Peace policy implications of maritime re-armament

By Jan Grebe and Christoph Schwarz

The world’s oceans are of vital importance for the security, welfare, and development of numerous states. Free maritime trade is imperative for a free exchange of goods and natural resources and thus an important factor for economic development. European countries are increasingly aware of the strategic importance of free sea routes, but rising powers are making sure that naval forces are becoming more and more prominent in the strategic makeup of their security and defense policy. Generally, it seems that the world is on the brink of a “maritime century”, which will have a significant impact on German and European security.¹

While in the framework of NATO and the European Union, the United States, Germany and other European allies—despite the downsizing of their maritime capacities—search to increase the protection of their security interests not only on land, some rising powers are newcomers to the world’s oceans. Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, for instance, are using their economic strength, which they have gained in recent years, to adapt their naval forces to the challenges and threats of the 21st century: a tightening of resources, pirates who increasingly threaten maritime transportation routes, and growing overlaps of national interests. Their strategies range from securing territorial waters to regional and global power projection on the world’s oceans.

How to evaluate the new risks and dynamics of maritime armament? Are NATO and EU-countries to adapt their own maritime capacities to these developments, or is there room for a new maritime security architecture? (...)

Different paths for preventing conflict and promoting peace can be chosen, which European countries including Germany should actively support:

Growing military capacities of the rising powers should be integrated into areas where there are reciprocal security interests and where joint cooperative structures can be created. One obvious example in this context is the anti-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa. India and China as possible formal and equal partners could contribute even more than they do presently. Beyond concrete response to dangers, this could contribute to building trust, which in turn could lay the foundation for a more intensive future cooperation and, in the long run, could contribute to the control and disarmament of maritime potentials. One starting point could be the participation of China and India in the annual Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Event (SHADE), which offers the chance for an exchange of information in view of the fight against pirates in the Horn of Africa.

Re-armament always increases the risk of a military escalation. It is true that it would be highly desirable to achieve as much global global maritime disarmament as possible. Yet, presently, this seems to be unlikely in view of the motives of the rising powers such as the protection of vital trade routes and maritime borders as well as power projection and the use of the navy as a diplomatic tool. Despite earlier sobering experiences with maritime arms control efforts, a first step could be an initiative for an agreement which aims at a global maritime arms control regime. In view of necessary savings in arms procurement, the US, too, should at least show some interest in such a process. The European states, and particularly Germany, could be the initiators of such an agreement, as the free use of the oceans is a fundamental interest to them and they are not directly party to territorial conflicts such as in Asia. By suggesting a maritime arms control regime of global significance, the preference for multilateral action incorporated in German foreign and security policy could be underlined.

Such an initiative must be accompanied by measures that address the motives for re-armament directly. In contrast, the US, Germany, and the EU only have limited military means

to contribute to the solution of existing territorial conflicts, such as the still unresolved border conflict between China and India. Irrespective of the fact that they are increasingly being handled in a pragmatic manner, these conflicts still carry the risk of a military intervention. The EU, and Germany as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in particular, ought to advocate the recognition of the international weight of Brazil, India, China and South Africa within the framework of the United Nations. This is an interesting approach; not only against the backdrop of the rugged Asian security architecture, which so far has hardly been able to contribute to the containment of the security dilemma in the region. An institutional cooperation between the European Union, the United States and the IBSA-dialogue forum would be an important step in the right direction.

With their exports, the European Union and NATO countries play an important part in the maritime re-armament of the rising nations, except for China. A detailed examination of the arms export standards, which also includes the comprehensive technology transfer in the case of India and Brazil, is the main task for EU member states in view of the danger of arms races and military confrontations. Short-term mutual interests in armament cooperation must not block the view of the long-term substantial direct and indirect risk potential of arms and arms technology exports.


Extract from “Die maritime Aufrüstung der Schwellenländer: Strategische und friedenspolitische Implikationen” (translated into English)
German information service: Laenderberichte

Whoever is looking for information on the situation in recipient countries of German arms exports will find it at www.ruestungsexport.info. A categorization of 170 countries according to the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports is provided alongside detailed country reports on security, armament and development in recipient countries of German arms exports (in German). This information service, which is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) allows an informed assessment of the effects of German arms exports on the security situation and improves the basis of information in the discussion about German arms exports.

Besides already existing 21 country reports, six further reports will be made available in March on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ecuador, Peru, Serbia, Ukraine, and Vietnam. In the updated version, criterion 8 of the EU Code of Conduct—the reconciliation of armament and development—will be reworked and complemented by further indicators for evaluation.

BICC’s Global Militarization Index (GMI), which shows the importance of state military apparatuses in relation to the whole society, will also be included. The GMI compares, for example, a country’s military expenditure with its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its expenditure on medical care. It contrasts the total number of military and paramilitary forces in a country with the number of doctors. Finally, it studies the number of heavy weapons available to a country’s armed forces. These and other indicators are used to determine a country’s ranking, which in turn makes it possible to measure the respective level of militarization in comparison to other countries.

Additionally, both the new and existing country reports (to be found at www.ruestungsexport.info) will contain a chapter on the role of the police and other security forces in the respective countries. The GMI is not concerned therefore with whether a country is “militaristic”, but with a description of the situation in that country based on figures. This makes it an ideal instrument for analysis.

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Commercial security practices in development countries

Commercial security affects a number of development-related factors, such as the capacity of states to govern, overall feelings of public safety, economic growth and social welfare. Findings from field research in Timor-Leste, Liberia and Peru conducted within the BICC-project “Commercial security practices in development countries” between 2010 and 2011 indicate that the relation between commercial security and development is highly ambivalent. The research was funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

BICC brief 45 (upcoming end December 2011) contributes to an emerging body of literature, which seeks to shed light on the role and impact of private security industries in comparatively poor societies of the Global South. An important argument of this brief is that the phenomenon of commercial security forces us to reconsider some of the contentions underlying the so-called ‘security–development nexus’. The provision of security does not always and necessarily promote development efforts. Especially the commercialization of security services may well—under particular circumstances—run the risk of undermining some of the stated goals of a given development policy.

Security markets can foster economic growth and ease the burden on the back of the public security sector. Nevertheless, weak regulation of commercial security practices has created problems. These include low-level conflicts between public and private security providers over policing authorities in particular surroundings. Moreover, a trend toward the corporatization of private guarding has engendered extremely exploitative labor relations in the security industry. In the worst case, security firms may even commit frequent human rights abuses, thereby directly undermining any wider sense of security in society. From a development-policy perspective, these findings are all the more pertinent, since international development organizations themselves are often the largest customers of security companies.

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BICC Notes

Peter Croll was invited by the Institute of West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), which is part of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), to visit them in Peking as one of his stops during his travels to China from 13 to 20 September 2011.

The BICC-Director also visited more leading research institutes, such as the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the China Institute of International Studies as well as the Center for African Studies.

The aim of these travels was to open up new cooperation partnerships between BICC and the Chinese organizations.

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Within the framework of the BICC project on “Socio-economic consequences of Chinese oil investments in South Sudan,” Elke Grawert and Christine Andrä have been conducting fieldwork and interviews in Juba, Malakal and sites located within the oil exploitation area of Petrodar Operating Company in Upper Nile state. They are cooperating with ECOS and local researchers from the University of Juba. The research is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

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On 28 September 2011, BICC, together with the Heinrich Böll Foundation, organized an expert roundtable on the Kimberley Process (KP) and Marange diamonds in Zimbabwe. Panelists were Mike Davis (Global Witness), Machinda Marongwe (Zimbabwean national NGO umbrella organization NANGO), and Farai Maguwu (Executive Director of the Centre for Research and Development). In the discussion, moderated by Lili Fuhr of Heinrich Böll Foundation, it emerged that the KP has proven incapable of dealing effectively with the situation at Marange. Such general problems of the KP could be overcome by an enlarged definition of conflict diamonds that includes violence by armed state actors.

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On 8 to 9 December, BICC organized a workshop on “Terrorism and Radicalization” in Bonn. The workshop was part of the joint research project TERAS-INDEX, coordinated by IFSH (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg). The project is funded by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF). BICC conducts a subproject on foreign affairs and security politics of European states in the Middle East.

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