Global and Regional Agreements on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Control
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written by
Mike Bourne (Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, UK) and the TRESA team
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List of Icons for TRESA modules

The following icons will be used in the text. These are intended as pointers for actions the trainer or trainee should take while using the text.

**Activity**
Indicates some sort of group activity, exercise, discussion, division into separate smaller groups, etc.

**Case study**
Two types of case studies are indicated here:
- Case studies which are required (later text refers to the case, and therefore the case study must be used). These are indicated by an "R".
- Case studies that are optional (trainers can use a similar case study they might be more familiar with, as the same lessons are drawn).

**Essential point**
Main points that the trainees *must* remember from the training.

**Formal quote**
Written or pictographic material that is a quote from some other source (e.g.: UN declaration, national law) and cannot be changed or modified.

**Outside reference**
An arrow pointing to some outside source, for example, another module.
Tag
This indicates an element of the module that the trainer must be careful to modify to fit the audience.

- L: Linguistic usage. Where the text uses a particular expression that might not translate well from one language to another.
- C: Cultural usage. Where the text uses examples from one culture that might be misunderstood in another.
- S: Social usage. Where a text is aimed at a particular audience (example, parliament members) and must be modified to fit another audience (example, military people).

Take a break
Breathe some fresh air, relax, have a cup of coffee, ...

Technical device
Trainer must ensure the availability of some technical device: a computer with presentation software, an OHP, a film projector, puppets, ...

Tool
A film, a form or questionnaire, theatrical performance, etc., that accompany the module but are not part of it. Most are downloadable from www.tresa-online.org

Trainer preparation required
The trainer must make some special preparation (prepare notes or labels, assemble material, collate material for distribution).
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Trainer Preface

This training module is intended for government officials, legislators, NGO project managers and coordinators, administrators and civil society activists who have a general understanding of SALW issues. However, it is anticipated that these participants will either have little to no knowledge of global and regional measures for SALW control and are thus unfamiliar with the existing agreements for tackling the small arms issues at the national, regional and global levels.

The objectives of this module are:

- To introduce the SALW problem.
- To familiarize trainees with global and regional agreements on SALW control.
- To provide a general background for making policy decisions on SALW issues.

After completing the module, trainees should be able to:

- Base their work on the political and legal framework provided by global and regional agreements for tackling the small arms problem.
- Influence national policy decisions on SALW or apply pressure on their governments to commit to existing global and regional measures for SALW control.

**Trainer preparation – 3 days**

In order to deliver an effective and well-organized training session, some advance preparation will be needed. As you read through this module, take note of the ‘trainer preparation required’ icon we have included to identify those issues and exercises that may require some advance work. In particular, there are a number of issues where changes are currently taking place, and where the information in this module will need to be updated on a semi-regular basis. This includes:

- Update on the draft Arms Trade Treaty (Sections 1, 2)
- Update on the new marking and tracing instrument (Section 2)
- Update on the proposed brokering instrument (Section 2)
- Update on membership to the Firearms Protocol (Section 2)
- Update on membership to the SADC Protocol (Section 3)
- Update on membership to the Nairobi Protocol (Section 3)
- Update on membership to the OAS Convention (Section 3)
- Update on the draft ECOWAS Convention (Section 3)

We also recommend that you perform some of the exercises on your own prior to the training session to better prepare and assist your trainees. These exercises, along with others requiring advance preparation, include:
We recommend that you begin by reading through this entire module, comparing it as you go with the corresponding trainee manual. This will give you a sense of what the trainees will be provided, as well as areas of the training where you will be required to add value. If you are new to the topic, please make sure that you understand the underlying issues by reading some of the recommended texts within the body of this module or in the bibliography. Through ‘Trainer Note’ boxes on the left-hand side of the page, we also offer additional information, guidelines and possible answers for discussion questions. Please note that these are recommendations only and open to modification according to your experience and the level of your trainee group. If you have alternative ideas or methods for training a particular section as well, please feel free to explore them.

Remember: all the material presented in this module is to be used only as a guideline for the substance and organization of your training.

Please also feel free to:

- Change the sequence of the sections or sub-sections.
- Add material or leave out certain parts.

We strongly advise that you do not rely too heavily on the written order and structure of this module, as this might lead to a rather static training that can be counterproductive to your goals. Instead, we encourage you to be as flexible and target-group oriented as possible.

Among other things, there is a copy of the UN Programme of Action (UN PoA) in the Annex of this module, and links to all relevant global and regional agreements have been provided below. While it is not necessary for you to review all agreements prior to the training session, we recommend that you read through the PoA and the regional agreement most relevant to the trainees’ background or the area where you will be training. We also recommend that you reproduce the relevant agreements and distribute them to the trainees at the start of the training session.

**UN PoA**: http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html
**UN Firearms Protocol**: http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/18-12_c_E.doc
**Regional Agreements** can be accessed via the Small Arms Survey (SAS) resources website: http://www.smallarmsurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm
**National reports** providing updates on the status of PoA implementation can also be accessed at the UN DDA’s website: http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-nationalreports.html

Finally, please note that the national and regional origin of trainees is an important factor to take into account. As such, we recommend that you read the appropriate regional sections of the “Biting the Bullet” reports on implementation of the UN Programme of Action (PoA) to better relate the material to each regional context.
The most up-to-date report is entitled “International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action” and can be accessed at http://www.iansa.org/un/bms2005/red-book.htm. This is an independent global source of information and contains regional overviews, national case studies and detailed tables on SALW action in over 180 countries – many of which do not have a national report available – including updates on the implementation of all relevant agreements. For additional background, you may also wish to refer to the previous report published in 2003 at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/iac/IANSA_PoA_report.pdf. Both reports will provide you with invaluable examples and context for the delivery of this module in a particular country or region.

Depending on the knowledge of SALW issues of the trainee group, we recommend you to consider combining this module with TRESA modules SALW Basics-Definitions (SB-D05) and SALW Basics-Recognizing SALW and Ammunition (SB-R05). Details on a number of other crucial issues, such as the role of civil society, SALW collection programs, SALW and development, SALW destruction programs, and SALW transfers are dealt with in more depth in the following TRESA modules: Civil Society Action on Small Arms Control (CSA05); SALW and Development (SAD06); Management of Weapons and Ammunition Destruction Programs (MWA06); and SALW Transfers (SAT06). At the appropriate points in this module, you will be directed to these modules for your information or further training. All of these modules are available online at www.tresa-online.org.

In sum, we recommend that you set aside at least 2 days to review the above material, and at least 1 day to prepare for your training session. Use this time to adequately familiarize yourself with the issues at hand and to identify any questions you may have - it is likely that trainees will also have these questions. If your own research does not provide you with any answers, please feel free to contact the TRESA team at www.tresa-online.org.

Structure of the training

As the trainer, you are free to choose how to deliver this module based on the amount of time you have for training. The average time we recommend is 1.5 days; however, this can be shortened to 1 day or stretched out to 2 days. If you have less time than this, we recommend that you instead use the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs’ (UN DDA) PowerPoint presentation on the PoA at http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/PoA%20generic%20presents%20Xiayou%20chngs.ppt

For each exercise requiring group work, we have suggested the amount of time to allocate for group discussion followed by group presentations. Please note that these are guidelines only and will need to be adjusted according to your trainee group.

Using this module

This training module is intended to provide you, the trainer, with the necessary information and resources on global and regional agreements on SALW.
Each section of this module should be considered independent of one another. This means that, based on the level, interest and objectives of your trainee audience, all of the sections do not need to be covered, delivered entirely or in the order presented. At the end of each section, we offer short summaries that are not necessary for you to include in your training, but rather may help to ensure that you’ve covered all the key points. In addition, we have included ample room in the trainee manuals for them to take notes – encourage them to make use of this resource and to follow your presentation along in their manuals. Trainee manuals are freely accessible online at www.tresa-online.org.

Please also note that all module abbreviations deliberately state only the first three letters (e.g. SB-D), as well the year in which the module was written (05), but not whether it is the A (trainer), or B (Trainee) version, or e.g. 01 (is the first version of this module, 02 the second, etc.). This is to emphasize that all our modules are works in progress, and will be regularly updated and modified (01, 02, 03, 04, etc).

**General training tips**

The following provides some general suggestions on how to run an effective training course. For a more detailed overview and additional ideas, we recommend that you review TRESA’s Train the Trainer Module (TtT06) available online at www.tresa-online.org.

At the beginning of the training course, it is important for you to establish some ground rules to be respected by everyone at all times. You might want to consider posting the following rules at the front of the class for everyone to see:

- Respect for time and punctuality.
- Respect for the views of the others.
- All participants have the same right to express their views, no matter whether they are old or young, male or female, which religion or nationality they have.
- Mobile phones need to be switched off during training sessions. In case a mobile phone does ring during class it should be handed over to you, the trainer, until the end of the day.
- No smoking during training sessions.
- No sleeping during training sessions.
- Trainees need to minimize movement when sessions are in progress.

For some trainee groups, it might be advisable to combine the written text with signs, e.g. a watch for “Respect for time and punctuality”.

**Note:** it is important to assure the trainees that everything they say will be treated as confidential and will not be made reference to outside the course. The training course should be a trustworthy environment and a safe haven, so invite the trainees to trust your confidentiality and encourage them to speak openly.
As we recommend a number of discussions during the course of this module, we suggest that you take the following points into consideration:

- **Make sure that the discussions do not get too heated** (quite often people come to this discussion with a distinct ideological position), and that latitude is given for everyone’s opinion.

- Ensure that **each and every individual has the opportunity to express his/her views** within the suggested timeframe of the exercises.

- If there is prolonged silence after you raise a question to the trainees or explain an exercise, it may be because your questions or instructions were not clear. Ask the trainees if they understand their task and try to re-phrase your questions/instructions in more simple terms.

- **Promote acceptance** of differing opinions and an understanding that individuals have different experiences in organizing or conceptualizing these sorts of problems. This is particularly important in mixed groups (men and women, people from different types of communities, people with different educational backgrounds, etc).

- Try to **hold back individuals who**, because of their personality or experience, **take over the discussion**. You can, for instance, establish a ground rule that no one speaks without raising their hand, and keep a mental count of individuals that are very active to ensure that their voice is not the only one heard.

- Try to **encourage shyer or quieter people to speak**, not by putting them on the spot, but rather by creating an informal and accepting environment in which they can feel confident. Circulate often during group work activities to listen for their contribution, and encourage them to later share this with the group if time and the subject matter permit. It is likely that shyer participants will feel more confident after having worked in smaller groups. Also, if groups are to present their work several times, make a rule that the presenter for each group should be a different person each time. That will encourage shyer participants to get involved in the general discussion.

**Note:** in some societies, certain individuals or groups do not dare to speak in front of their superiors, their elders or, often in the case of women, in front of men. If this is the case in your training session, try to engage these individuals as much as possible in your discussions. We would like you to keep gender and the trainees’ culture in mind while doing the exercises, though these two issues are not always easy to combine, especially in cultures where women have a certain status which is seen as below that of men. Please make note of any difficulties that may arise as a result of these issues and relay them to the TRESA team for consideration in future training sessions.

We wish you the best of luck and success in using this manual for your training.

We welcome any feedback or comments you might have.
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Centre for International Cooperation and Security at Bradford University, and in particular Mike Bourne for his contribution and efforts in developing this training module.

We would also like to thank Rosula Blanc for her creative design and illustration of the TRESA mascot, the Anteater.
Meet the Anteater, the TRESA mascot.

Much of the transfer of SALW occurs through what has been called the “ant trade”: the small-scale, cross-border smuggling and person to person transfer of SALW. Since the Anteater only has an appetite for ants, it’s no surprise to see it as the TRESA mascot.

The Anteater will appear throughout this module to highlight important facts and help draw your attention to some interesting points.
# Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accession</strong></td>
<td>The process of joining an international treaty after it has entered-into-force if a state is not a signatory to the treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arms embargo</strong></td>
<td>A prohibition on the trade of arms with a particular government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broker</strong></td>
<td>A third party acting as an intermediary arranging some or all key aspects of the transfer including: sourcing of arms, submission of documents for applications for authorization, arrangement of transport, arrangement of financial matters (negotiating price, transferal of funds etc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brokering</strong></td>
<td>Refers to a range of activities that are undertaken to establish an arms deal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compliance</strong></td>
<td>The act of observing official requirements or commitments, whether they are political or legal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive implementation</strong></td>
<td>Refers to the process of implementing the UN PoA in an integrated manner so that all commitment areas are well coordinated and fulfilled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conventional weapons</strong></td>
<td>Refers to all weapons designed and used for military purposes. Small arms and light weapons belong to the broader category of conventional weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demand side measures</strong></td>
<td>Refers to measures that tackle the reasons why small arms enter a particular community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disarmament</strong></td>
<td>The process of collecting, controlling and disposing of SALW in order to remove the means and tools of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diversion</strong></td>
<td>Movement of arms from the legal to the illicit sphere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End-user certificate</strong></td>
<td>A certificate stating who the end-user is. The certificate should also include a range of other information on the transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entry-into-force</strong></td>
<td>The formal entry of a treaty into international law following the signatures of a designated number of states. States that have signed the treaty are now obliged to implement its provisions and obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human security</strong></td>
<td>A people-centered approach to security. Human security aims to remove the threat to people arising from poverty, conflict, disease, starvation and the environment, among other things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illicit trade</strong></td>
<td>The trade in arms that breaks either international or national laws of both the exporting or importing states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>The act of putting into action or fulfilling the provisions and commitments a state has agreed to via an official document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International law</strong></td>
<td>A set of laws and principles based on treaties or customs that control or affect the rights and duties of states and their relations. International law based on treaties only applies to those states that have consented to it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IHL</strong></td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set of rules that place restrictions on the use of weapons and methods of warfare. It aims to protect people who are not involved in the fighting and to limit human suffering during times of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legally binding</strong></td>
<td>Refers to those commitments, principles or provisions that are part of a treaty and that states are formally obliged to implement under international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loopholes</strong></td>
<td>A way of bypassing or escaping a particular commitment or obligation. This can result from ambiguity or an omission in the wording of a particular obligation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Misuse</strong></td>
<td>Refers to the use of small arms that is contrary to the principles of international humanitarian law and that result in the gross abuse of human rights or the suffering of innocent civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moratorium</strong></td>
<td>A suspension of a particular activity. A moratorium on the trade of arms suspends all planned sales or potential transfers of these weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGOs</strong></td>
<td>Non-governmental organization (NGO). This is a voluntary organization that is non-profit oriented and independent from the government and government institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NSAs</strong></td>
<td>Non-State Actors (NSAs). Refers to political, military or corporate actors that act independent of the national government. NSAs range from armed groups, private corporations to non-governmental organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politically binding</strong></td>
<td>Refers to those commitments or principles that have been made in good faith between states, but which states are not formally or legally obliged to uphold. Political commitments are voluntary in nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ratification</strong></td>
<td>The formal act of joining an international treaty. A state can only ratify a treaty if it has already signed it and thereby expressed its intent to abide by its obligations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALW Transfers</strong></td>
<td>Change in possession and usually ownership of SALW within and across international boundaries. Involves two or more actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanction</strong></td>
<td>A coercive measure adopted by one or more states against a government that is guilty of violating international law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small arms and light weapons (SALW)</strong></td>
<td>Weapons that can be carried and operated by one person or a small crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply-side measures</strong></td>
<td>Refers to measures that tackle how small arms enter a particular community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transit</strong></td>
<td>Movement of goods through and out of the territory of a state without a change in transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transparency</strong></td>
<td>The act of disclosing information in a comprehensive, accurate and timely manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Program of Action/ UN PoA</strong></td>
<td>A UN document calling for national, regional and international action to address the global problem of SALW.</td>
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Section 1

The small arms issue

Objectives and Goals of Section 1:
- To provide a better understanding of the SALW problem.
- To introduce the different dimensions of the SALW problem and how they intersect.
- To provide a brief overview of the major actors in the issue and the measures taken at the global and regional levels to address the problem.

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s saw the emergence of new kinds of conflict, those characterized by ethnic, tribal or religious fighting that occurred within, as opposed to between states. Many of these wars were fought with small arms and light weapons (SALW), which had become readily available through the downsizing and demilitarization of national armies. SALW are currently the weapons of choice of warring parties for a variety of reasons, including:
- SALW are cheaper than conventional weapons.
- SALW are widely available.
- SALW are lethal.
- SALW are simple to use.
- SALW are durable.
- SALW are easily portable.
- SALW are easily concealed and transported across borders.
- SALW have legitimate military, police and civilian uses.
Trainer Note (Exercise 1)

Open up the session with a discussion of why SALW control is important. Most individuals are inherently aware that uncontrolled gun proliferation is “bad”, but have difficulty articulating why. Offer some suggestions if the room goes silent – for example, “violence and killing is more likely”, so that trainees understand what is expected. This discussion will also frame the problem that the global community set out to address through the agreements discussed in this module.

Using a flipchart, chalkboard or other visual aid available, record the ideas raised by the trainees. Encourage group discussion on any points that you feel are not very obvious, clear, or which prove controversial among the participants. Possible answers include:

- Killing is made easier, especially in civil conflicts.
- Increased deaths, lethality of violence.
- SALW destabilize regions.
- Fuel, spark, re-ignite and help prolong conflicts.
- Destabilize relief programmes.
- Undermine peace initiatives.
- Exacerbate human rights abuses.
- Can be used to perpetrate criminal violence.
- Hamper and disrupt social and economic development.
- Interferes with efforts to deliver humanitarian aid.
- Perpetuates cycles of violence, insecurity and fear.
- Drains health care services, systems.
- Physical destruction of infrastructure, economic resources.
- Undermining peace initiatives.
- Etc...

For a more detailed look at these and other potential impacts, please refer to the TRESA module SALW and Development (SAD06).

Follow this discussion with a presentation of the bullet points on the SALW problem. These points are the more quantifiable effects of uncontrolled SALW proliferation and should complement and further substantiate the ideas raised above.

Trainer Note (Exercise 2)

This question can be posed to the trainees rather informally. Its purpose is to get trainees to start thinking about and better understand the complexity of the SALW issue – while there are many negative impacts of uncontrolled SALW proliferation, resolving the problem is extremely challenging. Not only are these weapons widespread,
2. What is the SALW problem?

Exercise 1: Brainstorm
- Why bother with SALW control?
- What is the impact of SALW proliferation?

The SALW problem
An estimated 500,000 people are killed every year by SALW.
- Of 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, 47 were waged with small arms as the weapons of choice.²
- Estimated 639 million SALW in circulation worldwide.

Exercise 2: Discussion
- Why not prohibit the use of SALW completely?
but they also have legitimate military, police and civilian uses (i.e. hunting). In addition, SALW do not cause violence alone so there are no direct causal relationships. It is not like the landmine issue where the significant human cost of this weapon led to its total and complete ban under international law – a total prohibition on the use of SALW is not a feasible resolution. Possible answers to the question include:

- SALW have legitimate uses for the military, police and national security forces as tools for providing defense, protection and maintaining order.
- SALW have legitimate civilian uses for hunting and related sports.
- “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people” – guns are not inherently designed to kill, but rather wound the enemy. It is the way SALW are used that determines their lethality.

At the same time, SALW encompasses a wide variety of weapons, from handguns, hunting rifles to AK-47s and grenade launchers [see TRESA module SALW Basics – Recognizing SALW and Ammunition (SB-R05) for a more detailed description of the weapons included in SALW]. While it may not be appropriate to prohibit the use of all of these weapons completely, some can be prohibited for civilian use only (i.e. the AK-47). Several regional agreements to be discussed in Section 3 actually do this and also implement controls for the military use of these weapons.

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**Trainer Note**

The main purpose of this section is to highlight the three dimensions of the SALW issue. Key points to emphasize here are the following:

- The global SALW problem is a combination of factors arising from supply, demand and misuse.
- In any given country, one of these dimensions may be of greater consequence than the other – for example, in Haiti, the SALW problem may stem primarily from the proliferation and supply of small arms and their misuse, while in Afghanistan, the problem may be rooted more in the demand for small arms.
- Measures taken at the global level thus far – through international campaigns and regional and global agreements in particular – have been mainly aimed at controlling the proliferation of small arms, and therefore targeted the supply-side.
3. Dimensions of the SALW problem

There are 3 inter-related dimensions of the SALW issue as shown in Figure 1 below:

**Figure 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Misuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How</strong> SALW enter a particular community.</td>
<td><strong>Why</strong> SALW enters a particular community.</td>
<td><strong>In what way</strong> SALW are used.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refers to the widespread availability, proliferation and flow of SALW. It is important to regulate the supply of SALW in order to minimize the negative impact of small arms availability.</td>
<td>• Refers to the motivations for acquiring, possessing and carrying SALW. These factors are important in addressing the underlying need and/or desire for SALW.</td>
<td>• Refers to the use of SALW that is contrary to the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), and that result in the gross abuse of human rights or the targeting/suffering of innocent civilians. SALW can be misused by governments, non-state actors and individuals, even if they are acquired and held legitimately.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The global SALW problem results from the intersection of these three dimensions.

**Figure 2**

The international community has responded by mainly targeting the **supply-side**.
**Trainer Note (Exercise 3)**

The discussion question should again be asked informally. There is no right answer here; rather, this is an exercise to better understand the trainees’ biases - for example, what they believe to be the most important dimension of the problem - and their overall impression of how international diplomacy works. Answers will reveal how the trainees see the issue of small arms - whether they believe the supply creates the demand, or vice versa. Answers can be recorded on a flip chart, blackboard or simply discussed orally. Possible answers include:

- Supply-side measures are more observable, measurable, and possible to control - this makes it easier to tackle them.
- It is easier to reach global agreement and consensus on the problem of supply where there are tangible things that can be done. The problem of demand is more controversial and difficult to define.
- The demand problem is one that likely requires long-term approaches and solutions to help change mindsets and/or remove the root causes of demand - one that will also require long-term funding. The international community is often averse to this type of approach, as they prefer to see their funding generate quick and measurable results.

---

**Trainer Note**

The purpose of this section is to offer trainees a sense of what agreements exists at the global, regional and sub-regional levels. This table should be reproduced and posted either on the blackboard, flipchart or PowerPoint slide for the duration of the training, so that participants can easily refer back to it and have a visual of the different initiatives undertaken at various political levels. It should be clear from this table that no initiatives have currently been undertaken in Asia, and that a great deal of effort has been undertaken in the region of Africa. A particularly inquisitive audience might ask why - though this question should be returned to the trainees for their consideration and discussion.

Two more obvious reasons include:

- Africa is the region that experienced the highest number of civil wars over the past decade, and where SALW were used as the weapon of choice. By consequence, there remains a great deal of arms in the region and the proliferation/supply of these weapons is a contributing factor to continued violence and conflict.
- In many Asian countries, the state still has a significant monopoly over the use of force, and thus the problem of SALW is not rooted in the proliferation and illicit trade in the weapons, but rather in its misuse by both legitimate and non-legitimate actors. Governments may therefore be more reluctant to submit to regional or international controls that could affect their decision-making power at home.
Exercise 3: Discussion

- Why do you think this is the case?
- Why has the international community focused primarily on supply-side measures?

5. Overview of global and regional agreements

Figure 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLOBAL</th>
<th>UN FIREARMS PROTOCOL (2001)</th>
<th>UN PoA (2001)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROPE</td>
<td>EU Code of Conduct</td>
<td>Inter-American Convention (CIFTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bamako Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICA</td>
<td></td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nadi Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCEANIA/PACIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-REGIONAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nairobi Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SADC Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ECOWAS Moratorium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- General supply side issues covered by these agreements:
  - Production
  - Trade / Import / Export / Transfer / Transit
  - Brokering
  - Use
  - Stockpile Management
  - Ammunition

The agreements listed in the diagram are the primary documents dealing with SALW in each region and will be reviewed in Section 3; though by no means the only ones that exist.
Key Points to emphasize include:

- With legally binding agreements, states have consented to be bound by, and act in compliance with certain rules and obligations. In political documents, states have only expressed their support for certain rules and obligations but are not obliged to put their words into action.

- Political agreements are often easier to reach because states earn recognition and praise for committing to certain rules and principles without necessarily having to follow them through in any concrete way.

- Political agreements are ‘weaker’ than legal ones because there is no means of enforcing them. They can still lead to increased political will to address a particular problem, including through the negotiation of an international treaty.

- Non-compliance with a legal agreement will often result in negative consequences, including the loss of credibility in the international community among governments and civil society alike.

It must be noted that international law is very different from national law in that there is no over-arching authority that can ‘arrest’ a country for not complying with its obligations. Oftentimes, this fact is cited as a weakness of international law – that without enforceable punishments, there is no way to ensure that states respect their obligations. At the same time, states themselves have consented to be bound by international rules and nothing is forced upon them or applied without their express agreement. The lack of strong punishments therefore should not be taken as a sign of its inherent weakness.

Key Points to emphasize include:

- For legally binding documents, States Parties are obliged to implement the provisions agreed to in the document. Political commitments are those that states have agreed to and identified as important, but do not have formal obligations to implement.

- Implementation is the act of putting words into action – many of these legal agreements have obligations that States Parties must perform and fulfill.

- While no political or legal agreement can be entirely enforced, there is often a great deal of political pressure to fulfill the commitments made, particularly if the majority of the international community has done so. A great deal of credibility and positive benefits may flow from the mere demonstration of political will.

- No country is obliged to abide by any treaty that it has not ratified/acceded to. International law is based on the consent of individual countries, not on the ability to enforce rules or apply punishment.
There are two different types of global and regional agreements on SALW: legal and political. Oftentimes, you can tell the nature of the agreement simply by looking at its name:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention</td>
<td>Code of Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol</td>
<td>Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embargo</td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exercise 4: Discussion**

What is the difference between a legal agreement and a political one?

There are a number of key differences between a legal and political agreement, the most important of which is that in a legal agreement, states have agreed to be bound by, and to act in compliance with certain rules and obligations as a matter of international law.

**Box—The basics of international law**

| What is international law? | A set of norms and rules that states have adopted (treaty, protocol, convention) and thus formally agreed to comply with. International law is based on consent – those states that have not agreed to be bound by these rules or principles are not obliged to abide by them. |
| Who does it involve?       | States, not individuals, are the primary subjects of international law. |
| How is it applied?         | Sanctions, embargoes and diplomatic/political pressure are several means of enforcing international law. |
| How it works:              | States first negotiate the terms of, and sign a treaty on a particular issue. States then ratify the agreement, which signifies their intent to be bound by its principles and obligations. After a certain number of ratifications, the agreement enters-into-force, meaning that it becomes a part of international law – all states that have ratified the agreement must now begin to implement it. Following its entry-into-force, other states can accede to the treaty if they wish to be bound by its rules as well. All countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty are referred to as States Parties. |
**Trainer Note**

The timeline provided can also be posted as a visual aid. It is less important for participants to remember the exact dates and milestones achieved than it is to understand how the SALW issue arose. The most important events include the following:

- The collapse of the state of Somalia (1991) aided by the substantial proliferation and use of SALW.
- Civil war in Croatia (1991) where thousands of innocent civilians were targeted and killed by SALW.
- Civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992) where ‘ethnic cleansing’ was carried out by the use of SALW.
- Genocide in Rwanda (1994), which was made possible through the proliferation of small arms.
- Signing of the *Convention Prohibiting the Use, Production, Stockpiling and Trade of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction* (1997), which created political momentum to address the humanitarian impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms.
- The UN Millennium Summit and Declaration (2000), recognizing the small arms problem as an impediment to development.

An audience that is particularly familiar with the case of Rwanda may point out that this conflict was not primarily fought with SALW. This reality seems to counter the argument that small arms proliferation contributes to, and makes killing more likely - in the Rwandese example, the genocide of over 800,000 Hutus and Tutsis was carried out primarily with machetes, not AK-47s. However, SALW were still critical in terrorizing and rounding up the local population - without this capacity, it is unlikely that the genocide would have been possible in such a short period of time.

Key Points to emphasize in this discussion include:

- With each of these conflicts listed in the early to mid 1990s, it became increasingly evident that SALW were a major factor in the level of destruction and lethality of violence.

- The SALW issue also developed alongside and benefited from the emergence of the landmines issue, where public awareness of the problem and political will to resolve it culminated in 1997 with the signing of the Convention banning landmines (also known as the Ottawa Convention or the Mine Ban Treaty). Technically speaking, anti-personnel landmines are a form of SALW; however, they were dealt with on a separate track, primarily because of their overwhelmingly indiscriminate effects - landmines kill and maim a child as easily as a soldier. The human costs of these weapons were shown to far outweigh their military utility, and thus the international community was able to agree on a ban of this very specific type of SALW.

- The Millennium Summit Declaration recognized the importance of ending the illicit trafficking of SALW as a means of promoting peace, security and disarmament, which in turn are important elements of development. It was the first official recognition of the problem of SALW as a development one and committed Member States to take action against the uncontrolled trade and proliferation of small arms.
5. The development of the SALW issue – a timeline

“In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as ‘weapons of mass destruction.’”

~ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

The development of these global and regional initiatives to curb the illicit trade in SALW emerged alongside a number of important global political events in the 1990s. These include the outbreak of a number of civil wars in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Rwanda, all of which were fought primarily with small arms. The realization by the international community that small arms can cause mass destruction was one of the main motivations for attempting to diminish and control their proliferation. To better illustrate these developments and the corresponding measures taken at the global and regional levels, a timeline listing the key events and milestones that ultimately led to the adoption of the UN Programme of Action on SALW (discussed in Section 2) is provided below.

Figure 4
Trainer Note (Exercise 5)

On a flipchart, chalkboard or other visual device, ask the trainees what tools (tangible or intangible) they think are necessary for states to implement their political and/or legal agreements. There are no wrong answers here – rather, this exercise is intended to highlight some of the potential challenges that states may face in implementing their agreements if they lack any of the resources mentioned or listed below. Key answers that you should highlight to the trainees are bolded.

Possible answers include:

- **Political will** (meaning the desire and true intent of a government to follow-through with its commitments and obligations).
- **Human resources/capacity/labor.**
- Expertise in the field.
- A review of laws and the creation of new ones in the case of legal agreements.
- **Awareness/a good understanding of a state’s obligations.**
- Time.
- A responsible contact within the government.
- A centralized system to monitor progress and remain on deadline in the case of legal agreements.
- Other?

An optional follow-up question to ask is whether participants feel that their government has the resources mentioned to be able to fulfill international and/or regional commitments and obligations for SALW control? If not, what are the main gaps and/or deficiencies? How can these be remedied? At this point, participants may not be fully aware of the SALW agreements that their governments are party to or whether or not they possess the necessary capacity. This question simply attempts to highlight the general reality that states may not possess the necessary resources for implementation despite the strongest of intentions to do so.
6. Main actors in the SALW issue

There are a number of actors that are somehow involved in, or connected to the SALW issue. These include those actors who are responsible for producing, proliferating, using and profiting from SALW, as well as those who are attempting to control, limit and eradicate the illicit trade. Oftentimes, these actors are one and the same and many can play dual roles - for example, many governments are SALW producers, exporters, users and beneficiaries of the SALW trade, but also advocates of greater SALW control. While in some cases this can lead to a conflict of interest, the multiple roles of various actors and the interconnections between them can be a valuable source for positive change/definitively addressing the SALW problem.

The following diagram attempts to capture some of the key actors involved in the SALW issue:
Since awareness of the SALW issue developed in the early 1990s, a number of international, regional and local actors have become actively involved in promoting SALW control. While space does not permit a comprehensive list of these actors, it is important to know the key players at the international level who are working toward positive change.

First and foremost, it must be emphasized that the primary responsibility of SALW control rests with governments themselves. All governments that export, import or transfer small arms are responsible for controlling the flow of arms both within and across their own borders. As they key players on the international stage - and given the multiple roles that they play in the SALW issue - the participation and cooperation of states is critical to addressing the international SALW problem in a definitive way.

To this end, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have an important role to play in helping to keep governments accountable and committed to fulfilling their promises. The following table provides a very brief overview of the role and capacity of key actors at the international level, followed by a brief actor profile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main civil society actors</th>
<th>Advocacy/ outreach</th>
<th>Research/ monitoring</th>
<th>SALW programming &amp; implementation</th>
<th>Funding for SALW activities</th>
<th>Policy-oriented work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IANSA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Alert</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saferworld</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms Survey</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**United Nations**

Three UN organizations are primarily involved in SALW control activities:

**United Nations Development Program** (UNDP) plays a leading role in assisting countries curtail illicit weapons, address the needs of ex-combatants and other armed groups through alternative livelihood and development prospects, while building capacities at all levels to promote human security. UNDP undertakes a number of small arms and demobilization activities, including support to public awareness campaigns, the building of national capacities for weapons collection and destruction, and the
implementation of effective demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programs. http://www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/

**United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)** conducts cross-cutting research on small arms collection, weapons as a public health issue, and security-building measures. The Institute undertakes a number of research activities on small arms and provides funding for research-oriented projects and programs. http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/focus-search.php?onglet=5

**United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA)** collects data and information provided by states on a voluntary basis on SALW, including national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action. The full text of the PoA is available on the UNDDA website, http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salwnationalreports.html.

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**International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)**

IANSA is the global network of civil society organizations working to stop the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Founded in 1998, IANSA has grown rapidly to more than 500 participant groups in nearly 100 countries, with representation from many gun-affected regions. IANSA is composed of a wide range of organizations concerned with small arms, including policy development organizations, national gun control groups, research institutes, aid agencies, faith groups, victims, human rights and community action organizations. http://www.iansa.org/index.htm

IANSA, in partnership with Amnesty International and Oxfam, launched the Control Arms campaign in October 2003. Control Arms focuses on the international trade in small arms and seeks to build support among governments for an Arms Trade Treaty. Control Arms also encourages governments to develop and strengthen national and regional arms controls measures and supports the strengthening of partnerships between governments and civil society to reduce small arms availability and demand at the local level. www.controlarms.org
International Alert (IA)

IA has been working on this issue since 1994, when they identified unregulated small arms proliferation and misuse as one of the world’s most pressing security issues. IA’s work centers around assessing progress made and challenges faced in the implementation of international small arms control measures, and also works to strengthen the knowledge and expertise of policymakers in understanding and responding to small arms matters. http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/small_arms.php

Saferworld

Working for effective international controls on the proliferation and misuse of weapons is key part of Saferworld’s work. Saferworld is working with governments and civil society to ensure that the UN Programme of Action is effectively implemented and strengthened. Saferworld and other NGOs are also working to build support for a global Arms Trade Treaty that will create a legally binding framework for international arms controls. Saferworld is also a leading member of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) that encourages regional and global action on small arms issue. http://www.saferworld.co.uk/iac/index.htm

Small Arms Survey (SAS)

SAS is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. It serves as the principal international source of public information on all aspects of small arms, and as a resource centre for governments, policy makers, researchers, and activists. SAS is also an independent monitor of governmental and non-governmental policy initiatives on small arms, and disseminates best practice measures on small arms issues. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.html
Box—Major players in the SALW trade

According to the Control Arms Campaign, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States – together account for 88 per cent of the world’s conventional arms exports. As such, these governments have the greatest responsibility to control the global trade in SALW. The following table indicates the main players in the global trade in SALW, listed in order of greatest to least.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Producing Countries*</th>
<th>Main Exporting Countries*</th>
<th>Main Importing Countries*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = based on information available from 2002, as reported in the Small Arms Survey 2005.

Summary of Section 1

- There are a number of efforts at the global and regional levels to tackle the problem of SALW.
- Their measures are primarily oriented toward the supply-side of the SALW problem and cover a broad range of issues within that dimension.
- The most comprehensive of the global agreements, the UN PoA, has significant commitments that states need to implement, though this document is not legally binding.
- The primary responsibility of small arms control rests with national governments. NGOs and civil society at the global, regional and local levels are important to ensure that governments live up to their commitments.
Section 2

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA)

Objectives and Goals of Section 2:
- To provide an understanding of the purpose, structure and significance of the PoA.
- To overview the key commitment areas included in the PoA.
- To underscore the importance of comprehensive implementation of the commitments in the PoA.
- To identify several of the main limitations, gaps and weaknesses of the PoA that need to be addressed, as well as next steps in the global effort to promote SALW control.

1. Introduction

In July 2001, the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held at the UN Headquarters in New York. This conference agreed, by consensus, on a political commitment, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). The adoption of the PoA was the result of international efforts to draw attention to the devastating effects of SALW and recognition of the need to address these effects in a definitive way. The PoA is one of two global agreements that exist on SALW. The other agreement is the UN Firearms Protocol – a legal document – that was agreed a few months earlier. The Protocol, however, is focussed primarily on illicit SALW used in crime, while the PoA deals with the problem of SALW more comprehensively. These two agreements are nevertheless mutually reinforcing.
2. General overview of the PoA

2.1 What is the PoA?

- A UN document that establishes a **global framework** for addressing the problem of SALW.
- An **ongoing process** with mechanisms for monitoring and review.
- A **political commitment** agreed to by all members of the UN.
- **One of two international agreements** on the issue of SALW - the other is the UN Firearms Protocol.

**Box—The UN Firearms Protocol**

The first global agreement dealing with SALW was the **Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components, and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol)**. It is a legally binding agreement that was negotiated as a supplement to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime based on the growing recognition of the role of illegal firearms in facilitating organized crime. It was agreed in May 2001, just before the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms. The Protocol, however, did not enter into force until July 2005 following the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification by Zambia. The full text of this protocol is available at [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf).

**Status of agreement**

- Legal

**Participation**

- All Member States of the UN who choose to ratify or accede to the Protocol.

**Purpose**

- The Firearms Protocol is explicitly targeted against illicit trafficking in civilian firearms by criminals. Within this context, it aims to promote controls of civilian firearms for the purpose of crime prevention and public safety. The Protocol therefore establishes a means of addressing the problem of illicit arms used in criminal activity and the prevention of these arms from falling into civilian hands.

**Value added**

- If fully implemented, the Protocol’s provisions would put in place a number of very important measures to regulate the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms.
- The Protocol would also enhance cooperation, information exchange and transparency on the illicit trafficking of firearms.
- The Protocol is mutually reinforcing with the PoA.
Trainer Note (Exercise 1)

After listing the main features of the UN PoA – global framework, political commitment, ongoing process, one of two international agreements on SALW – the question of why this is a political and not a legal document is important to ask. Not only will the trainees’ response provide you with a sense of their understanding of the SALW thus far, but also their understanding of international diplomacy. While there are many possible answers to this question – conflicting national interests, unwillingness to commit to a global regime that imposes restrictions upon national behaviour, language issues, etc. – perhaps the most obvious answer is the fact that the UN operates by consensus. As such, decisions must be agreed to by all member states, which results in agreements that are representative of the lowest common denominator and often less strict and more vague in their requirements as a result.
Limitations

- Most illicit arms originate from legal producers or government stockpiles, but the Protocol does not apply to or attempt to limit state-to-state transfers of SALW.
- The Protocol focuses on the context of crime and does not tackle SALW related to civil or international conflict.
- While it calls for the marking and tracing of firearms, the Protocol only includes a limited commitment to maintain these records for 10 years, which is significantly shorter than the life span of most SALW.

Status of implementation

- The Protocol entered into force in July 2005 with the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification by Zambia. For an update on further ratifications or accessions to the Protocol, please visit the following website: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures_firearms.html.

The Firearms Protocol and the PoA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Firearms Protocol</th>
<th>UN PoA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplement to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.</td>
<td>Formal outcome of the UN Conference on Preventing, Combating, and Eradicating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally binding.</td>
<td>Politically binding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aims to promote national controls of military-style SALW for the purpose of crime prevention and public safety.</td>
<td>Aims to promote controls on the international trade of SALW for the purpose of preventing conflict, promoting development and ensuring human security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishes a means of preventing illicit arms from falling into civilian hands and/or for use in criminal activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exercise 1: Discussion

- Why do you think the PoA is a political and not a legally binding document?
2.2 What does the PoA aim to do?  

- To reinforce and better coordinate efforts against the illicit trade in SALW at the national, regional and global levels.
- To develop agreed international measures to prevent illicit SALW manufacture and trafficking.
- To reduce excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of SALW in post-conflict situations.
- To promote responsibility by states in the import, export, transit and re-transfer of SALW.
- To raise awareness of the threat and international problems posed by illicit SALW.
- To secure maximum participation by states in all efforts to reduce the threat of illicit SALW.

In negotiating the PoA, many governments and NGOs wanted the 2001 UN Conference to tackle all aspects of the spread of SALW, including both the legal and illegal trade. These actors argued that the distinction between the legal and illicit trade is in fact blurred; that most illicit weapons actually originate from the legal sphere; and that legally acquired weapons are also used for illegal purposes (i.e. human rights abuses, repression, conflict, crime). However, some governments were strictly opposed to this line of argumentation and, due to the consensus-based nature of the UN, the conference was only able to deal with issues pertaining to the illicit trade. The PoA commitments therefore relate to illegal transfers of SALW only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box—The legal vs. illicit trade in SALW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Trade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One that conforms to international law and the national laws of both the exporting and importing states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The legal global small arms market is estimated at USD $4 billion a year.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Trainer Note (Structure of the PoA)

At this point, please refer trainees to Annex I of their manuals where they will find a copy of the PoA. This will help them follow along with your brief overview of the PoA structure. The PoA is available in all six official UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish) and can be downloaded at http://disarmament2.un.org/cab.poa.html. If the primary language of the participants is not English but rather one of the other UN languages, you may wish to distribute copies of the PoA in this language or refer trainees to the website for them to access on their own.
In reality, the lines between the legal and the illicit trade are blurred. This is primarily due to weak national, regional and international controls and oversight for the legal trade in arms – evidence shows that legal arms are very often diverted or shifted into the illegal market. There are a number of ways in which diversion occurs – most commonly through disposals of ‘surplus’ arms or thefts from insecure government stockpiles – a great deal of which would not be possible without government involvement. Whether it is through corruption or neglect, government agents are responsible for millions of weapons entering the illegal or ‘black’ market.

2.3 Structure of the PoA

Figure 1

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Section 1: Preamble
Section 2: Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects:
   ① At the national level
   ② At the regional level
   ③ At the global level
Section 3: Implementation, international cooperation and assistance
Section 4: Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
Annexes:
   ① Initiatives undertaken at the regional and sub-regional levels
   ② Statement by the President of the Conference
Section 1: The Preamble

- Recognizes that **governments bear the primary responsibility** for controlling SALW.
- Notes that **international cooperation and assistance is essential** for SALW control and must be strengthened.
- Acknowledges that measures must not only be taken at all levels of government, but also involve all relevant actors, including civil society groups.

Box—The role of civil society in SALW control

The problem of the proliferation, availability and use of SALW not only threatens the stability of the state, but also the security and well being of people. As such, individuals and collectives – also known as civil society – are uniquely positioned to become an effective part of SALW control since they often represent the public interest and have access to public trust. Civil society can become engaged in SALW control action in a number of different ways, including through advocacy and research, awareness raising, monitoring compliance, and participation in weapons collection and destruction programs (WCDP). Their participation with local and national authorities on SALW control is also critical for progress to be made at the grassroots and global levels. For example, IANSA was critical in unifying the voices of many NGOs at the 2001 UN Conference and for starting a dialogue with a number of government actors. For more detailed information on the role of civil society, please refer to the TRESA module Civil Society Action on Small Arms Control (CSA05).

Section II and III: measures to be undertaken for SALW control and implementation

- Section II lists 19 commitment areas on a variety of SALW issues.
- Only key commitment areas will be discussed in this section, including:
  - Transfer controls
  - Brokering
  - Stockpile management and weapons disposal
  - Disarmament
  - Marking and tracing
  - Cooperation, assistance and transparency
- Section III deals with implementation, international cooperation and assistance measures.
Trainer Note (Exercise 2)

In small groups of 4-5 participants, introduce the following exercise and provide one example from the completed table in Annex I to ensure that trainees understand the instructions. Circulate often throughout the exercise to ensure that participants remain on track and to answer any questions they may have. This will also help you determine how much time is needed to complete this exercise, though we recommend allowing between 25-30 minutes.

Rather than request that each group complete the table in full, you can also assign one thematic area to each group to fill out as best as possible. As this exercise requires participants to read through the PoA carefully and discuss various provisions, only one row is necessary to appreciate the point of this exercise. Essentially, trainees should begin to notice linkages between different commitment areas – for example, that some supply measures also contribute to demand reduction, etc. – and also that some areas relate to more than one thematic cluster. The identification of government actions is intended to impress upon the trainees the lack of explicit instructions for implementation in some cases – which creates confusion and impedes proper implementation – while others have very specific obligations that can be measured and traced. Encourage trainees to also take note of the language used in these obligations, a point that will be returned to in a later exercise. What should become obvious through this portion of the exercise is the expression of good intentions, but little direct action to be undertaken by national governments.
Section IV: Follow-up to the 2001 UN Conference

- States have agreed to meet on a biennial basis to chart the programme’s implementation. States have agreed to convene a formal review conference no later than 2006 to assess progress in implementation.

- States also agreed to discuss the establishment of a UN Study Group to examine the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit SALW in a timely and reliable manner. For an update on this process, refer to IANSA’s website, www.iansa.org/issues/marking_tracing.htm.

- Member states have also agreed to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing and eradicating illicit brokering of SALW.

Box—Update on the 2005 Biennial Meeting of States (BMS)

The second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects took place from 11-15 July, 2005 at UN Headquarters in New York. This meeting reviewed the implementation of the PoA to date and took stock of the progress achieved at the national level since the last BMS in 2003. While the meeting recognized significant progress in states’ efforts to implement the PoA, it was made clear that further action was necessary to fulfill the PoA’s objectives. States reaffirmed their commitment toward this end and dedicated themselves to the success of the PoA’s first Review Conference in June 2006.

Exercise 2: Group work and analysis

The 19 provisions listed in Section II of the PoA can also be arranged into thematic clusters. For example, and despite its heavy orientation toward supply-side measures, a number of the PoA’s provisions can also contribute toward reducing the demand for SALW.

In small groups, use the following table to arrange the 19 provisions of the PoA into the following thematic clusters, identifying the actions that governments are required to take to ensure their implementation.
### Global and Regional Agreements on SALW

**Key thematic areas**

- Supply-side measures
- Demand-side measures
- Transfer
- Removing arms
- Community-related activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key thematic areas</th>
<th>Provisions of the PoA</th>
<th>Government actions toward implementation</th>
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<td>Supply-side measures</td>
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<td>Community-related activities</td>
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Trainer Note

Explain to the trainees that the mere inclusion of a variety of SALW controls in any regional or global agreement – while important – says nothing about its actual contribution on the ground. Rather, the details contained within the PoA's provisions must be carefully considered in order to understand whether they have the potential to make a positive impact on SALW control. To make this section more interactive, ask for volunteers to read the relevant provisions in the PoA out loud, beginning with those that have to do with transfer controls. Once they have finished, ask the trainees to summarize what exactly the commitment entails – what do governments have to do or not do? Are there any actions that they have to undertake? And what is the importance of this measure for SALW control? Trainees can record their answers in the appropriate section of their manuals.

Trainer Note (What does this commitment entail?)

The PoA calls for:

- Strict national regulations and procedures in authorizing SALW exports.
  - The PoA makes no reference as to what these “strict” regulations should entail. For example, should these regulations take into account a country’s respect for human rights? International humanitarian law? What minimum standards of criteria should a country take into account when authorizing these exports?

- The establishment of systems of export and import licensing or authorization.
  - The same concern applies here – what bodies of international law should be relevant in these decisions and how can they be incorporated into licensing systems?

- Proper and timely assessment of the risk of SALW diversion.

- The use of end-user certificates (paragraph 12).
  - Refer to Trainer Note in sub-section 4 below for an explanation of end-user certificates.

- Notification of retransfer of previously imported weapons to the original exporter (paragraph 13).

- Control of SALW transit.
  - Transit refers to the movement of SALW within a nation’s borders, while transfer refers to movement across them. Transit controls – monitoring the movement of SALW within a country’s borders – are often neglected.
3. Overview and analysis of key commitment areas

The table in Annex IV indicates which regional agreements cover key commitment areas and is useful for comparing different agreements. While an agreement may cover almost all commitment areas, this tells us very little of the details contained within that commitment, which often determine its true impact and value on the ground. The purpose of this sub-section is therefore to examine six key commitment areas of the PoA in greater detail to better understand their potential effectiveness in SALW control. These areas include:

1. SALW transfers
2. Brokering
3. Stockpile management and destruction
4. Disarmament
5. Marking and tracing
6. Cooperation, assistance and transparency

3.1 Transfer controls

Transfer controls refer to the act of regulating the movement of SALW between and within national borders. They usually involve a process of national authorization in which applications to transfer SALW—whether through national exports, imports, transit or retransfer—are judged against a set of guidelines and criteria.

Section II, paragraph 2 states: The PoA commits States to put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and procedures to ensure control over the export, import, transit and retransfer of SALW.

What does this commitment entail?
**Trainer Note (Why are transfer controls important?)**

Possible answers include:

- Lowers the risk of SALW diversion into the black market.
- Helps prevent unauthorized transfers and thus the illicit proliferation of SALW.
- Allows transparency in weapons flows and accountability in determining where, how and by whom they were diverted in the transfer process.

More detailed information on transfers and diversion can be found in the TRESA module SALW Transfers (SAT06).

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**Trainer Note (What does this commitment entail?)**

The PoA commits states to:

- Develop national legislation or procedures regulating the activities of SALW brokers, including:
  - Registration of brokers.
  - Licensing or authorization of brokering transactions.
    - In practice there has been little implementation of this commitment to date.
  - Penalties for illicit brokering activities within their jurisdiction and control (paragraph 14).
    - Through this commitment, member states only claim responsibility for brokering activities on their own territory; controls over brokering activities outside their borders are not covered.
  - Help prevent, combat and eradicate illicit brokering in SALW through the development of common understandings of the problem at the global level (paragraph 39).
Why are transfer controls important?

3.2 Brokering controls

Arms brokers are individuals that coordinate arms transfers between two or more parties. Brokering involves a range of activities with a variety of different actors – buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers, and insurers – for the purpose of establishing an arms deal. While legitimate, these activities are not adequately regulated since they do not involve the export or import of arms out of the country in which the brokering is taking place. Brokers are therefore able to engage in illicit activities, such as facilitating arms transfers to regions of instability or to governments under international arms embargoes. Arms brokers are often the key to both legal and illicit arms transfers – the common lack of regulation of these actors and their activities is a major area of concern for many governments, international organizations and civil society groups involved in efforts to tackle the illicit trade in SALW.

What does this commitment entail?
Common understandings of the problem are necessary, but do not translate into common solutions or approaches to the problem; there is no reference made to the need to harmonize standards for brokering controls at the international level.

Consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in this area (Section IV, 1, d).

- Through this provision, states recognized in 2001 the problem of poorly controlled arms brokering and committed to developing adequate national legislation and common understandings on this issue.
- In December 2003, a UN Resolution on Small Arms (UN A Res 58/241) called for the formation of “broad-based consultations on further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.”

Civil society organizations have been promoting the creation of an international treaty to regulate the activity of arms brokers, and a ‘Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms Brokering’ was drafted by civil society groups in 2001. In addition, member states of the EU committed themselves in June 2003 to establish national legislation requiring brokering activities from the territory of any EU country to require a license. For updates on this and the international process on a new brokering instrument, you can refer to the IANSA website, www.iansa.org/issues/arms_brokers.htm or the UN DDA website, http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw.html.

Trainer Note (Why are brokering controls important?)

Possible answers include:

- Regulating their activities would help reduce undesirable transfers to human rights abusers, regions of conflict or to embargoed actors.
- The illicit trade in SALW would be easier to prevent, control and eventually eradicate with tighter restrictions on arms brokering.
- Cooperation between states on capturing and holding arms brokers accountable for perpetuating illicit activities would be enhanced. Currently, a handful of illicit arms brokers are able to act without the fear of punishment, despite being well known to national authorities and the international community.
3.3 Stockpile management and weapons disposal

Many arms that are illicitly trafficked or used in crime and conflict originate in state stockpiles. Poor stockpile management and security contribute to the risk that arms and ammunition will be stolen and then misused or trafficked. For example, in 1997 over half a million weapons were stolen from the Albanian national arsenal and used throughout the Balkans and beyond. In fact, and estimated 1 million small arms are stolen or lost around the world each year, many of which end up on the black market.₉
Trainer Note (What does this commitment entail?)

The PoA contains strong commitments on stockpile management and security. It commits states to establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of the stocks of SALW held by the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold SALW, including:

- Choosing appropriate locations for stockpiles.
- Establishing physical security measures.
- Controlling access to stocks.
- Inventory management and accounting control.
- Staff training.
- Security, accounting and control of SALW held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel.
- Procedures and sanctions in the event of theft or loss (Section II, paragraph 17).

Other commitments include:

- To conduct regular review of all stocks.
- To ensure stocks declared as surplus are clearly identified.
- To establish programmes for the responsible disposal of these surplus stocks.
- To ensure that surplus stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.
- To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected SALW are destroyed unless another form of disposal or use has been officially authorized.
  - This commitment in particular reinforces good practice by indicating that the preferred method of disposal should be destruction.

There remains significant challenges and debate in determining the meaning of a stockpile ‘surplus’. To date, there is no internationally agreed upon definition of surplus weapons stocks, and thus it is up to national governments to develop criteria and procedures for designating surplus weapons. Oftentimes, these criteria and procedures are inadequate and inconsistently applied.

Trainer Note (Why is stockpile management important?)

Possible answers include:

- Insecure, poorly managed and unguarded stockpiles of small arms are easy targets for theft and diversion into the black market. They are therefore a primary source of illicit weapons.

- Using destruction as the primary means of disposal helps ensure that these weapons cannot be diverted, enter the illegal market or be misused.

- Destruction also assists with transparency and confidence-building in the small arms control process.
Global and Regional Agreements on SALW

For more detailed information on destruction as a key method of weapons disposal, refer to the TRESA module on Management of Weapons and Ammunition Destruction Programs (MWA06).

What does this commitment entail?

Why is stockpile management important? What about weapons destruction?

3.4 Disarmament

Disarmament is the process of collecting, controlling and disposing of SALW in order to remove the tools of violence.

“The best strategy for prevention of armed conflict is to eliminate the means of violence.”

~ Alpha Oumar Konare, former President of Mali
Trainer Note (What does this commitment entail?)

The PoA promotes disarmament beyond formally constructed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR) in post-conflict situations. For example, paragraph 20 of Section II also mentions the voluntary surrender of SALW – also known as voluntary weapons collection programs – and notes the associated importance of awareness raising, cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, and the public destruction of collected weapons. This commitment also asks states to address the reintegration and rehabilitation needs of children affected by armed conflict.

Trainer Note (Why is disarmament important?)

Possible answers include:

- Disarmament removes stocks of weapons from circulation – including those already in illicit circulation – so they cannot be misused, diverted or trafficked.
- Within the context of DDR programs, disarmament promotes the transition of individuals from military to civilian life and offers potential alternatives to taking up arms.
In Section II, paragraph 21 of the PoA, states committed themselves to develop and implement, where possible, effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations...[.]

Key aspects of DDR programmes and weapons collection programs are explored in TRESA modules Reintegration Strategies for Ex-Combatants (RSC06) and Civil Society Action on SALW Control (CSA05) respectively.

What does this commitment entail?

Why is disarmament important?

3.5 Marking and tracing

All legally manufactured weapons are supposed to have permanent markings impressed upon the fabric of the weapon to provide them with a unique identifier. The purpose of this marking is to identify the country of manufacture and to provide a means by which the transfer route of these weapons can be traced.
Trainer Note (What does this commitment entail?)

The PoA commitments related to marking and tracing are relatively strong. They ask that states:

- Ensure that all SALW are given a unique marking at the point of manufacture.
- Ensure that unmarked weapons are either marked or destroyed.
- See to it that no unmarked weapons are transferred.
- Ensure that all markings are unique and identify the country of manufacture, and also ensure that states can identify the manufacturer and serial number.

Even more significantly, the PoA requests the UN General Assembly to undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (Section II, paragraphs 9 - 10).

Improving marking and tracing controls has been the subject of a new campaign by a number of states and civil society. Since 2003, many of these actors have been supporting the creation of a legally binding agreement in order to enable states to identify and trace illicit SALW in both conflict and crime situations. At the second Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) in July 2005, an agreement was reached that requires the serial numbers of SALW to be recorded when they are sold and transferred between countries, making it possible to trace their transfer routes. The agreement, however, excludes ammunition, shells and other explosives from this system and is not legally binding, making it voluntary for states to implement it in practice. Updates on this instrument can be obtained from http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-oewg.html. Trainers will need to check for updates prior to training.

If appropriate, you can have a short discussion here of the potential value of this new marking and tracing instrument. For example, ask them what they think will happen once a particular stock of illicitly traded weapons has been traced back to their originator? What measures within this agreement (if any) can be taken against the supplying countries? How will this help the goal of SALW control? This is an opportunity for participants to consider the potential strengths and weaknesses of this measure, as well as to develop their own opinions on its relative merits.

Trainer Note (Why is marking and tracing important?)

Possible answers include:

- To assist with the manufacturer or owners’ stock control.
- For tracing a weapon in case of loss or involvement in a crime.
- Helps to identify where a particular weapon has been.
- Helps to identify weaknesses in the transfer system, as well as points at which a particular weapon has been diverted to illegal use.
Section II, paragraphs 7-10 cover these commitments in the PoA and call for the explicit marking of SALW, detailed record keeping and cooperation between states in tracing illicit weapons as particularly important aspects of tackling the illicit trade in SALW. Ammunition and other explosives are not covered within these commitments.

**What does this commitment entail?**

**Why is marking and tracing important?**
**Trainer Note (What does this commitment entail?)**

The PoA recognizes that assistance in fulfilling the PoA may be required in the form of financial and/or technical support. As such, it calls for assistance with many of the commitment areas of the PoA, including:

- Capacity-building for the development of appropriate legislation and regulations.
- Law enforcement.
- Implementing systems for marking and tracing.
- Stockpile management and security.
- The collection and destruction of SALW.
- Establishing programmes related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (Section III, paragraph 6).
- The exchange of information (Section III, paragraph 6).
- Combating the illicit trade in SALW linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism (Section III, paragraph 15).
- Conducting action-oriented research (Section III, paragraph 18).

With regard to transparency, the PoA encourages states to submit voluntary reports to the UN DDA on their status of implementation and to exchange information for better cooperation. Few of these national reports have actually been submitted to date, and information exchanges largely occur on a confidential basis between states. While increasing amounts of information on SALW are becoming available from independent sources, this lack of full transparency, as called for by the PoA, likely results in missed opportunities to cooperate and share lessons learned on implementation.

**Trainer Note (Why is cooperation important?)**

Possible answers include:

- Cooperation is important to ensure consistency in the application of SALW control standards among states, particularly in a specific region.
- Cooperation makes it less likely that loopholes, gaps or other measures can be exploited and that SALW control measures remain robust.
- Assistance is important to ensure that states in need of support are still able to implement their PoA commitments and have the necessary capacity to sustain it.
- Transparency is important for building confidence between states in the SALW control process, and for sharing information that could identify any weak links in the process.
- Transparency is also important for citizens to have confidence in their governments, particularly in assuring that weapons will not be supplied or used against them.
3.6 Cooperation, assistance and transparency

In order for states to be able to implement their commitments at the national level, the PoA calls for them to cooperate and provide assistance to other countries as necessary. Such cooperation not only requires states to share information about their national and legal processes relating to SALW control, but also to be transparent in their reporting and documentation of SALW transfers. In specific, cooperation is emphasized at several different levels, including between states and with civil society. Section III of the PoA outlines the key commitments relating to cooperation, assistance and voluntary transparency among states, regional organizations and international organizations.

What does this commitment entail?

Why is cooperation important?  Assistance?  Transparency?
In order to generate discussion, ask trainees the following question: what are some of the challenges of promoting cooperation between states, as envisioned in the PoA? The purpose of this question is to consider this commitment in realistic terms – while many agreements and issue areas call for ‘cooperation’ to eradicate the problem, this is often very difficult to achieve. States not only adhere to different rules and values, but the process of harmonizing these are often costly. In addition, the trade in SALW is fairly lucrative and thus states may not be fully committed to implementing the PoA or cooperating with other countries toward this end. Additional challenges exist in the case of state and civil society cooperation. Allow the trainees to discuss these challenges in general terms, prompting them to differentiate between these two levels of cooperation if they do not themselves, and take note of their answers. Many of them may already have first hand experience of the challenges involved in state-to-state or state-to-civil society cooperation, and would be an excellent resource for the rest of the group.

**Trainer Note (Optional Exercise 1)**

This exercise can be challenging to participants who do not have a good command of the language or a great deal of experience with legal or political documents. As such, we recommend this exercise as optional only.

Begin by explaining to the trainees the difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ commitments: the former requires a government to take a particular action or fulfill certain criteria, while the latter does not. Provide trainees with an example from your completed matrix in Annex II, emphasizing the importance of wording and/or phrasing. For example, key terms to look out for include “to establish” or “to adopt”, which require states to take explicit action; while the term “to consider” does not and is therefore much weaker. Since each commitment area contains a number of sub-commitments, it is entirely possible that one of these is ‘hard’, while the rest are ‘soft’. Trainees are asked to indicate these contrasts within the appropriate column, making it entirely possible to have checkmarks/writing in both columns for one commitment area.

This exercise can be done in groups, again by assigning one commitment area to each group or, if time permits, the entire matrix. Allow each group 15-20 minutes to complete their section of the matrix (or 35-40 minutes for the whole matrix) and an additional 10-15 minutes to take it up as a group. Answers should be shared among the groups to see if there are any major disagreements or differences. Disagreement should be expected, as commitments are often framed in such a way as to allow a range of possible interpretations. This can be very useful to you to emphasize the point that ambiguous requirements and vague language in the PoA – as well as other political documents – are often deliberate. Without the possibility for interpretation by individual states, it is unlikely that these documents would be agreed by consensus.
Optional Exercise 1: Hard vs. soft commitments

In a large group, review the language used in the above provisions to determine the relative strength of the PoA commitment. For example, look out for the use of terms such as “to consider”, which implies a much softer commitment than “to establish” or “to adopt”. As a group, rate each commitment in the box below as either a ‘hard’ (meaning firm) or a ‘soft’ (relatively loose) commitment, trying as hard as possible to reach these ratings by consensus. Do note that, within each provision, some elements may be ‘hard’ while others are ‘soft’ – it is therefore entirely possible to have checkmarks in both columns. In such cases, indicate which of the specific provisions you have decided are relatively firm.

Did you notice that SALW production is not a key commitment area of the PoA? This is because inadequate controls on production are not generally a primary source of SALW problems. But this may change – the Biting the Bullet project reports that there is a growing problem of small-scale arms production for illicit trafficking and use in many countries; and that the role of such local production may increase as transfer controls and restrictions on civilian possession become more effective. Production controls may therefore have to be strengthened in the coming years.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key commitment area</th>
<th>Hard commitment</th>
<th>Soft commitment</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Transfer controls</td>
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<td>Cooperation, assistance and transparency</td>
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Trainer Note (The most common loopholes within the PoA)

The following provides a brief explanation of each loophole for use in your presentation.

- **Bypassing end-user certificates**

An end-user certificate is an official document authorized by the purchasing state to verify that the arms being transferred are intended for a legitimate purpose and to a legitimate entity. For example, when arms are being shipped, the shipper must have a certificate of "end use" in which the buyer declares that the weapons are for its use only, and will not be transshipped to another user or destination. The PoA requires all states to enforce the use of end-user certificates to identify where arms are going and what they are to be used for. There are two main purposes of end-user certificates:

- To ensure that arms authorized for export are delivered to the stated end-user.
- To ensure that arms are not diverted or misused for human rights violations.

As most participants will likely know, arms dealers are able to bypass this system. Common reasons include:

- The authorizing body for the SALW transfer has little capacity, or does not take action to verify the certificates.
- Certificates are obtained through corrupt channels within the government.
- Certificates are faked or cite a destination that is just a transit stop.

Again, ask trainees for their ideas before providing the answers above.

- **Lack of accountability and financial transparency**

This refers to the lack of accountability of arms brokers - the middlemen - who are able to move small arms around the globe without being caught or held responsible for their illicit actions. These individuals arrange transfers between sellers and buyers without being caught by using transporters, carriers and other tactics to cover their tracks. They also use 'off-shore' banking to make it difficult to trace their financial deals.

- **Bypassing national laws by manufacturing in another country**

According to the Control Arms Campaign, a number of arms companies export their expertise and arms technology to other countries, allowing weapons to be made there under license. By shifting production to another country, arms companies can avoid restrictive national laws. This means that even if a country is engaged in human rights violations, civil war or export arms to conflict zones themselves, arms exporters are able to get around the controls that prohibit them from selling to that particular country.
4. Loopholes within the PoA

Despite the measures agreed to in the PoA, there are a number of ways to bypass SALW controls. Some of these “loopholes” exist because of the lack of strength of certain commitment areas, while others arise from varying interpretations of these commitment areas, which allows states to remain in compliance with their national, regional and international obligations.

The most common loopholes within the PoA include:

- Bypassing end-user certificates.
- Lack of accountability and financial transparency.
- Bypassing national laws by manufacturing in another country.

**Box—A case of bypassing end-use certificates**

In 1999, the Canadian Government sold over 40 surplus military helicopters to the United States Government, 33 of which were redirected to Colombia, a country with a poor human rights record and ongoing civil war. Despite strong export controls on SALW, this transfer was able to occur via the United States by reason of two loopholes within Canadian legislation. First, Canadian military goods that are refurbished or used in manufacturing in another country do not require a Canadian permit for transfer to their final destination. The second loophole is that Canadian military goods exported to the United States do not require export permits. While the Export Import Permits Act requires a permit to be issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the transfer of any military equipment from Canada to a foreign destination, this rule does not include exports to the United States, which itself has no retransfer guarantees. As such, Canadian military sales to the United States are seldom reported or tracked.11

**Box—Bypassing national laws by manufacturing in another country**

According to the Control Arms Campaign, “Governments in at least 15 countries, including France, USA, UK, Israel, Switzerland, and Germany, permit companies to license the production of their arms and ammunition in 45 other countries. Many of these countries have even weaker arms-export controls, greatly increasing the likelihood that the weapons they produce will be used to carry out atrocities and destroy lives and livelihoods.”12
Trainer Note (Operational loopholes within the PoA)
Operational loopholes refer to more general gaps within the framework of the PoA that allow states to get away with minimal- or non-compliance with its commitments. These aspects are loopholes in the sense that states can get around implementing certain commitments to their fullest, if at all.

- **Lack of verification procedures**
The PoA does not call for the creation of an independent body to monitor and verify states’ implementation of their commitments. While this role has largely been undertaken by civil society groups – namely IANSA and the ‘Biting the Bullet’ project – formal verification procedures would provide a more diplomatic basis from which to apply pressure on states toward full implementation of the PoA. Given the challenge of negotiating various PoA commitment areas, it is unlikely that states would have also achieved consensus on such independent observation and monitoring of their activities.

- **Lack of consequences for non-compliance**
Since the PoA is a political document and not a part of international law, compliance with its provisions is completely voluntary. There are therefore no measures within the document to take against states that are either unable or unwilling to implement its commitments. Because there is also a lack of formal verification mechanisms, states are also unlikely to point fingers at one another with regard to slow or ineffective implementation of the PoA. While the document is only politically-binding, the inclusion of both formal verification procedures and recourse actions – such as independent observers to verify implementation – would be beneficial to increasing states’ political will to implement the PoA.

If you feel the participants have a good understanding of these loopholes and the nature of the PoA in general, you can generate some discussion by asking the following question: how should states deal with other member states that are suspected of undermining the object and purpose of the PoA? What tools are at their disposal?

Since the PoA does not recommend any negative consequences to be applied against non-compliant states, governments will have to rely on diplomatic tools such as bilateral discussions and technical and/or financial assistance to promote the fulfillment of PoA commitments. The role of civil society is also important here, as states can partner with civil society organizations to engage other countries in a more constructive manner, such as through workshops, conferences or discussions.

Ultimately, however, a legally binding document would provide more tools to promote compliance with the PoA’s commitment areas.

Trainer Note (The importance of comprehensive implementation)
Comprehensive implementation simply refers to the fact that, in order for the PoA to be effective in eradicating the illicit trade in SALW, all commitment areas need to be implemented in a complete and integrated manner. This is because action in one area necessarily involves or has an impact on another area. For example:
Operational loopholes within the PoA also include:

- Lack of verification procedures.
- Lack of recourse measures for non-compliance.

5. The importance of comprehensive implementation

The SALW issue has broad linkages with other issue areas. Some of these are explicitly identified in the text of the PoA – for example, Section II paragraph 21 refers to the relevance of SALW control to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes - while others are more implicit. In reality, all issue areas in the PoA are inter-linked and together contribute to SALW control.

Overall, it’s essential to recognize that the commitments of the PoA are mutually reinforcing in two very important ways:

- The process of implementing one may contribute to the process and effectiveness of implementing another.
- Implementing one commitment area affects the scale of the problem also being tackled by another commitment area.

Figure 2

| Stockpile Mgmt and Security | Marking and Record Keeping | Disposal of Surplus and Other Weapons | DDR Programmes | Decreased Risk of Diversion | Significant and Sustained Reduction in Illicit SALW Trafficking | t.r.e.s.a |
1. Effective import controls are not only important in reducing the illicit trafficking of SALW, but they also help to control SALW tracing and regulate arms brokering.

2. Figure 2 illustrates how a number of different commitment areas in the PoA seek to reduce the risk that weapons will be diverted into the illicit trade. If only one of these initiatives is implemented, the impact will only be minimal, as there will remain other potential sources for diversion. Implementing all of these commitment areas together is thus necessary in order to reduce the chance that arms will be diverted into the illicit trade.

**Trainer Note (What is needed for comprehensive implementation?)**

The following information elaborates on these points. Implementation of the PoA requires the establishment of a solid foundation from which all further activity can be coordinated. For example, the PoA explicitly commits all states to put in place or to designate a National Point of Contact and National Coordination Mechanism for PoA implementation (which are sometimes referred to as National Commissions or National Focal Points) in Section II, paragraph 4. These bodies often need to conduct a national review of existing legislation on SALW control in order to bring their laws in line with the PoA. These reviews and national ‘mappings’ of the SALW problem are sometimes carried out in the process of designing a National Action Plan (NAP) on SALW. While not a requirement of the PoA, a NAP is generally recognized as an important implementation tool and a significant step forward in addressing a country’s SALW problem. To this end, a number of organizations and governments provide support to SALW-affected countries in developing their NAP, as these are costly and often labour-intensive to produce.

- **Good practice in the implementation of each individual commitment** refers not only to the full implementation of a particular commitment area, but also to its implementation as part of a broader and coordinated strategy. While this strategy need not take on the form of a National Action Plan, states should ensure that, at a minimum, commitment areas are not implemented in isolation. An analysis of good practice can be found in Section Four of the 2003 and 2005 Biting the Bullet reports at http://www.iansa.org/documents/report/colour/analysis4.pdf. You can either mention this to the trainees, provide an example to show them, or make copies of this section available for their review.

- Attention to the links between commitment areas is also necessary for proper planning and good practice in national implementation, as it helps to promote greater effectiveness and coherence. What is more, such recognition may contribute to the efficacy of national implementation by identifying key entry points and opportunities for implementation of several commitment areas.

What follows are three different exercises from which you can choose one or more to undertake with trainees (though we recommend that you only perform two in the interest of time). Exercises vary according to their level of difficulty and range from 40-60 minutes in length. Each will also require some advance preparation on your part.
Implementing all of the commitment areas on the left-hand side help decrease the risk that SALW will be diverted into the black market and therefore should be implemented in an integrated manner. For example, marking and record keeping, stockpile management and security and the disposal of surplus weapons can be implemented within a comprehensive DDR programme. On the other hand, implementing a DDR programme without these elements will ultimately be less effective in reducing the illicit trafficking of SALW since insecure stocks, poor record keeping and surplus weapons are all potential sources of illegal arms.

What is needed for comprehensive implementation?

It is important that PoA implementation goes beyond a simple ‘tick the box’ approach – meaning that commitment areas are not only pursued but actually fulfilled. In order to provide meaning and substance to each individual commitment and fully implement the PoA, states will need to:

- Establish strong foundations for implementation.
- National Point of Contact/Focal Point
- Achieve good practice in the implementation of individual commitments.
- Pursuing a coordinated approach
- Pay close attention to the links between commitments.
- To achieve good practice and effective implementation
**Trainer Note (Optional Exercise 2)**

While trainees are working in their groups, try to reproduce the diagram on a flipchart or blackboard and place at the front of the training room. When taking up this exercise as a group, ask a representative from each trainee group to present at least 3 of their linkages and overall rationale by drawing them on the diagram you provide. Once all linkages have been drawn, groups can add additional ones or challenge those they do not feel are appropriate. If time permits, ask the trainees why they feel some of the commitment areas are not linked. We recommend that you perform this exercise on your own prior to your training session in order to better assist and/or challenge the trainees. Sample answers are provided in Annex IV.

If you decide to engage in this activity, we recommend that you allocate 20 minutes for trainees to work in their groups, another 10 minutes for them to present their linkages to the group, and an additional 5-10 minutes for group discussion.

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**Trainer Note (Optional Exercise 3)**

This exercise should be performed in small groups. If the trainees do not come from the same country, ask them to think in more general terms, drawing upon any insight or experience they may have within their own context. Trainees should be prepared to present their answers to the class.

This exercise offers a good opportunity for trainees to examine and better understand the challenges faced by governments in fulfilling these commitments. For example, in designing National Action Plans or national strategies for implementation, states have to take a number of often competing interests into consideration (foreign policy vs. trade policy) and design their plan accordingly, and with a thorough assessment of the costs and benefits of implementation. In particular, full consensus and cooperation will have to be reached between a number of government departments on the terms of implementation (e.g. through the establishment of a National Focal Point that may include representatives from the Foreign, Defense and Justice ministries). In addition, full implementation will require a great deal of time and resources that the state must be willing and able to commit. As a trainer, it is your role to encourage trainees to consider these challenges as realistically as possible, so they have a full understanding of costs associated with full implementation and the difficulties of reaching consensus both within and between government departments.

If you decide to engage in this activity, we recommend that you allocate 30 minutes for trainees to work in their small groups, and an additional 15 minutes for group presentations and discussion.
Optional Exercise 2: Linking commitments

In small groups, use the diagram in Annex III to draw arrows between the commitments where you agree with one or all of the following statements:

a) Implementing X and Y together makes sense because they are affecting the same aspect of the problem.

b) Implementing X will help in implementing Y.

c) It is necessary to implement X before Y can be achieved.

The arrows do not need to distinguish between a), b) or c), as the commitments may be linked for all three reasons.

Optional Exercise 3: Key steps for implementation

With the PoA in hand, and keeping in mind potential links between commitment areas, how would you go about designing a national strategy for implementing the PoA in your country? In particular:

- What steps would you take to design the plan?
- What issues would you tackle first? How would you decide which issues to tackle first?
- What difficulties would you run into?
- What are the costs and benefits of implementation for a government?
**Trainer Note**

This sub-section can be delivered as a lecture where you will be supplying trainees with the bulk of the information – they cannot be expected to have prior knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the PoA. Nevertheless, you can open the session by asking trainees what they believe are the key strengths of the PoA (without referring to their manuals), and/or what impact they believe the PoA has had thus far? Try not to allow them to think in terms of success or failure, since there have been many successes and failures of the PoA to date. Rather, try to get a sense of whether trainees feel that the PoA can make a contribution to the SALW problem and why.

Emphasize over the course of your discussion that **the lack of implementation by a number of countries is the key factor impeding more substantial progress in eradicating the SALW problem**. Using whatever visual device at your disposal, draw a line to separate a column for the ‘strengths’ and the ‘weaknesses’ of the PoA and either proceed with a brainstorm or, if you feel this is too advanced for your trainee group, write down the key strengths and weaknesses offered in this module. Ask trainees to follow along in their manuals and encourage any questions they may have.

**Trainer Note**

Emphasize here that without ammunition, small arms would be less deadly, if not useless. Rather than focusing simply on limiting the proliferation of guns, the PoA recognizes that limiting the proliferation of ammunition is also a critical approach to reducing the destructive impact of SALW. Since ammunition is mainly transferred with weapons shipments, the inclusion of ammunition within the PoA ensures that the controls established for SALW – particularly import-export controls and the commitment to destroy surplus stocks – also apply to ammunition.
6. Strengths and weaknesses of the PoA

Despite a number of different challenges, the PoA has had positive outcomes in the fight against the illicit proliferation and trade in SALW. Several key strengths include:

- Provides a framework for promoting cooperation to prevent and combat illicit trafficking and the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW at the national, regional and global levels.
- The establishment of international norms for SALW not only as a security issue, but also as a peace and development issue.
- Facilitation of a diplomatic process on the issue of SALW and a means of maintaining momentum through biennial meetings and the 2006 Review Conference.
- Committed states to carry out more destruction of surplus and illicit weapons, increase security of existing stockpiles and implement more effective DDR programmes.
- Covers ammunition, promotes civil society participation and calls for international assistance and cooperation.
- The PoA also identified further challenges to be pursued through other international measures and instruments. These include:
  - Arms brokering.
  - Marking and tracing of SALW.
  - Civilian ownership of SALW designed for military purposes.
  - Non-State Actors (NSAs).

The last two of these issues have been identified as major weaknesses of the PoA and will be discussed in turn.

6.1 Controls on civilian possession and trade

The issue of regulation of civilian possession and associated domestic retail trade was highly contentious during the conference. As a result, the PoA only commits states to “establish as criminal offences under their domestic law the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction…” (Section II, paragraph 3).

Put simply, states are only required to ensure that any possession, manufacturing or trade of SALW that is not in line with their domestic legislation should be punishable as a criminal offence. The PoA makes no suggestions as to what standards of criteria should be used to judge such illicit action; for example, which weapons should be covered under this legislation, and which civilians should be allowed to own or trade small arms.
Many civil society groups, experts and governments wanted more detailed standards on civilian possession. This is because much of the illicit trafficking of SALW occurs through the “Ant Trade”: the small-scale, cross-border smuggling of weapons that have been purchased legally in one state and smuggled across borders into countries where there are more restrictive regulations. Weapons that have been smuggled across borders in this way often form a substantial part of the arsenals of criminals and other violent groups.

**Box— The ant trade**

While most weapons transfers (legal as well as illegal) are done in large shipments - often by specially chartered ships or planes - a significant amount of small arms are illegally brought across borders by individuals. An individual with one or two guns might attempt to raise some money by carrying it across a border and selling it to another individual, perhaps a relative, acquaintance or border partner. Most participants in the ant trade do not see this as a business. It is simply a means to realize some cash, and the extra gun is often considered a form of imperishable investment.

### 6.2 Prohibition on SALW transfers to Non-State Actors (NSAs)

A key issue since before the 2001 UN Conference was the transfer of SALW to rebel groups, terrorist organizations and other non-state actors (NSAs). Since the Conference was particularly concerned with the impact of SALW in conflict situations, the issue of transfers to NSAs - namely to rebel groups - proved to be among the most contentious. While some states and regional organizations (such as the African Union and the EU) wanted these transfers to be completely banned, others argued that in some cases - such as state-sponsored genocide - transfers to NSAs may be desirable. As such, consensus could not be reached and the issue did not get addressed in the PoA.
**Trainer Note**

Gender refers to the socially constructed, as opposed to biologically determined identities of women and men. Gender shapes the roles, relationships, experiences and expectations of women, men, boys and girls in a society. These different roles and relationships, combined with local, national and regional contexts, often determine ways in which people are affected by the availability of SALW and the impact of SALW on their lives, both in conflict and non-conflict situations. The lack of an express commitment by states to recognize the impact of SALW on gender leaves this issue on the periphery, rather than at the center of national and regional SALW control efforts. For a more detailed section on gender see TRESA modules Civil Society Action on SALW Control (CSA05), SALW and Development (SAD06) and Youth and SALW (YSA06).

As discussed in Section 1, the limited focus of the PoA on the illicit trade in SALW leaves in tact the problem of why individuals want arms in the first place. Without implying that one aspect is inherently more important than the other, a continuing demand for SALW will contribute to their ongoing supply.

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**Trainer Note (Exercise 3)**

Most of these gaps and limitations have already been discussed in previous sections and therefore should be somewhat of a repetition for the trainees, helping them to better grasp the nature of the PoA. If your group is struggling with this question, provide clues as to some answers or simply provide the answers yourself, writing them on a visual aid as you go. Possible answers include:

- No deadlines.
- Lack of verification measures.
- No enforceability.
- Lack of recourse action/punishment for non-compliance within commitment areas.
- Limited political will to follow-through with commitments.
- Some language remains vague and open for interpretation.
- Etc...
The problem of SALW transfers to NSAs is that these actors are often responsible for the misuse and proliferation of illicitly manufactured or traded weapons. Weapons in the hands of rebel or terrorist groups are a destabilizing factor in society and a source of human insecurity. These actors often act with impunity – as state structures are too weak or ineffective in exerting authority over them – and they are not subject to any international laws or regulations. Since states are the sole subjects of international law, NSA activity cannot be controlled or regulated by means of a legally binding treaty.

Nevertheless, while the PoA does not contain important commitments relevant to the issue of arms transfers to NSAs, there are certain commitments that, if properly implemented, would affect NSA access to SALW. These include controls on SALW production, possession, sale and transfer, as well as measures to prevent illicit trafficking of small arms and promote stockpile security. If these controls were effectively implemented, NSAs would have less opportunity to obtain SALW.

6.3 Other gaps and limitations

- Lack of gender issues in the PoA.
- Limited focus on demand-side of the SALW problem.

**Exercise 3: Brainstorm**

- What are some structural, as opposed to thematic, gaps and limitations in the PoA discussed so far?
Trainer Note

The purpose of this sub-section is not to provide a detailed analysis of the status of implementation of the PoA, but rather to point trainees to where they can find this information and continue to monitor states' progress. IANSA's Biting the Bullet report is the most comprehensive resource on the PoA's status to date and provides detailed analysis of the progress made and challenges that remain. While the impact of the PoA on the ground has been minimal, emphasize to the trainees that such progress is unlikely unless there is substantial movement by governments in establishing the key legal, procedural, and programmatic commitments called for in the PoA. It is therefore not the inability of the PoA to make a significant impact on the ground, but rather the lack of its implementation that allows the SALW problem to persist. The lack of movement in this area can be caused by a variety of things, including the lack of political will, resources, awareness and understanding, as well as weaknesses in the PoA itself.

Trainer Note (Exercise 4)

The following are possible key entry-points for states, international organizations and civil society actors. Keep in mind that these are very general answers and by no means the only ones that are relevant.

**States**

Domestically:

- Appoint a national commission to review existing legislation and make recommendations to bring it in line with PoA commitments.
- Creation of a National Action Plan to execute these recommendations.
- Seek national or external assistance in creating legislation and identifying next steps toward better implementation.
- Review the current state of implementation and identify needs and challenges to move the process forward.

Internationally:

- Offer financial, technical, legal or other assistance for implementing the PoA to states in need.
- Lobby other governments to fulfill their PoA commitments, sign regional agreements and/or offer political incentives to promote more efficient implementation.
- Support local capacity-building programs or civil society initiatives in countries where SALW regulation is weak or lacking, and where there is a SALW problem.

**International organizations**

- Liaise with government officials and offer advice and support on interpretation and implementation of PoA commitments, including in the design of National Action Plans.
7. Brief update on implementation of the PoA


Since the UN Conference in July 2001, the 2005 Biting the Bullet report indicates that efforts toward implementing the PoA have improved substantially in some countries, and especially at the regional level. More and more regions are taking concrete action toward fulfilling their commitments in the PoA. Despite these improved efforts, however, the report concludes that, to date, the impact of the PoA on preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW remains minimal. A higher level of progress is achievable if the agreement is properly implemented by all member states of the UN.

Exercise 4: Small groups discussion

The lack of progress and impact of the PoA on the ground is the result of a number of different factors from political, economic and technical issues to cultural considerations. Nevertheless, PoA implementation can be improved with the help of a number of different actors, including states, international organizations and civil society. What are some key entry-points for these actors?
Disseminate research and information on the need and potential impact of PoA implementation.

Organize local, regional or international conferences for state and civil society representatives on the needs, challenges and next steps for PoA implementation.

**Civil society**

- Apply pressure on local or regional governments to meet their PoA commitments through lobbying and advocacy efforts, as well as increased monitoring activities.
- Increase public awareness of the problem and create a sense of urgency for political leaders to properly address it.
- Capture media attention around the SALW issue and the lack of implementation in relevant countries.
- Initiate local programs to assist with PoA implementation, including DDR programs.
Summary of Section 2

- The PoA covers the illicit trade in SALW at the national, regional and international levels.
- There are six main commitment areas, each with mutually reinforcing provisions.
- PoA implementation has been inconsistent; however, it has contributed to greater awareness, understanding and policymaking on SALW control.
- Effectiveness and impact of the PoA on the ground will depend on a number of factors, but most importantly on the political will of states to effectively implement the agreement.
Section 3

Regional and sub-regional initiatives on SALW

Objectives and Goals of Section 3:

- To provide regional overviews of the SALW problem and the measures taken to address it.
- To provide a basis for assessing and comparing the different regional agreements and initiatives.
- To help familiarize trainees with general weaknesses and limitations that are common to these initiatives.

1. Introduction

While the impact of SALW is ultimately felt at the community level, the problem is more regional and global in nature. Undoubtedly, national efforts to combat the small arms problem are vital but ultimately futile if they are not combined with regional and global efforts. This is primarily due to the spillover problem; for example, weapons collected in Mozambique found their way into South Africa, while arms collected in Afghanistan were later found in India and Pakistan.  

Local solutions to the SALW problem will therefore only be effective and sustainable if they are combined with broader regional and global efforts. In fact, better levels of national implementation of the PoA have tended to correlate with the presence and implementation of regional agreements.

In addition, each region and sub-region will experience and perceive the SALW problem in a different way and must therefore create their own solutions and approaches to the problem. Mobilizing countries to take action against SALW is also much easier at the regional level, as these states are typically most affected by and concerned about the problems in their immediate environment. Consequently, they may be more willing to cooperate.

Recognizing this, a number of regional initiatives and efforts have been undertaken to combat the SALW problem. Regional agreements exist in Africa, Europe, the Americas and in Oceania/Pacific, but not yet in the Middle East and North Africa or in Asia and its sub-regions. Many of these agreements helped facilitate the development of the PoA, and the process of implementing the PoA has in turn stimulated and further strengthened the implementation of regional agreements. In this way, the PoA and regional agreements on SALW are mutually reinforcing – the implementation of one helps further the purpose and objectives of the other – ultimately helping to combat the global proliferation of SALW. The PoA sets minimum global standards that all regional agreements should either be consistent with, or seek to promote through their own implementation.
Trainer Note

The method of presenting the information in this sub-section is very much up to you and will depend greatly on the composition of your trainee group. For example, it is not necessary for you to review all regional initiatives in great detail or to ask participants to memorize the various names and principles of each agreement. Rather, the focus of this section should be on the initiatives undertaken in the region in which you are training, or in which the trainees will be working. If this is not a homogenous group, you can either select one region or briefly highlight all agreements before moving along to the next sub-section on general trends and lessons learned.

This section will require some background preparation in order to familiarize yourself with the progress achieved to date and the status of implementation in your region. All relevant links and sources of information are provided - it is a good idea for you to print and reproduce, if possible, a copy of the relevant agreements to distribute to the participants.
2. The development of regional initiatives

Regional efforts to combat the illicit proliferation and trafficking of SALW grew not only from the growing recognition of the small arms problem, but also as a result of the momentum gained on this issue in the lead up to, and immediately following the UN Conference in 2001. While the instruments adopted to address the problem are specific to the region or sub-region, they very much rely on existing institutions and structures for cooperation between states. The following diagram provides a chronology of the development and progress of regional initiatives, each of which will be discussed in turn.

Figure 1

2.1 Small arms and Africa

During the 1990s, much of the African continent was affected by intense problems of insecurity, crime, conflict and violence. As a result, SALW are readily available in most sub-regions and have found their way into the hands of criminals, militia groups, children and other non-state actors. It is estimated that of the 649 million weapons in circulation worldwide, 100 million are in Sub-Saharan Africa, 8-10 million of which are in the sub-region of West Africa. Their widespread availability has exacerbated and prolonged conflict, contributed to violence and destruction and impeded the process of development in the region. Preventing their access by non-state actors and their destabilizing impact on human security are thus key concerns for the African region as a whole.

The African continent has been the most active in undertaking initiatives to promote SALW control. The following highlights the key agreements that have been adopted and implemented at the regional and sub-regional levels:
2.1.1 Bamako Declaration

In 1996, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) agreed to conduct an in-depth study into ways to reduce small arms proliferation on the continent. The principles of this study were later expressed in the *Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and trafficking on Small Arms and Light Weapons* in December 2000. While this Declaration is not legally binding, it is the only document that commits all African states to a common set of measures on SALW to be undertaken at the national and regional levels. The Declaration was also instrumental in moving ahead the negotiation of the UN Programme of Action.

**Status of agreement**
- Political

**Participation**
- All member states of the African Union with the exception of Morocco (53 of 54 African countries) have signed the Declaration.

**Purpose**
- At the national level: among other things, the establishment of national monitoring mechanisms; national legislation against violations of international arms embargoes; national SALW collection and destruction programs; and civil society participation in national efforts to combat the local and continental SALW problem.

- At the regional level: to strengthen regional and continental cooperation among police, customs agents and border control services in SALW control.

**Value added**
- As the only document that commits all states and sub-regions in Africa to common measures, this document paved the way for more robust and localized efforts to combat the proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW, such as the Nairobi Protocol and the SADC Protocol to be discussed below.

**Limitations**
- Because the Declaration is a political agreement, there are no mechanisms in place to monitor states’ compliance.

- The Declaration also lists more principles to be upheld rather than precise actions for African states to undertake on SALW control.

**Status of implementation**
- There are no bodies responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Declaration. A copy of the Declaration can be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#africa.
2.1.2 Nairobi Declaration

The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was signed in March 2000. It was the first African sub-regional agreement on SALW control, serving as one of the main catalysts for the signing of the Bamako Declaration several months later - in fact many of the principles established in this document were modeled on those in the Nairobi Declaration. The Declaration further recognizes the wide-ranging and devastating impact of SALW proliferation and highlights civilian possession as a key concern of the region.

Status of agreement

- Political

Participation

- 10 African countries have signed the Declaration: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Purpose

- To promote greater controls on the civilian use and possession, transfer, manufacturing, and brokering of SALW in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region, as well as information sharing and cooperation between governments toward the same end.

Value added

- Mandates countries to develop National Action Plans to address arms-related issues.
- Explicitly recognizes the role of civil society.
- The Declaration mandated the creation of the Nairobi Secretariat to coordinate its implementation and promote information sharing. A ‘Coordinated Agenda for Action and Implementation Plan’ was also established alongside the Declaration.
- The Declaration calls for annual ministerial review conferences to identify priority areas for future action. Both mechanisms - the annual meetings and Nairobi Secretariat - ensure more effective implementation of the principles expressed, and have since paved the way for the negotiation of the Nairobi Protocol (to be discussed below).

Limitations

- The document does not list precise actions to be undertaken for SALW control, although this is later addressed in the Nairobi Protocol.

Status of implementation

- The Nairobi Secretariat was established to regulate and monitor the implementation of the principles established in the Declaration. A copy of the Declaration can be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#africa.
2.1.3. SADC Protocol

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials was the first legally binding document on SALW to be developed in Africa. It was agreed in August 2001 and entered into force in July 2004 after two-thirds ratification by member states. The Protocol developed from the Declaration Concerning Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in SADC, which was signed in March 2001 in response to a growing recognition of the SALW problem in the region.

Status of agreement

- Legal

Participation

- Currently, 12 of the 13 members of the SADC have ratified the Protocol: Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Angola has signed, but not yet ratified.

Purpose

- To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture, accumulation, possession and use of firearms, ammunition and other related materials through, among other things, the establishment of infrastructure for effective law enforcement; transparency and information exchange; public awareness programs; the regulation of brokering; marking; and the establishment of national legislation and proliferation control measures.

Value added

- The Protocol sets out minimum standards for national legislation and commits member states to begin harmonization of their firearms legislation.
- Promotes greater engagement by civil society groups on the issue of small arms.
- Provides for the destruction of surplus, redundant, obsolete, confiscated and unlicensed firearms.
- Identifies civilian possession of arms as one of the priority issue areas in Southern Africa where action must be taken.

Limitations

- In the Protocol, member states agreed to establish common controls in many different areas, but did not always specify what exactly these common controls should entail. A great deal will therefore depend on the capacity for coordination and information sharing between governments.
- Implementation of the Protocol is hindered by a lack of coordination between the SADC and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) – while the former is charged with implementing the Protocol, the latter controls the financial support for implementing programs.
- A committee to oversee implementation was called for by the Protocol, but is not yet operational.
Global and Regional Agreements on SALW

Status of implementation

As the main sub-regional organization, the SADC Secretariat and the South African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO) are responsible for implementing the Protocol. Updates on the Protocol’s status can be found directly from the SADC website, http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=protocols_status. A copy of the Protocol can also be obtained from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#africa.

2.1.4 Nairobi Protocol

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa was signed in April 2004 and entered-into-force on 5 May 2006 after two-thirds ratification by member states. This document is the legal expression of those principles expressed in the 2000 Nairobi Declaration, as well as the 2000 Bamako Declaration of the African Union.

Status of agreement

Legal

Participation

11 African countries are either parties or signatories to the Protocol: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Purpose

To expand on and strengthen the contents of the Nairobi Declaration by prescribing exact SALW controls and initiatives that are needed – and which can be legally enforced - to eradicate the problem in the sub-region. To this end, states are charged with developing a National Action Plan to ensure its compliance with the Protocol, and must designate a Focal Point Coordinator to liaise with and report to the Nairobi Secretariat.

Value added

Provides prescriptive measures for SALW control, making all principles expressed in the Nairobi Declaration legally binding.

Limitations

The effectiveness of the common controls established depends to a large degree on the ability of the participating countries to harmonize their national legislation, a process that could take a long time and prove rather challenging.

Status of implementation

The Nairobi Secretariat is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Protocol. Every year, a Review Conference for States Parties is held at the ministerial level to take stock of the progress made and work that remains to be done. The official outcome of these meetings and all relevant information is posted on the Secretariat’s website, http://www.nbisecsalw.org/index.html, or can be found at http://www.saferafrica.org. New accessions to the Protocol can also be found at these sites. A copy of the Protocol can also be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#africa.
2.1.5 ECOWAS Moratorium

The Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa was the first sub-regional initiative in Africa on illicit arms trafficking. Initiated by Mali, the Moratorium was declared in October 1998 as a programme of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and was set to run for only three years. In 2001, the Moratorium was renewed for an additional three years and renewed again in the summer of 2004. Since the proliferation of SALW continues to be a problem in West Africa, ECOWAS is now in the process of negotiating a legally binding instrument - an ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons - to tackle the problem in a more robust and enforceable way. This instrument will likely replace the Moratorium when it ends in 2007.

Status of agreement
- Political

Participation
- All ECOWAS members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

Purpose
- The Moratorium aims to effectively ban the illicit import, export and manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states as a means of preventing their uncontrolled use, proliferation and subsequent impact on conflict in the region.

Value added
- The Moratorium is the first of its kind in the world and serves as a useful template upon which a more robust SALW control regime in West Africa can be based. The document itself calls for the harmonization of national legislation on civil possession of small arms with “a view to formulate a regional convention....”
- A Code of Conduct was established to regulate and monitor the implementation of the Moratorium.

Limitations
- Since this is a political document, compliance with the Moratorium is voluntary. A number of governments in the region continue to circumvent it and thus its overall impact on preventing civil conflict has been rather minimal.
- The document is drafted in weak language with remains vague with regard to outlining specific measures for implementation.
- The document fails to include (or was not amended to include) a role for civil society in the monitoring and implementation of the Moratorium, or the role of non-state actors in the region who are often equally responsible for the proliferation and transfer of light weapons.

Status of implementation
- The ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, the UNDP and the Lome Centre (which represents the UN DDA) are the bodies responsible for overseeing compliance with the Moratorium. A copy of the Moratorium can be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#africa.
2.2 Small Arms and the Americas

A number of civil wars and insurgencies took place in Latin America during the 1980s whereby a large supply of small arms and ammunition were brought into the region through covert channels. Armed groups not only acquired large supplies of illegal arms to pursue and defend their campaigns, but they also became deeply involved in trafficking arms and drugs to finance their operations. Small arms are now widely available in the region – particularly amongst civilians – and are linked to the continuing problems of criminality, social violence and drug trafficking. As such, regional efforts in the Americas to combat the illicit proliferation of SALW have occurred within the context of initiatives to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.

The following highlights the key agreements and initiatives undertaken to promote SALW control in the region.

2.2.1 OAS Inter-American Convention (CIFTA)

The Americas became the first region to develop a legally binding treaty against the illegal trafficking of small arms with the adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) in November 1997. The Convention developed within the context of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the OAS following the growing recognition of the link between drugs and arms trafficking. The Convention entered into force in July 1998 after the deposit of only two instruments of ratification.

Status of agreement

- Legal

Participation

- The Convention only applies to OAS countries that have accepted to be bound by its provisions. The OAS comprises 34 member states, all of which are listed on the organization’s official website, www.oas.org.

Purpose

- The Convention aims to prevent and eradicate the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition and other explosive materials, as well as to promote cooperation and the exchange of information between States Parties.

Value added

- CIFTA is the only existing legally binding agreement in the region that deals with firearms proliferation in the context of law enforcement and crime control.
- The Convention mandates the creation of a mechanism to review its implementation.
- CIFTA encourages cooperation and information sharing between national law enforcement agencies.
- Due to its legal nature, the Convention establishes more robust principles and obligations to adhere to.
**Global and Regional Agreements on SALW**

**Limitations**
- The scope of the Convention is restricted to civilian transfers of firearms and does not cover transfers between states for the purpose of national security.

**Status of implementation**
- While almost all members of the OAS have signed the Convention, only a portion of these have ratified it. For more information on the status of implementation and ratifications of the treaty, refer to [http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-63.html](http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-63.html). A copy of the Convention can be accessed at [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#americas](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#americas).

### 2.2.2 CICAD Model Regulations

The Americas was also the first region to develop a system of regulations to strengthen controls on legal firearms transfers and manufacturers, thereby reducing their possible diversion into the illegal market. In 1996, the OAS established an expert group within CICAD to establish measures for regional cooperation on this issue, and this group provided recommendations by way of the *Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition*. The regulations were adopted in November 1997 alongside the negotiation of CIFTA - both documents are mutually reinforcing.

**Status of agreement**
- Political

**Participation**
- The Model Regulations apply to all members of the OAS.

**Purpose**
- The Model Regulations aim to establish harmonized measures and a harmonized system of procedures for monitoring and controlling international movements of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, in order to prevent their illegal trafficking and diversion.

**Value added**
- The Model Regulations assist in the implementation of CIFTA for those who have ratified the Convention.

**Limitations**
- The Regulations are voluntary guidelines only. They have not yet been incorporated into the national practices of many OAS member countries, particularly the developing countries.

**Status of implementation**
- As mentioned, the Regulations have not yet been incorporated into the national practices of many OAS member countries. Currently, they are in the process of being updated to include more detailed controls on firearms transfers, marking, stockpile management and brokering. In particular, regulations on the control of brokering have been drafted and proposed. For updates on this, visit the website: [http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cicad_brokers.pdf](http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cicad_brokers.pdf). A copy of the Regulations can also be accessed at [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#americas](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#americas).
**Trainer Note (The Americas)**

The above agreements are the main documents in the Americas that promote SALW control (the most important being the OAS Convention), but are not necessarily the only initiatives. Other sub-regional efforts include the Central American Integration System’s (SICA) Security Commission, which continues to develop a sub-regional action plan for countries in Central America (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) to combat the illicit trade in SALW. Their official website can be accessed at www.sgsica.org.

MERCOSUR members also signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 1998 to create a Joint Register Mechanism of Buyers and Sellers of Firearms, Explosives, Ammunition and Related Materials. The MOU helps to promote implementation of the OAS Convention and, while not significant in and of itself, is evidence of political will amongst the main MERCOSUR countries to promote effective implementation. All MERCOSUR countries have ratified the OAS Convention. For background, MERCOSUR is a trading zone between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela that promotes free trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and currency in south and Central America. Associate members also include Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

It is important to be aware of these sub-regional efforts should you be asked for additional information, particularly if you are working and/or training in the region.
2.2.3 Andean Plan

In June 2003, the Andean Community of Nations – a sub-regional trade bloc in South America – took Decision 552 by which it adopted the *Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects*. While this agreement is not legally binding, its implementation is obligatory for all members of the Andean Community. The agreement can be accessed at http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/D552e.htm.

**Status of agreement**
- Political

**Participation**
- Members of the Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. 15

**Purpose**
- With a focus on preventing and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW, the Plan calls for the establishment of voluntary weapons collection programs, the destruction of collected and surplus weapons, controls on civilian possession and awareness-raising, among others.

**Value added**
- The Plan establishes guidelines for action in the national, sub-regional and international contexts.
- The Plan promotes the active involvement of and participation with civil society in formulating and implementing national programs of action against SALW proliferation.
- Establishes an operational plan for the implementation of the document’s objective, including concrete deadlines.
- The Plan calls for the creation of a verification mechanism to ensure full compliance with its guidelines.

**Limitations**
- Implementation of the Plan and adherence to its deadlines are voluntary only.
- While deadlines are called for in the short-term, there are no mechanisms established for follow-up over the longer term.

**Status of implementation**
- Progress in implementing the Plan’s objectives is unclear. The Andean Community Secretariat, along with National Focal Points, is one of the bodies responsible for coordinating implementation. The Andean Plan Decision 552 and all relevant documents can be found on their website at www.comunidadandina.org or at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#americas.
Trainer Note (EU Code of Conduct)

A great deal of analysis has been undertaken regarding the effectiveness of the EU Code of Conduct. There are many known limitations – only some of which are listed here – due in part to the fact that the EU adopted a weaker code than most members wanted given that decisions are made by consensus. For a more critical perspective on the Code, or more detailed analysis of its limitations, the following links are useful to consult:


The BICC has also produced a database that evaluates 170 countries according to seven criteria based on the EU Code. This database can be accessed at http://www.bicc.de/ruestungsexport/index_e.html.

The Common List of military equipment covered by the EU Code is also available at the following website: http://www.nisat.org/EU/EU%20Common%20list%20of%20Military%20equipment/EU%20Common%20List%20of%20Military%20Equipment%202003.pdf.
2.3 Small arms and Europe

Europe is not as much at the receiving end of the global SALW problem as Africa or the Americas. Rather, it is home to a number of major suppliers of arms and ammunition – indeed a large fraction of illicitly held or traded weapons have at some stage been exported from European countries. Following the Cold War, military restructuring and downsizing made vast stockpiles of arms available for release on the market, many of which entered the illicit trade. There is also evidence that substantial quantities of weapons pass illicitly in transit through European countries. Some European governments have also been guilty of tolerating covert arms transfers to one or more favoured parties in armed conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus or in Africa.

As such, a number of important SALW agreements have emerged within Europe that focus specifically on import, export and transfer controls. Part of the political push that has enabled these agreements to have ‘teeth’ – meaning legal status – is the process of new members acceding to the European Union (EU), which requires all member countries to harmonize their small arms policies with those of the EU.

The following highlights the key agreements in Europe relating to SALW control.

2.3.1 EU Code of Conduct

The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is an agreement relating to arms export policies only. It applies to all types of weapons and reflects broader concerns about transfers of all conventional weapons and military equipment, not just SALW. The Code lists eight criteria that EU countries should consider before making a decision on whether or not to export weapons, and requires consultations between members when one country pursues a weapons deal that another had previously denied. Adopted by the European Council in June 1998, the Code is a first step towards the harmonization of EU member states’ policies and regulations on arms transfers.

Status of agreement

- Political

Participation

- The Code applies to all member states of the EU.

Purpose

- To establish minimum standards to be applied by all EU states when considering the export of weapons and military equipment, including SALW. The Code also aims to harmonize and increase the transparency of member states’ arms export policies.

Value added

- The Code is an important mechanism to increase transparency and accountability in arms transfers within Europe and has been adopted by states outside of the EU, including countries in eastern and central Europe, as well as Canada.
There are important norm-building effects of the Code – a number of EU countries are in the process of enacting legislation to implement similar codes of conduct at the national level, which would be legally binding on them. The Code also helped to inform the OSCE Document on small arms (to be discussed below).

Member states have developed a "Users Guide to the EU Code" to assist in its implementation, harmonize their efforts and set out common positions on issues of brokering and equipment to which the Code specifically applies.

In addition to establishing common criteria for arms exports, the Code also attempts to strengthen restrictions on arms exports. For example, there is a denial notification mechanism in which EU countries are required to exchange information on those applications for arms export authorizations that are denied.

Limitations

The Code does not include violations of international humanitarian law or list specific abuses of human rights in the receiving state as grounds for refusing arms transfers.

There are currently no criteria for member states to regulate arms re-exports or the transfer of arms production to ‘third countries’, as the Code does not apply to third-country transfers.

The Code does not explicitly cover government-to-government transfers (i.e. the sale of government-owned arms to other governments). As there are no reporting requirements for such transfers, their transparency remains limited.

Status of implementation

Currently, there is little consistency in the application of the Code among EU member states. Some states have adopted the Code into their national laws (i.e. Hungary), while others have incorporated elements of it (i.e. Belgium, United Kingdom), rendering it more binding upon them. The Code can be accessed at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf or at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#europe.
2.3.2 EU Joint Action on Small Arms

Following efforts aimed at combating and preventing illicit trafficking in conventional arms from and through the EU, member states were now prepared to deal with the specific issue of SALW. In December 1998, the EU Council adopted a Joint Action on the European Union’s Contribution to Combating the Destabilizing Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons to help prevent and reduce the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW. The Joint Action builds on the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms adopted by the Council in June 1997, as well as the EU Code of Conduct adopted in June 1998.

**Status of agreement**
- Political

**Participation**
- The Joint Action applies to all member states of the EU.

**Purpose**
- The objective of the Joint Action is threefold. First, it aims to combat and help end the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW. It also contributes to reducing existing accumulations of these weapons to levels that are consistent with a country’s legitimate security needs. Finally, the Joint Action sets out to help regions suffering from problems associated with the excessive accumulation and spread of SALW to tackle them.

**Value added**
- Under the Joint Action, only states are considered legitimate end-users of SALW. As such, the sale of military-style small arms to sub-state or non-state actors is not permitted.
- The Joint Action commits the EU to providing financial and technical assistance to solve the problems caused by SALW.
- The Joint Action calls for annual reviews of its implementation and publishes the results in annual reports.
- In 2002, the Joint Action was amended to include ammunition within its provisions.

**Limitations**
- The impact of the Joint Action in restricting supplies of SALW from and through the EU is hard to observe.
- The Joint Action applies to categories of military-style weapons – which are listed in the annex to the document – but not to those developed and produced for civilian or sporting use.
- Transfers of military equipment to actors suspected of human rights abuses have continued in secret.

**Status of implementation**
- The EU Council publishes an annual report on implementation of the Joint Action. These can be accessed at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/eujointact.html. A copy of the Joint Action can also be found at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#europe.
2.3.3 OSCE Document

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons was adopted in November 2000. It provided important impetus to the negotiation of the UN Programme of Action, particularly since its membership contains four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States). The Document is a broad framework agreement that includes commitments on a variety of supply-side measures, particularly those relating to arms transfers.

Status of agreement

Political

Participation

- All 55 member states of the OSCE including Russia, the United States and Canada.

Purpose

- In line with the OSCE’s goal of cooperative security, the purpose of the Document is to reduce the threat posed by the uncontrolled spread of SALW in the international community. The Document aims to address the problem to contribute towards the OSCE’s wider efforts in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

Value added

- The Document is the only applicable regional agreement on SALW for member countries in Central Asia.

- In order to overcome some of the Document’s weak language and thus assist with its implementation, member states developed best practice guidelines in 2003, among other things, on national control of brokering activities, the definition of surplus, and weapons destruction methods.

- The Document calls for the adoption of commonly agreed standards for licensing transfers and requires member states to review several criteria prior to awarding export applications.

Limitations

- No controls established on civilian possession of small arms.

- The Document and the best practice guidelines have no legal basis.

Status of implementation

- In February 2002, the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation convened a Workshop on SALW to review the Document’s implementation and provide recommendations for the way forward (http://www.grip.org/bdg/pdf/g1904.pdf). For updates on the status of implementation, visit the Forum’s website, http://www.osce.org/fsc/ and click on the link to ‘special events’. The Best Practice Guidelines can be accessed at http://www.osce.org/fsc/item_11_13550.html or http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#europe.
2.3.4 Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan

In November 2001, the Stability Pact of Eastern Europe adopted a Regional Implementation Plan on Combating the Proliferation of SALW (RIP) in order to develop a coordinated regional approach to tackling the excessive and uncontrolled circulation of SALW.18

Status of agreement

- Political

Participation

- The RIP applies to eight countries in the region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro.

Purpose

- The RIP aims to strengthen regional cooperation in combating the proliferation of SALW in the region. Many of the commitments covered are similar to those established in the UN PoA, thereby also furthering the implementation of this global agreement.

Value added

- One of the most concrete outcomes of the RIP was the establishment in May 2002 of the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). SEESAC (www.seesac.org) provides practical assistance to a variety of SALW-related projects and programmes in the region that are helping to further the implementation of the RIP.

- The RIP emphasizes the elaboration of integrated projects that tackle issues that are closely linked, such as disarmament and weapons destruction programmes.

Limitations

- The RIP’s requirements for implementation are not very clear; hence its implementation has been slow. The requirements also lack clarity and leave a great deal of room for interpretation.

Status of implementation

- The SEE SALW Monitor provides an overview of implementation of the RIP and other relevant SALW agreements in southeastern Europe. This report is not a technical verification system but rather a collection of relevant information to facilitate the analysis of progress towards the implementation of the RIP. The report can be accessed at http://www.seesac.org/target/salw_monitor.htm. A copy of the RIP can be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#europe.
2.3.5 EU Common Position on Arms Brokering

In June 2003, the EU agreed a Common Position on Arms Brokering. Through this agreement, member states committed to a set of provisions to be implemented through their national legislation requiring them to take all necessary measures to control brokering activities on their territory or carried out by their citizens.

**Status of agreement**
- Political

**Participation**
- The Common Position was adopted by all member states of the EU.

**Purpose**
- The purpose of this agreement is to harmonize national legislation on SALW brokering controls among EU countries, so that brokering activities from the territory of any EU country will require a license.

**Value added**
- The Common Position elaborates a range of controls on arms brokering and requires member states to apply sanctions to ensure that the controls are effectively enforced.
- The agreement requires member states to exchange information on denied applications for brokering licenses, among other things.

**Limitations**
- The Common Position does not require member states to incorporate its provisions into their national legislation.
- The document does not require any monitoring of brokering activities outside of member states’ territories or of brokers that are not their citizens.

**Status of implementation**
- A copy of the common position can be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#europe, while a review of its implementation can be obtained at http://www.grip.org/bdg/g4579.html.

2.4 Small Arms and the Pacific/Oceania

The Pacific/Oceania region has been generally weak in drafting and implementing regional agreements on SALW. Research indicates that in all Pacific nations, the domestic leakage of legally imported and legally held guns into illicit hands greatly exceeds the volume smuggled into the region. As such, the safety and security of weapons stockpiles is a priority, and much of the regional body’s focus - the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) - has been on these aspects. For example, in 1998, the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC) produced the Honiara Initiative: Agreement in Principle on Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives and Other Related Materials in which PIF countries agreed in principle on measures to combat illicit traffic in firearms. Further measures followed, the most critical of which is the Nadi Framework.
2.4.1 Nadi Framework

In October 2000, the PIF adopted the Nadi Framework in the document Towards a Common Approach for Weapons Control produced by the SPCPC and the Oceania Customs Organization (OCO). At this time, the PIF also approved the development of model legislation to facilitate the implementation of the principles enshrined in the Honiara Initiative, as well as in the Framework.

Status of agreement

- Political

Participation

- The Framework applies to all 16 members of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Purpose

- The Nadi Framework is a regional strategy that aims to establish stricter controls on firearms ownership, as well as their importation, use and storage.

Value added

- In 2000, the PIF also approved the development of model legislation to facilitate the implementation of the principles enshrined in the Honiara Initiative, as well as the Nadi Framework. In 2003, the Nadi Framework Model Weapons Control Bill was endorsed by member states and seeks to promote the harmonization of regulations and basic standards in firearms control.

- The Nadi Framework formalizes, improves and harmonizes standards in, among other things, controls over civilians possession and the need for a ‘genuine reason’ for possessing or using a weapon, generally outlining what such reasons would entail.

- A series of regional workshops on small arms have been undertaken within the context of the Framework.

Limitations

- The Framework does not address the topic of SALW surplus destruction.

- The Framework also leaves a great deal open to interpretation, including the need for ‘genuine reasons’ despite attempting to outline what such reasons may entail.

Status of implementation

- Currently, only Australia, New Zealand and Fiji have amended their laws in line with the Model Weapons Control Bill, which is a legal obligation in itself. Implementation has therefore been slow. A copy of the Framework can be accessed at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm#pacific.
**Trainer Note**

It is likely that trainees may ask you why there are no regional agreements on SALW in Asia or the Middle East either here or elsewhere during your training. While there are a number of possible answers, an important reason may be the lack of trust, security and good political relations between many of the countries in these regions. While there are regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC), a general lack of cooperation and confidence between neighbouring countries – particularly those in conflict – precludes the negotiation of an agreement that would potentially restrict their national security needs. Ask your trainees for other possible reasons, as they may have first hand experience or insight into this matter.

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**Trainer Note**

The following table can either be reproduced on an overhead projector, or simply referred to in the trainee manuals. It is not necessary that you spend a lot of time on this – particularly if you only focussed on one region for this section – but rather that you allow trainees to get a sense of the different SALW focus of each region. For example, many agreements in Africa establish controls on civilian possession of small arms, while other regions do not. Civil society participation is also included in several African agreements, while it is not mentioned in others. In addition, general trends can be observed between all agreements, such as the importance of information exchange between regional countries, the inclusion of ammunition, and the need to establish an ‘implementing’ body or focal point for implementation. Finally, several gaps can be observed, mainly in the areas of end-user certificates and the destruction of surplus weapons.

In order to get trainees to pull out some of these general trends and observations for themselves – and thus to generate a short discussion - a good question to ask is whether any of the commitments established are common to each agreement? The answer is generally ‘no’, which could then lead you to ask more direct questions, such as: which commitments are most common to all regions? Which ones do most agreements lack? Which measures are unique to what regions? Establishing a macro-picture is also a good way to lead into the next exercise.
2.5 Missing Pieces: Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions

With countries such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia and Israel-Palestine in their midst, the Asia and Middle East and North African regions have experienced the destabilizing effect of SALW. These regions are the scene of numerous intra- and inter-state conflicts that have not only resulted in human suffering and deaths, but also large weapons stockpiles, the proliferation and use of these weapons by non-state actors, and increasing civilian possession. For example, IANSA reports that an estimated 75 million firearms are in South Asia, 63 million of which are in civilian hands. Small arms demand and misuse are particular concerns in both regions, as these weapons are often used for customary purposes, or misused by non-state actors and government agents. Despite this, there are no regional agreements on SALW among states in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. It should nevertheless be noted that North African states have signed the African Union’s Bamako Declaration.

3. Comparing the agreements

From the above overview, it is clear that there exists a wide range of regional measures and commitments on SALW control. Some of these commitments overlap within the same region, while others are very different. By participating in these agreements, as well as the UN PoA and Firearms Protocol, states often have several different reporting requirements on their implementation of relevant SALW control measures. Not only do many states lack the capacity to produce these reports in a comprehensive and timely manner, but this situation also leads to confusion as to what states are specifically obliged to do or not to do. This confusion, disorganization and lack of capacity are often impediments to the successful implementation of regional agreements on SALW control.

To assist in providing a clearer picture of these various SALW control measures and commitments, the table provided in Annex IV compares some of the key regional agreements – the building blocks of other regional initiatives – outlined above. While not all agreements are covered, this table provides a basis for comparison between the regions, as well as a better indication of what is required from participating states.
Trainer Note (Exercise 1)

Distribute copies of both agreements to each group, and allow them sufficient time to read through them. The groups should be quiet for the first few minutes while they read over the agreements, and then become more talkative as they enter into a discussion. Circulate between the groups to ensure that they understand the task at hand, and be available to answer any questions they might have. Circulating often should also give you an idea of how much time they will need to finish the exercise, though we believe that 30 minutes should suffice.

In your preparation, you may wish to complete this exercise as well so that you can anticipate possible answers and contribute to the discussion. In general, the Nairobi Protocol is considered more restrictive and the language used in both is relatively detailed and firm. Both agreements also deal with the issue of civilian possession of small arms and call for cooperation and capacity-building, public education, and the harmonization of legislation between States Parties, among other things. The table in Annex IV can also provide a helpful overview of these two agreements.

When taking up this exercise, ask one group to provide their answer to the first question and ask the rest of the group if they agree/disagree. A simple answer will not suffice – justification will be needed and can be expanded upon by other groups. Ask for specific examples – for instance, what language did you feel was vague or firm? How did your group determine this agreement is more restrictive? Does everyone agree? As for the trends, record these down on a visual device if possible (blackboard, flipchart, overhead projector, etc.), and collect as many ‘trends’ as they come up with. Alternatively, each group can be responsible for offering their observed trends in one issue area (i.e. one group for production, another group on brokering), while others will be asked to comment.

The purpose of this exercise is to allow participants the opportunity to analyze and compare the obligations of two sub-regional agreements on SALW. The question may then turn to the status of implementation of these two agreements, or more specifically, to their impact on the ground. In general, both agreements are important first steps, but are not a panacea to the SALW problem in the region. More specifically, their effectiveness depends heavily on the ability of participating states to harmonize their national legislation on the common controls established, so that each country has the same laws and regulations in place and can act as a united front. Challenges certainly remain, particularly with regard to brokering and the lack of capacity within government and civil society. We recommend that you refer to the following links provided in subsection 2.1 for updates on compliance and implementation of both agreements.


In total, this exercise should take anywhere from 45 – 50 minutes: 30 minutes for group discussion and another 15 – 20 minutes for presentations.
Exercise 1: Discussion and analysis

In small groups, compare the two legally binding sub-regional agreements in Africa – the SADC Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol – to see how they deal with the following issue areas:

- Production
- Marking
- Import/Export
- Brokering

Based on your observations, please answer the following questions:

- Which of the two agreements is more restrictive? What is the nature of the language being used - is it relatively firm, or fairly vague?
- Can you observe any trends from these two agreements? For example, do they both deal with SALW production in a similar way?
**Trainer Note (General trends and lessons learned)**

The bullet points provided can be either read out loud, written on a visual aid or posed as a question for trainees to answer. Of course, additional points can always be added and suggested by the participants themselves. **A key point to emphasize here is the issue of transparency.** A possible question that can be asked to the trainees is what specific measures in the agreements help to promote greater transparency on the issue? Why is transparency important for SALW control?

Possible answers to the first part of this question include:

- Marking and Tracing controls.
- Brokering controls.
- Information exchange.
- Annual reporting requirements (provided they are publicly available as well).
- End-user certification.
- Civil society participation.
- Formal reviews of progress (conferences, meetings, etc.).
- Destruction of surplus weapons (particularly if these occur in public destruction ceremonies).
- Etc...

A number of good answers can be offered for the second part of the question. However, the key point to emphasize is that transparency is important because it **helps build confidence.** Without such confidence, states are less willing to establish and adhere to strict controls on SALW transfers, lack adequate trust in the process and in the commitment of their neighbouring countries; and civilians are also less willing to give up their arms and trust the state security apparatus.

**Trainer Note (Exercise 2)**

The purpose of this question is to get trainees thinking about ways in which to address the limitations identified, and thus achieve greater progress on regional implementation. For example, many of the bullet points offered can be transferred into lessons learned so that existing regional agreements – and potentially new ones – can be more effective on the ground.

Possible answers include:

- The establishment of sanctions or other recourse measures within regional agreements can be an effective way of promoting compliance.
- The creation of common understandings, guidelines or “model regulations” can be useful towards clarifying, or in some cases determining the exact obligations of states.
4. General trends and lessons learned

While the adoption of regional agreements is by no means the answer to the SALW problem, it comprises an important step in addressing the issue in a concrete way. More specifically, regional agreements make important contributions to:

- Awareness raising among states, civil society and the international community.
- Sustaining the political will to addressing the SALW problem.
- Establishing regional standards and common understandings of SALW control.
- Accountability and greater transparency in SALW control.

At the same time, all regional agreements share a number of general weaknesses and limitations that need to be either rectified or addressed in another way. These include:

- Non-compliance and lack of mechanisms to deal with non-compliant states.
- Low levels of implementation, or slow implementation.
- Loose and relatively weak language – controls established are relatively loose and not strong enough to be effective.
- Lack of detail – expression of broad principles rather than prescriptions or concrete actions to be taken.
- Lack of follow-up measures or mechanisms to monitor progress and implementation.
- Lack of public access to and oversight of the process.
- Mixed intentions and lack of political will – governments want political recognition for their efforts, but not necessarily the economic costs of implementing them.
- Lack of resources/capacity to implement the agreements.

Exercise 2: Discussion

What lessons can be learned from the weaknesses and limitations identified in these agreements? What are some of the reasons for these weaknesses?
Annual or biennial meetings to review implementation are useful measures for promoting transparency, accountability, and commitment to the agreement.

Civilian oversight of the process or involvement in monitoring compliance would help to increase transparency and public trust in the state. A role for civil society should thus be recognized in the agreement.

International, regional and civil society support is needed to assist with the lack of resources. In particular, a popular suggestion is the harmonization and streamlining of the reporting process so that states follow the same methodology.

Some of the reasons for these weaknesses, however, cannot be easily addressed. This is because:

- Consensus decision-making – since some of these above regional organizations operate by consensus, decisions taken will always reflect the lowest common denominator.

- Lack of political will – nothing will be done unless government possess the requisite desire, commitment and interest to effectively address the SALW problem.
Global and Regional Agreements on SALW

Summary of Section 3

The SALW problem is not one that remains within borders. As neighboring countries are often a source of SALW proliferation, regional agreements are essential to controlling the illicit proliferation of SALW.

Regional agreements respond to the particular concerns and issues that are unique to a set of countries and therefore have the potential to be effective in addressing specific needs.

Based on the nature of the controls established and the language used, some agreements may be ‘stronger’ than others, though each represents a significant step in raising awareness of the issue, a common resolve to address it and transparency in SALW control.

Limitations and weaknesses of these agreements must also be addressed. While reaching a consensus on these issues is a positive step, political will to implement the commitments made is essential to confronting the SALW problem.

Box—List of resources on the implementation of regional agreements

The following resources are useful for more information on, or an overview of the implementation of these and other regional agreements:


- International Alert’s Monitoring and Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC) Project also provide useful reports on SALW controls in numerous regions, including West Africa, Central Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, the Black Sea region and Eastern Europe. See http://www.international-alert.org/publications.htm#security.


Section 4

Final exercise

This exercise is intended to utilize and apply the knowledge and skills acquired over the course of this training module. Given the diversity of expectations, needs and objectives of trainee groups, we provide two options for this final exercise to choose from, both of which should last approximately 30-45 minutes. If neither of these exercises adequately meet the needs of your trainee group, we encourage you to modify them accordingly or create your own.

Option 1: Analyzing the PoA

Working in small groups, trainees will be asked to complete the table below for the PoA (a copy of the PoA is included in trainee manuals).

When completing the table as a group, trainees should pay attention to the following:

- Whether or not there is a commitment in the relevant area.
- How strong they believe this commitment to be and why.
- Significant gaps.

Allow trainees approximately 10-15 minutes to complete their tables. You will need to provide this table as a handout to the trainees and may also wish to produce a copy either on a flipchart, blackboard, PowerPoint or on an overhead projector slide so that you can record the trainees’ answers. Most of this will be repetitive and is meant to reinforce understanding of the key commitments and issues surrounding the PoA. This table should then be compared very briefly to the larger overview of regional agreements in Annex IV, noting in which areas it falls short of, or complements specific agreements. This process should take approximately 15 minutes.
## Final exercise: Overview of the PoA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obligation and issues covered</th>
<th>UN PoA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National legislation required / recommended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production prohibited / controls established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export / import controls established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking controls est. / recommended</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile management controls established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokering controls established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition covered within SALW controls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual reporting requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National implementation Bodies req. / established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian possession restricted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of surplus weapons required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End-user certification required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society participation included</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal review of progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Global and Regional Agreements on SALW

Option 2: SALW needs assessment

This exercise is particularly relevant if the training is occurring in a SALW-affected region and if trainees are from the same background. Prior knowledge of the SALW situation in their country is also an asset.

In small groups, trainees are to perform a basic needs assessment of the SALW problem in their own country or region. This is to be based on their own information/experience, or on information that has been provided to them by you, the trainer, which may require additional research and preparation – a good source to consult is the 2005 Biting the Bullet Report, national reports and general online searches.

In small groups, trainees are to determine which approach to the SALW problem (supply, demand, misuse) would be best suited for their country or region. In particular, trainees will determine which focus and controls would be most relevant to their context and then compare these to the commitments contained in a) a regional agreement that may apply to their country, and/or b) the PoA. Trainees should then consider answering the following questions:

1) Are the commitments/provisions contained in these agreements adequate to address the SALW problem? Which ones?

2) What supplementary provisions or controls would be necessary or should be included?

3) How can these supplementary provisions be addressed or achieved?

Allow approximately 30-35 minutes for trainees to work in groups, and the remaining 10-15 minutes for group presentations and discussion. This exercise would be particularly relevant and appropriate for government officials or those working in SALW policymaking.
Annex I – Exercise 2, Section 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key thematic areas</th>
<th>Provisions of the PoA</th>
<th>Government actions toward implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply-side measures</td>
<td>◆ Production controls</td>
<td>◆ Develop national legislation, laws, including the use of end-user certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Criminalizing unauthorized manufacture, possession, trade</td>
<td>◆ Establish national coordination agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Export controls</td>
<td>◆ Establish and maintain a system of record-keeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Brokering controls</td>
<td>◆ Establish national system of export and import licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Stockpile management and disposal</td>
<td>◆ Etc...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Marking and tracing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Etc....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand-side measures</td>
<td>◆ Public awareness and confidence-building programmes</td>
<td>◆ Establish/support DDR programmes and reintegration of children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Cooperation towards conflict prevention and addressing root causes of violence</td>
<td>◆ Develop national legislation to criminalize the unauthorized production, possession, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Criminalizing unauthorized manufacture, possession trade in SALW</td>
<td>◆ Implement DDR programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Address special needs of children</td>
<td>◆ Include children in reintegration programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Disarmament</td>
<td>◆ Etc...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Etc....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>◆ Export controls</td>
<td>◆ Develop national legislation, laws, including the use of end-user certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Marking and tracing</td>
<td>◆ Establish effective national system of export and import licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Stockpile management and destruction</td>
<td>◆ Establish and maintain a system or record-keeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Disarmament</td>
<td>◆ Etc...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Etc....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing arms</td>
<td>◆ Destruction of surplus or collected weapons</td>
<td>◆ Establish/support DDR programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Stockpile management</td>
<td>◆ Voluntary weapons collection programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Etc...</td>
<td>◆ Etc...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-related activities</td>
<td>◆ Disarmament</td>
<td>◆ Public destruction of surplus weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Public awareness and confidence-building programmes</td>
<td>◆ Voluntary weapons collection programmes with civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ Etc...</td>
<td>◆ DDR and reintegration of children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex II – Completed matrix for Optional Exercise 1, Section 2

**Hard vs. soft commitments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Commitment Area</th>
<th>Hard Commitment</th>
<th>Soft Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer controls</td>
<td>11, 12, 27</td>
<td>13, 25, 26, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokering Controls</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile management and weapons disposal</td>
<td>17, 18, 19</td>
<td>29, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>21, 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking and tracing</td>
<td>7, 8</td>
<td>9, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation, assistance and transparency</td>
<td>2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18</td>
<td>23, 31, Section III: 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex IV – Sample answers for Optional Exercise 2, Section 2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of agreement</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National legislation required / recommended</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production prohibited / controls established</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – but only for Light Weapons</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export / import controls established</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No – only common criteria established</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – completely prohibited</td>
<td>Yes – via the CICAD Model Regulations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking controls established / recommended</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – records to be kept for SALW tracing for no less than 10 years</td>
<td>Yes – records to be kept, though no minimum established</td>
<td>Yes – records to be kept for SALW tracing for no less than 10 years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – records to be kept, though no minimum time established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile management controls established</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No – but standard for establishing such controls set</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No – but provides standards on storage of civilian weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokering controls established</td>
<td>Common Position adopted on the control of arms brokering in 2003 as one of the objectives set out in the Code</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No – but standard to regulate brokering established</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – via the CICAD Model Regulations</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition covered within SALW controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – with the exception of marking and record-keeping requirements, which only deal with firearms</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange required</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – creation of national databases</td>
<td>Yes – creation of national databases</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual reporting requirements</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Guidelines established whereby national focal points to report to Nairobi Secretariat “on a regular basis”; Nairobi Secretariat to report to Ministers every six months</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National implementation bodies required / established</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – contact points to be established</td>
<td>Yes – national bodies to be established</td>
<td>Yes – national focal points to be established, Nairobi secretariat to oversee implementation</td>
<td>Yes – national body to be established; a Consultative Committee to make recommendations on furthering implementation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian possession restricted</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes – total prohibition on the civilian possession of semi-automatic and automatic rifles, machine guns and light weapons</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – unless there is a &quot;genuine reason&quot; for possessing and using a weapon, which are outlined in the document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of surplus Weapons required</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No – not required but identified as the ‘preferred’ method of disposal</td>
<td>Yes – but only for ‘state-owned’ surplus weapons</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End-user certification required</td>
<td>Draft decision taken in 2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Standard set?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society participation included</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – public community education and awareness programs to be established</td>
<td>Yes – public community education and awareness programs to be established</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal review of progress</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes – annual review meetings of the Forum for Security Cooperation to review compliance with norms</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Annual Ministerial Review Conferences of the Nairobi Declaration considers progress on the Protocol</td>
<td>Yes – review of moratorium to be undertaken every 3 years</td>
<td>Yes – Review Conference to occur 5 years after the Convention's entry-into-force</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Global and Regional Agreements on SALW
Annex VI – Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

(UN Document A/CONF.192/15)

I. Preamble

1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, having met in New York from 9 to 20 July 2001,

2. Gravely concerned about the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world, which have a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and pose a serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable development at the individual, local, national, regional and international levels,

3. Concerned also by the implications that poverty and underdevelopment may have for the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

4. Determined to reduce the human suffering caused by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to enhance the respect for life and the dignity of the human person through the promotion of a culture of peace,

5. Recognizing that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism,

6. Gravely concerned about its devastating consequences on children, many of whom are victims of armed conflict or are forced to become child soldiers, as well as the negative impact on women and the elderly, and in this context, taking into account the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on children,

7. Concerned also about the close link between terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and stressing the urgency of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating this trade simultaneously from both a supply and demand perspective,
8. Reaffirming our respect for and commitment to international law and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States,

9. Reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

10. Reaffirming also the right of each State to manufacture, import and retain small arms and light weapons for its self-defence and security needs, as well as for its capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

11. Reaffirming the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognizing the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

12. Recalling the obligations of States to fully comply with arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

13. Believing that Governments bear the primary responsibility for preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and, accordingly, should intensify their efforts to define the problems associated with such trade and find ways of resolving them,

14. Stressing the urgent necessity for international cooperation and assistance, including financial and technical assistance, as appropriate, to support and facilitate efforts at the local, national, regional and global levels to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

15. Recognizing that the international community has a duty to deal with this issue, and acknowledging that the challenge posed by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects is multi-faceted and involves, inter alia, security, conflict prevention and resolution, crime prevention, humanitarian, health and development dimensions,

16. Recognizing also the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting Governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

17. Recognizing further that these efforts are without prejudice to the priorities accorded to nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament,
18. Welcoming the efforts being undertaken at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and desiring to build upon them, taking into account the characteristics, scope and magnitude of the problem in each State or region,

19. Recalling the Millennium Declaration and also welcoming ongoing initiatives in the context of the United Nations to address the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

20. Recognizing that the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, establishes standards and procedures that complement and reinforce efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,

21. Convinced of the need for a global commitment to a comprehensive approach to promote, at the global, regional, subregional, national and local levels, the prevention, reduction and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security,

22. Resolve therefore to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects by:

(a) Strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, regional and national levels that would reinforce and further coordinate efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects;

(b) Developing and implementing agreed international measures to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons;

(c) Placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently;

(d) Mobilizing the political will throughout the international community to prevent and combat illicit transfers and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons in all their aspects, to cooperate towards these ends and to raise awareness of the character and seriousness of the interrelated problems associated with the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in these weapons;

(e) Promoting responsible action by States with a view to preventing the illicit export, import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons.
II. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

1. We, the States participating in this Conference, bearing in mind the different situations, capacities and priorities of States and regions, undertake the following measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects:

At the national level

2. To put in place, where they do not exist, adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons, in order to prevent illegal manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, or their diversion to unauthorized recipients.

3. To adopt and implement, in the States that have not already done so, the necessary legislative or other measures to establish as criminal offences under their domestic law the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction, in order to ensure that those engaged in such activities can be prosecuted under appropriate national penal codes.

4. To establish, or designate as appropriate, national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. This should include aspects of the illicit manufacture, control, trafficking, circulation, brokering and trade, as well as tracing, finance, collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons.

5. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a national point of contact to act as liaison between States on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.

6. To identify, where applicable, groups and individuals engaged in the illegal manufacture, trade, stockpiling, transfer, possession, as well as financing for acquisition, of illicit small arms and light weapons, and take action under appropriate national law against such groups and individuals.

7. To ensure that henceforth licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process. This marking should be unique and should identify the country of manufacture and also provide information that enables the national authorities of that country to identify the manufacturer and serial number so that the authorities concerned can identify and trace each weapon.

8. To adopt where they do not exist and enforce, all the necessary measures to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.
9. To ensure that comprehensive and accurate records are kept for as long as possible on the manufacture, holding and transfer of small arms and light weapons under their jurisdiction. These records should be organized and maintained in such a way as to ensure that accurate information can be promptly retrieved and collated by competent national authorities.

10. To ensure responsibility for all small arms and light weapons held and issued by the State and effective measures for tracing such weapons.

11. To assess applications for export authorizations according to strict national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and are consistent with the existing responsibilities of States under relevant international law, taking into account in particular the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal trade. Likewise, to establish or maintain an effective national system of export and import licensing or authorization, as well as measures on international transit, for the transfer of all small arms and light weapons, with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

12. To put in place and implement adequate laws, regulations and administrative procedures to ensure the effective control over the export and transit of small arms and light weapons, including the use of authenticated end-user certificates and effective legal and enforcement measures.

13. To make every effort, in accordance with national laws and practices, without prejudice to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they have previously imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons.

14. To develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering. This legislation or procedures should include measures such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization of brokering transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering activities performed within the State’s jurisdiction and control.

15. To take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative means, against any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms embargo in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

16. To ensure that all confiscated, seized or collected small arms and light weapons are destroyed, subject to any legal constraints associated with the preparation of criminal prosecutions, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered.

17. To ensure, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons. These standards and procedures should, inter alia, relate to: appropriate locations for stockpiles; physical security measures; control of access to stocks; inventory management and accounting control; staff training; security,
accounting and control of small arms and light weapons held or transported by operational units or authorized personnel; and procedures and sanctions in the event of thefts or loss.

18. To regularly review, as appropriate, subject to the respective constitutional and legal systems of States, the stocks of small arms and light weapons held by armed forces, police and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that programmes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal.

19. To destroy surplus small arms and light weapons designated for destruction, taking into account, inter alia, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives (S/2000/1092) of 15 November 2000.

20. To develop and implement, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, public awareness and confidence-building programmes on the problems and consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including, where appropriate, the public destruction of surplus weapons and the voluntary surrender of small arms and light weapons, if possible, in cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

21. To develop and implement, where possible, effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including the effective collection, control, storage and destruction of small arms and light weapons, particularly in post-conflict situations, unless another form of disposition or use has been duly authorized and such weapons have been marked and the alternate form of disposition or use has been recorded, and to include, where applicable, specific provisions for these programmes in peace agreements.

22. To address the special needs of children affected by armed conflict, in particular the reunification with their family, their reintegration into civil society, and their appropriate rehabilitation.

23. To make public national laws, regulations and procedures that impact on the prevention, combating and eradicating of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to submit, on a voluntary basis, to relevant regional and international organizations and in accordance with their national practices, information on, inter alia, (a) small arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed within their jurisdiction; and (b) other relevant information such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition that can contribute to the eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

At the regional level

24. To establish or designate, as appropriate, a point of contact within subregional and regional organizations to act as liaison on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action.
25. To encourage negotiations, where appropriate, with the aim of concluding relevant legally binding instruments aimed at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and where they do exist to ratify and fully implement them.

26. To encourage the strengthening and establishing, where appropriate and as agreed by the States concerned, of moratoria or similar initiatives in affected regions or subregions on the transfer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, and/or regional action programmes to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and to respect such moratoria, similar initiatives, and/or action programmes and cooperate with the States concerned in the implementation thereof, including through technical assistance and other measures.

27. To establish, where appropriate, subregional or regional mechanisms, in particular trans-border customs cooperation and networks for information-sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies, with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons across borders.

28. To encourage, where needed, regional and subregional action on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to, as appropriate, introduce, adhere, implement or strengthen relevant laws, regulations and administrative procedures.

29. To encourage States to promote safe, effective stockpile management and security, in particular physical security measures, for small arms and light weapons, and to implement, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms in this regard.

30. To support, where appropriate, national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, particularly in post-conflict situations, with special reference to the measures agreed upon in paragraphs 28 to 31 of this section.

31. To encourage regions to develop, where appropriate and on a voluntary basis, measures to enhance transparency with a view to combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

At the global level

32. To cooperate with the United Nations system to ensure the effective implementation of arms embargoes decided by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

33. To request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within existing resources, through the Department for Disarmament Affairs, to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis and including national reports, on implementation by those States of the Programme of Action.

34. To encourage, particularly in post-conflict situations, the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and their subsequent reintegration into civilian life, including providing support for the effective disposition, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of this section, of collected small arms and light weapons.
35. To encourage the United Nations Security Council to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant provisions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the mandates and budgets of peacekeeping operations.

36. To strengthen the ability of States to cooperate in identifying and tracing in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons.

37. To encourage States and the World Customs Organization, as well as other relevant organizations, to enhance cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to identify those groups and individuals engaged in the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in order to allow national authorities to proceed against them in accordance with their national laws.

38. To encourage States to consider ratifying or acceding to international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational organized crime.

39. To develop common understandings of the basic issues and the scope of the problems related to illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons with a view to preventing, combating and eradicating the activities of those engaged in such brokering.

40. To encourage the relevant international and regional organizations and States to facilitate the appropriate cooperation of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in activities related to the prevention, combat and eradication of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, in view of the important role that civil society plays in this area.

41. To promote dialogue and a culture of peace by encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes on the problems of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, involving all sectors of society.

III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance

1. We, the States participating in the Conference, recognize that the primary responsibility for solving the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects falls on all States. We also recognize that States need close international cooperation to prevent, combat and eradicate this illicit trade.

2. States undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the global, regional, subregional and national levels and to encourage the establishment and strengthening of cooperation and partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations and international financial institutions.

3. States and appropriate international and regional organizations in a position to do so should, upon request of the relevant authorities, seriously consider rendering assistance, including technical and financial assistance where needed,
such as small arms funds, to support the implementation of the measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects as contained in the Programme of Action.

4. States and international and regional organizations should, upon request by the affected States, consider assisting and promoting conflict prevention. Where requested by the parties concerned, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States and international and regional organizations should consider promotion and assistance of the pursuit of negotiated solutions to conflicts, including by addressing their root causes.

5. States and international and regional organizations should, where appropriate, cooperate, develop and strengthen partnerships to share resources and information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

6. With a view to facilitating implementation of the Programme of Action, States and international and regional organizations should seriously consider assisting interested States, upon request, in building capacities in areas including the development of appropriate legislation and regulations, law enforcement, tracing and marking, stockpile management and security, destruction of small arms and light weapons and the collection and exchange of information.

7. States should, as appropriate, enhance cooperation, the exchange of experience and training among competent officials, including customs, police, intelligence and arms control officials, at the national, regional and global levels in order to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

8. Regional and international programmes for specialist training on small arms stockpile management and security should be developed. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should support these programmes. The United Nations, within existing resources, and other appropriate international or regional organizations should consider developing capacity for training in this area.

9. States are encouraged to use and support, as appropriate, including by providing relevant information on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, Interpol’s International Weapons and Explosives Tracking System database or any other relevant database that may be developed for this purpose.

10. States are encouraged to consider international cooperation and assistance to examine technologies that would improve the tracing and detection of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as well as measures to facilitate the transfer of such technologies.

11. States undertake to cooperate with each other, including on the basis of the relevant existing global and regional legally binding instruments as well as other agreements and arrangements, and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and intergovernmental organizations, in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons, in particular by strengthening mechanisms based on the exchange of relevant information.
12. States are encouraged to exchange information on a voluntary basis on their national marking systems on small arms and light weapons.

13. States are encouraged, subject to their national practices, to enhance, according to their respective constitutional and legal systems, mutual legal assistance and other forms of cooperation in order to assist investigations and prosecutions in relation to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

14. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance in the destruction or other responsible disposal of surplus stocks or unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and light weapons.

15. Upon request, States and appropriate international or regional organizations in a position to do so should provide assistance to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons linked to drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism.

16. Particularly in post-conflict situations, and where appropriate, the relevant regional and international organizations should support, within existing resources, appropriate programmes related to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

17. With regard to those situations, States should make, as appropriate, greater efforts to address problems related to human and sustainable development, taking into account existing and future social and developmental activities, and should fully respect the rights of the States concerned to establish priorities in their development programmes.

18. States, regional and subregional and international organizations, research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to develop and support action-oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

IV. Follow-up to the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

1. We, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, recommend to the General Assembly the following agreed steps to be undertaken for the effective follow-up of the Conference:

   (a) To convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action, the date and venue to be decided at the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly;

   (b) To convene a meeting of States on a biennial basis to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the Programme of Action;
(c) To undertake a United Nations study, within existing resources, for examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons;

(d) To consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons.

2. Finally, we, the States participating in the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects:

(a) Encourage the United Nations and other appropriate international and regional organizations to undertake initiatives to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action;

(b) Also encourage all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in their implementation of the Programme of Action;

(c) Further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of international, regional, subregional and national efforts to implement the present Programme of Action.
Annex VII – Membership of global and regional agreements

All Member States of the UN are bound by the Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA) and thus are not listed here. Many States are members of more than one major regional and/or sub-regional agreement. Any country that is not listed here is not a member of any agreement on SALW aside from the UN PoA.

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Global and Regional Agreements on SALW

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Greene, Owen; Bourne, Mike; et – al (Biting the Bullet), International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action. London: IANSA and Biting the Bullet, 2005.


Global and Regional Agreements on SALW


United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, Conventional Arms Branch. *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.* http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/PoA%20generic%20presents%20Xiayou%20chngs.ppt


Suggested reading

- There are several good overviews of the 2001 UN Conference and the PoA. In particular, the Biting the Bullet reports of 2003 and 2005 both contain good summaries of the PoA. The 2002 Small Arms Survey (SAS) Yearbook, Chapter Five, also has a good description of the negotiation process at the 2001 Conference (full text available online at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook%202002/Ch.5Yearbook02Final.4.4.02.pdf.
Global and Regional Agreements on SALW


Useful websites on small arms

- Global Policy Forum (http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/salwindx.htm)
- UN SALW Page (http://disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw.html)
- Control Arms Campaign (www.controlarms.org; http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/)
- SAS resources website (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/reg_docs.htm)
Endnotes

1. These rules were adapted from the UNDP Sierra Leone “Arms for Development, Module II Training Workshop, Police Training School Hastings, 27.9.-02.10.2004”


5. Owen Greene, “Examining international responses to illicit arms trafficking,” Crime, Law and Social Change 33 (2000): 153. According to Greene, the source of a large proportion of illicit conventional arms is government disposals of “surplus” arms or thefts from insecure government stockpiles. This particular problem intensified following the downsizing of military forces and inventories after the end of the Cold War and the lack of proper/strong control systems in a number of post-Cold War states.


15 Venezuela was also a member of the Andean Community until its recent withdrawal from the trade bloc in April 2006.


17 The OSCE is a regional security institution with 55 member states, including Russia, the United States and Canada. Its main areas of activity include conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, particularly within Eastern and Central Europe. Decisions within the organization are taken by consensus and on a politically binding basis. For more information, visit their website at www.osce.org.

18 Country partners of the Stability Pact include those in the region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Other country partners include Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and various regional, financial and international organizations such as the OSCE, the World Bank and the UN.


20 The Pacific Islands Forum represents Heads of Government of all the independent and self-governing Pacific Island countries, Australia and New Zealand. Since 1971 it has provided member nations with the opportunity to express their joint political views and to cooperate in areas of political and economic concern. For more information, visit their official website at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/.


22 This table draws on information contained in Greene and Bourne et-al, “International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action,” London: IANSA and Biting the Bullet 2005, particularly Table Four on pages 186 – 195.