The Security-Migration Nexus
Challenges and Opportunities of African Migration to EU Countries

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BICC at a glance

BICC is an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting peace and development through the efficient and effective transformation of military-related structures, assets, functions and processes. Having expanded its span of activities beyond the classical areas of conversion that focus on the reuse of military resources (such as the reallocation of military expenditures, restructuring of the defense industry, closure of military bases, and demobilization), BICC is now organizing its work around three main topics: arms, peacebuilding and conflict. In doing this, BICC recognizes that the narrow concept of national security, embodied above all in the armed forces, has been surpassed by that of global security and, moreover, that global security cannot be achieved without seriously reducing poverty, improving health care and extending good governance throughout the world, in short: without human security in the broader sense.

Aims: To this end, BICC is intensifying its previous efforts in the fields of weaponry and disarmament, not only through its special work on small arms but also by increasing its expertise in further topics of current concern such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms embargoes and new military technologies.

Peacebuilding: BICC is extending its work in the area of peacebuilding. In addition to examining post-conflict demobilization and reintegration of combatants and weapon-collection programs, the Center aims to contribute, among other things, to the development of concepts of security sector reform with an emphasis on civil-military cooperation, increased civilian control of the military, and the analysis of failed states.

Conflict: BICC is broadening its scope in the field of conflict management and conflict prevention, including tensions caused by disputes over marketable resources and transboundary issues such as water.

These three main areas of analysis are complemented by additional crosscutting aspects, for example, gender, pandemics, or environmental protection.

Along with conducting research, running conferences and publishing their findings, BICC’s international staff are also involved in consultancy, providing policy recommendations, training, and practical project work. By making information and advice available to governments, NGOs, and other public or private sector organizations, and especially through exhibitions aimed at the general public, they are working towards raising awareness for BICC’s key issues.

While disarmament frees up resources that can be employed in the fight against poverty, conversion maximizes outcomes through the careful management of such transformation of resources. It is in this sense that they together contribute to increasing human security.
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The Security-Migration Nexus

Challenges and Opportunities of African Migration to EU Countries

Documentation of the International Conference Bonn, 22–23 February 2008

Jerry Sommer and Andrea Warnecke (eds.)
Prefaces

Migration is an old phenomenon. However, the recent discussions about migration are still burdened with fears. New potentials and challenges of migration have recently reinforced calls for the establishment of an overall system of international migration governance. This development has strongly influenced the highly interwoven discourses on peace-building, security and development policies.

In these discussions financial and social remittances of migrant communities to foster peaceful development and stability in their countries of origin play an important role. But the concepts of 'brain circulation' to tackle the dilemma of brain drain from developing countries through a more flexible system of international migration governance are equally important.

However, despite these promising concepts, in European countries the perception persists that international migration and migrant communities are more or less substantial threats to the security situation of the recipient countries. Hence, while the issues of security and migration are certainly closely connected, there seems to be little agreement as to the exact nature of this link and its implications for all affected stakeholders.

Against this background, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) organized an international conference entitled “The Security-Migration Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities of African Migration to EU Countries” which was held at Bonn, 22–23 February 2008. The event was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and brought together 150 experts from academia, political and civil society institutions as well as diaspora representatives not only from Germany, but from different European countries.

Trying to incorporate the security needs and aspects of all affected stakeholders, that is the societies in the countries of origin and residence and in particular the migrants themselves, the first conference day was dedicated to discussing the ‘Feasibility of Triple-Win’ from a research perspective. It started with the wide ranging and thought provoking keynote speech of Prof. Rita Süssmuth, the former President of the German Federal Parliament. For many years now she has been actively involved in issues of migration and integration, e.g. as a member of a number of national and international expert commissions like the Global Commission on International Migration.

Building on these results and findings, the second conference day followed up these debates by focusing on practical and applied policy implications of these issues for both state and non-state actors. Among the stakeholders involved in these discussions were representatives of the German Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the Migration for Development in Africa program of the International Organization for Migration, the Federation of African Associations in NRW, the German Technical Corporation (GTZ), the German Development Bank (KfW), as well as of the African Rally for Peace and Development (ARPD). Also, the second day provided for an active participation of all participants through an ‘open space forum’.

In this ‘BICC brief’ we are documenting the papers and speeches presented at the conference. It highlights the complexity of the issues, perspectives and requirements that have to be taken into account when dealing with the nexus of security and migration—both on a scientific and policy-oriented level. Following up the active discussions during the conference, we hope that this publication will foster an open and balanced dialogue between the affected stakeholders—migrants, countries of origin and of residence—and contribute to a more thorough understanding of their mutual expectations and requirements.

Peter J. Croll
Director BICC
Migration is a topic that is tied up with many fears and prejudices of a socio-economic and security policy nature. This is something that is particularly evident in the metaphor “fortress Europe”, which is very popular with the media and which conjures up an image of thousands of African refugees desperately trying to storm Europe’s defenses and gain entry into the protected stronghold.

Unfortunately, these images cause attention to be focused one-sidedly on security problems in Europe. They thus distort the way we view the causes of migration and also important aspects in the way we address the task of tackling these causes in the countries of origin. In addition they mask the true dimension of the problem: a major share—namely more than 63 percent—of the migratory movements by African refugees takes place inside Africa.

It is not my intention to belittle the problems of unregulated migration to Europe and the catastrophic humanitarian situation facing the refugees. However, it is a fact that the vast majority of migration and refugee flows, for example those caused by natural disasters, negative environmental impacts or violent conflicts, affect neighboring countries in the immediate neighborhood of such a crisis region far more than we generally realize.

It is precisely in this nexus between migration and development that the conference has prompted a successful change in perspective.

A changed security situation—due to migration—should not be met solely with tightened security controls in Europe. Rather, we must start by seeking to improve the security situation in our partner countries and conditions for the people living there. Insecurity is a major cause of migration. Countries that are shaken by civil war and violent conflicts often also lack the public capacities to provide basic social care.

If a country is not able to provide and safeguard these services, its population will be forced to flee their homes. The migration movements then produce repercussions in the neighboring countries which take the migrants in. The population in these transit countries or countries of residence often view the refugees with distrust and fear because they see them as potential competitors for scarce resources and as a security risk for the stability of their own country.

This is precisely where development policy begins to work, supporting states in fragile situations so that they can avoid threats to their populations not just from bellicose situations but also from poverty and malnutrition, acute pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, ecological dangers such as climate change, poor health care and education deficits. Development cooperation thus makes an important contribution towards making sure that the causes of migration are eliminated or nipped in the bud.

My thanks goes to the organizers of the conference, especially BICC, for successfully raising an important topic and bringing together international experts to discuss it from different aspects, including that of the diaspora.

I am convinced that the conference has helped achieve a better appreciation of the different positions, so that they can be included in the future development of political and research strategies. I would be pleased to see the present documentation contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the complex links between migration and security.

Erich Stather
State Secretary
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Initial Addresses
Migration Opens Up New Prospects for Our Common Security

Migration is an old phenomenon. And yet it is a highly topical and emotional one, and it is associated with fears that could have been taken from a dictionary on natural disasters: people talk about avalanches, tidal waves, storms or even human tsunamis. What they tend to forget is the individual fate of the people who, in many cases, were forced to leave their home countries by the hardship they experienced.

This rhetoric of disaster gives an impression of the tensions and resentments that can easily be mobilized when the topic of migration is raised. The risks, especially for ‘recipient’ countries, are widely acknowledged while migrants’ risks often receive little attention.

This is the first important connection between migration and security: the population in the destination countries harbors fears that migration could lead to a lack of security in the broadest sense, i.e. violence and crime but also social insecurity such as the loss of one’s job, competition over social benefits, etc. In the discussions about migration, there is all too often a tendency to adopt a one-sided, negative attitude from a security perspective.

Yet, migration opens up new prospects and opportunities for our shared security. Ideally, this does not only benefit the migrants but also their home countries and the destination countries. We must seize these opportunities and build on them when dealing with the issues we are concerned with and formulating our approaches.

Three million migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are currently living in Europe. That is no reason to talk about a tidal wave, a storm or similar natural disasters. The belief that globalization has caused migration to rise dramatically is no more than a prejudice. The truth is that the migrant share of the world’s population was just as high a century ago as it is today: 2.5 to 3 percent. What has changed is only the direction of migration, from south to north. And the change of direction has changed the way we perceive migration.

And yet, migration within Africa is much higher. African countries receive more migrants from other African countries than the number of African migrants received by us. Until 2005, 25 percent of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa migrated to OECD countries whereas 63 percent migrated within Sub-Saharan Africa. For example: 17.6 million people live in Côte d’Ivoire, 4 million of whom are African migrants. Germany, with more than 82 million inhabitants, has only 350,000 African migrants living here.

As representatives of the Development Ministry, we find it particularly important to ensure that migration does not lead to destabilization and conflicts in developing countries and that people are not forced to migrate because of their living conditions. That is our starting point. It is an approach that will benefit us and the people concerned.

The reasons for migration are many and varied, as is well known:

- Poverty: Even today, almost half of the 680 million people in Africa are still living in extreme poverty.
- War: Violent conflicts, civil war and displacement put a brake on development and destroy what was built up during years of cooperation.
- Environmental degradation: Wars can cause severe and lasting damage to the environment and deprive people of their livelihood.

Experts call these factors the push factors of migration.

What these people are lacking can be summed up in one word: human security. Because security is more than the absence of violence. Security includes political, social, economic and ecological security. Living in security also means protecting people from hunger, disease, environmental disasters, deficits in legal certainty and poverty. Security goes beyond what we are doing in the Hindu Kush region.

“No freedom without security.” This simple statement by Wilhelm von Humboldt summarizes very well how crucial security is for human self-fulfillment. And another statement is equally true: “No development without security.” Because lasting peace and stability are key prerequisites for sustainable development. A recent example of the consequences of insecurity are the refugee movements in Chad and in Kenya.

Development policy addresses the causes of migration, not the consequences. Development policy aims to foster human security in our partner countries. We have

Erich Stather is State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany.
to take account of the interaction between migration and security in our development programs. However, there are not only many different causes for migration but its consequences are varied, too.

The first point to note is that violent conflicts are more than just a cause of migration. Migration can in itself be a destabilizing factor and a security risk in destination countries. One reason for this is the fear this generates in the host countries, as I already mentioned. When migrants are perceived as a threat, this can indeed give rise to tensions.

In developing countries in particular, the flow of migrants can place a heavy burden on the weak infrastructure and overstrain benefit systems and the local economy. Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan—currently 2.2 million of them—are an example. The competition over scarce public funds is leading to growing tensions between refugees and the local population. These tensions are further exacerbated by the fear that refugees could bring with them the conflicts of their home countries.

When refugees return to their countries of origin, their return can also cause tensions between the inhabitants who left the country and those who stayed. These tensions can center on the distribution of land or on aid measures that are perceived as unjust. For us, this is a relatively new area. But the first approaches and concepts have already been developed. For example, the Civil Peace Service offers training courses on civilian conflict management in refugee camps in the north of Kenya and in Sudan. Communities learn how to deal with conflict when refugees of different ethnic groups return to their home countries and this gives rise to tensions.

A report by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has shown how easily migrants themselves can become part of a conflict. Increasing numbers of child soldiers are recruited from refugee camps in crisis countries. Thus, the place where they seek protection turns into a trap for them. In such cases the international community has failed.

Diaspora communities are now gaining more and more attention since they are regarded as ‘experts’ on this matter. A World Bank study carried out in 2003 revealed that migrants’ remittances are more than twice as high as official development assistance volumes worldwide. Consequently, they yield an enormous development potential.

But can this be transferred to the sensitive area of peace and conflict management? People are setting increasingly high hopes on involving diaspora communities and individuals in conflict resolution and peace consolidation. Afghanistan’s current foreign minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, is a particularly prominent example. During his exile, he went to a German university and took a doctoral degree, was a member of the Aachen city council as a representative of the Green Party, and is now supporting reconstruction in his home country as a member of the Afghan government. Refugees like him have benefited from the openness of western societies, have received a good education and embraced western values. At the same time they know their countries and culture better than anyone from outside ever could.

Yet we have more questions than answers in this field. That is why we are hosting this international expert meeting. Refugees are part of the conflict. They fled their countries because they were caught up in a conflict, or maybe even persecuted. Their position is not neutral, and cannot be neutral. Their perspective, their experience, their insights into the conflict situation in the country is enlightening for us, but can also leave many things in the dark, cast a shadow—consciously or unconsciously—over important details.

What is the relationship between integration, assimilation and marginalization? We must clarify in each specific case for whom the diaspora community or the individual is speaking. Do they have any legitimacy to speak? Who accepts these representatives in the country of conflict? Or are their actions regarded as unsolicited interference from outside? Moreover, it is questionable whether the diaspora community can intervene in their home country when the government is a party in the conflict. To answer these questions, more discussions and insights are needed so we can tap the potential of migration for the sake of increased human security. I am sure that this conference will help us to make further progress in this field. I wish you every success!
There are approximately 50 million uprooted people around the world—people fleeing armed conflict, ethnic conflict, conflicts over the distribution of increasingly scarce resources.

The United Nations Commissioner for refugees provides assistance to about 22 million refugees—approximately half of them are women. It is important to mention this, because as we know, women refugees are particularly vulnerable and face many forms of human rights violations while fleeing—sexual violence, forced labour, and trafficking to name a few. The issue of human security is a concern that can not be highlighted enough.

The link between security and migration is a very sensitive issue, which is often at the forefront of the current policy debate on international migration management. At a time when the interest in the positive effects of migration are gaining greater attention, the focus on security raises, nevertheless, some very uncomfortable questions that must be addressed if we are to develop practical, relevant and effective approaches to current migration dilemmas. The growing interest in this debate amongst the old and new Member States of the European Union is to some degree a result of increasing cooperation in efforts to combat the negative consequences of migration: better coordination of border control, visa policy, the treatment of third country nationals, the asylum system, anti-terrorism and so on. A coordinated approach to combating illegal migration while attempting to maintain maximum control over a country’s territory makes this a very controversial and extremely complicated field of policy.

The strategic concerns and initiatives of European Union and Member State policy makers only represent one part of the larger picture. By raising the question of human security in this context, this conference offers a chance for an interesting change of perspective from the traditional focus on national security. “Whose Security?” is the question raised here—one that is not raised often enough. It is however an important question that makes space for a closer examination of the security of individuals and the security needs of migrants themselves. It is a debate that goes beyond popular concerns about demographic, domestic and social security. It is also a discussion about the threats to people’s lives and livelihoods as a cause of, and in the course of, migration. I would like to congratulate the conference organizers for making this clear.

Kofi Annan once referred to human security as an issue of human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and being sure that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential.

Supporting the potential of African migrants is an important focus of the activities of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia. There are about 275,000 nationals of African countries living in Germany and we assume about as many Germans of African descent. One-third of all nationals from African countries live in North Rhine-Westphalia. One-fourth of all nationals of Sub-Saharan Africa live in North Rhine-Westphalia. The largest group in North Rhine-Westphalia is from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country that is no stranger to conflict, and a diaspora for whom security and migration is a major concern. The next largest group is from Ghana, a country with a reputation for relative stability and one that may have a lot to tell us about conflict resolution. The Ghanaian diaspora in Germany is relatively well organized and plays a key role in our newly established partnership with Ghana.

Increased mobility in a globalized world challenges, especially as it applies to Africa, our traditional understanding of countries of origin and countries of destination. In times of conflict, it is neighbouring countries, which feel the immediate impact of forced and sudden migratory flows. Traditional countries of origin thus become countries of transition and destination—with all of the challenges this involves but without the resources available to richer countries in the North.

A good example for this is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 1.15 million citizens have been uprooted within the country, 300,000 are refugees in neighboring states. The DRC also hosts more than 140,000 refugees from neighboring countries.

Winfried Mengelkamp is the Head of the Group for International Cooperation in the Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration of the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia.

I mention this, because it links to a couple of projects which are supported by the Ministry and highlight our interest in the migration-security nexus. One of them is the “Migration for Development in Africa-North Rhine-Westphalia“ (MIDA-NRW) project, a pilot project we implemented with the International Organization for Migration MIDA-Program for members of the Congolese diaspora. It is a project designed for members of the diaspora who express an interest in contributing to the economic and political stabilization of the country and who are willing to participate in short-term missions to do so.

This project is the beginning of a closer examination of the challenges and opportunities related to circular, return and temporary migration. The success of these and similar programs ultimately depends on the ability of governments and the international community to secure peace in affected regions.

This brings me to another issue that has played an important role in our work and one that is at the heart of the discussion for this conference: “The Role of the Diaspora in Conflict Situations”. It is a project that began as a cooperation with BICC, which conducted a study on our behalf on diasporas and conflict. The study addressed the potential role of the diaspora as agents for intensifying conflict and their role as facilitators of peace particularly in post-conflict situations. Our interest was focused on supporting the positive role of the diaspora. Effective ways of doing this are not easy to find, nevertheless, we believe that the diaspora can be a positive force for change. The successful integration, and equal treatment of the diaspora in the receiving countries is an important factor in this context.

There is much to be said and much to be done on this issue. A very crucial task is deepening our knowledge of the migration and security nexus. A continued focus on human security in this context is essential. The role of research should not be underestimated.

A look at the list of speakers indicates that there is a great deal of expertise present today. I am certain that this will be the basis for a lively exchange and much useful insight over the next couple of days. I wish you a successful conference!
As Mayor, I welcome you most heartily on behalf of the City of Bonn. We are happy to have you here at ‘Deutsche Welle’ broadcasting headquarters. ‘Deutsche Welle’ is the voice of Germany in the world and an example for the international outlook of organizations here in Bonn.

As you know, Bonn is the former capital of the Federal Republic of Germany. Today, Bonn is an UN city—17 UN organizations are based here in the former parliamentary quarter. Bonn is also the host city of numerous NGOs and home to people from all over the world—all in all from more than 170 countries. Migration is a fact in Germany and in Bonn. Every 7th inhabitant in Bonn today holds a foreign passport. More than 30,000 citizens have a German passport and yet still a migration background. In absolute numbers, there are some 10,000 of these migrants who come from African countries.

I personally believe that the openness towards other cultures, to other languages and other religions is a great benefit for our society. At the same time, the need for integration is becoming more and more evident in our society.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Croll for organizing this important conference. This is an important issue for the federal state and also our local governments. I want to thank you, Mr. Stather, for the support of your ministry for this conference and for your personal engagement with regard to migration and integration issues.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Mengelkamp, for being here in Bonn today and for the commitment of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia. You have already mentioned the conference coming up in October. Other conferences already took place here in Bonn. As a city, we always try to provide the best atmosphere and a lot of support for these conferences.

Finally, my special thanks to you, Professor Süßmuth. You are playing an important role in the discussion about migration and integration in Germany. That fact that you are here today to give a speech is an indication for the importance of this conference.

Migration is a fact in our world, is a fact in our society. We are all responsible for handling the integration and advance the discussion about this very important topic. Let me stress once again: Bonn is the right venue for this undertaking.
More than 200 migrants land in Southern Italy. “Up to 40 African migrants feared dead on boat to Spain.” “Italian coastguard intercepts over 230 would-be immigrants.” These or similar headlines appear regularly on our computer screens when we access news agencies. But in the German media, generally speaking, African migration to the European Union is seldom given in depth coverage and analysis. This is not the case at Deutsche Welle: Germany’s international broadcaster is constantly giving due attention to this issue. For Deutsche Welle, migration is a subject of great importance—it’s covered extensively by our radio programs and internet in 29 languages, as well as by Deutsche Welle-TV, Germany’s international television service.

When we report on migration, our audience is not restricted to Europe. This issue is, of course, of fundamental importance in our programs directed to the African continent. Through our broadcasts in Kiswahili, Hausa und Amharic, as well as in English, French and Portuguese, Deutsche Welle regularly reaches more than 30 million listeners in Africa. We constitute a bridge from Europe back to those regions from which these migrants come. Our aim is therefore to provide a complete picture of migration—both the chances it offers as well as the risks involved. Building up that picture might require focusing on a summit of European and African countries when migration is top of the agenda. Or it might involve coverage of different non-governmental organizations debating aspects of ‘Fortress Europe’. Or perhaps it’s simply an interview with one of those thousands of refugees who are rescued each year on the coasts of Italy and Spain.

With regard to this international conference concerning “Challenges and Opportunities of African Migration”, you’ve definitely come to the right place. And I’m pleased to welcome you, also on behalf of our Director General Mr. Bettermann, to Deutsche Welle’s broadcasting center here in Bonn.

By the way: If you have the time, I would recommend you take a look at our art exhibition in the lobby. It’s called ‘Transafrica’ and highlights modern works by six artists from Africa who now live in Portugal.

I hope you have a fruitful and stimulating conference over the next two days and return home with useful ideas and positive impressions. And, of course, I’d like to take this opportunity to thank you for coming and hope you enjoy your time here at Deutsche Welle.
2 Introduction
As some of you will know, I had the honor to be a member of the Global Commission on International Migration, which presented a report to Kofi Annan in October 2005 called ‘Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action’. When we were preparing the report, it was very difficult to convince the members of the United Nations that we have to take a new direction. At that time, 2005, many people were very interested in that nothing should change. Especially with regard to the role of international organizations there were big question marks raised: Who will decide—the national governments or transnational organizations, or perhaps both together? Will there be a new approach to governance, to management and to cooperation with the different countries in need?

Let me clarify: when I say in need, I do not only merely mean developing countries, but also developed countries. In my opinion there is a need for new thinking and for a new kind of real cooperation. It is not the right approach to try to teach each other, but it is high time to work together.

I would like to add that a new approach to migration does not only need to take the governments on board. We need the civil society as well. And as we are not very familiar to have them, there are problems. We say, “Yes, they are important, but where is their legitimation?” I myself have learned a lot from non-governmental organizations. The work of the Global Commission on International Migration was organized in the way that we did listen not only to the representatives of the governments, but at the same time to the civil society, including non-governmental organizations and the business community.

After our report was published in 2005, I have the impression there was a paradigm change with regard to migration. There was a very spontaneous reaction to start a new approach and a new way, also in Germany. Nevertheless, it is obvious that we are still at the very beginning of a new approach and a new concept.

The new approach that emanated from the report was how to create a win-win-situation. One of the questions is how to use migration for development, for overcoming poverty. Here there was a focus on remittances. Migrants who left their countries are taking care of their countries also from abroad. Especially women are contributing a lot, although very often in the European Union and also in my country, we do not realize their contribution. This is the old problem of women issues’ visibility.

One also has to strive for a win-win-situation with regard to security. Security has never been a mere question of state security. However, it is especially since 2001 that security is, in the broad public, no longer discussed only in the context of states but also in relation to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, and individuals, such as immigrants. The security-migration nexus refers to three major dimensions: the lack of (human) security of migrants on their way; the lack of security in migrants’ countries of origin as cause for migration; and the security of migrants’ countries of destination and their members of society.

The Security Puzzle

With regard to the security approach we are still a step behind in looking for a win-win-situation. There is a big interest in security of the receiving countries. But there is much less attention to the broad security needs of the migrants and of the countries of origin. My thesis is that none of these three security dimensions in relation to migration can effectively be protected without engaging in the protection of the other two security dimensions. They are parts of the same puzzle.

It is very important to bring together these different needs of security. Of course, there are different interests as well. I saw that for example in the work of the Global Commission.

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Prof. Rita Süssmuth is former President of the German Federal Parliament and former Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Women, Youth and Health. She has been Director of the Research Institute ‘Woman and Society’ and Professor of International Comparative Educational Science at the Universities of Bochum and Dortmund. For many years now, she is actively involved in issues of migration and integration. For example, she chaired the Independent Council of Experts on Migration and Integration, appointed by the German Government from May 2003 until December 2004 and she was member of the Global Commission on International Migration, which presented a report to Kofi Annan in October 2005 called ‘Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action’.
From the perspective of the representatives of Africa the expectation was: open the borders and give free flow to human beings as well. I don’t think that this is possible now. Perhaps it will be possible in 100 years time—if we change course. Look at all the financial resources we put in border control, imagine only half of that would be invested in development and cooperation, it would be a bigger hope and a better investment!

When the Bonn International Center for Conversion asked me to contribute to this conference, my first reaction was: why is this institute dealing with the issue of migration and security? Conversion in our common understanding is to have fewer weapons. But if this is a goal then the question has to be asked: what is the alternative? This institute is thinking about alternatives. That is a new quality, a jump, security is to be understood in a very broad sense.

The political, economic and environmental security needs to be protected in developing countries in order to reduce the inherent negative effects on the population and to reduce the push-factor for people to emigrate with regular and irregular status. The following figures provide an idea of the magnitude of the phenomenon: Over three million Ghanaians live abroad; that are 15 percent of the inhabitants of the country. In Senegal, the number of international migrants is estimated at two million people out of a total population of 10 million. About four million Malians (roughly one-third) live abroad and are present on every continent, mainly in Africa (over three million) and Europe.

The Negative Effect of Brain Drain

The negative effect of African emigration is the phenomenon of brain drain. The continent is widely affected by the departure of highly qualified human resources, particularly in the fields of health and education. Statistics give the full measure of the situation: Approximately 80,000 qualified people including 23,000 highly educated professionals leave the continent each year. 12,500 African physicians currently practice medicine in the United Kingdom. There are more Malian doctors in London than in Mali. In Ghana, at least an estimated 60 percent of the medical doctors trained in the country have emigrated and 2,500 nurses have gone abroad since 1992. In Ghana respectively 40 percent and 60 percent of teaching positions are vacant in universities and polytechnic institutes due to the massive exodus towards countries that offer better conditions of employment.

When we take into account that the big majority is not migrating out of choice, but out of force, then there is an obligation to bring together the issues of migration and development in order to reduce forced migration and to increase migration out of choice.

What is the role of the diaspora with regard to this? When I read the study conducted by BICC on this specific topic, I was not very encouraged. There were not only more questions, but more skeptical views than encouraging initiatives. But it is better to know where we are and what has to be done than to be too optimistic. Nevertheless, when you look at the different dimensions of diasporas, for me that opens up an optimistic outlook. You have to look at the diaspora not only as being isolated in a country far away from home, but as actors on different levels, in the receiving countries, in their home countries, organized and not organized.

The efforts made in North Rhine-Westphalia are very encouraging. Firstly you have to ask, how many are living here. This is essential if you want to organize these people and take their human potential to contribute to a security, migration and development success. There is already an outcome of this North Rhine-Westphalia approach which I try to spread all over our republic. The majority of our people are thinking. Africans are very weak, they live on social aid and have low capacities—it is a kind of mirror image they have on Africa as a whole: in their view it is a very weak continent, needing a lot of help, looking at the deficits while ignoring the strengths.

But the North Rhine-Westphalia study showed, two-thirds of the Africans came to Germany with university certificates. Many are talking about our low qualified migrants in Germany, but we do not recognize their capabilities, their certificates. It is so important that they know they can make a change in our country and take responsibility. And a lot of them take responsibility for their home countries as well.

Even Plants are Not Assimilated

Let me touch another topic: Why is it so important in a world of variety, of cultural creativity, that we are so eager to destroy it, in order to have only uniformity? We need this variability and we have to live peacefully and productively together. That is integration—living together and solving problems together. Let’s forget
these endless debates about ‘assimilation’! Even plants are not assimilated, when you bring a plant to a different soil, there is an acclimatization, but there is no assimilation. With regard to the diaspora, it is not only a task for the diasporas to profit from their experiences. Now they have to ask themselves and we have to ask them: How can we help to do the right things in the countries of origin, to give them development, stability, security and empowerment? We haven’t achieved that yet, but we have started, because we are obliged to recognize: border controls will perhaps diminish the amount of migrants, but they will not solve the problems.

The diaspora consist of migrants with regular and irregular status. To talk about the irregulars is a taboo in most countries. I deliberately use the term ‘irregulars’, and not ‘illegals’, because human beings cannot be illegal. They might have crossed a border in an irregular way without papers, without documents, but they are no illegal human beings. This is very important for the legislation and for the way we are dealing with migration and especially with the security of migrants on their way and in the countries of destination. Some people are saying, “We have to prevent them from coming in the first place.” But we know people who try to cross borders—in America, but also from Africa to Europe—not only once or twice, but even ten times. And we know the human tragedies that occur. Therefore we have a double, perhaps a triple obligation to look for other solutions than only border controls.

Here from a European point of view also demography comes into play. The trend in European countries is downwards with negative consequences for welfare, business, scientific and economic development. There are European countries, which are very eager to have more migrants coming in, and there are countries that are saying, “No, we do not need them, we have a high level of unemployment, perhaps later. 2020.” Postponing the issue to 2020—this makes me smile. I do not see the logic, because it is important to start it now and not in the year 2020; especially when you look at the emerging competition from a lot of countries to get the best and with all the problems around the issue of brain drain.

However, we know that the bulk of refugees from all the zones of conflict are not coming to Europe. Mostly the neighboring and often very poor countries in Africa have to take care of the refugees. Some of them are going back, others not. This is the mechanism of migration. So there is they dire need for their support from the European Union and all other developed countries. We have not only to open channels for migration into Europe, at the same time we have to manage the migration within Africa—a huge challenge.

Perhaps we can even learn from the experiences of African countries dealing with migration. We might be able to learn how to improve our migration management and our approach to migration, because very often in Africa, there is a big openness to let migrants in. This is why some cannot understand our mechanisms.

Let me briefly touch on the topic of integration of migrants in European countries. I think, that the measures on the regional and local level are especially important. In Germany we have platforms at the local level for the first time since we have a lot of migrants. There were many separate activities before, but it is important to have local platforms, where all the stakeholders come together.

When we have an approach saying: We are all people of Dublin, we are all people of Stuttgart, all people of Berlin, this is a very good and effective approach to integration. Thus people coming from outside get the feeling of belonging. It is easier on the local level than on the federal or national level. On the local level we have much more progress at the moment than on the level of new national legislation. We are learning on the local level that the migrants have a lot of competences. They can help to solve problems in kindergartens and schools, within the police to reduce criminality, etc.. The business community is very active in looking for competences of young migrants and helping them into education and work. This is not the big ‘security’ question, but definitely a security issue at the micro-level, the level of human security of the migrants in the countries they are living in.

Too Much Money Spent on Weapons

To bring the three dimensions of security-migration together in new ways and with a new approach is a long process. But we have to start now. The world is already burning, and we cannot wait until it burns even more. In this process, all sides have to do some learning. We have a lot of lack in democracy, in good governance, in peoples’ participation. There is still the old thinking that we will solve the problems by military power. We spend more money on developing and selling weapons than we really invest in human development. We have to be strong and stop giving money to governments without
any efficiency control. The governments have to learn that people have rights wherever they live.

It is also necessary to strengthen the international organizations—I might be heavily criticized for this point of view. There is this endless debate if the United Nations should exist or not. I would like to remind us how many difficulties there were before the First World War, after the First World War and after the Second World War. After the Second World War, all the initiatives for creating the United Nations came from the United States. Why do they have nowadays such a skeptical approach to the UN? We need the United Nations, if they were abolished, we would have to recreate them.

Thank you very much and good success for your program.
3 Conceptualizing the Security–Migration Nexus—Challenges and Opportunities
Migration has become one of the new soft issues on the security agenda in many countries around the world. The debates on immigration in Western Europe began in the early 1990s during a period of a rapidly rising inflow of refugees and migrants. This migration was mainly a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse set also an end to the Cold War, and many security experts simply lost their enemy and therefore the main security challenge they had been confronted with for so many years. The result was disorientation in the strategic community, and a hectic search for new potential security risks. In this context migration was increasingly seen as a security challenge.

Today, the situation appears to be different: Many of the predicted security risks have not materialized, including the alleged mass inflow of migrants. The good news is that the debate on security concepts has raised new awareness for a broader understanding of security. It has become widely accepted that security does not only mean state security but also regional, societal and human security.

Therefore, this paper deals with the overarching question of whether migration is a risk or a chance. It will be argued that after all, migration is one of main driving forces of economic and human development. From a historical perspective it is obvious that most of the countries that tried to avoid migration were not too successful in economic, social and cultural terms. Overall, migration should be considered as a chance, and therefore open border policies should be fostered. Nevertheless—as all social processes—migration of course bears some risks for countries, for communities, and for individuals. A responsible policy must be aware of these risks in order to be able to reduce the negative impacts of migration and fully exploit the positive ones. To study migration exclusively from a security perspective limits the view and does not grasp the whole complexity of the issue.

Six Global Migration Trends

The first trend shows an increase in global migration. Statistics show that the number of international migrants (people living outside their home country for more than one year) has increased rapidly from 75 million in 1965 to 200 million in 2005. However, if we compare the percentage of migrants in relation to the world population we gain a different picture: In 1965, about 2.5 percent of the world population were migrants whereas in 2005 they made up for about three percent of the world population. This means that although there was a huge increase in the absolute number of migrants, the percentage of migrants in relation to the world population is still relatively small. Nevertheless, overall global migration increases, but of course with regional differences. Throughout the last decades there was a strong increase of migration in developed countries and a slight decrease in developing countries. Looking at migration from a regional perspective, it becomes obvious that it mainly took place in North America and Europe.

Second, there is a decrease in the number of refugees. When comparing migrants to refugees one can see that the overall number of migrants increased until 2000 whereas the number of refugees slightly decreased. This means that there is a different development on the quantity of refugees and migrants.

A third trend that can be noticed is an increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) worldwide. One of the major IDP crises at the moment is taking place in Sudan. This is a problematic situation because, unlike refugees, IDPs cannot claim protection by an...
international regime like the Geneva Convention. As a result, the access for IDPs to humanitarian aid is extremely difficult. Unfortunately it can be expected that the number of IDPs will not fall in the coming years.

The fourth trend is an increase in irregular migration. All recent estimates suggest, for example, that smuggling routes to Europe are becoming longer and longer, turning Northern Africa to a transit region for long-distance refugee movements.

A fifth trend might be an increase in environmental refugees. There are some studies trying to set up scenarios on what will happen if the global temperature rises by one, two or three degrees and then try to forecast what will be happening with water supply, food, health, environment and land. If the temperature rises by only one, two degrees, seven million people will be affected in one way or another. This will increase the more the temperature rises and there might be hundreds of millions of people who have to move away from their homes in coastal areas to other parts of the country or even neighboring countries. Even if this particular scenario is highly speculative, the likelihood of having to face more environmental refugees in the future is strong.

A sixth and last trend is a changing pattern of migration to a form of circular, pendulum or temporary migration. Many host countries and many home countries will consider temporary migration as a means to solve economic problems. This might result in a renaissance of recruitment programs in future times.

Migration and Security: Main Challenges

When talking about the migration-security nexus it is helpful to clarify whose security we are actually referring to. There are three main concepts to classify security: a) state security, b) regional security and c) human security. The state-centric approach is the traditional security concept which was established after World War II focusing on territory, political independence, and as a key issue, the survival of the state. In the 1970s this concept was challenged by an approach that focuses on regional security. This concept broadens the security agenda to different kinds of possible threats and acknowledges the interdependence of states, which restrains their possible actions. However, this concept still takes the state as a reference object to security.

The latest and most comprehensive approach—human security—focuses more on individuals as a reference object for security. The main risks being considered are civil wars within so-called ‘security complexes’—neighboring regions where destabilization in one region affects the other and might challenge human development. By using these three categories (state, regional, human) it is possible to identify some main security issues we might face in the future.

Threats to State Security

According to Myron Weiner\(^1\) one possible threat that might occur is the rise of uncontrolled mass migration, bringing about the violation of national territory and border controls of the sovereign nation state. This is a ‘classical’ security issue. Furthermore, migrants can cause diplomatic conflict. This might be the case if asylum is granted since this process means that the sending country is classified as one where people are persecuted.

* Top remittance-receiving countries, 2006 (as % of GDP)

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try to avoid diplomatic clashes with the host country because they fear that employment opportunities for their nationals could be in danger. The last challenge for state security caused by migration might be political radicalism and terrorism within the host countries. Political extremists or terrorists may use their home country to plan attacks. Host countries with integration deficits and radical immigrant groups might provide an breeding ground for supporters of such radical ideas.

Threats to Regional Security

A threat affecting regional security are protracted refugee crises. These are usually defined by the UNHCR as situations where more than 25,000 refugees live for more than five years in a developing country. Protracted refugee crises cause several direct and indirect security risks that mainly arise from conflicts between immigrants and the local population. On top of that, ecological hotspots affected by climate change might become a more prominent challenge for regional security in the future. There are some major hotspots arising where several risks, such as climate change, degradation and problems with food supply come together. These regions will mainly be in Northern Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, the Gulf of Texas as well as parts of India and South-East Asia.

Brain drain as a risk for home countries

Security aspects will play an important role in future migration policy. To avoid the pitfalls of a further securitization of migration and populist policies, realistic and empirically-backed analysis of state, regional and human security risks are necessary. It should be clear that migration does not cause conflict directly, but may turn, under certain circumstances, latent conflict into open conflicts. In the future, governments will increasingly be confronted with security arguments to prevent migration-induced conflicts in regions of origin through peace enforcing and peacekeeping. To avoid wrong decisions, the respective security-migration nexus should be examined carefully.

Societal Security Risks

On an individual or societal level, migration could be seen as a threat to or a burden for the welfare state in industrialized countries. In contrast, migration could cause a competition for scarce resources such as land, fuel or water in developing countries. A risk, which mainly affects the societal security in developing countries is the ‘brain drain’, the migration of highly skilled employees.

Another future challenge will be demographic developments. If we turn our perspective to the Western European countries, we can easily recognize the aging process of the population. The demographic change will finally lead to a shrinking society. Statistics suggest that by 2050, Germany, for example, will face a net population loss of about 600,000 people per year. The question, which poses itself is whether migration could be used to stop, or at least slow down the process. In 2007, Germany had a positive net migration of less than 20,000 people. This means that even with a substantial increase in migration, there will still be a significant decline of the potential labor force in Germany, as in most other European countries. This points out the importance of international migration for the future labor force in developed countries.

Conclusion

To sum up, migration should be considered as a positive and major development tool for sending and receiving countries, for local communities, and for migrants and their families. The positive impacts of migration are substantial—if it is well managed. Nevertheless, migration can pose a broad variety of security challenges for all actors involved in the process. The scope of migration-induced security risks only becomes visible when applying comprehensive security concepts that address state, regional and human or societal security aspects.
I would like to express my honor and gratitude for this opportunity to speak before you today. Before I begin, please allow me to thank the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Bonn International Center for Conversion for organizing and hosting a conference about such a timely and critical topic as African migration to Europe.

African migration to Europe is both timely and critical in light of its ever increasing volume and its link to the issue of security. Today, I wish to approach this nexus of migration and security from the migrants’ perspective. This means that the concept of ‘security’ is applied for, and not against, their welfare and interests. This raises questions such as: What can European governments do to better integrate their African migrant populations? In humanitarian terms, how can we ensure better security for migrants from Africa to Europe? How can development go hand in hand with migration management?

It is critical to try to understand the perspective of migrants because they are often the most marginalized population in a society. In Europe, African migrants may suffer from a negative reputation, often being linked to crime, terrorism and a host of other prejudices. The events of 9/11 have exacerbated the situation. However, in reality, African migrants like any other migrants, bring significant socio-economic benefits to European countries. For instance, in 2007 alone, the 16 million legal migrants in Western Europe earned more than US $460 billion. For this reason, the European Union has remained open to attracting more migrants.

Still, at the forefront of many political agendas, is the link between integration of migrants and security, as well as the issue of migrants’ integration in Europe. In the European context, migration is viewed as a threat to security, which renders the integration of migrants and their children ‘problematic’ and ‘burdensome’ for host societies. As a result, there is a visible disenfranchisement for millions of immigrants, which is often met by frustration and sometimes violent responses.

The Experience of France

I wish to take the case of France to illustrate the link between integration of migrants and security. To provide a general background, the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) placed the number of immigrants in France at 4.9 million in 2005, or 8.1 percent of the population. Three regions host 60 percent of the total number of immigrants to France: Ile de France, where Paris is located, with 40 percent of the total (one person in every six is a migrant), the Rhône Alps region hosts 11 percent, and the southern region of Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur nine percent.

African migration to France is deeply rooted in history and each wave of migration has taken place within different contexts. These factors have influenced migrants’ standing and integration in France. 1.5 million, or 31 percent of all immigrants to France, come from the Maghreb region, representing 2.4 percent of the total population. In comparison, Sub-Saharan Africans represent 12 percent of the migrant population, or 570,000 people. Even when counted together, they represent less than 3.4 percent of the total French population.

The geographic isolation of migrant communities in France goes back to the social segregation of workers during France’s industrial expansion and subsequent guest worker programs in the aftermath of World War I. Like other European countries that had invited large groups of guest workers from abroad, France had believed that the migrants would return home upon completing their work contracts. However, this ‘myth of return’ never materialized. Instead, many workers were settling in the host countries with their families, thanks to reunification programs. The immigration of migrants and their families created a separate social reality in
suburban areas that were increasingly dominated by migrants and their children. In other words, ‘cités’ began to form within an environment of social exclusion, without the possibility of long-term social and economic development.

Specific to Sub-Saharan African migration is the subsequent migration of educated Africans in the 1970s and 1980s following various independence movements. This latter migration created a cleavage between the lower skilled migrants and migrants from the more educated elite in the former French colonies.

Another pattern to point out is the difference between first generation and second generation immigrants—that second generation immigrants recognize themselves as French and wish to have the same access to education and employment as other French citizens. In fact, less than 20 percent of immigrant parents use only their native tongue, among third generation French citizens only one-quarter (24 percent) still use their background language frequently.

The failure to properly integrate second and third generation of migrants in France’s social-economic fabric has given rise to what is known as the “delinquency of exclusion”. This phenomenon is compounded by the difference in ethnicity in the predominantly African suburbs of Paris. The blame for the riots was laid on immigration, whereas the failure lies in the integration mechanisms which have consistently treated the problems related to youth disenfranchisement as a security issue instead of dealing with the latent social and economic difficulties. Unemployment estimates in French suburbs vary between 30 and 85 percent in the poorest areas and, not surprisingly, the crime rates are noticeably higher in these neighborhoods.

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The Algerian Group Islamic Army (GIA) conducted a series of bombings in Paris in the Summer of 1995, which rapidly shifted the focus to North African immigrants, particularly the link between Islam and terrorism in France’s immigrant communities. The bombings reinforced France’s view towards integration as a process aimed at avoiding the ‘ghettoization’ or self-segregation of immigrants. This view is also echoed as part of the rationale for banning head scarves and other ostensible religious symbols.

In a post-Paris-bombings and 9/11 context, the isolation of immigrants and a lack of response by the state create a breeding ground for the kind of security implications that states fear as a result of migration, namely terrorism. It is important for France to bear in mind that, although 14 million people, almost one-quarter of the French population, have at least one foreign parent, most of them from other European countries, 3.7 million of them from Africa, the number of third and subsequent generations of French citizens that claim to be Muslim, other than through cultural affiliation, is decreasing. It must also be recognized that France, with its newly elected presidency, has shown commitment towards positive discrimination, as well as the inclusion of women minority representatives in the French government, as a step forward in improving the status of minorities in the country.

Still, police across Europe are focusing on the link between the North African diaspora and terrorism. The situation is not as polarized as the US media presents it, but the London bombings in 2005 do raise the question: Why do young European citizens born and raised in Europe participate in causes such as Islamic fundamentalism? European legal authorities recognize the difficulty in investigating this question without ostracizing and stigmatizing entire immigrant communities.

**Black and White Sheep in Switzerland**

The Swiss People’s Party’s ‘Black Sheep’ poster is one of the most controversial examples of the ostracization and criminalization of immigrants in Europe. The poster explicitly links migration to national security by portraying immigrants as ‘black sheep’ while the Swiss citizens are ‘white sheep’. The message of the poster, and the platform of the Swiss People’s Party, is that black sheep must be ‘kicked out’. Swiss People’s Party politicians seem to only further accentuate the difficulties in the integration of immigrants and the ease with which fundamentalists recruit among second and the third generation immigrants.

There are countries with successful models of integration, avoiding much of the problems that characterize other European countries.

**The Swedish Model of Integration**

Sweden is noteworthy for having an impressive record with integration, not only for migrants but for their children as well. Integrating second and subsequent generations of immigrants is a veritable challenge, as they continue to suffer from the same stigmas, isolation and marginalization from the mainstream society as their parents.

Sweden is ranked as the number one country with regard to integrating its immigrant population. This Scandinavian country is rarely thought of as a country of significant transnational migration, yet out of a total population of nine million, Sweden counts one million immigrants, 12 percent of the local population, among which between 400,000 and 450,000 Muslims, or almost 5 percent of all Swedish residents.
The Swedish government has recognized that integration, employment, education and political participation are all closely linked. The country’s motto is: ‘Do your bit’. If migrants want to integrate into Swedish society they have to contribute, and to contribute they must work. Sweden has simplified access to citizenship, and more importantly dual citizenship, so migrants could find jobs. It has made ethnic diversity a mandatory part of companies’ recruitment process. Furthermore the acquisition of citizenship does not rest upon knowledge of the country’s history or language proficiency, but on ‘good behavior’. Immigrants sentenced for criminal offenses have seen their demands rejected or postponed. The Swedish model of integration is exemplary for highlighting immigrants’ empowerment and civic responsibility.

Don’t Forget the Security of Migrants

As illustrated by the previous examples, the question of security does not rest solely on protecting borders from illegal migrants. What is often forgotten is the security of migrants themselves, human security, and how proper migration management through cooperation between sending and receiving countries can also enhance national security.

The casualties suffered by irregular African migrants to Europe remind us daily that migration is not a smooth and safe process. Human trafficking is another related issue, for which both sending and receiving countries bear responsibility. Men, women and children can all be victims of human trafficking. Women and children are often trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labor, delinquency or begging. Men are usually trafficked for exploitation in labor-intensive sectors, often covered by seemingly legal agreements with reliable employers.

Although figures for irregular migration and trafficking are difficult to determine, Africa is undoubtedly experiencing these issues at a high rate because of factors such as poverty and the lack of information available to migrants. In Italy, it is estimated that 60 percent of trafficked Africans come from West Africa, and 29 percent of known cases of trafficked children in the European Union for sexual abuse are from Africa.

Although it is easy to place the blame for irregular migration and trafficking on the migrants themselves, it is the responsibility of governments to ensure the safety and security of their citizens by properly monitoring those who enter and leave a country and to determine the purpose of their entering or leaving. Concerted efforts are necessary between developed and developing governments to address these migration-related challenges. The International Organization for Migration is conducting efforts in this area to assist trafficked victims return to their countries of origin and facilitate their reintegration.

International actors and institutions have linked security and development since the early 1990s. The question of HIV became recognized as a cross-border security issue by the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Ending conflicts are often accompanied by significant population movements, from Internally Displaced Persons and refugees returning home to new flows of commerce and the demobilization of combatants.

The potential for spreading viruses increases, particularly HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa. The spread of HIV/AIDS became a security issue within the context of peacekeeping missions, which were believed to spread the disease within affected countries but also to the West via western troops. This led to the UN Resolution 1308 in 2000 to address the responsibility of the Security Council in maintaining peace and security with regards to HIV/AIDS in international peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion

Security within the migration context can be seen as resulting from migration management. In other words, insecurity results from failed or inadequate migration management, while security can be enhanced through proper migration management. Immigrants and diasporas at large would not be able to participate in conflicts in their home countries or sponsor terrorism if the right mechanisms were in place to promote and ensure Good Governance. Also, since poverty alleviation is one of the main push factors for migration, a fairer international economic system can render migration an option rather than a desperate choice.

There is a need for demonstrated political will in promoting and developing stronger cooperation between sending and receiving countries affected by mutual migration issues and challenges. Actions must deal with the proper preparation, information and empowerment in Africa, as well as establishing adequate mechanisms for a smooth and successful integration of migrants in Europe.

Ultimately, security is a development issue when it is linked to migration, one that can be addressed through development-oriented partnerships, such as the various European ‘co-development’ policies and the EU Africa Partnership Agreement. Migration is an increasingly important phenomenon, and it is a human phenomenon. Migration management is not just an issue for developing countries but one of the fundamental issues in the development of European societies in the near future.
4 Case Studies
The European Commission launched the project Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR) in early 2007. The main objective of the project is to support the European policies, research and civil society through the development of future plausible forced migration scenarios. Moreover, the project aims at cooperating with other migration- and environmental degradation-related projects and institutions.

The project EACH-FOR, which covers six regions with 24 case studies, attempts to assess the impact of environmental problems worldwide on the local, regional, and international migration flows. The United Nations University—Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS)—one out of the seven partners of the project, is conducting the case studies in Egypt, Mozambique, Niger and Vietnam. This report demonstrates the preliminary findings and outcomes of the Niger field trip in the framework of EACH-FOR.

With the highest population growth rate of the world, Niger has roughly more than 12 million inhabitants. Since its independence in the year 1960, the population has increased from three million up to 12.8 million. Niger consists of eight regions, namely Agadez, Diffa, Dosso, Maradi, Niamey, Tahoua, Tilabéri and Zinder. Due to budgetary and time constraints, the UNU-EHS field trip was run in Niamey and Tilabéri only.

Since 90 percent of the Niger population is involved in farming and cattle herding, most of the people are heavily reliant on the environment in their daily lives. The climate is arid and semi arid, especially in the north within the largest region Agadez, where the population mainly consists of nomads. Some are also engaged in extracting natural minerals and uranium. The southern part of the country is more fertile and not as arid, since it is located in the relatively rainy Sahel zone. However, the region is having enormous problems due to the droughts that struck the country, especially in 1973 and 1984. The drought process is accumulative and always has a negative impact over long periods of time. Thus, the Niger people today are still suffering from these two severe droughts.

By questioning various farmers who left their regions or the entire country, most of them would attribute their decision to migrate to unemployment and economic hardship. However, after running an in-depth analysis one finds out that their necessity to migrate is caused by environmental factors, which were the main reason for the deterioration of their living conditions.

Environmental Causes of Migration

Droughts in Niger are getting more severe and the drought cycle has gradually become shorter, from 20, to 15, to 10, to 5 years. Not all of the droughts in Niger affect the entire country, some of them are of a regional nature. Deforestation is a consequence of the low income caused by droughts; people had to look for new sources of income and therefore started cutting down trees in order to earn more money. Overgrazing is another phenomenon that results from droughts. Remaining grasslands are used to exhaustion in search of new additional income for farmers.

However, both deforestation and overgrazing take their toll on the environment, since they expose the land to wind and rain; the land is no longer protected and both the wind and the water erode the fertile soil with its important nutrients, causing further land degradation.

The Niger River is yet another factor exacerbating environmental degradation. Its source is in Guinea, but it flows through Mali, Niger and Nigeria, before finally flowing into the Gulf of Guinea. Mainly because of the deforestation, the sand creeps into the river and makes it very shallow (siltation phenomenon), which inhibits fish reproduction, which in turn has a negative effect on the livelihoods of the fishermen. As a consequence, they often not only change their activities but even migrate to other regions and countries.

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Last but not least, Niger and its three neighboring countries Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria are suffering from the drying up of Lake Chad. Currently, the Niger part of the Lake has completely dried up. Since it is fed by irregular rainfall (reduced by the droughts) and the two rivers Chari and Logone, it shows seasonal fluctuations in size. As the Lake is shallow by nature, any changes in average depth have a negative impact on the fish population. Due to the fact that the Lake in the Niger part has dried up, a breed of cattle called Vache Kouré has died out, and a certain tribe (Bhodouma) that used to keep this breed is losing its identity, and is migrating to other countries, such as Nigeria.

The History of Migration

Before colonization (1900), the Niger economy was mainly based on slavery; the slaves were responsible for growing crops and managing granaries and the economy was based on barter instead of monetary transactions.

When the tax system introduced by the colonists came into force, the economy was completely monetized (1906), and the indigenous people had to earn money to be able to pay their taxes. Initially they started to grow cash crops, such as peanuts, in the east of the country, where the soil was more suited for such a crop. This led to mass movements from the west to the east. When the soil was completely overexploited, people started to leave the country, mainly to the Gold Cost, today’s Ghana. Moreover, they had to provide the colonial army with food and material supplies as well as construction services, which made them neglect the land and the granaries. When the droughts hit the country, there was hardly anyone available to tend the soil, which led to more and more land degradation and ultimately to the great famine of 1913.

After the independence of Niger in 1960 and Ghana in 1957, the latter suffered from political unrest, and people from Niger started shifting to Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria for petroleum and coconut production, respectively. When civil war and political unrest broke out in Côte d’Ivoire in the mid-1990s, most of Niger migrants had to leave the country. The same happened in Nigeria. Since then, workers from Niger have moved to Libya, which was in need of labor due to the international embargo imposed against its economy. However, after the embargo was lifted, people from Niger were no longer able to easily work in Libya, although the official position of Libya had not really changed. Therefore, some of the Niger migrants to Libya returned voluntarily or were deported from the country.

Types of Migration

Since most of the people in Niger are farmers and nomads, they have traditionally grown crops in the rainy season (four months from June to September) and concentrated on cattle herding or other simple jobs for the rest of the year. The relative fertility of the land and abundance of water—especially in the south—allowed for enough crop production and reserves to cover the dry season. The severe droughts, which had their accumulative negative impact on the land and the rapid population growth resulted in the fact that these reserves were no longer sufficient and people had to leave the region/country during the dry season, looking for alternative livelihoods. Hence, most of the migration is of a seasonal nature.

There is a current trend for people to leave for Libya, but most of these people return after several years or even months, either after having collected the money they needed, discovering that life there does not meet their expectations, or having been sent back to Niger. Unfortunately, no conclusive research has been carried out yet about the length of time that migrants from Niger stay abroad. There seems to be no evidence that people from Niger would typically leave the country and stay away for a long time. Some might, but it is not the majority, since they are very attached to the country, and culturally, it is accepted to leave for some period and return back.

Destinations of the Niger Migrants

Migration in Niger takes place on a regional scale, i.e. within the country’s borders. Most of the migrants move from the north (the dry Agadez region) to the fertile south of the country (the Sahel zone). The cattle herders, for example, would move to the south in order to look for food for their animals. In general, people in Niger follow their livelihoods. They move gradually from one village to the other, looking for new ways of earning their livelihoods. Several people interviewed confirmed that if the environmental conditions in their own villages improved, they would return.

In part, the migrants from Niger move to other African countries, mainly to the neighboring Nigeria, Chad and Mali. Hardly anyone of the persons interviewed would travel to the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), despite the fact that these—in contrast to Libya—are francophone as is Niger. One of the reasons for this may be that in geographic terms, North Africa is relatively remote. This could indicate that the Niger people prefer to stay physically close to their country, if leaving the country is necessary in the first place.
The cultural aspect plays an important role in the migration decisions of the Niger people. People from the south of Niger prefer to stay within Africa, since they are mainly farmers and their skills match more with the traditional skills spread over the continent. As soon as they face problems with crop production, they prefer to move to other places within the country or within Africa. Thus, the migration decision here is a matter of survival. However, when people from Agadez (north) leave for Europe, they leave for prestige and wealth, since this is part of their culture. Usually, they come back after a while. In general, people from the Agadez region are more capable of leaving for Europe as compared to people from the regions in the South, since the former are usually better off due to their involvement in activities related to mineral and uranium extraction.

Niger as a Transit Country

Niger is often used as a transit country for migrants from other countries who then move on to Algeria and Libya. Most of them proceed to Europe as a final destination. Unfortunately, there are no statistics that show how many people exactly use Niger as a transit hub. However, it is well-known that not only Africans use Niger as a transit country on their way to Europe but also migrants from the Middle and Far East.

The reasons why Niger is considered a transit country are first its strategic location between North and South Africa, second its membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which permits all the citizens of the member countries to move freely (with no visa or passport requirements) across the borders of these countries, and third the relatively low quality of border controls on the part of Niger. People attempting to cross the borders to Algeria and Libya know about this low quality and take it as an ‘incentive’ to falsify identification documents.

Conclusion

The preliminary conclusion of the field research in Niger argues that the Niger environmental migrants prefer to keep physically close to their country; they would always ‘keep an eye’ on developments in Niger. Those who have to leave prefer not to be out of the country for too long; they mostly want and hope to return.
Although Ghana has recently once again become an example for a secure, democratic, stable and relatively prosperous African state, it is at the same time one of the most important emigration countries from Sub-Saharan Africa to Western Europe. The mass emigration of Ghanaians, which has led to a profound transnationalization of Ghanaian society, is closely linked to different types of insecurity, which were and are experienced by the migrants at different stages of the migration process. In this paper I will focus on three types of insecurities and their relation to migration from Ghana.

Socio-Economic Insecurities as Causes of Migration

At the time of its independence in 1957 Ghana was one of the most promising colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. It had about the same average income per capita as Mexico and South Korea and it was three to four times higher than the estimates for Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda (Rimmer, 1992, p. 4). Consequently Ghana was not an emigration but an immigration country. Labor migrants from different regions in West Africa, in particular present-day Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria and Niger, migrated in search of work to the cities, cocoa plantations and mines in the prospering south of present-day Ghana (Caldwell, 1969; Roux, 1956). It was estimated that between 10 and 15 percent of the Ghanaian population were born outside Ghana in the mid-1960s (cf. Peil, 1974, p. 369).

During the following decades, the direction of migration was gradually reversed. First, non-Ghanaian migrants left the country, partly due to an expulsion of ‘foreigners’ in 1969 (Peil, 1971). Ghanaians themselves have started to leave the country in larger numbers since the 1970s. Recent estimates assume that between five and 20 percent of the Ghanaian population live outside their country of birth, which amounts to a number in between one and four million people (Peil, 1995, p. 365; International Monetary Fund, 2005, p. 7).

The reversal of the migration trend was the result of the deterioration of the country’s political and economic situation after independence. By the early 1980s, Ghana had become an impoverished and over-indebted country. The Cedi, the currency of Ghana, was dramatically overvalued and wages were devalued by hyperinflation and urban unemployment. The low wages forced people to go back to the rural areas and parts of the demoralized population were fleeing the country (Siebold, 1988). Within two decades modernity and its benefits had changed from being a vision for the future of Ghana, to an aim one had to look for outside of the country.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, most Ghanaian migrants went to other African countries in particular Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire. In Nigeria, the oil boom had led to a strong increase in the demand for labor. An estimated one million Ghanaians worked as teachers, medical doctors, nurses, artisans, petty traders and as building workers in Nigeria in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a reaction to Nigeria’s economic crisis, Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria in two waves, one in 1983 and the second in 1985 (Adepoju, 1986; Brydon, 1985; Gravil, 1985).

The returnees met Ghana at the nadir of its recent history. On 31 of December 1982, Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council had forcefully overthrown the Ghanaian government. Beside the political instability, the violence and the economic chaos, Ghana suffered under a serious drought and disastrous bush fires destroyed food and cash crop plantations all over the country. In this situation, an estimated 700,000 Ghanaians returned from Nigeria. Many of these refugees tried to reinvest their savings from working in Nigeria by leaving Ghana again as soon as possible. Since African alternatives, which provided sufficient material and political security were rare at this time, many of these migrants traveled to Europe and North America although this often led to a devaluation of their cultural capital like language skills, school or university degrees and previous work experience.

Besides socio-economic insecurities, formal education also had an impact on the decisions of migrants. This means that people with a high or medium degree of formal education were more likely to migrate, in

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particular outside Africa, than people with little or no formal education (cf. Bump, 2006; Peil, 1995; Rado, 1986; Twum-Baah, Nabila and Aryee, 1995a; Twum-Baah, Nabila and Aryee, 1995b). The successes in terms of educational expansion and the demographic developments had created a situation in Ghana in which an increasing number of people with some degree of formal education encountered a shrinking formal labor market. For them it was extremely difficult to realize their education-based aspirations of social advancement in Ghana.

Moreover, education also stimulated transcontinental migration in another respect. Several hundred students who were sent on state scholarships to Europe after independence played a strategic role in the extension of the regional scope of migration. For those who returned to Ghana after the mid-1960s, it became more problematic to find adequate occupations with a sufficient salary and convenient working conditions (Martin, 2005). As a reaction, many returnees decided to leave the country again. Others preferred not to come back to Ghana at all. In many places the Ghanaian labor migrants of the late 1970s and 1980s traveled to, they met with former Ghanaian students who had already established themselves and who were able to assist their compatriots in some way.

In this sense, mass migration from Ghana to Europe and North America should not only be seen as the product of the (temporary) failure of the nation state to induce a sustainable economic development but also as a consequence of its success in terms of educational expansion.

However, not only the highly educated but increasingly also those with medium educational achievements left Ghana in the course of these developments. A village census of mobility patterns of families, which we conducted in the Brong Ahafo Region in the mid-west of Ghana in 2003, showed that 7.7 percent out of 1410 people questioned lived outside of Ghana, of which more than half resided outside of Africa.

Table 1: Geographical distribution of kinship units from the Brong Ahafo region (Ghana)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Residence</th>
<th>No. of Residents</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brong Ahafo Region (B/A)</td>
<td>1164</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana (without B/A)</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (without Ghana)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe/ North America</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside of Ghana (Total)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deviation of the transcontinental migrants from the non-migrant population in terms of their educational background was most significant among those with medium types of education (Nieswand, 2007). 31 out of 44 covered transcontinental migrants had an educational background above primary school level and below secondary school level. This means that in our small sample their proportion was about twice as high as in the district average (cf. Dormaa District Assembly, 2003, p. 8).

Table 2: Transcontinental migrants by education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>No. of people</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Education/ No education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School/ Junior Secondary School</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Senior) Secondary School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational School/ Polytechnics</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University/College</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of urban unemployment—and especially underemployment—of people with medium-types of education were, and are still likely to experience status inconsistency (Nieswand, 2007, pp. 82–112). On the one hand, they followed the modern promise that better education should be the key to societal development and individual well-being (Meyer, 1992, p. 24), on the other hand they experienced a lack of opportunities on the formal labor market to realize their aspirations.

Although in many cases the educational degrees of transcontinental Ghanaian migrants are devalued on the labor markets of the receiving areas (Nieswand, 2005), from the Ghanaian perspective migration seems to offer a way to overcome socio-economic insecurities and status inconsistencies. Remittances and home visits of successful migrants who often buy cars and build large conspicuous houses in Ghana create local evidence that transcontinental migration is a way to overcome the Ghanaian predicament.

Insecurity and Migration Routes

A second form of insecurity is related to the routes of migration. Generally, it can be stated that parallel to the rigidification of the Western European migration regimes mobility from West Africa to Europe became more difficult and dangerous for the majority of non-elite
migrants. For instance, before the late 1970s Ghanaians did not even need a visa to enter Germany. After the introduction of the requirement to obtain a visa, it still could easily be circumvented by travelling to East Germany and entering West Berlin from there without a visa. In 1986, the two German governments agreed that people intending to travel from East Germany to West Germany had to have proof of a valid visa before entering East Berlin (Bade, 1994). Moreover, the West German government started to fine airlines, which transported passengers without valid travel documents and required transit travelers to produce a transit visa.

Map 1: Routes of undocumented migrants to Europe

As a political reaction to the sharp increase in asylum seekers during the 1980s, the asylum procedures gradually became more restrictive. Since the mid-1990s, when the anti-migration measures of the Western Europe governments showed increasing effectiveness, it became less and less possible for the majority of young Ghanaians to enter Western European countries legally. Since the pressure of migration is still high, a significant number of people from different West African countries try, partly successfully, to circumvent the border controls of the European Union as undocumented migrants. Important routes for undocumented migrants from Africa to the European Union are from Tunisia or Libya to Lampedusa and Sicily, from Morocco to Spain and from Morocco, Mauritania or Senegal to the Spanish Canaries (Mattes, 2006). All of these ‘new migration routes’ to Europe involve life-threatening dangers and there is a considerable death toll. A significant proportion of migrants die on their way in the Sahara, the Mediterranean Sea or the Atlantic Ocean.

Insecurity and the Destination Country

The great majority of the more than 20,000 documented Ghanaian migrants came to Germany after the legal halting of labor recruitment in 1973. This means that most of them did not enter Germany as legal labor migrants but by other legal means, in particular as asylum seekers, with a tourist visa or in the framework of a family reunion. Until 1993, asylum seeking was a major way for Ghanaians and many other migrants of attaining a temporarily limited legal status in Germany, which was often transferred into a more permanent legal status by other means. Between 1977 and 1993, the official numbers of Ghanaians in Germany grew from 3,275 to 25,952. During the 1980s and early 1990s, between 1,700 and almost 7,000 Ghanaians annually applied for asylum in Germany.

The German anti-migration policy, which reacted to the sharp increase in asylum seekers, peaked in 1993 when Article 16 of the German constitution, which guaranteed the right of asylum, was changed. That year also marks a caesura in the recent history of Ghanaian migration to Germany. Ghana became one out of eight countries which were classified as safe countries of origin in the Annex to §29 of the German Asylum Procedure Law. Since then, it is practically impossible for Ghanaians to obtain political asylum in Germany and the decision-making process is substantially accelerated. Partly as a result of these policies, partly as a reaction to Germany’s economic problems after the reunification the official numbers of Ghanaians declined from more than 25,000 in 1992 to 20,600 in 2006.

2 It seems that because of conflicts in the north of Niger, one main migration route from Ghana to North Africa has recently shifted from Niger to the north-eastern part of Mali.

3 The other seven countries were Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Senegal, the Slovakian Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Roughly three phases of Ghanaian migration to Germany can be distinguished. The period in-between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s when the relatively small Ghanaian population in Germany was dominated by students, a period between the mid-1970s and 1993 when the asylum law was for many Ghanaians a major way of achieving a temporary secure legal status and the phase between 1993 and today during which we can observe a tendency towards diversification of the Ghanaian population in Germany in terms of duration of stay, age, gender and legal and socio-economic status (Tonah, 200).

There is, on the one hand, the larger part of the Ghanaian community who have often, by now, been in Germany for more than 20 years and have legally and socially ‘accommodated’ themselves. This tendency of localization becomes visible by the increase in Ghanaian families and in second generation Ghanaians, the activities of diaspora organizations, the foundation of churches and by the spread of shops, which are adapted to the specific demands of African migrants (cf. Jach, 2005; Nieswand, 2007; Tonah, 2007). On the other hand, there is a larger group of undocumented Ghanaian migrants. According to some estimates the group of undocumented migrants is as large as the group of documented ones. Undocumented migrants often live under precarious and particularly insecure conditions. They are exposed to the constant fear of being caught by the police, are vulnerable to the exploitative practices of employers and have no or only a limited access to state institutions of social security, like hospitals, courts and schools.

In my concluding remark, I want to emphasize one aspect of the complex situation of Ghanaian transcontinental migrants: I argued that the migration pressure from Ghana appears to be particularly high among the large group of people with medium levels of education, who have normally no legal possibility of labor migration to high wage countries in the present situation.

However, we can observe two diverging developments in regard to the insecurity of this group of people. On the one hand, the socio-economic and political situation in Ghana has become politically and economically more secure compared to the situation of the early 1980s. On the other hand, the insecurities non-privileged migrants meet on their way to Europe and which they encounter if they manage to enter the European Union have significantly increased.

As long as the differences in wages and living conditions are as high as they are, it is improbable that in a society like Ghana, which has reached a high level of transnationalization, the pressure of migration will decrease. But, this practically means that the political responsibilities for the causes of these migration-related insecurities have shifted from the countries of origin to the North African transit countries and the receiving countries in the European Union.

References


The Three Dimensions of International Migration—Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Synergies?
On 8 August 2007, seven Tunisian fishermen were arrested after they landed with 44 migrants on the island of Lampedusa. The fishermen, who responded to the migrants’ distress signals and acted in accordance to the law of the sea, were arrested upon arrival for assisting illegal immigration for profit (Statewatch, 2007). The situation of the Tunisian fishermen—just like that of other captains who had saved 37 migrants the previous summer—passed largely unheeded in the UK media. However, the Summer of 2007, as the Summer before, had been largely mediatized for the arrival of thousands of so-called ‘boat people’ on the shores of the Spanish Canaries. A few months earlier, the European border agency Frontex had drawn the balance sheet for a one-year project regarding migration to the Spanish shores. The Frontex Executive Director, Ilkka Laitinen argued that Frontex had managed to save 1,000 lives and diverted 1167 migrants to the shores of Africa.

A similar contradiction between those who are to be saved and those whose lives are worth so little that they even fall under the radar of media attention was examined by Peter Hallward (2007) in an analysis of two events that took place on 3-4 May 2007. One was the highly-mediatized disappearance of Madeleine McCann from a holiday resort in Portugal. The other concerned the death of 80 African migrants on a boat in the Caribbean, which was ignored by the media. As the migrants were trying to reach the British territories of Turks and Caicos Islands, they were allegedly ‘rammed’ by the TCI marine police. Although investigations in the role that the TCI police played in this event showed that the TCI police did not intentionally damage the migrants’ boat, their actions can only be understood from the perspective of deflecting migrants away from British territory. The Frontex interventions in Mauritania and Senegal have a similar purpose of deflecting migrants before they can actually reach European borders.

On the Contradictions of Migration: Salvage and Abjection

These various events I have selected by way of introduction reveal a series of contradictions between lives that need to be salvaged and lives that are relegated to abjection or death. These contradictions can be understood, I argue, by unpacking the practices of security that govern migration. While the ‘securitization’ of migration has become a leitmotif in critical security studies, I introduce the concepts of ‘salvage’ and ‘abjection’ to conceptualize the critical injunctions to transform security and tend to the individual’s insecurities and vulnerabilities. Thinking about the insecurity effects of security practices has led to concerns with redeploying security to ‘salvage’ the vulnerable and the insecure. Judith Butler (1993) has coined the term “abjection” to refer to the space of repudiation that the identification of the self creates.

If salvage refers to the celebration of life, abjection is the repudiation of life. However, a discussion of contradictions displayed by security practices show that ‘salvage’ is always partial: some must be salvaged, while others must be left to abjection or death. Moreover, security can render the abjection of some as salvage, while salvage can become abjection as in the fate of the Tunisian fishermen.

The inherent contradictions of security practices will clarify why the idea of ‘human security’ or the exploration of migrants’ insecurity and vulnerability does not challenge the dichotomy of salvage versus abjection. For this purpose, I am sketching out a brief overview of critical theories of security and attempt to insert ‘human security’ in this theoretical framework.

Critical security studies have moved away from narrow definitions of security that were rendering invisible the vulnerabilities and insecurities of many people, as well as legitimizing violent practices by the state by reconceptualizing security. Critical reconceptualizations of security have been threefold: security as discourse, security as practice, and security as a promise.

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Security as Discourse

This approach is probably most readily associated with the speech act definition of security and with the poststructuralist analyses of the performative role of discourse. Issues are securitized by virtue of discursive construction or, as Buzan et al. have put it, “[s]ecurity is a quality actors inject into issues by securitizing them, which means to stage them on the political arena... and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves” (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998, p. 204). Alongside the speech act, securitization is characterized by three other elements: political actors (with the state as the ultimate securitizing actor, as it is the state that needs to take up the security claims), the audience that accepts the speech act and the sanctioning of extraordinary measures.

Thinking of security as discourse also opened up an analysis of the negative effects of security. For Buzan and Waever, securitization is at best “a kind of mobilization of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state” (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 8). Thus, it invokes a specter of violence that hovers in the shadows of political communities. Violence becomes a permanent possibility in a society that defines itself in terms of conflictual relations, of self/other. Securitization also entails other pernicious effects beyond the specter of violence. It creates exceptional practices or, rather, it reactivates exceptional practices that represent conditions of possibility of modern communities and law. The exceptionalism of securitization reshapes politics along the lines of friend/enemy or rather friend/foe, as the ‘foe’ is the dangerous other whom Schmitt tries to exclude from the realm of politics, the true name for the object (Aradau, 2006; Schmitt, 1996).

Security as Practice

Security is not simply a discourse, but refers to the routine technologies of bureaucracies and ‘security professionals’. Security is about the technologies to filter and categorize a person, to estimate categories of risk and deploy particular forms of knowledge. Individuals or populations are ordered according to a norm against which deviations can be measured. Security implies “counter-measures to deal with the danger which initiates fear, and for the neutralization, elimination or constraint of that person, group, object or condition which engenders fear” (Dillon, 1995, pp. 161–62). In this perspective, analyzing security implies an exploration of the “practices of coercion, protection, pacification, static guard, control, surveillance, information gathering and sorting, information management, grid-like security cover, calming, dissuasion, locking up, turning back, and removal from the territory that are deployed by security agents (private or public, police, military police, or army)” (Bigo, 2001b, pp. 99–100).

All these modes of analysis unpack security as a specific type of ordering of the polis, an ordering based on practices of inclusion and exclusion and imbued with a mimetic desire to make its members conform to ideal images of what they should be (Hindess, 1998, p. 59). Unpacking practices of security shows how violence and exceptionalism are not simply matters of performative discourses contested in the political spectacle, but inform our everydayness through bureaucratic technologies and innumerable ways in which these technologies govern us.

Security as Promise

In this approach, the promise of ontological and epistemological certainty that security offers is exposed as an unfulfilled promise. Rather than tending to the many uncertainties and vulnerabilities that exist in the world, this approach covers the ongoing interest in ontological security, but also the so-called “realities of security” (Booth, 2004). Security entrenches certain dominant certainties while others are rendered invisible. The individual has been relegated to the background of security studies given the same assumption of the primacy of state security. States have been considered the guarantors of individual security too, but where individuals could only count as collective, as an aggregate rather than as specific individuals. The security of the individual demands critical attention to a large array of issues which affect the prospects for a free life.

Critical scholars have challenged the disqualification and objectification of life that security entails and have countered the human being to the state, asking the question of primacy: Who is the primary referent object of security, “is it states, or is it people? Whose security comes first?” (Booth, 1991, p. 319). Critical security studies and feminist security studies have promoted the individual as the legitimate referent object of security and tackled the issue of inclusion/exclusion.

Feminist security studies have been mostly concerned with those who cannot voice their security concerns, those “whose experiences of danger and violence are written out of the account” (Pettman, 1996, p. 98). They have either set out to make such concerns audible from specific loci or have advocated, more generally, the diminution of all forms of violence (Tickner, 2001, p 143). They have tirelessly interpellated those whom Cynthia Enloe metaphorically calls the “margins, silences, and bottom rungs” (Enloe, 1993, p. 186). Christine Sylvester has argued for privileging the “profoundly mundane” and women’s experiences of insecurity (Sylvester, 1994, 1996).
Human Security: A Critique of Security?

Human security approaches have vied for a definition of the individual’s security that would prove useful for policymakers. Unlike critical approaches to the security of the individual, which attempt to understand the ‘realities of security’ by analyzing power and injustice in concrete situations, human security approaches draw on traditional social science methodologies and attempt to quantify and isolate vulnerabilities and factors of insecurity. However, for the purposes of this paper, I want to consider ‘human security’ as a discourse, practice and promise of security rather than a quantifiable reality that different international institutions and policymakers try to calculate once and for all.

As discourses, practices and promises of security have been variously criticized for their negative effects, their partiality (addressing the community at the expense of outsiders or ‘internal others’), or their falsity (unfulfilled promises), human security can be seen as a discourse, practice and promise that challenges these dominant understandings of security.

What does this mean more concretely? In the discursive approach, the negative effects of security can be counteracted by counter-discourses, discourses that desecuritize or unmake the representations of migrants as dangerous, risky, linked with crime, trafficking or other illicit activities. Speech acts, whatever their structure, are in a certain sense ordinary in their functioning: they need to be reiterated, are open to contestation and can be replaced. Desecuritization becomes a matter of different speech acts. Rather than dangerous or risky, ‘human security’ approaches would speak about the vulnerabilities and insecurities of migrants.

In the practice-based approach, human security would entail different practices of governing societies which do not function through technologies of surveillance and risk management. One of the practices that is put forth by ‘human security’ approaches is exactly that of ‘salvage’. Instead of risk screening and other practices that separate categories of risky others who are to be relegated to abjection from categories of people who are to be made secure, human security proposes a ‘universal’ practice of salvaging and protecting the vulnerable. The lives of migrants and asylum seekers could be valued as they are rescued, provided with food, shelter, even medical assistance. However, they are to be saved from sinking boats only to be deported to their countries of origin.

In the security-as-promise approach, human security would hold the state’s promise of security to account. Nonetheless, the opposition between state and individual often misses the point inasmuch as “the state is not only expected to ensure the institutional survival of the community but also the personal survival of each of its members” (Bigo, 2001a, p. 134). Who is to protect all the vulnerable and the insecure? Human security proponents find themselves often bound to admit that it is the state (ICISS, 2001). The state not only assigns membership in the political community and ensures the survival of the community, but is also in charge of the well-being of individuals (or of categories of the population). Yet, as part of this process of securing the individual, the state permanently draws boundaries, creating categories of individuals who are to be protected at the expense of the exclusion and elimination of others. In Dillon’s words, the “continuous biopolitical assaying of life proceeds through the epistemically driven and continuously changing interrogation of the worth and eligibility of the living across a terrain of value that is constantly changing” (Dillon, 2005, p. 41).

Let me for a moment turn to the specific case of trafficking in women, where human security approaches have had most resonance if not most impact. The vulnerabilities of victims of trafficking have challenged a statist discourse of security from the perspective of victims. Rather than deported, victims were to be ‘salvaged’. Nevertheless, salvaging victims of trafficking perpetuated a dynamics of ‘insecuring’ others. And if the other is taken for granted as being the trafficker (morally blameable), when ‘other others’ made insecure in the process of securing trafficked women are prostitutes or asylum-seekers, then we need to ask questions about how human security tackles the contradiction between ‘salvage’ and ‘abjection’.

Shifting an insecure and vulnerable subject from one category to another does not suspend the contradictions of security. The limit, which human security confronts is that of security as universal. Can security be universal? Security is often rendered as something which we can all partake of or share in. Nonetheless, I suggest, security is always limited by the dynamics of ‘salvage’ and ‘abjection’, which is its condition of possibility. Not only does human security render ‘other others’ insecure, but it does not even render victims of trafficking secure (see also Aradau, 2004). Victims of trafficking are to be rescued from exploitation only to be later on returned home, voluntarily repatriated, which means ‘humanely’ deported even against their manifest wishes.

Thinking Past (In)security

What this very schematic discussion of approaches to security and human security has tried to point out is the limit that is constitutive of security. Security is constituted by contradictions between ‘salvage’ and ‘abjection’. Hence, ‘salvage’ can only be partial: some must be salvaged, while others must be left to abjection or death. Moreover, security practices can
render the abjection of some as salvage, while salvage can become abjection as in the fate of the Tunisian fishermen or of victims of trafficking.

The contradictions of security clarify why ‘human security’ or the exploration of migrants’ insecurity and vulnerability does not challenge the dichotomy of salvage versus abjection. Proponents of human security argue that shifting security from the state to the individual is a progressive move of tending to the other’s insecurity and vulnerability. Yet, this pedagogical sentimentality is inherently flawed. On the one hand, the state has always been tasked with ensuring the security of the individual. The fiction of the social contract refers to exactly this relationship. However, ever since Hobbes, this fiction is dependent upon drawn boundaries, creating categories of individuals who are to be protected at the expense of the exclusion and elimination of others who are dangerous or risky. Security legitimizes inequalities between the domestic and the international, as well as practices of inequality among the different members of the realm of the international, be those states, political communities or other types of actors. The constitution of political communities is based on the inegalitarian delimitation of inside and outside, citizens and strangers, natives and aliens.

The contradictions I have exposed show that security is an inherently inegalitarian practice, a practice that can only be understood in opposition to practices of equality (Aradau, 2008). The question for a renewed politics of migration is not to think (in)security, but to reconsider political equality in opposition to security. Rethinking the politics of migration would entail rethinking how its governance can be more consistent with aspirations for equality.

Rethinking therefore the politics of migration does not mean rethinking the human security of migrants, counter-discourses, alternative practices and criticizing unfulfilled promises. It means reinstating equality within our political practices. This a difficult task, particularly given the general political context in which we live: economics and particularly neoliberal economics sees inequality as the motor of progress, culturalist approaches emphasize difference at the expense of equality and nations create more and more hierarchical boundaries against those who challenge inequalities. In my view, rethinking the politics of migration is to try and attempt to make governing practices and regulations more consonant with aspirations for equality.

References


Policymakers in Europe and elsewhere are increasingly making links between migration policy and national security.¹ Such a focus is only one possible lens through which to view migration policies, and any discussion of the relationship between state security and migration should occur in a context that also takes into account individual and human security issues, as well as the range of social, economic and other issues relating to migration policy. However, as I have been asked for the purposes of this conference to focus specifically on the topic of “Domestic Security and Migration to EU Countries”, this paper will focus primarily on the relationship between migration and the security interests of European states.

Within this context, this paper seeks to provide a comprehensive view of the security impacts of migration on European states—noting the security-enhancing dimensions of migration alongside potential security risks. The paper has a simple argument: the key to managing the relationship between migration and security is policy. State migration policies—whether border control policies, citizenship and integration policies, or the policies of migration-sending states towards emigrants/diasporas—need to be designed to take advantage of and promote the security-enhancing dimensions of migration while minimizing any potential security risks.

Of course, this is easier said than done. But it is an important point to make when analyzing possible security impacts relating to migration flows, as security risks can potentially be viewed as a symptom of policy gaps in the management of migration flows. Migration is an area that suffers from governance deficits and policy incoherence at both the national level (with regard to both migration-sending and migration-receiving states) and at the regional and international levels. As compared to other areas of global policy concern that involve trans-border flows—international trade, finance, communications, travel and transport—it is still one of the least regulated and institutionalized at the regional and global levels.²

Migration is not a new phenomenon. It is, however, more than ever before, a global phenomenon, which is closely related to a number of other globalization processes in both its causes and effects. The globalization of trade, finance, and production, and the general trend toward greater global economic integration, all contribute to the emergence of new and more mobile pools of labor, while creating stronger ties and networks among advanced industrial and developing economies that provide new avenues and opportunities for migration. These economic processes are reinforced by cheaper and more accessible forms of transportation and communication technologies, as well as an emerging global infrastructure of services that link national economies and that undergird the formation of international migration networks.

International Migration and Cross-Border Mobility: Counting and Categorizing

The United Nations defines a ‘migrant’ as someone entering a country for twelve months or longer; yet individual states have varying definitions of what constitutes a migrant. Some states measure migration flows based on the number of border crossings, and others measure migration by country of birth (International Organization for Migration, 2003). In addition, there are broader categories of temporary border-crossers—such as tourists, commuters, and business travelers—who cannot be counted as ‘migrants’ per se, but nevertheless are significant for understanding the political dynamics surrounding migration, security, and border control. In practice, the lines between various categories of border-crossers and migrants are difficult to define, but...
nevertheless it is useful to think conceptually about who crosses borders and why, as a prelude to thinking about how this impacts on national security.

Much of the general literature and political debate on migration has implicitly dealt with voluntary migration—that is, migration by individuals who have left their homes of their own accord, whether it be to pursue economic opportunities, for personal enrichment, to be reunited with their families (family reunification is a standard immigrant category in most industrialized states), or for other reasons. A second category consists of forced migration, including refugees and displaced persons. Involuntary migration can stem from a variety of causes, including human slavery, ethnic cleansing, and deportation.

The impetus for an individual to migrate can be economic or political or, often, a combination of both. Economic migration can include unskilled or skilled labor, temporary workers, guest workers, and forced migrants such as trafficked persons in the sex industry or slave labor. Refugees and asylum seekers leave to avoid the trauma of war or political persecution. In practice, disentangling the political and economic factors that contribute to migration flows is often difficult (IOM, 2003, pp. 30–33; Neumayer, 2005).

Economic migrants can feel compelled to move due to the harsh conditions they face in their country of origin; asylum seekers or refugees may be able to exercise a degree of choice in their country of destination, which can be influenced by such factors as economic opportunities, family ties, and existing migration networks.

Another distinction is made between immigrants who enter states through formal, legal channels, as opposed to those who enter through illegal channels, including those who are smuggled, trafficked, or enter with forged or no papers. It is estimated that so-called irregular migrants comprise 30 to 50 percent of all migration to Western industrialized countries. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) surmises that approximately four million people are smuggled across borders every year. Half of all irregular migrants have some interaction with smuggling or trafficking networks—a global industry that raises approximately US $10 billion per year.3

A further relevant distinction is permanent or temporary migration. Permanent migration refers to the crossing of national borders leading to permanent resettlement, what many traditionally think of as ‘immigration’. Temporary migration, on the other hand, includes so-called guest workers, seasonal laborers, and students. In addition, millions of people cross borders for purposes of travel, contributing to the US $3.13 trillion global travel industry.4

The complicated dimension with regard to categorization—and of crucial importance for thinking about the general relationship between migration and security—is that categories of border-crossers are not always clearly cut. Tourists enter a country and then proceed to stay and look for work; political asylum seekers may leave a country for political reasons, but may then decide to relocate to one particular state and not another due to the existence of economic opportunities or family ties; members of organized criminal networks are unlikely to mention this when they apply for a visa and may well indeed also have a legitimate pretext to enter a country as, for example, students or businesspeople.

The Security-Enhancing Dimensions of International Migration Flows

Many analyses of migration and security look only at the security risks associated with migration flows, and not the ways in which migration may enhance a state’s security. A country’s population is arguably its most important resource; however, it must be effectively mobilized. Purely on the level of basic demographics, migration can make a difference to a state’s power and security. Most European states have aging populations and need a younger stock if their social security systems are to function and if they are to be able to compete on the world market.

In addition to demographics, there is the security-enhancing effect of economic growth that has accompanied many migration flows. The post-war economic boom in Germany and other Western European countries would not have been possible without the influx of migrant labor from Mediterranean countries in the 1960s. Highly industrialized countries are designing their immigration systems to harness the talent of skilled workers, attempting to outdo one another in luring talent in what some have referred to as a “human capital accretion ‘sweepstakes’” (IOM, 2003a, p. 149). This trend is especially noticeable in the area of information technology and the knowledge economy, which has become an integral component of state power. In 2000, for example, Germany instigated a new ‘Green Card’ program, modeled on the US program, as a way of attracting highly skilled labor, especially computer specialists.5 Students are another group of sought-after ‘migrants.’ In Great Britain, universities are turning to overseas students as a source of revenue to

3 Numbers of illegal migrants are not counted in official statistics and are thus difficult to establish. IOM, 2003a, pp. 58–61.
4 See: World Travel and Tourism Council, Executive Summary: Travel and Tourism: Forging Ahead, available via <http://www.wttc.org>
stem the financial crisis that has hit its education sector, with approximately 50,000 students from China studying in the United Kingdom in 2005.\(^6\)

In the global competition for highly skilled workers, however, there are winners and losers. In particular, many parts of Africa continue to experience a brain drain of skilled labor. According to estimates, 70,000 professionals and/or university graduates leave countries in Africa every year with the aim of working in Europe or North America. More than 20,000 Nigerian doctors practice in North America, and in 2003 the IOM estimated that the South African economy had lost approximately US$7.8 billion in human capital due to emigration since 1997 (2003a, pp. 6, 216–217). The exit of highly skilled labor from developing economies contributes to the growing gap between the wealthiest and poorest members of the international state system.

Yet, the effects of emigration processes from the developing world to the developed world are multiple, and developing countries also benefit greatly from out-migration. Perhaps the most significant result of migration from developing countries is the capital flows that are generated through labor remittances. If states are able to capture the developmental benefits of remittances, this can contribute substantially to economic growth in ways that have advantages over other types of capital flows. As opposed to other categories of external capital flows, which are measured as changes in the assets and liabilities of residents vis-à-vis non-residents in a state, many labor remittance flows are technically transfers of capital from one set of nationals (living abroad) to another set of nationals. Additionally, remittances tend to be more stable than other forms of private capital flows across borders (McHale and Kapur, 2003).

The impact of remittances on national economies has been rising steadily since the 1970s. Whereas in 1970 global remittances were estimated at slightly more than US$3 billion, by 1988 this had increased to US$30.4 billion (Segal, 1993). A decade ago, global remittances were estimated at US$66 billion, an amount that was greater than the sum of all state-sponsored foreign development aid programs (UNPF, 1993, p. 45). Estimates for remittances in 2002 ran as high as US$100 billion annually in transnational flows across national borders (Gammeltoft, 2002).

Labor remittances from migration make up more than one-half of all total financial inflows in a number of countries. In Morocco, labor remittances total approximately US$3.3 billion a year, accounting for 83 percent of the trade balance deficit (IOM, 2003a, p. 224). In both Egypt and Tunisia, they account for 51 percent of capital inflows into the state (IOM, 2003b, p. 2). Labor remittances can be put to use for a variety of purposes and, if effectively utilized, can help to stimulate economic development.\(^7\)

In 2000, labor remittances contributed more than 10 percent to the national economies of several developing countries, including El Salvador, Eritrea, Jamaica, Jordan, Nicaragua and Yemen. As such, more states are trying to harness the power of labor remittances. Morocco, for example, is prioritizing migration management through the establishment of foundations that encourage temporary return migration of skilled professionals, and by fostering a core of elite emigrés who can further the country’s development and promote Moroccan culture abroad (IOM, 2003a, pp. 17, 225).

Migration flows can also enhance a state’s ability to engage in diplomacy. Small states in the international system can involve their diasporas in diplomacy by drawing on emigrants and their descendants within a target country, and by sponsoring lobbying and public relations activities. For example, NATO enlargement was helped along by the domestic lobbying activities of Americans of Eastern European descent. Armenia has a Diaspora Desk in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Shain and Barth, 2003).

European states have possibly been less adept at harnessing the diplomatic and public relations power of their migrant populations than the United States. Transnational diaspora populations can be an important source of national influence abroad. Yossi Shain (1999), for example, has argued, contra Huntington, that migrants and diasporas can promote US national interests by acting as unofficial ambassadors who propagate American values in their home countries. At the level of official policy, states can mobilize first- and second-generation immigrants to assist in achieving particular foreign policy projects that enhance overall levels of security—whether engagement via development projects, public diplomacy, or as negotiators, diplomats, or ‘economic ambassadors’.

Migration and Security Risks: Transnationalized Conflicts, Organized Crime and International Terrorism

Migration flows may interact with other factors in at least three ways that create some security risks for EU states: (1) by transnationalizing violent conflict; (2) by providing an opportunity for networks of organized crime, and (3) by providing conduits for international terrorism. Like many other aspects of the relationship between migration and national security, these factors are not

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\(^7\) See, for example, Van Hear, 2002, pp. 202–223.
all necessarily ‘new’. For example, in the period of pre-
World War I globalization in the nineteenth century,
which saw similar waves of migration, there was also
a plethora of political activity by non-state actors who
utilized migration channels and immigrant communities
to mobilize transnationally and, at times, employed
political violence that challenged state security
interests. Examples include nineteenth century anarchist
and socialist networks, as well as various nationalist
movements, such as the Fenians who were particularly
active in mobilizing Irish immigrant communities within
the United States.8

International migration processes, combined with the
availability of new technologies and media markets,
allow for migrants and their descendents to remain
connected to their ‘home country’ and ‘co-ethnics’
through diaspora networks. These transnational
diaspora networks, in turn, can be used as a political
resource, including a resource in violent conflicts.

A number of qualitative studies of diasporas in internal
conflicts have echoed this observation (Kaldor, 1999;
Anderson, 1998, pp. 58–74; Byman et al., 2001). The
Independent International Commission on Kosovo
(2000, pp. 45ff), for example, noted that it was Kosovar
 Albanians in the diaspora who created the Kosovo
Liberation Army, raised money in the diaspora to
support the conflict, and even utilized the diaspora
to recruit fighters. Other examples include the conflict
between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Turkish
state throughout the 1990s, as well as that between the
Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan state.

As well as potentially affecting the course of violent
conflicts, migration flows can impact on state security
when they become intertwined with organized crime.
Perhaps the most obvious link between migration and
organized crime is the global industry in human smuggling
and trafficking that has emerged to meet the demands
of individuals seeking to cross national borders. This is
an instance in which market-based mechanisms take
over when the demand for opportunities to immigrate
outstrips the supply provided by official channels in
state migration policies. Smugglers demand high prices
for their services that range from US $500 for a passage
from Morocco to Spain to prices from some countries
in Asia to the United States that can be as high as US
$50,000 (IOM, 2003a, p. 60). Like other non-state actors,
smuggling networks have been able to take advantage
of new technologies to achieve their goals.

In addition to the security problems of civil wars and
organized crime, questions relating to migration and
security are increasingly viewed through the lens of
international terrorism. This is true not just in the United
States, but also in Europe and other states. In Spain,
for example, the Foreign Minister argued that “the fight
against illegal immigration is also the reinforcement of
the fight against terrorism” (Rudolph, 2003, p. 616). A report
issued by the Nixon Center declared that “immigration
and terrorism are linked—not because all immigrants
are terrorists but because all, or nearly all, terrorists in the
West have been immigrants” (Leiken, 2004). The same
report went on to cite Rohan Gunaratna’s claim that “all
major terrorist attacks conducted in the last decade in
North America and Western Europe, with the exception
of Oklahoma City, have utilized migrants” (ibid., p. 6).9

Such claims are sensationalist and highly problematic,
not the least because they do not take into account
attacks by domestic groups in Europe such as the
Basque group Euskade Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Migration
does not cause terrorism, but migration policies and
migration networks can, however, potentially provide
avenues for terrorist organizations and other non-state
actors to pursue their interests. Similar to patterns one
sees in cases of the utilization of diaspora populations
as resources in civil wars, diaspora populations can be
utilized by violent non-state actors in terrorist campaigns
or broader transnational political struggles. This is not
a new phenomenon—one earlier example of this
dynamic in Western Europe was the mobilization of the
Algerian community in France by the FLN during the
Algerian War of Liberation.

While recent attention has focused on the role that the
marginalization of immigrant populations may play in
fostering ‘radicalization’, a narrow focus on social and
economic marginalization of immigrant communities is
insufficient. Some of the more active members of radical
Islamist organizations in Europe (such as Hizb ut-Tahrir
in the United Kingdom) are actually converts rather
than immigrants or descendents of immigrants. And,
by all accounts, the perpetrators of the 7/7 bombings
in London were reasonably well-integrated into British
society.

Radicalization activities have to be seen within their
broader geopolitical and transnational context. In some
respects, radicalization activities may occur due to the
availability of opportunities for political participation
as much as restrictions on political expression and
participation. This is not necessarily a bad thing as long
as there is a distinction made between holding radical
political views and the use of political violence/terrorism.
This is a tension that European states are familiar with from
previous histories of ‘home grown’ radical movements,
whether they be leftist or nationalistic.

8 See, for example, Rapoport, 2003, pp. 36–59.
9 Gunaratna’s quote is attributed to his presentation at the Nixon
Center on 1 December 2003.
One danger in making too close a link between migration and security with regard to international terrorism is that states may overreact. In addition to raising serious questions with respect to civil liberties and profiling, many of the actions taken in response to concerns about terrorism in the United States and Europe since 9/11 contribute to a range of other detrimental and counterproductive outcomes, such as threatening the flow of remittances or weakening incipient diasporic civil society networks that could help to support bottom-up processes of political liberalization (Jamal and Heydemann, 2004).

Conclusion

The management of international migration flows is a key challenge facing states in a globalized international security environment. Like other dimensions of globalization, many of the mechanisms by which migration flows affect national security are not necessarily new, but rather operate cumulatively and in combination with other factors.

Ultimately, it is how states respond to global migration flows through policy formation and policy implementation that will determine to what extent national security is enhanced or diminished by international migration. International migration flows, like other globalized dimensions of the international security environment “do not present iron laws, but rather they change the cost-benefit calculus of various policy choices” (Kirshner, 2006, p. 5). Migrant populations are ultimately resources that can be mobilized by states to enhance economic productivity and can be drawn upon in the pursuit of foreign policy and/or development goals. A failure by states to mobilize migrant populations may leave such populations more vulnerable to mobilization activities by non-state actors, including violent non-state actors: such actors do not view migrant populations as problems, but rather as resources.

The challenge facing states is to adopt an expansive, long-term view of migration, taking into account the many benefits of international migration while devising comprehensive migration policies that enhance overall levels of international security in the international system. States that are best able to ‘harness the power of migration’ through well-designed policies in cooperation with other states will also be the best equipped to face the new global security environment.

References


IOM. See: International Organization for Migration.


The current globalization process has facilitated the long-distance involvement of the diaspora in events in their respective homelands. Thanks to inexpensive transportation and rapid communication, the diaspora is exerting an increasing influence on their homeland politics. This advantage enables diaspora communities to build up vast transnational networks, crisscrossing countries and continents, linking the process of globalization to local conditions of their respective countries of origin. Likewise, it enables the individuals and groups in the diaspora communities to build up intersecting social, economic and political bridges that link their new places of residence with their original homelands. In this regard, the contemporary diaspora manifests itself in different ways as being one of the main global forces shaping the directions and trends of the 21st century.

The existing knowledge on the long-distance interactions of the diaspora with the homeland dynamics is very scarce. There are certain limited studies about the long-distance activities of some of the older diaspora groups, which however focus disproportionately on negative practices of a minority of militant members, thus not reflecting the total picture of their overall activities. For instance, most of the available studies on the subject are largely informed by the activities of Irish, Sri Lankan Tamil, Sikh and Kurdish diaspora groups. The focus of these studies is mainly on the diasporas’ role with regard to homeland conflicts.

The relationship between the long-distance activities of the diaspora and the impact this could have on the positive developments in their respective countries of origin has hardly been addressed. Particularly, the social, economic and political networks and activities of the African diaspora are the least studied among all the diaspora. Empirical data available on the long-distance African diaspora activities relating to conflict or development in all of its facets is still scarce.

One explanation is the comparatively late emergence of the African diaspora communities. The phenomenon of the contemporary African diaspora is of very recent origin. It is largely the result of violent conflicts and wars that have flared up in many African countries since the early 1990s. More importantly, it is because of their recent origin—now just a decade old—that we know very little about the activities of the African diaspora as compared with the older and well-established diasporas. This is an area, which is still waiting to be explored as the interactions of the African diaspora with their homelands in Africa have not yet been sufficiently studied. This reality therefore compels us to gain insights and build up knowledge about the activities of the African diaspora in EU countries.

Theoretical Debate

The theoretical debate in this emerging field is still at its rudimentary stage. One immediate reason is that the long-distance interactions of the diaspora in the homeland’s dynamics have since recently been an area which has received very little research and policy attention. Politically speaking, diasporas are generally mentioned only in passing remarks as negative agents in the peace process in their homelands, without further substantiation.

The current theoretical debate in the field revolves around on the discussion of whether the long-distance interactions mediated by the diaspora help exacerbate or moderate the dynamics of conflicts in the homelands. The debate is contested by two policy camps. One policy strand holds the view that the activities of the diaspora largely reinforce the dynamics that make homeland conflicts more protracted (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). According to the authors, the diaspora makes the life of those left behind much more difficult because of their militant and hard-line attitude to the conflict in the homeland, which prevents a peaceful settlement. This is the predominant paradigm

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1. See Mohamoud, 2005.

2. According to Yossi Shain (2002), “the ways in which diaspora involvement [in homeland] influence the prospects for conflict perpetuation or conflict resolution are of direct concern to the United States and other states that invest time and money in peacekeeping, diplomatic initiatives, and economic development in [the conflict plagued regions in the world]”, pp. 115-144.
on the subject. The position of this policy strand stresses the malign impact of diaspora interactions in the homeland’s domestic political and power struggles, focusing disproportionately on the negative impact of the long-distance diaspora involvement in the homeland. The main focus of this policy camp is on the political role that the diaspora plays with regard to homeland conflicts. This point of departure generally links the activities of the diaspora with security issues and then concentrates more on global rather than homeland security concerns.

The other policy strand challenges the proposition of the first camp (see Zunzer, 2004; Calliess, 2004). It accuses the first camp of magnifying disproportionately the negative aspects of the diaspora, so that they overshadow their positive activities. It also blames the first camp for concentrating largely on the activities of the militant and hard-line groups in the diaspora even though they are neither the majority nor represent the whole diaspora of any given country, despite the high visibility of their activities. There are many diaspora groupings with different political and socio-economic aspirations, and as such the diaspora should be carefully disaggregated. This last policy strand does not deny that some diaspora groupings sponsor subversive activities in their respective countries of origin but they stress that it should be seen in its proportional context. It therefore suggests that adopting creative policy strategies that turn the destructive activities of the diaspora into constructive gains for the people in the homeland can reverse this negative tendency. According to this policy strand, positive activities of diaspora have a moderating influence on conflict dynamics in the homeland.

The problem is that the existing literature in the field is gravely imbalanced in favor of the negative involvement of the diaspora in the homeland situations. Furthermore, the current available empirical data cannot substantiate either position as it is still very limited. There is therefore an urgent need to undertake diverse and wide-ranging cases studies of diaspora involvement in the homeland’s socio-political dynamics so as to provide balanced information in the field on the one hand and to also come to reliable conclusions on the other. Thus, undertaking wider basic research and collecting hard data would greatly improve our understanding of the nature, patterns and dynamics of the diaspora interactions with regard to their respective homelands.

This is particularly imperative as the contribution of the African diaspora to the promotion of peace in their respective countries of origin is an aspect that is largely overlooked and has not received proper attention yet.

Disaggregating the Diaspora

There is a need to disaggregate the diaspora for two analytical considerations. The first is that there is an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ diaspora. Second, the diaspora is not a homogeneous entity. There are, for instance, many diaspora groupings with different political aspirations. For analytical considerations, it is imperative to categorize diasporas as positive and negative agents, passive and silent, whereas the silent members are in the majority. Each category will require a different policy and research strategy in order to be engaged effectively. For example, engaging with the positive agents among the diaspora, the focus of the policy and research attention should be on the positive dimensions of the diaspora involvements in the conflict in the homeland.

The aim of such focused strategies must be to raise awareness of the peace-making initiatives and activities undertaken by diaspora organizations and groupings to inform policymakers, development practitioners and civil society activists. Such awareness will help the diaspora to be seen as potential strategic actors and valuable bridgebuilders in the efforts to foster the resolution and transformation of conflicts in their respective countries of origin. It is also imperative as Margret Johannsen (2005, p. 11) notes that “diaspora groups have the facility of utilizing their personal and institutional contacts with their country of origin to support peace constituencies in the conflict region. Furthermore, diaspora groups could offer a strategic opportunity to make contact with violent actors in the conflict zone as they have access to wider circles. Winning over diaspora groups for non-violent modes of conflict can complement local initiatives and strengthen capacities for indigenous constructive conflict management.”

Similarly, engaging with the negative agents among the diaspora will require a different kind of policy and research attention. It will primarily require adopting creative policy strategies that can turn the destructive activities of the diaspora into constructive gains for the people in the homeland. Finally, the passive and silent majority among the diaspora needs to be mobilized and made aware of the potential role that they can play in contributing to the peace efforts in their respective homelands. Knowledge-producing strategies and information are necessary means of awareness raising.

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3 Shain and Barth (2003) note that “core members are the organizing elites, intensively active in diasporic affairs and in a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora. Passive members are likely to be available for mobilization when the active leadership calls upon them. Silent members are a larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved in diasporic affairs (in the discursive and political life of its institutions), but who may mobilize in times of crisis”, p. 452.
Added Value of Working with the Diaspora in Peacebuilding in their Homelands

There are great advantages of working with the diaspora in peacebuilding in their respective homelands. Few advantages are highlighted here. The first advantage is that diasporas understand local contexts in their respective homelands much better than anyone else as they combine both internal and external knowledge and experiences, which is a viable comparative advantage. For example, external actors, such as the staff of international organizations, normally need a lot of time to understand the socio-cultural and historical complexities in any local context. In this regard, the incorporation of the diasporas in the peace process in their homelands can effectively bridge this missing gap. So far, this latent considerable potential of diasporas has not been harnessed for the promotion of peace in their respective homelands.

The second advantage is that African diasporas are in a unique position as they live in two cultures—or between two cultures—and thus have the advantage of a far greater degree of intimate knowledge of different social situations, local conditions and networks, as well as cultural experiences in Africa than people with a Western background.

The third advantage is the growing realization among the African diasporas in Western countries that they have a responsibility to do something for the continent that they have left physically but not emotionally. They also feel that they are now in a strategic position to facilitate the process of transnational activities and networks and act as development bridgebuilders between the West and Africa. For instance, this strategic position is enabling them to channel information, innovative ideas, intellectual capacities, new technological skills, smart and innovative business and trade practices, peacemaking tools and techniques, and democratic political habits and practices from the West to Africa. Such activities can make a difference if they are effectively utilized for the promotion of peace in the homelands.

The fourth advantage is that diaspora peace actors can bring in new ways of dealing with the conflict in the homelands and can also widen the horizon and world view of local protagonists. The fifth advantage is that diaspora, and particularly those located in the Western countries, are in a position to mobilize substantial financial resources, extensive transnational networks, powerful international forces, and political connections that span the globe. Like this, they can make a difference and contribute to improving the situation in the homeland in different respects.

Finally, diaspora organizations, as the experience in the Netherlands demonstrates, are now involved in setting up peacebuilding projects as one of their core activities so as to contribute to the conflict transformation in their countries of origin. This was not the case some years back as a conflict transformation activity was not a priority at all. But this has now changed. There is, therefore, a policy need to stimulate the African diaspora organizations to continue initiating concrete projects that focus on conflict transformation as one of their foremost activities so as to contribute directly to the peace process in their homeland.

Conclusion

Diasporas are one of the contemporary global forces shaping the directions and trends in this 21st century. This makes it important to partner and join forces with them in the promotion of peace in their respective homelands. Diasporas as potential peace actors have been increasingly acknowledged by international bodies such as the United Nations, etc. Yet, the potential of their peacemaking capacity has not at all been used for solving and transforming the conflicts in their countries of origin. Diasporas can be part of the solution if they are seen as potential strategic actors and valuable bridgebuilders to be aligned with in the efforts of promoting peace in their homelands in Africa. The incorporation of the diasporas as peacemaking actors in the homelands in a more structured and formal manner would widen and greatly strengthen the capacity of peace forces active in their respective countries of origin. More importantly, diasporas can play a role as capacity builders, as advisors and as peace brokers. Furthermore, it should be understood that the same way that the diasporas contribute to development can also contribute to peacebuilding in the home countries. More importantly, peace is a pre-condition for development.

In this regard, there is an urgent need to develop knowledge that gives us better insights on how the long-distance peacebuilding activities initiated by diaspora organizations and groups are structurally integrated into the existing peace making frameworks and processes so far exclusively implemented by mainstream donor development agencies, government institutions, international and regional organizations and UN bodies active in their home countries of origin. This is with the objective of joining forces for peace and also widening the civil society peace constituency in the EU countries and beyond with respect to Africa. This can be possible if the diasporas are recognized as the ‘fourth’ external peacebuilding actors active in the domestic peace process after international organizations, governments and mainstream donor agencies.
References


The Feasibility of Triple-Win—Three-Dimensional Approaches to Global Migration Governance

Panel Discussion
In my comments following the presentations of Claudia Aradau, Fiona Adamson and Awil Mohamoud I shall use the relation between Spain and Morocco as an example helping to demonstrate the interdependence of migration, security and diaspora. In addition, I shall also make a few remarks on the origins and consequences of the EU’s border agency Frontex.

Claudia Aradau started her presentation with skeptical remarks on the concept of human security. She showed us some slides with boat people who were rescued by Tunisian fishermen. The Tunisian fishermen were sentenced for saving boat people fleeing the desperate situation in their home countries. She stressed the fundamental contradiction entailed in security: salvage and abjection; some are to be salvaged while others are relegated to abjection.

The concept of human security is mentioned for the first time in a UNDP report of 1994. Claudia Aradau analyzed the concept within a ‘trilogy of security’. She began by speaking of security as a discourse, which invites counter-discourses. I shall call it the ‘propaganda level’, and its political consequences should not be underestimated. Second, she referred to security as practice involving technologies. This shall be called the ‘hardware level’, including all recent surveillance technologies used for border control as well as for ‘homeland security’ measures.

Third, she referred to security as a promise. This refers to human security: individual security is guaranteed by entering the ‘promised land’. For many boat people fleeing from the desperate situation in their home country, this promise collapses as soon as they reach the shores of Europe. They come to realize that there is no shared security, that security is an inegalitarian practice. It is quite obvious that the life of some people is not as highly regarded as the life of some others. Instead of politics of security you have to address the politics of equality. We need to denounce security as a non-egalitarian practice. Europe needs more migrants treated in an egalitarian way and less workers who live a precarious existence.

I would like to stress the difficulty that is attached to the aim of equality in an economic space of inequalities. And not only do these difficulties stem from economic but from, above all, legal inequalities. Who decides on which basis what person can enter the European Union?

Fiona Adamson gave some general comments on the impact of migration to domestic security. First, she mentioned the hope for better economic opportunities as a cause for migration flows. Second, she pleaded for a comprehensive view of security, holistically addressing key factors of domestic security: border control, integration and citizenship.

She mentioned three specific security issues: First, the possibility of a political violent conflict originating from diaspora groups (referring to the Algerian violent protests in France during the 1950s). Second, organized crime and trafficking of irregular migrants. Third, radicalization and terrorism (especially with non-state actors using migrants as resource persons).

She stressed the policy gap that exists between the legal limits on migration and the increased opportunity for migration by traffickers. In this context you can identify a contradiction between human security and state security. I would like to underline the fact that especially the third security issue mentioned by Fiona Adamson—the fear of radicalization and terrorism—has its roots in the end of the Cold War and the search for a ‘new enemy’.

Awil Mohamoud discussed the controversial issue “Diaspora Interventions in Conflicts: Agents of Peace or Agents of War.” He pointed out that the public discourse in the majority of Western media is focusing on negative aspects of the diaspora. His key question was: How can we manage to transform the ‘negative’ image of the diaspora to a positive one? In this context he mentioned the contributions of diasporas to development, human rights and good governance.

Especially his final remark on the contribution of diasporas to the—not only economic, but also political—development of their home countries reminded me of the important role the Spanish diaspora played during the Franco dictatorship, who not only helped their families in Spain financially, but also ‘re-imported’ democratic values from Western European countries.
The impact of living in democratic societies in the West on a future transition of authoritarian regimes is often underestimated.

With regard to Fiona Adamson’s presentation, I would like to stress one fundamental difference between the Spanish migration to Western Europe in the 1960s and African migration to Europe since the 1990s: the securitization of migration in that past decade was completely absent. What people considered important was the positive economic contribution of migrants. As I mentioned above, the rise of the security issue is strongly linked to the end of the Cold War.

Taking up Claudia Aradau’s remarks on the question of salvage and abjection, I finally would like to reflect on the role of Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Let me quote the Hague Programme of 2005 in which Paragraph 1.6. deals with the external dimension of asylum and migration:

The European Council recognises that insufficiently managed migration flows can result in humanitarian disasters. It wishes to express its utmost concern about the human tragedies that take place in the Mediterranean as a result of attempts to enter the EU illegally. It calls upon all States to intensify their cooperation in preventing further loss of life.1

One of the central instruments of migration control is “externalization”. In economic discourse, externalization means the delegation of one or more tasks to an external enterprise that will take over all responsibilities of the given task. In the context of EU’s migration control this implies the delegation of certain control functions at the border to third countries as well as the delegation of responsibilities attached to these functions. One of those instruments “to prevent further loss of life” was the establishment of the EU’s border agency Frontex.

Since May 2005, Frontex’ main task has been the surveillance of the Atlantic coast vis-à-vis the Canary Islands. As a consequence of the effective surveillance by ships and helicopters, African boat people are forced to take ever longer and riskier routes from ports of Western Africa (Senegal and Guinea) in order to reach the Canary Islands. According to Spanish sources, the number of boat people coming to the Canary Islands diminished considerably from 39,225 in 2006 to 18,228 in 2007. This is 53.5 percent less than in 2006. However, the figure of those people who died on their 2,000 kilometer-long journey to the Canary Islands is unknown.

Another instrument of the EU’s migration management is its return and re-admission policy: Paragraph 1.6.4 of the Hague Programme states:

Migrants who do not or no longer have the right to stay legally in the EU must return on a voluntary or, if necessary, compulsory basis. The European Council calls for the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy based on common standards for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity.3

The issue of European return and re-admission policy does not really take into account the human rights situation in the migrants’ countries of origin. With regard to Morocco, there are constant raids by the police on Sub-Saharan migrants who are then forced to leave the country regardless whether they are refugees or legal migrants. The only criterion is their dark skin. Many of them are transported to the Algerian border (officially closed in 1993), near the Moroccan town of Oujda, from where they are forced to cross into the neighboring country. The Algerian border police chases them back again. A Moroccan newspaper recently characterized this inhumane practice as “ping-pong humain”.

The EU’s return policy has yet another inhumane consequence: As the return policy obviously contributes to lower rates of irregular entries to Europe, there are more and more children trying to reach Europe; the reason being that their expulsion is not as easy as that of adults.

All these examples demonstrate the inhumane consequences of the EU’s securitization of the migration policy. The establishment of Frontex and the related instruments to control migration on the external borders is a clear sign that a human rights-based migration policy is not being realized.

2 El Pais, 8 January 2008.
4 Le Reporter, N° 450, 21 February 2008
Summary of the Panel Discussion

After the remarks by Ulrike Borchardt, a panel discussion took place, chaired by Dr. Tamer Afifi (United Nations University, Bonn). The panelists were:

Dr. Ndioro Ndiaye (Deputy Director-General of the International Organization for Migration, IOM)
Dr. Steffen Angenendt (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP)
Dr. Ulrike Borchardt (University of Hamburg)
Dr. Claudia Aradau (Open University, United Kingdom)
Dr. Fiona Adamson (University of London)
Dr. Awil A. Mohamoud (African Diaspora Policy Centre, Amsterdam)

This panel discussed approaches to migration governance considering perspectives and needs of the migrants, the countries of origin and the countries of residence. The discussion focused primarily on the topic of policy coherence and the possibilities and challenges of benefiting from involving diasporas in peacebuilding and development processes in the countries of origin. Other issues being debated were the securitization of the migration discourse, the complex of problems concerning integration and racism and demographic aspects of migration. In the following, the contributions and comments made by panelists and participants are summarized.

Dr. Ndioro Ndiaye pointed to the problem of operationalizing the academic findings and translating them into policy options, asking, “How are we going to translate the very good ideas into a policy framework? This is something important for the recipient country, but also for the country of origin of those migrants. This link is lacking. But we have to find it to be more effective and more efficient.” She stressed the point of a missing dialogue on migration issues between policymakers in Germany and policymakers in the African countries of origin.

Concerning Frontex, she mentioned that the European borders actually have moved from the Mediterranean Sea to the Maghreb states. “When we formulate policy, we have to take into account what is going on in the 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Migration creates a pressure on the Maghreb states before leaving for Europe and the problems have to be addressed correctly,” she stated.

Finally she criticized the lack of policy coherence and the imbalance and contradiction between the policies of the ministries of the interior and ministries of development. Dr. Ndiaye stated that building policy coherence was fundamental both in European countries and in the countries of origin.

Demography and Migration

Dr. Steffen Angenendt focused on demographic aspects of the debate on migration. While in many parts of the world the problem is overpopulation and population growth, the debate in Europe completely concentrates on the problems of an aging and shrinking population. However, there is also no long-term strategy on migration policies, he stated. “The basic question is: where are the future sources of migrants? They are not in Northern Africa. Fertility rates in Algeria have diminished from six to less than two percent during the last 25 years and we are facing exactly the same situation in the most northern African countries.”

Second, he noted that governments of industrialized countries were increasingly confronted with security arguments to prevent migration, producing conflicts in other regions of the world through peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Nonetheless there was no evidence whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement could be a tool to preventing migration. He also deplored a lack of strategic thinking in this field.

After Dr. Afifi had opened the floor for discussion, Mehari Taddele Maru (African Rally for Peace and Development) pointed to the difficulties of merging the three points of view of the academic level on the one hand and the policy and the practical levels on the other.

He also raised the issue of policy coherence, synergy and harmonization of policies. He stated that in the United Kingdom, the discussion and the debate was predominantly focused on securitization of immigration and human rights violation of migrants, while in African countries brain drain was the central issue of concern. He pointed out, “It is a problem for poverty reduction because Africa is losing its own best minds. Thus, brain drain is having an adverse effect on the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals.” He then pointed to the fact that in the European Union there were strategies, such as the Blue Card, to ‘get brains’ that served the knowledge-based economy of the European Union.

Dimitria Clayton (Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration, State of North Rhine-Westphalia) took up the issue of policy coherence and stressed the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to migration issues, stating, “So this is one of the few
conferences in which we have someone representing interior ministry issues, classical integration issues, someone who is looking at the issue of migration from the development perspective and someone who is looking at it from the foreign policy perspective."

She asked Claudia Aradau, how the concept of security and the idea of ‘salvage’ and ‘abjection’, as Claudia Aradau phrased it, apply to the perspective of migrants themselves and their security needs.

### Equality as Guiding Principle

**Dr. Claudia Aradau** answered this question commenting on the existence of the nation state as a form of inequality. The nation state would not disappear and not become egalitarian over night, she stated. With regard to the security of migrants she said, “We need to take one step back and realize that fears arise in contexts of injustice and of inequality, for example if we look at the position of refugees in eastern Germany.” She made a political pledge for equality as a guiding principle, otherwise one would end “with what is called the security dilemma.”

She also criticized the inequality in the international regulations and governance of migration. “Nowadays development is also very much tied in with questions of security, for example aid is conditional upon the acceptance of readmission agreements by the developing countries. So we need to be very careful about what we mean by development and what is actually happening with development when security is brought into it”, she stated. 20 years ago, development policy was much more about equality than today, she deplored.

**Dr. Fiona Adamson** commented on the issue of human security and stated that she did not necessarily see the salvage-abjection dichotomy as being a inevitable part of the discourse. From her point of view a human security perspective should be a comprehensive security perspective, aiming at a win-win situation. With regard to the question of the diaspora as being agents of peace or agents of war she said, “I do not think that this is an ‘either or’ situation.” According to her, policy is the key to how migration is shaped: People crossing borders do not necessarily have any impact on security itself.

She agreed to the notion of vast global inequalities, stating, “Until we are at a stage where the migration of people is globally as liberalized as the migration of capital or other goods, we will still have this question of equality and how it related to the state border and the idea of states as bounded communities. We may all wish for a borderless world, but at the moment policies are still implemented at the state level, open borders are a bit of a contradiction to it.”

### Diaspora is not Homogeneous

**Dr. Awil Mohamoud** stated that not all African governments were willing to link up with the diaspora. From his point of view this was also a way to marginalize the diaspora and to refuse them the opportunity to be part of the development mission back home. “But the African reality is changing. We have today new African Diaspora Ministries and Ministries dealing with diaspora issues,” he said.

Additionally, he reported that there was also a need to reconcile and unite the diaspora. He stated that the diasporas were actually divided along many lines and that they were also often far away from the reality on the ground in their home countries. He described his work as “bringing the diaspora together”. Although the diaspora had diverse grievances, it was having the same problems in Europe and was a victim of the problems in the country of origin. The African diaspora Policy Centre in Amsterdam is organizing workshops at neutral venues like the university, where members of the diaspora can talk freely. He stated, “That is the way to heal some of their differences.” Accordingly, the Centre tries to give more ideas and more information to the participants on how to contribute to the development and the peacebuilding processes in their countries of origin.

**Eugène Kandekwe** (Migration for Development Programme, Rwanda) stated that the leadership of the three countries of the Great Lakes region, Burundi, Rwanda and DR Congo—which are the partners of the MIDA Great Lakes program—were taking into account the importance of the diaspora in the development of their countries. “We can only encourage this kind of thinking, which was not the case in the previous years,” he said. He reported that in Rwanda every two years a global forum for discussions takes place where diaspora members are officially invited to take part and to give their contributions.

**Dr. Awil Mohamoud** pointed to the fact that most African governments are currently creating an enabling environment to attract diaspora, not only at the country level, but also at the African Union level. He pointed to the Diaspora African Union Summit, which will take place
in South Africa in 2008. According to him, the idea is to learn something from the Chinese and Indian diaspora who increasingly return to their countries. Whereas most of the Asian diasporas have strong transnational networks, the weaknesses among the African diaspora lie in the fact that African diasporas are not organized in networks. Awil Mohamoud stressed the need to have an African diaspora network at the EU level.

Some participants raised the issues of racism and diaspora integration in the countries of residence. Using migrants as a means of increasing the shrinking population of Europe is difficult since racism and discrimination have not yet been overcome. “Any person in Germany should see a migrant not as a liability, but rather as a constructive force,” one participant stated from the floor.

Identity and Shrinking Population

Dr. Steffen Angenendt answered by saying that it was necessary to talk and fight racism on a daily basis. Regarding the fear of migrants in Eastern Germany, he stressed that the issue was not equality or inequality but also a problem of police (in)action and law enforcement.

But, more generally speaking, one has to address the question of national identity. “If the trends of an aging and shrinking society in our country and in the European Union as a whole are right and if we have the impression that a shrinking population is bad and that we should do something to combat it then we will have growing ethnic heterogeneity. Then the question of identity is on the table,” he said and added a comment he had heard from a colleague from a South East Asian country, “Europe will be either more heterogeneous or poor.”

Dr. Claudia Aradau brought in the question of ideology. From her point of view, ideology was the problem because it simplified the situation by using migrants as a scapegoat for the problems with regard to the ongoing transformation of societies. “We need to unpack the situation by saying: the way the societies are changing is wrong. And it is not about people coming in,” she said. For example one had to look at the flexibilization of labor and the fact that jobs become more and more precarious. With regard to physical violence, European societies ought to think about the reasons for it. “We know very well that sending the police in will not change the fact that there is a potential for violence,” she stated. “For the potential of violence, questions of racism and discrimination, about security relations and ideology are imperative. Security might be one of these ideologies,” Claudia Aradau added.

Dr. Steffen Angenendt answered a question concerning brain drain noting that it could be restrained by legislation currently proposed by the EU Commission. But he warned to overestimate management capacities with regard to migration policies. Migration is a social process, people decide what to do, whether to marry or have children or migrate, all by themselves. “State influence is generally limited. It is an illusion that state policies could organize certain migration movements, especially in the field of irregular migration. If a home minister says, he is able to stop illegal migration that is simply not true,” he stated.

From his point of view the only way to cope with brain drain in the long run was to foster mobility and to open chances for coming and moving back and coming again. Fostering mobility should also mean empowering diaspora, ‘the right ones’, he added. “We have diasporas that are positive and we have diaspora, smaller ones, that are perhaps more of a criminal organization.”

Dr. Fiona Adamson stressed that governments were in the early stages of taking a comprehensive approach to migration. At the same time she pointed to a lack of policy coherence by giving two examples: In the United Kingdom, the Department for International Development has been quite active in working with diasporas as a development tool. At the same time the home office and other agencies are trying to foster their sense of Britishness and of belonging to Britain. Fiona Adamson questioned whether there was much dialogue between these two competing imperatives of integration and transnational thinking.
Current Trends in the Security–Migration Discourse and the Future Research Agenda
The two aspects security and migration bring together a broad range of issues and only loosely connected research and policy fields. Accordingly, discussions have shown the heterogeneity not only of approaches, but also of competing perspectives that have to be taken into account.

In recent political, and to a lesser extent in recent academic debate, discourses on the so-called ‘Security–Migration Nexus’ have usually evolved around the following four, more or less, substantive, threat scenarios. First, there is a fear of an uncontrollable rise in irregular migration, often vaguely linked with fears of organized crime, such as women and drug trafficking. Second, there is a fear of a so-called ‘demographic imbalance’ of immigrant versus resident groups. Fueled by current concerns regarding declining birth rates in many industrialized countries, this debate tends to overemphasize perceptions of the resident society of being outnumbered by large groups of immigrants who will compete for jobs or housing.

Third, this discourse is often closely connected with issues regarding failed or lacking integration efforts on the part of both migrants and the resident society. There are fears of youth gangs, of ‘ghettoization’, and of the development of so-called ‘parallel societies’.

Finally, especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but to a lesser extent even prior to that, there is a tendency to closely link terrorism and migration in political debates. Public and media-sponsored calls for stricter border controls to close out potentially dangerous ‘aliens’ are mirrored on the institutional and bureaucratic level.

In the United States, shortly after the terrorist attacks, President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, ‘Combating Terrorism through Immigration Policies’. This linked immigration and security to each other bureaucratically. In the European Union, issues of migration, asylum, terrorism, and crime are all being dealt with by the Justice and Home Affairs Council. EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, Franco Frattini, recently justified his plans to introduce biometric border controls with the need to counter “terrorist threats, criminality, and pedophile networks”.

However, the link between terrorism and migration is usually vastly overstated. According to a study on terrorist networks in the European Union and the United States, only six percent of all terrorists recorded in the United States and the European Union between 1993–2004 entered the respective countries illegally. 33 percent entered with visas. More than 40 percent of all terrorists within the given period had European citizenship (Leiken and Brooke, 2006, pp. 503–521).

As these examples clearly illustrate, at least on a political level, international migration is usually debated in context with somewhat vague fears and worst case scenarios, which tend to exaggerate actual threats and causal links. Didier Bigo has coined the phrase “Governmentality of Unease” for this process, which leads to an overall ‘securitization’ of discourses on migration, predominantly focused on the state perspective.

This is, of course, not to say that all of these issues have simply been made up. Problems arising from insufficient integration efforts, illegal migration or human trafficking have to be clearly identified and addressed.

However, by unduly overstating the security concerns of the recipient states, additional dimensions of and perspectives on the security–migration nexus are frequently ignored or glossed over. This especially pertains to the security concerns and requirements of migrants, ranging from insecurity as a cause of migration, life-threatening circumstances of flight and expulsion, and social and economic insecurity in the residence countries. On the other hand, it also applies to

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1 Speech delivered by Franco Frattini, 13 February 2008. Available at <http://www.europa-nu.nl/353000/1/j9vvh6n08temv0/vhsdndn7hikyn9ctxv=vt14a099w&start_tab0=40>.

the causes and consequences of migration processes for the societies in the respective countries of origin.

My thesis is thus that by focusing public and political debate on the seemingly—and often hastily established—causal link of migration and terrorism, or more generally, domestic security issues of the recipient countries, other dimensions of the security–migration nexus are largely masked.

Accordingly, a more balanced approach to analyzing the interplays of security and migration would have to equally take into account the following three dimensions: (1) the countries of origin, (2) migrants, and (3) the countries of residence respectively.

Countries of Origin: Peacebuilding

Regarding security effects on the countries of origin, I would especially like to point to the role of diaspora organizations as non-state actors in processes of conflict management and peacebuilding. When analyzing the connection between migration and the security situation in the countries of origin, questions about the importance of (in)security as push and pull factors of migration arise first. This holds true in particular in the cases of involuntary migration, such as flight, expulsion or migration as a consequence of repression, war, and poverty. Additionally, however, groups that were so far mainly perceived as refugee communities present themselves as political or ethnic exiled entities with clear expectations and agendas for the development of their countries of origin. Thus, possible security-relevant effects of these diaspora activities on the societies of the countries of origin have to be analyzed.

The new found interest in diaspora or migrant groups is down to a number of reasons. From an economic perspective, a 2005 World Bank report gave new impetus to this area of study. According to the report, remittances by migrants into their countries of origin surpass the sum of the annual payments of official development aid (ODA) and partially also the sum of direct investments many times over. In addition to that, individual diaspora representatives have caused a stir in the media when they have taken over central roles in their home countries in transition periods towards a more stable post-war order. Examples can be found in the government-building processes in Afghanistan or recently on the occasion of negotiations of the Somali government with the Islamist movement.

Such an intervention in conflict processes in their home countries, for example lobbying with foreign governments, is by no means a new phenomenon. However, the opportunities for transnational political mobilization and cooperation have skyrocketed in the past few years.

Against this background, one has to investigate in what ways diaspora groups get involved in these conflicts and what are the consequences of such commitment for peace consolidation and local development policy. This would also entail looking into possible positive and negative effects of diaspora activities and the corresponding framework conditions for such activities in the European recipient countries.

Migrants: Security Needs

The second dimension to analyzing security and migration is considering the living conditions and security needs of migrants in European countries i.e., migration and ‘human security’. The social, legal, and economic situation of migrants—especially those from conflict regions—should become a major focus when conceptualizing the security–migration nexus. Among many other aspects, this includes the reasons that have induced migrants to leave or flee their countries, and also the circumstances and dangers arising during the journey, such as human trafficking or the often dangerous passage over the Mediterranean. Upon their arrival in the European Union, many migrants face prolonged social and economic insecurity due to unsettled residence statuses. This often prevents them from building a new and secure existence.

Additionally, the political or societal commitment of diaspora communities originating from conflict regions can result in additional personal risks. Such risks include a possible loss of an insecure residence permit upon leaving the European Union, or in extreme cases, the observation or repression of political activities of the diaspora by the governments of their countries of origin. Furthermore, the well-meant attempts to foster diaspora activities, such as the transfer of remittances to support development in the migrants’ countries of origin, hardly ever take into account the consequences of these sustained financial transfers for the economic situation of the migrants themselves. Similarly, EU programs facilitating circular migration are still primarily designed to cater to the labor needs of the recipient countries. In both cases, migrants are mainly perceived to be passive objects of state policies rather than independent actors. While there is certainly much to be said for supporting constructive diaspora activities vis-à-vis their respective origin countries, both state and non-state actors in the European Union have to make sure to not simply consider migrants as a means to an end, but as actors in their own right.

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Finally, the third dimension of the security-migration nexus refers to the perspective of the recipient countries, i.e. to European societies and their security concerns. As mentioned above, there is a broad discourse on migration as a potential source of insecurity for resident citizens. In addition to already discussed threat scenarios with respect to irregular migration or the ongoing integration debate, this especially includes the fear that diaspora communities could ‘import’ existing conflict potentials into the communities of their countries of residence. In order to balance this highly emotionalized discourse, we need to ask why this link has been established so prominently in the first place, i.e. why migration has increasingly become a matter of security. Among others, this should for example include an analysis of the rhetoric of regular immigration politics in order to unearth how this securitization discourse has influenced and shaped current perspectives and policies on migration.

By structuring the security–migration nexus according to these three dimensions of migrants, resident, and origin countries, it becomes evident that we not only have to question our definition of security, e.g. physical, social, economic security, but also and firstly whose security we are talking about. Trying to equally incorporate the respective needs and concerns of all affected stakeholders in international migration—that is migrants, the countries of origin and of residence—this conference intends to set both scientific and policy-oriented impulses to facilitate a balanced and equitable dialogue between the affected stakeholders.

Following up on the presentations on the trends and developments of African migration to EU countries, the conceptual links between security and migration, the two case studies from Niger and Ghana, as well as the panel on the three dimensions of the security–migration nexus, the second conference day will introduce some of the major stakeholders in international migration and provide a forum to discuss competing approaches to international migration governance.

Keeping in mind the multitude of actors, perspectives, and issues at stake, I am aware that we can hardly expect to cover all issues, least to speak of finding solutions within the course of a single conference. However, I hope that this event will provide a forum to initiate or reinforce a balanced dialogue between stakeholders from different backgrounds and organizations to discuss competing perspectives, needs, and expectations on an equal footing.

References


Stakeholders and Protagonists in International Migration
We are currently witnessing a number of trends in the management of migration, which incorporate new actors and follow new ways. Control over migration is traditionally a task of national governments; progressively these policies expand towards intergovernmental and supra-national regulations and are increasingly carried beyond European borders. There is a clear tendency in the European Union to incorporate third states into policies addressing border control measures and combating causes of migration related to lack of security and development. Moreover, transnational communities are becoming a further dimension related to policies in these respects.

New Trend in Countries of Reception

Starting with the receiving states, I want to point out three aspects relevant to the understanding of current processes. First, the control over the national territory and national membership is considered to be crucial to national sovereignty; second, we nevertheless observe processes of locating control policies beyond the national realm by the Europeanization of migration management; and third, closely related to this, control policies are also being expanded and externalized towards territories further away, incorporating third countries into the management of migration towards Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of what used to be the communist world, security concerns have gained great importance in the field of migration. At the beginning of the 1990s, the fear of mass migration towards the West from Eastern Europe and other destabilizing world regions and the growing numbers of asylum seekers, refugees and other types of migration brought the issue to the center of political attention. This has contributed to elevating migration from the lower levels of politics, to the high level (Poku and Graham, 1998; Collinson, 1996; Koslowski, 1998). The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and other targets in the United States have put new emphasis on these concerns.

Now interestingly, even if migration is still considered to be at the core of national sovereignty, we can see a number of collaborations, within the European Union and also beyond, by incorporating third countries into the migration management. In order to compensate observed losses of control over peoples’ movements across borders and fears of uncontrolled movements, European countries today collaborate intensively with other states and actors.

Europeanization of migration policies has been rapidly expanding over the last few years and in the meantime has led to its supra-nationalization. At its starting point, however, European migration policy-making was located at the margins of the European Community, i.e. outside of the Community’s institutional framework. With the end of the Cold War when the scenery was dominated by security concerns and existing and expected increases of inflows from all over the world, Europe was just about to create a free movement area within its territories. The creation of the European Single Market abolished the restriction of free movement of workers with its signing in 1986 and entering into force in the year 1992.

In parallel, a core European community group—Germany, France and the Benelux countries—agreed on the Schengen Agreement, which abolished border controls between the countries; the agreement was signed in 1985, but only went into force in 1995 after further and difficult negotiations. This process was characterized by the intensification of police and judicial cooperation and guided by the belief that new control measures were needed as inner-European borders were eliminated (Boswell, 2003). These collaborations were used as much on potentially irregular movements between member states, within the new free movement area, as well as being intended to address such movements from outside of the European Community or the Schengen area.

The Maastricht Treaty then brought migration within the third pillar of the European legal framework, maintaining its intergovernmental character (only visa policies were a EU competence in the first pillar), and agreements continued to be negotiated behind closed doors.
The incorporation of countries of migrants’ origin has been growing over the past few years. Control and return are the first dimension in this respect; here source and transit countries are getting increasingly involved with European migration controls. The second dimension is marked by the new partnerships, a strategy originally called the ‘root causes approach’. New partnerships between Europe and third countries, particularly in Africa are under way, though many may not have reached the level of concrete measures yet.

The externalization of originally national migration control instruments includes liaison personnel for example at the borders or airports of third countries, collaboration in border control, for example through bi-national border patrols, support for capacity-building of immigration officers and border patrols, as well as capacity-building in the management of migration in general, and various means in the fight against irregular migration.

The European Union itself but also individual member states have been eager to sign re-admission agreements with the countries of migrants’ origin or transit. The first of these agreements between the European Union and another country was signed with Poland in 1992. Today, there are many others regulating the return of rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants to countries of origin, and also to transit countries (Albania, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Ukraine and many others). In 1994, the EU member states decided to use a common specimen agreement as a basis for negotiation when a member state wished to establish this type of relation with a third country.

The nature of these agreements depends on each country’s migration history and pattern. Germany, for example, signed re-admission agreements with Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Spain in turn signed agreements primarily with African countries, including Morocco as early as in 1992, to return transit migrants who crossed the North African state on their way to Spain; Nigeria (2001), Guinea Bissau and Mauretania (2003).

This, additionally, has set off a chain reaction. Some of the countries which had to sign a re-admission agreement with European countries or the European Union, have in turn signed secondary re-admission agreements with countries further south or east.

As for the second dimension—the new partnerships on migration and development—we can observe growing efforts to bring receiving and origin states of international migration together, linking migration and development considerations. Having been discussed for more than a decade within the United Nations, the Global Commission on International Migration, launched in 2003, constitutes a major effort in this respect, and finally the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006 and its follow-up, the Global Forum on Migration and Development, have directed global attention to the phenomenon.

On the European level, after discussions that started already in the early 1990s, these issues were given a higher profile at the end of the decade with the European Council’s Tampere meeting of 1999. Conclusion Number 11 reads the following:
The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development (Council of the European Union, 1999). Today, these two dimensions increasingly merge in agreements on cooperation and partnership between the European Union, its members and third countries. Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement states, for examples, that

Each of the ACP States shall accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of a Member State of the European Union, at that Member State’s request and without further formalities (Council of the European Union, 2005).

There are a number of initiatives and proposals, which the Commission and the Council have designed in this respect, and European-African dialogues have been further promoted. The Rabat Ministerial Conference in July 2006 was a first important step in this respect, and the following Tripoli conference the same year for the first time formulated a joint strategy on the subject with the Joint EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Development. This was recently taken up at the Lisbon Summit, where European and African heads of government met in 2007. All of these initiatives join together the promotion of development, the cooperation in migration management, the fight against irregular migration, return and re-admission agreements and the synergies of migration and development, in particular concerning remittances. Against this background, a strong focus is put on transnational engagements of migrants identified as agents and ideal partners for development.

Concerning these trends we firstly see a new emphasis on control measures, accompanied by collaborations among European countries as well between these and the countries outside Europe in the combat of irregular and uncontrolled migration. In addition we also observe new partnerships particularly addressing so called root causes of migration linking development, security, poverty reduction and political change to migratory movements. In growing degrees newer initiatives also include a perspective on enabling a positive relationship between migration and development and using its potentials. On that background a strong focus is put on transnational engagements of migrants identified as agents and ideal partners for development.

Transnationalization from Below

A further aspect or dimension in international migration and current initiatives are processes of transnationalization, cross-cutting countries of origin and receiving countries. They contribute to a new protagonism of processes and ties, which are cross-cutting borders constituting transnational social spaces. These are defined as regular, stable and lasting ties reaching beyond and across borders of sovereign states (Faist, 2000).

Transnationalism from below refers to the observation that migrants today maintain and establish social relations, ties and networks across state borders more than ever before. New possibilities in communication technologies, travel, forth and back migrations have contributed to a strengthening of such linkages through close distances between the United States and Mexico or the Dominican Republic, but also far away between Northern European countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. There have always been occasional contacts, activities, visits and so on of migrants across borders; today, however, the intensity of exchanges, new modes of transacting and multiplication of cross-border activities have contributed to growing attention to this field (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999) in research and policy-making.

Transnational ties and practices are taking place in the daily practices of individual migrants, within family and kinship networks, but they also—and obviously increasingly so—take place on the intermediary level of communities and organized social groups (Levitt, 2001) and transnational migrant organizations (Portes, Escobar, and Walton Radford, 2007). In particular, so-called home town associations have attracted attention, but of course there are many other forms of collective engagement in community development, health care, schooling and education, political change, or related to religious activities.

Looking at the flows being transferred across borders, most focus has been put on financial remittances—be they collective or individual—as well as on economic investment. Other flows such as knowledge transfer and expertise, used to be seen more critically—think of brain drain. Today, the possibilities of brain gain or brain circulation are equally taken into account. Research in
the last years has moreover directed its focus on social remittances: ideas, beliefs, identities and social capital that flow from host to sending country communities (Levitt, 2001).

Transnationalization from Above

Transnationalism from above takes two forms. Governments of countries of origin and, more recently, governments of the receiving countries are promoting transnational ties of migrants with their families, communities and countries of origin.

Many countries, which faced mass emigration, started to strengthen transnational ties to their citizens who live in another country in political, economic and symbolic terms.

Politically, they do so, for example, by allowing dual citizenship, sometimes also for second generations, including facilitated application for the citizenship of the parents and even grandparents for second and third generations. Transnational politics by sending states also include extra-territorial voting rights, where before citizens had to return for the day of election in many countries if they wished to vote. In economic terms, many states started to encourage remitting and investment from abroad, improved consular procedures, supported short-term returns and tourism for the benefit of expatriates What is equally important is that we have seen a change in the symbolic relation to migrants in many countries. Often, they were being regarded as having betrayed their countries or at least disregarded. It is true that emigration still may signify losses in terms of educational investment and future potentials for the labor market. However, emigration countries nowadays evaluate the role of their transnational migrants more positively, and have changed their attitude towards them, publicly acknowledging their contributions and attachments to their home country.

More recently, we can also observe that receiving states have discovered the diaspora as an actor, particularly in relation to development, post-conflict and security issues. Although skepticism and fear still prevails concerning the negative role of transnational communities in the promotion of conflict, by financial, logistical and political means, the positive role is acknowledged and the intentions are on promoting positive commitment.

This has also meant a change of direction of the long dominant focus on return as the only positive contribution of migration to development and social and political change in countries of origin. And it has meant an acknowledgement of the already existing contributions of settled migrants to their families, kin, communities and countries of origin.

Transnational Communities and the Problematique of Integration

Transnational communities have a decidedly cross-border nature, establishing relationships across nation states. In this capacity they pose multiple challenges to concepts of politics and society, which are still very much related to (territorially) bound nation states. They challenge understandings of membership, of identity, and belonging, of rights and duties, and thus the social and political foundations of integration.

Current initiatives make a claim for migrants’ integration as a matter of rights and recognition. However, we still know very little about the mutually reinforcing (or constraining, contradicting) forces between transnational engagements and integration. Moreover, the attention needs to be directed not only towards the problématique of integration in the receiving countries but also on the countries of origin. The question to be posed then is, first, about integration into the receiving society. There are already some studies, theoretical reflections, available but also some empirical studies on this question. They address the linkage between transnationalization and integration, seeing that dynamics of integration, the life and living conditions in the host society, and the relationships with authorities are shaping the intensity, possibly also the form of transnational practices towards the home countries and communities.

Discrimination and limited perspectives in the settling society have been identified as the driving forces for transnational engagement ‘back home’ in the absence of a more prosperous future abroad. At the same time, we have also learned from empirical research that migrants who are more integrated, better established and better off, are also the ones strongly engaged in transnational practices. In addition, they have the financial and cultural resources to get involved more easily. Nevertheless, much research still needs to be done to achieve a better understanding of the mechanisms, dynamics and mutually reinforcing and constraining features.

Second, discussing these issues, we usually only speak of integration in the receiving country, while current initiatives emphasize the potential contributions to the country of origin. But hardly anybody has so far dealt with the integration in the country of origin. Economic and social development, conflict mediation, reconstruction and political change are complex processes. To what degree, by which mechanisms and dynamics does the existence and the involvement of transnational migrants change local communities? What kind of integration do these processes require? And finally, what are the conditions, which contribute to a positive relationship
between transnationalization and integration within the sending society? The latter question, moreover, seems crucial if we are to analyze the contributions of transnational migrants to development, security and democratic change in origin countries of migrants in Europe.

One last point should be added to this examination of the role and integration of the transnational community. It may well be questioned whether we can take the diaspora as one homogenous actor, and it may be more advisable to account for the heterogeneous character of migrants from same origin countries, their different resources, positions, networks and ways of being integrated. This would mean to reflect on and investigate the integration within transnational communities.

Moreover, on both sides—reception and origin—there are not only states or homogenous (national) societies that are involved, but also local communities and manifold actors, local governments and parties, business networks as well as greater numbers of non-governmental organizations. In many places there is a whole array of development agencies, which all contribute to the complexity of the setting. To which degree and in which ways we may speak of necessary integration among the multiplicity of actors remains an open question for the moment.

Thus, the strong focus on the contributions of diasporic or transnational actors in current initiatives should not narrow the view for the many questions integration poses for societies or communities. Many current initiatives do not consider such questions so important as they ask for positive engagement, not considering immigration countries and even less considering countries of origin. This is of course not much of a surprise after all, since many of the corresponding initiatives take place within the realm of high politics and are part of the external relations of countries. In this round of the migration-security-development-triad, European and African heads of government together negotiate their collaborations in the fight against poverty and the improvement of living conditions, on migration management, the combat of irregular migration and external border control. However, domestic policies, and in particular questions of integration and membership, are still even more a domain of national sovereignty than borders.

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Organizing the African Community in North Rhine-Westphalia

With over one million migrants a year and 299,000 asylum applications in 2006 alone, Europe is the primary destination for migrants worldwide. Countries bordering the Mediterranean such as Spain, Italy, and Malta are most focused as targets of migration. Germany in contrast is not one of the key targets of African migration. Only 4.1 percent of all foreigners living in Germany and only 0.3 percent of the complete population of Germany are from Africa.

92,000 or one-third of the 274,929 Africans without a German passport living in Germany live in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). Here, five percent of all foreigners are from Africa. 153,087 Sub-Saharan Africans live in Germany, 41,376 or 27 percent of them in NRW.

If you look at the countries of origin of the Sub-Saharan Africans living in NRW without German passports, you will find that the strongest communities are from DR Congo (20 percent), Ghana (15 percent), and Nigeria (15 percent).

The Diversity of African NGOs in NRW

There is a remarkable diversity of African NGOs concerning their fields of activity, levels of organization and applied strategies to reach their goals. But what they all have in common is the motivation to undertake their work with energy and creativity.

Most of the NGOs have been built by a national group of Africans and Germans as a project-association with the intention of organizing development aid in a specific region of the origin countries. They have a strong relationship and partnerships to the local African societies.

The key activities of development cooperating NGOs are education, construction of schools; health, medical aid, construction of local hospitals; empowerment of disadvantaged people, like orphans, handicapped persons; environmental protection; support of small agricultural structures and communities and support of political groups and parties.

The second form of African NGOs pursues an integrative perspective. Here we find multitasking work tanks, which focus on different objectives: improving the education of migrants; conservation of traditions and cultures; professional and psychological consulting for migrants; the coordination and organization of community events; building contact points for the members of the communities and building political representations in the different regions (Dachverbände). Their members are Africans as well as Germans. But of course, most of the NGOs, which focus particularly on traditional and cultural issues, consist only of Africans.

Regarding the scenery of African NGOs the boundaries between integration and development cooperation are open and fluent. Many NGOs pursue both perspectives.

Many African students are members of an African Student Association like in Aachen, Bochum, Dortmund, Cologne, Munster, Duisburg and Essen. As Figure 2 shows, six out of ten students in NRW from Sub-Saharan Africa come from Cameroon.

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In 2006 and 2007, five regional conferences took place. 20 NGOs participated in Dusseldorf, 15 in Aachen, about 60 in Cologne-Bonn, 10 in the western Lower-Rhine region and 30 in the Ruhr region. The key issues in every region were: fundraising; improving the public relations of the NGOs and the image of Africa and the African community; empowerment of the NGO management (project planning, member management, event management); and the building of an umbrella organization to represent the African NGOs in NRW on the political stage.

Actually, in every region the networking process is going forward. In Cologne, regular meetings of the ‘initiative committee’ of the first regional conference are taking place. The connection between the “Allerweltshaus” and the NGOs of Cologne is a positive and encouraging example of the cooperation between the “One-World-Net” and the African community.

Dusseldorf is the center of the Ghanaian–German partnership activities. Particularly InWEnt and the One-World-Forum are the partners of the African Community in Dusseldorf.

In the western Lower-Rhineregion, twostrong NGOs (Light of Africa e.V. und Eritreischer Verein Krefeld e.V.) and the ‘Neusser Eine Welt-Initiative e.V.’ are coordinating the network. In Aachen, an African Center is planned with NGO-bureaus and space for organizing cultural events and the coordination of the network process. In the Ruhr area, the One-World-Net and the initiative committee are organizing fundraising workshops and the NGOs are working on the issue of improving the network structure of the local community. In Munster, the DMD, the African Community, and the One-World-Net are planning the next regional conference.

The Capacity-Building Workshops

Not only NGOs but also individuals of the African Community are the target of the application of empowerment. Between December 2006 and August 2007, four weekend workshops with about 30 participants of the African Community from NRW took place in Oer-Erkenschwick. To build up African multipliers as network experts was the key objective of this sequence of workshops, which were facilitated by members of the African Community.

Techniques of fundraising and applications for fundraising, of the improvement of public relations, of networking, of NGO management and event management were worked out in the seminars. Although the level of knowledge and ability was very diverse, the learning targets have been reached. Participants of the capacity-building workshops are now members of the initiative committees in the various regions.
The Internet Platform www.afrika-nrw.net

As a third instrument of coordinating and supporting the networking process of the African community in NRW, the internet platform “Afrika-NRW.net” has been created, which has gained wide attention. In the meantime it is of remarkable importance. About three hundred members of the African Community NRW are registered in the data bank. Among them are NGOs, experts, companies, civil organizations, scientific and governmental institutions.

With the support of the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration, InWEnt and the One-World-Net, a circle of African web designers, network experts, and the DMD have built an attractive and permanently growing internet platform as virtual network for the African community. Various information about the different members can be gathered by a prospective client. Events and news can be published on the event calendar, which is connected to the event calendar of the One-World-Net.

Future Prospects

VEN (Alliance of Development Policy of Lower Saxony) has asked the DMD to support the networking process of the African Community in Lower Saxony by applying the same strategies as in NRW. A new sequence of regional conferences is planned for 2008.

The institute ADER (Association for regional economic development) in Paris has invited DMD to be the German representative at a group of European NGOs which put the networking process of the African community on a European level. We also want to reach out to other regions of NRW that we are not covering yet like East-Westphalia-Lippe and the Sauerland.
Competing Policies on International Migration Management—Security First?

Panel Discussion
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), founded in 1953 and started as a small department. In 1965, it was transformed into the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees. In the first half of the current decade its portfolio broadened, and in 2005 its name changed into Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. It is one of the federal superior authorities within the area of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Its central headquarters is in Nuremberg and it has more than twenty branch offices in all of the Federal States of Germany.

Talking of security and the security dimensions mentioned by Steffen Angenendt, BAMF’s work is related to the dimensions of human security and of state security. Its relation to human security lies in its task of deciding upon the asylum applications in adherence to the German Asylum Procedures Act. During the asylum procedure it verifies the merits of a case. It verifies whether, according to the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, the preconditions for political persecution, for legal protection against deportation, or legal obstacles against deportation with regard to a particular country, apply. The Federal Office is also to be consulted by the Aliens’ Authorities when there are any legal obstacles against deportation with regard to a particular country, in cases beyond the asylum procedure.

Closely related to this is the dimension of state security as it is also within BAMF’s responsibility to examine whether the need for protection once recognized is still granted, or, whether there might be certain aspects concerning national security which could exclude further granting of protection. Beyond this special case, BAMF is integrated in the security architecture of the German state. It cooperates with the administrations and services responsible for state security (e.g. Federal Criminal Police Office, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) and in 2002 created its own security unit after the 9/11 bombings. The cooperation with these services results inter alia from the German Asylum Procedures Act. In the light of this Act, BAMF has to rule out any suspicion of terrorism before granting asylum. By law BAMF is obliged to inform the services when it obtains relevant information.

Within a comprehensive approach towards security the tasks of BAMF lie in the fields of analysis in early warning. As a consequence of this, the Federal Office became responsible for the Central Aliens Register, which holds the data of all foreigners who stay in Germany for a longer period of time. The Central Aliens Register serves as a source of information for security and local registration authorities. It renders assistance to the administrative authorities in fulfilling their tasks in the field of the aliens’ and asylum law, supports them as a means of ensuring internal security and furnishes information for concepts in the field of aliens’ policy as well as data for controlling policies. Furthermore, BAMF takes part in several working groups at federal and state level, e.g. the Joint Centre for Defence of Terrorism and the Joint Centre for Analysis and Strategy of Illegal Migration.

Along with asylum, integration today is one of the most important tasks BAMF has. In this field, the Federal Office fosters and coordinates linguistic, social and societal integration. When the new Immigration Act came into force in 2005, these responsibilities were transferred to BAMF. They comprise first of all the development and organization of integration courses. Theses courses are particularly intended to familiarize newly arrived immigrants with the language and the rules and values of German society. The courses provided by the Federal Office consist of two components. The main part is a language course to convey sufficient knowledge of the German language while the second part is an orientation course where immigrants shall learn about life in Germany and the existing rules and values in our society. For the effective implementation throughout the country BAMF is cooperating with (and financing) private and public organizations. In this context, the Federal Office is responsible for the accreditation and qualification of the teaching staff and it is developing the guidelines for teaching materials.

Furthermore, the Federal Office develops—in dialogue with central state and social actors in the field of integration—the nationwide integration program, which serves as a strategic guideline for the integration activities.
of all actors in Germany. The integration program offers an overview of the existing integration options provided by the federal government, the federal states and the local communities as well as private organizations for immigrants and gives recommendations on the further development of integration options.

On an operational level, the Federal Office supports projects aimed at social and societal integration. These are among others: integration of foreigners and (late-)ethnic German resettlers focusing on their living environment, seminars for the integration of foreign women, assessment and further development of integration work (pilot projects) and strengthening intercultural competence and honorary commitment.

Projects are carried out in cooperation with associations, foundations, corporations, initiatives and authorities on federal, state and local level. The Federal Office has established a clearing center and registers all applications for project funding and examines the applications to prevent double funding.

Among several other tasks it should be mentioned that BAMF also supports voluntary return, provides the two (merged) programs the Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers in Germany (REAG) and the Government-Assisted Repatriation Programme (GARP). They are implemented by the International Organization for Migration. The Federal Office grants and examines the eligibility for the funding in agreement with the German Federal Ministry of the Interior.

In order to coordinate and organize the support of voluntary return, the Federal Office established the Centre for Information Exchange (ZIRF) to provide access to public data banks in order to make public all existing return supporting programs, national, international and European support measures, information on countries of origin, contact partners and counselling institutions.

BAMF is also the national center for the administration of the European Refugee Fund. The Fund provides supporting funding for co-financed projects carried out for refugees and displaced people referring to the conditions of acceptance and integration of people with the right of abode, as well as voluntary return, to their country of origin from the Federal Republic of Germany. For a short time, BAMF has also been tasked with administering the European Return Fund, the European Social Fund and the European Integration Fund.

Last but not least there is the area of research as a new part within the portfolio of the Federal Office. The new Residence Act that came into force on 1 January 2005 assigned the Federal Office with the task to conduct scientific research in the field of migration in order to gather analytical evidence for controlling immigration. Therefore a research group has been established consisting of twenty researchers from a wide array of disciplines. Beyond the analysis of international migration and its impact on Germany, research projects center on the processes of integration of foreigners and (late-)ethnic German resettlers as well as the relation between migration and demographic change. In summary, the task of the research group is to describe and analyze processes of migration and integration, to evaluate measures for migration control and for fostering integration and to advise on policy on the basis of the results.¹

Development aspects and/or a special focus on Africa have not sparked the interest of the research group until now, as its main focus is on Germany and regions with a high propensity of migration towards the country. African nationals in Germany are a minority with just more than 270,000 persons compared to more than 6.7 million foreigners registered in the Central Aliens register in 2007. Looking at asylum seekers, we find the same ratio: In 2007, there were only 3,283 African applicants within a total number of 19,164. Looking at the total immigration in 2006, the ratio is even more compelling: 25,585 Africans within a total of 661,855.

Nevertheless, we have recently broadened our focus and are now beginning to analyze African migration. This has to do with the development of the European migration policy approach and especially with the so-called “Global Approach towards Migration”, issued at the end of 2005, which has a special focus on Africa.

In this context, in December 2007, the research unit “InternationalMigration, Islam, Demography,” presented a paper on African immigration at a conference of the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) (Baraulina, Borchers and Kreienbrink, 2007). There we analyzed quite generally, mobility in Africa, migration to Europe, and the situation of Africans in Germany (with a special view on Moroccans, Ghanaians, Kenyans and Cameroonians) with regard to education, care drain, feminization, labor market and return.

A next step will be a comprehensive analysis of African migration schemes as part of a project on migration potentials and projections of migration. In the same line we are also planning to explore further the nexus of migration and development, more specifically we are interested in relations between return migration and development. A qualitative research project will inter alia have a look into these relationships in Russia, the Caucasus and Turkey.

¹ See <http://www.bamf.de/forschung>.

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With regard to the previously mentioned “Global Approach towards Migration” there is an ongoing discussion on the concept of circular migration. Generally, it means some form of temporary migration, which promises in theory a triple-win for the sending country, the receiving country and the migrant. Differing from the former guest worker migration scheme it comprises in theory explicit development policy aspects—transfer of knowledge, fostering economy, reducing poverty. This concept is also intended to open new means of migration management.

Nevertheless, there are still a lot of open questions that make it difficult to assess whether this concept will really attain practical relevance. What shall be the time frame for the migration phase? Who shall participate in circular migration programs? How can return be secured to prevent permanent immigration? What could be the consequences of the brain drain problem? Independent of different actors in the national arena who discuss the concept benevolently or who refuse it explicitly because of a short-term perspective of current labor market problems, the whole concept has to be analyzed further to prove if it really offers new solutions for migration management and development (see Zerger, 2008, pp. 1-5).

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In Africa, there are an estimated 16.3 million migrants and close to 13.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 19 countries (UN, 2002; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002). There are estimated to be some 3.25 million African refugees and asylum seekers. The International Labour Organization estimates that the number of labor migrants in Africa today constitutes one-fifth of the global total and that by 2025, one in ten Africans will live and work outside their countries of origin (ILO, 2002). Many protracted conflicts have ended in recent years as new ones such as the Darfur conflict and northern Congo have also got worse in terms of humanitarian crisis. Currently, in Sudan alone, there are more than seven million IDPs, more than in any other country in the world. Sudan is also the country with the largest amount of people newly displaced in the recent years. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) there are 3.6 million IDPs and refugees whereas in Uganda there are more than two million IDPs. Sudan, DRC, Angola, Burundi, and Somalia were the largest sources of uprooted people in Africa, as five years ago, they accounted for more than 75 percent of all uprooted Africans. Tanzania, Sudan, Chad, Congo-Kinshasa, Zambia, and Uganda were the leading refugee and asylum hosts.

This shows Africa has remained both the source and host of most of refugees and IDPs. Repatriation has also been carried out in vast numbers in several African countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Sudan and Uganda. Again African countries remain by far the most affected by internal displacements and refugees. Africa is the source and host of half of the world's IDPs in Africa (United Nations, 2002).

Migration Defined

Migration is a purposeful act of change of location of a group of persons or an individual, as outcome of a deliberate decision of some form by the group or the individual. Strictly speaking, there is no absolutely voluntary migration for migration of any kind involves some sort of outer/super agency; each individual decision bears some sort of socio-geographic influence. Neither does absolute involuntary migration exist. for no migration is a sort of involuntary reflexive reaction. Migration of all kind has, no matter how narrow, a margin of discretionary power of decision as to migrate or not, including the decision and choice to not migrate even at heavy cost including death.

The margin of discretionary power of decision and choice making in forced migration is far narrower than in the case of voluntary migration. Thus, voluntary migration has a larger list of choice and a relative predictability of the situation of migration and destination of migration as well as a better chance to plan prior to the migration. This difference in margin of maneuver in decision and choice making is one way of delimiting the "the fuzzy boundaries between forced and unforced migration" (Turton, 2003, p. 7).

The propensity—desire and capacity—to the change of the 'socio spatial' status quo in forced migration is also far less in magnitude and motivation than in the case of a voluntary one. Propensity to move is higher in the case of voluntary migration than in forced migration. This is what Kunz qualifies as "reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of ...motivation ..." (see Hansen and Anthony, 1982, p. 3). Therefore, the desire and inclination to maintain the status quo socio-spatial relationship and inertia against 'socio-spatial change' is one amongst the few defining distinctions between voluntary and involuntary migration.

New Trends and the Nature of Migration in Countries of Origin and Transit

In Africa, migration could take varied causes, forms and trends. As summarized in the African Union’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa, low level development, poor governance, conflicts, human right violations, drought-driven spontaneous internal and international migration of pastoralist communities are some of the push factors for migration. These are factors of human insecurity.
Significant internal migratory movements—such as rural-urban migration—are another yet important push factor. The United Nations estimates that the rate of urbanization in Africa stands at 3.5 percent per year, the highest rate in the world, resulting in the rapid growth of urban agglomerations throughout the continent. By 2030, the proportion of Africa’s urbanized population is expected to reach 54 percent, as compared to today’s figure of 38 percent (UNCHS, 2001). This will increase mixed migration to the European Union and other destinations.

Better opportunities and greater security in the destination countries such as the European Union serve as pull factors in the decision to migrate. Moreover, social capital in terms of family networks and broader ethnic ties play a role as another pull factor by inducing decisions to why, when, how and where to migrate. The push and pull factors are intensified by lower cost of transportation, lower and better access to information such as television, internet and communication such as telephone, e-mail and postal services and increase the volume and speed of migration.

Human Insecurity, Migration and Security

Clearly if poverty, political instability, conflict, non-respect of human rights, climatic and environmental degradation are the causes of migration, then human insecurity is the cause of migration. Addressing these root causes will need different tools and efforts. Poverty reduction, human rights protection, and the UN Millennium Development Goals are efforts towards human security.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States has transformed migration as source of a security threat (Tirman, 2004). Clearly the security-migration nexus is not limited to physical and traditional security threats. Rather it has dimensions of socio-economic insecurity and fears of cultural and value domination. The association made between terrorist attacks and migrants, between religious ideological differences with the ‘clash of civilization’ type theory makes migration a non-traditional security threat, while the old threats attached with migration such as economic, social security and cultural threats are remaining.

National and International Security and Stability

Large spontaneous and unregulated flows of migrants can have a significant impact on national and international stability and security, hindering states’ ability to exercise effective control over their borders, and creating tensions between origin and destination countries and within local host communities. Recent international terrorist activity has also turned the focus on individual migrants and the potential for public order to be compromised by individuals whose intent it is to undermine the security and stability of states and societies. Combating irregular migration and establishing comprehensive migration management systems can contribute to enhancing national and international security and stability. Effective border management would prevent persons with guns from moving across boundaries for illegal purposes.

A key challenge is therefore on the one hand to establish a balance allowing states to meet their economic need for migrants and humanitarian obligations to refugees while concurrently addressing security problems and the need for effective border management.

Migration after the End of the Cold War

Due to security concerns, the strengthening of the border management systems in terms of technology, infrastructure, business process for inspection of travelers and training of staff has become a primary area of cooperation of states with respect to the securitization of migration. Of course, the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the United States is very important. Migration already emerged as a core issues in rethinking national security strategies. Especially against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks, migrants are taken as potential terrorists. This has increased the securitization of migration.

The nature of migration i.e. the causes, types and volume of migration has changed with the end of the Cold War. A new conception of security that considers en masse migration and asylum seekers as threat to national security has also emerged after the end of the Cold War (Chimni, 1998, pp. 284–287; Weiner, 1995, p. 148). The asylum policy became one of the agenda of international and regional political forums (Gibney, 2003, pp. 22–23; Weiner, 1995, pp. 190–192). In some Western countries like the United Kingdom and Germany, political parties called for restrictionist asylum policies ostensibly with legal and economic reasons but inherently racist (Layton-Henry, 1994, pp. 275–280; Martin, 1994, pp. 198–201). The refugee issue became both a topic of the global and domestic political agenda. Furthermore, rampant poverty and internal civil wars—as result of political and economic transformation—have become the main driving causes for the large volume of forced migration.

These changes in causes, types and volume of migration, mainly ascribed to the end of the Cold War, have brought about changes in the policies of both, countries of immigration and emigration (Goodwin-Gill, 1998, pp. 191–192). This is the shift from a policy of openness towards refugees to a policy of closed gates and containment by the Western countries based on
racism and geographic origin of migrants (Layton-Henry, 1994, pp. 275–285). On the other hand, almost all states of the South, mainly the former communist countries, replaced their ‘iron curtain’ policy, which brought about massive mobility of people (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000, p. 145).

Asylum Policy Shift: From Encouragement to Containment

The end of the Cold War proved that the solidarity by Western governments to the UN refugee regime, ostensibly motivated by humanitarian consideration, was rather a self-serving politically motivated policy (Carens, 1998). This policy shift is best summarized by Cohen and Kennedy who state that “the political refugees of yesteryear are the economic migrants of today” (2000, p. 145). This policy shift from encouragement of refugees to containment on the part of the countries of immigration is probably the major effect of the end of the Cold War and signaled the end of the ‘hero refugee’ regime (Chimni, 1998a, pp. 284–287).

With the great number of migrants to the Western countries, the issue of multiculturalism and readiness to accommodate other ways of life became a serious security issue and brought the refugee regime into high politics. Racists, far right politicians, assimilationists and the advocates of the pro-homogenous ethnic nation state are at the center of these changes in asylum policies in Europe (Gibney, 2003, p. 24; Kymlicka, 2003). The cases of US intervention in Haiti, Bosnia and the creation of ‘free zone policy’ as well as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, and to some extent the intervention of Australia in East Timor were aimed at keeping the refugee influx out and render protection and assistance within the country of origin (Carens, 1998, pp. 28–29). However, in some cases such interventions unintentionally increased the volume of migration (Gibney, 1999, p. 25). US intervention in Somalia and the refugee flux to Ethiopia may serve as the best example for this situation.

Immigration as Source of Socio-Economic and Cultural Threat

Apart from the end of Cold War, other explanations for the emergence of restrictionist asylum policies in the Western countries, such as the global economics thesis or the volume of migrants, are reductionist by nature. Neither the labor market in the Western democracies, which demand for more labor, nor the numerical thesis sufficiently justify restrictionist policies. Closer study of historical accounts of global migration compared to the population increase globally shows that the numerical justification for restrictionist policies is not plausible. The recent competition for skilled immigrant labor from the South by the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Canada, and Australia is a good example to prove the high demand for labor in the Western countries.

However, there is a very crucial point relevant to this topic: the assumption that skilled labor immigrants will be culturally comfortable based upon the Anglo/German-Conformity criteria (Kymlicka, 2003, p. 1). Hence, the large volume of migration coupled with the decreasing birth rate and future demographic imbalances has posed a serious threat to values of the Western countries and nation states. Such threats became real with the growth of international protection of human rights universally regardless of the possession of citizenship of the host country (Layton-Henry, 1994, p. 275). Moreover, increasing acceptance of multiculturalism as form of governance—including adoption of policies that legitimize and promote territorial autonomous self-government of ethnic and indigenous communities—engenders a new kind of problem.

Multiculturalism as form of governance is not the most favorable one to the ideal of liberalism. Respect and state support (as multiculturalism demands) for collective rights such as culture and religion in countries like France and the Netherlands with regard to migrants from former colonies in Africa, and the Middle East, Turkey and Africa in Germany were taken as threat to the very foundation of the assimilationist nation state (Layton-Henry, 1994, pp. 275–285; Martin, 1994, p. 196; Kymlicka, 2003, pp. 2–3). This is also holds true for the Puerto Ricans in the United States who have a permanent residence permit but not political rights. Migrants, as failed guest workers, illegal overstayers and entrants were considered as Metics—citizens with lesser rights (Martin, 1994, p. 194; Kymlicka, 2003 pp. 2–3).

Economic Globalization, Global Governance and Forced Migration

The end of the Cold War is marked by turmoil and reordering of the political and economic systems of many countries. In some cases, it brought many violent regime changes particularly in the former communist countries. Of the 62 major conflicts registered worldwide since 1960, more than 40 i.e. 66.6 percent were registered from the end of the 1980s to January 2002 (Barry and Jeffery, 2002, p. 23). One effect of this turmoil and reorder was massive forced migration of people fleeing severe internal civil war and conflicts. With these changes, complexities begin to occur regarding the traditional division between forced and voluntary migrants (Castles, 2000, pp. 80-81). Such complexities are partially attributed to the nature and causes of forced migration. Internal civil wars (as result of political and economic transformation) and rampant poverty became the main driving causes for the large volume of forced migration. During the Cold War, the
main reason for flight was political persecution due to ideological struggle. Therefore, one disruptive effect of economic reordering, via globalization and global governance, is a marginalization of the Global South. Both shattered the hope of survival and narrowed the freedom of choice of many poor people in the South. Migration became one of the few coping mechanisms for survival.

The end of the Cold War marked the triumph of capitalism as the only viable economic system. This brought about the post-Cold War’s new international political and economic order led by the United States, as sole superpower, and other transnational corporations and multilateral institutions of economic globalization such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The establishment of global governance under these three powerful institutions accelerated the economic globalization. Any disobedience with regard to an implementation of the reforms prescribed by these institutions (on global financial, monetary and trade relations respectively) is difficult, if not impossible, because it is met with severe penalties. These prescriptions, such as the imposition of free market policy, structural adjustment programs and privatization without the necessary prior preparation disrupted the livelihood of millions in the South (Castles, 2002, pp. 1149–1152). These failed economic and social transformations intensified the economic inequality and marginalized the South more than ever (Cohen and Kennedy, 2000, p. 114; Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 9–12). This in turn forced people to migrate to Western countries (Castles, 2002, p. 1163).

EU Policies of Migration and Security

Securitization of migration by Europe is rather discursive in practice and is not limited to border management and a rigorous visa process. It also involves ‘psychological warfare’ against migrants by limiting their access to services vital to life. This has been witnessed in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other countries (Gustavsson, 2006). It heavily depends on border management and restriction on visa to low-skilled people.

Even if immigration to the European Union is generally securitized, it welcomes highly skilled professionals from Africa. The legislative proposal for an EU Blue Card scheme is a mechanism to meet the growing need for skilled labor. It provides for a fast processing of migration by removing barriers in the visa process and by granting freedom of mobility within the European Union. The Blue Card provides attractive conditions for the admission and residence of highly qualified immigrants needed for the EU economy.

In Africa, however, brain drain (due to unethical recruitment) is one major constraint which endangers the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategies. The problem of brain drain is undoing the efforts of both donors and aid-receiving countries. Brain drain is, and will be, a serious policy coherence challenge to donor countries whereas for developing countries it will be another additional development challenge in the efforts of escaping the vicious cycle of poverty. Clearly the problem of brain drain does not apply to low and semi-skilled labor migrants. There is no ‘labor drain’. This policy incoherence from the part of the European Union negatively affects the human security efforts of Africa.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The most famous and major African Union policy and legislative documents on migration and development are the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the African Common Position on Migration and Development, the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and Development, and the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children. The whole efforts towards a comprehensive response to ensure migration remains voluntary and legal and as a factor for development have, in my opinion, to take the following points into serious consideration.

Economic Development as Soft Power Tool of the European Union

Adapting the ‘Soft Power’ and ‘Hard Power’ concepts of Joseph Nye, the EU migration agencies have to employ a mix of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ tools of migration management.

Reframing the methods of meeting the security challenges migration has posed is vital if the root cause of the threats of migration is to be removed. The soft power tools will be both long-term in making migration voluntary and legal through socio-economic development, and short-term through consulted cooperation on effective border and migration management. Migration could only be made more secure through efforts towards making migration voluntary and legal for all. This is only possible through the eradication of poverty and the establishment of regimes protective of human rights in the countries of origin. In short, human security is necessary for migration to remain voluntary and legal. Coherence in policies of donor countries will be essential.

At the end of the day socio-economic development of the developing countries will be the factor that ensures that migration be voluntary and legal. Only human security will ensure that migration remain legal and secure, and contribute to the development of all
countries of destination, transit and origin. Economic development and economic growth are vital to facilitating poverty reduction, human rights protection, and the Millennium Development Goals. Establishing peace and a social and physical security architecture in Africa is of paramount importance. This could be achieved by using the African Union as entry point for maximum impact and the African Regional Economic Communities for specific aspects of cooperation.

Such architecture would provide the minimum physical safety, social and economic standards necessary for life. This would reduce migration and also causes and breeding grounds for fundamentalism of any kind. Such architecture would provide early warning of deadly conflicts, disasters, food insecurity in the form of famine and persecution in violation of human rights that cause forced migration. Policies, cooperation and assistance targeting poverty reduction, the Millennium Development Goals, human rights protection in Africa and capacity-building of the African migration agencies is a ‘soft’ tool of migration management. Also, an African Migration Fund, which will be partially used to encourage legal migration could be established and supported.

The challenges of both legal and illegal migration could become an impediment to or facilitator of development depending on how it is managed by countries affected by migration. To solve this problem, my suggestion is that the central object and purpose of donor policy should be poverty reduction through the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In other words, any policy that may have a direct or indirect adverse effect should be reconsidered to ensure coherence among development aid and domestic policies of donor countries.

If we take brain drain as an example of such a challenge, the Millennium Development Goals heavily bank on trained professionals particularly in sectors which are facing a critical shortage of trained human resources such as health and education. If this is true, then how could least developed countries grow fast while their human resources are depleted by migration of their most skilled professionals? Moreover, if trained professionals of poor countries are actively recruited by developed countries like the European Union, then how could public investment in education have the expected return to accelerated development efforts? Donor countries need to ensure coherence of their various policies. They also need to ensure compatibility of their policies—domestic and foreign, humanitarian and security, international development and economic competition. This exercise has to be looked at from the point of view of the intended and unintended consequences such domestic policies have on international development policies.

‘Hard’ Tools, with Limited Effect

Interception and apprehension, reception and detention capabilities are the ‘hard’ migration management tools with only short-term deterrence effects for migrants fleeing poverty and death. Also, the prosecution of smugglers, traffickers and their accomplices by strengthening law enforcement measures to curb the activities through stiffer penalties for perpetrators is a ‘hard’ tool of migration management. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its two additional Protocols (2000) are other ‘hard’ power tools. Organized criminal activities link migration to insecurity. Due to illegal migration of African youth and to the securitization of immigration, particularly to Europe, the youth are facing serious dangers to their life.

Indeed, a well managed border would facilitate migration from and within Africa. A key challenge is therefore to establish a balance allowing states to meet their humanitarian obligations to refugees and others eligible for protection while concurrently addressing the need to manage borders effectively. A better border management needs the strengthening of the border management systems in terms of technology, infrastructure, business process for inspection of travelers, and training of staff.

References


We are far from having coherent policies on migration management. Not only are there conflicting views between countries of origin and destination but also within governments. So in my point of view there is no such thing as competing policies—because the options are not clear yet.

Speaking from the point of view of the federally-owned Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), an agency in charge of technical development cooperation, I have to admit, that in our work the security-migration nexus has not yet been dealt with in depth. Of course, there is a broad spectrum of development activities to foster human security in the context of migration, e.g. the fight against human trafficking, humanitarian aid in the wake of refugee crisis situations, or programs to promote employment, small and medium-sized enterprises or microcredit schemes in countries with high demographic pressures. However, in all these programs migration is seen as but a side issue.

I am here as a member of the GTZ migration team and, therefore, I will present to you our specific approach, which tries to promote the positive effects of migration on development and to minimize its negative effects. It does not yet deal with aspects of security policy linked to the migration debate in detail, but of course we are very aware of the many open questions and dilemmas we are facing. This presentation is not exhaustive of our activities and describes—as it says in the title—our first steps.

Currently, we have three main areas of activity: remittances, cooperation with the diaspora, and mainstreaming migration.

Remittances

Migrants in Germany are sending roughly 10 billion Euros back to their countries of origin per year. The main receiving countries are Turkey, countries of the former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Albania, Sri Lanka, and Ghana. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned the GTZ to carry out a study on the German remittance market. The study showed that transfer costs are high because the market lacks transparency and competition. Building on these results, we followed the British example to create a website with information on money transfer providers, costs, and time needed for remittance transfers into six receiving countries (Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Morocco, Vietnam, Ghana). Its aim is to reduce transfer costs through increased transparency and competition. The website has been online since November last year and it is run and regularly updated by our cooperation partner, the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.

Further activities in the field of remittances include the extension of this website from six to 15 corridors with a focus on Africa and Eastern Europe, round tables on specific remittance topics, the creation of a Remittances Task Force, e.g. to improve data collection, as well as the extension of financial services and the development of financial products linked to remittances in countries of origin.

Engaging Diasporas in Development Cooperation

In May 2004, GTZ organized a first international conference on “Cooperation with the diaspora, a New Approach to International Partnership”. In a follow-up, several diaspora surveys were carried out on how migrant organizations in Germany contribute to the development of their countries of origin. In 2006 and 2007, surveys on the Egyptian, Afghan, Serbian, Vietnamese, Senegalese and Moroccan diaspora in Germany were published. Studies on the Cameroonian and Philippine diaspora in Germany are forthcoming. The following results can be drawn from these studies: First, migrants are already very active in the field of development in their countries of origin. Second, their activities are close to the activities of our bilateral development cooperation, so there is space for synergies. And third: the better migrants are integrated in their host countries,

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the more capacity they will have to engage themselves in their countries of origin.

Therefore, in 2007 the GTZ started a pilot project which gives financial support to migrant organizations in order to enter into dialogue and to build up structures for future cooperation. So far, we have supported about 15 projects, but a lot more are to come. 50 percent of project costs to a maximum of 25,000 Euros are provided as a grant. The migrants’ contribution has to be no less than 10 percent in cash and no more than 40 percent in kind. The organizations have to be legal entities, e.g. registered associations, and their project proposal has to be in line with the focus of the German bilateral cooperation in the country in question. Additionally, there should be a local partner in the country of origin with whom the organization in Germany is cooperating.

Mainstreaming Migration

Mainstreaming migration is crucial, because as many of the speakers yesterday and today have emphasized, migration is a cross-cutting theme that has links to many developmental issues. If we insist that migration has an enormous influence on the process of development, we have to increase our knowledge on the specific mechanisms. Therefore we want to analyze how migration is influencing current development projects and vice versa—e.g. the interplay between migration and education, health, conflicts and climate change—how to make use of positive aspects of migration to enhance their results—e.g. create synergies with migrants’ activities—and how to avoid counterproductive results—e.g. through taking into account migration motivations and histories.

We have only just started to explore these links and to figure out how this could facilitate the work of existing development programs that struggle with migration effects, so there is still a lot to be done.
On behalf of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, KfW-Development Bank plans and finances investment programs in our partner countries worldwide to foster development and poverty alleviation. For this purpose, we use funds from the German government as well as market funds.

People migrate because of livelihood disparities, acute or chronic political crisis or war, climatic changes and socio-cultural habits. Migration, development and security are intertwined, both, in countries of origin and in countries of destination.

Insecurity often leads to migration. But migration may trigger or fuel conflict, both in sending and receiving countries and regions. Migration may foster development with substantial welfare gains. But there are no universal truths about the impacts of migration on development. Security is a prerequisite for economic and social development. Development needs a secure and stable environment.

Impacts of Migration: What Do We Observe?

Attitudes towards the topic of migration within the development debate have shifted considerably: While the earlier focus of the discussion about migration from developing countries was largely put on potential and actual brain drain, the more recent discourse also identifies large developmental potentials from migration through economic and social remittances from the countries of residence. Today, the objectives of migration policies within a developmental context are to foster the potential of migration and to reduce the risks associated with migration, both for the individual migrant as well as for entire countries. All in all, the impact of migration on development varies considerably—there is no universal truth.

- Direct investments by the diaspora in countries of origin are often impeded.
- ‘Brain drain’ affects the poorest countries, there is limited empirical evidence of ‘brain gain’ through migration. People are more reluctant to return to their countries of origin if migration policies of receiving countries are rigid, as stated by the OECD report 2007.
- Forced migration (illegal migration, trafficking and bad living conditions) poses risks and hardship to migrants and their families.
- Rural/urban and transboundary migration challenges our partner countries in terms of infrastructure requirements (health, water, sanitation, education, employment) and in terms of cultural and ethnic integration and conflict prevention.

KfW’s Migration-related Portfolio at a Glance

During our portfolio analysis, we identified at least 35 programs, which are directly or indirectly related to migration issues both at the international as well as the regional, local and rural/urban level.

There are 14 programs with migrants as target group or dealing directly with migration issues (125 million Euros) in the areas of infrastructure (five programs), governance (five); financial systems (two), and education and employment (two).

Moreover, 12 programs have indirect or general links to migration issues. Here, migration issues are not at the center of attention, but are subordinate topics. The focus could be easily changed with minimal adaptations of the program design.

Finally, there are nine innovative programs mainly in the financial sector, including securitization of remittances, which are in preparation.
Contributions of KfW Programs

KfW programs tackle many issues of migration in their daily work, specifically issues of regional or national rural/urban migration. At the general level, they improve livelihoods and reduce migration pressure arising from economic needs.

Better perspectives in peoples’ home regions lowers incentive for labor migration, i.e. ‘forced migration’. They reduce conflict due to migration and urbanization in the countries of origin and of destination.

Migration is often a source of contention and conflict. Helping migrants to (re-)settle in their countries of origin and destination stabilizes communities and opens windows of opportunity for development.

Our programs also enhance the development potential of remittances. Better financial systems make transactions more efficient. Channeling remittances into financial systems opens options for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Thoughts for Policymakers on Migration and Security

In many receiving countries, migration is a contentious topic at the interface of internal, economic, employment and development issues with conflicting interest and objectives. Despite the EU’s commitment to Policy Coherence for Development, the OECD asks for increased policy coherence in migration policies to promote development.

What would policy coherence need in practice? Policy coherence needs clear objectives and transparent priorities—it is here where the discussion is convoluted, imprecise and vague. Policymakers have to clearly state objectives and priorities.

There is not one single policy solution to all different aspects of migrations issues. However, the various approaches need to converge to one policy framework. Rational migration policies must reconcile different interests. In this, the development of partner countries and poverty reduction must be an integral part of migration policies.

For security policies to be effective—both in regions of origin and destination—migration policies need to consider links between migration and development. Security takes on various dimensions—security in sending countries, in receiving countries as well as for the migrants themselves in both sending and receiving countries. For sending countries, ‘security first’ comprises no development without security and, conversely, for receiving countries, it comprises there will be no security without development in partner countries.
The “Migration for Development in Africa” (MIDA) Program for the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa is implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) with the financial support of the Kingdom of Belgium.

This Migration for Development program aims at strengthening the capacities of institutions in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve their national and regional development goals. The program is tailored to enhance the mobility of the qualified and skilled human resources from the Great Lakes diaspora residing in European countries, thus enabling them to share their expertise and provide an innovative response to brain drain affecting the continent. Since 2003, more than 100 institutions in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda have been reinforced through the organization of more than 240 missions of Great Lakes professionals residing in Europe. The sectors of education, health and rural development have been identified as strategic by the countries to achieve their national development goals.

Implemented by IOM since 2001 in close partnership with Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs of the Great Lakes countries, the program supports the exchange of knowledge and resources of the diaspora in different ways: Transfer of skills by means of repeated short-term and mid-term missions, development of distance and e-learning courses in university education, and providing information about money transfer mechanisms and investment opportunities in the Great Lakes region.

Taking into consideration the private nature of remittances, the MIDA program limits its involvement to information about money transfer mechanisms and investment opportunities in the Great Lakes region. The MIDA Program encourages investment through dissemination of incentives and creation of secure environments for diaspora remittances through investments in micro-, meso-, and macroeconomic activities, including micro-finance.

The action is exclusively managed by National Coordinators, who come from the Ministries of Labor and Employment in each target country and who ensure the full cooperation of all private, public and civil society partners. IOM ensures and facilitates the upgrading of their management capacities, in line with its MIDA policy for African countries’ ownership of development programs.

For further information see: www.midagrandslacs.org

Generally, poverty, bad governance and lack of job opportunities in Africa have resulted in conflicts and therefore insecurity. They are among the main causes for migration. Therefore supporting institutions in key sector and enhancing development contribute to the stabilization (security) of the three countries. Consolidating links between the diaspora and their country of origin when insecurity (conflicts/genocide ) has been the cause of migration contributes to peace, unity and reconciliation.

As a regional program, MIDA develops partnership between Congolese, Rwandan and Burundian institutions or people through regional training, missions of Burundian Congolese or Burundian experts in Rwanda. It is a factor of security and peace consolidation at the regional level since there have been conflicts within the region and tensions between communities.

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The “Afrikanischen Dachverband in NRW” (ADV), the Federation of African Associations in NRW is a young institution. The ADV was created on 23 April 2005. There are five fundamental reasons why 46 autonomous, active and dynamic African NGOs decided to set up the ADV NRW e.V.. We wanted a strong and representative network of all the African diaspora forces in NRW as a response to physical and social insecurity and a lack of constructive integration. We wanted a stronger representation of the interests of more than 90,000 African citizens living in North Rhine-Westphalia (40,000 black and 50,000 from the Maghreb region). Also, we wanted to contribute to changing the negative and false image of Africa and African citizens in NRW and in Germany and to enhance the integration of the African citizens and their children born here. Additionally, we wanted to transport the constructive contributions of African citizens in NRW to the German public through media and concrete initiatives.

These main aims and missions are based on a common vision to work ‘together and in solidarity’ as an African community fighting coherently to get our human rights here and, at the same time, to enable the African diaspora in NRW to play, after a successful integration process, an active and positive role in NRW, Germany and also in Africa in social, economic, academic, political and cultural fields.

Our vision is based on three principles: Migration is a result of famine, of natural catastrophes, of conflict and of poverty. If people leave their country to flee from insecurity, they come with the dream being secure. We have created this federation in a context where migrants have been living here for many years and have no access to education, to good jobs, but are still working only in low wage jobs. We know a lot of Africans with a PhD who work as taxi drivers. If all African people living in Europe and the United States and in Oceania had access to good jobs, they simultaneously would have the opportunity to send a lot more money home.

We are not critics of capitalism, but we think that we need some degree of a renaissance of humanism. We are talking about remittances, about the link between migration and economic development, but the core issue is that we have to talk about morality and humanity. Therefore the first principle of our organization is humanism: the human being should be in the center of all thinking, planning and action and not the interest in the capital or the interest in people with specific skills (workers, students, football players, etc.).

Solidarity and Equality

The second principle is solidarity, solidarity inside the heterogeneous African diaspora—between integrated, accommodated African citizens and newcomers and between Africans beyond national, ethnic, religious or political frontiers and between African and German citizens.

Our third principle is equality: African citizens—integrated ones and so-called irregulars—are equally promoted by the ADV and we will fight for all of them to be equally treated like German or European citizens in the eyes of the law and with the same access to education and work.

Our last principle is subsidiarity: the ADV will not take away or play the same national- or cultural-oriented role of its basis, the African NGOs. But it will concentrate on those coordinating activities to activate all African potentials in the diaspora. We want to enable the diaspora to be aware of the huge role they can play as active actors to help Germany become healthier, but also to help Africa to have less problems. African people do not like migration. They would prefer to stay at home. If you have the best university in the world, you will not see Africans going to other countries’ universities, except to learn the language. Our vision in 10, 20, 30 years is to have a powerful Africa, a worthy Africa. African people should come here as tourists, scientists or investors. Africans are not beggars. We would like to change this image of Africa in Germany.

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In the ADV we have created a thematic forum to discuss relevant and current Africa-related problems and to particularly address new and innovative issues such as

- integration as a transversal mission for African diaspora and the German society;
- remittances as a new instrument to contribute to stabilization of Sub-Saharan Africa and an innovative vehicle for poverty alleviation;
- racism and discrimination as the main obstacles to successful integration into German society;
- pan-africanism as an alternative ideology to practice solidarity between African citizens abroad and for the whole continent;
- conflict prevention, management in Africa, etc..

The ADV decided to conceptualize an action plan and to work strategically and methodically on six identified priority fronts: integration as a transversal front (social, economic, political, cultural, environmental and scientific fields) for the African diaspora and the German society; capacity-building of African associations (NGOs) and individuals (African citizens); fight against racism and structural and conjunctural discrimination; spreading the political voice of African citizens in NRW and in Germany; contributing to a greater presence of the African diaspora in the mental map of the German society from bottom (German society) to top (German elite and leaders) by coordinating all activities, ideas and resources and presenting them in a representative, constructive and positive way; enabling the African diaspora to play a main role in economic cooperation, poverty alleviation, AIDS prevention, access to education, health and achieving the Millennium Development Goals in their home countries.
Diversity within Unity?

Closing Speech
This conference gives an opportunity for researchers, practitioners and policymakers to engage with the very difficult and often sensitive issues of migration and security. The complexity and sensitivities become more pronounced when the discourse is focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa. It can be divisive because it is one of these issues that have many dimensions to the ways in which one perceives, states the perceptions and frames them for making potentially opposing arguments.

One can explore to see the connectedness of migration and security to influence or make an integrated policy of human movement to capitalize on the potential for social and economic changes. Another can construct a negative scenario that basically shows the risk to the host country’s security as the result of migration of individuals from Sub-Saharan Africa and hence argue for stratified policy that makes it more various if not impossible for these migrants to gain entry to the potential host country.

I have taken the liberty not to attempt to summarize the discourse of the day for two main reasons. First, because I can’t do justice to the range of issues presented in the time allocated and taking too long a time in capturing all issues poses a greater risk of boring my audience. Second, having spent the two days totally immersed and challenged in the various presentations and discussions, I wanted to provoke my audience by taking one of the threads in the tapestry of the two days.

This thread is that of ‘diversity within unity’, a phrase that is about the celebration of the richness of the different cultures, changes in the individual leading to the transformation of society—in this case the transformation of the German society as the catalyst to the changes in Europe.

When we talk about diversity, it might be useful to frame the desired changes in the context of social transformation. This sometimes happens through some crisis or challenges that lead to introspection by individuals, groups or institutions. Conscious choices are made to engage differently to change the ways in which past relationships were informed and diversity was perceived and experienced. I would like to sketch some of my thoughts, framed as questions/suggestions and leave you to think of their relevance to you as participants, people of the nation, academics and policymakers. I would also try to unpack the thoughts and frame them in the following perspectives:

National Perspective

The past debates on migration of Sub-Saharan nationals have often hidden the thinking that there can not be diversity and unity at the same time. The discourse, informed by the not so distant past, has often encouraged assimilation of the minority culture into the dominant majority culture, the vision of the ‘melting pot’. However, it might be useful to think of diversity as the most accepted thinking and the ingredient required for building a united identity—a prerequisite for building a much more stable society that recognizes the various needs of all groups in a country.

What are the dominant expectations of the host country? Is it for the migrants to assimilate? Is assimilation possible and enriching or is it impossible and degrading to all? Is the national frame of mind for migrants to lose themselves and change and if so, to what? Are these changes in the mind or are they all inclusive, body and mind? How do we interpret the physical, social and cultural manifestations of differences? What are our assumptions about each other, the migrant communities and the indigenous nationals?

How do most indigenous Germans respond to the migrants and the different cultures they encounter on their streets, schools, and neighborhoods? What dominant roles do migrants generally play, specifically those from African origin living here? Do they perceive themselves as helpless, needing help, etc. or do they help themselves and each other? Have they transcended their national differences or are they divided? Are they making choices that are empowering or disempowering? (I have in mind for example somebody with a PhD, who works as a taxi driver).

Melkamu Adisu

Transformation to Celebrating Diversity Needed

Melkamu Adisu is Country Director at the German Foundation for World Population (DSW) in Ethiopia. After working as a consultant and counselor in Great Britain, he developed and conducted training programs and strategies for government and city management staff in various African countries which were geared towards local capacity-building. He worked for the Foundation of Netherlands Volunteers in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia and Kenya as well as for the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Adisu Melkamu holds a Master of Science in Counseling Psychology from the Roehampton Institute, University of Surrey, Great Britain.
Personal Perspective

Social change is driven by the changes at the individual level. In considering the theme of ‘unity in diversity’, the white community, formal and informal groups and those who came from other countries to make Germany their home need to assess the degree to which the diverse groups see each other as competitors or collaborators in nation-building and transformation. Transformation is to mean the changes (hopefully positive) in the dynamics of all the relationships. This requires a paradigm shift in the manner one perceives him/herself—of personal identity. (Can one be a German and an African? How acceptable is this identity to the Africans and to the indigenous Germans?) It also requires being able to develop a new way of looking at oneself, in the multiplicity of identity of everyone, without loosing and transcending the socialized differences, and with the acceptance that all are the sons and daughters of the same god (‘unity in diversity’) and with the willingness to work for the transformation without looking for personal short-term gains (political expediency).

Institutional Perspective

There is the need to define and map-out the roles and responsibilities of the policymakers, legislators, and implementing institutions of the land so that they lead the wider transformation of society. Is the government doing the right thing or not? Is it doing enough or not? What are the successful examples? What can be learnt from other countries?

In sum, for me the critical issues to face are located in the individual psyche (identity, sense and sources of empowerment), and in the leadership of the nation: Whether or not leaders only get involved in the reduction of conflict areas as the result of encounters between different cultures, races and religions or whether the leadership is transformative and creates the climate and the necessary conditions for building a nation that celebrates the diversity of its people.
Friday, 22 February 2008

8.30 Registration

9.30 Initial Addresses
Peter J. Croll, Director, BICC
Erich Stather, State Secretary, Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Winfried Mengelkamp, Head of the Group
for International Co-operation, Ministry for
Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and
Integration (MGFFI), State Government of North
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW)
Bärbel Dieckmann, Lady Mayor of Bonn
Miodrag Soric, Editor-in-Chief, DW-Radio

Introduction
Prof. Rita Süssmuth, Former President of the German
Federal Parliament, Berlin

10.30 I. Conceptualizing the Migration–Security Nexus:
Challenges and Opportunities
and Perspectives
Dr. Steffen Angenendt, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
b. Trends and Developments of African Migration
to EU countries in the 21st Century
Ms. Ndioro Ndiaye, International Organization for
Migration

11.30 Coffee Break

11.45 II. Case Studies from Sub-Saharan Africa
a. The Niger Diaspora
Dr. Tamer Affif, United Nations University, Bonn
b. Ghanaian Migrants in Germany
Dr. des. Boris Nieswand, Max Planck Institute for
Social Anthropology, Halle

13.00 Lunch

14.00 III. The Three Dimensions of International Migration:
Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Synergies?
a. Beyond (In)Security? Rethinking the Politics of
Migration
Dr. Claudia Aradau, Open University, United Kingdom
b. Domestic Security and Migration to EU Countries
Dr. Fiona B. Adamson, University of London
c. Diaspora Intervention in Conflicts: Agents of Peace
or Agents of War?
Dr. Awil A. Mohamoud, African Diaspora Policy
Centre, Amsterdam

15.30 Coffee Break

15.45 IV. Panel Discussion: The Feasibility of Triple-Win:
Three-Dimensional Approaches to Global Migration
Governance
Dr. Claudia Aradau
Dr. Fiona B. Adamson
Dr. Awil A. Mohamoud
Dr. Ulrike Borchardt, University of Hamburg
Moderation: Dr. Koko Warner, United Nations
University, Bonn

17.30 End of first conference day

Saturday, 23 February 2008

9.30 Kinduku Choir (Cologne)

9.45 V. The Way Ahead: Current Trends in the Migration–
Security Discourse and the Future Research
Agenda
Summary presentation of the results of the first day
Andrea Warnecke, BICC

10.00 VI. Stakeholders and Protagonists in International
Migration
Introductory Session
Margit Fauser, COMCAD, University of Bielefeld
Rahim Diallo, Office for Migration and
Development, Solingen

11.00 Coffee Break

11.45 VII. Panel Discussion: Competing Policies on
International Migration Management: Security First?
Dr. Anne Hünnemeyer, KfW Development Bank
Eugène Kandekwe, Migration for Development
(MIDA), Rwanda
Dr. Axel Kreienbrink, German Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees
Mehari Taddele Maru, African Union
Ababacar Seck, Federation of African Associations
in North Rhine-Westphalia
Moderation: Dimitria Clayton, MGFFI, Dusseldorf

12.30 Lunch

14.00 VIII. Shaping International Migration: Principles,
Priorities, and the Scope of Cooperation
Open Space Forum: Open dialogue with relevant
actors: academia, policymakers, international
organizations, NGOs, diaspora and CSOs

16.00 Coffee Break

16.15 IX. Summary Presentation: Diversity within Unity?
Melkamu Adisu, Country Director German
Foundation for World Population (DSW), Ethiopia

17.30 Departure
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BICC at a glance

BICC is an independent, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting peace and development through the efficient and effective transformation of military-related structures, assets, functions and processes. Having expanded its span of activities beyond the classical areas of conversion that focus on the reuse of military resources (such as the reallocation of military expenditures, restructuring of the defense industry, closure of military bases, and demobilization), BICC is now organizing its work around three main topics: arms, peacebuilding and conflict. In doing this, BICC recognizes that the narrow concept of national security, embodied above all in the armed forces, has been surpassed by that of global security and, moreover, that global security cannot be achieved without seriously reducing poverty, improving health care and extending good governance throughout the world, in short: without human security in the broader sense.

Aims: To this end, BICC is intensifying its previous efforts in the fields of weaponry and disarmament, not only through its very special work in small arms but also by increasing its expertise in further topics of current concern such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms embargoes and new military technologies.

Peacebuilding: BICC is extending its work in the area of peacebuilding. In addition to examining post-conflict demobilization and reintegration of combatants and weapon-collection programs, the Center aims to contribute, among other things, to the development of concepts of security sector reform with an emphasis on civil-military cooperation, increased civilian control of the military, and the analysis of failed states.

Conflict: BICC is broadening its scope in the field of conflict management and conflict prevention, including tensions caused by disputes over marketable resources and transboundary issues such as water.

These three main areas of analysis are complemented by additional crosscutting aspects, for example, gender, pandemics, or environmental protection.

Along with conducting research, running conferences and publishing their findings, BICC’s international staff are also involved in consultancy, providing policy recommendations, training, and practical project work. By making information and advice available to governments, NGOs, and other public or private sector organizations, and especially through exhibitions aimed at the general public, they are working towards raising awareness for BICC’s key issues.

While disarmament frees up resources that can be employed in the fight against poverty, conversion maximizes outcomes through the careful management of such transformation of resources. It is in this sense that they together contribute to increasing human security.