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Preface

Conversion: The theme of this publication may sound rather dry, but it is extremely topical and its importance is on the increase rather than on the decline. What is more, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), as the world’s only research center working in the field of conversion, really knows a lot about this subject. BICC’s task is the effective and sustainable transformation of military processes, activities, properties and structures. What is needed are concepts for regions that are having to cope with structural change as a result of the closure of military bases. But concepts alone are not enough. BICC’s unwavering intention is to promote peace and development and thus to contribute towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

When we talk about innovation as the key to the future of our society, we usually think about fields of science such as the life sciences, nanotechnology or biotechnology. BICC shows us that we should not forget that innovative concepts are needed just as much in the humanities and the social sciences. Civil wars which smolder and repeatedly flare up, poverty, pandemics, scarce resources and, not least, international terrorism—all these threaten the security of the International Community of States. We need creativeness and new approaches in order to tackle all these issues.

BICC’s work in this broad field is widely acclaimed. The Center was founded in 1994 with the support of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia as an independent and non-profit organization. In 2003, BICC received a second excellent audit report. It has numerous national and international contacts and partners. All in all, we can be proud of this jewel in the crown of Bonn, the “City of Science”.

Dear reader, you are holding in your hands the first trail-blazing edition of a new series of publications—the Annual Report/Jahresbericht. This publication takes BICC’s previous yearbook, the conversion survey, a step further and, for the very first time, is being published in both English and German. It is good that BICC is providing the public with an even better insight into its practical work. The Center’s Financial Report is also being published for the first time within this Annual Report and depicts BICC’s financial situation. Not only does this allow greater transparency, it also casts a good light on BICC in this respect.

I wish the Center continued success with its important work and you, the readers of this Annual Report, a stimulating read.

Prof. Dr. Andreas Pinkwart
Minister for Innovation, Science, Research and Technology of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia
In 2006, BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion—Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn) is launching a new publication series: the Annual Report. With this new publication we intend to comment on our three key areas of work—arms control, measures to establish peace, and conflict—as well as analyze worldwide armament and disarmament trends. But we also want to provide better insight into BICC’s work by including short articles describing the experience, objectives, results and key research areas of selected projects. A Financial Report is also included to provide information on BICC’s financial situation. In short, we want to inform the research world, our potential clients and the broader public about our work in greater detail.

The leading article in this year’s Annual Report is entitled “How can peace be established?—Successes, failures and challenges”. BICC regards conversion as the transformation of military processes, activities, resources and structures. Conversion as defined by BICC also supports conflict prevention and reconstruction in post-conflict situations. The question of how to build sustainable peace discussed here is of decisive importance against the background of the various conflicts that are smoldering or repeatedly flaring up, for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa. What are the ‘sore points’ that make many violent conflicts so persistent? Has the international community learned from its mistakes? What contributions can arms control, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and crisis prevention make?

These commentaries are underpinned by an evaluation of international trends in the field of armament and disarmament. This analysis of available data indicates a continuing worldwide trend towards increased military expenditure. But what does this mean for regional conflict constellations? What conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between security and development? What does human security involve?

Together with the leading article, this analysis carries on from BICC’s former yearbook, the conversion survey, which appeared for ten years up to 2005 and analyzed global trends in armament and disarmament.

Some articles in this report are devoted to individual BICC projects. The article on TRESA (Training and Education on Small Arms), for example, describes experiences gained with internationally recognized training modules in the field of small arms control. Another article explains a new BICC database on arms exports, and research on the German and European arms industry. The articles on the connection between the use of natural resources and conflicts describe the projects “Transboundary water management” and the “Role of external stakeholders in civil war economies in Sub-Sahara Africa”. The Annual Report also includes information about research projects on United Nations Integrated Peace Missions and national as well as international experience with, and the prospects of, base conversion. The exhibition project entitled “Millennium Development Goals 2015—Acting globally for poverty reduction, peace and development” can also be regarded as representative of BICC’s public relations and educational work.

A new feature that appears in this publication is BICC’s Financial Report. This does not only provide information on the facts and figures of the Center’s economic development, but also on its projects and staff. A list of publications rounds off the picture of BICC’s activities. Conversion is innovation—this is what BICC stands for as the only conversion research center to date, not only in Europe but also worldwide. With our new Annual Report we intend to provide regular information on how we are positioned to perform our tasks of conducting research and providing information and consulting.

Peter J. Croll
Director of BICC
Conversion, in BICC’s understanding, comprises at its core the transformation of military-related processes, activities, assets and structures that support conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. This chapter takes a closer look at some issues related to the current difficulties of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is both a major objective of and a factor setting the frame of conversion activities such as small arms control, disarmament, the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and conflict prevention measures.

Summarized in brief, this chapter makes the following points:

• The International Community of States has improved its capability to suppress and end open fighting, even though it is far from willing to use this capability in all cases of violent conflict.

• The international community of external supporters of post-war peace-builders, including international organizations, governments and development donors continues to have limited knowledge of how to successfully assist societies in building up sustainable, peaceful structures after the end of violent conflict, despite a long list of cases. Certain measures are favored even though it is not known whether and how they work.

• Beyond the failings of practical policy implementation on the ground, another reason for the widespread failure of post-conflict peacebuilding in poor countries is that our knowledge about the causes of violent conflict and wars, as well as the conditions and policies for successful post-conflict reconstruction, and conflict prevention remain scant.

Peacebuilding in 2005

The international machinery of responding to crisis and warfare continues to be complicated and prone to failure. In early 2005, it looked as if efforts at reforming the UN Security Council—the highest decision-making body at the international level—had a good chance; however, the outcome at the end of 2005 was highly disappointing as at the decisive UN Millennium plus Five Summit in September 2005, few concrete measures for reform were actually agreed upon. Among the most successful reforms was the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, though with a much more limited mandate than had originally been suggested in the proposal by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December 2004.1 What came out of it will be discussed below. But—however vague the suggestions in the final document may be, the proposed Peacebuilding Commission is one of the few operational measures for UN reform that survived the Summit negotiations.

The positive role of international interventions

The following events of 2005 can serve to signal recent trends in conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction where the International Community of States has improved its capability to suppress and end open fighting. Unfortunately, states are often far from willing and, in some cases even unable to use this capacity in most violent conflict situations.

• A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Government in Khartoum was signed on 9 January 2005 under the spotlight of the international community and the media, thus ending the longest civil war in Sub-Sahara Africa. Regrettably, the violent conflict in Darfur (West Sudan) continued.

• At the end of 2005, the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) handed all security responsibilities over to the government of Sierra Leone.

• Under pressure from the UN, NATO and SFOR, the two de facto armed forces on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina were united at the level of the central government. This is an evolution in peacebuilding beyond the arrangements agreed in Dayton in 1999.
• Talks about the future status of Kosovo have started.

• Elections held in Afghanistan during 2005 may serve to improve the conditions for peacebuilding in a still volatile post-conflict situation.

An important study published in 2005 summarizes recent trends in conflict and conflict management. It shows that both the incidence of wars and the number of battle deaths are at a historical low, and that the main reason for this is a greater willingness of the international community to engage in preventing, suppressing and ending wars worldwide.2

The number of peacekeeping missions and other measures to constrain fighting, such as international conflict prevention diplomacy and international sanctions has risen significantly. Between 1948 and 1990 there were 42 broadly defined peacekeeping missions to assist in the establishment of peace. Since then, there have been an additional 83 missions.3 The statistics for international sanctions are even more striking. International and regional organizations have mandated sanctions in 46 cases since World War II, starting with Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) in 1964. But aside from Rhodesia, only four other cases occurred prior to 1990—the remaining 41 cases occurred in the last 15 years.4 While the record of sanctions in helping to contain and end wars is not very good, external military interventions have in most cases been associated with the end of open violent fighting, recent examples to the opposite, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, notwithstanding. International conflict prevention diplomacy, which by nature is harder to describe empirically, also seems to have been quite successful in recent years in a number of cases, such as in Sri Lanka. Clearly, conflicts are not solved solely through such measures. Major conflict risks and roots of violent conflicts, such as poverty remain, while others, such as natural disasters, may even increase. However, their evolution into open warfare can be, and often is prevented through greater international engagement. Transboundary water issues are a case in point—here, potential conflict has, in a number of cases, been transformed into actual cooperation.5

The argument of a close link between the increase in the use of international measures—ranging from preventive diplomacy to military force—and a decrease in the incidence of warfare can therefore be substantiated. Examples of ongoing warfare in early 2006, while seemingly in contradiction, actually strengthen this argument. For example, in Darfur, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire—where international peace support missions have more or less failed to definitively end open fighting—the international community is currently debating on whether to strengthen these missions, assuming that more military force is needed on the ground. Similarly, in the Israel/Palestine conflict, more international involvement is generally seen as necessary for reaching peace.

Major failings

However, the relative success of increased international engagement in ending open conflict in the post-Cold War period should not detract from the following major failings in crisis management:

• Some cases of warfare and violence remain outside of the realm of international action. Among the most egregious cases are Chechnya and Israel/Palestine. Although in Chechnya there had been critical reports by the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the parties to the conflict are, on the whole, powerful enough to prevent stronger international engagement. In other cases, such as Nepal, international interest in taking action remains low. Another example is the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia that flared up again in late 2005. In this case, the international community is divided, there is support for both. Therefore it will likely remain uninvolved.

• International engagement to stop fighting has been quite successful in ending open conflict and keeping low the number of battlefield deaths, but much less so in stopping the killing of civilians off the battlefield. While we lack good data on overall ‘excess death’ in warfare6, some recent examples,
such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), indicate that the ratio between battle deaths and civilians dying off the battlefield from starvation or preventable diseases may have changed during the last few years. As such, the latest estimate of the number of victims in the DRC conflict since 1998 is 3.9 million people, while the number of battle deaths is probably less than 200,000. In any case, one cannot conclude from the statistics on the incidence of warfare that suffering from war has also decreased.

• Military interventions, while generally successful in ending wars, have created their own sets of problems. The case of Iraq since Spring 2003 provides striking evidence of how military interventions can go wrong when seen as illegitimate by significant parts of the population. Even though this case may not belong to a discussion of intervention that is geared toward ending overt conflict, the case of Iraq demonstrates how opposition to occupation is primarily expressing itself—not in military-style fighting, but rather in terrorist-style bombings and shootings. While opponents to militarily superior forces have also resorted to terrorist-style attacks in the past, the recent intervention in Iraq has fuelled the internationalization of terrorism, with terrorist acts committed in various parts of the world and by citizens of many countries. One of the reasons could also be seen in the lack of an immediate application of generally valid disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) guidelines in the immediate stabilization phase after the end of hostilities.

• The most important problem, however, is that strong international interventions alone, particularly when they involve military force, tend to only ‘freeze’ conflicts rather than provide a ‘breathing space’ to transform them. Keeping the peace with external force is rarely sustainable, and much more needs to be done in order for peace to take root. Military force can only be one element of a successful intervention to achieve a lasting peace. While lip service is often paid to this reality, most international interventions continue to be top-heavy on military force both in terms of personnel and resources. The argument here is not to weaken international peace support missions, but rather to invest more money and thinking into the other elements that are needed for post-conflict peacebuilding. One of the key actors in a sustainable peace process is civil society in the respective country. Therefore local actors must be more involved in the peace process.

Efforts and critical problems in peacebuilding

The Human Development Index (HDI) presented in the UNDP Human Development Report 2005 highlights a strong relationship between violent conflict and poverty. Of the 32 countries at the bottom of the index ranking, 22 countries went through a period of violent conflict during the 15 years before 2005 (see also “Global and regional trends” below). This finding underscores the question of how priorities in policy and spending should be established. The “Trends” below will publish data about the relation between military and social spending as well as global and regional trends in armament and disarmament and conflicts. Another important aspect of the relationship between violent conflict and poverty is the difficulty to escape what has been called the ‘conflict trap’ through post-conflict peacebuilding.

Beginning with the 1992 Agenda for Peace of the then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the concept of comprehensive peacebuilding has been widely accepted. Small libraries can already be filled with books and papers making suggestions on how to achieve a lasting peace after violent conflict. The United Nations (UN), as well as many other national and international organizations, have applied a host of instruments to assist countries in post-war peacebuilding. But progress in achieving success remains limited. A number of long-standing cases, such as Afghanistan and Kosovo, remain intractable. Cases that seemed to be successful, such as Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti, have proven to be short-lived. In other cases, such as Angola and Cambodia, the situation remains tenuous.
The general lack of resources, particularly beyond the initial and not sustainable rush of international donors following the end of violence, is one of the reasons for this limited success. This must be seen in the general context of the efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015. A favorable point in development, however, might be the result of the G8 summit in Gleneagles deciding on multilateral debt relief for the poorest countries. But several donor countries also indicated that they will have difficulties in reaching their commitment to raise national levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 0.7 percent of GDP due to financial constraints. This includes member countries of the European Union (EU), despite the official EU declaration to increase the ODA to 0.51 percent of GDP by 2010, and finally to 0.7 percent by 2015.

In addition to the question of resources, success in peacebuilding faces other problems. For example, some of the difficulties of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding are self-inflicted. The international community’s efforts are not often well coordinated, not only among donor countries, but also within them. Donors have preferences and self-interests that do not always add up to a well-balanced approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. The timing of post-war assistance often depends less on the needs on the ground than on budget cycles and political considerations in donor countries. Better coordination would make success in post-conflict peacebuilding more likely. In addition, international interventions tend to underestimate—and often have no access to—the potential of regional and local efforts, which should be actively included in the peace process to ensure sustainable results.

The UN Peacebuilding Commission

As mentioned, one of the few reform measures surviving the Millennium Plus 5 Summit in New York in September 2005 was the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission. After long and difficult discussions, the mission and composition of the Peacebuilding Commission was finally agreed upon in concurrent resolutions by the General Assembly and Security Council on 20 December 2005. The new Commission is set up as an inter-governmental advisory body to the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Secretary-General and to member states for countries on the “verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict.”

The work of the Commission is steered by seven members of the Security Council, amongst them the five permanent members selected by the Council itself; seven members of ECOSOC elected from regional groups; five top contributors to UN budgets, funds, programs and agencies; and five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to UN missions. The General Assembly is tasked with electing seven additional members, with special consideration for states that have experienced post-conflict recovery.

A number of developing countries have criticized that the weight of powerful countries, particularly that of the permanent members of the Security Council, is overly strong. Other states and NGOs have strong concerns about the Commission’s ability to address contentious situations given that it can only act by consensus. The Commission will also have limited resources to perform its main task of pushing for the implementation of integrated strategies for stabilization, economic recovery and development. Staff to support the Commission will have to be pulled out from other UN offices, as no new funding was made available. Still, the President of the General Assembly, Swedish Diplomat Jan Eliasson, stated on 20 December 2005 that “[t]his resolution would, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, create a mechanism which ensures
that for countries emerging from conflict, post-conflict does not mean post-engagement of the international community.”

Which factors are obstructing peacebuilding?

While the Peacebuilding Commission may, despite its various shortcomings, help in better coordinating the activities of the UN and other international, regional and national actors involved in post-conflict peacebuilding, it is unlikely to be able to deal with the more substantial problems in this field.

Only four of the most critical problems shall be mentioned here:

- **High level of expectations.** The international community regularly sets high standards for success in post-conflict peacebuilding. Afghanistan is a good case in point: The country is to become a democracy, with a full spectrum of political and individual rights for all citizens. This is a big jump for a society that has very little experience with democracy and the protection of human rights, and where many traditions and patterns of behavior run counter to Western conceptions. Furthermore, the long conflict has engrained political and economic interests which are difficult to overcome.

- **Depth of intervention.** The international community’s engagement in post-conflict situations has vacillated between a ‘light footprint’ approach in Afghanistan and *de facto* trusteeship, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While in theory, preference is given to the former, the lack of suitable local actors to govern in practice often leads to the second approach. Both, however, have proven problematic, the first because it may lead to outcomes contrary to the intentions of the international community (as in Haiti), and the second because it implies long-term and possibly indefinite engagement. ‘Local ownership’, the word of choice of the international donor community, can hardly develop in situations where external actors dominate.

- **Sectoral balance.** In most post-war societies, peacebuilding entails many facets. For a while in the early 1990s, the international community focused on democratic institution-building, particularly elections. Since the mid-1990s, security-related issues have attained greater importance, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). Economic reconstruction is also central to a successful peacebuilding strategy. But what do we do in what order, and what do we prioritize under conditions of limited resources?

- **Legacies.** One of the marks of New Wars is their brutality. Conflict parties regularly commit war crimes; but peace needs the cooperation of all conflict parties. The international community thus often has to confront leaders that it would prefer not to deal with. While a good number of war criminals have recently been prosecuted, many still go free. The question of who to punish for earlier actions, and how to redress earlier injustices has many additional levels. The negotiations about the future status of Kosovo, which began at the end of 2005, illustrate many of the difficulties of overcoming legacies of the past without creating new sources of discontent and potential new conflict.

Dimensions of improvement

While it is easy to criticize international actors’ actions in post-conflict situations, it is much more difficult to produce ex-ante good advice on how to do better. The knowledge of how to prevent, manage and solve conflicts remains thin.
Both, conflict and post-conflict research have produced many interesting results. Unfortunately, most of these research results involve constellations of variables that cannot easily be achieved. The model of the Western industrialized countries with their strong economies, liberal societies and differentiated political and administrative systems strongly dominates most of the thinking of post-conflict peacebuilding. But is this a realistic model that corresponds to the wishes of the people in post-conflict countries? And, if so, how can a society get there?

One example of this state of affairs is research into the effectiveness of security sector reform (SSR) in post-conflict situations. Originally developed as a concept within the framework of ‘good governance’ that focuses on the democratic oversight and control over the military, police and other security institutions, it has now been widely adopted as describing the increase in the efficiency of local forces. In a recent publication from the NATO Defense College, David Yost calls SSR the best exit strategy for foreign troops. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq, effective local forces have been defined as a precondition for withdrawal. But is a rapid post-conflict build-up of forces possible? And can this be done without running counter to other post-conflict peacebuilding objectives, such as democracy and the promotion of human rights? Should democracy and legality be integral parts of the build-up of forces, even if that means that the process may be more difficult and long-term?

Obviously, more solid research is needed into the conditions and parameters of successful post-conflict peacebuilding. Such research needs to be well informed by the knowledge acquired from particular post-conflict situations. Particularities of conflict history, but also of societies beyond the last conflict to be transformed, need to be known to properly analyze post-conflict situations. Comparative research of post-conflict situations is necessary to bring out the structural factors that shape success and failure. Research in this vein is one of the core activities of BICC especially in the relevant fields of DDR, SSR, sanctions and the disarmament and control of small arms.

Summary

The international community has improved in containing direct military confrontations. However, we are far from achieving the end of war, with egregious cases where the international community continues to be inactive. Problems also remain with respect to the implementation of peace support operations, including by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU). The strategic plan of the Commission of the African Union and the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by-Force and the Military Staff Committee of the AU is an important step towards improving capabilities in the most conflict-afflicted region of the world.10 More fundamentally, the nature of warfare has shifted: Violence often occurs outside of the battlefield and death is now more of a consequence, rather than a direct result of war. Still, the impact of greater international commitment to ending wars is remarkable.

Unfortunately, no such statement can be made with regard to post-conflict situations. The integration of the civilian and military aspects of international missions remains a major problem. Furthermore, after a decade of effort, post-conflict peacebuilding remains a difficult arena for international assistance. Commitments are generally not commensurate with the demand for support. While it is often difficult to collect the necessary number of troops for an external military intervention,
it is always more difficult to get the necessary financial support for post-conflict reconstruction. Military and civilian efforts are not in balance; overall there is an over-commitment of military resources and an under-commitment of civilian resources as shown in the “Trends” below.

Dr. Michael Brzoska
Former Research Director of BICC, today Director of IFSH (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg)

Peter J. Croll
Director of BICC

4  Establishment of sanction regimes against countries or territories, calculated using BICC sanctions statistics, see www.smartsanctions.de
In 2004, the latest year for which reliable data was available at the time of writing, total global military expenditure amounted to a sum of roughly US $1,000 billion, which is about 2.5 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). Compared to an estimated US $825 billion in 2001 and US $950 billion in 2003, this indicates an absolute increase in global defense spending of about 18 percent over a period of three years. Military expenditure per capita has also increased from US $135 in 2001 to US $160 in 2004. Since the defense budget of the United States constitutes almost half of total global military spending, the main reasons for this overall growth can be attributed to the significant raise of the US defense budget following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

Other major countries to have increased their military spending between 2001 and 2004 include China, India and Russia. In China the military budget in this period increased from US $26.1 billion in 2001 to US $35.4 billion in 2004, in Russia from US $15.7 billion in 2001 to US $19.4 billion in 2004 and in India from US $12.357 billion in 2001 to US $15.059 billion in 2004.


While global military expenditure has been on an upward trend since 2001, the number of personnel serving in armed forces worldwide has declined from 20.5 million in 2001 to 19.9 million in 2004. This trend can be explained in part through the emphasis on the modernization of military forces—new investments in research and development and the procurement of new technology—as well as the transformation of antiquated and often bloated military structures.

For the year 2005, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) recorded 95 conflicts—predominantly internal—involving at least sporadic use of physical violence. This number has slightly increased from last year where 87 such conflicts were reported. By far the most destructive wars in 2004 and 2005 were in Western Sudan (Darfur), Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

### Overview of world regions

#### North America

Between 2001 and 2004, US defense expenditure grew by nearly 30 percent from US $324 to US $455 billion. Both the Iraq war and the US operation in Afghanistan account for 45 percent of this growth.

As a share of GDP, national defense spending in the US government budget reached four percent of GDP in 2004, the highest since 1994. If spending for the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Veterans Affairs—two other large components of national security—are included, total security spending increases further to 4.9 percent of GDP.

The upward trend in US defense spending is not necessarily reflected within the budgets of other NATO members. Whereas in absolute terms, military expenditure in these countries has slightly increased—most notably in the new member states in Eastern Europe—defense spending as share of GDP decreased to an average of just below two percent in 2004.

#### Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean

This region has experienced the most significant decrease in military spending since 2001, both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP. Whereas military expenditures amounted to US $25.2 billion in 2001, this number declined to US $23.7 billion in 2004 with an overall share of only 1.2 percent of GDP—this is lower than in any other region of the world. Colombia remains the only exception to this regional trend, namely because of its continuing civil conflict.

The total number of military personnel in the region has not experienced a similar decrease. While the number of people serving in regular military forces has remained more or less stable at around 1.28 million, there has been a slight increase in the number of paramilitary and reserve forces in the period under review. However, this region still boasts the lowest density of military forces worldwide.

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1 All monetary references are calculated in constant 2003 US dollar.
While HIIK recorded 10 internal violent conflicts in the region in 2005, only the ongoing conflicts in Colombia and Haiti involved the regular and organized use of force.

### Europe, Caucasus and Russia

There has been an increase in military expenditure in the region since 2001, from US $244 billion to US $254 billion in 2004. One of the reasons for this upward trend is the considerable growth of Russian military expenditure over the same period, which now constitutes more than 10 percent of the country’s GDP. Similar defense outlays are only found in the former Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus.

At the same time, the number of personnel in regular military forces has steadily decreased from 14 million in 2001 to 13.1 million in 2004. This downward trend is even more pronounced when paramilitary and reserve forces are taken into account.

On the whole, defense spending within EU member countries grew from US $205 billion in 2001 to US $211 billion in 2004, while military personnel fell from 1.96 million to 1.77 million. An actual reduction in both defense spending and military personnel could be observed in Germany, Spain, Hungary and the Slovak Republic.

With the Paris riots in October and November of 2005, the number of intra-state conflicts in the region increased from 11 in 2004 to 12. Systematic violence on a larger scale occurred within Chechnya over secession from Russia, as well as in parts of Turkey over the Kurdish question. Sporadic violent clashes have also continued between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

There have been no drastic fluctuations in defense spending since 2001 in the region. The most notable increases in defense spending have taken place in Israel, Kuwait and Syria. Iran and Lebanon are the only two countries in the sub-region to have markedly reduced their military expenditures. However, with an average of 7.5 percent of GDP, the Middle East continues to have the highest share of military expenditure in the world.

During the same period, the number of military and paramilitary forces in the MENA region has decreased only slightly from 3.28 to 3.24 million. With an average of 11 people out of 1,000 serving in military or paramilitary forces, the Middle East still remains the most militarized sub-region (in terms of personnel) in the world. Algeria, Egypt, Israel and Yemen are the countries in the MENA region to have increased both military spending and armed forces personnel.

The number and intensity of internal violent conflicts in the region remains unchanged since 2004, where seven conflicts were recorded. Aside from the war in Iraq, organized and systematic violence continues to trouble Algeria, Yemen and Israel/Palestine.

Sub-Sahara Africa

Sub-Sahara Africa comprises a mere 0.8 percent of global military expenditure. Between 2001 and 2004, overall defense spending rose from US $7 billion to US $8.3 billion, while the number of personnel serving in military and paramilitary forces fell from 1.4 million in 2001 to 1.3 million in 2004.

Within this overall trend, military expenditures vary between sub-regions. For example, spending increases in the East and in South Africa were the main reasons behind the general growth of military expenditures since 2001. At the same time, both military expenditures and the number of military personnel decreased in the Horn of Africa and Central Africa. By contrast, western Africa is the only sub-region where military expenditures have gone down, but where the overall number of personnel in military and paramilitary forces has gone up.

Between 2004 and 2005, the total number of internal conflicts in Sub-Sahara Africa grew from 23 to 26. However, conflict data from HIIK shows that the number of these conflicts involving the regular and organized use of force has decreased sharply from 13 to 5, occurring mainly within the Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and Uganda.

Asia

In slight contrast to global trends, Asia has experienced continual growth in both military expenditure and personnel between 2001 and 2004. The rise in military spending from US $143.5 billion in 2001 to US $154.4 billion in 2004 is mainly due to the rapid growth of the Chinese defense budget from US $26.1 billion to US $35.4 billion over the same period. India and Pakistan have also continued to increase their spending and personnel levels, despite the gradual easing of tensions over Kashmir.

In the same period, the number of military and paramilitary personnel rose from 13.1 million to 13.5 million. At the sub-regional level, a rather worrisome trend is taking place in Central Asia where Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have increased both military expenditure and the size of their armed forces, while the same can be observed in parts of South-East Asia, namely in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Significant reductions in military expenditure and force levels have only taken place in very few countries, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Mongolia.

Asia is also host to the most internal violent conflicts worldwide. While the HIIK counts more than 30, the number of these conflicts involving the regular and organized use of force was eight in 2005, half of which occurred in India. Nepal and Afghanistan also continued to be troubled by large-scale violence during this period.
Security and development

Defence expenditures of all thirty OECD member states constitute around 80 percent of global military spending. In 2004, the average share of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 2.4 percent. Whereas defense spending has increased, the number of personnel in regular military forces reduced slightly from 5.07 million in 2001 to 4.99 million in 2004.

By contrast, defense spending of the 40 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) decreased over the same period, though the average share of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP continues to remain much higher than that of OECD countries. LDCs have also reduced—if only very slightly—the number of personnel serving in regular military forces from 1.91 million in 2001 to 1.89 million in 2004.

In countries classified by the UNDP as having a high rate of human development, HIK recorded only six internal violent conflicts in 2004 and 2005. By comparison, 25 out of 40 LDCs were experiencing internal violent conflict in 2004 and 2005.

Since the “War on Terror” began in 2001, the focus of development assistance has shifted away from the security of peoples—what is often referred to as the “human security agenda”—to the security of states and the prevention of international terrorism. Overall development priorities have seemingly moved from poverty-reduction assistance to counter-terrorism strategies. This is not only observable from the debate on whether to extend the definition of official development assistance to cover more security-related factors, but also in the type of development assistance being provided to countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Marc von Boemcken

Notes on data

Data for military expenditure and military personnel is largely based on estimates published by both the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. By the time of writing, the latest available year for military data was 2004, and thus most findings consider regional military trends for the period from 2001 to 2004. Especially for developing countries, data on defense-related aspects is often arrived at by speculation rather than actual evidence. Indeed, individual figures quite often vary considerably depending on the source consulted. Moreover, in contrast to SIPRI data on military expenditure, which is provided in constant US dollars on the basis of a particular year, IISS military data in US dollars is calculated by way of considering—where appropriate—the respective purchasing power parity (PPP) for the country in question. Given possible changes in the PPP index from year to year, IISS estimates are not best suited for observing actual expenditure trends over a period of time, but rather for comparing the military spending of two or more countries for one specific year only.

Conflict data relies on the findings of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) at the University of Hamburg. For the calculation of conflict trends, only conflicts with an intensity level of three and above were considered in HIK’s annual Conflict Barometer. Level three conflicts are termed “crises” by HIK and involve at least some sporadic incidence of violent force. HIK refers to conflicts as “severe crises” when violent force is used repeatedly and in an organized way. For a conflict to be classified as “war”, the organized and systematic use of violence must amount to “massive destruction”. By contrast, AKUF treats “severe crises” as “wars”, highlighting the continuity of violence as the main characteristic of war, regardless of its degree of destruction.
Project reports
BICC’s TRESA project (Training and Education on Small Arms), which was launched in 2003, develops training material on small arms control. Training courses have already taken place, for example in Colombia and South Sudan. The training modules can be used throughout the world and are available free of charge at www.tresa-online.org.

Esperanza’s eyes grow wider and wider: “Is that really so?” She can hardly believe it: Can it really be true that private houses in England and Germany are not guarded by armed security men and that the people there still feel safe? People in Colombia do not rely on the protection of the police alone. During a short tour of an upper-middle-class residential area in the Colombian capital of Bogota, she has just counted seven security guards carrying weapons, and observed the presence of guard dogs, alarms and fences topped with barbed wire. Together with her colleagues who work for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social institutions or research institutes in Colombia, Esperanza is taking part in a training course organized by the Colombian NGO Fundación Gamma Idear and BICC. The course is intended to help the participants to better analyze, document and thus understand the problems of small arms in their country. The walk around the residential area was part of an exercise to teach people how to observe and how to analyze their observations—data collection outside their own front door.

The course in Colombia on “Basic Principles of Small Arms Research” was held within the framework of a project that BICC launched at the end of 2003, financed by the BMWZ (German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). The TRESA project has the task of designing material for training courses aimed at supporting and building capacity in the field of small arms and light weapons control.

Small arms and light weapons are certain recognizable firearms, such as pistols or rifles, but also mortars and grenade launchers. These weapons kill and injure several hundred thousand victims every year and, in recent years, not only civil society groups but also the international community of states have been endeavoring to limit their uncontrolled proliferation. The possibilities for achieving this were first discussed in 2001 within the framework of a United Nations conference in New York at which 189 states took part. A Programme of Action agreed at the conference is intended to help states to improve small arms control at the national, regional and international levels, focusing mainly on controlling the illicit trade in these weapons. Since the 2001 conference in New York, there have been two further meetings of states on the implementation of the programme. A First Review Conference of the Programme of Action in June/July 2006 considers the progress achieved thus far, the challenges that remain, and how to proceed with the work that still lies ahead.

Aim: New experts to deal with the problem of small arms

The success of control mechanisms depends on the capability of those who are responsible for implementing them. This is where TRESA comes in. The TRESA project designs teaching materials on various topics relating to small arms control which are suitable for a number of target groups, such as government representatives, staff from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or citizens’ action groups. TRESA’s work covers:

- Research methods to determine the problem.
- Civil society activities such as youth work.
- The integration of former combatants.
- Methods for destroying small arms.
- International agreements aimed at preventing the uncontrolled proliferation and use of small arms.

The various learning units—also known as modules—can either be taught individually or combined to form courses that cover several topic areas. Each module includes didactic tips for the trainers. This means that even people who are not experts on small arms issues can teach the modules; but also that the modules can be used in “train the trainer” courses, which are intended
to achieve a multiplier effect. All the material can be downloaded from the TRESA website www.tresa-online.org free of charge so that even local organizations in remote places and without substantial financial and institutional means are able to hold training courses on small arms control.

For example, consider the town of Yei in South Sudan. Bulletholes are noticeable in the walls of many houses, and weapons on the streets in town are a stark reminder of the civil war that was fought in this area for decades. Armed violence can still flare up. The war between the North and the South is officially over, but how does one prepare for peace? The staff of several local NGOs are facing huge challenges. They are participating in a course that is based on TRESA material. Some problems they are facing are: What happens to the weapons? And what about the former combatants that used these weapons for years during the war? These people are now returning to communities, ‘unemployed’, without roots and often without prospects for the future—a fate that they share with refugees and displaced persons. How can those people who remained in Yei deal with the return or integration of ex-combatants? Is their attitude towards the returnees positive or negative? How can the former combatants be integrated into society without destroying existing structures? Are there sufficient opportunities for employment, and, if so, in what areas? Where can the local community manage by itself, and where is outside assistance necessary? The course participants are trying to find answers to these questions, for example at the watering holes in Yei. Here they have an opportunity to talk to the local inhabitants, and these conversations provide insight into the problems and hopes of reintegration.

The ultimate impact of the use of TRESA material and of capacity-building in general on small arms control depends on whether and in what ways the participants can apply their newly acquired skills. Often, the prevailing conditions do not make it easy: It is hard to persuade people who feel threatened or who depend on their weapons for livelihood to put down their arms, so long as no measures have been taken to ensure their safety or to provide alternative sources of income. Unfortunately, international efforts to control small arms are still not paying enough attention to these key reasons for the possession and use of small arms. BICC plans on focussing more on this aspect of the small arms issue in its future research work in the field of small arms.

Julie Brethfeld

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**Project title:** TRESA—Training and Education on Small Arms

**Duration:** December 2003–May 2006

**Supported by:** Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung - BMZ)

**Coordination:** Dr. Michael Ashkenazi

**Project team:** Christine Beeck, Julie Brethfeld

**Publications:** TRESA modules, www.tresa-online.org
Arms imports, development aid, human rights: A database for greater transparency

With a database accessible at www.ruestungsexport.info, BICC examines how 170 countries meet the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The database also supplies basic data on armaments, the military and the security sector of key recipient countries of German military goods. The aim of BICC’s database project, which is funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to expand the base of available information relevant to a discussion on German arms exports.

A visit to the database at www.ruestungsexport.info provides some quick insight into just how critical the respective situation of each of the 170 countries actually is. Countries are listed alphabetically and analyzed according to seven points which are based on the eight criteria of the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports:

- International or regional arms embargoes.
- Adherence to human rights.
- Good governance.
- Internal conflict.
- Membership in human rights and arms control conventions.
- Arms export controls.
- Danger of unproportionate military capacities impairing development.

‘Green’ stands for ‘OK’, ‘yellow’ for ‘some concern’, and ‘red’ for ‘highly problematic’. By simply navigating further, one arrives at the sources and data on which this evaluation is based. The database makes use of various sites that are publicly available, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Five red ratings! A lot of warning signals light up when Somalia is called up on the database. How is it rated with regard to arms embargoes, for example? Red: The UN imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in 1992. An EU embargo followed in 2002. Somalia’s observation of human rights? Red: After all, the country in the Horn of Africa has signed fewer than five important UN agreements on human rights and is graded as “unfree” according to Freedom House’s 2006 status classification. Internal conflicts? Red: According to information from AKUF (Working Group on the Causes and Origins of War) war has been waging in Somalia since 1988. Even though peace negotiations did commence in 2002 and the fighting has somewhat abated, there were once again hundreds of dead and wounded in the reporting year of 2004.

According to the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, then, absolutely no armaments should be delivered to Somalia.

Another critical example is Angola. Freedom House describes this country, too, as ‘unfree’. Angola is rated red with regard to ‘good governance’, since reports such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2006 and Government Effectiveness 2004 (World Bank) grade the country’s democratic development as inadequate. What about Angola’s economic and technical capacity? Red: Because the relationship between arms expenditure and social expenditure is grossly disproportionate. There are 209.7 soldiers per 10,000 inhabitants, but only 0.80 doctors. Angola’s per capita military expenditure is US $233.79 expenditure in the field of health on the other hand is only US $92.00.

Data transparency as a contribution to the discussion

Apart from the 170 countries, www.ruestungsexport.info also includes studies on 16 key countries outside NATO that receive German arms exports. These studies can be downloaded as a PDF file, and were last updated in Spring 2006.
What level of arms imports can development withstand? This is one of the questions posed in the European Union’s 1998 Code of Conduct. Political decision-makers and legislators must repeatedly ask themselves this question, as must non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have to deal with the field of tension between respecting legitimate defense requirements on the one hand, and the prejudice of sustainable development through military expenditure on the other.

In Germany, the discussion on arms exports often suffers from a lack of information about the situation in the recipient countries. Data on the economic situation is relatively easy to obtain. It becomes more difficult to uncover information on more political topics, such as the position of human rights. Data on the military sector is practically only available in specialist literature.

“The BICC database makes sound information readily available and is intended to facilitate a reliable evaluation of German arms exports,” explains project leader Marc von Boemcken. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is funding the internet service. The BMZ has become an important actor in the field of German arms exports policy, not least due to its membership in the Federal Security Council. It is interested in the wider availability of information in this area.

The Federal Government’s “political principles governing the export of arms and other armaments” state: “On principle export licenses for war weapons and other military equipment shall not be granted where there are reasonable grounds to suspect they will be used for internal repression as defined in the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports or the sustained and systematic abuse of human rights. In this context the assessment of the human rights situation in the recipient country is an important factor to be considered.” The BICC database with its comprehensive, carefully evaluated material can help to assess the situation in individual countries more precisely. It not only supplies facts, but can also promote dialogue between the Federal Government, civil society and non-governmental organizations, as well as provide objective assistance when taking decisions on the awkward question of arms exports.

Susanne Heinke

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Project title: Documentation of arms exports
Duration: December 2005–March 2006
Supported by: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung - BMZ)
Coordination: Marc von Boemcken
Project team: Natalia Krieger, Christian Kraft, Markus Kessel

www.ruestungsexport.info

1 Freedom House, a non-profit, nonpartisan organization, is a clear voice for democracy and freedom around the world. Through a vast array of international programs and publications, Freedom House is working to advance the remarkable worldwide expansion of political and economic freedom. For more information, visit www.freedomhouse.org.

2 www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/lpw/Akuf/kriege_aktuell.htm

3 www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/

4 www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters_IV_Appendices.pdf

Perspectives for the German defense industry

German companies working in the field of defense technology are at the beginning of a restructuring process, which is the result of reduced budgets for military procurement. This process cannot be halted. Jobs and industrial locations are in danger, and the time available for restructuring is running out since, for example, the US industry is making a concerted effort to buy up European manufacturers. A two-year research project funded by the Hans-Böckler-Foundation is investigating alternative scenarios for the German defense industry within the framework of this restructuring process.

One could define the defense industry or the land systems industry as the providers of weapons systems, components and carriers to the branches of the armed forces. This means that the industry includes all companies whose products are necessary for maintaining efficient land forces. Apart from armored vehicles, various weapons systems and ammunition, this definition also covers medical goods, uniforms, IT and many other things.

The planned reform of the Bundeswehr to become a highly specialized professional army for operations overseas calls for different weaponry from that used by an army of conscripts aimed at defending the German state. Since this new Bundeswehr is to share tasks with its European partners and thus no longer needs to cover all fields of deployment itself, the German government must first define those military capabilities in which Germany is especially interested. The weaponry needed for these new capabilities should correspond to the central competencies of the German industry. This is also a question of safeguarding Germany’s position as a technological power.

Ultimately, the German government has few options for retaining key competencies in Germany within the consolidation of the land systems industry. Should Germany not succeed very soon in formulating a national defense industry policy, it will see itself confronted with a situation dictated by other governments and rival foreign arms companies.

One of the objectives of the study, therefore, is not only to analyze the situation, but also to depict possible scenarios with regard to the necessary consolidation of the arms industry. Inter alia, there is also the problem of how to maintain existing German know-how. As a result of its technological competence, German defense technology still enjoys a leading role in many areas on the world market. The industry is characterized by the predominance of small and medium-sized companies. Dual-use goods play an important role, and the industry offers interesting examples of spin-offs in the civilian sector. The future of the German defense technology industry is therefore not only of key interest for security and strategic reasons, but also for reasons of European employment policy.

The future of the German arms industry lies in cross-border European integration

The planned study must also be seen against the background of current efforts to establish an integrated European defense market. A country’s industrial and technological base in the arms industry does not only play a role in its defense and security policy. It is also a precondition for that country’s ability to share in decision-making and to influence not only the imminent restructuring process in the European arms industry and the development of strategic technologies, but also the political restructuring of Europe as a whole. Germany will only be able to play a proactive role in these developments—particularly in the creation of a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)—if it has its own technological capacities in the arms sector, which it can incorporate into European cooperation programs.

On the European side, on the other hand, equal regulatory principles and equal competitive conditions are essential for a fair cross-border partnership and for the necessary integration of national arms markets into a common one guided by economics rather than national pride and prestige. The different procurement policies and mechanisms currently operating in Europe must therefore be harmonized as a first step. There is also an urgent need for a common European export policy, as differing practices not only distort competition
but correspond to different political standards, for example human rights standards when selling arms to third countries. European states should thus no longer compete against one another for the most lax export control laws in order to gain a competitive advantage.

The study—funded by the Hans-Böckler-Foundation and in which BICC is cooperating with the Working Group on Defense Technology of the IG Metall (Metalworkers’ Union) and the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF)—sets out to evaluate current literature and conduct interviews with numerous experts from federations, unions, politics and industry. The findings are intended to contribute towards advising the German government on the development of an industrial policy for this strategic sector within the framework of a European reform process, as well as towards linking the fields of industry, research and politics.

Dr. Hartmut Küchle
Cooperation instead of conflict: Water management in Sub-Sahara Africa

How can the different interests of riparian states in international waters be taken into account or balanced? Can such settlements perhaps even act as an example for solving other conflict situations? How can one achieve a fair distribution of domestic and inter-state water resources? A BICC project is dealing with questions of the conflict potential of transboundary and domestic water management within the framework of various studies, publications, conferences and workshops. These are described in detail on the website www.bicc.de/water. This project focuses on the region of Sub-Sahara Africa.

It has been popular in recent years to conjure up the danger of ‘water wars’. In view of the heightened global water crisis, violent conflicts are to be expected over the increasingly scarce resource of freshwater. This applies in particular to the over 260 transboundary rivers. There have already been threats along the Nile, the Euphrates and the Ganges-Brahmaputra. However, these were dramatic exceptions and there could be no mention of a ‘water war’. In actual fact, riparian states in most international river basins do not have any quarrels that could lead to conflict. On the contrary, in numerous cases agreements have been concluded or institutions established which regulate the joint use of the respective river basin and thus provide a contribution towards avoiding conflicts. Shared water resources, therefore, do not necessarily harbor the potential for conflict, but can even be an incentive for cooperation.

The same also applies to conflict-ridden Sub-Sahara Africa. Water resources in this region are distributed most unequally and are scarce in certain regions. But despite a number of violent conflicts between the riparian states of various international rivers, efforts to cooperate are well advanced. Guided by the insight that only joint integrated transboundary river basin management can serve the interests of all riparians, states have established the contractual and institutional basis for the cooperative use of international waters, for example within the framework of the SADC (South African Development Commission) with the SADC Water Protocol and the SADC Water Sector. As a follow-up, so-called river basin commissions have been set up for a number of international rivers in this region. For example, Angola, Botswana and Namibia have been working together through OKACOM (Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission) for the Okavango since 1994. ORASECOM (Orange Senqu River Commission) has been established for the Orange River, whereby South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Botswana have been regulating the use and development of the river basin since the year 2000. The latest river basin commission is the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM), which was established in July 2004 and in which all eight riparian states are represented. Admittedly, there are still no settlements for many international rivers in southern Africa, and in other cases practical implementation of the agreements leaves a lot to be desired—the institutions are weak or their work is inadequate. Nevertheless, it should be noted that southern Africa is on the right road as far as transboundary water management is concerned. This is the conclusion reached by the BICC study “Water Governance in Southern Africa—Cooperation and conflict prevention in transboundary river basins” (BICC brief 33).

Inter-state cooperation but domestic conflicts?

Whereas the inter-state relations of riparian states can in some cases be described as exemplary, the most serious problems are often of a domestic nature. Massive inner-societal conflicts can often occur precisely as a result of inter-state cooperation—for example over large-scale dams. Different groups of users, such as settled (subsistence) farmers, pastoralist nomads, state hydroelectricity concerns, private industrial and export-oriented agricultural enterprises and urban households are all competing for scarce supplies of water. Conflicts over water holes between clans of pastoralist nomads as well as ‘water riots’, where the poor population in the slums of large cities rebel against the water prices charged by (privatized) water supply companies show that such constellations can escalate and lead to violence.

The powers and political influence of the various users are thus highly unequal. One cannot exclude the possibility that domestic conflicts over water can even have transboundary effects. Often, international treaties and commissions do not take sufficient account of the needs of the local population and instead enforce the interests of central governments and powerful industrial stakeholders at the expense of the majority of the rural and urban poor.
Water management and good governance

In order to prevent violent water-related domestic as well as transboundary conflicts, it is important to involve the disadvantaged, poor and marginalized sectors of the population in water management more strongly than has been done in the past. In the meantime, stakeholder participation is a popular and universally used slogan, but its implementation often leads to considerable difficulties and opposition. One possible approach may be the return to local, traditional, pre-state institutions as well as methods of water management and conflict settlement. In those regions where the state is relatively weak and where public institutions are not efficient, such traditionalist or ‘informal’ institutions can help the rural populations in particular to solve their everyday problems.

International donors and state bodies tend to focus solely on modern water management in the state context and have hardly heeded this aspect in the past. Most of them regard water management as a purely (intra-) state affair. But this is not enough to avoid conflict. An alliance of modern state, traditional local and civil society stakeholders and institutions can lead to new approaches to solving the problems instead of courses of action centered around the state. International organizations, donor states and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can contribute towards this change by providing information, imparting knowledge and becoming active in the field of capacity-building. These concepts form the background for BICC’s research activities.

Water governance in the Okavango Delta represents a positive example of such cooperation. Here, state and intra-state institutions (OKACOM), traditional village communities, local and international NGOs and other international organizations form a close network. This partnership has made a decisive contribution towards ensuring that there have been no violent conflicts along the Okavango, despite considerable potential for domestic and intra-state friction. Even more importantly, there has been cooperation. The example of the Okavango shows that water governance should pursue a direction that takes many levels and different stakeholders into account.

To summarize, it can be said that water scarcity itself is not a potential cause of violent conflict, though a society’s management of its resources might be. The United Nations World Water Development Report rightly states that the water crisis is not a natural phenomenon unconnected with human activities, but rather a crisis of governance. What is needed is good water governance. A promising start has been made in southern Africa—this must be supported by the extensive inclusion of local traditional and civil society actors, as well as appropriate international assistance.

Dr. Volker Böge
Since 2003, a research program at BICC on so-called war economies has aimed to shed light on the specific impact of external economic actors, a diverse group that includes multinationals, (neighboring) countries, private persons, local firms, etc. on the conflict situation. One of the guiding questions was: What constitutes a war economy, and how do its structural features differ from a ‘normal’ situation? Subject to analysis were countries and regions in Sub-Sahara Africa, where a vast number of conflicts occurred in the 1990s. In one way or another, all of these conflicts were related to natural resources. To list a few: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Angola, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were among the cases studied. A BICC paper on the DRC is in preparation.

The war in the DRC cost the lives of an estimated four million people, out of which 200,000 were actual combatants. With the signing of the Pretoria peace accord in December 2002, it is now officially over. A Transitional National Government (TNG)—consisting of the former government, the two most important rebel groups RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie) and MLC (Mouvement de Libération Congolais) and parties from the civilian opposition and members of civil society—was established. The role of this body is to oversee a period of transition and organize parliamentary and presidential elections. Despite the fact that the elections have been postponed twice, they are now set to take place in July 2006. A constitution was finally adopted in December 2005.

The record of the TNG has been questionable, and there are daunting challenges that lie ahead. At the very least, the peace agreement has brought a formal end to the fighting and the TNG enjoys continuing international financial and other assistance, exemplified by the strengthening of MONUC (Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo), the UN mission to the DRC, following the peace agreement. On the other hand, it is often said that the TNG is as much a ‘part of the problem’ as it is a part of the solution.

The conflict in the DRC became a prime example of a resource war, in which fighting was mostly over the control of resource-rich areas. The DRC is rich in minerals such as gold and diamonds, but also columbite-tantalite (used in the high-tech industry and locally referred to as ‘coltan’) and cassiterite (tin-ore). The exploitation of mines, the taxation of miners and the control of trade routes generated funds for continuing warfare, but also substantially contributed to the wealth of local warlords and elements of the elite both in the DRC and in neighboring countries, such as Zimbabwe and Namibia.

What “remains” of the war economy?

It is a widespread misunderstanding that wars end once a peace-deal has been signed. The particularities of a peace treaty can, for numerous reasons, evoke new conflicts or cause the escalation of violence once again. Even well-prepared, well-negotiated and clear-cut peace agreements that include realistic timelines for implementation cannot result in a conversion from war to peace from one moment to the other. In many cases, therefore, it is not so much a war that ends, but rather a peace that is assumed to ‘break out’; and a period of reconfiguration and re-negotiation commences, endangering the fragile peace. Like conflict itself, war economies do not simply ‘disappear’—trade routes and economic networks have managed to establish strong roots and persist over time and can easily adapt to ‘new’ circumstances. The rationale for economic exploitation remains the same, meaning that a war economy continues to function even in times of peace. BICC’s research in the DRC has focused on this aspect of continuation of war economies, concentrating on the questions of what ‘remains’ of the war economy, and what impact the transitional process has had on the ground, both economically, socially, politically, and in effects in everyday security.

At present, former war elites remain influential and have made their ways into the political system. The major (Congolese) actors competing over political, military and economic influence in the region—RCD (RCD-Goma), Mai Mai and the former Kabila government—
are all signatories to the peace agreement and hold positions in the TNG. While officially taking part in the peace process, these groups continue to bypass formal state institutions via their own parallel networks. In this way, they attempt to secure their interests and defend their benefits and possessions accrued during the war. The result is a political stalemate and, due to the incapacity to combat parallel political networks, corruption. Fighting corruption would mean attacking the vested interests of members of the TNG. Arguably then, the military stalemate of the war has just been replaced by a political stalemate in the TNG.

Today, ‘illegal’ exploitation of natural resources continues almost as it did during the war. In areas of conflict, it is hard to define what is ‘legal’ and what not, and thus the concept of legality has proven rather unhelpful for the study of war economies. A mining operation will have to obtain a license from the de facto state authority, but the level of ‘legality’ of its operations is—even when in possession of such a license—questionable. The new DRC mining code, aiming to regulate the highly corrupted, informal and opaque mining sector remains—according to experts at a recent meeting in Brussels—“little used, unknown (..) and not evenly applied to new mining partners” (Nytimes, 29 November 2005).

The FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda), one of the eastern militias that were excluded from the power-sharing negotiations that led to the peace agreement in 2002, are still in control of several mines in the Kivu provinces. Other groups still engaging in mining activities (or the taxing of these activities) are RCD, Maï-Maï militias and other relatively organized armed groups. External actors are still involved.

Until the end of 2004, competition for power and thus access to natural resources in the Kivus has led to several instances of military confrontation. In June 2004, ‘dissident forces’ even temporarily occupied the capital city of South Kivu, Bukavu. This occupation was the most telling example of the existence of parallel chains of command, since the occupying forces were actually part of the newly integrated national army. MONUC, the UN mission to the DRC, was unable to prevent the fall of the city.

Despite the fact that its actions have regularly been insufficient, inconsistent and at times even counterproductive, the international community has also shown that it can be an important force for stability and peace in the DRC. MONUC now has a strength of 16,700 deployed soldiers and observers and, under UNSC Resolution 1493, has a Chapter VII mandate. But despite the fact that it is the largest UN mission currently active, it still has to cover an area the size of Western Europe. Unfortunately, for an area of this size, MONUC’s numbers do not suffice.

Willem Jaspers

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<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>April 2003–December 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funded by</td>
<td>German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Dr. Michael Brzoska</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Leader</td>
<td>Wolf-Christian Paes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project team</td>
<td>Dr. Volker Böge, Sabrina Grosse-Kettler, Willem Jaspers, Scott Lewis,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maraike Wenzel</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The United Nations (UN) are involved in a large number of peacebuilding missions. Critics repeatedly ask how civil and military authorities are to work together. The establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Commission is intended to set standards, and new approaches are to be introduced in the field of demobilization. A BICC project funded by the BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) will, amongst others, deal with the institutional cooperation between various UN sub-organizations.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations have been faced with new challenges in the field of security, peace and development. Following evaluations of missions in the 1990s which revealed various omissions with regard to effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, the last few years have witnessed a trend in the further development of the United Nations system and its peace missions. This is the result of both external pressure and internal demands and has led to the thematic and organizational equation of security and development and the relevant civil and military components at UN headquarters and at UN missions in the field.

But how do military and civilian or development stakeholders interact and cooperate at all levels of the United Nations? Do the civilians or the military predominate? There can be no development without security and no security without development—these arguments are repeatedly used by both sides of the civil-military spectrum to strengthen their own positions. Diverse forms of civil-military relations can be identified; there are many levels of action and different stakeholders and these are often difficult to distinguish: UN military and local populations, UN civilian personnel and rebels, NATO forces and classical ‘Blue Helmets’, NGOs and institutions involved in bilateral cooperation. In addition, there is the complexity of the United Nations itself. Not only must it coordinate military and civilian components, but also up to 16 special organizations, 13 special departments and programs, as well as various offices in the Secretariat-General, not to mention complex missions in the field. Patterns of interaction, decision-making processes and questions of hierarchy are often problematic and of key importance for development policy as well as for the military.

Although the United Nations’ civilian missions have been at the forefront of public attention in recent years, it is often forgotten that the large majority of UN missions are still of a military nature both as far as their mandate and their personnel are concerned. Apart from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which can be best compared with a national foreign ministry and which is currently coordinating eleven political missions involving approximately 1,500 civilian staff, there are also a further 16 military missions with almost 65,000 soldiers and police under the administration of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In the meantime, there are more than 11,000 civilian personnel working in various functions in DPKO peace missions. In addition, individual institutions such as UNDP, the International Labour Organization (ILO) or the World Bank are stepping up their involvement in areas which in the past were usually the domain of the military or the police. Areas affected include, for example, security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

From integrated missions to integrated demobilization standards

The term “Integrated Mission Task Force” (IMTF) first appeared in the so-called Brahimi Report, presented in Summer 2000. United Nations IMTFs bring together representatives from the fields of political analysis, military operations, the police, election helpers, human rights, development, humanitarian aid, refugees, public relations, logistics, finance and recruiting. IMTFs were set up in the field in Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti as well as for the UN mission in Sudan. Initial experience with IMTFs has been very varied. No concrete evaluation has been made so far.

A further controversial report was published at the end of November 2004: “The Report of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change—A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”. This report, too, demanded the increased coordination and merging of
responsibilities within the UN: The UN is described as the “[...] only place where the issues of peace, security and development can be addressed together at the global level.” The Peacebuilding Commission was established as a direct result in December 2005 (Recommendation 14). Although the Commission is still only equipped with little staff and funding, it nevertheless promises increased efforts towards ‘integrated’ strategies and their implementation.

One area in which coordination between the different institutions and civilian and military stakeholders is also being promoted is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. For the first time, it appears that efficient cooperation is possible both within the Secretariat (with all the corresponding UN bodies and programs) as well as between the agencies working in the field. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) under the leadership of the DPKO, DPA and UNDP is developing so-called “Integrated DDR Standards” (IDDRS) along the lines of the IMTFs. These standards are intended to enable the clear planning, organization and implementation of the individual phases of the process of demobilization and their assignment to the different stakeholders. An attempt has even been made during the current UN missions in Sudan and Haiti (UNAMIS and MINUSTAH) to merge UNDP and DPKO personnel and financial resources in a single DDR unit. This is intended as a measure to bridge the gap between disarmament and demobilization activities, on the one hand, and the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants, on the other. Close cooperation in this area is a wise step. Nevertheless, such missions must always be clearly under civilian leadership.

The reorganization of the UN and its missions and the enhanced status of Integrated Missions in post-war situations will also have an effect on international and national development cooperation. BICC’s work is positioned between security policy and development cooperation and BICC has had long years of experience with peace missions, particularly DDR. The BMZ has therefore commissioned the Bonn International Center for Conversion to study the institutional cooperation between different UN sub-organizations. In particular, BICC will examine the joint mandate and planning as well as interactions of individual components of field missions, such as in Sierra Leone, Haiti and Liberia.

Tobias Pietz

Project title: Research for the BMZ in select topics at the interface between development and security
Duration: January 2006–December 2007
Supported by: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Zusammenarbeit – BMZ)
Coordination: Peter J. Croll / Michael Dedek

1 Inter alia the so-called Eisele Assessment Mission on UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and the Brahimi Report in 2000.
What happens when the military leaves? Base conversion in Germany and abroad

The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the Allied troops in the early 1990s together with the structural reform of the German Bundeswehr introduced in 2000 has meant that many communities and Länder in Germany have been confronted with planning and structural challenges. What concepts and strategies exist for the wise and innovative utilization of sites that were formerly used for military purposes? And furthermore—is base conversion merely a German problem? BICC has been studying these issues and questions intensively since its foundation in 1994.

A process of disarmament was set in motion in East and West in 1990. This process was unique with regard to both its nature and extent. In particular, it affected the reunified Germany, which at the time had the highest military density in the world. For example, there were 1.3 million soldiers stationed in Germany in 1990—from the Bundeswehr, the Nationale Volksarmee, the armed forces of the former Soviet Union and various NATO states. This number had fallen to approximately 370,000 by 2005. Of the 920,000 hectares of land formerly used for military purposes, 386,000 hectares were decommissioned between 1990 and 2000.

Since its foundation in 1994, BICC has provided intensive assistance to communities in North Rhine-Westphalia, in particular on questions regarding the process of converting former military sites, and has advised the Länder governments of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Brandenburg on questions of civilian follow-up uses.

A new chapter in base conversion began with the structural reform of the Bundeswehr that was introduced in 2000. This process, which is still underway, will lead to a further reduction in the number of soldiers stationed in Germany (cf. Figure below). A substantial reduction in the size of the armed forces also has massive effects on those communities where these troops were based.

According to the Bundeswehr’s 2004 stationing concept, a further 105 bases are to be closed by 2010 so that the number of bases will fall from the current total of 572 to 392. There will also be considerable cuts at 30 further bases of at least 50 percent of staff or 500 servicemen and women.

The planned withdrawal of US troops from Germany will lead to further base closures. Of the approximately 75,000 members of the US armed forces currently stationed in Germany, approximately 30,000 and their families are to be transferred back to the United States. A precise timeframe for the withdrawal, which was decided in 2004, is not yet known. To various extents and depending on the nature of their other economic activities, all the affected communities are expecting a considerable loss of jobs, spending power and tax revenue, as well as a high number of empty residential properties.

A difficult structural change for towns and communities

It is the towns and communities in largely rural areas that fear the consequences of base reductions and closures...
the most. After all, the Bundeswehr chose such areas in the 1950s not only for military and strategic reasons, but also for reasons of structural policy. The withdrawal of the soldiers and the loss of civilian military jobs cause massive economic and employment problems in the regions affected. A satisfactory solution hardly seems possible at first glance.

But there is a ‘life after the military’, as the first large wave of disarmament in the 1990s has shown. Back then, this was realized through successful base conversion—in other words, the intelligent civilian transformation of areas and resources that had formerly been used for military purposes. Take, for instance, the conversion of a former military air base into a civilian airport; the use of a bunker site as a flourishing logistics center; the creation of new living space in former living quarters; or even the successful location of commercial companies on the sites of former barracks. These examples are not just wishful thinking on the part of optimistic town planners and economic developers, but have actually become reality in many places in NRW and Brandenburg. BICC has contributed to the realization of such projects by providing expert guidance and support.

In the meantime, however, the framework conditions have changed drastically. A shortage of funding is making things more difficult for the communities affected. On the other hand, the longer intervals between the announcement of base closures and the actual release of sites offer more scope for planning, and there is increased awareness of solutions which go beyond the direct transformation of the respective sites. Against this background, BICC sees its main task today in communicating innovative strategies and concepts for conversion.

Base conversion—not only a problem in Germany

Processes of demobilization and the structural reform of the military apparatus have not only led to the release of military bases in Germany. Be it as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the common European defense policy, the global restructuring of the US armed forces or the end of military conflicts, there have been troop reductions in many parts of the world since the 1990s, resulting in the corresponding closure of military bases. The year 2000 alone saw the closure of more than 8,000 bases worldwide, involving a total area of more than one million hectares.

BICC has also been, and continues to be, active internationally. Having worked on the evaluation of national conversion concepts, for example in South Africa, and provided counseling on the establishment of national conversion management structures, for example in the Ukraine, the Center is now involved in the conversion process in the Balkans.

Not only Western Europe, but also almost every former socialist country in Eastern Europe saw the extensive restructuring of their defense sectors in the 1990s. In all cases this led to a reduction in military personnel and the closure of military bases, barracks and depots. For some time now, first steps are being taken in the Western Balkans to implement a comprehensive defense reform process, including base conversion. These moves have led, among other things, to the foundation of the RACVIAC (Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre). BICC is providing advice and support to this Centre, not only on questions of demobilization but also in the field of base conversion.

Lars Wirkus

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**Project title:** Base conversion  
**Duration:** Since 1994  
**Supported by:** BICC funds; partly by MWME NRW, individual communities, RACVIAC, NATO, Stability Pact  
**Coordination:** Lars Wirkus  
**Project team:** Tobias Pietz, Dr. Hartmut Küchle, Dr. Andreas Heinemann-Grüder  
**Publications:** cf. p. 40 ff.
BICC’s photo exhibition project “Millennium Development Goals 2015—Acting Globally for Poverty Reduction, Peace and Development” was organized in association with the laif photo agency and funded by InWEnt (Capacity Building International, Germany) with funds from the BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). BICC sees the travelling exhibition, which has already been held in four different places, as a contribution to education in the field of development policy.

The 13-year old schoolgirl becomes contemplative. She is standing with her mother in the foyer of the Bonn Science Center in front of a photo which shows two children. One boy is holding a football, the other a machine gun. The text next to the photo states: “Belonging to an armed group has an enormous effect on children. Many of them are traumatized as a result of being separated from their families and through the acts of brutality which they experience or have to commit themselves.” The young girl cannot stop thinking about the child soldiers: “We must do something!” At school she and her friends start to look for more information on the Internet and find what they are looking for under “UNICEF”.

The exhibition “Millennium Development Goals 2015—Acting Globally for Poverty Reduction, Peace and Development” informs people about these issues and rouses their awareness. It was put together by BICC in association with the internationally renowned photo agency laif. It is a contribution to education in the field of development policy, funded by InWEnt with funds from the BMZ.

Eight goals for combating poverty worldwide

The thirty selected photos and texts intend to make one thing clear: There is an alarming connection between poverty, conflicts and wars, as well as between injustice and a lack of security. And, that there are alternatives provided that political priorities are changed.

The objectives for the year 2015 that the heads of state and government of 179 states committed to at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York in September 2000 are:

- To halve the proportion of the world’s population who live in extreme poverty and suffer from hunger.
- To ensure primary schooling for children everywhere, boys and girls alike.
- To promote gender equality and the empowerment of women.
- To reduce child mortality to one third of the current rate.
- To improve the health of mothers.
- To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases.
- To secure ecological sustainability and protect the environment.
- To establish a worldwide partnership for development.

Poverty as a cause of violent conflicts—violent conflicts as a cause of poverty

Worldwide more than one billion people have to manage on less than one US dollar a day, and more than two billion on less than two US dollars a day. This is approximately half of the world’s population. But poverty is not just the lack of material income; it is the exclusion from political and economic life. The tendency to resolve societal conflicts by violent rather than peaceful means is therefore particularly marked in a climate of existential need with no opportunities for participation and no prospects for the future.

Achieving the Millennium Goals is therefore an important step towards promoting peace and security. The promotion of peace and security is in turn a necessary condition for achieving the Millennium Goals. The relationship between poverty and war can be a vicious circle. Extreme poverty often contributes to the start of violent conflicts—and precisely these conflicts protract the misery from which they arise.

About one-quarter of the world’s poorest countries are currently at war or in a war-like situation, or they are still dealing with the immediate effects of previous wars. Against this background, crisis prevention and measures
to settle conflicts peacefully are an essential instrument for overcoming poverty.

Conversion—the transformation of military resources, structures and processes for civil uses—can also provide an important contribution towards achieving this objective. Conversion means, for example, the successful reintegration of former soldiers and combatants in civil society, the destruction of military weapons, and the reform and democratization of the security sector, such as the military and police.

Facts and photos as a travelling exhibition

The “Millennium Development Goals 2015” photo exhibition examines each individual development goal from the perspective of how conflict or security influences its attainment. The text next to each of the thirty photos provides background information explaining these inter-relationships.

The exhibition portrays the reintegration of child soldiers at schools and the implementation of UN Resolution 1325, which is intended to promote greater equality of the sexes and the position of women in peace processes—for example, one picture shows an Afghan woman entering a polling office for the first time.

Children’s drawings of armed, masked men demonstrate how children throughout the world have to suffer as a result of war and violence. These drawings are probably the last signs of life of the young hostages who died during the terrorist attack in Beslan, Russia, in 2004.

The demand for “improved health for mothers” is expressed in the photo of a young mother, the victim of rape, with her baby in a reception camp in Freetown. Rape was commonly used as a ‘weapon’ in the conflict in Sierra Leone and elsewhere.

“Together we can defeat AIDS” are the words on a colorful poster published by the Kenyan government and intended to appeal to all groups of the population. The text accompanying the photo explains the particular role of the military in spreading HIV/AIDS. The following texts are devoted to the violent conflicts over resources—the illegal mining of “blood diamonds” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Finally, the section of the exhibition entitled “Establishing a worldwide partnership for development” considers the role of the UN, the German government and non-governmental organizations and shows UN Blue Helmets in Eritrea, a settlement program organized by GTZ in the village of Bohol (Central Luzon) and Doctors Without Frontiers in Rafah in the Gaza Strip in Palestine.

“Millennium Development Goals 2015—Acting Globally for Poverty Reduction, Peace and Development” is a travelling exhibition. So far it has been held at the Stadthaus (council offices) and the Science Center in Bonn, at the Town Hall in Hanover (at the invitation of the Agenda 21 Office) and at the Municipal Theater in Mainz (at the invitation of the Rhenish Palatinate Center for Political Education). Among other things, there are also plans to show the exhibition in Dusseldorf within the framework of the celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, as a contribution to the North-South focus. But BICC would also be delighted to make the exhibition available to its partners for other occasions. What is more, the photo exhibition will be reworked into other formats as an instrument of education in the field of development policy, for example by making it available on the Internet, as a CD-Rom, and for use in the secondary school curriculum.

Susanne Heinke

Project title: Millennium Development Goals 2015—Acting globally for poverty reduction, development and peace

Duration: Since 2005

Supported by: InWEnt (Capacity Building International) with funds of BMZ

Coordination: Susanne Heinke

Project team: Janek Sliwka (technical and artistic support)

Publications: Leaflet
BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion—Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn) was founded in 1994 as a non-profit private limited company (gGmbH) on the initiative of Johannes Rau, the Minister President of NRW at the time, and the NRW Ministry of Science. Since then, BICC has been advising and supporting the United Nations and other international organizations, governments, local authorities and social groups in disarmament issues and on all questions relating to the interface between peace, development and security.

Highlights of BICC’s work

BICC organizes its work in the form of projects. These projects, under which a predetermined objective is to be achieved within a given time frame, are dealt with in topic areas. Detailed examples of BICC’s projects are to be found on pages 18 to 33.

BICC’s activities in the field of small arms and arms exports form the basis for the topic area of “Weapons and Resources”. BICC’s biggest project is currently the Training and Education on Small Arms (TRESA) project. With funding provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), entire course modules have been developed that systematically cover various issues in this area and help to improve knowledge about the topic, thus supporting international efforts in the field of small arms control. These modules were tested in different regions and contexts in 2005; for example in Bogota, Colombia, and within the framework of a training course on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) developed in conjunction with the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. The TRESA project has prompted a related project on the implementation of exemplary training measures in small arms control in South Sudan commissioned by the German Foreign Ministry and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, which will take place this year. BICC was also involved in the 2nd Conference of States to Review the UN’s Programme of Action on Small Arms in 2005 and had an opportunity within this framework to show parts of its small arms exhibition at the United Nations and the German House in New York. The signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding” for increased cooperation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDAA) means that BICC has also been able to recruit a further strategic partner in this area.

The topic area of “Peace Consolidation” is based among other things on intensive cooperation with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). In 2005, work was completed on the demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers in Serbia, Albania and Macedonia. One of the first results was the publication of BICC’s brief 31 Demobilizing and Retraining for the Future—The Armed Forces in Serbia and Montenegro. This is the first time that a BICC
Members of the BICC Supervisory Board as of 31 December 2005:

1. Dr. Michael Stückradt, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Secretary of State, Ministry for Innovation, Science, Research and Technology of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dusseldorf
3. Dr. Ulrich Hatzfeld, Ministry for Building and Transport of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dusseldorf
4. Franz Meiers, Director LEG Stadtentwicklung GmbH & Co. KG, Dusseldorf
5. Theo Gößner, Director, NRW.Bank, Dusseldorf
6. Helmut Rubin, Ministry of Finance of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dusseldorf
7. Roland Vogl, Ministry of Economics of the Land of Brandenburg, Potsdam

BICC’s International Board as of 31 December 2005:

1. Dr. Sverre Lodgaard (Norway), Chairman of the International Board, Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
2. Anke Brunn (Germany), former Minister and Member of the State Parliament of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia
3. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), former Under-Secretary General, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA)
4. Dr. Uschi Eid (Germany), former Secretary of State and Member of the German Parliament
5. Dr. Patrick Hardouin (Belgium), Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Regional, Economic and Security Affairs, NATO
6. Jutta Haug (Germany), Member of the European Parliament
7. Reinhart Helmke (Germany), former Assistant Secretary General, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
8. Hartmut Krebs (Germany), former Secretary of State of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia
9. Dr. Patricia Lewis (Switzerland), Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
10. Prof. Ann Markusen (USA), Professor, Humphrey Institute, University of Minnesota
11. Prof. Franz Nuscheler (Germany), former Director, Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen
12. Dr. Michael Stückradt, Secretary of State, Ministry for Innovation, Science, Research and Technology of the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia
13. Prof. Ramesh Thakur (Japan), Vice President of the United Nations University (UNU)
14. Dr. Reinhard Weise (Germany), Brandenburgische Boden Gesellschaft für Grundstücksverwaltung und -verwertung mbH
15. Dr. Theodor Winkler (Switzerland), Director, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

BICC’s work in the topic area of “Conflicts” concentrates in particular on two problems that are becoming increasingly important in the international context: cooperation and conflicts over natural resources such as water, and the increasing significance of private sector stakeholders in conflicts. In particular, BICC projects have dealt with questions of transnational cooperation in transboundary river systems. One of the results is a study commissioned by the BMZ and the DIE (German Development Institute) on the situation and experiences in transboundary water management in Africa, which was published as DIE Discussion Paper 7/2005. The publication of BICC’s brief 32 Who’s Minding the Store?—The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict, marked the completion of a long-term project funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). The project departed from the observation that the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in internal violent conflicts in the South, particularly with regard to access to and the
exploitation of natural resources. The study, which was published in February 2006, describes these links and presents possible solutions for reducing the potential for violence and, at the same time, involving the private sector in peacebuilding.

One of the most important overarching projects in 2005 was the publication of the tenth BICC yearbook, the conversion survey, which is now being replaced by the Annual Report. Last year’s Survey was devoted to the topic of achieving the Millennium Development Goals and aroused great interest in the German press. The Friedensgutachten (Peace Report), which is co-edited by BICC, and which devoted itself to the question of the escalation and de-escalation of conflicts in 2005, was also met with lively interest from various committees of the German Parliament, among others. BICC is also proactive in the field of public relations and takes part in joint public relations activities with its partners. The City of Bonn and the UN organizations based in Bonn play an important role in this respect.

BICC is running two Exhibition Projects. The information exhibition entitled “Small Arms—A Global Threat” is available for worldwide use in German, English, Spanish and French (soon) by other NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and has already been shown in several German cities (including Bonn, Berlin and Dresden) as well as in New York (cf. above) and Colombia.

“Millennium Development Goals 2015, Fighting Poverty and Violent Conflict” is a photo exhibition organized in conjunction with the international photo agency laif. It is sponsored by InWEnt with funds from the BMZ. Using the example of eight millennium goals, the exhibition depicts in photos and texts the links between poverty, social injustice, conflict and conflict prevention. This exhibition can also be used as a means of political education and has already been shown in several German cities (Bonn, Hanover, Mainz).

BICC relies on an international team of staff in order to be able to perform its varied and demanding tasks in the fields of research, consulting and training. As of 31 December 2005, BICC employed sixteen full-time members of staff (eleven of them involved in projects), seven student and research assistants, and three people in marginal employment.

The Conversion Center also offers interns the opportunity to work in an international field, and the BICC often benefits a great deal from such cooperation. Between January 2005 and March 2006, 24 interns from 13 countries fulfilled a placement at BICC.

Financial Development

The finances of the non-profit private limited company (gGmbH) are based on two pillars. The first is the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), which as the Principal Trustee supports BICC with basic funding. This enables the Center to acquire orders and backing from other donors within the framework of so-called third party operations. The tasks that are linked with this funding vary from research to consulting to other services. BICC is constantly endeavoring to increase the volume of such third party funding. In 2004, BICC was able to compensate for a cut in funds from the Land of NRW by acquiring the same amount of third party funding from other sources. This is a quite an outstanding achievement for a research and advisory center working in the field of policy-making and the social sciences.

However, BICC’s financial situation became more difficult in 2005. Due to renewed significant cuts in its main funding from the Land of NRW, BICC was not able to acquire the same level of funding as it had in the past. This situation was aggravated by the fact that it has become considerably more difficult to acquire third party funding, particularly from public institutions and foundations.

BICC donors are as varied as the Center’s wide range of issue areas. They include, among others, the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as foundations, companies and other corporate bodies.

Michael Dedek
An overview of the most important projects 2005/2006:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Weapons and Resources</th>
<th>Select products/ further information</th>
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<tr>
<td>Development of training materials and further training courses on small arms control (TRESA)</td>
<td>Dec. 2003–May 2006  <a href="http://www.tresa-online.org/">www.tresa-online.org/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Training small arms control in South Sudan in cooperation with the Africa Peace Forum (APFO)</td>
<td>Since Dec. 2005  Training measures in the South Sudan region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counseling in the field of small arms</td>
<td>Since Jan. 2003  e.g. Study on small weapons activities in the Balkans on behalf of UNIDIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security, armaments and development in countries receiving German arms exports</td>
<td>Since May 2002  Data base, country reports <a href="http://www.ruestungsexport.info">www.ruestungsexport.info</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspectives of the German defense industry within the framework of alternative scenarios</td>
<td>Dec. 2004–April 2007  Research report, plans to publish a book</td>
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<tr>
<td>The privatization of security—the role of private military companies</td>
<td>Since March 2005  Website with discussion forum: <a href="http://www.bicc.de/pmc/portal.php">www.bicc.de/pmc/portal.php</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base conversion—use of barracks, training grounds, national and international context</td>
<td>Since 1994  e.g. active participation in the “Conference of Lord Mayors” at the Ministry of Defense in April 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess small weapons and ammunition in Ukraine</td>
<td>July 2004–March 2005  BICC paper 41: Aging Stacks of Ammunition and SALW in Ukraine: Risks and Challenges</td>
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<th>Peace Consolidation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Experience with demobilization in Eastern Europe, cooperation project DCAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic federalism—institutional preconditions for stability and conflict settlement</td>
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### Conflicts

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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Demobilization of child soldiers in Afghanistan</td>
<td>May 2004–June 2005</td>
<td>BICC paper 42: Demobilizing and reintegrating Afghanistan’s young soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External economic actors in civil war economies, Sub-Sahara Africa</td>
<td>May 2003–Dec. 2005</td>
<td>e.g. BICC brief 32: Who’s Minding the Store? The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict</td>
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### Crosscutting projects

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<th>Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>Research for the BMZ in select areas at the interface between development and security</td>
<td>Since Jan. 2006</td>
<td>Research-based support for the BMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in Master’s study course on Peace and Conflict Research at the Distance University Hagen</td>
<td>Since 2003</td>
<td>Preparation of a reader: conversion and conflict transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in post-graduate study courses in peace research and security policy: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg</td>
<td>Since Oct. 2002</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifsh.de/IFSH/studium/mps_info.htm">www.ifsh.de/IFSH/studium/mps_info.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo exhibition “Millennium goals 2015—Acting Globally for Poverty Reduction, Peace and Development”</td>
<td>Since April 2004</td>
<td>Exhibitions in Bonn, Hanover and Mainz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annual Statement of Accounts 2004

The Supervisory Board examined the annual statement of accounts of BICC GmbH for the financial year 2004 at its meeting of 10 May 2005 in accordance with Section 16 Paragraph 5 of the Trustees’ Agreement and recommended that the Meeting of Trustees approve the statement of accounts and formally approve the action of the Management.

In its meeting of 10 June 2005, the Trustees approved the statement of accounts for 2004 in the version of 18 March 2005 drafted by the firm of auditors Dr. Krause & Partner, Bonn and certified by the BDO Deutsche Warentreuhand Aktiengesellschaft.

According to the decision by the Meeting of Trustees, the annual deficit will be offset against the profit carried forward and the net profit carried forward onto the profit brought forward account for the Company’s purposes in accordance with the terms of its statutes.

The Annual Statement of Accounts was deposited at Bonn Municipal Court with the Certificate of Audit HRB 6717.

Certificate of Audit

The firm of auditors has granted the following audit certificate:

“It is our conviction that the Annual Statement of Accounts presents an accurate representation of the Company’s financial situation, finances and revenue, taking into account the principles of proper accounting. As a whole, the report provides an accurate account of the Company’s situation and describes the risks of future developments.”

Bonn, 1 September 2005

Director
Peter J. Croll

Profit and loss account for the period 1 January to 31 December 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual 2004</th>
<th>Actual 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Main funding from the Ministry for Science and Research of the Land of NRW</td>
<td>1,220,000</td>
<td>1,356,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Revenue from completed projects</td>
<td>1,416,445</td>
<td>1,735,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Reimbursement of costs and other income</td>
<td>24,209</td>
<td>16,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,660,654</td>
<td>3,108,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Changes in totals in the case of unfinished projects</td>
<td>-155,547</td>
<td>-771,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Other operating income</td>
<td>44,175</td>
<td>66,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Material costs of projects</td>
<td>-471,329</td>
<td>-356,546</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Staff costs</td>
<td>-1,690,424</td>
<td>-1,580,295</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Depreciation</td>
<td>-37,373</td>
<td>-60,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other operating costs (space costs, etc.)</td>
<td>-388,189</td>
<td>-412,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Miscellaneous interest and similar revenue</td>
<td>5,681</td>
<td>9,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Depreciation of current assets</td>
<td>-354</td>
<td>-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Interest and similar expenditure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Results of ordinary business activities</td>
<td>-32,705</td>
<td>3,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus/ Deficit</td>
<td>-32,705</td>
<td>3,261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of publications (January 2005—April 2006)


Briefs

brief 31: Tobias Pietz with Marc Remillard, Demobilizing and Retraining for the Future: The Armed Forces in Serbia and Montenegro, July 2005
brief 31 (serbische Version): Demobilizacija i prekvalifikacije za buducnost Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore

Papers

paper 40: Eugene Kogan, European Union (EU) enlargement and its consequences for Europe’s defence industries and markets, January 2005
paper 41: Leonid Polyakov, Aging Stocks of Ammunition and SALW in Ukraine: Risks and Challenges, February 2005
paper 42: Vera Chrobok, Demobilizing and reintegrating Afghanistan’s young soldiers, A review and assessment of program planning and implementation, May 2005
paper 43: Markus Koth, To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia, July 2005

Bulletins

BICC bulletin, No. 34, January 2005
Feature: The UN Charter and its limitations in the face of aggression, Dr Hans Blix

BICC bulletin, No. 35, April 2005
Feature: A Call for Tighter Policing Tools for Biological Weapons, Amy E. Smithson

BICC bulletin, No. 36, July 2005
Feature: 60 years after the end of the war– 60 years United Nations, Dr Christoph Zöpel

BICC bulletin, No. 37, November 2005
Feature: Security and the Millennium Development Goals, Guido Schmidt-Traub and Prateek Tandon

BICC bulletin, No. 38, January / February 2006
Feature: Is there a necessity for new definitions of war? Dr Michael Brzoska

BICC/DCAF Schriften zu Sicherheitssektor und Konversion – BICC/DCAF Security Sector Governance and Conversion Studies


Other publications


BICC is an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting peace and development through the transformation of military-related processes, functions, activities, assets and structures effectively and efficiently.

While disarmament frees up resources that can be employed in the fight against poverty, conversion maximizes outcomes through the careful management of such transformation of resources. It is in this sense that they together contribute to increasing human security.

Having expanded its span of activities beyond the classical areas of conversion that focus on the reuse of military resources (such as the reallocation of military expenditures, restructuring of the defense industry, closure of military bases, and demobilization), BICC is now organizing its work around three main topics: peacebuilding, arms, and conflict.

In doing this, BICC recognizes that the narrow concept of national security, embodied above all in the armed forces, has been surpassed by that of global security and, moreover, that global security cannot be achieved without seriously reducing poverty, improving health care and extending good governance throughout the world, in short: without human security in the broader sense.

Peacebuilding: BICC is working in the area of peacebuilding. In addition to post-conflict demobilization and reintegration of combatants and weapon-collection programs, the Center aims to contribute, among other things, to the development of concepts of security sector reform with an emphasis on civil-military cooperation, increased civilian control of the military, and failed states.

Arms: To this end, BICC is intensifying its previous efforts in the fields of weaponry and disarmament, not only through its very special work on small arms but also by increasing its expertise in further topics of current concern such as nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms embargoes and new military technologies.

Conflict: BICC is broadening its scope in the field of conflict management and conflict prevention, including tensions caused by disputes over marketable resources and transboundary issues such as water. These three main areas of analysis are complemented by additional crosscutting aspects, for example, gender, pandemics, or environmental protection. Along with conducting research, running conferences and publishing their findings, BICC’s international staff are also involved in consultancy, providing policy recommendations, training, and practical project work. By making information and advice available to governments, NGOs, and other public or private sector organizations, and especially through exhibitions aimed at the general public, they are working towards raising awareness for BICC’s key issues.