than the initial cause of displacement. The allocation of a legal status as a refugee takes place ex-post—that is, (sometimes long) after displacement—and does not equally include persons with the same need for assistance. DPs who lost their documents or cannot pay smugglers are, therefore, treated differently even though they may have experienced the same hardship of displacement as those who received a legal status.

Facilitate access to legal documents for undocumented DPs. Valid documents provide at least a certain minimum of security and facilitate access to basic services. Therefore, initiatives to reduce the number of undocumented persons through amnesties and a reduction of costs and bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining papers should be supported.

Implications of being undocumented and forced return: Key insights

For various reasons which are beyond their control, many DPs, including IDPs, are excluded from accessing a legal status. Some DPs deliberately avoid the exclusions and restrictions that come with having a legal status (e.g. a refugee status). Wherever there are registered DPs, there are also unregistered ones.

Living without valid documents often means living in hiding and avoiding public services for fear of being identified. Undocumented DPs

Access to and meanings of legal documents: Key insights

Access to valid documents can safeguard achieved levels of de facto (re)integration and unlock further livelihood opportunities.

Many DPs, however, including IDPs and returnees, do not manage to obtain proof of a valid legal status (refugee or citizen). This is either because political decisions or conflict dynamics block their access to legal documents or due to high costs, bureaucratic obstacles and missing documents like birth certificates or ID cards required to obtain legal status.

The legal status is more reflective of the options provided to the DPs by the political framework conditions than of the initial causes of displacement. Chances of obtaining and keeping a legal status are also higher when the DP has a high socioeconomic status or good personal networks, indicating considerable inequality among DPs.

There are contexts where even having a documented legal status has little or no value, mostly when the political and public climate has turned against (certain groups of) DPs.

In some places, so many constraints are attached to a refugee status (e.g. no freedom of movement, no permission to work) that people may choose not to apply for it to maintain a minimum of control over their livelihood.
face the permanent risk and fear of imprisonment or deportation and hence have no or hardly any prospect of a formalisation of achieved levels of (re)integration. They tend to remain subjected to exploitation, extortion and violent behaviour as they lack access to legal remedies.  
\  
After deportation, DPs struggle the most. They had no time to prepare their return and have lost their previous livelihood. In many cases, they also struggle with social stigmatisation, which further inhibits reintegration.  
\  
**Recommendations for action**  
\  
Include undocumented persons in needs and vulnerability assessments and avoid shutting down of their livelihood options. Undocumented persons are likely to pursue different and less visible livelihood strategies than documented ones. As part of do-no-harm, any measure that undermines undocumented people’s livelihood should be avoided unless a viable alternative is found, as they often have very few options. Therefore, needs and vulnerability assessments should ideally also include undocumented persons, even though they may be hard to reach out to.  
\  
Assist deported DPs to rebuild their lives in the long term and enable them to reintegrate. After having been forced to return, people struggle the most to settle and secure their livelihood. Deportations, especially into countries at war, should therefore not be supported. However, coerced relocations do take place, and those deported usually need substantial and long-term assistance to rebuild their lives.
Empirical findings:
Livelohood and coping strategies of displaced persons

In an attempt to deal with the various exclusions, constraints and uncertainties they face, DPs adopt diverse strategies to retain or regain sources of livelihood (see Box below). Having focussed on agency and livelihood-making, the research uncovered a diversity of different coping strategies and ways of dealing with the impacts of protracted displacement, which go beyond the dimensions of access and exclusion listed in the IRR. The most important strategies, (a) (im)mobility between protracted conflicts and livelihoods opportunities, (b) trans-local networks, (c) returning or staying, and (d) self-organisation and adaptation are presented in this chapter. Spatial mobility has emerged not only as a constant feature of protracted internal displacement for people who need to avoid the shifting hotspots of violence but also as an expression of DPs’ permanent search for livelihood opportunities in exile. The importance of spatial mobility for DPs, which has so far not received much attention in research on protracted displacement, is highlighted by the plight of DPs or displaced-in-place, who are cut off from this option (forced immobility). A result of spatial mobility on the one hand and facilitating condition thereof on the other are trans-local networks of DPs, which also support DPs’ resilience and livelihood-making in other ways.

Local integration in Tanzania
Mathias*, 66 years old, mechanic, driver, trader, in the settlement Katumba, region Katavi

“I was 18 when I fled from Burundi in 1972. I saw people die, so I ran away”. Mathias explains. “It was the army. They shot into the crowd without making any difference. I only saved my life. I was lucky and fled with my parents. Seven brothers and three sisters were murdered. We got on the boat to cross lake Tanganyika. We had to pay a lot of money for that to Kigoma in Tanzania”. From there, he and his parents were directly transported to the refugee settlement Katumbo where they were registered and received tents, blankets and food. Later, they were given 70 x 100m of land and some tools. Mathias and his family had to clear the land: “We built bamboo huts and then houses. We couldn’t just leave the camp, we needed a permit for that”. As it had become more difficult to make a living in Kigoma, Mathias decided to return to the settlement. Katumbo is located in one of the poorer and less populated areas of eastern Tanzania. Some of the settlements of the Burundian refugees are very isolated, but Katumbo is easy to reach from the district capital.

“The situation in the camp was difficult, but Mathias found another option. Since he had been working as a mechanic before he was displaced, he was employed by an NGO. He became a driver and worked for many years in Kasulu and Kigoma. Three of his children were born there. Today, they are studying in Kigoma, two are married—and citizens of Tanzania. Mathias himself, however, has no citizenship: “When you could register in the camps, I was in the city. That’s why I missed it”.

©BICC
Mobility and trans-local networks are expressions of DPs agency as well as the structural constraints they are constantly confronted with, as neither mobility nor networks necessarily translate into opportunities for development and social upward mobility (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, pp. 10-11). The fact that displaced people have to strongly rely on those highlights the conditions of rejection by one or several states and societies that they are facing.

(Im)mobility between protracted conflict and livelihood opportunities: Key insights

\[-\] In contexts of violent conflicts, the decision to flee is a result of a combination of several factors and is often taken in several steps. Most people leave their house and property when violence and immediate threats start to affect them directly, hoping to be able to return soon. They will decide to leave the country (for those who can) when they do not expect any chance to retain livelihood options in their country of origin and have lost the hope that conditions will improve. The decision to flee across their country’s border can also be linked to the existence of family networks abroad.

IDPs often embark on journeys that may take years, guided by attempts to avoid armed groups and hot-spots of violence in search for shelter. They usually try to stay in contact with family members while searching for sources of livelihood in different places, often without being able to settle anywhere permanently. But even those DPs who no longer live under conditions of armed conflict often keep moving in the attempt to reunite with their families or because they cannot find a place which allows them to live in safety and to make a living at the same time.

\[-\] Despite a strong inclination to stay together as families, DPs are often forced to split up at different points along the way, e.g. due to security considerations. Many adopt poly-local households as a strategy to diversify their livelihood sources. For example, they would leave one family member behind to farm the land and maintain chances for return, or they would leave women and children in safer areas while the men, including minors, move around in search of jobs and income.

\[-\] The ability to be mobile is not distributed equally. Some people lack the means to flee far enough to get themselves out of harm’s way. In some cases, armed groups force people to stay. Some people decide to stay against all odds hoping that they can maintain access to their assets like land by their presence.

\[-\] Where spatial mobility has become a livelihood strategy for DPs, this is usually due to a lack of alternatives or is regarded as necessary to live a life in dignity (one example is when DPs move out of camps that do not offer privacy or protection against sexual harassment). If legal, mobility-related livelihood options are closed, the result tends to be (a) the formation of an illicit economy that offers those who can afford it a way around those restrictions, and (b) being stuck in a vicious cycle of insecurity, impoverishment and indebtedness for those who cannot afford (illicit) mobility.

Recommendations for action

Spatial mobility must be acknowledged as a central strategy for DPs who aim to re-gain self-reliance and should, therefore, not be constrained. Onward mobility of DPs, rather than regarding it as a problem or ignoring it altogether, needs to be understood as an important coping strategy and attempt by DPs to increase their self-reliance. Aid and assistance, when offered, should thus not undermine DPs’ chances for mobility (not be bound to registration in one place, for instance).
Widen the mobility options for DPs by offering exchange and scholarship programmes, facilitating access to work visa, etc. Spatial mobility of DPs can be a successful livelihood strategy. Offers that provide opportunities for DPs to attain a higher qualification or remain independent from assistance through access to employment abroad can improve their chances to benefit from spatial mobility.

Open up income opportunities for DPs to avoid the trap of indebtedness and aid dependence. Mobility practices including those taking place informally, semi- or ‘illegally’, result from a lack of alternatives. Restricting these practices without improving the economic framework conditions and providing chances for DPs to access social services will cut them off from essential means to sustain themselves where they are. The result will be that entire families are stuck in vicious cycles of indebtedness and lack any future perspective.

Dispersed families and ruptured livelihood

Maribel*, 23 years old, unemployed, Ecuador

Maribel lived in a small village within an indigenous reservation in Nariño, Colombia, until the age of 12. “My family had a finca there. We had animals and cultivated crops, vegetables and fruits”, Maribel remembers. The camp of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) was very close to their village. “In 2006, when the Colombian Army bombed the FARC camp, we fled to a nearby town in Nariño. There, fighting continued”, she explains. Maribel became an eyewitness of massacres against the population. Nevertheless, she succeeded in finishing high school at the age of 16 and went to a technical school until she was 18.

When the killing continued, her aunt who lived in an Ecuadorian village close to the Colombian border called her and asked her to come to Ecuador. She and her husband went to Ecuador via Rumichaca in May 2017. “For the first weeks, we stayed with my aunt. Now we have rented a room in the house of another aunt. My husband works as a day worker picking fruits in the nearby fincas. He earns around US $12 per day—enough to buy food”, Maribel explains her situation.

“In the beginning, we thought that we would return soon, but the killing of one of my half-brothers in August 2017 finally made us change our minds.” As Maribel had planned to return soon, she never applied for asylum nor for a migrant status and has no papers besides her Colombian identification card. Having heard that the new Ecuadorian law on human mobility will introduce fines for those without papers, she is thinking about applying for documents.

“My family is split up: My great-aunt, my aunt, my cousins, my husband and I are in Ecuador, my mother and one of my brothers remain in Nariño. Another other brother has been internally displaced to Cali. My grandfather who used to live in Ecuador has recently returned to his home village”, Maribel describes her situation. She is reluctant to talk about her opinion on the peace process as many other Colombians close to the border and to their former perpetrators are.

“It is impossible to find a job here since the landlords of the fincas only employ men. To find another job, one would have to move to the city and to have proper papers”, Maribel says.
Trans-local networks: Key insights

Trans-local networks emerge when DPs connect with earlier generations of DPs or migrants, often from the same extended family who live in other places within the same country or abroad. These networks are, to varying degrees, manifestations of a trans-local mode of living that people adopt when searching for safety and livelihood opportunities. DPs who live trans-locally simultaneously belong to groups in different places.

Strong trans-local networks form a crucial source of livelihood as they enable members to access remittances, facilitate mobility and migration and provide a chance to escape from violent conflicts. Members of the network can help displaced relatives by hosting them, providing contacts with smugglers and (temporary) funding. The network members can guide newcomers in ways to overcome bureaucratic hurdles, assist with their knowledge of the local labour market and contacts to help the newly displaced to find jobs or educational opportunities. In some cases, trans-local networks can offer business ties across borders.

The strength and livelihood-generating effects of trans-local networks are an expression of a persons’ positionality in society. Hence, despite their supportive role, these networks may exacerbate rather than overcome socio-economic differences between displaced persons.

Recommendations for action

- Facilitate money transfers within trans-local (family) networks at little cost. Money transfers to people in protracted displacement can play a significant role in their resilience and offer chances to overcome conditions of protracted displacement. Therefore, informal money transfers should not be closed down unless alternative ways have been established.
- Increase sustainable options for legal migration. The livelihood of entire families in protracted displacement often depends on remittances from one family member, who lives abroad and has an income. Once this person loses their income or is forced to return to their country of origin, all relatives may have to move into a camp or simply face reduced chances of access to services like education, etc.

To return or not to return? Key insights

Regardless of large-scale repatriation programmes, the majority of returns are self-organised. DPs actively search for information about the conditions in their places of origin. If allowed, they will make their own decision whether, when and where to return to, based on criteria by which they compare the potential places of residence in exile and upon return. In many cases, however, even self-organised returns are the result of a lack of alternatives.

The main criteria for return are the prospects for physical safety (which may vary from person to person, e.g. based on their ethnic background, gender or political activities) and livelihood opportunities (availability of infrastructure, public services, access to land and legal documents). The presence and well-being of (extended) family members and the DPs’ capacity to start and build up a new life upon return are crucial criteria, too.

Peace agreements and elections can trigger return movements or increase the pressure to return but often mislead people about de facto prospects for peace and stability on the ground.

The time spent in exile is an important variable for the readiness to return. Having established a feeling of belonging in the country of residence and having invested a lot into building a livelihood there, as well as giving children the chance to finish their education and the perceived need to save and prepare for a new beginning after return are reasons against or for a later return. The longer people have stayed in exile, the less probable they are to return, especially when children have been born and raised, visited schools or found work in exile.
A strong wish to return is not limited to the period soon after displacement; it may last for decades but often reflects a longing to return to the lost pre-crisis home rather than returning to the place of origin as it is.

Moving back and forth between places of origin and residence or temporarily staying somewhere half-way in-between the place of origin and displacement is a common response to unsafe or unsatisfactory conditions at both places. Circular movements can also be a deliberate strategy to connect the original with the new society and involve economic endeavours to bridge two (or more) countries.

Recommendations for action:

- Put efforts in the progress of peace negotiations and support repatriation only when the fighting has ended and armed groups have been demobilised and disarmed. Experiences with early repatriation that was reversed due to renewed armed fighting show that such measures can threaten the lives of returnees and create new large-scale displacement.
- Provide DPs with accurate information on their security and livelihood options upon return, and leave the decision to them. Reintegration can only be achieved if DPs are well-prepared for return and have planning security in the mid-term. Pushing DPs into repatriation programmes by providing incentives hardly ever leads to durable reintegration. A volatile security situation, constraints of mobility within their country or limited trade opportunities prevent DPs from returning and hence, attempting to reintegrate.
- Facilitate the legal integration of DPs who are making a living on their own. Well-integrated DPs can overcome protracted displacement and its constraints if they and the following generations have the option to stay legally. Due to a feeling of belonging to their original and the current society, they may establish connections between the two places (through trade or business relations, etc.), from which all parties can benefit.

Support reconstruction in a sustainable manner. The reason for most DPs to not return (if given a choice) is a lack of adequate framework conditions for reintegration. Therefore, rather than investing in individual, short-term reintegration incentives, the reconstruction process in the country of origin, including marginalised and rural areas, should be supported. This needs to be done with an eye on the sustainability of such efforts, as new displacements by large-scale infrastructure projects or high resource needs must be avoided.

Self-organisation and adaptation:

Key insights

- In several instances, DPs have managed to close the gaps in their access to services by establishing schools, hospitals or health care centres by themselves or in cooperation with NGOs.
- Essential support, such as individually targeted medical or financial assistance, also comes from self-organised, often highly flexible and unbureaucratic networks of activists from the receiving society or is provided by immigrants from the same country as the displaced, who are willing to accept high personal risks, for example when channelling support to undocumented DPs.
- To avoid discrimination and negative stereotyping, some displaced persons adopt strategies with which they change their appearance or accent to blend in or to be seen as someone entirely different.
- DPs’ self-organisation covers a broad range of aspects including mediation of conflicts, for instance in camps and mutual support and solidarity. Specific political self-organisation often focuses on refugee issues and can take the character of a diaspora organisation maintaining contact with those who stay in the country of origin. Especially politically persecuted minorities form strong representations in exile, which may take over the role of representing the interests of DPs in camps and
Agency and livelihood-making in protracted displacement

R. Vollmer

Working Paper 10  
2019

Acknowledge DPs’ organisations and involve them in decision-making on issues affecting them while avoiding an exclusion of others. When DPs form their own organisations, these can become a valuable link between the DPs and humanitarian and development agencies as well as government authorities. Concrete interventions and projects need to allow for the participation of various interest groups, including local residents and account for the diversity and potentially conflicting interests of the DPs, however (see below).

Recommendations for action:

Protect self-organised healthcare and education services and support them in achieving regional (or international) quality standards and having an open-door policy for everyone. Through self-organised healthcare and education services, DPs gain the opportunity to get necessary treatment and education regardless of their legal status.

Persecuted minorities

Dislsoz*, 32 years old,
English teacher from Bashiqua, Iraq

"We’re all going to Germany. Everyone will go. There is no future for Yazidis here, after everything that has happened to us. My husband is already there. He’s fine, but he misses the family," explains Dislsoz.

The young teacher comes from Bashiqua, a city near Mosul, Nineveh Province, Iraq. In the area around her hometown, different religious communities had lived side by side for thousands of years. When IS conquered Mosul, people were expelled, enslaved, or killed. ‘My husband was a Peshmerga and was wounded. His position was often bombed. Then I told him, either you stop or you go to Germany. We have already lost everything, our house, everything. I don’t want to lose you, too’. Her sister-in-law, a brother and an uncle are already there.

In 2007, 24 Yazidis were killed in Mosul. After that, no Christians and Yazidis were allowed to study there. ‘I studied in Zakho (Iraqi Kurdistan) to become an English teacher. With the Kurdish degree it was easy to find a job in Dohuk when we fled from IS’. She had already tried to travel to Turkey in January 2017 with the two children of six and eight, already had a visa, but just as she was sitting on the bus they closed the border. In March, at her second attempt, she did not receive a salary payment and had to postpone the trip again.

‘Coming to Germany costs about US $4,000. The smugglers know how to make money. There were four buses full of Yazidis,’ reports Dislsoz. Her brother had made it all the way to Turkey. After fifteen days there, he even managed to reach Greece. ‘There, he was arrested and came back to Iraq after two days, but at least he didn’t have to pay the 4,000 dollars then’.

My mother wants to stay in Iraq, but I just want to be reunited with my husband’. He has had a residence permit for five months, but papers they need for her to be able to join her husband in Germany are still missing. She would have to go to Baghdad to obtain the marriage certificate. But that ‘requires a lot of money and time’.

*name changed

©BICC
Empirical findings: Social relations

De facto local integration has been defined as a “process where refugee individuals or groups establish belonging at the local level (which makes it dependent on) the relationship between refugees and the host population in the locality they inhabit” (Kuch, 2016, p. 474; cf. also Bakewell 2000; Jacobsen 2001). In applying the perspective of established-outsider figurations, the research revealed that neither DPs (as the ‘outsiders’/newcomers) nor local residents (as ‘the established’/’hosts’) are homogenous and static social entities. Local inhabitants may also belong to marginalised groups and have experienced disruptions of their livelihood, violent conflict, or may have a history as DP themselves. Yet, across contexts, receiving communities play a crucial role in hosting and supporting DPs, many of whom find shelter in local people’s private homes or religious institutions. This section presents the research findings regarding the various boundaries and cleavages, both within and between groups of DPs and local residents, returnees and people staying put and highlights how social interaction and group relations shape livelihood options (Box 6). The chapter will first point out the role of (a) heterogeneity/diversity and then of (b) social and intergroup relations.

Diversity: Key insights

- Groups of displaced persons from the same country are usually heterogeneous and can be deeply divided along boundary lines predetermined by the conflict that made them flee or political repression in the country of origin, fostering hostility and suspicion among them. Some DPs may be perpetrators of armed violence, including security forces of the government who may continue to pose a threat after displacement.
- Traumatising experiences, impunity for perpetrators and a lack of (trusted) transitional justice processes harm social cohesion and inhibit trustful social relations during displacement and after return.

- Socio-economic and class differences, among DPs as well as local residents, are in most cases predictive of people’s ability to adapt to the new context but are often concealed by ethnic, religious or cultural group identities.
- Displacement has a transformative potential as it can open up livelihood options which would not have been accessible otherwise. However, it also blocks livelihood options as it contributes to the devaluation or loss of assets and the loss of access to previous options (healthcare, education, income, land, etc.). The transformative potential also extends to changing gender roles and socio-cultural norms through living in different cultural contexts, which increases heterogeneity upon return.

Recommendations for action:

- Assess carefully the potential for social cohesion before starting related programmes and opt for measures with indirect positive effects if in doubt (for instance improving economic framework conditions for (re)integration or access to services for all). Causes and trajectories of displacement of any groups of people in protracted displacement need to be taken into consideration before drawing any conclusions about social cohesion.
- Consider pre-existing conflicts among DPs and adjust camp and settlement arrangements in a way that safeguards protection and unbiased conflict mediation. To guarantee the protection and safety of DPs’, conflict and inter-group dynamics need to be analysed continuously. The set-up of camps and settlements must be such that acts of violence, harassment or revenge can be prevented.
- Account for the target groups’ diversity in all matters of representation and participation. Projects applying participatory approaches or aiming to strengthen the political self-determination of DPs need to be based on a thorough understanding of the diversity of interests and possible fault lines among the target group(s).
Caught in Myanmar’s persisting armed conflicts

Shaw*, 25 years old, farmer, northern Shan

“The conflict has torn my family apart. My father died. As village leader, the Palaung tasked him to assemble the boys in the village so that they could recruit them forcibly. He volunteered for me. He was shot”, Shaw remembers. Each year, ten men per village had to be recruited and a donation made. Normally, the villagers would hide or sleep outside the village all night, but this time the gunmen came and surprised them.

The prolonged conflict determines the life of the families in the region north of Lashio in every respect. “The fighting has been on the increase for two years. Since they do not have the means, the civilian population cannot flee”, Shaw explains. A multitude of competing armed groups haunts the area where Shaw lives. With some—like the SSA (Southern Shan Army)—one can buy oneself out. “It depends on your prosperity. If you have money, you can move to the city”, Shaw explains. Since they can’t afford it, many villagers still wait. Those villagers who were displaced and fled, ending up in camps inside or outside Myanmar, have to get by without any help.

“We have no other choice”. His sister lives and studies in the nearby town. He went to China as a migrant worker to finance her studies. “But the pay is getting worse and worse, so I no longer go there”. As crossing the border has become increasingly difficult, Shaw now goes to the even more fiercely contested jade zone around Hpakan (Myanmar). “There, it is even more dangerous”, but informal workers earn a lot of money by extracting the mineral from the abandoned mines by using simple tools, such as hammers.

The compulsory levies and recruitments, as well as hardly any chance of taking the products to the markets, take their toll. Avoidance strategies and alternatives are limited. “Two of my brothers are in the monastery because the armed groups cannot fetch them from there”, Shaw says. The villagers can only help each other through labour: “They help with working the fields and harvesting”.

Shaw says that conflict is not really the main problem: “My problem is how to make money—and we don’t have many options. That’s why I’ll go back to the mines when my sister takes time off and can take care of the house”.

* name changed
Social and intergroup relations:

Key insights

- Social relations and networks, particularly between DPs and local residents, often provide constitutive framework conditions that shape DPs’ livelihood opportunities, either by opening and facilitating livelihood options or by closing them down.

- While adverse circumstances like a hostile political climate or economic distress can harm social relations and the ability or readiness of local residents to accommodate and support DPs, there are many instances where social networks and relations open up opportunities beyond the legal and political constraints imposed by the respective governments.

- Factors facilitating solidarity and hospitality towards DPs are ethnolinguistic or religious commonalities or similarities and experiences of violence and displacement among local residents. Supportive relations can deteriorate over time, mostly due to external factors (economic, political, aid-related, absolute scarcity of vital resources, or the specific positionality of the local residential community within the larger society). However, relations can also improve over time.

- Upon return, DPs may face rejection or suspicion simply based on the fact that they spent the years of the armed conflict elsewhere. Violent conflicts often trigger new identity dynamics and can prevent return to the place of origin due to a changed ethnic balance or perception thereof. Moreover, the years spent in displacement can change people’s socio-cultural norms and behaviour, which can make reintegration challenging.

- The situation of ‘returnees’ born in exile makes it all the more clear that return is a new beginning rather than ‘going home’. The situation of former combatants who can no longer face the communities they came from due to the war crimes they committed shows that return is not an option for everyone.

Recommendations for action:

- Make sure that assistance is perceived as fair and unbiased by DPs/returnees and local residents. (De facto) local integration takes place within and through the immediate social context that DPs live in. Any kind of assistance and support provided needs to make sure that it does not disturb the delicate balance of social relations and intergroup perceptions. It should factor in possible social obligations owed by the DPs to local inhabitants, having received their support as well as potential grievances or envy by local residents over (perceived) preferential treatment of DPs. These would include indirect effects on their livelihood, e.g. from cash-for-rent programmes or food aid for DPs.

- Support local social or entrepreneurial activities in which displaced or returnees, as well as local residents, participate. These may be construction, farming and infrastructure projects as part of community development programmes that benefit DPs and local residents equally. Involve groups of DPs and the local community in planning and implementing the project from the outset.

- Make reintegration processes inclusive, i.e. considering returning IDPs, refugees and disarmed former fighters equally, where possible. For this to be successful, returnees should not be placed in different categories with different benefits as this may raise resentment by those—local residents or returnees—who receive less or no aid or compensation (in case of DDR often the civilian victims).

- Accompany reintegration with reconciliation, reparations and community development programmes for several years upon an initial agreement with local representatives. To overcome the resentment of civilians against former fighters and prevent revenge, the reconciliation process must continue, covering urban and rural inhabitants as well as returnees, involve independent civil society organisations and be linked with development that includes disadvantaged social groups.
Lessons learned: International interventions and reform of the refugee regime

The rise in total numbers of displaced, but the increase and increased duration of protracted displacement and the realisation that the international refugee protection regime has not done enough to overcome those, in particular, (see Annex) has given rise to major attempts at reforming it in recent years. In 2016, seven international meetings and the UN Summits for Refugees and Migrants were held to identify better responses to forced displacement. The UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration on Refugees on 19 September 2016. As the initial plan to adopt a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees did not find enough support among the member states (Schmalz, 2017), the General Assembly endorsed the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the ‘Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration’ were adopted in December 2018. The GCR aims to complement the CRRF and envisages better ‘burden-sharing’ between states and more participation by displacement-affected communities in planning, among other points. It is meant to complement, but not replace the Geneva Refugee Convention. Its scope is hence limited to those DPs who meet the criteria of the refugee definition according to the Geneva Convention. During the negotiations for the GCR, the CRRF was piloted in about a dozen countries. The experiences were fed back into the compact negotiations.

The World Humanitarian Summit of 2016 focused on the often problematised gap between humanitarian and development assistance. Subsequently, large-scale humanitarian-development partnerships were launched, such as the ‘Grand Bargain’, besides funding initiatives to provide concessional financing to middle-income countries hosting large refugee populations (CGD-IRC, 017, xi). One tangible outcome of these initiatives is the new instrument of refugee compacts, by which governments of high-income countries like the EU member states are to support middle-income refugee-hosting countries like Jordan through economic cooperation and trade liberalisation (Grawert, 2018a).

Consequently, two new instruments started in two of the case study regions while this project was ongoing (2015–2018) and will most likely have a considerable impact on the international refugee regime in the future. Although these examples go beyond our initial research questions, they provide insights and lessons learned regarding practical steps to improve refugee protection and hence are highly relevant: Jordan e.g. illustrates the challenges local integration is facing and is a rare case where the practices of local integration have been altered due to international interventions (research question II). The case study on the impact of the EU–Jordan Compact in Jordan provided some conclusions regarding its planning, implementation and opportunities for improvement. The case study in Tanzania analysed the pilot phase of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). It examined why Tanzania as one of the pilot countries of the CRRF decided to opt out of the process in 2018. The study provided valuable lessons on how to avoid this from happening in the future by putting more emphasis on the analysis of the national context of the partner country. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the establishment of the respective new refugee regime.

The EU–Jordan Compact (2016)

The EU–Jordan Compact aims to increase the share of Syrian DPs in formal employment and to make them agents of development. Accordingly, the Compact was to create 200,000 additional jobs for Syrians without detrimental effects on the job situation for Jordanians. Subsequently, Syrians got permission to apply for work permits, but only for a limited number of sectors (farming, construction or manufacturing). These are the sectors where they mostly compete with labour migrants from North Africa or South-East Asia and not with Jordanians (Grawert, 2019c). The European Union provided the Jordanian government with financial assistance to create these additional jobs and used this as a lever towards intensifying economic cooperation and trade
liberalisation. In 2018, a relaxation of criteria and the extension of preferential trade relations to 2030 were agreed upon (Grawert, 2019a). Other adaptations to the Compact referred to work permits: Work permits for all jobs open to non-Jordanians were now granted independent of individual employers in agriculture and construction, where seasonal work is very frequent, and fees were waived (Grawert, 2019a).

Three years into the Compact, neither the targeted employment numbers nor the inclusion of a sufficient number of Jordanian companies into preferential trade agreements have been achieved. Only four companies qualified for the relaxed trade regime, and they together employed less than 300 Syrian refugees. Only the number of work permits issued in total is known, but as this figure includes both first permits and many extensions, the total number of Syrians who have been granted a work permit is unknown.

Reasons for the slow onset of any effect lie in the design of the Compact: Two-thirds of the products which Jordan exports are excluded from the deal, and those that are part of it are not competitive internationally (Grawert, 2019a). Moreover, companies failed to become eligible for the relaxation of the trade regime as one condition was to employ at least 30 per cent Jordanians, whereas most workers in the designated economic zones are immigrants. The Compact also ignored the realities of the Jordanian labour market, namely that it is stratified into a formal economy that mainly consists of the huge public sector that provides employment for most Jordanians and the migrant and informal economies. The Compact did not succeed in breaking up this structure (Grawert, 2019c).

Highly-skilled Syrians (often in medicine, education or business management) are not allowed to work in these professions in Jordan. For them, working in a factory in the designated economic zones, far from their families and for low pay is not attractive. Many prefer to work in the informal economy where they do not have to pay for a work permit and insurance. Despite work permits, the conditions of formal employment are not necessarily better than in informal jobs. Wages are low, social security and labour rights are often not granted, especially in the designated zones. For women, living in dormitories close to the factories or travelling long distances to work every day is even less of an option. They prefer to run small home-based businesses. However, a regulation in 2017 which aimed to include informal trades into the formal economy criminalised these home-businesses, which resulted in the fact that small entrepreneurs have since faced a constant threat of shutdown, fines or being relocated to camps as a punishment, ultimately having to rely on humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the Compact did not consider that a large number of displaced Syrians (different from labour migrants) are either not of working age or not fit for work, because many suffered from trauma, illnesses or disabilities. The need for medical and psychological treatment among the refugee population was underestimated and the assumptions about the share of ‘ready-to-work’ refugees too high. The goal to increase the number of Syrians in formal employment has eclipsed the aim to improve working conditions.

Take-away 1: The design and preparation of the EU–Jordan Compact did not include an assessment of the needs, priorities, skills and capacities of the Syrian DPs, but was driven by an interest of EU member states and the Jordanian government to conclude a deal with mutual benefits. The inclusion and participation of the main target groups (Syrian refugees and Jordanian employers) could have led to a more realistic basis for decision-making and taken into account the needs and vulnerabilities, skills and priorities of the DPs as well as the nature of the Jordanian labour market.

Take-away 2: With its focus on having Syrian refugees in formal employment, the Compact introduced a preferential treatment of Syrians over labour migrants from other countries. This created disadvantages and grievances on the side of the latter. The related attempt to formalise small businesses shut down a vital livelihood option for Syrian women. A more systems-based, inclusive context analysis conducted beforehand would have helped to avoid such harmful implications.
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) Pilot Tanzania

Tanzania has received a great number of refugees since independence and used to be a safe haven for refugees from Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa and Burundi for decades. After the change in government in 2015, the new president advocated for a stronger focus on regional alliances and independence from Western donors. As the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the CRRF aim to ease the pressure on receiving countries by a multi-stakeholder approach and improved refugee self-reliance, both Tanzania and Uganda volunteered to become CRRF implementation pilot countries. The way the CRRF and GRC were announced raised high expectations among refugee-receiving countries, as they were presented as the ‘New Deal’ for better burden-sharing. However, there was little substance behind these claims, as both the Framework and the Compact are non-binding (Rudolf, 2019a). Claims to follow a whole-of-society approach were juxtaposed by the de facto lack of consultation with the lower levels of government. “Local, district and regional authorities—those who respond to refugees on a daily basis” (Thomas, 2017, p. 70) were left out, as well as refugees themselves. According to observers, there was no “truly open dialogue” i.e. without power asymmetries, and the different starting points and interests of the negotiating partners were not acknowledged (Rudolf, 2019a).

A dispute about payments for the naturalisation programme had preceded the CRRF pilot phase. The Tanzanian government expected financial support from international donors who rejected the claim because the government had not yet fulfilled agreed-upon conditions. The clear stance adopted by the Tanzanian government on receiving a debt reduction was ignored when the World Bank offered a loan to cover the cost of the refugee protection in the country. Tanzanian officials repeatedly stressed that they saw refugee protection as an international responsibility and were not willing to take a loan to pay for it (Rudolf, 2019a). Not only the Tanzanian government, but even UN officials perceived the communication about terms and the implementation of the GCR and CRRF to be top-down and very rigid, leaving no space for feedback or modification. Indications for a lack of commitment of the Tanzanian government to the CRRF process were ignored (Rudolf, 2019a). The ‘dialogue’ between the Tanzanian government and the UN failed to agree on the goals of CRRF implementation in Tanzania. Due to perceived contradictions between domestic political goals and the CRRF, the Tanzanian government became disillusioned with the process. In early 2018, the government of Tanzania declared its decision to withdraw from the CRRF implementation process. At the time of writing, Tanzania was the only country that had taken this decision.

The way the international community treated the government of Tanzania linked the refugee issue inside Tanzania to questions of national sovereignty that the government then defended against international paternalism. This political issue contributed to the rise of anti-refugee sentiment in Tanzania, thus counteracting the aim of refugee protection. Moreover, the CRRF focused on the situation in the refugee camps and disregarded urban self-settled refugees. Rather than combating the discrimination of refugees, the process curbed the freedom of movement for refugees and eliminated the legal grey zone that allowed self-settled urban DPs an existence outside of the restricted camp settings (Rudolf, 2019a).

Take-away 1: Interventions (including those at the highest levels like the CRRF) need to analyse and consider the socio-structural context, e.g. understandings and practices of local integration, the different settings refugees find themselves in and to anticipate how the intervention may impact on each group of DPs including self-settled and irregular ones.

Take-away 2: International dialogues on refugee protection need to take conflicts of interest between receiving and non-receiving countries seriously. Negotiations need to aim for true participation, especially of the most concerned. While the language of the Compacts, as well as the New York Declaration, emphasises a multi-stakeholder and whole-of-society approach, the preparatory negotiations regarding the implementation process lacked those elements.
Conclusion

Our findings on the questions when and under what conditions DPs are protected and how and when their (re)integration is successful indicate that context and framework conditions play an essential role. The understanding of agency applied throughout this research, which includes a person’s positionality and thus individual exposure to larger social and structural constraints as factors that influence the ability to act, allowed us to combine the analysis of livelihood and coping strategies with that of processes of exclusion and marginalisation that DPs are exposed to. Despite remarkable resilience and—often—the support and solidarity by receiving communities, most displaced persons are unable to overcome the impacts of forced displacement due to unfavourable framework conditions and systematic legal and political exclusion. Most DPs, returnees and marginalised local residents suffering from a lack of or highly volatile access to basic livelihood-sustaining resources also suffer from social and political exclusion and tend to be cut-off from international assistance. Different dimensions of (non-)access are entangled with each other and add up to multiple exclusions. These findings confirm that the deprivation from one asset can never be seen in isolation from other deprivations, as has been conceived in the notion of access as a ‘bundle of powers’ and as being structured by power relations, which has been included in the analytical framework of this project. (Re)integration, and even de facto (re)integration can, therefore, not just be seen as an attribute of an individual or a state to be achieved by an individual. It is highly dependent on the context, which includes a lot more than simply (un-)available resources and services: It entails the entire social and political framework e.g. of fragmented land rights, political inertia, power struggles over access, etc. Because a lot of protracted displacement crises occur in already poor and marginalised areas, displaced persons share experiences of exclusion, hardship and lack of rights with many of the local residents, who are citizens but equally not integrated. These structural framework conditions of protracted displacement are in fact a field in which development cooperation can achieve a lot in improving livelihood options and chances for sustainable reintegration. Our research highlighted examples, for example in Uganda, where thanks to assistance that was made available to DPs and local residents and targeted towards establishing long-term structures to improve the availability of public services, living conditions of the local population have improved, which at the same time helps to foster supportive inter-group relations. Thus, guided by the aim to widen people’s options and with an eye to supporting established livelihood strategies and fostering good community relations, development cooperation can make a big difference.

Similarly, upon return, the framework conditions and how they will affect an individual’s safety and livelihood options upon return form the main basis for decision-making. Displaced persons interviewed in neighbouring countries of their country of origin for this project described how they first fled their homes when impacts of violence and fighting started to affect them and their families directly (hoping to be able to return soon) but left the country when hope for return vanished and survival became increasingly difficult as IDPs due to a lack of livelihood opportunities and perspectives. For return and (re)integration to be sustainable, the following needs to be kept in mind: People should be allowed to wait until not only until the immediate causes to escape (such as armed fighting, forced recruitment by armed actors, an oppressive and violent regime) have changed but also until the framework conditions allow a decent livelihood, which is a complex and long-term process that can, again, be supported by development cooperation.

Approaches to fostering self-reliance of displaced persons should also aim to overcome the distinction between local integration and reintegration—classically considered two different durable solutions—and to lift the multiple constraints that prevent people from building strong and resilient trans-local networks, for instance especially constraints on people’s legal mobility and opportunities of making a living.
The social context of displacement and return, and social relations in general, have emerged as common themes across all aspects of protracted displacement discussed in this Report. There has been little research on the impact of forced displacement on social relations, and where it exists, it focusses on interactions and relations between DPs and receiving societies, not on the dynamics within these communities, or between returnees and those who stayed behind (Berry & Roberts, 2018). Equally, the influence of social context and social relations on the livelihood of the displaced have not been studied systematically. The data that was collected in the context of this project can be summed up in two broad strands:

1) Rather than assuming the existence of pre-defined social groups and studying their interactions or figurations, one needs to acknowledge that “the displaced” as well as “receiving communities” or societies (and equally returnees and stayees) are in most cases politically, socio-economically, ethnically and legally (in terms of legal entitlements) fragmented and diverse. Identities and abroad. Local integration and reintegration are, in fact, not mutually exclusive at all, as successful local integration is the best precondition for successful reintegration or the establishment of a trans-local approach to sustaining one’s livelihood.

Attempts to open up migration channels for refugees reach back quite a few years. In 2008, a discussion paper prepared for UNHCR suggested that refugees could be “admitted to migrant worker and immigration programmes” (UNHCR, 2008, quoted in Long, 2014, p. 479). Similarly, a suggestion that resettlement states could open parallel channels for “suitably qualified refugees” was made in the context of Annual Tripartite Consultations on resettlement in Geneva. However, so far these initiatives—even though strongly backed by research indicating the importance of migration and mobility as a livelihood strategy of displaced persons—have remained on paper (Long, 2014, p. 479). The Global Refugee Compact, which also emphasises the importance of opening up channels for legal migration, has a new opportunity to follow this up with concrete actions (Box 2).

Circular processes of recurring violence and forced displacement have become frequent. Development aid, therefore, needs to adjust its planning regarding the duration and instruments of programmes accordingly.

Protracted displacement requires long-term approaches, and the traditional bilateral framework needs to be complemented by intensified multilateral and multi-stakeholder cooperation with international humanitarian actors and transition assistance (Übergangs-hilfe) while the triple nexus of humanitarian—development—peace needs to be strengthened.

Reconciliation and the rule of law have been identified as important prerequisites for reintegration. Accordingly, reconciliation efforts and programmes strengthening the rule of law need to be linked up more closely to reintegration measures.

A holistic approach that includes receiving communities, stayees and returnees and, where applicable, ex-combatants and civilian victims of war avoids exclusion, doing harm and social tension. Trajectories, needs and vulnerabilities of refugees, IDPs, migrants and other mobile population groups overlap as their status changes frequently.

The presence of displaced persons in camps needs to be strictly limited to a few months before being either transferred to settlements, other sites of (partial) local integration or any durable solution. Aid must be delivered along an area/needs-based approach rather than a vulnerability approach that positively discriminates beneficiaries (e.g. based on the criteria of vulnerability or gender).

Analysis and aid projects must address displacement as a regional and cross-border challenge. Projects need to take multiple movements, repeated border crossings of displaced persons as well as spill over effects of political events in the region into account. Any aid measures in situations of protracted displacement need to be contextualised to avoid unintended consequences.

Dependencies need to be prevented and resilience strengthened by building upon existing capacities and livelihood strategies. To identify these, empirical bottom-up assessment and studies that reach beyond the group of beneficiaries are necessary. Focussing exclusively on vulnerabilities is detrimental to fostering capacities, assets, networks and transnational options of displaced persons.

Box 2

General recommendations for development action in displacement situations

1. Circular processes of recurring violence and forced displacement have become frequent. Development aid, therefore, needs to adjust its planning regarding the duration and instruments of programmes accordingly.
2. Protracted displacement requires long-term approaches, and the traditional bilateral framework needs to be complemented by intensified multilateral and multi-stakeholder cooperation with international humanitarian actors and transition assistance (Übergangs-hilfe) while the triple nexus of humanitarian—development—peace needs to be strengthened.
3. Reconciliation and the rule of law have been identified as important prerequisites for reintegration. Accordingly, reconciliation efforts and programmes strengthening the rule of law need to be linked up more closely to reintegration measures.
4. A holistic approach that includes receiving communities, stayees and returnees and, where applicable, ex-combatants and civilian victims of war avoids exclusion, doing harm and social tension. Trajectories, needs and vulnerabilities of refugees, IDPs, migrants and other mobile population groups overlap as their status changes frequently.
5. The presence of displaced persons in camps needs to be strictly limited to a few months before being either transferred to settlements, other sites of (partial) local integration or any durable solution. Aid must be delivered along an area/needs-based approach rather than a vulnerability approach that positively discriminates beneficiaries (e.g. based on the criteria of vulnerability or gender).
6. Analysis and aid projects must address displacement as a regional and cross-border challenge. Projects need to take multiple movements, repeated border crossings of displaced persons as well as spill over effects of political events in the region into account. Any aid measures in situations of protracted displacement need to be contextualised to avoid unintended consequences.
7. Dependencies need to be prevented and resilience strengthened by building upon existing capacities and livelihood strategies. To identify these, empirical bottom-up assessment and studies that reach beyond the group of beneficiaries are necessary. Focussing exclusively on vulnerabilities is detrimental to fostering capacities, assets, networks and transnational options of displaced persons.
group interactions are dynamic: Armed conflicts, living apart or living in different social and cultural surroundings for a long time change boundaries, identity narratives and perceptions, ways of being perceived, as well as values and behaviours, thereby adding to pre-existing boundaries. Group identities and their boundaries need to be established empirically in each context, and it needs to be acknowledged that they are dynamic and subject to change over time.

Social and inter-group relations have a major impact on livelihood options during protracted displacement and return. In a positive sense, they are often mediated by pre-existing community ties or a history of displacement of the local residents, thus depend very much on where displaced people settle within a country. In a negative sense, livelihood options can easily be overshadowed by political events, economic hardships or unequal access to opportunities or aid. While the perspective of the established-outsider figuration opened up relevant research avenues, especially regarding mutual and self-perceptions and general interaction patterns between and within groups, the contexts under study were too large and too complex to narrow the reasons for power differentials between groups down to a single factor like social cohesion (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019). Patterns of established-outsider figurations were usually overlaid and coincided with other boundary-creating factors, like income inequalities or legal status differences.
Annex

Historical emergence of protracted displacement in the context of the changing refugee regime

The international refugee regime, and with it the concept of the three durable solutions, emerged against the background of the two World Wars in Europe. However, the way refugees are treated under it has undergone paradigmatic shifts in previous decades. In Europe’s inter-war phase, between 1922 and 1938, the League of Nations issued “stateless persons passports” that became known as Nansen passports to facilitate migration of otherwise stateless and trapped displaced persons, initially to stateless persons of Russian origin, later also to Armenian, Assyrian and Turkish refugees. By 1938, the Nansen passport was recognised by 52 states and had been issued to some 450,000 people. ILO was actively supporting refugees providing vocational training and facilitating employment opportunities after World War I (Barbelet & Wake, 2017, p. 20).

After the end of World War II, the number of displaced people was the largest throughout the 20th century. Only five per cent of those registered as refugees after World War II, however, returned to where they had fled from; the International Refugee Organisation, and after 1951 the newly founded UN Refugee Agency UNHCR, focussed on finding resettlement options in third countries for them (Kleist, 2015). According to UNHCR’s statute, its task was to seek “permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments […] to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities”.

During the Cold War, influential Western countries continued to practice generous resettlement programmes according to their foreign policy interests so that in many cases, countries of first asylum were happy to accommodate refugees, since they knew that in most cases this would be of a temporary nature (Gottwald, 2014, p. 531). Western countries generally granted asylum as a right to permanent residency (Bradley, 2013, p. 1; Jacobsen, 2001). In the African context, local integration was less commonly supported, but self-settlement was widely permitted, without assistance but also without any constraints (Jacobsen, 2001), people fleeing from armed struggles against colonialism and Apartheid experienced a lot of solidarity (Rutinwa, 2002). When wars were over, voluntary return as a right and as a choice was quite commonly practiced until around 3.5 million DPs returned within Africa before and during the 1970s (Rogge, 1991).

UNHCR assisted countries with large refugee inflows upon their request. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees lifted the geographical (on persons displaced from within Europe) and temporal (on persons displaced before 1951) restrictions of the Geneva Convention (White, 2019, p. 108), and the Convention became potentially globally applicable. Even though the problem of territorial access to countries offering asylum and safety for refugees was well-known, a regulation on territorial access to asylum suggested in the same year was never adopted. Due to this gap in refugee law, the principle of non-refoulement (forbidding the return of people seeking protection to any country where they could be at risk of persecution) that applies already at the border can be bypassed through externalised and outsourced border controls (Schmalz, 2017, p. 11f.). Also in the 1960s, the political separation of refugee and migrant identities became more clear, initially meant to ensure refugees’ humanitarian protection, but in practice rather constrained their mobility (Long, 2014, p. 480).

During the 1970s and 1980s, the prolonged conflicts in Indochina, Afghanistan, Central America, the Horn of Africa, and southern Africa displaced millions; the global refugee population tripled from three to ten millions between 1977 and 1982 (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 7). In the 1970s, protracted refugee crises became a tangible phenomenon of global proportions (Milner & Loescher, 2011). Due to rising numbers of refugees and economic recession, Western states went for more restrictive refugee policies, and many countries of first asylum followed their model in a downward spiral of mutual non-compliance with international principles (Gottwald, 2014, p. 531). With the end of the Cold War, the global context changed significantly. Conflicts became increasingly protracted, more governments failed in their protective roles to uphold the rights of citizens or even
became actively involved in causing displacements of their own citizens, and the motivation of displaced persons to return decreased (Rogge, 1991). At the same time, refugees’ movements increasingly mixed with migration movements, and refugees had lost their role as a geopolitical ‘bargaining chip’. The willingness to receive refugees decreased globally starting from the Global North, the legitimacy or genuineness of their claims was increasingly questioned, a refugee status became more difficult to attain, easier to lose and involved ever more restrictions (Chimni, 1999).

Due to the lack of any international regulation on sharing the burden and responsibility for refugees between states, the withdrawal of the Global North meant that ever-larger numbers of refugees were concentrated in countries with limited protection capacities, which were not able avoid this responsibility easily due to geographical proximity to armed conflicts: Camps and situations of protracted displacement emerged (Schmalz, 2017). After the end of the Cold War, countries of the Global North started to redefine their share of the “burden” and increased active peacemaking and peacebuilding interventions with the aim to solve or prevent displacement to the Global South, however, without reflecting on their own role regarding structural causes of war and displacement (Gottwald, 2014, p. 531). Since around 1985, so-called voluntary repatriation became the favored “solution” by refugee receiving countries and UNHCR, who in 1992 declared the “decade of voluntary repatriation”. Having shifted towards promoting return, its voluntariness, which is enshrined in the legal principle of non-refoulement and part of the Geneva Convention, was more and more eroded. Receiving countries in the Global North started to create conditions under which return was meant to look more attractive than to stay; assessments about the safety of return issued by receiving countries’ authorities do not include assessments of the displaced persons themselves, and objective criteria for “voluntariness” have never been established (Grawert, 2018).

On the one hand, UNHCR gained legitimacy to expand its focus of work into areas of reintegration and developmental requirements for it (Macrae, 1999), but the emphasis on return as preferred durable solution came at the cost of local integration (Jacobson, 2001; Chimni, 1999), which has become more restricted, leading to the creation of refugee camps and restriction on refugees’ freedom of movement and possibilities to integrate locally since the late 1980s (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 4). The decade of voluntary repatriation, accordingly, resulted in large-scale repatriations of refugees (around nine million between 1991 and 1996 according to UNHCR data quoted in Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 7), often before the causes of displacement had been overcome. As a result, many returnees ended up internally displaced or had to flee again (Black, 2006). Accordingly, in the early 2000s, protracted refugee crises became more prominent on the international and UNHCR agenda. Individual receiving countries moved away from the practice of “isolated and insecure refugee camps” towards more local integration (Milner & Loescher, 2011), academics tried to revive the “forgotten solution” of local integration (for example Jacobsen, 2001), but in the context of the ‘global war on terror’ after 9-11 2001, refugees were increasingly framed as a security threat and viewed with suspicion (Hyndman & Giles, 2017), prolonging their status as outsiders and undermining such efforts in many places.

Looking at the causes of the increasing number and extent of protracted displacement crises, one for sure is the changed nature and protracted nature of conflicts today. Conflicts today last a lot longer on average than they did a few decades back, around 13 years, and they have no clear beginning or end. They erupt again and again, even after a peace deal has been struck (CGD-IRC, 2017, p. vi). Therefore, return is not an option for a long time. The increased deliberate targeting of civilians also leads to more displacement (Bermudez Torres, 2005). However, the changed implementation of the international refugee regime just as important: The changed perception and reception of displaced people has created a regime of containment and suspicion instead of solidarity, especially in the Global North, but with far-reaching repercussions. Today, 88 per cent of refugees are received by low and middle-income countries, and around 76 per cent live outside of formal camp settings (CGD-IRC, 2017), often with private hosts or in communities. The constellation of poor receiving countries, UNHCR in charge of protecting refugees and providing them...
with material goods as a surrogate state but without being able to grant civil rights or any form of political participation, and rich countries that finance UNHCR as their main contribution to refugee protection means that refugees are turned into recipients of aid over long periods of time (Schmalz, 2017, p. 12) and is a major underlying cause for the longer duration of displacement. It provides the context against which receiving low-income countries resist and constrain local integration as a durable solution as obviously, from their perspective, discussions on local integration initiated by the Global North are part of established mechanisms to shift the burden and infringe on their sovereignty (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 6).

**Ethical guidelines applied in this project**

Research involving refugees and vulnerable populations pose particular ethical challenges. These include ethical considerations when developing the research designs, the relationship between research, practice and policy and the responsibility towards the people in the field. Research should neither be used to further a particular political standpoint nor to gather sensitive information for dubious purposes of governments or other bodies.

1. **Avoid causing harm**: Researchers have an ethical obligation to consider and assess the potential impact of their research and the dissemination of the results of their research on all persons directly or indirectly involved. They shall prevent and minimise any negative effects of research, which can increase people’s vulnerability to physical and psychosocial risks. The safety and dignity of all involved persons have the utmost priority.

2. **Respect protection principles**: Researchers must ensure that they do not harm the safety, dignity or privacy of people with whom they work, conduct research or who might reasonably be thought to be affected by their research. Coordination with local actors is a necessity.

3. **Accountability and transparency**: Research should be transparent regarding the purposes, potential impacts and sources of support for research projects with relevant parties affected by the research. Researchers must determine in advance whether their providers of information wish to remain anonymous or receive recognition and make every effort to comply with these wishes. All data gathered while conducting field research must be protected and preserved.

4. **Voluntary and informed consent**: Researchers should obtain the voluntary and informed consent of persons or communities being studied in advance. This means that a person’s decision to participate in research is to be based on sufficient information about and adequate understanding of the proposed research, its purposes and methods and the implications of participation in it.

5. **Agreement of the participants**: The agreement of the participants in participatory methods is essential. The process of organising consent will vary according to the community, culture, and possibly by the nature of the crisis. In some cases, consent may be needed from more than one actor, e.g. village chiefs or councils, camp managers, government officials or parents. In organising consent, be prepared that some communities may not agree to take part in the participatory methods.

6. **Respect and professionalism**: Researchers should endeavour to respect the culture and customs of the communities and countries they are working in. Moreover, they should maintain respectful and ethical professional relationships with the people interviewed and support their empowerment and participation rather than treat them only as objects of research. An open learning and sharing attitude should be maintained at all times.

7. **Unbiased research**: Researchers should be aware of any possible bias of their own and others concerning gender, ethnicity, ability, religion, geographical location, class/caste and sexual orientation, among others. The diverse make-up of groups shall be recognised and given proper attention. A reflection upon their significance for the research process is mandatory.

---

12 The guidelines developed within the project “Protected rather than protracted—Strengthening refugees and peace” are based on different ethical guidelines for field research: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies & ICRC, 1994; American Anthropological Association, 2009; Burke & Eichler, 2006; Actionaid, 2010.
Box 3

Project publications

Working Papers

- Rudolf, M. (forthcoming). Share the burden or pass it on - Telling narratives of local integration. International Migration, Special Issue, Eds: Ferris, E & Martin, S.

Policy Briefs and Knowledge Note


# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCR</td>
<td>Global Compact on Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Protracted displacement situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Protracted refugee situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


The study has been facilitated by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as part of the research project “Protected rather than protracted. Strengthening refugees and peace”. All views expressed in the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to BMZ or any other institution or person.