“Guns are for the government”

An evaluation of a BICC advisory project on state-owned arms control in South Sudan

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SUMMARY

From 2011 until 2014, BICC worked with the government of South Sudan to improve the management of state-owned arms and ammunition. Arms and ammunition management is still weak, with dilapidated infrastructure, untrained staff, and lack of clear and unified rules and regulations. The situation is further complicated by limited institutional capacity to instigate and manage change initiatives, as well as a lack of clarity over which government institution is supposed to drive change. Although awareness had increased and numerous positive developments had started, the situation has again deteriorated with the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013 and the subsequent large-scale proliferation of small arms. This report evaluates the project results, and tries to draw lessons for interventions on arms control in the future, not only in South Sudan but also in other countries.
## CONTENTS

Summary 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms control is seen too much in isolation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current limits in capacity also limit the build-up of future capacity</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The conflict has deteriorated an already difficult situation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSSM is about making security forces better at what they do</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Introduction 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms proliferation in South Sudan</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation and disarmament</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling government arms</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory framework</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible institutions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The BICC project 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2011: Assessment phase</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012: Raising awareness</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013: Growing interest in PSSM</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Challenges to be addressed 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which guns to control, and whose?</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional strength and realistic expectations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining the objective</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Concluding remarks 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bibliography</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| List of acronyms and abbreviations | 23 |
Main findings

The difficulties related to improving arms management, also known as physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) are not unique to South Sudan—although the country does present an especially difficult environment. PSSM borrows from different concepts such as ammunition management, armed violence reduction (AvR) and security sector reform (SSR). As such it can form part of attempts to professionalise the armed forces, make peoples’ immediate surroundings safer or more secure, improve relations between communities and local security providers, strengthen criminal justice mechanisms, or even improve a country’s operational capacity and readiness to fight wars. The question of what “doing PSSM” entails in a particular situation can cause considerable confusion and lead to turf battles between different institutions who claim to be working to achieve the same goal (“better PSSM practices”). Different projects can aim at different outcomes, but strong co-ordination and allocation of responsibilities is paramount, as well as a mutual understanding of what the different partners want to achieve and why they agree to a PSSM programme in the first place.

South Sudan has seen this mixture of motives at the level of government and that of international partners. A large-scale, internationally supported PSSM programme has not yet taken off, although numerous projects did start prior to the outbreak of violent conflict in 2013. These have included drafting of legislation, construction of storage facilities, and marking and registration of weapons. They have been moderately successful in that they have helped to raise awareness and build up networks within the organised security forces of South Sudan.

The current situation has undermined much of the progress that has been made. A large-scale PSSM programme is now unlikely to start given the current security situation in South Sudan, as well as the lack of a clear indication of the political direction of the country. However, arms and ammunition management remains a major concern in the country, and once some sort of stability has returned, certain activities urgently require attention from the government—in all likelihood with support from the international community. The following is a short description of the main findings of this Working Paper.

Arms control is seen too much in isolation

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a pervasive problem that aggravates existing social tensions in South Sudan. Government security services have difficulties controlling large parts of the territory, and SALW control programmes (particularly disarmament) are therefore seen as a way to improve the ability of the government to exercise control over rural parts of the country. To many South Sudanese government representatives the main function of PSSM is to decrease the risk of theft from government stockpiles. Although donors and their implementing agencies (NGOs, private contractors) understand the importance of decreasing the risk of theft, they usually have additional motivations to engage in PSSM, such as to improve safety for the civilian population, or to support their efforts to improve community security by increasing police accountability. Such differing motivations are quite common and can be overcome, as long as both sides are aware of the other party’s intentions.

However, what seems absent from the debate in South Sudan on the control of government-owned and civilian weapons is first of all the question why people would want to own a firearm, and second why weapons disappear from government stocks in the first place. Although criminal intentions clearly play a role, and even though the distinction between offensive and defensive use of guns is rather blurred in practice, the reason why many South Sudanese will want to own a gun is that they don’t feel sufficiently protected by the state. This is why some previous disarmament operations proved to have such disastrous effects: Entire communities were left without weapons but also without protection against their still armed neighbours. These communities will now do everything they can to hold on to their weapons.

The other side of the arms control coin is that the state’s absence in rural areas currently provides opportunities for gun owners to profit from them. Weak accountability and links between security providers and local communities mean that government representatives are sometimes directly involved in the diversion of government arms to local communities.
This can be either for political (support to one’s ethnic group) or criminal motives (“renting out” one’s weapon for the night). Setting up a good PSSM system within the different security services of South Sudan means first of all improving central control over stocks, and strengthening accountability. Second it entails removing peoples’ motives for owning a weapon in the first place.

Current limits in capacity also limit the build-up of future capacity

There is limited administrative capacity within the South Sudanese security services to manage arms and ammunition. There have been efforts to bring management structures up to standard, but a large number of specific tasks such as the drafting of standard operating procedures (SOPs), training of storekeepers, or the inspection of storage facilities have not been assigned to dedicated units or individuals. In general the bureaucratic capacity and willingness to implement a basic regulatory framework (including training, procedures for handling, transport, and inspections) is insufficient. As a result, assistance provided by international partners will often not lead to lasting change as the goods provided, whether they be storage facilities or training of individual servicemen, do not become part of the “fabric” of the organisation.

Apart from concerns over staffing or financial means available, the current administrative limits also have a strong impact on the rate at which new or modified tasks can be incorporated into existing structures. Experience in state-building in South Sudan since 2005 has demonstrated how difficult it is to build genuine institutions from scratch. Adding many new responsibilities to weak institutions within a short period of time risks overburdening the system. It also diminishes the ability to learn from mistakes; an existing chance when time is not that much of an issue.

South Sudan can be considered an extreme example of a problem that all countries that have gone through prolonged periods of violence suffer from: They end up with weakened, or even perverted institutions that cannot, or can no longer, perform their basic tasks. This is particularly likely in cases where the standards are not necessarily engrained in the society that spawned these institutions, but were set by foreigners or at an international level. This makes the dilemma of PSSM, and arms control in general, so much more poignant: Countries that need proper arms control the most are also the ones where lasting change is most difficult to accomplish.

The conflict has deteriorated an already difficult situation

Government control over arms has been weak, with the different security services only having an incomplete picture of the number of guns in use, their condition, and their geographical distribution across the country. The problem has persisted for a long time, dating back to the origins of the different components of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) as rebel militias. It is caused to a large extent by the limited linkages between units in the field and central headquarters. There is also a general lack of centralised administrative systems that can connect the details of individual service members (payroll information) to the weapon they have been issued, or are licensed to carry. With the outbreak of the war many youths were recruited into both the government army and rebel forces, and both sides have acquired or handed out large stocks of small arms and ammunition. Many stores, insofar as they existed, have been destroyed or plundered. Realistically, for each security service, a new system for the registration of weapons will have to be re-built from the ground.

PSSM is about making security forces better at what they do

As stated above, motivations for the government and international partners to strengthen PSSM practices can vary considerably. Nevertheless, all attempts to reinforce certain practices and approaches within the security forces have one thing in common: They want to make a security service better at what it does. The real concern lies with what this objective is, and how legitimate it is. In principle the objectives of the security forces, both stated and implicit, should involve such things as defending and controlling territory, protecting citizens, keeping criminals off the streets,
or protecting the country’s wildlife. All of that has to happen in a transparent and equitable manner, under close scrutiny from a country’s civilian institutions.

The collapse of the armed forces in South Sudan has demonstrated that the different factions within the security services (a coalition of loosely integrated rebel groups) have very different aspirations, including securing the power of a number of individuals, advancing the interest of particular ethnic groups, or bringing wealth and status to its members. Changing this is first and foremost the responsibility of the government of South Sudan, and making judgment calls on morality should not be left to foreigners. However, this does not absolve South Sudan’s international partners from at least thoroughly scrutinising their counterparts’ intentions and assessing whether their project to better secure, safeguard and control government arms and ammunition contributes towards the “right” objective: making South Sudan a safer and more secure place to live in.
Introduction

On 5 March 2014 fighting over pay broke out in the South Sudanese capital Juba between different elements of the national army. Mortars were launched and an ammunition depot caught fire. Following a few weeks of relative calm it was a stark reminder of just how fragile the situation had become. The incident took place against the backdrop of a conflict that started in December 2013 as political infighting but that quickly evolved into a prolonged rebellion with ethnic overtones. The depot burned throughout the night, exacerbating already strong feelings of anxiety regarding the stability of the armed forces that were supposed to protect the capital from an invasion by rebel troops. Over the next few days the government handed weapons out to soldiers and even civilians in Juba to assist them in quelling what they have consistently labeled as a “failed coup attempt.” By the end of March, the government had to organise house searches to recover some of the weapons only to find—allegedly to their own surprise—that many civilians had multiple “illegal” weapons stored, and some even had hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades lying on the floors of their houses.

The recovery of lost or stolen government weapons during disarmament operations is unfortunately not an unfamiliar pattern in South Sudan. Accidents that occur as a result of badly stored explosive ordinance are far from the exception either. Tackling those risks falls under the umbrella of the physical security and stockpile management of arms and ammunition (PSSM). It encompasses small arms and light weapons (SALW) as well as conventional ammunition and can involve a wide range of interventions including the construction of weapons storage facilities, marking and registration of weapons, drafting of rules and regulations, training of army and police personnel in storage, handling, and transport of weapons and ammunition, and the destruction of surplus. Good PSSM practices help increase security through better control over the weapons. They improve safety by making sure explosives are stored, handled, and transported with care. And they strengthen accountability by allowing, in case of abuse, individual weapons to be traced back to individual soldiers or police officers.

Funded by the German Federal Foreign Office, BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) has been working with the government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) since 2011 to improve PSSM practices and approaches, primarily by providing technical advice. This Working Paper will provide an outline of that project and evaluate its results, as well as describe the broader developments that took place in arms and ammunition management over the entire length of the project period—roughly from 2011 until early 2014. A discussion of these developments allows for an evaluation that is of use to the larger community engaged in improving weapons management, both in South Sudan and in other countries.

The author of this Working Paper, a BICC technical advisor who was based in Juba within the Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, the National Focal Point on small arms under the Ministry of the Interior, supported the GRSS from 2012 to early 2014. Although equipped with a limited budget for some activities, which included a number of trainings at the provincial (“State”) level, the main task of the advisor consisted of assisting the South Sudanese authorities in their efforts to improve their arms and ammunition management.

This Working Paper is divided into four chapters. After an introduction of the main findings the second chapter describes the political and security situation in South Sudan, with a focus on the problem of SALW proliferation and the institutional arrangements in place to tackle the problem. It is followed by a description of the BICC project, as well as the efforts by the GRSS and other international partners to improve the situation. The third chapter analyses project results and the operating environment. The Paper ends with a number of concluding remarks.

In his Working Paper, the author argues that the GRSS is increasingly aware of the importance of good PSSM, but that sustainable progress has not yet been made. Confusion over the appropriate institutional set-up for arms management—including the attribution of responsibility—within the government hampers concerted and targeted efforts to implement PSSM projects. This makes it more difficult for the GRSS to identify priorities for arms control and to submit these to its international partners for consideration and discussion.
Here a preliminary remark with regard to the current situation is warranted. This evaluation is based on the efforts and activities undertaken until December 2013. The outbreak of hostilities in late 2013 put into serious doubt the results of all projects that aimed to improve the GRSS’ practices in arms and ammunition management. At the time of writing it is unclear what South Sudan’s future prospects for peace and stability are, or how the country can recover from the ethnic divide that has manifested itself during the conflict. The mass defection of entire army brigades that characterised the first phase of the rebellion in particular has brought into the open the extent to which internal cohesion, and command and control have been key weaknesses of the South Sudanese armed forces. Other organised forces, including the police and wildlife service, have also suffered from defections but to a lesser degree. Any future effort to better control, safeguard, and account for arms and ammunition will only be a more complicated endeavour for it.

Arms proliferation in South Sudan

Proliferation and disarmament

The presence of SALW is a pervasive problem in South Sudan and a result of the protracted civil war that pitched the government of Sudan against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The war cost countless lives before finally leading to the establishment of the independent Republic of South Sudan as the world’s youngest nation on 9 July 2011. Although in the West the war was popularly portrayed as a struggle of Christian–Animist “African” Southerners against oppressive Muslim Arabs in the North, the war also set a large number of Southern militias and warlords up against each other. Some of those were used as proxy fighters by the Sudanese government in Khartoum to suppress the independence movement. Individual leaders’ political influence and wealth were in most cases more important drivers of conflict rather than of ideological differences. Whereas the militias received weapons from Khartoum, the SPLA obtained them from neighbouring countries, mostly Ethiopia. Small arms from ex-Soviet stocks, particularly the ubiquitous AK and its variants, were not in short supply, although ammunition tended to be harder to obtain. The result was a country awash with guns.

The government, and in particular the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), has been struggling to provide security in rural areas. This role is frequently still taken up by local youth, particularly in the most volatile states of the country, such as Jonglei, Lakes, Warrap, and Unity State. SALW are often labelled “multipliers of violence”, but that hides a more pervasive effect they have had on South Sudanese society. Over the course of the civil war and the post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)-years, they have become embedded in rural culture, not merely as a means of violence but as an intrinsic component of a young man’s transition to adulthood. This is particularly the case amongst pastoralist groups where the youth carry guns in the cattle camps to protect their livestock, but also to raid cows from other ethnic groups. Apart from carrying immense symbolic value, cows are the currency of choice to pay dowries and over the years, prices have fallen victim to inflation. As a result cattle raiding has become almost a necessity for youth who want to find a suitable wife. The practice has also increased in notoriety as the use of automatic rifles has made the number of fatalities rise, and as the raids now sometimes also target women and children to increase the raiding party’s population through forced marriage and adoption. Retaliatory raids aim to recover stolen cattle set off a cycle of revenge attacks that is very difficult to stop. Cattle raiding youth have proven to be a fertile constituency for recruitment into different ethnic-based militia groups. Membership of these groups is often fluid, depending on what the youth can get out of it in terms of access to arms, cattle, or other resources, including political power.

The situation leads to a dilemma: The same youth responsible for cattle raiding are also those who can make a credible claim of providing protection to their own communities. The SSNPS lacks both the capacity in terms of manpower, equipment, and professionalism, and the level of trust required to fully take over responsibility for local security structures.

The GRSS has on numerous occasions tried to disarm civilians, both through voluntary, civilian-led
processes, and through forceful disarmament; the latter usually carried out by the SPLA. In rural areas disarmament operations typically involved the SPLA surrounding villages, followed by door-to-door searches. The practice was often characterised by a lack of discipline and numerous human rights violations and resulted in a mistrust of the army that the civilian population often perceived as biased against certain communities. In addition, because the SPLA was then unable or unwilling to provide the disarmed communities with protection, disarmed communities risked falling victim to cattle raids by neighbouring communities that had not (yet) been disarmed. Such occurrences only reinforced the perception amongst some communities that they were politically marginalised and would have to fend for themselves.

Whether selective disarmament was an SPLA-wide policy is debatable. Instead of demonstrating an institution-wide commitment to targeting certain minorities, the process laid bare the extent to which the national army was unable to control units in the field from its headquarters in Juba. It is arguably just as likely that individual SPLA units and field commanders displayed an ethnic bias. This is lent credence by numerous stories about soldiers and high-ranking officers who handed out guns confiscated during disarmament campaigns to members of their own ethnic group. The result was a worst case scenario: a rural population again in possession of its firearms, but now with a heightened sense of distrust of the government because it had tried to take away the primary means of defence against that population’s neighbours and the government itself.

Controlling government arms

Lack of government control is not restricted to weapons confiscated during disarmament campaigns. It is a well-known phenomenon in South Sudan that government weapons are stolen from official depots or are lost. In the absence of safe storage inside police stations, officers are forced to take their weapon home with them, leaving these vulnerable to mishandling or accidental discharges by others in the officers’ homes. It is often difficult to find out whether a weapon is lost or stolen as records are inadequate, incomplete, and not subject to regular audits.

Stories of police officers “renting out” their weapon for the night also abound. Accountability for the loss of weapons or ammunition is minimal.

Control over ammunition, particularly the storage and handling of items containing explosive material, is not up to even the most basic international standards. This is mostly a concern for the SPLA that owns the majority of this kind of materiel and that is normally in charge of military operations that would require the use of items like mortars, tank grenades, and rockets. Storage facilities suffer from a number of common deficiencies: In many cases they are not designed for storing explosive material; different kinds of explosives that ought not to be mixed are stored together; and conditions inside stores (such as high temperatures, presence of rodents, and atmospheric humidity) increase the risk of unintended explosions. A combination of these factors leads to a high risk of accidents with potentially large-scale loss of life as a result. It also diminishes the lifespan of ammunition for operations, thereby reducing operational readiness and necessitating earlier replacement. In a country where already half the government budget is spent on the security forces, this is an unwelcome addition to a budget line that already crowds out expenditure on social services.

The adequate registration of weapons and proper storage facilities for weapons and ammunition are two central aspects of PSSM. Other essential elements include a clear legal and regulatory framework for all components of the arms and ammunition management cycle, and a thorough training package for all personnel involved. From generals down to privates, all should at least have a minimal understanding of the importance of sound arms and ammunition management. All these components are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.

At all levels South Sudan is not yet able to adhere to international standards. SPLA officers frequently report that during the liberation struggle PSSM practices within the SPLA were in fact quite stringent. Allegedly this was born out of sheer necessity as especially in the early days of the struggle weapons and ammunition in particular were hard to come by and had to be looked after. These practices later became diluted when, as part of the CPA and later the
Juba Declaration, numerous rebelling commanders and their militias were integrated into the movement. The new members did not live up to the same standards of security and accountability. Practices and skills acquired during the civil war were gradually lost or became too dispersed to be of systematic use as reliable standards across the movement.

Regulatory framework

The regulatory framework for PSSM in South Sudan is far from coherent. This has as much to do with the different objectives PSSM tries to achieve, as with the nascent state of South Sudan’s laws and institutions. As outlined above, the various objectives PSSM aims to achieve range from increasing community security and trust in local security providers to improving safety and operational readiness of the armed forces. These policies and actions generally fall under the authority of a number of different institutions and require a regulatory framework that works at different levels of abstraction.

Generally speaking, a national arms and ammunition policy and legislation will provide the regulatory framework for all other activities employed under the PSSM umbrella. A policy describes at the most general level the aims a government has with regard to a certain topic. The policy is subsequently developed into legislation. Whereas the policy is a description of government aims that is merely politically binding, legislation turns this into mandatory minimum requirements that are often backed up by provisions in the penal code. The political aims of having for example a gun-free society, or of regulating hunting practices, need to be circumscribed in legislation that makes the possession of firearms illegal or that requires individuals to apply for firearms licenses if they want to go hunting.

Because legal provisions remain rather abstract, they require further specification in regulations. Legislation normally requires ratification by parliament but regulations can be signed into effect by the designated official; usually the minister responsible. This facilitates their adjustment to new or changing circumstances over time. In the case of arms control, regulations for example can specify the exact procedure individuals must follow when acquiring a licence, or they can prescribe the fees that have to be paid.

The greatest level of detail is provided for in the standard operating procedures (SOPs) or standing orders within the different organised forces (wildlife, prisons, etc.). These, for example, specify the emergency procedures for an individual weapons storage site, or detail the administrative procedures that an officer has to go through in order to accept an application for a hunting license. It is up to the respective part of the armed forces to then implement and enforce the provisions of the SOPs.

Responsible institutions

In South Sudan, developing policies on small arms and light weapons (SALW) control was initially part of the mandate of the National Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). This authority was shifted in 2008 to a newly created institution, the South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC). Its establishment was partly due to dissatisfaction within some parts of the international community with the Commission that, already burdened with a difficult mandate, did not sufficiently prioritise arms control and community security. The establishment of BCSSAC was also very much in line with a number of international treaties and protocols that call for the creation of dedicated, civilian-led institutions to address issues of small arms control—chiefly the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA).

BCSSAC was originally part of the Office of the Vice-President, but was later transferred to the Ministry of Interior at the request of the then Minister of Interior. It is responsible for policy development and the co-ordination of activities in the field of SALW control and community security. Under its auspices the SALW Control Policy was enacted in 2011. Its priorities were the regulation of firearms transfers across the borders, the prevention of licit stocks becoming illicit, and removing from society the existing stock of illicit firearms. Even though BCSSAC maintains that the entire spectrum of PSSM activities fall within its mandate and authority, its main activities primarily relate to issues of community security and safety.

BCSSAC is the co-ordinating body for the drafting process of the SALW Control Bill, for which in 2012 a committee under the Minister of Interior was
constituted. South Sudan is a signatory of the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms Control (Nairobi Protocol)—an agreement between states in the East-African region that aims to curb the proliferation of small arms. The SALW Control Bill would translate the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol into South Sudanese law. In late 2012 the Bill was submitted to the Ministry of Justice for review by a technical committee that would look into the compatibility of the Bill with the national body of laws. By the time of writing (July 2014) that process had not been finalised and the Bill still awaited ratification. In the meantime, the same committee in charge of drafting the legislation has started working on the regulations. The rationale is that this decreases the time lapse between the Bill coming into force and the finalisation of the regulations. The process of drafting the regulations has been put on hold as the result of the outbreak of hostilities in December 2013.

Developing SOPs for arms and ammunition management will be the responsibility of the individual organised forces. Apart from the SPLA and the South Sudan national police service (SSNPS), these are the wildlife service, the prison service, the national security service, and the fire brigade. They are tasked with taking care of the weapons on a day-to-day basis. This means that at least in principle, there is a clear institutional divide between formulating national policy and legislation (BCSSAC) and the implementation and enforcement of the rules (organised forces). With such a dichotomy in place, regular meetings and coordination of activities between the policy-setting body and those implementing it is of paramount importance and could in principle help to avoid discussions about the role and responsibilities of the different institutions involved.
The BICC project

2011: Assessment phase

BICC has been working with the NDDRC since 2007. As a result of that collaboration it received a request from BCSSAC to assess the state of arms and ammunition management of government-owned weapons in South Sudan. Funded by the German Federal Foreign Office a BICC technical advisor undertook the assessment in 2011. The main findings of the study were that:

- Safe storage is rudimentary in the Republic of South Sudan, and infrastructure as well as technical capacity to securely store or manage the inventory of SALW/ammunition is lacking.
- If stores are available, these are often unsecured mud huts (tukuls), old infrastructure such as unused schools/hospitals, or other concrete facilities and metal sheet huts which are not secure to store arms and ammunition. Marine cargo containers are used as bulk storage facilities mostly without any ventilation holes or sun protection. There is a high risk of unintended explosions.
- The situation outside of Juba (at the county level and below) is dire. High hazard class ammunition is often accessible to the public, remains unprotected and unguarded. In some cases they are left scattered on the ground.
- Racks or equipment for organising storage and ensuring that small arms are secure were not found anywhere. The general security of storage facilities, such as permitting entry and access to the stores of weapons and ammunition only to official personnel, is often insufficient and needs upgrading. In some cases new facilities will be required.
- There is a general lack of safe storage guidelines.
- None of the security services had independent authorities charged with the oversight of SALW and ammunition stocks.

2012: Raising awareness

The assessment was followed by an official request from BCSSAC to the German Federal Foreign Office to provide advisory services through BICC for PSSM. As a result, in 2012 a technical advisor spent roughly six months working with BCSSAC in Juba to assist the government in making a start with the development of a PSSM programme. Over the course of 2012 BICC spent most of its time raising awareness with key government counterparts in BCSSAC, SPLA, SSNPS and other organised forces of the benefits of sound arms and ammunition management, as well as on the concrete steps the forces could take to improve their current practices. The technical advisor worked on a day-to-day basis with the co-ordinator for PSSM in BCSSAC to strengthen capacity at both the individual and the institutional level.

One of the most visible steps taken in 2012 was the establishment of an interagency arms and ammunition management working group, consisting of an appointed focal point from each service at the level of a colonel or lieutenant-colonel. The idea was that at this rank officers would be able to play a central role within their service, linking up the technical level in charge of store management with the senior level responsible for policy development and budget allocation. The working group’s main task was to co-ordinate efforts to improve PSSM and to report on activities taking place. In addition it would provide a useful forum for government representatives and international partners to interact, exchange ideas, and develop proposals for PSSM interventions.

Through the working group, BCSSAC and BICC focused their attention on getting the organised forces to implement so-called low cost, high value measures: small-scale interventions that are relatively cheap but that would still greatly increase the safety and security of the stores. Concrete examples include installing a new door, drilling ventilation holes, or using a standard register for the registration of weapons. This strategy was dictated by the political-economic circumstances prevalent in the country. In early 2012 the government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) decided to shut down its oil exports through Sudan in response to what it deemed an illegal seizure of the country’s natural riches by its Northern neighbour. With 98 per cent of the government budget coming from oil revenues, the country was effectively dependent on its remaining foreign exchange, donor funding, and high-interest loans. Civil servants’ salaries...
were still paid but over time operational budgets effectively came down to zero—particularly those that were not yet appropriated. As a result the message that prevention is cheaper than a cure became a moot point as there was simply no money to prevent anything other than a revolt by unpaid soldiers.

Apart from BICC not many international partners were active in PSSM in 2012. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was BCSSAC’s strongest supporter through its community security project, which included a strong capacity-building component for BCSSAC. Earlier on some small arms had been destroyed, but these were mostly one-off events based on relations between demining non-government organisations (NGOs) and local commanders. Saferworld, and UNDP to a lesser extent, provided financial assistance to the drafting committee for the legislation that also received support from a Saferworld consultant and benefited from advice from BICC and the security sector reform (SSR) unit of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). UNMISS DDR provided the SPLA Engineering Corps with modified containers for the storage of small arms as a pilot project.

In 2012 UNMISS DDR started a project to acquire marking and registration equipment for small arms. The Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), the body overseeing and providing assistance for the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, had already provided BCSSAC with marking equipment in 2010. Roughly 37,000 weapons were marked from SSNPS, wildlife service, prison service, and the fire brigade. However, incomplete registration, a limited linkage of weapons to individuals or storage sites, and the storage of data at BCSSAC instead of at the level of the services meant that it was impossible to trace these weapons based on their markings. Consequently the database was neither expanded nor updated. The RECSA project effectively came to a halt in 2012. UNMISS DDR then issued a tender for new marking and registration equipment. It was won by two South African companies: FACTT (software), and Traceability Solutions (machines) who had gained experience in marking in South Africa and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

In 2013 BICC’s presence in South Sudan was intensified, with a technical advisor permanently present within BCSSAC. This made it possible to participate regularly in the meetings of the drafting committee for the regulations and to be more involved with the marking and registration process. The project shifted focus so that there was more frequent engagement with the Focal Points in the organised forces.

Around early 2013 interest from other international partners in PSSM increased. The UN Mine Action Service commissioned three pilot projects for building or upgrading storage sites for the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) and the SPLA, executed by Mines Advisory Group, Danish Demining Group, and Norwegian Peoples Aid. The rationale was that a successful implementation of these projects would create greater donor interest for PSSM in the face of less funds available for humanitarian mine action. BICC provided technical advice to these projects and on a number of occasions assisted the implementing agencies to get in touch with government counterparts.

In mid-2013 UNMISS organised a study tour to South Africa in order to help officers responsible for arms management within the different organised forces gain a better understanding of what a functioning marking and registration system would look like. The trip was also used to discuss customisation of the database. The first batch of operators of the machines was trained in Juba in November, with handover of the machines still pending when fighting broke out in December 2013. Although the software design differs from the RECSA software that had by then become operational, it does capture the same basic information and allows for exchanges of information with other RECSA member states.

Over the course of the project period, BICC encountered a number of persistent problems with the way arms and ammunition were managed. In both SPLA and SSNPS, there is little systematic knowledge at both headquarters and state level about the number, type, and condition of arms and ammunition present in stores across the country. Central control over their strategic distribution is limited, and this in turn
greatly impedes the strategic lifecycle management of arms and ammunition and a corresponding acquisition programme to make best use of what is available.

A side-effect of this weak inventory management system is that no weapons are ever determined to be surplus to requirements or even obsolete. Although the GRSS has a policy for destroying weapons, that policy is so cumbersome and involves so many senior officers that in reality destruction in accordance with the established procedures is impossible—a legacy of the liberation struggle, during which weapons and ammunition were prized assets. As a result, there is neither a clear indication of the number of weapons the government requires (based on a strategic defence posture), nor of the number of weapons already available. This means that there is no data that can help counter the frequently heard argument that it could never hurt to hold on to the old rifles lying in a corner—just in case. When the conflict broke out in December 2013, arms purchases quickly became a government priority. Again, there were no means of telling whether this was based on a real or perceived lack of functioning guns already available and, if so, what the exact requirements were.

The majority of weapon stores in South Sudan contain guns that are inoperable. Their conditions range from those that just need minor repairs to completely rusted-through and outdated rifles for which neither the expertise to handle them, nor the corresponding ammunition is available. They occupy already limited storage space and are a hazard to anyone who would try to use them. This is particularly dangerous in the case of rusty hand grenades or moisture-filled mortars that frequently pile up inside inadequate stores. Public incineration, particularly of the weapons, will not only increase security, it can also send a strong signal to the community that the government is taking small arms control seriously and is willing to start with its own stock.

Within the police and the army, the potential lethality of their sizeable caches of weapons and the significant value these represent is not reflected in manpower allocated, as expressed in the number of officers responsible for co-ordinating weapon storage, handling, and transport. This is not to say that the organised forces do not think that improving the management of weapons would be in the interest of their force and the country. With support from BICC, the SPLA and SSNPS have developed ideas to restructure the administrative structures for arms so that these better reflect a) the changed nature of the service (from rebel group to professional force) and b) the added responsibilities that needed to be introduced with, for example, a new curriculum or a comprehensive weapons marking and registration system. Discussions between BICC and the SPLA and SSNPS had been at an advanced stage, and a concept paper, a draft organisational chart, and revised job descriptions had been ready to be sent to the police and army leadership. As with other developments in PSSM, this discussion was put on hold following the eruption of violence in the country.
Challenges to be addressed

The outbreak of hostilities in South Sudan has laid bare many of the structural problems that the country faces, not only with regard to arms control. What started as a political dispute in Juba quickly escalated into large-scale conflict that was fought by renegade soldiers and youth militias who had easy access to small arms from badly secured arms depots and weapons that were registered nowhere. Weak command and control, loyalty to commanders instead of to the army as an institution, and a strong ethnic dimension all combined, turned the conflict into something incredibly hard to contain. In the process, the fighting tore away any veneer of respectability and institutional coherence that the GRSS and the organised forces had been able to build up since 2005.

PSSM is a relatively new field of intervention, and in South Sudan it had barely taken off when the first shots were fired in Juba. The current situation has led to a forced suspension of most activities already underway, making it an opportune moment to reflect on the way forward and what could be improved upon.

This chapter discusses a number of the key points faced by those working to counter the proliferation of small arms and improve PSSM in South Sudan, both within and outside of the government. The three most important points are:

\the kind of arms control that is needed in South Sudan,
\the expectations of the institutions involved,
\the more conceptual problem with regard to the possible objective of PSSM interventions.

The following discussion of these points can only be brief here and each one deserves (and sometimes has received) separate discussion that remains outside the remit of this evaluation. All three are grounded in South Sudanese history, and there are interests that need to be taken into account and different perceptions of what works or what constitutes success. As such they will continue to play a role in future interventions.

Despite billions of dollars of international assistance, there remains a large gap between what should change in South Sudan and what is possible given the current power constellations, the economic situation and the country’s social and cultural fabric. This is true even for the relatively “technical” field of PSSM. The necessity of having to improve arms management is based on the basic premise that there is a deficiency in the way a government enforces its monopoly of violence. The situation will only sustainably improve if there is a change in the structural reasons for why individuals behave in a way that threatens safety and security. When weapons are lost it makes all the difference for the sort of intervention required to find out whether the loss is due to generally weak infrastructure, lack of training, or low pay. Interventions need to be targeted to individual and group motivations, which is why PSSM is, and must be, executed as more than a collection of purely technical tasks.

The motivations host governments have for agreeing on externally co-ordinated or funded PSSM programmes can also differ significantly from the ones held by their international partners. Nevertheless, diverging motivations can often find congruence in project-specific objectives. Government and donors will need to find a way to work together to achieve these goals, while remaining conscious of what each partner’s motives are.

Which guns to control, and whose?

In South Sudan, the limited degree of physical control that central authorities have historically exercised over a large predominantly rural part of the country has implications for the kind of authority the government can aspire to establish. The SSNPS has so far not been able to keep many communities safe or to prevent inter-ethnic cattle raiding from spiralling out of control. In the latter case, the SPLA has often been called upon to restore order, further blurring the lines between law enforcement and the armed forces.

This situation has surprisingly enough not led to any serious debate on the conditions under which the possession of firearms for self-protection is an acceptable situation. For the moment, small arms control remains based on the premise that the possession of most types of weapons is reserved for representatives of the state, and that being granted a licence to own a firearm is a form of government permission, not the exercise of a right. In order to obtain such a licence, the applicant will have to
undergo training with a government-accredited trainer, submit proof of safe storage, and pay the prescribed fees in order to obtain a one-year licence. After that year he will have to go through the process again.

All of these conditions are a significant burden for anyone living in a remote part of the country with limited financial means.

In addition, as the possession of an automatic firearm is reserved to members of the organised forces, citizens are only allowed to apply for a licence to possess either a semi-automatic or a non-self loading weapon. From a conceptual point this is understandable, if only because it is an intrinsic part of a model followed by all countries in the region. However, in the absence of a comprehensive disarmament of competing tribes and a government stepping in to fill the void, many South Sudanese will continue to feel the need to carry a gun. A blanket ban on the possession of automatic weapons will not only be hard to enforce, it will leave even people who have a genuine need for a weapon to defend themselves with a dilemma. Non-automatic alternatives to the ubiquitous AK47, such as bolt-action rifles or semi-automatic handguns, are expensive, hard to come by, and do not offer the kind of firepower some individuals might feel they require as long as the state is not able to guarantee their safety.

Those without a permit are in violation of the law, and despite more community-oriented sensitisation programmes on the dangers of gun use such as the BCSSAC / UNDP ‘Peace Caravan’, the dominant rhetoric within the GRSS remains that small arms control involves taking away guns from civilians.

Although it is understandable that the government wants to exercise control over its territory, the objective of arms control efforts should be the security of the citizens, not securing the capacity of the government to use unrestrained force when this suits its interest. Even if security can be guaranteed, civilian disarmament should not proceed without a comprehensive plan in place for the marking, registration, and safe storage of any weapon confiscated. The relevant authorities must take a decision in advance as to what will happen to confiscated weapons, both serviceable and unserviceable, to avoid that local communities try to get their guns back. The fact that this has happened in the past only underscores the close link between PSSM and civilian arms control.

Without curbing the demand for guns in the communities, pressure on government stockpiles will remain. PSSM initiatives will be all the more difficult for it. Amidst discussions on the sort of civilian weapons control the government should exercise, control of government-owned arms can also play an important symbolic role. By better securing and accounting for its own weapons and reducing leakages from government stocks, the government can demonstrate that weapons safety and security is a genuine priority and that it is willing to take up its own responsibilities first.

Institutional strength and realistic expectations

The weakness of government institutions are a challenge that donors quickly identified as one of the ills of the world’s youngest nation. Immediately after the signing of the CPA in 2005, large numbers of technical advisors started working to build the capacity of all the newly founded line ministries, courts, local government institutions, the central bank, and the organised forces. Given the short time lapse, rocky past, and the economic and political difficulties the country has already faced in its two years since independence, it is hardly surprising these are not yet up to the standards outlined in international best practice guidelines.

In the field of SALW control the institutional weakness of BCSSAC has had a strong impact on its ability to steer policymaking on arms control in South Sudan. This was partially due to disputes over leadership and internal management, but these have evidently been compounded by broader issues of political will, both with regard to the institution’s mandate and its institutional placement. The institution’s position as a semi-independent body under the Ministry of Interior but physically separated from the Ministry of Police means that it has less direct access to the top level of government than, for example, the numerous independent government commissions whose commissioners are considered (junior) cabinet
members. Most staff members are acutely aware that this makes BCSSAC’s access to the highest level of government precarious and dependent on individual connections—even though informal networks are admittedly important throughout the South Sudanese administrative system.

The real problem lies not so much with the institutional weakness of the existing body but with the lack of genuine interest and will within the upper echelons of government (at the level of the minister and the presidency) to provide BCSSAC with either the hierarchical positioning, the manpower, or the financial means to implement its ambitious mandate. A number of examples make this apparent: After a reshuffle, no permanent Head of the institution has been appointed for over two years; the Ministry of Justice failed to review the draft SALW Control Bill for over a year after it had lost its copy; and finally BCSSAC was transferred from the Vice-President’s office to the Ministry of Interior, and has now finally become the responsibility of the Deputy Minister of Interior who is not a full cabinet member. In the minefield of competing priorities, capacity-building, and technical advice across the full range of government activities, SALW control has unfortunately not received the unmitigated attention it requires and deserves.

BCSSAC’s positioning within the government hierarchy has had an impact on its ability to co-ordinate PSSM activities throughout the country. Whereas the institution is (at least nominally) responsible for policy drafting and co-ordination, genuine control over arms lies with the organised forces. Because BCSSAC itself falls under a different line ministry than the SPLA, it has no direct formal links to the army senior leadership. Implementation of BCSSAC policies by the SPLA is therefore not guaranteed, and buy-in has clearly been a problem. This was evident in the numerous unilateral disarmament campaigns conducted by the SPLA, in which no civilian institutions, including BCSSAC, were genuinely involved.

The problem also applies to the drafting committee for SALW legislation. Although the committee initially boasted the presence of a senior SSNPS general, he gradually (unofficially) withdrew and became otherwise occupied. One of the consequences is that the drafting committee has decided that because stockpile management is part of the BCSSAC mandate, the committee can also lay down rules on ammunition management. It remains to be seen whether the uniformed services will accept the rather strict standards laid down for weapons and ammunition storage as part of a process in which no officers from the key logistics directorates have consistently been involved.

In all likelihood, this situation is not unique to South Sudan. The premise that a civilian body, situated outside of the chain of command, would be able to co-ordinate and take decisions on matters of logistics and procurement on behalf of the organised forces is wishful thinking in many countries where the military controls a preponderance of political (and often economic and social) capital. For such an institution to succeed, it must have direct access to and consistent support from the highest levels of power—including the military.

The arms and ammunition management working group supported by BICC and co-ordinated by BCSSAC has been one attempt to bring the different government institutions involved in PSSM closer together. However, the organised forces in South Sudan function in a particularly hierarchical manner that leaves little room for manoeuvre lower down the ranks. Whereas for example in most armies around the world a full colonel is a high-ranking officer with autonomy and responsibility within his area of operations, South Sudan boasts no less than 745 generals (Brigadier-Generals and above)—making a colonel a comparatively less senior rank. This is why the Focal Points’ superiors (at the level of Brigadier and Major-General) have been increasingly involved in the BICC project.

The skeleton regulatory framework the organised forces currently have in place shows that there is in fact much need for higher-level, policy-oriented involvement. Focussing too much on the institutional weakness of BCSSAC risks glossing over the fact that the organised forces themselves currently lack the bureaucracy or administrative capacity to implement large-scale reforms required to, for instance, mark and electronically register their entire inventory. The numerous professionalisation initiatives that were started in collaboration with international partners and the numerous operational requirements took up
the majority of energy and resources that could have been dedicated to enacting change.

Limited central control over arms and ammunition stored outside of Juba means that any intervention aimed at setting national standards will face serious implementation problems. At headquarter level there is no overview of the state of stores (and thus of when stores need to be upgraded), and officers are regularly rotated without taking into account the specialised knowledge they have acquired through training programmes. At the same time, entirely decentralised interventions through the training of storekeepers and building of infrastructure will require buy-in from headquarters. This is not only to prevent central actors from feeling left out of the process, it is also because local interventions easily risk being one-off events. Without regular inspections from a higher authority (be it at the national or the state level), the sustainability of PSSM interventions will be largely accidental and based on connections to individual commanders. In the long run, national regulations, included in every private and non-commissioned officer’s core training curriculum and backed up by a thorough accounting system, are required to elevate standards across the board.

The problem of a limited administrative and bureaucratic capacity having to implement change points to a puzzling dichotomy: Everyone involved in the South Sudanese state-building project recognises the fact that it is a young nation with weak institutions that need to be built from scratch. At the same time, there is little evidence that building those institutions or giving the existing ones new responsibilities, is based on a realistic assessment of what they can currently achieve or how many additional tasks they would be able to absorb. The over-stretching of institutions with new tasks and the lack of a phased approach cannot be fixed by external technical advisors alone, as this creates over-reliance on foreigners and parallel structures of governance. The difficulties of capacity-building in a post-conflict environment are well-known and discussed exhaustively, but the debate has not taken much hold in PSSM yet.

BICC has experienced this difficulty when trying to engage government counterparts in discussions on low-cost measures, on drafting training curricula, or on reforming administrative structures. Particularly after it became clear that donors would potentially be interested in funding the construction of new stores, it became impossible to get attention for smaller, less visible measures. This was not merely a matter of disinterest, it was the result of a wider environment in which certain core government functions were effectively outsourced (both financially and technically) to outsiders. Even with regard to weapons control, a basic responsibility of the armed forces, a similar expectation existed that foreigners would build stores, train personnel, and help draft the required rules and regulations. At the same time, international partners, primarily demining NGOs, were asking the government to provide them with policies and a legislation that would allow them to start applying for donor funds. Whether or not this was a realistic expectation was a question that was answered differently even within government, where different institutions and individuals oscillated between a lack of trust in their own capacities—often employing the metaphor of South Sudan as an infant that needed nursing—and a strong sense of pride, resulting in assertions that outsiders had no right to interfere with the government’s affairs.

There is a degree to which strengthened internal GRSS co-ordination as well as improved co-ordination amongst donors, implementing partners, and the GRSS could ameliorate the situation. It could help to align government priorities, allocate responsibilities, and provide clarity regarding mutual expectations. The continued call for co-ordination has become louder, even though a high turnover rate at both sides of the table means there is little institutional memory in place that can guarantee that previously held debates are not repeated. BCSSAC has not been able to consistently take upon itself this co-ordinating role in PSSM for reasons mentioned earlier, and BICC has therefore had difficulty finding an approach that would be able to strengthen co-ordination with all major stakeholders (BCSSAC, the services, and international partners) who are genuinely on board.
Defining the objective

As mentioned earlier, PSSM is a broad concept that can incorporate multiple types of interventions that each aim at different objectives. This ambivalence is inherent in the concept of PSSM. It permits actors with different backgrounds and different institutional objectives to converge and jointly design a project that seems appealing to all those involved.

The risk is that because neither the GRSS nor the international community operate according to the strict hierarchical and policy-consistent formula known from Western government bureaucracies, different interpretations of what a PSSM project tries to achieve will emerge. For some donors securing arms is a means to improve community security, whereas others aim at preventing terrorists from getting their hands on particularly lethal military equipment. For organisations with a background in humanitarian demining, focussing on ammunition safety may seem natural, whereas more development-focussed organisations might want to prevent armed violence between communities as it obstructs development efforts.

The same difference in objectives is visible within government. BCSSAC might care more about the impact of SALW proliferation on community security, whereas for the SPLA controlling the territory and maintaining operational readiness is more of a concern. This has become visible on numerous occasions when the more civilian-oriented institutions bordering the South Sudanese security sector (BCSSAC, DDR Commission, Peace Commission), despite large-scale backing from international donors, had to give way to interests exemplified by the army, national security, or individual interests over matters of peace and security. “Civilian-led” initiatives only remained civilian-led as long as their programmes and projects were compatible with the objectives of key figures in the politico-military centre.

Bypassing civilian institutions in favour of direct engagement with the security services may in practice lead to more “effective” interventions. However, such a policy will only reinforce the relatively marginal position of such institutions, even though their objectives are likely to be closer to the ones donors prioritise. It would also be an acknowledgement that the large-scale financial and technical donor support that these institutions received in the past has not been effective. Shifting to unencumbered support of the organised forces in PSSM will make some things easier but, as their recent partial disintegration has aptly demonstrated, many similar challenges remain.

Pointing out the difficulties involved in focussing energy on one institution instead of another is not a call for a “holistic” approach. There will not be an integrated, well-co-ordinated programme whereby government, donors, and implementing agencies get stores upgraded across the country, officers from all levels trained, national standards ratified and implemented, and full ammunition lifecycle management put in place—thereby fulfilling everyone’s wishes. Such programmes require the exact kind of systematic approach and sustained political commitment that key stakeholders in South Sudan cannot guarantee. In fact they should not, as this approach rarely leaves enough flexibility to quickly adjust to challenges encountered during early phases. A more incremental approach, whereby government and international partners engage in small-scale efforts, learn from mistakes and adapt to changing circumstances is more likely to foster the relations needed to succeed in a sensitive field like the control of nationally owned arms. As BICC has experienced, building relations with the right people is crucial, even though for outsiders the internal machinations of South Sudanese politics are, and in most cases will remain, highly opaque.

What this does call for is a re-think of what a PSSM project is supposed to achieve, and what the most effective use of resources available would be to achieve that objective. Sometimes this means tying in PSSM with efforts looking at community security or armed violence reduction. Some components are genuinely technical and involve knowledge from explosive ordnance disposal or munitions training. And some will require building governmental capacity and authority in a manner not dissimilar from security sector reform programmes. In all cases what is necessary is to understand why certain practices came into existence and what has caused the current situation.
Concluding remarks

BICC has, through its support to the GRSS, been able to raise awareness on the importance of PSSM and increase interest amongst government actors and the international community. BICC deliberately chooses to leave only a small footprint as part of its advisory services. It operates with a minimum of staff, is without its own office space, logistics, or finance personnel in-country and does not acquire fixed assets such as vehicles. Advisors are based within government institutions to which they provide technical advice and with which they work together to strengthen their capacity. This approach aims to make the role of BICC personnel strictly advisory, instead of implementers of a programme or project on behalf of a government. As a downside this means that the overall success or failure of a programme—in this case the degree to which arms and ammunition management has improved in South Sudan—is dependent on a large array of factors that often fall outside of the advisor’s direct sphere of influence.

The long-term impact of the project is currently in question and it is very doubtful whether sufficient political will exists for the country’s elite to implement broader political and societal changes that are required to move South Sudan forward after the deep divide caused by the violence. Future project on arms control require in any case an acknowledgement that the South Sudanese organised forces have only a rudimentary ability to manage their weapons, and that this capacity cannot be upgraded overnight. Simple programmes with modest aims might be better than more ambitious projects that not only require individuals to do many things differently, but also to do it within an organisation that is undergoing a complete overhaul.

Integrating all these different components at a smaller scale and in a relatively safe and stable environment (insofar as it currently exists) would be the ideal approach, as long as different actors focus on where they each can add value and clearly communicate amongst each other—both of which are easier said than done. The training of storekeepers, the upgrading and building of storage facilities for small arms should be backed up with establishing decentralised systems for auditing weapons and ammunition registers, for example at the State level. The State-level Commissioner of Police can play a central role in keeping the system intact, including preventing needless transfers of trained personnel. Information on the condition of stores, the location of weapons, and the degree of implementation of rules and regulations can then be fed back to headquarters, at which level more engagement by the army and police leadership on the drafting of regulations and standard training curriculums is still required. BICC’s previous role in providing advice and raising awareness at the policy and senior level of the organised forces will remain relevant in this field.

The recent events in South Sudan also pose fundamental ethical questions. International standards on PSSM are rather technical, and the precise nature of many of its components will change very little whatever the political affiliation of the government or its general stance towards arms control may be. Nevertheless, its activities form a part of a professionalisation initiative of the organised forces, and as such aim to make them better at what they do. Experience in other countries has demonstrated that measures aimed at improving accountability and at introducing checks and balances can easily be discarded if the organised forces perceive them as straightjackets or obstacles. The South Sudanese security forces, both those loyal to the government and those in opposition, have been involved in killings of civilians, often based on tribal affiliation.

Support to the South Sudanese armed forces should therefore not come without reservations. Where exactly to draw the line between principled rejection and constructive re-engagement is difficult to say, but at the moment working with local police to improve arms control as a means to improve police-community relations makes more sense than improving ammunition safety and operational capacity for the SPLA. External assistance on arms control is only warranted if it aims to reinforce the activities of a force that is dedicated to improving the lives of the people it is supposed to protect. This is BICC’s responsibility as well as any donor’s, and this precondition should have an impact on the kind of activities proposed and the partnerships struck. There still remains a lot of work to be done in small arms control in South Sudan, probably more than ever.
Bibliography


LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>AVR</td>
<td>Armed Violence Reduction</td>
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<td>BCSSAC</td>
<td>Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control</td>
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<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>PSSM</td>
<td>Physical Security and Stockpile Management</td>
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<td>RECSA</td>
<td>Regional Centre on Small Arms</td>
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The responsibility for contents and views expressed in this Working Paper lies entirely with the author.