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The conference was organized by BICC with the generous support of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).
Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Security-Migration Nexus II

Clara Fischer and Ruth Vollmer (eds.)
Contrary to the still prevailing belief caused by sometimes one-sided media coverage that a large share of African migrants relocate to Europe or the developed states in the North, research has shown that this is not the case. Only 1.5 percent of all Sub-Saharan Africans, living outside their country, live within the European Union. More than two-thirds of all migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, however, migrate to other countries within Sub-Saharan Africa (approximately 16.3 million).

Sub-Saharan Africa is also a region characterized by high numbers of forced migrants. It has the world’s highest concentration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and hosts approximately 20 percent of the world’s refugee population. In the region, we find both sending and receiving states. We also find states that are both, or that are transit countries. Tanzania, Chad and Uganda are amongst the top ten refugee-hosting countries worldwide. Cameroon, Sudan and Kenya are amongst the countries in Africa that hosted the highest amount of new refugees in 2007. 17 African states have refugee populations of more than 50,000 persons each.

Flight and expulsion, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, influence the development, stability and security of the states concerned and give rise to great challenges for action by policymakers at all levels and international humanitarian assistance.

Nearly to the day one year ago, in February 2008, experts from research, politics and civil society gathered in Bonn to discuss the “Security-Migration Nexus”, challenges and opportunities of migration from Africa to Europe. Following these discussions on the nexus between security and migration, BICC, the Bonn International Center for Conversion organized this second international conference, entitled “Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Security-Migration Nexus II” which was dedicated to forced migration within the Global South. The event was held in Bonn from 13–14 February 2009 and was supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Just under 200 national and international experts from academia, political and civil society institutions gathered and discussed the issue of forced migration in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The first conference day, which started with a comprehensive and thought-provoking keynote speech by Prof. John Oucho was dedicated to discussing causes and different shapes of forced migration in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the humanitarian, social and legal consequences for those affected and the repercussions resulting from forced migration, resettlement and return on social, political and economic conditions in the countries of the regions.

The second conference day followed up on these debates by focusing on the policy agenda and concrete instruments in migration governance at the national and regional level. African organizations, such as ECOWAS (Economic Community Of West African States) and the African Union have recognized the importance of the refugee issue. This is why the African Union has called for an extraordinary summit on refugees, returnees and IDPs which will take place in April 2009 and which will probably adopt an AU IDPs Convention.

On a final panel, representatives of international organizations as well as civil society groups and development cooperation actors shared their experiences and perspectives in the field of forced migration and discussed the role third parties can play in refugee emergencies.

This year BICC will celebrate its 15th anniversary. Since its inception in 1994, BICC has continuously developed its work with regard to the national and international agenda. With applied research, advisory services, capacity-building and public relations, BICC promotes and facilitates peace and development.

Today, our work includes areas such as “Resources and Conflict”, “Arms: global trends, exports and control”, “Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)”, “Base Conversion”, “Development and Peace” and last but not least “Migration and Conflict”. Within this field, BICC carries out applied research on the nexus between migration and security. It provides fora for the discussion of challenges of migration and displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa and studies patterns, trends and potential of diaspora engagement.

BICC, as a peace and conflict research organization intends to discuss flight and expulsion from the perspective of security. The topic of migration and
security has turned into a great challenge. The receiving countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, master huge tasks which neither research nor politics have been able to address adequately so far. This conference intended to give a new impulse to this discussion. At the same time it has to be taken into account that too much of a focus on the security implications for states contributes to a one-sided focus that makes the (security) needs of (forced) migrants appear secondary.

This BICC brief documents the papers and speeches presented and the results of the lively panel discussions during the conference. We hope that this publication will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the complex causes, faces, and consequences of forced migration and will foster an open dialogue between all stakeholders—migrants, countries of origin and destination countries of forced migrants, the international humanitarian regime and development cooperation actors alike.

Inspired by the conference, BICC will build up a network of researchers and practitioners for sharing ideas and fostering cooperation in the field of migration and joint research on the national and international level. BICC is also planning to organize other workshops on migration issues in the course of the year and is aiming to organize a follow-up conference in about a year’s time.

Peter J. Croll
Director BICC

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank all the contributors to this brief and participants of the conference for their valuable input, the Deutsche Welle for providing the conference venue and the City of Bonn for inviting all conference participants to an evening reception on the first conference day.

BICC also extends its gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Irene Quaile-Kersken for the excellent facilitation of the entire event.

Many of BICC staff contributed to the success of this conference. In particular, the editors would like to thank Andrea Warnecke for providing the concept of the conference, Heike Webb and Susanne Zacharias, who were responsible for the logistics of the Conference and the well-being of all participants, and Susanne Heinke, BICC’s spokesperson. Our sincere thanks also go to Kerstin Botsch, Edward Ceska, Daniele Dickmann, Sebastian Gerlach, and Stijn Ottens for taking the minutes of the respective presentations as well as to Andrea Warnecke and Lars Wirkus for facilitating two of the Panel Discussions. Last but not least, we would like to thank Heike Webb for her keen eye and efficient copyediting of this brief.

Editors’ note:

The responsibility for the content of the Papers lies fully with the authors. The views expressed in Sections 1-7 are not necessarily the views of the editors or BICC. The Summaries of the Panel Discussions and the Conclusion are compiled by the editors from the presentations and discussions among participants and do not necessarily express the views of any particular participant or their organization.
More and more people leave their home countries either voluntarily or due to circumstances that force them to leave. In the last forty years the amount of international migrants has more than doubled. 200 million people live outside their home countries.

Public attention in the past merely focused on labor migration from the South to the North with migration being perceived mainly as either an issue of interior policy or labor policy. Development policy, too, in recent years has predominantly dealt with the causes and impacts of South-North migration.

We have learned a lot along the way. Today, we look at migration and the risk of ‘brain drain’ much more consciously than a decade ago. We now know and appreciate much better the developmental potential of migration, such as the extensive remittances of migrants, which far outweigh some of our Official Development Assistance (ODA). Today, we make an extensive effort to get migrants to sustainably invest their knowledge and their capital for the benefit of their countries of origin.

Against this background, we as the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), commissioned BICC to investigate the important issue of migration with special attention to its potentials and risks for development. We started out together last year with the conference “The Security-Migration Nexus. Challenges and Opportunities of African Migration to Europe”. The purpose of the conference was to identify the opportunities for Africa that arise from South-North migration. The conference also shed light on the new facet of security policy implications for European destination countries.

Today’s conference again opens new topics, focusing on migration mainly from the African perspective, exploring the links between South-South migration, displacement, and security. This issue is highly relevant to development policy for several reasons. Let us look into the three main points:

1) High numbers of South-South migration

Migration between developing countries outnumbers every other form of migration. This is particularly true for migration between African countries, who take up more migrants than their northern neighbor Europe. Until 2005, only one-quarter of Sub-Saharan African migrants went to OECD countries. 63 percent of migration flows took place within Sub-Saharan Africa.

Internal displacement makes up a large share of migration: people flee armed conflicts, violence, or poverty and move to other regions within their countries. Today, an estimated 12 million Africans are internally displaced—or IDPs as we tend to call them.

2) South-South migration as a consequence of insecurity

Why do so many people move within and between African countries? The main reasons are poverty, lacking employment opportunities, war, environmental degradation, and climate change. Let me illustrate this:

- Poverty and lacking employment opportunities: 41 percent of all Africans still live on less than one dollar per day and 487 million laborers don’t earn enough to feed their families. Yet another 1.3 million earn less than two dollars a day—they need to work under humiliating conditions with no labor rights and social standards to protect them.

- Armed conflicts: Another reason for high migration and refugee numbers in Africa are wars. 40 percent of all wars of the last decade were fought in Africa. Multiple inter- and intra-state conflicts witnessed forced displacement, so-called ethnic cleansing, and severe violation of human rights.

- Environmental degradation and climate change: These deprive humans of their resources for survival. UNDP estimates that more than 100 million people in southern Africa alone are severely threatened by desertification and drought.

Therefore, South-South Migration is a consequence of insecurity and a lack of development, which results in a lack of human security.

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3) South-South Migration as a cause for insecurity

South-South migration is not only a consequence of insecurity, but at the same time the very cause for insecurity. Migration increasingly impacts developing countries’ stability in various ways:

- Migration may threaten the sovereignty of a host country with uncontrolled mass migration violating border control and sovereign territory.
- Migration threatens host countries’ economies. High immigration is a burden to a country’s infrastructure and increases competition for local resources (land, fuel, water). It can even cause conflict and thus hamper development.
- Extremist immigrants may abuse receiving countries as safe havens for planning assaults, with radical immigrants even recruiting support in their host countries.
- Migrants may also be perceived as a threat to cultural identity. In closed ethnicities, migration may lead to the discrimination and suppression of minorities.

I think these are sufficient reasons for dealing with the topic of migration and security in African countries.

But we also need to find answers for the following questions: “What is the role of development policy?” “How can development policy shape South-South migration?”

First and foremost, development policy tackles the root causes of forced migration—poverty, insecurity, and climate change. For example, development policy in Africa promotes governance as functioning state institutions are a requisite for public welfare and the provision of otherwise scarce resources. It also supports non-violent conflict resolution. An important actor for us in this respect is the Civil Peace Service. We try to alleviate the impact of climate change with projects combating desertification, with support for i.a. agricultural income generation, reforestation, and food security. The prevention of crises, which either arise due to war or natural disasters is high on our agenda in order to protect specifically the poor and the weakest of society.

However, we also have to accept that migration flows and displacement are a continuing phenomenon. We therefore want to assist refugees to live in dignity and enjoy the protection of their human rights. In concrete terms this means:

- We contribute to ensuring sustainability from the very beginning of refugee camp construction—e.g. when developing health, water, sanitation, and education infrastructure.
- Security is often lacking in refugee camps. Thus together with the Civil Peace Service, we provide training in civil conflict resolution in refugee camps as in Sudan and Kenya or we cooperate with UNHCR.
- As soon as security circumstances in countries of origin permit, we support and accompany repatriation and the reintegration of refugees, specifically that of women and children.
- Internationally, we try to find solutions for long-term conflicts. We promote higher standards for the treatment of refugees in our engagement in the United Nations in general and UNHCR specifically.

However, we have to acknowledge that, despite all our efforts, development cooperation with emigration countries remains a long-term effort. We would certainly be too optimistic if we expected short-term results in a sense that our development projects have immediate effects on the behavior of people who plan to emigrate. This is another reason why our cooperation should not be limited to traditional approaches. We should rather accept migration as a feature of globalization and try to shape it so that it fosters development.

Given the large variety of problems causing and created by South-South migration in African developing countries we need to find ways to coherently manage South-South migration. I want to know which good practices we have to reduce conflict potential caused by immigrants and refugees in their host countries. Are we able to and should we support such instruments in our development cooperation?

I look forward to hearing—and learning from—the attending experts’ opinions and to receiving some guidance from this conference as concerns these questions.

I wish us all fruitful discussions for the two days to come and thank BICC for their outstanding work in preparing this important event.
I am pleased to welcome you in the name of the State Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration of North Rhine-Westphalia to the second conference on “Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa”.

Allow me the opportunity to begin with a few words about North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous federal state and about our particular interest in this topic.

A leading economic region in the heart of Europe, the history of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia has always been linked to migration. It is a history that has been much influenced, but not limited, to the large-scale recruitment of guest workers from the 1950s to the early 1970s. Of a total population of 18 million inhabitants, approximately four million—almost half of them women—have a migrant background. The great majority, 80 percent, originate from a country within Europe. Every third immigrant is a Turkish national (36%). Every tenth immigrant in North Rhine-Westphalia is of Asian descent. One-third of the African nationals in Germany, that is 275,000, live in North Rhine-Westphalia. For the past three years, Sub-Saharan Africa has been at the focus of our work in the field of international cooperation and includes, amongst others, a formal Partnership with Ghana and a long-standing cooperation with the South African province Mpumalanga. Ours is the first ministry in Germany in which integration and development are housed under one roof. The support of and cooperation with African migrant communities and their organizations is a key aspect of the program.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Over the years the debate on migration in Germany has predominately focused on migration as a challenge for countries of destination in the Global North. Major concerns about the impact of migration on social cohesion, social welfare systems and national security, the prevention of undocumented migration and border control have been at the forefront of respective policy initiatives. The growing interest in examining the ‘root causes’ of migration is motivated in part by the realization that policies which aim to secure the borders but do not address the factors that make it important and necessary for people to move, simply do not work. Migration as a result of violent conflict, political persecution, environmental degradation, and economic disparity are some of the primary concerns, which are often raised in this context. African migration to Europe has figured prominently in the public debate. The situation in Sub-Saharan Africa as a region of destination and transit, and the dynamics of migration and displacement on the continent has, in Germany, received little attention.

BICC has provided a very valuable forum for a much needed exchange of information and experience on this topic. The inputs on the human dimension of forced migration and displacement, its impact on the migrants themselves and their communities, and on relevant migration policy approaches of countries in the region, will provide a welcome change of perspective—one that is essential to a comprehensive understanding of this multifaceted issue.

I would like to thank BICC for organizing this conference on migration and displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa and commend them for bringing together such an impressive group of national and international experts on this very timely and very pressing issue.

I hope that over the next two days you will have many interesting debates, new insights and much success.
It is a pleasure to welcome you, on behalf of the Ministry for Innovation, Science, Research and Technology at the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia, at the second conference on migration, “Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa”.

First off, let me say this: throughout the history of mankind, there has always been migration. Looking for work, getting away from war, persecution or disasters, searching for a good place to live, the desire to enjoy freedom of worship—there are plenty of reasons why people leave their homelands. International organizations estimate that between 175 and 185 million people are currently living, either temporarily or permanently, away from their home countries. That is between 2.5 and three percent of the world’s population. Not only is this a low percentage in absolute terms, it has also not significantly increased over the past four decades, even with all the dynamics of the globalized economy. Make no mistake, though, against the backdrop of such globalization, international migration is set to rise further.

Whilst integration of the markets will create opportunity for many, it is bound to force many others to migrate. Generally, we will see an increase in individual mobility, in both the developed world and less developed regions. There are many areas where, in the face of poverty, strife and lack of development, the pressure to leave will grow. Deteriorating environmental conditions, especially in close proximity to desert areas, are likely to lead to renewed migration, and there is of course always the chance of major disasters triggering large-scale refugee movement. Migration and expulsions are therefore among the most pressing of global problems, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, home to 16.6 million migrants—most of them victims of forced emigration.

Not only does this have far-reaching consequences for the individuals concerned, it also impacts the social processes in the countries that are affected, which in turn poses huge challenges for political leaders at every level. Among the key problems faced by migrants’ countries of origin is the ‘brain drain’ of highly skilled and academically trained professionals. Countries with low foreign exchange earnings are particularly vulnerable to human capital flight. Figures estimated by the World Bank put the brain drain percentage in Ghana, for example, at just under fifty.

The causes, forms and conditions of forced migration are highly complex, and migrant groups vary in their coping strategies. The first day of the conference has a scientific focus and addresses the causes and the various forms of forced migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the impact on society. On Day 2, approaches to—and instruments of—‘migration governance’ will be discussed. The aim of the conference is to demonstrate the current state of research by presenting case studies, to debate strategies to tackle forced migration, to identify terms of reference for future studies and to discuss specific options for political action. Moreover, impetus will be sought for the development of a network and shared focal research areas at national and international levels.

Can I give special thanks to the conference organizers, BICC, the Bonn Center for Conversion, who have managed to bring together a multitude of national and international experts to talk about a very important issue. Numerous activities and cooperations have raised BICC’s profile in the areas of migration and conflicts as well. A few cases in point:

- Participation in a multi-year international EU research project, “Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora Involvement in Conflict Settings” (DISPEACE), which sets out to establish new findings on diaspora activities both in the countries of origin and receiving countries as well as on a transnational level.
- Organization of the international conference, “The Security-Migration Nexus. Challenges and Opportunities of African Migration to EU Countries”, addressing migration from the Global South to the North.
- Organization of a workshop, “African Diaspora Groups as Facilitators of Peace and Development” during last year’s 13th International Metropolis Conference.

Finally, let me say a few words about BICC. Established in 1994—with the support from the NRW State Government—as an independent non-profit organization, it has the motto, ‘Facilitating Peace and Development’. During its 15-year history, BICC has evolved as one of Germany’s leading defense-conversion think tanks, and has earned international renown. As a science and technology heavyweight, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia takes pride in hosting a research institution with so much to contribute to resolving the crucial issues of our modern world.

I wish this conference every success.
I feel greatly honored to have been invited to come to Germany for the first time ever to deliver a Keynote Address to this august conference on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region that lags behind all world regions in almost all indices of what development signifies. When I was asked to deliver a Keynote Address on voluntary versus forced migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, I was immediately faced with an intellectual dilemma. I toyed with one principal question: Is there a clear boundary between the two or do they simply signify a continuum? My hunch is that both are but a continuum, though a closer scrutiny of their form, causes and the movers involved suggest some subtle differences. Anyone who cares to access my previous work will find that I have made contributions on the two forms of migration at both internal and international levels, a feat that has given me inroads likely to elude one who confines oneself to only one of the two. Much as I have been a victim of this dichotomization of studying migration, I have become increasingly convinced that the intellectual divide is inappropriate and migration scholars and other stakeholders should work conscientiously together without being slavishly confined to their so-called pet forms of migration studies. Even at the level of the United Nations, compartmentalization of migration within the purview of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for refugees and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in Population Division of the United Nations mainly for voluntary migration, is clearly academic. If anything, various UN agencies working on migration should find common ground within which to operate.

As it has become fashionable among migration scholars and other stakeholders to treat voluntary and forced migration separately, this Keynote Address will adopt that framework but conclude eventually that drawing a boundary a priori between the two is inadvisable, and that the distinction should come after a number of issues have necessitated it. This conference is no exception as it perpetuates the distinction between voluntary movement and movement due to displacement. As security, broadly defined, interacts with migration, I wish to salute organizers of the conference for choosing a most fitting theme, one that is of immense relevance in the contemporary world, and especially in SSA.

Both voluntary and forced migration occasion some form of displacement, one willingly, the other due to particular circumstances that are often beyond the movers’ control. In this Address, I have decided to focus on seven main issues:

- Lack of unanimity in conceptual definitions;
- Typologies of voluntary and forced migration which have compartmentalized the subject;
- Why the sudden upsurge of interest in migration over the last few years;
- Institutional settings for migration work;
- Trends in, perceptions of and responses to migration;
- Drivers and faces of forced migration; and
- Some repercussions of voluntary and forced migration.

I conclude by urging migration scholars and other stakeholders to cooperate more closely and to desist from compartmentalizing a phenomenon, which keeps changing its complexion as well as its effects.

**Lack of Unanimity in Conceptual Definitions**

In the literature and in common usage, “migration” signifies voluntarism, even if implicitly, while “displacement” entails the influence of forces beyond movers’ control. Yet students of voluntary migration, drawn from a wide range of social sciences, are hardly unanimous about the phenomenon they study and thus underline aspects that are consistent with the epistemological stances of their respective disciplines. The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) describes forced migration as “a general term that refers to movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine and development projects”\(^1\). The study of forced migration, very much like that of voluntary migration, is multidisciplinary, has both internal and international

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**John O. Oucho**

**Voluntary versus Forced Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa**
dimensions, involves academics and other practitioners with considerable diversity and attracts the attention of intervening agencies from equally diverse circles.

A review of literature of environment as a cause of migration reveals lack of unanimity in the conceptual definition of voluntary and forced migration (IOM, 2008b, p. 15–29). Castles (2002, quoted in IOM, 2008b, p. 15) identifies three major elements in the debate on environmentally induced migration, namely debate over the terminology and definition of “environmental refugees” proposed by Hinnawi (1985) and Jacobsen (1988); whether environmental factors can be recognized as the root cause of migration; and who provides protection for environmentally displaced people. The last element is because, strictly speaking, environmentally displaced people do not qualify to be refugees in the mould of the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees or the OAU 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa—which place emphasis on fleeing from well-founded fear owing to issues other than environment. Richard Black (1998, quoted in Castles, 2004) contests the expression “environmental refugees”, arguing that while environmental factors do play a part in forced migration, displacement by them is closely linked to social and ethnic conflict, weak states and abuse of human rights. This discourse is inconclusive as the Inter-Governmental Committee on Climate Change (IPCC), in its scientific assessments, continues to provide startling evidence on migration-climate change interrelations. IOM’s “Migration and Climate Change” (2008a, p. 22), provides overwhelming evidence in SSA, including the “migration gamble” in Sahelian Africa when drought stimulates rural-urban migration.

Earlier in the 20th century two concepts, “forced” and “unforced “migration, were in vogue (Fairchild, 1925; Peterson, 1958, quoted in IOM, 2008b, p. 15). Peterson’s typology suffered from overlap, differentiating between “impelled” migration in which migrants retain some power to decide whether or not to leave and “forced” migration when migrants have no such power; he argued that in between the two extremes is “free” migration in which the will of migrants determines a move (IOM, 2008b, p. 16).

Olson (1979, quoted in IOM, 2008b, p. 16–17) adopts relatively wide definitions of refugee and forced movements:

Refugees differ from other, spontaneous or sponsored migrants, largely in the circumstances of their movement out of one area to another and the effects these have on them in the settlement and adjustment phases of their relocation. Refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere.

IOM’s (2008b, p.17–18) review considers this definition more holistic because it views refugee movements as a subset of all population mobility rather than of international migration. In the final analysis, the IOM (ibid, p.18) identifies six differences between forced and voluntary migrants: (i) while voluntary migrants choose to move, involuntary migrants never want to move in the first place and have no intention to do so until circumstances dictate their moves; (ii) involuntary migrants maintain a greater commitment to their place of origin to which they eventually wish to return, while voluntary migrants do not; (iii) involuntary migrants are more likely to be in a state of emotional and physical stress because of losing family friends and facing up to uncertainties of the future, which compromise their adjustment at their destinations; (iv) involuntary migrants are less likely to bring with them to the destinations belongings, money and other economic assets than do voluntary migrants; (v) first-wave involuntary migrants are less likely to have established linkages with people and institutions at their destinations than voluntary migrants who often move whenever these conditions apply; and (vi) involuntary migrants are more likely than voluntary migrants to be moving to a destination in which the dominant language, culture, food and so on is different from their own. These differences between involuntary and voluntary migrants underline their moves, adjustments and links with their origins.

Typologies of Voluntary and Forced Migration

Typologies of both voluntary and forced internal and international forms of migration have changed over time, especially to reflect salient migratory events. A quick look into this will provide useful insights and explain how far migration scholars and other stakeholders have come in addressing different types of migration.

In the sphere of internal migration, four types of both voluntary and involuntary migration have included rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-urban and urban-rural (including return) movements. For quite some time in the past, migration analysts did not pay attention to internally displaced persons (IDPs), the form of forced migration, which has rocked the foundations of practically every SSA country (Oucho, 1997). No doubt at the turn of the 1990s, the UN Secretary-General appointed a representative to take charge of IDPs, a move which went a long way in fathoming research, policy frameworks and programs on IDPs. Yet, the notion persisting in SSA is that rural-urban migration is the most dominant, parceling countries into urban and rural
enclaves; impeccable evidence suggests that rural-rural migration, which consists of several components including seasonal mobility, is actually the most dominant type in the region (Oucho and Gould, 1993). SSA urbanization is largely a function of rapid population growth attributed to a high natural increase even in existing urban areas and reclassification of formerly rural territory to become urban, lack of economic incentives spurring urbanization notwithstanding. With SSA’s demographic transition, it is now time to turn our attention to urban-urban migration in the face of rapid urbanization and urban-rural migration (including return) as the first generation of rural-urban migrants of the period before the 1970s return to their rural origins. It is also the time to study IDPs through a variety of disciplinary lenses and programmatic interests as the phenomenon persists in the region.

Internationally, the Population Division of the United Nations (1982, 1998) identified four categories of both voluntary and involuntary migration as permanent: labor, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented (clandestine migration). Over the years migration scholars have refined these categories. For instance, Appleyard (1991) categorizes four types of international migration as permanent settlers: (i) settlers and naturalized persons; (ii) labor migrants including temporary contract workers and skilled/professional temporary transients; (iii) refugees and asylum seekers; and (iv) various categories of clandestine/illegal migrants. Bilisbrow et al. (1997) on the other hand, identify five broad categories; (i) immigrants comprising settlers with indefinite stay (permanent residents) and those moving because of family reunification; (ii) foreigners designated as frontier workers or project-tied, contract and temporary as well as established highly skilled or business travelers; (iii) asylum migration, which includes conventional refugees and those granted humanitarian admissions or stay of deportation; (iv) unauthorized, irregular migrants; and (v) return migration to countries of origin. The latter is more complete as it is based on guidelines which the authors developed for the International Labour Organization for a systematic study of international migration-based requisite datasets.

The contemporary world is awash with information in both print and electronic media and published work on forms of migration, which have been in existence for rather too long, and which continues to occupy too much attention, apparently for no sound reasons. The first is the hullabaloo about brain drain, brain circulation and deployment of the African diaspora in homeland development. The tendency is to focus on those outside Africa and to ignore those residing in SSA countries other than their own. In the 1960s, brain drain was viewed as developed countries’ deliberate move to recruit highly educated persons and professionals from African countries which needed them for the nascent nation-building vocations soon after independence. Then, brain drain was considered an unfair removal by the developed North of requisite human resources from the developing South, which could not develop in the absence of the highly needed skills. Over time and especially currently, SSA countries view brain drain and diaspora as extremely useful to them through financial remittances and, it is believed, domestication of skills, information and knowledge by the diaspora. Yet much of what we are treated to is anecdotal evidence in many SSA countries and sporadic empirical evidence in Western African countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Mali and in the Horn of Africa’s failed Eritrea where remittances are compulsory for expatriate nationals.

All of a sudden every SSA national outside his/her country has become a diaspora irrespective of how they had left their countries of origin. Within SSA, however, the diaspora experiences uneasy coexistence with xenophobic nationals of the countries of immigration as unemployment is exacerbated by depressing economic performance of most national economies. Surprisingly much xenophobia in SSA countries is directed at the African immigrant stock: non-Ghanaians when Ghana invoked the Aliens Compliance Act in 1969, against non-Nigerians in 1983 and 1985 against non-Gabonese when Gabon embarked on citizen employment only; in Southern Africa where immigrants in Botswana have had their incentives withdrawn and in South Africa where violence against foreigners has cast a shadow on the country’s human rights efforts.

With the countries of destination controlling migration more strictly, ‘brain drain’ has increasingly become ‘brain circulation’, and ‘transnational migration’ or ‘transnationalism’. In SSA, every Regional Economic Community (REC) has drafted a protocol on “free” (replaced by “facilitation of”) movement of persons within the respective RECs’ area of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) protocols for respective RECs have never gone beyond phase one which provides for “visa-free entry” for a specified period as the other two successive phases—“right of residence and “establishment of an economic undertaking”—remain too controversial to be pursued. The points raised in a critical analysis of the SADC protocol (Oucho and Crush, 2001) calls for its thorough re-examination which could provide lessons for other RECs’ protocols. For SSA, the stalled protocols pose a serious challenge because their crafting should have been informed by sound research and reliable data on national perceptions and apprehension of the member states’ citizens.

Broadly speaking, types of forced migration, on the other hand, are IDPs at the national level and refugees at the international level. In the two settings, human trafficking and smuggling—themselves components of forced
migration—have become rampant, raising concerns about the so-called “irregular migration”. Refugees and asylum seekers have faced ominous challenges within and outside the SSA region. Some of them who are well educated, skilled or are professionals often work for a pittance and have no grounds for complaint to avoid the risk of refoulment. But in the porous borders of many SSA countries, IDPs graduate into refugees and asylum seekers and the latter two relapse into IDPs, their situations too complicated to track, rendering them destitute for as long as their dire conditions persist.

The point to underline in concluding this section on conceptual definitions and typologies is that analysis of any form of migration requires clarity of definitions, delimitation of focus, underpinning of relevant data and recognition of theoretical constructs and empirical evidence in similar or different situations. It is inadvisable to make generalizations on SSA where virtually every country constitutes an origin, a transit country and a destination. Moreover, that a substantial portion of African international migration is intra-African (and not extra-African) implies that more work should be done within SSA and North Africa with which it shares much within the framework of the AU and through which Sub-Saharan Africans—and surprisingly Asians—transit migration to Europe.

Why the Sudden Surge of Interest in Migration?

Given the complexity of population mobility, it is not surprising that a consensus eluded the world nations who met at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt in 1994. In the wake of the ICPD Programme of Action (ICPD/PA), there has been a growing global interest in international migration. Several fora have been convened, among them the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM); the Global Dialogue on Migration and Development (GMD) with two successive conferences so far in Brussels and Manila; and the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration which met in New York in 2006. All these fora have strong hand of the United Nations, though the global body has never risen to occasion to give migration the place it very much deserves in a globalizing world. The lone ranger in migration remains the International Office for Migration (IOM) which, since 2003, has been publishing the “World Migration”, itself a handy companion in the migration and development nexus. Although “World Migration 2008” does not distinguish between voluntary and forced migration, it recognizes that refugees are a characteristic and dominant feature of international migration in Africa, stating that the number and proportion of refugees have been declining largely as a result of voluntary repatriations from the late 1990s (IOM, 2008c, p. 391).

Toying with the polemics about the “migration crisis”, Castles (2004, pp. 4–5) posits that migration is but an integral part of a crisis in the North-South relations. In the North he attributes the migration crisis to both the widespread popular fears about globalization and the rise of anti-migration right-wing parties and movements and the trend to a “securitization” of migration issues, which have gathered momentum in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. In the South, the migration crisis takes the form both of the massive increase in forced migration due to ‘new’ wars and the widespread abuse of human rights, and of the blocking of free mobility to (“non-entrée regime” in) the North, which forces would-be migrants to rely on informal networks or human traffickers and other forms of irregular migration. Without the two worlds coming to terms with the fundamentals of the so-called “migration crisis”, any attempts at a consistent migration management will turn out to be futile.

Institutional Settings for Migration Work

Several institutions have been producing data and perspectives on voluntary and forced migrants. They include the Population Division of the United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). Sadly, virtually all SSA countries have neither the will nor the know-how to assemble data on their emigrants, even though they believe that out there are their diasporas willing to develop their homelands through both remittances and periodic return. African institutions, including those based in universities, survive precariously, often relying on support from the developed North whose agenda those institutions must of necessity carry on board their programs. In Southern Africa, for instance, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), based in Canada with an appendage in South Africa, ground to a halt after a successful decade (1997–2007) of impressive research on which the nine African countries where it worked should have relied for policy formulation and reviews as well as for appropriate programs. Unfortunately, the once much-acclaimed protocol “free movement” (later changed to “facilitation of movement” of persons in the SADC region) remains on the drawing board as the member states become increasingly reluctant to ratify it once it had been signed by the required number.

One can find institutions focusing on Africa in many countries of the developed North—for example, various African Studies Centers in Scandinavian countries, the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC) at Sussex University, and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford, both in the United Kingdom—all undertaking research without a strong,
formally streamlined African partnership.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the first institutions to engage in immigration work as a scientific area of study are several forced migration centers based in several SSA universities—Makerere in Uganda, Moi in Kenya, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, Witwatersrand in South Africa—to name but a few. It is not until three or so years ago that the University of Ghana, with the support of the Dutch government, opened a Centre for Migration Studies; the European Union has helped to establish the Centre for Information and Control of Migration (CIGEM) in Mali, specifically to fight illegal migration through job counseling for prospective and return migrants; and the European Commission is set to help in establishing an African institute on remittances to provide some remedies and improve the beneficial effects of remittances. These are novel developments but they should desist from specializing in a particular type of migration which, once redundant, may render the institutions equally redundant. Moreover, these are institutions initiated from the North without the South lending the support necessary to ensure their sustainability.

With the establishment of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) since November 2000, some Southern African countries have evolved bilateral migration management arrangements that became subsequently instructive for the member states of the Economic Community Of West-African States (ECOWAS), and later for those of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These structures provide an opportunity for interfacing of research and policy as well as the programs that they instigate. Yet they are merely consultative processes of the regional economic communities (RECs) that grew out of regional integration mania two or so decades ago sadly lack the teeth to influence change in the RECs’ member states. The recent consultative processes are implants of the International Organization for Migration and other interested parties (IOM, 2001) hence their dismal performance in migration management.

Table 1: Voluntary and forced migration in Sub-Saharan African regions, 2000–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-region</th>
<th>Total population*</th>
<th>Migrant stock</th>
<th>Number of refugees*</th>
<th>Net migration (Average annual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number*</td>
<td>% of total population</td>
<td>Number*</td>
<td>Rate per 1,000 pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>287,707</td>
<td>4,516</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>109,641</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>54,055</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>263,636</td>
<td>7,543</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DESA, 2009 (wall chart).
Note: * in thousand

Trends, Perceptions and Responses

It is inevitable to concur with Adepoju (2008, p. 17) that the SSA region is characterized by a variety of migration configurations—contract workers, labor migrants, skilled professionals, refugees and IDPs, all moving within a continuum of internal, intra-regional and international circulation—with most countries serving as places of origin, transit and destination. Although African immigration to the developed North has been dominating airwaves and raising growing concern, it trails that of other developing regions. At the turn of the millennium, immigration from Africa accounted for only 4.5 percent of Australian immigration, 5.4 percent of Canadian and 2.8 percent to the United States; these proportions were far below Asia’s 28.6 percent, 36.7 percent and 26.4 percent respectively (Migration Policy Institute, 2009). IOM’s (2008c) “World Migration 2008” reports that although Africa’s migrants increased from 16.3 to 16.9 million between 2000 and 2005, the region, with the lowest share of only two percent, registered the lowest growth rate in international migrants of any world region.

In fact, much of African international migration is intra-regional, although African countries are starkly unaware of this because they rarely share figures on the migrants exchanged, largely due to either lack of data or absence of bilateral arrangements, or both. Out of a total of 14.5 million migrants originating in SSA, 10 million (or 69 percent) move within the region (IOM, 2008, p. 408, quoting Ratha and Shaw, 2007). But the region has the world’s highest concentration of IDPs—12.7 million in 20 countries at the end of 2007 (IOM, 2008c, p. 408, quoting IDMC, 2008) who outnumber refugees whose population declined from about six million to three million in the decade 1995–2005 (IOM, 2008, p. 408, quoting UNHCR, 1995 and 2007). Thus, analysts,
policymakers and program implementers should state clearly what breed of migrants they are dealing with at any time in their work.

For over a decade now, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in Population Division of the United Nations has been publishing biennial wall charts on international migration, which contain information as far as the available data permit. It shows that in the first five years of the new millennium SSA had a total population of 715,041 million, or 79 percent of Africa’s population of 905,936 million (Table 1).

SSA had only 2.1 percent of migrant stock of the total population and 0.4 percent of refugees. The DESA data suggest that the proportion of migrants exceeds that of refugees in the region given that the number of refugees has been declining over time.

The MPI Data Hub holds even more exciting data. Estimated stock of international migrants by mid-1990 reveals that Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, South Africa, Malawi, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda occupy the first top positions among SSA countries. Further, while Côte d’Ivoire remained perched as the top-ranked destination by mid-2000, the pecking order of other African countries changed to South Africa, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Sudan, Nigeria, Guinea, DR Congo, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe in descending order (MPI, 2009). Clearly, these rankings incorporate both voluntary and forced migrants, and underline the volatility of intra-African migration. The last five years of the 20th century (1995–2000) saw positive net migration in only 18 African countries and negative net migration in the majority of the countries. This divide probably convinced SSA countries that emigration had become a major problem to which they needed to pay attention. The flurry of activity in migration issues in the first decade of the new millennium attests to this fact.

Africa’s share of IDPs is astounding. The “Nationmaster.com” on refugees and IDPs states that in 2004, Sudan topped the whole world with 4.4 million IDPs, the DR Congo came fourth with 1.4 million, followed by Uganda (1.3 million), Somalia (1.1 million) and Côte d’Ivoire (0.7 million). Africa accounts for 20 (38.5 percent) of the 52 countries in the “Nationmaster.com” register, implying that the region remains a persistent producer of IDPs. Listing a similar distribution, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian Refugees Council provides figures from government, United Nations and other sources—which vary considerably, and which, therefore, are difficult to compare or likely to contain errors. In such situations of data variability, it is not the exact figures that matter; rather, it is the magnitude and characteristics of IDPs in relation to a country’s population. Admittedly, there can never be accurate figures of IDPs in situations where some governments inflate figures to attract international assistance and others deflate them to save the national image of not being condemned as perpetrators.

The publication of the US Committee on Refugees and Immigration (2008, p. 24), “World Refugee Survey 2008”, reports that as of 31 December 2007, there were 40,800 Angolan refugees in Zambia; 13,300 DR Congolese in Angola, and 291,500 in Tanzania; Zambia, Rwanda and other countries; 20,800 Ethiopians in Sudan; 300,700 Sudanese in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and other countries; 85,200 Liberians in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and other countries, 20,200 Mauritians in Senegal; 12,300 Sierra Leoneans in Guinea, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire; 418,400 Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen; 331,900 Burundians all in Tanzania; and 21,200 Rwandans in Uganda. Noteable features of the distribution of refugees are their flight to neighboring countries where they easily fit and feel at home, and the exchange of refugees between several countries.

Drivers and Faces of Forced Migration

The two main faces of forced migration are conflict- and disaster-induced. Movers affected include refugees and asylum seekers, IDPs, development displacees, both environmental and disaster displacees and smuggled and trafficked people. Castles (2004, pp. 3–4) points out that the majority of forced migrants flee for reasons not recognized by the international refugees regime, many of them displaced within their own countries, and that IDPs are more numerous than refugees. The difficult transition experienced by African countries towards national independence or majority rule sparked conflict-induced migration, which gained prominence over disaster-induced migration in a region most prone to environmental disasters. Understandably, when the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa in 1969, the drivers and faces of forced migration were seen through the lens of colonialism, the focus then inevitably glued to refugees. Little did the OAU member states envision other faces of forced migration, not least internally displaced persons which almost every SSA country has had to contend with then and thenceforth.

As population displacement became more rampant, the OAU/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa met in 1994 to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the said Convention and made certain salient recommendations, among them that armed conflicts

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2 For Forced Migration Online, “What is Forced Migration?” Available at <http://www.forcedmigration.org/whatisfm.htm>; downloaded 12/01/09.
and civil strife were among the root causes of forced migration; that political leadership should embrace inclusive politics for better governance; and that all parties involved in armed conflicts needed to respect the principles and norms of humanitarian law to protect civilians. Indeed, proper handling of the displaced requires thorough knowledge of the triggers of displacement: how dams, airports, roads and urban housing cause development displacees; how desertification, deforestation, land degradation, water pollution or inundation cause environmental and disaster refugees; and how human trafficking and smuggling thrive because of the complementary demand and supply sides and intermediaries in between (Castles, 2004).

To streamline work on IDPs, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons in the 1990s consequently raising the visibility of IDPs. The representative’s work culminated in the development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-

Figure 1: Definition of human trafficking on the basis of three criteria

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Way/Means</th>
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<tr>
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Note: If one condition from each category is met, the result is trafficking. For adults, victim consent is irrelevant if one of the Means is employed. For children consent is irrelevant with or without the Means category.

Source: US Department of State, 2008.

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from their diasporas about which they know very little; some SSA countries that are still embroiled in conflict are apprehensive of their diaspora some of whose remittances end up fuelling more conflict (Nyberg Sorensen et al., 2003, p. 27); and others are indifferent to the absence of their nationals. Sustained conflict in Somalia is partly due to transfers (including financial remittances and small arms) as was the past Eritrean-Ethiopian war in which the two countries’ diaspora were heavily involved.

Forced migration has generated population groups who are helpless and who cannot survive without some support. Their welfare, repatriation and resettlement are at the hands of second and third parties who rarely involve them in actions being taken. In SSA countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique, the return of refugees and IDPs has instituted spirited post-conflict reconstruction programs worth studying for the purpose of replication elsewhere in the region. Unfortunately, there are SSA countries—among them Kenya, Uganda, South Africa and Zimbabwe—where the unresolved IDPs problem remains a powder keg unless durable solutions are found sooner rather than later.

Conclusion

Although scholars, policymakers and other stakeholders of migration begin by distinguishing between voluntary and forced migration, the dichotomy raises more questions than answers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The political map of SSA countries shows arbitrarily drawn international boundaries slotting similar ethnic groups within different states even though they may still cherish cultural affinity. All of us involved in migration should endeavor to work more closely to break the barriers which have persisted as we ‘specialize’ in particular types of voluntary and forced migration. Much as this had helped greatly in turning out excellent scholarship, it does not represent the challenge of our time, especially in SSA where strong migration institutions are yet to assert their place in the international arena. I end on a positive note though: that this conference promises to provide an opportunity for serious reflection in SSA-North as well as intra-SSA collaboration.

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Drivers of Force: Causes and Faces of Forced Migration
Forced Migration and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

Migration is “the relocation of people within space that involves their permanent or temporary change of residence” (Mafukidze, 2006, p.103). When borders are crossed, migration is international. Much of international migration is voluntary—driven by people following economic or social opportunities. But a significant proportion of migrants have been forced to flee their homes—most often due to violent conflict (see Reuveny, 2007). This is especially true of migration from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Some of the most protracted violent conflicts of the 20th century have occurred in SSA, predominantly in the form of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). As a result, Africa is the region with the largest numbers of refugees—about one out of three refugees worldwide are in and from SSA (Black, 2004). And not all forced migrants are classified as refugees—indeed the majority of forced migrants from SSA are not classified as refugees.

While we know that violent conflict is one of the major determinants of forced migration from SSA, we may surprisingly still have gaps in our knowledge as to the impact of the nature, duration and intensity of conflict on migration. One reason is that there has not been much empirical work to quantify the determinants of international migration (see Konsiega, 2007) in general, and more specifically, to quantify the impact of conflict on international migration in SSA. The few studies that are extant only proxy the effect of conflict, and do not consider “direct indicators of the nature, duration and intensity” of conflict (Lucas, 2006, p. 365).

This Paper seeks to overcome these gaps by quantifying the impact of violent conflict on migration in SSA. For purposes of this Paper, violent conflict is defined as organized mass conflict, and specifically following UCDP/PRIO (see Gleditsch et al., 2002) is measured as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”.

International migration is defined and measured as net migration from a country in a particular year. This is the net total of migrants during the period, i.e., the difference between the total number of immigrants and emigrants expressed as the number of migrants per 1,000 of the population. This data is made available by the UN Population Division for 45 SSA countries for 10 five-year periods from 1960 to 2005.

Background: Forced International Migration and Conflict in SSA

Between 1960 and 2005, the countries with the largest average annual emigration numbers in absolute terms were Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Mozambique, Burundi, Ghana, Sudan, Guinea, Lesotho and Zimbabwe (see Figure 1). South Africa and Côte d’Ivoire were the countries with the largest net inflow of migrants over the period.

In many of the net out-migration countries conflict has been prominent. Burundi and Somalia, as well as Mozambique, Sudan and Zimbabwe have long histories of violent conflict. Over the period from 1960 to 1995 Burundi experienced seven years, Somalia 18 years, Mozambique 24 years, Sudan 19 years, and Zimbabwe 18 years of violent conflict.

But, before we accept that conflict is the main driver of international migration, it should be kept in mind that environmental factors may also be at work in these countries. Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Mali, Somalia, and Sudan are particularly drought-prone and water scarce countries characterized by seasonal migration. Burundi, a country which experienced intense civil conflict for many years, also experiences high water stress (Ohlsson, 1999).

1 The term ‘refugees’ refers to people migrating internationally in order to flee political violence, war, civil conflicts and persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. Legally, these do not include people fleeing from economic misrule or economic collapse (‘economic refugees’) or from environmental catastrophes (‘environmental refugees’). See the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; available at <http://www.unhcr.org/1951convention/>.

2 Use of gross migration data would have been useful, but is not available (Hatton and Williamson, 2001).

3 See the Africa Research Program dataset at <http://africa.gov.harvard.edu/>.
Indeed, if we take into account a country’s population size (which Figure 1 does not do) the largest net out-migration per 1,000 of population takes place in small island states and small landlocked countries such as Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius and Sao Tome and Principe. These small island states have generally not experienced armed conflict to the extent that some others (e.g. Mozambique and Angola) have, but are reckoned to be both environmentally and economically vulnerable or at risk.

The patterns of net migration from SSA also suggest that migration may be forced, if not by conflict then by environmental or economic considerations. For instance, migration flows from SSA countries are very volatile, and most migration from a SSA country is destined for another SSA country. This is consistent with the sudden outbreak and ceasing of hostilities, and with the sudden occurrence and abatement of a natural disaster or economic crisis*. In such cases, when migrants expect to return in the near future following cessation of violence or the passing of a disaster, they often migrate to neighboring countries (Adepoju, 2007; Hatton and Williamson, 2001).

Although the data presented in Figure 1 could be interpreted that conflict (or at least conflict and environmental factors such as a disaster) is a leading cause of out migration in SSA, one should be cautious and take into consideration other determinants.

Consider for instance the relationship between net migration and conflict (as measured by the number of

* In contrast, environment change per se is not expected to lead to cyclical changes in migration, as it takes place over much slower periods, allowing adaptation.
battle deaths in a country) in SSA over the period 1960 to 2005 (see Figure 2).

As shown in Figure 2, the number of battle deaths related to civil conflict in SSA increased during the 1980s, declined after the end of the Cold War, rose again slightly after 1992 and again towards 1998 and 1999, after which it came down significantly. Thus the period of major conflict in SSA was between roughly 1978 and 1991 (with a peak in 1999). During this period available, data on net migration also showed an increase—rising to a historic peak of over 100,000 by 1990, after which it came down significantly.

These trends would suggest, at first glance, that the rise in net migration from SSA may be related to the rise and occurrence of violent conflict. Certainly for the period 1978–1991 this may hold. And in the case of specific countries, the relationship between battle-related deaths and net migration is also strong. Consider, for instance, the case of Liberia depicted in Figure 3. It shows that in the period 1985–1990 battle-related deaths in Liberia peaked (at over 5,000). Simultaneously, net migration, which had always been slightly positive into Liberia before this, turned negative, with more than 30 persons per 1,000 leaving the country. The cyclical nature of SSA migration is also clear in this case, as net migration turned from negative (a net outflow) to a positive when conflict ceased.

Returning to Figure 1 and the general relationship between battle deaths and net migration, it also shows that by 2005, international migration from SSA had increased again, to record levels, in the relative absence of intense conflict. It would suggest that the nature of international migration from SSA had
changed and that perhaps either environmental or economic factors may have become more important. Earlier research on the determinants of international migration from SSA had indeed found economic and environmentally-related factors to be significant, and Figure 1 may be suggesting that, following the decline in violent conflict in SSA, economic and environmental factors are now starting to play a more significant role. For instance, recent overviews of international migration from SSA, such as by Lucas (2006), Adepoju (2006) and Akokpari (2000) all emphasize that apart from conflict, economic and environmental factors are very important determinants of migration from SSA. As to the environment, Hatton and Williamson (2001, 2002) argue that “population pressure on the resource base” is an important underlying determinant of migration in SSA. Indeed, forced migration due to environmental factors could become even more significant due to climate change (see for instance the Stern-Report—Stern, 2006).

Conflict, Economic Opportunities, the Environment and Migration in SSA: Empirical Evidence

While I recognize the importance of economic and environmental determinants of international migration from SSA, my main interest is on the impact of armed conflict. However, it must be stressed that it is very difficult—and counterproductive—to attempt to isolate the impact of armed conflict from the impacts of economic opportunities and environmental change.

Figure 3: Battle deaths and net migration from Liberia, 1960–2005

Source: Author’s calculations based on data from UN Population Division and UCDP/PRIO.
Very often, conflict arises out of changes in economic opportunities and environmental change. For example, as far as economic opportunities are concerned, lower economic growth may be one cause for conflict. Miguel et al. (2003, p. 2) find empirical evidence of a causal relationship from economic (GDP) growth to civil conflict, finding that “a five percentage point drop in annual economic growth increases the likelihood of conflict by 10 percentage points”. As far as environmental change is concerned, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) present empirical evidence that water scarcity and land degradation may increase the risk of conflict in SSA. In these cases one could expect to find correlations between migration, and economic and environmental change, and will be faced with the difficulty of disentangling the impact of conflict.

Furthermore, conflict also has a detrimental impact on the economy and environment. Collier (1999) found that civil conflict depresses growth rates by about 2.2 percent per annum on average. Conflict will also limit the degree to which countries can manage or protect the environment (Barrios and Bertinelli, 2006; Le Blanc and Perez, 2007). Thus, in cases of conflict one should also expect to find migrants leaving for economic and environmental reasons, again making it difficult to disentangle the impact of conflict.

Therefore, the high international migration from SSA after the reduction in civil war as illustrated in Figure 1 may be reflecting the legacy of decades of civil war, which had damaged the economies and natural environments in many SSA countries.

In disentangling the effect of conflict on migration, empirical analysis is therefore needed. Perhaps surprisingly in view of the scope of conflict and migration in SSA, the existing literature is not of great assistance in providing answers as to the impact of conflict. Very few studies have so far empirically analyzed the impact of armed conflict on migration from SSA—indeed very few studies have empirically analyzed the determinants of migration from SSA. The only study that I am aware of is that of Hatton and Williamson (2001). They use data on 21 SSA countries spanning the period 1977 to 1995, and use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), a standard linear regression procedure to find that the most significant determinants of international migration in SSA (as measured by net migration) over this period were the foreign to domestic wage ratio and the share of the population between 15 and 29 years of age.

They also found GDP growth, a proxy for employment, to be significant. In particular, as one percent increase in GDP is associated with a decline in net out-migration of 0.5 per 1,000 (they did not take into account the effect of lagged GDP growth). They investigated the effect of armed conflict focusing on refugees rather than on all migrants. In their regression analysis they used the stock of refugees in a country at the end of a particular year as dependent variable, and as explanatory variables various dummies for different types of conflict. These capture the incidence of coups d’états, guerrilla warfare, and civil wars. They found that these generate respectively 45, 30 and 64 refugees per 1,000 of population, concluding that civil wars have the most serious impact on refugees.

Apart from the shortcomings of using the linear regression procedure (which is essentially based on a static, cross-section of data) which they used in the case of migration where dynamics and endogeneity issues may be important, a further potential weakness of their study is that they left the small island states of SSA out, such as Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Comoros and Mauritius. These are all states with high rates of out-migration combined with particularly high environmental vulnerabilities as was shown in section two of this Paper.

A further empirical study worth mentioning is Moore and Shellman (2004) who, instead of investigating the determinants of overall international migration, confine their interest to forced migration. Their definition of forced migrants takes both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) into account and they provide empirical estimates for the determinants of such forced migration flows over the period 1952 to 1995 using an unbalanced panel of more than 175 countries.

They find that civil conflicts and the resulting violent actions of both government (especially ‘government terror’) and rebel groups (dissidents) are the main determinants of forced migration. They also find that the higher the past stock of forced migrants from a country, the higher subsequent forced migration. In their words “the more people who have left in the past, the more costly it is to stay” (ibid, p. 740). Although they do not investigate the possible influence that forced migrant flows may have on the behavior of government and rebel groups in conflict, they note previous research, which had found that migrant flows may play a causal role in conflict, and point out that this could be a possible avenue for further research.

Neither Hatton and Williamson (2001) nor Moore and Shellman (2004) consider the potential impact of environmental factors, including natural hazards, on forced migration from SSA.

In Naudé (2008) I added to these studies and in particular made four contributions to the empirics of international migration from SSA, which are of interest for forced migration studies.

First, forced migration is significant. I established that conflict and not voluntary migration is the single largest individual impact on international migration from SSA. To be precise, an additional year of conflict will directly...
raise net out-migration by 1.35 per 1,000. Furthermore, in my regression analysis, past migration is found to be negative. This suggests rather a situation where there is return migration than persistence in international migration flows as is mainly the case in other regions, and confirms the patterns of volatility of international migration as was discussed in section two of this Paper.

Second, environmental factors, including natural hazards, significantly contribute towards forced migration from SSA, but rather in an indirect manner. My findings show that unless natural disasters, environmental degradation and resource scarcity substantially affect either conflict or economic opportunities, their impact on emigration from SSA countries are not likely to be substantial. Statistically, the impact of natural disasters on emigration is significant (when a dynamic two-step estimator panel data estimator is used; see Naudé, 2008 for a brief explanation of the panel data methods used) with a coefficient size which suggests that one additional natural disaster per year could lead to an increase in net out-migration of 0.6 per 1,000. Apart from population density, which could be seen as reflecting pressure on resources, other determinants related to environmental degradation and resource scarcity, such as irrigation, and water stress or the environmental vulnerability index were found to be insignificant.

Third, due to resource scarcity, population pressure and dependence on natural resources, there is a particularly close connection between conflict, the environment, and the economy in SSA. Even though the direct effect of natural disasters on out-migration is relatively small, its indirect effect, through its impact on conflict and its deceleration of economic growth, may be more substantial.

In this regard I found that the higher the number of natural disasters in a country, the higher the probability of civil war. One additional disaster per annum (the average in the sample was 3.6) raises the probability of the country falling into civil conflict by 1.75 percent. However, as far as the intensity of civil conflict is concerned (measured by the number of years of conflict) the number of disasters neither affects the duration nor the intensity of conflict. These findings support the notion that natural disasters act as a ‘trigger’ for conflict—and thus forced migration—in SSA.

As far as economic growth is concerned, I found that to the extent that conflict and environmental degradation reduce economic opportunities, it will catalyze emigration. I also discovered that the effect of the environmental variables on GDP growth is generally insignificant. Only the variable ‘natural disasters’ is statistically significant with a one-period/five year lag. Once institutions, geography and conflict are controlled, the only environmental variable that becomes significant is the amount of arable land. Decreases in arable land, for instance through soil degradation, will therefore lead to a decline in GDP growth. The impact of natural disasters and soil degradation on forced migration in SSA may be substantial given that for each additional reduction of economic growth in SSA by one percent, net out-migration will increase on average by 1.31 per 1,000.5

Finally, as far as the impact of forced migrants on the home and host countries’ economies is concerned, I found that neither net migration nor the stock of migrants have any significant effects on either conflict or GDP growth. Thus fears about the negative consequences of migration (see for instance Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006) cannot be supported from this analysis.

Concluding Remarks

There is little sign that out-migration from SSA is abating. Indeed, it may be accelerating. Back in 2001, Hatton and Williamson (2001, p. 1) warned that “African emigration pressure is building up dramatically”. Subsequently, SSA has been the region with the highest growth rate in net migration, of more than 275 percent between 2000 and 2005. Today, Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the second largest stock of international migrants.

This Paper investigated the patterns and determinants of this forced international migration in SSA. The main causes are conflict, and environmental and economic factors. Disentangling these factors is, however, difficult. Although conflict and environmental degradation might affect survival and thus the decision to migrate, it will also affect economic opportunities, and thus influence the decision to migrate in search of better economic opportunities. Environmental degradation may also lead to conflict, and vice versa, and poverty is often a contributing factor to conflict and environmental degradation.

This Paper argued that conflict is the single most important cause of forced migration from SSA. With the good news that conflicts in SSA are on the decline, the implication is that forced migration may decline. However, before assuming that this will be the case, one needs to recall that this Paper also highlighted the growing potential for environmental change (including natural disasters) to fuel forced migration.

The impact of environmental change on forced migration is more difficult to isolate, as it is not only direct (albeit still small) but more significantly indirect. Thus, environmental degradation and natural disasters have a negative impact on economic opportunities

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5 Here I use a dynamic panel regression method, and the result shows the importance of taking lags into consideration: without lagged GDP growth, a one percent decrease in growth leads to an increase in out-migration of only around 0.8 per 1,000—closer to previous estimates in the literature (e.g. Hatton and Williamson, 2001) where static estimation methods are used.
in SSA, and this is a cause for concern given the dire predictions about environment degradation in SSA under various climate change scenarios. The number of natural disasters in SSA is on the rise and expected to continue to rise.

Also of concern is that natural disasters may trigger conflict. Thus whereas the number of conflicts in SSA has been declining since the early 1990s, an increase in natural disasters under the pessimistic climate change scenarios may indicate a possible rise in the frequency of conflicts.

The policy implications from this Paper emanate from the fact that much of international migration from SSA is forced, and as such is a symptom of underlying problems. Policies to address these, rather than to try to stem the tide of African refugees through measures which further worsens the welfare of these refugees, are warranted.

Coordinated policies are therefore required to end conflict in Africa, and much has been written on this elsewhere. In addition to these, policies to address the impact of climate change are in my view now more essential than ever before. These policies should, based on the evidence discussed here, aim at reducing population growth, land degradation, and the negative interaction between population pressures and the environment. Comprehensive strategies will be required to deal with these, and will need to span the range from weather and food crisis forecasting systems to significant changes in regional and global coordinating institutions and arrangements.

And, instead of waiting for more natural disasters to occur, proactive efforts towards strengthening the resilience of countries and communities are required. Natural hazards need not become natural disasters: knowing where and how communities are vulnerable, and strengthening accountable governance on the local level across SSA would be valuable first steps in creating stronger safety nets, in a continent where exposure to risk and lack of security have been displacing human populations since time immemorial.

References


4 Despite the frequent hostility with which migrants are greeted they have made important contributions to economic development in SSA. See Adepoju, 2006; Egbert, 2004; Sandy, 2004; PRIO, 2007.


Abstract

Environmental degradation, desertification, and deforestation along with natural disasters like floods or droughts are all factors which result in migration as a coping strategy of households. Environmental changes are especially pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Land degradation is nowadays of major concern to 32 countries in Africa; about 65 percent of the cultivable lands have degraded due to erosion and chemical and physical damage. The loss of forest annually amounts to more than four million hectares—twice the world’s average deforestation rate. Over 300 million people in SSA already face water scarcity, and areas experiencing water shortages in SSA are likely to increase by almost one-third by 2050 (UNEP, 2008). Against this background, the question arises to what extent environmental factors currently and in the future are likely to trigger migration. To shed some light on the question, this Paper provides latest figures and information related to environmental changes and migration flows in SSA. The evidence from different branches of the literature—environmental sciences, migration research as well as development economics—is analyzed. A focus on the four countries Ghana, Mozambique, Niger, and Senegal offers more specific perspectives.

Introduction

As Suliman (1994) argues people begin to move “whenever land degradation is coupled with political pressure, armed conflict, ethnic tension, growing poverty, deteriorating services and infrastructure”. Socio-economic and political factors accelerate the chain of processes leading to migration and conflict. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), most of these factors are very pronounced leading to migration flows of significant dimensions. However, little attention has been put on the question to what extent environmental factors currently and in the future are likely to trigger migration. Environmental degradation constitutes the African push factor for environmental migration.

In 2005, 34 of the 50 least developed countries were located in Africa (UNCTAD, 2005). In 2004, 41 percent of the population in SSA lived in extreme poverty and 31 percent of the population had to live with insufficient food within the years 2001–2003 (United Nations, 2006; 2007). Between 1993 and 2002, violent conflict prevailed in 27 out of 53 African states. Against this background it is not surprising that Africa, which accounts for 12 percent of the world’s population, hosts around 28 percent of the world’s refugees, and almost 50 percent of the world’s internally displaced persons (Crisp, 2000). At the end of 2005, almost 20 percent of all African migrants were refugees (Kohnert, 2007). But how many people migrated due to environmental reasons?

To shed light on this question, the Paper concentrates on changes of different environmental factors like land degradation, severe droughts or floods as well as various aspects of migration in four selected SSA countries, namely Ghana, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. Its objective is to discover and describe the causes of forced migration in relation to environmental degradation occurring in these countries. To achieve this objective, relevant literature and statistics, drawing from diverse secondary sources and different disciplines, are considered. The structure of the Paper is as follows: after the Introduction, the second part starts out by giving an overview of environmental framework conditions in SSA countries. To analyze to what extent migration may be driven by environmental factors like severe droughts or flooding, the third part focuses on the impacts of environmental degradation and policies given in the selected SSA countries, while the fourth part describes the resulting migration trends as well as migration policies. This is followed by the conclusion.

1 This research was carried out within the framework of the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR, www.each-for.eu) Project with the financial support of the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme. This Paper is a shortened, completely revised and updated version of a longer general overview study produced in the context of the project. Contributions are acknowledged from the following participants of the project: Frauke Bleibaum/Migra, Francesca Burchi/UNU-EHS, Alfons Fermin/FSW, Johannes Frühmann/SERI, Kees van der Geest, Jill Jäger/SERI, and Marc Stal/UNU-EHS.

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Environmental problems in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa contains a wide variety of ecosystems with rich diversity in plant and animal wildlife. However, Africa’s land resources continue to be degraded through poorly planned activities related to agriculture, forestry, and industry as well as by urban slums and infrastructure development. The five major human causative factors of land degradation are overgrazing, deforestation, agricultural mismanagement, fuelwood consumption, and urbanization (UNEP, 2002). Natural hazards, such as cyclones and floods also result in land degradation. Overall, it is estimated that the annual loss of agriculture’s contribution to GDP amounts to three percent due to land degradation in SSA (TerrAfrica, 2004). Land degradation is a major concern to 32 countries in Africa, including Cameroon, Eritrea and Rwanda (UNEP, 2008). The most common forms of land degradation are water and wind erosion, desertification, soil compaction and salinization as well as chemical pollution of the soil. Desertification has occurred especially in Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya and Niger. There is also a strong correlation between population density and soil erosion. The land is continuously cultivated because farmers have nowhere else to go and cannot afford to let their lands lie fallow. Soil erosion also causes dam and river siltation. Erosion and chemical as well as physical damage have degraded about 65 percent of the continent’s farmlands (UNEP, 2008).

The change of forest area in Africa is the highest among the world regions, with the annual net loss estimated at 5.3 million hectares or 0.8 percent compared with the global average deforestation rate of 0.2 percent (FAO, 2001). Primary forest is being replaced by extensive areas of secondary forests, grasslands and degraded lands. Between 1990 and 2000, Africa lost about 52 million hectares of forest. Southern Africa accounted for about 31 percent of the forest loss of the continent. Three countries (Sudan, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) accounted for almost 44 percent of Africa’s deforestation (ADB/EC/FAO, 2003). Overall, loss of forest has become a major concern in 35 countries in Africa. Next to the DRC, also Malawi, Nigeria and Rwanda are mentioned in this context (UNEP, 2008).

Sub-Saharan Africa experiences considerable climate variability. The El-Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) affects Southern Africa, tending to bring either heavy rains often accompanied by severe floods as in 1999/2000 when Mozambique was exceptionally hard hit, or drought as in 1982/83 when much of Southern Africa was severely affected. Recent weather patterns in Southern Africa have been erratic with severe droughts recorded in 1967–73, 1981–83, 1986/87, 1991/92 and 1993/94. The severe drought of 1991/92 caused a 54 percent decrease in cereal harvest and exposed more than 17 million people to risk starving (Calliham, Eriksen and Herrick, 1994). A hot and dry period from January to March 2007 caused a serious drought with extensive crop damages in Southern Africa. The 2004/05 drought was not only limited to Southern Africa and the Sahel, it also extended up the Eastern coast and many countries had food shortages from Tanzania in the south to Ethiopia and Eritrea in the north. In the Sahelian zone of Western Africa, the drought from 1972–84 was one of the worst on record. During this period, more than 100,000 people died, and more than 750,000 people were totally dependent on food aid in 1974 (Wijkman and Timberlake, 1984). Eastern Africa has experienced at least one major drought in each decade over the past 30 years. There were serious droughts in 1973/74, 1984/85, 1987, 1992–1994, and in 1999/2000 and there is some evidence of increasing climatic instability in the sub-region, and increasing frequency and intensity of drought (FAOSTAT, 2000). They have had serious impacts including total crop failure, which has led to increasing food prices and dependency on food relief in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda (DMC, 2000). Severe water shortages and rationing, continued reductions in water quantity and quality, increased conflicts over water resources, and the drying up of some rivers and small reservoirs contributed to death of livestock from hunger, thirst and disease, and increased conflicts over grazing belts.

The Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) shows that floods, droughts and epidemics dominate the list of top ten disasters ranked according to the number of people affected (see Figure 1).

Impacts of Environmental Degradation and Change in Sub-Saharan Africa

Despite some country-specific advances in soil conservation (Kenya, Ethiopia), small-scale agriculture (Nigeria, Zimbabwe), reforestation (Tanzania, Malawi), anti-desertification (South Africa), and population planning (Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Botswana), the outlook for SSA is not promising. This is also reflected by the fact, that SSA is not on track to achieve any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations, 2008). The number of people in absolute poverty in SSA is predicted to grow from 1.3 to 1.6 billion. The 135 million people affected by severe desertification could well increase to 180 million. According to projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), between 75 and 250 million people in SSA will be exposed to an increase of water stress (ibid). Ten countries are expected to be experiencing chronic water shortages or even acute water scarcity, affecting well over 400 million people. Some 20 countries with a projected population of 440 million are expected to experience up to 25 percent shortfall in food supplies,
and a further eight countries with a projected 75 million people face more severe deficits (Myers, 2001). Without greatly expanded efforts to tackle the region’s lack of development, the per capita Gross National Product (GNP) is expected to stagnate in real terms at around US $400, or be only little higher than in 1970 (Myers, 2001).

Environmental decline and associated problems such as spreading poverty and population increase will make it probable that by 2010 there will be another 25 million such refugees on top of the 25 million in 1995. In fact, the increase could well be more than another 25 million because of increasingly degraded environments coupled with growing numbers of impoverished people. Myers (2001) has estimated that climate change will increase the number of environmental refugees sixfold over the next 50 years to 150 million. The IPCC has also suggested that 150 million environmental refugees would exist by 2050. In addition, there will be problems of global warming. Due largely to a sea-level rise and flooding of coastal-zone communities, but also due to increased droughts and disruptions of rainfall regimes such as monsoonal systems, global warming could threaten large numbers of people with displacement by 2050 or earlier. At least 50 million people could be at severe risk through increased droughts and other climate dislocations.

However, the number of environmental migrants in Africa cannot be clearly identified, because there is no authorized definition and no central institution gathering the magnitude of environmental migration (Wöhlcke, undated).

More than 60 percent of western Africa’s population depends on land for survival. Unsustainable agriculture and land use, deforestation and demographic pressures could lead to extreme land degradation including desertification, salinization, and soil erosion. The effects of such a development would include:

- increased agricultural labor demand and material input for given levels of productivity;
- declining animal productivity;
- shortage of fuelwood;
- declining water supplies with consequences for irrigated agriculture;
- food shortages and famines in drought years;
- disease and ill health;
- migration to urban areas or to more fertile farming areas (UNEP, 2006).

Migration Processes and Policies

Main migration patterns, trends and networks

The reasons for migration are diverse. Socio-economic reasons include e.g. finding employment, escaping famine or being close to the family. Political reasons are mostly related to war and conflict. Environmental reasons, which are at the central focus here refer to environmental changes but also natural disasters like floods or droughts. Myers (2001) describes Sub-Saharan Africa as the prime locus of environmental migration. However, there are also many interlinkages between the different factors. For example, the political refugees frequently become environmental refugees when they use unsustainable agricultural practices in the resettlement areas (Schwartz and Notini, 1995).

A significant proportion of environmental refugees are displaced in SSA due to land degradation, desertification and drought in the Sahel. This is a region that spans west to east across nine countries from Mauritania and Senegal into Sudan. Out of 25 million environmental refugees in 1995, there were roughly five million in the Sahel, where about 10 million people had fled from recent drought, only half returning home again (Myers, 2001). Generally,
there is a huge migration movement to the coastal and urban agglomerations, and to the coastal states (Hammer, 2004).

In a study of the impact of climate change on drylands with an emphasis on West Africa, Dietz and Veldhuizen (2004) note that between 1960 and 2000, deteriorating situations due to rainfall decreases, land degradation, and violence in the arid and semi-arid areas of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger resulted in a rapid intra-country migration southward and in a swelling of the big cities like Dakar, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey and Kano. Estimates for Burkina Faso suggest that close to half of the adult population born there moved, at least for part of the year, to coastal states like Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana (see Dietz et al., 2004). One of the most important mechanisms to adjust to ecological changes in a continent characterized by poor soils, unfavorable climate changes and other natural adverseness has been, for example, the pastoral way of life (Bascom, 1995; Sullivan, 1994). In another study from Burkina Faso, Henry, Schoumaker and Beauchemin (2004) find that people from drier regions are more likely to migrate temporarily and permanently to other rural areas (rural–rural migration), compared with people from wetter areas. According to their results, long-term migration seems to be less related to environmental conditions than short-term moves.

In Ghana, internal, regional and international migration flows can be found. Internal migration in Ghana is predominantly north-south. Ghana’s pattern of socio-economic development has created three distinct geographic identities: the most industrialized and urbanized coastal zone, the middle zone with its forest, mining and agricultural potential, and the northern savannah zone (Northern, Upper West/East Regions). Poverty in Ghana is concentrated in the rural areas of northern Ghana, and many northerners try to escape poverty by migrating to the south. For northern Ghana, the 1990s were an era of environmental recovery after the droughts of the 1970s and early 1980s. Despite this partial recovery, migration from northern Ghana to southern Ghana accelerated in the 1990s. Furthermore, the high population growth rate in Ghana in the last three decades has been a main motive for migration, putting pressure on the available arable land (Anarfi and Kwankye, 2003; Dietz, Ruben and Verhagen, 2004).

There is a long tradition of movement of people within the region of western Africa and beyond. Thus, historical and cultural ties have been the predominant factors determining the regional migration flows between Ghana and its western African neighboring states (Bump, 2006). Temporary and permanent migration opportunities have been expanded by the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Studies show that the majority of the migrants from Ghana to neighboring states migrated from an urban center, as their last place of residence (Bump, 2006). However, Ghana has also been the destination for many forced migrants from other regions. According to UNDP data, Ghana housed an estimated 1.7 million migrants in 2005 (on a total population of 22.1 million). The UNHCR (2008) counted close to 45,000 refugees in Ghana at the end of 2006. Many forced migrants came from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire (Bump, 2006; Anarfi and Kwankye, 2003).

Recent studies on migration from Ghana to non-African destinations show that inter-continental migrants come almost exclusively from southern Ghana, especially the Ashanti, Eastern and Central Region (Asiedu 2005).

In Mozambique, a severe drought in the southern regions and the 17-years civil war after independence in 1975 led to significant migration to coastal and urban regions growing by over four percent annually (UNESA, 2006). While hundreds of thousands of people were killed, over one million fled the country, especially to Malawi, and more than one million were displaced within Mozambique. Many rural people migrated to the cities, especially along the coast where the government maintained control. By 1990, about 1,100,000 persons were displaced internally (Macassa et al., 2003), and by 1992, more than 100,000 civilians took refuge in neighboring Malawi (UNHCR, 1993). In 2000, a severe flood resulted in the displacement of 250,000 people, with 950,000 in need of humanitarian assistance (UNICEF, 2000). 2007 brought the worst floods in recent years (Zambezi basin) and six major cyclones hit the country hard. 435,000 people were affected. The heavy rains and a subsequent discharge of water from dams have displaced approximately 120,000 people. An estimated 49,800 people have gone to accommodation and resettlement centers that were established after the 2001 floods (WHO, 2007).

Migration is also a widespread phenomenon in Niger (World Bank, 1996). Rural poverty and food insecurity has accelerated population migration, from the rural areas to the cities in the southern part of the country (UNDP, 2006).

In the mid-1970s severe droughts in Mali and Niger forced thousands of young Touareg men to emigrate to neighboring Libya and Algeria. In the 1980s many returned with their governments promising them resettlement assistance, but in Niger the assistance never materialized. This and other grievances led to increased tensions between returning Touaregs and the Nigerian government (UCDP, 2006).

Temporary migration of part or the whole household is a coping strategy during periods of drought and seasonal migration. 80 percent of working-age males migrate seasonally from interior areas of South Sahara to coastal cities. Poor migrants seek employment
in unskilled jobs such as making small crafts or selling water and tea. Sometimes they go back to their village with some ‘gifts’—watches or radios—that they sell to be able to leave again. Some ‘come back with only an illness’, AIDS or venereal diseases. Young men stay away for two, three or four years and people say they hope to return with about 100,000 CFA francs (World Bank, 1996). Remittances are a major source of income for many poor Nigerian farmers. They are used for taxes and marriage dowries, and are invested in cattle and luxury goods (World Bank, 1996).

Having gained independence in 1960, Senegal was initially primarily a country of destination for African migrants and not a country of origin. Immigrants in Senegal originate from neighboring Guinea, Guinea-Bissau or from Mauritania, Mali, and Gambia. In recent years Senegal has accommodated approximately 23,000 refugees and asylum seekers on the basis of the Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention. The majority comes from Mauritania (20,000) but some also come from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is, however, evidence of a turnaround since the 1990s, with Senegal becoming more and more a country of emigration and new target regions emerging for Senegalese migrants (Gerdes, 2008).

According to the World Bank, about 463,000 Senegalese (or four percent of the population) were living abroad in 2005 (Ratha and Xu, 2007). The results of a household survey carried out by the Senegalese Ministry of Economy and Finance (2004) show that 76 percent of urban households and 70 percent of households nationwide have at least one family member abroad. A total of 46 percent have gone to Europe, with Italy, France and Spain being the most important countries of destination. A further eight percent have gone to North America. Within Africa, the most important destinations for migrants from Senegal are the neighboring Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Mauritania. The Gambia’s population includes about 300,000 Senegalese. Before the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, there were about 125,000 Senegalese citizens living in that country. The majority of these have returned to Senegal since the war started in 2002. The number of Senegalese in Mauritania is estimated at 50,000 to 60,000, while Mali accommodates about 30,000. The flow of thousands of Senegalese and Mauritians across their common border in both directions was caused by disputes over irrigable land in the Senegal River basin.

The severe changes in the Senegal River basin caused by the construction of the Manantali Dam led to tensions and several acts of violence between Mauritania and Senegal. Land use changes and inequitable land reform contributed indirectly to social upheaval and disputes over irrigable land resulting in a flow of thousands of Senegalese and Mauritians across their common border in both directions (UNEP, 2006). With the water management plan and more sustainable land use, the situation probably improved in recent years. Furthermore, there were also a large number of migrants leaving the peanut basin. People left mainly into the bigger cities in Senegal, but also abroad (UNEP, 2008).

There are no doubts that the presence of refugees can have serious consequences on the local stability from different points of view: social, political, environmental and economic. However, this cannot justify a discriminatory approach; it rather calls third country governments and international donors for an intervention in order to both share the security burden and help host countries with development programs (Boano, 2003).

Regionally, the most important immigration-related agreement for Senegal and Ghana—the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment—was signed in 1979 by the members of the ECOWAS. One of the main objectives of ECOWAS is to facilitate freedom of movement, residence, and employment within the ECOWAS region (Bump, 2006; Anarfi and Kwankye, 2003). From all the clauses contained in the Protocol, only visa-free entry for citizens of the Community has been implemented to date. The Senegalese, however, are not particularly restrictive with regard to the right of residence. When required by an employer, work permits can be granted to foreigners, although indigenous people have priority for jobs (Law No. 71-10 dated 25 January 1971) (Gerdes, 2008). Senegal and Ghana have also ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990). This Convention aims at protecting migrant workers and their families, a particularly vulnerable population, from exploitation and the violation of their human rights (UNESCO, undated).

Recent policies in Ghana seek to attract its citizens abroad to return; thus, the Ghana Dual Citizenship Act 2002, the Homecoming Summit in 2001, and a Non-Resident Ghanaians Secretariat (NRGS) in 2003 were instituted. Government actions and various programs attempted to decrease the migration of professionals, and especially trained medical personnel from Ghana. The Ghana Immigration Service, a government agency, has been established to advise on and to ensure the effective implementation of all laws and regulations pertaining to immigration and related issues.

Given the increased role of remittances for the national Senegalese economy, the topic of migration has gradually found its way into the political debate. The Senegalese government has an essentially positive attitude to migration. Internationally, it supports an effective implementation of all laws and regulations pertaining to immigration and related issues.
However, in response to the large number of migrants attempting to reach the Canary Islands, Senegal has entered into talks with various European countries and the European Union. In 2006, Senegal signed agreements with France and Spain that provided for the faster deportation of irregular migrants in exchange for making it easier for professionals, etc. to enter legally or an increase in development aid.

Matters of immigration have been of low importance in Senegalese politics. Instead of creating a comprehensive legal framework for regulating the immigration and integration of foreign migrants, the government has generally pursued a hands-off approach (Gerdes, 2008). The most significant domestic emigration policy effort in Senegal has been devoted to the establishment of the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad (Ministère des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur). It aims at convincing Senegalese abroad to make productive investments in the country. As a result, France financed, for the first time in 1983, a program of vocational training for, and lending to, migrants abroad who wanted to return. In addition, in 1987, France and Senegal established the Bureau de l’Orientation et de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Émigrés, BAOS, which is meanwhile under the auspices of the foreign office. The BAOS attends above all to smaller projects concerning returning emigrants, but is little-used due to administrative deficiencies, insufficient funding, and migrants’ lack of confidence in the organization (Gerdes, 2008). In 2000, the Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency (Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements et des Grands Travaux, APIX) was founded. APIX coordinates all of the administrative procedures necessary for founding a company, including import formalities, and also carries out feasibility studies. Furthermore, it assumes responsibility for managing projects in which loans are used to assist the return of emigrants from France and Germany. In contrast to the BAOS, APIX focuses not only on migrants, but on investors in general. It also attends to more financially complex projects. Overall, the success of both state agencies appears to have been limited, due to general deficiencies in the Senegalese administration.

No specific migration policies seem to exist in Niger and Mozambique. Niger’s policy supports emigration and is in favor of returning migrants. It appears to have no intervention in reducing emigration flows (United Nations, 2007). The Mozambican government has approved a new law, which will make human trafficking a crime punishable with long prison sentences (All Africa, 2007). But since the post-civil war repatriation work of the UNHCR there does not appear to be any formal organized international migration program of significance in Mozambique. It should be mentioned in this context, that since the 2000 floods, the government has established accommodation and resettlement centers for approximately 50,000 people.

Conclusion: Environmental Degradation and Migration

Africa is the continent, which is most affected by desertification, water stress and scarcity, and land degradation along with natural disasters especially like floods or droughts. Two-thirds of Africa is covered by desert or drylands (UNCCD, 2008a). The expansion of agriculture into marginal areas and clearance of natural habitats such as forests and wetlands has been a major driving force behind land degradation and desertification.

Desertification is a great concern in Niger. This phenomenon determines chain factors that result in great impoverishment of resources and an increase of the population’s poverty. Poverty has always been a determinant factor in pushing Nigeriens to migrate, and since the desert does not seem to halt its expansion, the impression is that slowly the pressure on small parts of (not eternal) arable lands may be too much to bear. New conflicts are likely to arise, which again may trigger degradation and migration as a consequence.

Even though Mozambique is one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, it is still considered to be a country with low human development (HDI, 2007) and faces an immense problem of poverty. After the civil war, which ended in 1992, Mozambique managed to recover quite well but the 2000 and the 2007 floods and cyclones have posed significant challenges to the further development in Mozambique. Therefore floods and tropical storms seem to be a major problem in particular when like in recent times, flooding and storm catastrophes have happened in close succession to one another limiting time for recovery.

Environment and poverty are the two interlinked concerns of any country in Africa. In fact, the probability of achieving the MDGs appears to be very low. This is due to the persistence and increase of natural shocks, a weak education level of the population, strong demographic pressure, extensive rearing and agriculture, insufficient knowledge of the vulnerabilities of locations, the absence of the valorization of water, and an abusive use of resources. These are all factors that could determine the risks of an acceleration of desertification and environmental degradation, acceleration of migratory movements, loss of potential productions, exacerbation of conflicts, increase of poverty; they all compromise sustainable development.
There is a long-standing debate about whether people migrate because of environmental pressure, lack of farmland or for other reasons (see e.g. Kasanga and Avis, 1988), but rarely have these discussions been sustained by good data. Further investigation is needed to understand the internal displacement caused by environmental catastrophes.

Because of the uncertainties mentioned above about future regional climate predictions for Africa, initial steps to reduce vulnerability should focus on improved adaptation to existing climate variability. To achieve a sustainable development, environmental concerns have to be taken into account by decision-makers. To decrease vulnerability to extreme weather events (i.e. droughts) early warning systems have to be implemented. Water management is essential for food security and synergy of adaptation and mitigation activities (land stabilization, improving water storage, and biodiversity conservation) have to be evaluated (UNEP, 2006). Further, long-term prevention strategies should address environmental damage, which is a potential contributor to refugee flows. The international community should have every interest in responding to the need to preserve and rehabilitate the environment before degradation leads to massive refugee flows, violence and persecution (UNHCR, 1993). But to be able to set clear priorities in policy-making, more research on vulnerability and its determinants as well as on coping strategies is needed.

References


DMC. See: Drought Monitoring Centre.


EM-DAT. See: Emergency Disasters Database.


FAO. See: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization


UCDP. See: Uppsala University Conflict Program.


UNCTAD. See: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP. See United Nations Development Programme.


UNESA. See: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.


UNESCO. See: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization


UNHCR. See: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.


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WHO. See: World Health Organization.

Social Dynamics and Repercussions
This Paper looks at causes of conflict-induced internal displacement in two East African countries. It compares and contrasts the causes of displacement in Kenya and Somalia and examines national and international humanitarian and political responses. While Kenya has functioning institutions and vibrant civil society and presence of international diplomatic and humanitarian community, the case of Somalia is the opposite. However, both countries have significant numbers of displaced people and the response of the state, especially in application of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, have been lukewarm. The overriding question in this Paper is thus the limitation and prospects of applying the Guiding Principles in preventing and responding to situations of conflict-induced displacement in the two countries.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Some ten years ago, Francis Deng, the then Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, presented the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” to the Commission of Human Rights. These Principles set out the basic tenets of a human rights-based approach to protecting and assisting internally displaced persons (IDPs)—protection from displacement, protection and assistance during displacement, and guarantees for return, settlement, or reintegration in safety and dignity.

The Guiding Principles (GPs) define IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (OHCHR-UNOG, 1998). They were developed by a team of international legal experts and presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 1998.

The 30 Articles of the GPs tackle the specific vulnerability of IDPs who do not benefit from the protection of international refugee law because they have not crossed international borders. The GPs maintain that national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction. They set out the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs in all phases of displacement, including prevention of displacement, protection during displacement, and the rights to long-term solutions, including resettlement elsewhere in the country or local integration at the place they were displaced to. The GPs provide detailed guidance on the rights of IDPs during each of these phases, including the guarantee of safe access to essential food and potable water, basic shelter and housing, appropriate clothing, and essential medical services and sanitation.

Although the Guiding Principles themselves do not constitute a binding legal instrument, they are consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law: they reflect human rights guarantees that already exist in international human rights and humanitarian law that is legally binding for states. The Guiding Principles were intended to serve as a practical framework and assist governments, regional organizations, and other relevant actors in ensuring an appropriate response to their situations.

However, at the regional level, Africa has shown the most progress in transforming the Guiding Principles into a binding international instrument. In June 2008, the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons to the Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region entered into force. This Protocol is the first and only binding multilateral treaty on IDPs in force.

Protracted displacement is seen as a major destabilizing element in much of Africa. There are approximately 12 million IDPs in Africa, of a global total of around 26 million. Unlike refugees who fall under the protection of international instruments such as the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Special Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and the United Nations (UN) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and who have a specialist UN agency to assist them, namely UNHCR, there were no comparable

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Internal Displacement: The Cases of Kenya and Somalia

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1 Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda are States parties to the Declaration and its Protocols. Angola, Sudan and Zambia have signed but not yet ratified the Declaration and its Protocols.
standards or mechanisms to safeguard the rights of IDPs before 2008. There is still no international institution for dealing with IDPs. Instead, they often have to rely on ad hoc arrangements and non-state actors willing (and able) to assist and, on occasion, protect them. Their own state is often unable or unwilling to assist and protect them, with the international community often being unable or unwilling to intervene.

In Kenya, for instance, there has been a perception that the ethnic Kikuyu group has accrued wealth and power at the expense of other Kenyans; a situation which led to targeting of this group during the December 2007 post-election violence. Sometimes, the state apparatus itself was party to the internal feud, if not the cause, and proved incapable if not unwilling to protect its people. Worse still, displacement of certain groups at times has become the very objective of the state. In 1991 and 1997, it was widely reported that the Kenyan state apparatus was behind the clashes that took place in the Rift Valley Province.

The prevalence of internal conflicts challenges the foundation of contemporary international relations, premised on the principle of state sovereignty. The causes of most conflicts derive from internal power struggles over who controls sovereign power, which may coincide with ethnic or sectarian cleavages within society. Given the international system’s prevailing norms, outsider access to victims required permission from the very authorities who were abusing them. Human rights groups, both intergovernmental and non-governmental, confronted the traditional bulwark state sovereignty and its corollary principle, non-intervention in domestic affairs, as is the case in Darfur, the Mount Elgon region in Kenya, and the Somali region of Ethiopia, just to name a few.

Over the past two decades, the ratio of refugees to internally displaced persons has seen a dramatic reversal. The number of refugees at the beginning of the 21st century is fewer than ten million and the number of IDPs today stands at some 26 million. When IDP data was first gathered in 1982, there was one IDP for every ten refugees; at present the ratio is approximately 2.6:1.

Special Vulnerabilities

Forced displacement is not just a passing event in people’s lives. It is a devastating transformation. It means that from one day to the next families lose their homes and livelihoods and are forced to leave behind all they had cherished. As a result, communities break apart under the stress of displacement, resulting in marginalization, abject poverty, exploitation, sexual and gender-based violence, and loss of community culture and tradition. Family members are all too often separated or exposed to malnutrition and disease. Children suffer from lack of access to education and a higher risk of child labor, sexual exploitation or recruitment into armed groups. In short: internal displacement shatters lives. Not surprisingly it is easier to displace communities than to rebuild them.

Individuals and communities displaced within their own country share the experience of dislocation with refugees who have fled to another country. Both refugees and IDPs are victims of human rights violations and have urgent protection needs. It is true that as citizens or residents they can invoke all the rights available to the population of their given state. However, displaced persons have very specific needs not shared by the population. They need to find a location and shelter where they are safe; to access humanitarian assistance and livelihoods away from home; and be able to seek restitution of the property they left behind.

International attempts to assist IDPs are often hampered by a lack of security, by physical and political obstructions, and by the very size of internally displaced populations. It is very difficult to get accurate figures for IDPs because populations are constantly fluctuating or inaccessible; some IDPs may be returning home while others are fleeing, others may periodically return to IDP camps to take advantage of humanitarian aid; some return home temporarily but come back to their place of displacement, or move elsewhere. Access for IDP populations to humanitarian assistance is often difficult, particularly (though not exclusively) in conflict areas. Often, IDP camps are controlled by state and non-state actors, who are unwilling to allow free access for humanitarian organizations. In many conflict zones insecurity presents a major obstacle to humanitarian staff. In some of the large-scale natural disasters, assistance has been severely hampered by the physical obstructions presented by massive infrastructure damage, remote locations and lack of appropriate transport.

Protecting IDPs is a major challenge for governments and humanitarian organizations alike. In conflict, whilst threats are often more obvious, ability to prevent or respond quickly to abuses when they occur are often greatly hampered by lacking means of entry. Governments face major challenges including limited resources, insufficient awareness of the needs and situations of IDPs, as well as a lack of political will to protect them.

Durable solutions for IDPs are elusive due to the intractable nature of conflicts, the causes of which relate to the failure of democracy and equitable share of political and economic resources; the failure of sustainable human development process, the failure to deal with negative ethnicity, and the failure of the state to meet its obligations in addressing social and humanitarian consequences of conflicts.
Failed State or Failure of the State: The Cases of Somalia and Kenya

Kenya

In contrast to the ‘absence’ of structures of governance in Somalia over the last decade or so due to instability and breakdown of virtually all the institutions of governance, displacement in Kenya was and still is occurring despite the presence of international diplomatic missions, numerous United Nations agencies and other international organizations, well developed national institutions of governance that include oversight institutions and multi-party system, vibrant and robust civil society and the media.

Yet, violence and mass displacement occur despite the above and early warning information provided by organizations like the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. At a time when the outbreak of most conflicts can be foreseen, and preventive action, early warning, and cluster approach occupy a significant part of the international funding and agenda, early detection and prevention of conflict, violence and displacement is still lacking in Kenya.

A pattern of violence and associated displacement in Kenya around and during elections, as well as during dry seasons in pastoralist areas in the north-west and north-east characterizes the Kenyan scene. During the December 2007 election, some 600,000 people were displaced, many of them having been previously displaced. Chronicling previous politically-induced displacements in 1992, 1997, and 2002, the Commission described internal displacement as a “permanent feature” in Kenya’s history.

Large-scale violence in the Rift Valley is attributed to the distribution of land rights after Kenya’s independence in 1963. The then new Kenyan government embarked on a policy of land distribution to its nationals. However, it is claimed that land was distributed in favor of the president’s Kikuyu ethnic community at the expense of indigenous groups who historically occupied the land and who were displaced by the British settlers before independence. It is this that has led to the politicization of land (and ethnicity) in later years and to serious political and humanitarian ramifications.

Violence is still ongoing in some parts of the country. Displacement unrelated to elections continues to affect regions like Mt. Elgon and pastoralists areas in the north of the country. In Mt. Elgon, security operations by the government against the militia group Sabaat Land Defence Force (SLDF) in 2008 (and by the latter against certain communities) continued to lead to loss of lives and livelihoods and the displacement of thousands of people. According to the Kenyan Red Cross, at least 500 died and 100,000 were displaced following three years of unrest in Mt. Elgon.

According to UN-OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the cumulative number of killings in pastoral areas in 2008 alone is 356. In September 2008 in northern Kenya, fighting over water and pasture led to the death of six people and displacement of hundreds along the Isiolo and Samburu border Districts. In north-eastern Kenya, a combination of inter-clan conflict and a security operation by the government to contain the situation led to the displacement of up to 7,000 people in the Mandera and Elwak Districts in November 2008.

Somalia

The demise of the socialist government of Siad Barre in 1991 led to a fratricidal war in the country that still bedevils Somalia up to the present. With no effective government, the country has been at the mercy of a myriad of groups that include clan warlords, extremists, pirates, and “war by proxy” between Ethiopia and Eritrea especially from December 2006.

Official estimates of the number of Somalis displaced internally as a result of conflict are at some 1.3 million people. From the 1970s onwards until today, over one million other Somalis have crossed borders to seek protection due to a combination of factors related to both internal and external dynamics of the country’s conflict; naturally affecting the entire Somali population in one form or another.

The conflict in Somalia has only surfaced at ad hoc agendas of Western governments, and international action, unlike Kenya2, has been limited to a flawed regional security intervention accompanied by a frustrated humanitarian operation. Although displacement is massive and humanitarian need great3—a human manifestation of state collapse—Somalia has never received the sustained and concerted attention necessary to break the cycle

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2 For a more in-depth study, please refer to existing literature that highlights the complex ethno-political dynamics in Kenya. As for Somalia, there also exists a significant body of literature on ethno-political and regional and international dynamics that have undermined the fabric of the State. (See Osman and Souare, 2007)

3 CIPEV is one of the Commissions established by the Kofi Annan-led National Dialogue and Reconciliation that negotiated an end to political violence after the December 2007 general election. See <http://vikileaks.org/leak/wakireport-2008.pdf>.

4 The magnitude of the post-election violence and its massive humanitarian consequences immediately attracted international attention, especially from Britain, the European Union (EU), the United States, and the African Union (AU). The mediation process was immediately set in motion and by 22 January 2008, a “Panel of Eminent African Personalities” led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, mandated by the AU and supported by the EU and the US, had arranged a meeting between the candidates Kibaki and Odinga.

5 The UN estimate that some 3.2 million people; almost 43 percent of Somalis are in need of humanitarian assistance.
of conflict and national recovery. Like Afghanistan, it languishes in a category of ‘stateless societies’, whose people remain beyond the reach of universally accepted standards for basic human rights.

The displacement situation in Somalia from the 1990s to the present is a symptom of the collapse of Somalia as a state and is rooted in the complexities of power shrouded in ethnic, regional, and international geopolitics.

The conflict and civil insecurity across most of southern and central Somalia, and the border conflict between Puntland and Somaliland in the north and northwest from 2007 has caused massive displacement, particularly from Mogadishu and its environs. At the beginning of 2009, there were an estimated 1.3 million IDPs (including an estimated 400,000 people in situations of protracted displacement since 1991).

Massive displacement was witnessed from 2007 to around January 2009 when fighting intensified in civilian areas as a result of Ethiopian intervention in Somalia at the end of 2006. In January 2007, Transitional Federal Government Forces (TFG) backed by Ethiopian forces, took control of much of south and central Somalia away from an Islamist movement known as the Union of Islamic Courts (ICU). Violence subsequently escalated in the capital Mogadishu and in much of south-central Somalia as Islamist militias and their supporters adopted guerrilla insurgency tactics, making the fighting the worst since the civil war of the early 1990s. Human rights groups estimate that some 16,000 civilians were killed from January 2007 to December 2008.

The recent events leading to a politically-negotiated agreement in Djibouti that culminated in the election of a new president by parliament and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in January 2009 has reduced the intensity of the conflict, but has yet to stabilize the country or have any meaningful outcome for the assistance or return of displaced people.

Kenya—Somalia. Have the Guiding Principles Made a Difference?

In Kenya, a number of recent studies show how the failure to follow the Guiding Principles has led to unnecessary suffering for IDPs. A study by the Kenya Human Rights Commission, which was released on 28 October 2008 points to gross violations of the Principles in the management of the affairs of displaced people in Kenya, especially with regard to tackling causes of displacement and the manner in which the government handled the return of the displaced. The situation in Kenya as it stands presents enormous challenges for finding durable solutions for IDPs.

For starters, perpetrators, the violent acts of whom lead to displacement in the first place, have never been persecuted, and this state of impunity has caused further displacement.

Second, the lack of cohesion in government and the presence of those suspected of inciting violence in high positions in government (including the Cabinet) and the use of IDPs for political ends make it hard to achieve a coherent strategy or a national IDP policy.

It was unfortunate that, just as Kenya seemed to be moving towards official endorsement of the Guiding Principles, electoral violence led to such massive new displacement. Without the Principles, however, things would have been worse. Trainings and workshops have led to wider awareness of the Principles, and government officials do claim that its policies are based on recognition of them. Media and civil society are increasingly aware of the Principles and are using them to advocate on behalf of IDPs.

In the case of Somalia, even though the document has been translated into the national language, and trainings and workshops for NGOs and local authority officials have been conducted, the Principles have not had any impact given the prevailing security situation and lack of institutions of governance that would be capable of apprehending violators of the Principles.

Somalia’s population continues to be subjected to human rights abuses and violations by all parties to the conflict, including killings, rape, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary detentions, recruitment of children into armed conflict and harassment, kidnapping and killings of humanitarian workers and human rights activists.

The much-needed assistance and protection of internally displaced people is being heavily affected by the lack of humanitarian access and inability to ensure protection due to the highly insecure and unpredictable political environment.

Recommendations

Kenya

- Embed the Great Lakes Pact, especially its Protocols on IDPs into Kenyan law.
- Establish a tribunal to try perpetrators and inciters of violence so as to end the climate of impunity, which has persisted for so long and contributed to displacement.
- Deal with the root causes of violence, especially equity in the distribution of land and other economic and political resources.
- Invest in genuine reconciliation between communities.
**Somalia**

- Support the new government of Sheikh Shariff and insist that an all inclusive government, accountable to Somali people and respecting international boundaries be formed.
- Engage all parties to the conflict in an inclusive process of political dialogue enhancing the possibilities of greater humanitarian access and better protection.
- Establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate crimes against humanity. Deploy human rights monitors to systematically document abuses/violations being committed to end the culture of impunity.

In consultation with donors and the humanitarian community and IDPs, set clear strategy for the return, resettlement or reintegration of internally displaced people.

**References**


Return, Resettlement or Reintegration in the Aftermath of Conflict

Introduction

This Paper deals with return migration with reference to Eritrean refugee experiences in Eastern Sudan. It is part of a study that I carried out on the situation of Eritrean refugees in the town of Kassala in eastern Sudan. One of the aims of the study was to examine the role of political aspects regarding return migration in the aftermath of the conflicts that trigger refugee flight. The core issue underlying my study was that once people leave their country of origin, regardless of the reasons that motivate their flight, their lives at the destination, as well as the conditions in their country of origin change and, as a result, the views and attitudes of such people also change significantly. The data upon which my study is based on is derived from interviews with key informants, participant observation in UNHCR information campaigns, discussions with self-settled refugees in Kassala, and with refugees housed in refugee camps. The fieldwork was conducted during three time periods: in 2001, 2002 and 2003.

Having been a refugee in Kassala, I am familiar with the social environment within which the research was conducted. Besides the fieldwork carried out in 2001, 2002 and 2003, I also previously conducted survey research in 1996 on female genital mutilation among refugees in Kassala, which provided an important background knowledge and experience to this study. In 2001, I prepared an interview guide for the pilot study. It focused on the general factors that influenced the decision of the refugees in the camps to repatriate to Eritrea or stay in Sudan. The results of the 2001 pilot study were very important in terms of providing knowledge that enabled me to change, modify and remove some of my previous questions. It also helped me identify gaps that required to be filled. Hence, new questions whose importance was not seen in the pilot study were added.

So before I started the fieldwork in 2002, the research guide was substantially revised in accordance with the results of the pilot study. The research guide or the interview schedule was semi-structured and open-ended. This was intended to give an opportunity for further probing as new issues arose during the conversations with respondents. The research guide was applied flexibly. The snowball technique was utilized as a means of identifying the various interviewees for the study. Identifying interviewees from this category was only possible with the assistance of relatives, friends and neighbors. In order to minimize the risk of biased data towards certain categories of the refugee groups, I tried to adopt multiple entry points for the snowball sample. This helped in broadening the scope of the interviewees. The interviewees were selected from three different areas of the town (Muraba’at, Abukamsa and Souq) where Eritrean refugees were concentrated. The Eritrean refugees are mainly concentrated in three parts of the town. The majority of Eritrean refugees are concentrated in Muraba’at, Abukamsa and Souq (Kassaia market). The first two are residential areas, but the third is the hub of all forms of economic activities, especially trade. Most of the interviews were conducted at places designated by informants, namely in shops, in the shade of trees, inside homes and in compounds. Most of the recorded interviews took place in the homes of informants. Some interviews took longer to conduct than others. The longer interviews did not necessarily produce better quality material than the others. The majority of the recorded interviews took between 40 and 50 minutes. Some of the recorded interviews took between two, and two-and-a-half hours.

In Kassala town, special separate focus group discussions were therefore held with a group representing those who came to Sudan as adults, on the one hand, and with a group representing the second-generation refugees on the other. The same procedure was replicated at the Kashm el Girba refugee camp. This time the participants in the group discussions were women representing the first and second generations.

In Khartoum, informal conversations were conducted with young women and men who worked in local restaurants. Invaluable data was elicited from these informal encounters. On top of the data gathered from the above-named sources, some useful information was gathered from informal discussions held with groups of refugees (from the Nara clan) residing in the El-Sebil District, to obtain an idea about what was going on regarding return migration in Kassala. Since I lived with refugee families, a lot of insights and knowledge was gained through the method of participant observation. Some data that I used for comparison in my analysis were also collected through informal discussions with Sudanese informants in the parts of the city where many Eritrean refugees lived. This process of data collection was also facilitated by my local knowledge.
but more importantly by my fluency in Arabic, as well as familiarity with local cultural practices. I personally visited the refugee camps of Shegerab and I had the opportunity to interview members of Legina (refugee comitte) of two camps in Kassala. I also attended meetings held jointly by the UNHCR, COR and ER-REC to inform the refugees about the changes that had taken place in Eritrea and to tell them that the time had come for them to return to Eritrea. Three such meetings were held in Kassala town, two in Khartoum, two in Kashm el Girba, one in Umagata and one in Kilo five. Attending all these meetings helped me gain some critical insights. My attendance in the repatriation campaign was very useful and as a result, I gained a deeper understanding of the complexity of the decision concerning repatriation. The overall issue of repatriation, as well as the appropriateness of the actual time of return was openly discussed by the refugees. Some of the refugee leaders were against repatriation and they spelled out the reasons why they thought so. This gave me an opportunity to comprehend the arguments of the refugees. The interviewees were selected to represent the refugee populations by taking into consideration sex, age, household headship, ethnicity, religion, education and marital status. Of the thirteen women, four were university graduates, three were high school graduates, three were literate in Arabic and three were illiterate. Seven of the male respondents were university graduates, two were junior high school graduates and two were senior high school graduates. One male respondent was illiterate. Of the eleven men, only two fled from Eritrea after independence, while the rest had lived in Sudan for more than 20 years. Of the eleven men, seven were active members of one of the main Eritrean independence movements, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), while three were ex-members of the ELF and one was an ex-member of the Eritrean People’s Liberation front, EPLF, another independence movement. Of the thirteen women, ten had lived in Sudan for more than 20 years while three had fled Eritrea after independence. Out of the thirteen women, only six were active members of the ELF while three were ex-members of the ELF.

None of the refugees I interviewed are unconditionally reluctant to return to Eritrea. However, they provide a number of reasons why they have not returned. Moreover, the results denote that the refugees’ failure to return to Eritrea is linked to political conditions in the country of origin as well as to the socio-economic conditions in the host country and the hope of resettlement to countries of the North. Another aspect is a person’s engagement with religious, social and political affiliations which mediate his or her sense of belonging. Consequently, people respond differently to discourses about Eritrea—but in each case they are seeking recognition and respect for their social, cultural and political identity. Having said that, I will also elaborate the exceeding remarks by my personal experiences as a refugee.

The reason why I am involved in the issue of refugees is linked to my identity. I left Eritrea many years ago and lived in Sweden without ever visiting my country or even thinking about the changes I might have undergone with regard to my identity. Prior to this research, I took my identity for granted. In Sweden, the question of who you are and where you come from is part of everyday life. One is constantly reminded of one’s ‘otherness.’ Every time people ask me about my origin, I proudly say that I am an Eritrean and that I came to Sweden as a refugee. When confronted with the question, “When will you return to your country?,” I used to say, “When I have completed my studies.” Despite routinely saying so, I never had any definite plan when or where to return. However, every time I was asked such a question, I repeated the same cliché. Questions such as, “When will you return to your country?” no matter how well-meant remind me I am in a place that does not belong to me and tends to reinforce my ‘otherness.’ It was as if the people who asked such questions did not approve of my belonging to Swedish society. They probably think that since I do not originate from Sweden and do not share the common physical attributes of a Swede, it is natural for me to return to where I came from. I am absolutely certain, that it was such reflections that motivated me to be involved in refugee research. I planned to write on the refugees living in the town where I lived as a refugee for the first time. Doing a study in Sudan brings back many happy but also unhappy memories that were associated with the long journey I have travelled spatially, socially and metaphorically to arrive where I am at present.

Today, these memories are part of my life as well as my identity and they are important to challenge, embrace and celebrate. At present, I consider myself a global citizen since my family members live in different countries across the globe. Nevertheless, my link with my country of origin will not cease but will remain despite geographical divide. I share these experiences with many other refugees. If refugees are given several alternatives, return would not be the durable solution as UNHCR states it.2 By interacting locally or globally, many refugees (as my informants) will come to see themselves as global citizens. Identifying some of the processes and influences that affected the refugees’ perception of self and their country of origin, my study poses that refugees want to settle where they are or resettle elsewhere while keeping in contact with their areas of origin.

1 In July 1960, a group of mostly Muslim exiles in Cairo announced the establishment of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which sought Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. The founders of the faction were mostly from the low lands of Eritrea. At the beginning the faction was led by Idris Mohammed Adam, a leading political figure in Eritrea in the 1940s. It grew strong when the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie abolished Eritrea’s autonomous status, annexing it as a province in 1962.

2 See: <www.UNHCR.org>.
Forced Migration, Repatriation and UNHCR: Some Experiences from Sudan

Forced migration, conflicts and human rights abuses stemming from bad governance have become the main reasons why refugees in many Sub-Saharan African countries have left their areas of origin. According to the international standards relating to refugee status, a refugee is one who flees due to well-founded fear of persecution based on religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group (United Nations, 1951; OAU, 1969).

In the last few decades, the instability among the nations in the Horn of Africa has caused massive forced migration (Moussa, 1995). The refugee problem in these areas dates back to the mid-1950s precipitated by the Southern Sudan problem followed by the Eritrean war of independence, the Derg’s gross violations of human rights in Ethiopia and the Somali civil war during the second half of the 1970s. The situation was further exacerbated by the renewed civil war in Southern Sudan in the 1980s and the collapse of the Somali state. The 1990s were designated by the United Nations as the decade of repatriation (see Black and Koser, 1999, Hammond, 1999; McSpadden, 2000, Hassanen, 2007). The idea that repatriation represents the most durable solution is influenced by the notion of sedentarism—people belonging to particular places where they have their roots and cultural moorings. This notion that naturalizes the relationship between places and people is increasingly questioned by different analysts. Instead, refugees are increasingly characterized by transnational networks, reflecting new circumstances that permeate the new millennium (Black and Koser, 1999, Bakewell, 2006).

Using a Dynamic Model

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees worldwide and to find durable solutions for a resettlement of the displaced. The organization operates within strict regulations as well as definitions of categories of refugees who are displaced and eligible for UNHCR support. Although upon their arrival in the host country refugees are in a precarious situation, the study shows that Eritrean refugees soon gathered their strengths and creative skills and managed to survive on their own, thus contradicting the myth that refugees are weak and helpless. Based on the experiences of the refugees in Kassala, one should perhaps be careful not to stretch their temporary setback into a permanent state of weakness, helplessness and dependency.

Despite commonly held views within organizations for refugee assistance, the individual’s decision whether to return or not has little to do with the original cause that motivated the flight. The multiple and complex political, economic and social issues are themselves continuously changing and shifting. At least in the case of the Eritrean refugees in the town of Kassala, the question of their eventual return to their country of origin after the elimination of the factors that prompted them to flee, has to do with the political changes that have taken place in Eritrea, but also with intersecting factors linked to the country of asylum and personal changes they themselves have undergone in exile. For the international community and the UNHCR repatriation was the most durable and desirable solution when the war ended. According to UNHCR policy, return should take place when fundamental changes in the circumstances that caused the dislocation have occurred. The UNHCR operates within a charter of international conventions and agreements. It does not lie within the UNHCR’s responsibility to react to later changes that might have taken place—a regime change or a peace agreement. Inevitably there will be clashes in perceptions of the situation among different parties. Important changes affecting the target group of my study were that Eritrea gained independence in 1993 when its occupation ended with the signing of a peace agreement. Nonetheless, the event did not encourage the refugees to return from exile. Instead, it led to a new wave of refugees from Eritrea. The UNHCR’s reaction to the new situation gave the impression of inflexibility; an agency that was out to pursue a policy rather than to evaluate the matters of this wave of refugees. For instance, in May 2002 the UNHCR announced the termination of the refugee’s status to all Eritrean refugees worldwide. This took place while Eritreans were crossing Sudanese borders on a daily basis. It appears (the arrival of refugees on daily basis is a fact) that the agency did not reconsider its position even though the Eritrean refugees continued to stream in after the announcement as they had done before.

General Views about the Eritrean Case and the Difficulty of Return

The Eritrean war of independence, which ended in 1991, forced thousands of Eritreans into exile. Since then, some Eritrean refugees have voluntarily returned while others have preferred to stay in Sudan. In 1991, the regime that had forced many Eritreans to leave their country was overthrown by the combined efforts of the liberation fronts after a long war of liberation. A referendum was held in 1993, after which Eritrea became an independent country and a new regime came into power. Despite this change and the opportunity to return, many Eritrean refugees who had left the country before independence chose to remain in Sudan. The question is why these refugees remained in Sudan? In fact, despite the political change in 1993, Eritrea remains
one of the principal refugee-producing countries in the Horn of Africa. In other words, independence as a political achievement of the country neither stopped the flow of new refugees nor led to the return of all those who were displaced before and during the long war of independence. The question that presents itself is: What does this imply?

In Sudan there are thousands of refugees who have not returned to Eritrea in spite of the elimination of the original factors that caused their displacement. There are also thousands who have fled from the independent state, mainly to escape the open-ended national military service and the regime’s violation of human rights. Those who abscond or run away from the military service are subjected to severe punishments and the best way to avoid being detected is by fleeing to neighboring countries, especially Sudan. The failure of the old caseload refugees to return home has puzzled many observers. This is because when they fled their country before 1991, it was occupied by Ethiopia. After independence, in May 1991, the Eritrean people under the leadership of the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) threw the occupying Ethiopians out of the country. However, the new regime in independent Eritrea did not encourage all its refugees to return. Return is not a mechanical or automatic reaction that occurs in response to political changes. It is far more complex than that. Many Eritreans have stayed more than thirty years in exile in Sudan. Some were even born in exile without ever having visited Eritrea. After the collapse of Eritrea’s economy and infrastructure during the long war of independence and the exclusion of the political organizations, many of the remaining refugees in Sudan who sympathize with the ELF do not regard repatriation as an option that appeals to them. These factors have also influenced the planned returns of the refugees to Eritrea.

Obstacles Associated with Return Migration

Empirical research has identified a number of obstacles with regard to return of Eritrean refugees in Sudan (see Hassanen, 2007 for details):

- Lack of confidence in the Eritrean regime who did not fulfill its promises during the armed struggle for a democratic rule in Eritrea;
- Fear of a new war with its neighboring countries;
- Different educational system, policy favoring mother tongue as the language of instruction in primary education;
- Imprisonment of its opponents for many years without judgment;
- Human rights violations committed by the present Eritrean regime;
- Unwillingness to participate in the open-ended national service;
- Membership in one of the exiled political organizations opposed to the Eritrean government;
- Land ownership by the Eritrean state.

What Messages does this Study send to African Communities?

Analyzing the situation of forced migrants requires reflection on the historical, economic, social and political issues. Although all are interrelated with each other, the main points are that without democracy, rule of law as well as economic and social development, people will not choose to return, visit or invest in Eritrea. When countries generate refugees it is a sign of poor governance. Many of the political problems haunting African countries can be attributed to the nation-formation processes. The country represents the land with its resources, economy and geography. The state represents governance in terms of legislation, rule, administration and political control (Westin 1996). It is when these aspects do not harmonize with each other that there is conflict and disagreement between citizens and those who are in power. It is also due to dissatisfaction that people decide to leave their area of origin. What messages does this study send to communities in Eritrea and in other parts of Africa?

Human rights that are violated by dictatorial regimes in the region of the Horn of Africa are the very reason why many people leave their countries of origin. This is why today the region is one of the areas that generates and receives most refugees on the continent. The countries of this area are known for their internal conflicts, and many people from these areas were and still are displaced. The refugees that sought asylum in these countries live in a state of limbo. They cannot return to their countries of origin or migrate further. The governments in this region either oppose or support each other in order to have control over the region and its people, as recently observed between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Despite political tension at the governmental level the people of these countries have shown a remarkable sense of hospitality, tolerance and kindness towards the refugees. This indicates that the conflicts do not affect the local people’s attitude within the region. There is a situation of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, of Somali refugees in Sudan, Sudanese refugees in Eritrea and Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. The study shows that Eritrean and Sudanese citizens of the border regions are connected through common religion, ethnicity, economic interests and culture. The border communities want to be able to move between Sudan and Eritrea and many persons I spoke with want to live in both countries. Traditional ‘cross-border’ contacts that have taken place for centuries for purposes of trade and exchange are now regarded as unrealistic unless special arrangements between the two countries are settled.
When the boundaries between most of these countries were drawn, they cut through territories of distinct ethnic groups. These borders therefore lack social logic, a fact that can be observed in the way refugees are treated by their host population.

What can be seen from the current African situation is that the present African states (Eritrea being one of them) oppress whoever opposes them and embrace whoever serves their interests. Unless some kind of changes takes place these countries will continue to produce refugees.

A solution to the African refugee problem cannot be reached without resolving the conflicts between the governments. The livelihoods of the border communities in all countries depend on cross-border economic activities and therefore it is important that the borders remain open to allow the movement of goods and services between the countries. Cross-border movement of people within African countries has nothing to do with being a refugee or not. People will continue to move back and forth in search of employment, water, grazing land and different forms of income-generating activities, including trade. Looking at African countries’ armed struggles people tried to build unity by disregarding sectarianism based on religion, region, clan and ethnicity in order to promote national unity. One of the key factors that contributed to the success of the wars of independence was that people were able to relegate their differences and particular interests to the background. Today, people in Africa lack this ability. However, if they regain this ability and turn their aggression into positive action, conflict management could be more successful.

References


OAU: See Organization of African Unity.


UN. See United Nations.


Introduction

According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters” (OCHA, 2004). The defining characteristic of internally displaced persons is that despite the fact that they have been forced to flee their homes by merely the same reasons as refugees—violent conflicts or gross violation of human rights or other crisis—they have not crossed internationally recognized borders and so remain within the borders of their own countries (ibid). The overwhelming majority of IDPs are also mainly members of minority groups, predominantly women and children.

Global estimates indicate that IDPs comprise the largest group of displaced persons around the world today. Of an estimated 40 million displaced persons worldwide some two-thirds are IDPs (Rempel, 2003). The situation that begs for answers is the fact that out of the estimated 26,000,0001 IDPs (IDMC, 2007), Africa alone hosts about half of that population, estimated at 12.7 million IDPs (IDMC, 2008). And while this is the sad scenario, many African governments turn a blind eye to the plight of IDPs, rendering the IDPs more or less ‘invisible exiles’ in their own country.

Like many other communities elsewhere, Africa has faced numerous migration challenges and, more specifically, forced migration. Conflict-related migration is the most common. Conflicts in Africa are complex and dynamic. They have displaced and continue to displace many civilians, mainly women and children. Most of the conflicts have been protracted (Somalia, Sudan), with little or no durable solutions for the IDPs or refugees. Protracted IDP situations can be viewed as those in which “the process for finding durable solutions is stalled, and/or IDPs are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights” (Diagne, 2007). As a result, the conflicts have led to serious, and sometimes complex, humanitarian crisis. Over time, protracted IDP situations are no longer being viewed as humanitarian emergencies, meaning humanitarian assistance, protection and the chances of finding a durable solution dwindle with the passage of time. While this is the practical situation on the ground, the IDP Guiding Principles contend that protection of IDPs must entail seeking a durable solution to their plight, the responsibility of which falls squarely on national authorities. The riddle here, however, is how to create political will and build the capacity of national governments to respect the rights of their citizens and accord them necessary assistance, including finding solutions to their plight. Oftentimes, finding durable solutions to the IDP plight is merely a political gesture than a desire to find long-term solutions to the IDP problem. As a result, IDPs are left out as key players in determining the solutions to end their problems. Consequently, their experiences during the different phases of the conflict are lost.

This Paper looks at the traditional IDP solutions and argues that there is a need to look beyond them; at the challenges facing IDPs in Africa during return, resettlement and integration, and posits that more research is needed to document the experiences of returning IDPs in order to challenge the traditional durable solutions. This will help researchers and development actors develop more encompassing solutions, informed by the changing nature of conflicts and IDP experiences.

Return, Resettlement and Reintegration

The IDP problem is one that many national governments in Africa would want to wish away but which has remained a constant headache. Looking for durable solutions in strained economies and diminishing resource bases is a never-ending challenge. But despite these challenges, the IDP situation is increasingly attracting attention from the international and national humanitarian community, warranting a refocus in seeking sustainable durable solutions to their plight.

Scholars and IDP advocates agree that durable solutions for IDPs are quite difficult to conceptualize in the context of protracted IDP situations. According to Amnesty International, few durable solutions exist to

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1 Estimates based on the analysis of available country figures and additional information on displacement and return trends See <http://www.internal-displacement.org>.
support Africa’s IDP population, the scenario of which is compounded by a lack of regional arrangements or responses to address the root problems giving rise to conflicts in Africa. According to this report

... durable and lasting solutions to Africa’s conflicts have frequently proved elusive, despite the contribution of [...] the African Union (AU) to conflict prevention and resolution. There has been a deplorable lack of political will to address the human rights violations that generally lie at the roots of political tensions and hostilities... . (Amnesty International, 2008, p. 3).

The Guiding Principles recognize voluntary return and resettlement as the main traditional solutions to IDP problems. The Principles further advocate that these solutions must be instituted in conditions of safety and dignity and must be voluntary in nature. Principle 28 states that

... competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country (...) shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons (UN-OCHA, 2004).

As more and more conflicts continue to erupt in Africa, thereby generating more IDPs and refugees, many scholars are arguing that the main dilemma is how to end the displacement through sustainable return and resettlement for the returning IDP populations. Studies now recognize that failure to successfully integrate returning IDPs back home or in their resettlement areas may be behind the onset of renewed conflicts and tensions in future. For instance, if returning populations find those who did not flee having occupied their land, this may trigger renewed conflicts.

Voluntary Return as a Durable Solution

As the conditions that made people flee diminish, there is a tendency to hastily institute return or resettlement drives, mainly out of a political impulse to please. This means the motivation may be imbued with a political, economic or security decision, not necessarily the right of IDPs to make individual decisions about safe return. No matter which durable solution is preferred; there must be effective consultation with IDPs who, according to Guiding Principle No. 28(2), are the primary decision-makers in decisions regarding their welfare and the primary beneficiaries to the solution. Special efforts must

be made to ensure the full participation of internally displaced persons in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration (ibid).

Voluntary return means that the decision to return to one’s place of origin must be a free choice made by the displaced person. It should be noted that “this requirement is more than a matter of principle” (Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, 2004) since a voluntary return is more likely to be lasting and hence sustainable. In the international legal framework, the law protects IDPs from forceful return. The Guiding Principles are very explicit (see above). But unlike the refugee-specific international law that prohibits forcible return, the IDP guidelines are not legally binding as to compel states to adhere to agreed standards for the promotion of IDP rights. The gap widens during return and or post-recovery programs during which time many of the non-state humanitarian actors have left the scene. Though the Guiding Principles are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law, and despite the fact that the Principles are very clear on the conduct of governments during return and resettlement, governments continue to flout the standards without having to fear any sanctions since the Principles merely spell minimum standards without mechanisms to task those governments that do not adhere to the standards.

On the other hand, the durable nature of voluntary return implies that IDPs cannot just return but will have to reintegrate fully back ‘home’. Today, this sustainability is increasingly being questioned. Scholars and IDP rights advocates now recognize a need for further research to establish the efficacy of blanket return programs in specific situations and more so where the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed in the first place. Consideration of return should not be automatically privileged as the solution for IDP problems without taking into consideration the very voluntary nature of return. While return does remain the preferred option for many IDPs a comprehensive approach is essential. This is particularly so where exile has been protracted and the root causes to the conflict are complex or have not been fully addressed.

It is worth drawing attention to the situation of those IDPs who do not settle in camps, but rather locate in or nearer ‘host communities’ or in urban areas making it harder to access them during return drives or compensation programs. The registration systems often leave out many of these populations. Many, especially women and young girls who end up this way may engage in unprotected sexual activities to make ends meet. If they are not documented, they are unlikely to receive assistance in form of compensation or restitution. This draws us to the need for adequate safeguards in terms of rights, including access to justice, restitution of
property and improved human rights conditions to be put in place before IDPs return. It is critical to underscore the importance of protection not only during the actual return or resettlement process but also in the areas of return or resettlement.

Resettlement

Where voluntary return is not an option, the IDPs can be resettled in another part of the country. However, the same conditions governing return must be employed. Interestingly though, many IDPs are still plagued by their attachment to their former homes and may find it difficult to continue with their lives after resettlement. Some researchers have argued that this attachment could be so strongly felt that it affects integration of IDPs in resettlement areas other than their homes. “(...) an individual’s sense of attachment to her or his place of origin and association of this place alone, with ‘home’ clearly can be very powerfully felt, and may remain so regardless of the conditions in areas of resettlement” (Mooney, 2007). This phenomenon then calls upon the national authorities to establish conditions that enable IDPs to feel at home in their new environments, in particular to ensure secure environments (where they will not only be accepted by communities receiving them, but also where they will live as near normal lives as when they were in their former homes) in the areas of resettlement, and to facilitate the reintegration upon resettlement.

Integration in Host Communities

Sometimes, given the considerable time that IDPs have spent in the area of displacement, local integration may be the only viable option. However, economic self-reliance must be promoted as a key factor in ensuring its sustainability. Development programs must not only focus on IDPs but on host communities as well, otherwise the integration may fan more tensions rather than act as a durable solution. More importantly, these programs must be accompanied by not just necessary legal and policy reforms, but also reforms in the practice and management of IDP and peace programs. This means that the basic human rights of IDPs must be respected not just on paper but also in practice during any integration programs. They should be able to access all rights as other citizens in the areas that they integrate and in standards that promote their well being. Governments should put in place infrastructural development necessary to support the integrating populations so that reintegration does not cause unnecessary strain on existing infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, water, etc.

Some Key Challenges Faced by IDPs during Return, Resettlement and Subsequent Reintegration

Today, as the problem of IDPs continues to grow globally, in magnitude and complexity, the challenges of developing durable solutions are also growing. People are now questioning the blanket viability of the traditional options, without considering the experiences of IDPs. “I cannot return home permanently, at least not now, not until I have received government assurances of safety and protection”, Anna2 quips in one of Kenya’s IDP camps. Like many others in her camp, she is afraid that her ‘home’ is still unsafe for their return. Her answer also reflects in great measure the role of the government to protect its citizens (IDPs) in words and in deed.

Lack of binding legal frameworks

Sustainable IDP protection during all the phases of displacement must be embedded in both international and national law, calling actors to establish binding legal mechanisms on IDP protection. But this alone is not enough. IDP problems must be given more focus and weight than has been the case. Treating the IDP problem merely as a national responsibility will not bring corresponding positive change to the lives of IDPs. There is a need to have internationally agreed standards on monitoring (of state acts of commission or omission towards the promotion of welfare and protection of IDPs, for instance by the United Nations setting aside a body to monitor the welfare and protection of IDPs just like the way UNHCR is designated to monitor the same for refugees. This body should establish binding legal frameworks to which governments’ accountability can be measured. This, together with national laws, will contribute to the change in both practice and policy. Many analysts, including the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (RSG), have recognized that addressing restitution, compensation and land reform issues are crucial to developing long-term solutions to displacement3. These can only be done if there are national legal frameworks and political will to implement them.

Limited literature on IDP experiences

One of the assumptions of voluntary return is that it is an end to IDP problems. This assumption means that the focus of documenting IDP experiences is mainly on the conflict, flight and exile, and rarely on experiences during return, resettlement or reintegration. Some IDPs

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2 IDP interviewed during a monitoring visit by Refugee Consortium of Kenya. Name changed to conceal identity.

will experience the harsh effects of displacement long after return. This can be summed up by the experience of Anna, a returning IDP in a Kenyan camp the author interviewed during the return program, dubbed as “Operation Rudi Nyumbani”, in Molo, Rift Valley Province in June 2008. “I must return because if I don’t I will not receive the compensation from the government. Of course if I had a choice I would never go back there, at least not now, I feel very insecure and can not trust ‘those people’ [those that displaced her] again. What about my property? I feel disturbed and frustrated but I have no other option.” This is how Anna summed up her frustration against the government return program. She added, “…in this camp, there is really no one’s husband or wife. Women who lost or got separated from their husbands have had to engage in ‘bad’ behaviors to earn a living. Some already have children out of these relationships of convenience (...) they will return home with added baggage, and who will accept them back?” Enough literature must be gathered and documented on IDP experiences, those who have returned and those unwilling to do so. With the complexities brought by changing displacement trends we need to rethink the return strategies and the whole spectrum of the traditional long-term solutions for IDPs (according to IDP Guiding Principle 28: return, resettlement and reintegration) in order to develop long-term solutions, whether locally or internationally.

This will further help question the viability of blanket return campaigns by governments as the only solution to IDP problems. It would help to do a critical analysis of assumption, which governments could be employing during such returns in contrast to the actual IDP experiences. Researchers are today questioning the general belief that IDPs are merely returning ‘home’. The argument is that there are many reasons such as the guarantee of physical and material security, infrastructural development, access to basic facilities like schools, respect for human rights, emotional attachment to the place, community support structures, etc. why one would call a place home, not just the presence of physical structures and property, or having lived there for the better part of one’s life.

Poor social and economic infrastructure in return/ resettlement sites

During conflict, most infrastructure and property is destroyed. Oftentimes, returning populations lack adequate housing, access to livelihoods and get no or limited access to health and education services. For instance, concerns have been voiced about the viability of IDP return programs in Eritrea, and in particular with regard to social infrastructure and services in return areas. According to OCHA (2007), “lack of clean water, food and sustainable livelihoods have threatened the durability of the returns and may have put great strains on the communities”. Many international agencies have added their voice to these concerns, urging both state and non-state actors to continue providing emergency and basic social services even after return ‘home’. More concerns were further raised regarding the suitability of resettlement projects to support sustainable livelihoods (IDMC, 2009). Cases abound of IDPs who learnt integrative skills, which they could not use upon return e.g. pastoralist communities learning farming skills in IDP settlement camps. This leads to frustration and helplessness after return. With dilapidated infrastructure, not only do IDPs face serious challenges to their social and economic survival, they are also at great risk from a lack of protection for their physical and material safety. Studies from other parts of the world show a similar trend. Although many people displaced in Iraq looked forward to returning home as soon as the 2003 war ended, this was not to be for many of them—they lacked adequate housing, had challenges of poor sanitation and stalled infrastructural development.

Socially, IDPs face negative social labeling from society even after return or resettlement. According to Catherine Brun (2003), locally, internally displaced persons become a social category the meaning of which is modified from the original definition made by humanitarian regime. And this social categorization can lead to unequal access to citizenship rights, including the right to return in safety and dignity as they are seen as internally displaced not as citizens entitled to the same rights and privileges as other citizens of their country). This is despite the fact that the Guiding Principles are clear regarding access to rights for IDPs, internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of any rights and freedoms on the ground that they are internally displaced (Principle 1).

Conclusion

Political will and legal frameworks alone are neither the only prerequisite to ensuring sustainable IDP protection nor are they the only preconditions that will ensure that IDPs continue to enjoy their rights after return as other nationals of their countries do. When return is precipitated more by political agendas than a desire to address the plight of IDPs, return programs could just be exercises in futility. For lack of choices the IDPs may remain in places of return or resettlement, at least for some time before another more serious conflict ensues.

While acknowledging that the task of protecting IDPs and providing assistance lies squarely on national
governments, this task is admittedly huge and demanding. This notwithstanding, governments must start focusing on IDP protection and support as a national concern not as a burden. Time is ripe to challenge the traditional IDP solutions. This Paper has argued that there is a need to carry out more research and to document voices and experiences of returning IDPs at three main levels: those returning home from exile, those who never return at all, and the self-integrated outside areas of return, settlement or displacement.

It is imperative that we begin to see a trend where IDPs in Africa and elsewhere are being recognized more as a specific group just like refugees requiring national and international assistance and protection at all stages of displacement. When all is said and done, the need for sustainable peace in Africa cannot be gainsaid! As long as conflicts continue to erupt every other time, coupled with environmental and food emergencies it is hard to conceptualize and implement durable solutions sustainably.

References


IDMC. See: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.


OCHA. See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

OCHA-ROCEA. See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Regional Office for Central and East Africa.


Introduction

This Paper discusses the livelihoods, challenges, coping mechanisms and survival strategies of refugees in Africa and their impact on peace, security and development on the continent. It presents refugees as active agents with specific survival strategies to overcome the multiple challenges and obstacles that they face while settling in countries of asylum. The analysis focuses on how refugees make choices and priorities in order to maximize the opportunities and access to resources obtainable in short supply in their settlements. It contends that the kind of welcome and treatment that refugees receive from the host country has a direct implication on peace and security in the region.

The Paper explores the patterns of forced displacement in Africa. It reviews the theories and concepts applicable to forced migration in order to understand the social life of refugees as individuals and as a group within the African socio-economic and political realities. It also analyzes the social links and networks, which refugees create among themselves, with the host community members, and with the outside world and how the latter contribute to their survival in exile.

The process of displacement and settlement can be analyzed in the three major phases, namely, the phase of mass displacement, the short-term settlement phase and the long-term settlement phase. Each phase creates needs and challenges that force refugees to adopt specific coping mechanisms and survival strategies.

This Paper is based on the results of a pilot research study conducted by the author among Rwandan refugees living in Congo (Brazzaville) and Zimbabwe. To collect the data and the views of the refugees on their survival strategies and coping mechanisms, the study uses mainly organized focused group discussions taking into consideration factors such as gender, age, level of education, marital status and type of settlement of the respondent. It also uses in-depth interviews and questionnaires in order to have individual account of challenges and responses.

The aim of the study is to document the strategies adopted by refugees to optimize their social and economic capital for their survival in exile. Specifically, the study analyzes the major challenges that refugees face in Africa and how they respond to them and maximize their access to scarce vital resources such as food, clothing, shelter, health care, social and physical security, education, formal employment and/or other income-generating activities.

The study also intends to inspire new approaches and considerations in refugee studies and policy formulation and decision-making in refugee protection, assistance and management. The Paper concludes with some recommendations on refugees’ protection and assistance in Africa.

The Refugee Problem in Africa

In analyzing the refugee problem in Africa it is imperative that one revisit the historical background of the refugee problem on the continent and the evolution of the refugee protection policies from sociological, legal and political perspectives. It is also important to review the current refugee situation on the continent in terms of the regional share of the global refugee burden and the regional policies for the management of the refugee problem.

Historical background of the refugee problem in Africa

Although forced displacement and the refugee phenomenon are ubiquitous and as old as humanity, the refugee problem in Africa has become a major concern of social and public policy during the post-colonial period. As Crisp (2006) points out, the large-scale displacement of people has become a defining characteristic of [post colonial] Sub-Saharan Africa. He says that during the past four decades, millions of people throughout the continent have been obliged to abandon their homes and to seek safety elsewhere, often losing the few assets they possessed and suffering great hardship in the process (ibid).

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The post-colonial Africa is marked with recurring incidents of population mass displacements due mainly to armed conflicts. The regional and national responses to forced migration on the continent have gone through a gradual process of policy formulation and implementation from open door attitude to closed door or control-oriented approach. During the 1960s, refugees fleeing liberation wars in different parts of the continent received a warm welcome and generous assistance in the countries of asylum everywhere on the African continent (Rutinwa, 1996; Rwamatwara, 2005). During this period, also referred to as the “Golden Age” (Rutinwa, 1996) in refugee protection history in Africa, all countries showed support to refugees fleeing persecution from foreign and/or colonial occupation. This attitude was derived from the collective engagement towards the liberation of the continent from colonial rule, which led African governments and local communities to treat refugees, victims of that effort, with compassion and generosity (Rutinwa, 1999; Crisp, 2006; Rwamatwara, 2005).

However, from the 1970s to date, the aftermath of independence for the majority of African countries, internal conflicts and civil wars have intensified in many countries causing new waves of forced displacement. The mass displacements caused by these internal armed conflicts do not attract the same sympathy. During this period, referred to as “closed door or control-oriented” policies (Rutinwa, 1999; Crisp, 2006), refugees experience serious denial of the rights enshrined in the international and regional legal instruments of refugee protection. This is mainly due to the fact that the causes of the conflicts which force people to flee their countries are attributed mainly to leadership failure to manage efficiently internal conflicts. In other cases, it is perceived that the refugee crisis has lasted so long that the host governments and the local communities get tired of providing hospitality and assistance indefinitely to refugees whose problems are not adequately addressed by the authorities of their respective countries of origin (Rutinwa, 1999; Crisp, 2006; Rwamatwara, 2005).

Moreover, most of African countries receive great numbers of refugees without enough means and infrastructure to accommodate them. Lack of policies of burden-sharing at regional and global level makes individual countries reluctant to welcome the massive influx of refugees without a guarantee of a quick durable solution and without any commitment of the international community for assistance and burden-sharing. This lack of commitment and clear policies on how to manage efficiently massive forced displacements contribute to the suffering and ill-treatment to which refugees are subjected on the continent. Consequently, this unwelcome attitude and ill-treatment of refugees by countries force the latter to move from country to country, which leads to a state of high and uncontrolled mobility of people across the continent resulting in generalized insecurity of the refugees and incidents of open violence in many parts of Africa.

The African share of the world’s refugee population

The number of refugees varies in space and time as armed conflicts that cause displacement are settled and refugees return to their home countries and as conflicts erupt in other parts of the world producing new waves of displacements. Due to the dynamics of forced displacements as well as the conceptualization of the term of ‘refugees’ in Africa, it is not easy to accurately report the number of refugees in Africa. In fact, many real refugees do not claim their ‘refugeehood’ and many non-refugees claim their refugee status; hence the figures presented are usually estimates, which do not reflect the real refugee situation on the continent. This calls for more research and better policies in order to accurately document the refugee phenomenon on the African continent.

However, as generally reported, the number of refugees in Africa is the highest compared to the rest of the world and has constantly increased during the post-colonial era. Milner (2004) observes that the number of refugees in Africa grew from one million in 1970 to over six million in the early 1990s. Currently, the number of victims of forced displacement in Africa is estimated at 15 million (Crisp, 2006). As Crisp (ibid) points out, Africa is home to more than one-third (2.7 million) of the world’s 9.5 million refugees and around half of the 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). He goes on to say that currently, of the 10 top refugee-producing countries around the world, five countries, namely, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and Liberia, are to be found in Africa. He also affirms that three of the world’s top-ten refugee-hosting states, namely Tanzania, Chad and Uganda, are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. This complex refugee situation in Africa calls for serious attention, especially when refugees settle in countries of relatively limited resources to handle the problems that accompany refugees’ displacement and settlement.

Moreover, the refugee crisis in Africa has always been at the same time a cause and a consequence of armed conflicts. Unresolved refugee problems and difficult living conditions within which large numbers of refugees find themselves have forced the latter to resort to violence to return to their countries of origin (Rutinwa, 1996; Crisp, 2006). This has resulted in recurring conflicts and new waves of refugees. Furthermore, conflicts have been spreading from one country to neighboring countries in which refugees fleeing violence in their countries have sought refuge. This is mainly due to the fact that in many instances armed elements are mixed...
with ordinary refugees creating instability in the area of refugees’ settlements (Crisp, 2003; Rutinwa, 1996; Rwamatwara, 2005).

**Protracted refugee situations in Africa**

The problem of protracted refugee situations is critical in Africa considering their causes, their manifestations and their effects. According to Crisp (2003, p. 1), “refugees can be regarded as being in a protracted situation when they have lived in exile for more than five years, and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement”. Many refugee situations in Africa qualify as protracted and are likely to remain so as no durable solution is foreseeable in the near future. This is the case for refugees from Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.

Moreover, of the three commonly agreed-upon durable solutions, namely, voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement in a third country, African countries favor ‘voluntary’ repatriation and are usually against the local integration solution. As Kibreab (2003) argues, “refugee status [in Africa] rarely [if at all] leads to acquisition of nationality or citizenship, and rights and sources of livelihoods basic to warding off poverty are accessible only to nationals”. The result of this general tendency is that refugees are usually forced to return back to their countries of origin even when the cause of their flight has not totally been solved. This results in high mobility of refugees across the continent in fear of being forcibly returned to their countries of origin (Rwamatwara, 2004). It also quite often results in armed conflict as refugees try to make their voice heard and their rights respected in their countries of origin.

**Theoretical and Conceptual Approaches to the Refugee Phenomenon**

To understand the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of forced migration in general and ‘refugeehood’ in particular, this Paper uses sociological theoretical and conceptual approaches. As Turner (1986) points out, “a theory is a story about how and why events in the universe occur”. This Paper examines how refugees act, behave and how they interact with other people within and outside the area of their settlement in order to maximize their survival opportunities. Although social theorists differ on the approaches and interpretation on human behavior, organization and interaction, this Paper tries to understand the phenomenon of ‘being a refugee’ and what it means to refugees and to the world around them.

**Legal and practical conceptualization of ‘refugeehood’ in Africa**

The discourse around the concept of forced displacement and the state of being a refugee or ‘refugeehood’ is fraught with varying and sometimes contradicting interpretations and connotations (Rwamatwara, 2005). The varying and often conflicting considerations of a ‘refugee’ determine whether individuals receive the benefits and rights granted to refugees while others are denied these benefits. Moreover, the term ‘refugee’ carries a social meaning which conveys a particular social status to those who claim or are ascribed the refugee status. Thus, refugees form a particular social group with socially ascribed status and possible stereotypical associations. Because of these associations and their implications in the society some individuals prefer not to claim their refugee identity.

Furthermore, a refugee status entails not only rights and benefits but also and mainly obligations and restrictions of certain freedoms and liberties. Failure to comply with the obligations and restrictions can attract severe sanctions to the recalcitrant. For example, in many African countries it is mandatory for refugees to stay in a restricted area, usually a closed refugee camp or a designated refugee settlement. Thus, claiming the refugee status is a form of giving up some fundamental rights such as the freedom of movement. This state of affairs bears direct consequences to refugees’ survival hence their various attempts and response to overcome these restrictions.

Furthermore, countries are sovereign when it comes to granting a refugee status to applicants. Thus, the refugee status is granted to some, but not all those who apply for it. As a result, there are some people who consider themselves to be refugees but are not recognized as such by the host country simply because the status-granting authority was not convinced of their entitlement to the refugee status. The main condition underlying the granting of the refugee status is to be found in the internationally accepted definition of a refugee. This is provided in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which defines a refugee as

(...)

5 Emphasis added by the author.
The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention broadens this definition to include

(...) every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his/her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his/her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his/her country of origin or nationality (Article 1(2)) (OAU, 1969).

According to this definition, the key determining factor for granting of refugee status is the well-founded fear of persecution. However, it is not always easy to prove a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’; hence many refugee status applicants see their applications rejected although they are convinced of their qualification to the refugee status. As a consequence, when an asylum seeker’s application to a refugee status is turned down, the tendency is to move to another country, usually with a different and more ‘convincing’ story. This creates a continuous and prolonged state of uncertainty and vulnerability for refugees. It also brings us to explore the concept of forced migration and the meaning of the term ‘refugee’ and the state of being a refugee.

**Forced versus voluntary migration**

It is important to understand the different conceptualizations constructed around the subject of forced migration and ‘refugeehood’ in Africa as well as the social, economic and political implications of those different interpretations.

The concept of migration implies displacement/moving from one’s home and settlement in another place on a temporary basis or permanently, regardless of the motive of that movement (Kibreab, 2003).

It is generally contended that migration implies a voluntary movement and change of settlement. However, the notion of migration carries different connotations depending on the motives of migration, namely, whether the decision to migrate is voluntarily taken by the migrant or the latter is forced to move. Thus, we talk of forced migration in opposition to voluntary migration (Rwamatwara, 2005). The discourse around the dichotomy of voluntary versus forced migration has produced varying views from academic analysts and political authorities. In this dichotomy migration is viewed from its causes and/or from its purpose. It is commonly considered that voluntary migration refers to a search for economic opportunities and/or better living standards (Adepoju, 1989). Forced migration, on the other hand, refers to displacements triggered by sudden events beyond one’s control, which threatens one’s life should one stay at one’s place of residence (Rwamatwara, 2005). Thus, accordingly, the migration dichotomy distinguishes economic migrants from socio-political migrants (Turton, 2003). Whereas the former refers to migrants who leave their respective residence and settle elsewhere in search of economic opportunities such as employment, business opportunities, education, etc. (Berger, 1987; Adepoju, 1989; Rwamatwara, 2005), the latter refers to migration caused by social and political problems such as armed conflicts, human rights violations, natural disasters, etc. (Berger, 1987; Bolzman, 1996; Anthony, 1999). Nick Van Hear (1998, p. 44) talks of voluntary as opposed to involuntary migration. Anthony Richmond (1994, p. 59) classifies migrants in two main categories: those with agency and those without agency, with forced migrants, among them refugees, being those with little or no agency (Rwamatwara, 2005).

However, the history of migration in Africa defies this simplistic approach to the concept of migration, which limits its interpretation to the dichotomy of voluntary versus forced migration. In many instances it is difficult to conceptualize, let alone to measure the degree of voluntariness and/or the forced nature of the decision to migrate (Rwamatwara, 2005). In fact, economic migration implies a degree of force and threat to the individual’s life if we consider that unemployment, lack of income and sustainable livelihood can cause malnutrition and starvation. Thus migration in search of economic and survival opportunities implies a degree of force beyond an individual’s control, which qualifies it to be forced migration. Moreover, the forced nature of migration is sometimes difficult to establish since some people in the same situation and facing similar threats decide to stay in their homes and survive or simply do not have the means to move. Therefore, the distinction based on the voluntary versus forced nature of the decision to migrate does not always translate the reality, hence offers a contested foundation for granting a refugee status.

**The notion of ‘refugeehood’**

According to Kunz (1973), refugees are different from voluntary migrants in that they have to leave their homeland against their will, with no positive motivation to settle anywhere else. Kibreab (2003) states that “refugees are people who flee their homes against their will because they fear for their lives”. Olson (1979) points out that refugees differ from other migrants in that refugees are forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment, which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it. They are coerced by an external force to leave their homes and go elsewhere. In Kunz’s theoretical framework, immigrants are seen as pulled and attracted to the new land by opportunities and better living conditions obtainable there, whereas refugees are pushed out.
of their homelands and not pulled to any particular area for opportunities (other than security and safety) (Rwamatwara, 2005).

However, in African migration reality, the push-pull factor as conceived in Kunz’s theoretical framework is not easily demarcated as regards the distinction between economic migrants and refugees. As Ricca (1990, p. 7) rightly puts it, in Africa the majority of migrants are forced into exile in one way or another. This is the reason why many people, due to the hardship prevailing in their country, seek refugee status by claiming a false nationality which can easily make them get the status.

Moreover, the push-and-pull factors surrounding forced migration in general and refugees in particular differ according to the phases of their plights, namely the initial mass displacement following a conflict, and the temporary, or short-term, and long-term settlement chosen by the fleeing individuals. In fact, in the initial stage of flight, refugees have no particular destination in mind other than any place that can offer safety. However, once in a safe place, which was the initial pull factor, other considerations come into play such as the durability of their safety and the quality of welcome and treatment received. Accordingly, the refugee decides whether to stay or to move to a more desirable place of long-term settlement. The factors, which determine this new destination are usually access to education, employment and other resources considered as vital by refugees. Thus the pull-push factor discourse has to be broadened to include all these considerations.

Survival Strategies and Coping Mechanisms among Refugees in Africa

As Kibreab (2003) points out,

(...) when refugees flee, they incur immense losses in life-sustaining resources, including social support networks, neighbours, friends, relatives, cultivable and grazing lands, livestock, jobs, houses, and access to common property resources such as forest produce, surface water, wild fruits, roots and wildlife.

Refugees’ experiences, challenges and responses

The main preoccupation for refugees is to satisfy the basic needs and to ensure a better future for themselves and for their children, usually, through education. The basic resources, which ensure individual survival such as food, water, health facilities and schools are in short supply even for local inhabitants. When refugees settle in a country, usually in remote rural areas, they have to share these scarce resources with local community members. This usually generates an inevitable competition, which can lead to tension and possible violence. As Crisp (2006) puts it, “when large numbers of displaced and destitute people are obliged to live alongside poor members of the local population, tensions and even conflicts can be anticipated”.

Indeed, it was reported by respondents during our study in Congo (Brazzaville) and Zimbabwe that the general sentiment of local community members is that refugees come to take away their resources. Furthermore, locals view the assistance and relief given to refugees as unfair since they themselves are equally poor and do not enjoy similar privileges. In response to such animosity, refugees usually have to make the decision either to stay and face the competition and conflicting relations with host community members or to settle in urban areas where they are not assisted or then to leave the country in search of better treatment.

Moreover, it is generally reported that refugees in Africa are not allowed to exercise a profession, and that their access to formal employment is significantly limited. Even when refugees are granted a refugee status, they are required to obtain a work permit like any other migrants, which is hard, if not impossible, to get. The obvious reason is the high rate of unemployment, which prevails in most African countries. The scarce available employment opportunities are reserved to the locals. To respond to this denial of the right to employment, refugees resort to jobs that locals do not want to perform, usually less rewarding. Highly educated refugees accept jobs that are low-graded and badly paid.

Furthermore, lack and/or denial of access to employment and profitable occupation can lead refugees, especially the youth, to engage in illegal activities. As Christie (1997) affirms, “the problem of forced migration in Africa is closely linked to the concern about security on the continent”. In fact, it has been reported that because of lacking alternative occupation, young refugees of school-going age constitute an easy target of recruitment by warlords to join factions in armed conflicts (Wilkinson, 2003). Lack of opportunities for, and access to, education is associated with the growing number of child soldiers in Africa. As Mahalingam (2002, p. 22) points out, education can help prevent children from being recruited as fighters through a curriculum that teaches non-violent conflict resolution and facilitates peacebuilding.

The proliferation of conflicts on the African continent is encouraged by the cheap and easy recruits of young refugees who are not given an opportunity to go to school. Describing military recruits and activities in one refugee camp in Côte d’Ivoire, a UNHCR reporter had this to say:
The recruiters came at sundown with fistfuls of cash and promises of adventure, power and women. Within three hours, 150 young Liberian men at the Nicla refugee camp in western Côte d’Ivoire had signed up to become government mercenaries in a unit nicknamed the Lima force. They each pocketed 10,000 local CFA francs (USD17)... (Wilkinson, 2003).

Currently, 3,000 of the world’s estimated 300,000 child soldiers are operating in Côte d’Ivoire alone (ibid). Untold numbers of older, but still vulnerable youth have also been recruited, mainly in Africa. Girls are particularly vulnerable, becoming foot soldiers or sexual slaves, or both (ibid, p. 18). From the views of respondents, the study establishes the relationship between access to education (or lack of it) among refugees and the proliferation of armed conflicts on the continent.

Social links and networks

Social links and networks within and beyond refugees’ countries of settlement play an important role in their survival strategies. As reported during our study, refugees who have relatives or close friends who managed to settle in developed countries assist them with resources to start an income-generating activity, usually informal trading to earn a living. In this regard, most parents strive to send their children to Western countries as an investment for the future well-being of the family through remittances from these children.

Furthermore, to access resources required to start a small-scale informal business or to expand existing ones, refugees have developed their own informal financial lending institutions as reported by respondents in our study. This system of lending consists of a circle of partners, ten to fifteen members who give to each member in a round a fixed amount of money on a regular basis, usually once a month. This money is invested in various income-generating projects such as transport, tack shops or kiosks, and informal trade.

Links with locals are also reported to ensure survival strategies of refugees. As gleaned during our study, to avoid harassment of any sort by local authorities and police, refugees prefer to register their businesses under the names of their local friends or enter into partnership with local business people. This, of course, exposes these refugees to the risk of sometimes losing their resources when their local partners cheat them by declaring the business theirs.

Social links and networks also help refugees to keep in touch with friends and relatives who remained in their country of origin. These relations go as far as arranging marriage between a refugee and a partner who did not leave the country. They also constitute a channel of sending or receiving money between refugees and relatives who remained in the country.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

This Paper examined the challenges and constraints of refugees in Africa as well as their survival strategies and coping mechanisms. It focused on refugees’ strategies to maximize their opportunities and access to resources obtainable in short supply in their area of settlement. The Paper highlighted the lack of commitment towards ensuring refugees rights on the part of African states. To overcome these challenges and to maximize the access to vital resources, refugees adopt different strategies ranging from accepting less desirable and less rewarding jobs to sending their children to developed countries.

Social relations and links among refugees and with the outside world are vital as they ensure their survival in different ways. These links provide income and resources to start businesses as well as to run them without harassment by authorities. Relations and links help refugees to send their children overseas ensuring income through remittances from these children. These links go as far as providing opportunities for marriages by linking up refugees with their potential partners.

Refugee policies have always tended to assist refugees with food and materials instead of equipping them with capacity to produce what they need by themselves. As it transpires from this study, the best assistance and protection to refugees should consist of capacity-building through proper education, loans and facilitation so that refugees can maximize the exploitation of their talents and skills as well as find strong markets for their products. There is also a need to facilitate the process of obtaining their administrative papers, thus enabling them to exercise their entrepreneurships without hindrance. Instead of confining refugees in restricted areas, refugees should be encouraged and allowed to work and produce, and hence contribute to the development of the host country.
References


OAU. See: Organization of African Unity.


Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in the East African Region

Abstract

Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is often and quite correctly characterized as a location of prevalent, violent conflict and conspicuous human displacement across and within national borders. And, indeed, data is striking. The continent accounts for a refugee population of around three million out of a global population of about 14 million. 50 percent of the nearly 26 million IDPs recorded as at December 2007 are attributed to Africa.

Conflict is often readily accepted as a primary cause of displacement but rarely is there an acknowledgement that displacement in turn, can fuel violent conflict hence completing a vicious circle. Therefore, there is all the reason to examine more closely the intersection between the two phenomena. This Paper captures the magnitude of displacement in the three countries of interest (i.e. Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda), along with the causes and consequences of such influx, as backdrop to a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict and displacement, and in that way, contributing towards forging effective intervention strategies.

Despite the global decrease in absolute numbers of refugees, it is unjustifiably overoptimistic to conclude that we have reached a stage at which the refugee problem has been resolved irreversibly. Viewing refugee presence exclusively in national security terms, incapable of contributing to national socio-economic development must continuously be questioned. Repatriation, resettlement and local integration have served the world well, but there is ample room for improvement by complementing them with home-grown initiatives from, among others, such regional bodies as the East African Community (EAC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).1

The study concludes with the observation that the protection of human rights deserves far greater attention since universal practice has demonstrably shown that the social cost from human rights abuses, especially where this is on a massive scale, leaves countries and communities devastated on a scale incomparable even to some natural disasters such as earthquakes or famine.

Determinants and Impact of Displacement

Immediate and root causes of displacement

In explaining the causes of forced migration, observers stress the necessity of distinguishing ‘root’, from ‘immediate’ causes. The distinction is critical to facilitating the adoption of appropriate and effective strategies and solutions. The immediate cause of forced migration (as opposed to root cause) is armed conflict and the attendant problems of insecurity and dissipation of governmental authority along with lawlessness. Refugee influx from Somalia (1991), Rwanda (1994), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1996–98) and Burundi are all directly connected with insecurity engendered by armed conflict.

But a growing number of observers take the view that it is supremely important to prise open these ‘immediate’ causes and search for the ‘root’ causes since it is here we are likely to find the more fundamental determinants and thus enhance chances of finding more appropriate and effective solutions. The 1992–2002 war in Sierra Leone, for example, is widely regarded as an instance of violent conflict driven by economic factors (specifically, attempts to control mining of alluvial diamonds). More penetrating analysis seems to suggest that the root causes of the war lie in political decay, corruption, injustice and social exclusion of the younger members of society.

Forced displacement and the problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Often, displaced persons and refugees in particular, are associated with the trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Interestingly, despite the notion’s prevalence, experts are not finding it easy to justify the causal link. The acute nature of the problem is not diminished even by the fact that the exact numbers of illegal arms in circulation in the region is unknown. The “Small Arms Survey 2003”, prepared by the

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1 For details, see <www.icglr.org> and IDMC/ IRRI, 2008.
Graduate Institute of International Studies of Geneva estimates that there are 30 million guns in circulation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Within East Africa, Tanzania and Uganda are believed to hold 780,000–1,280,000 and 630,000–950,000 guns respectively, while Kenya’s share is between 530,000–960,000.

As is the case elsewhere, refugee presence (particularly, but not confined to Somalis) in Kenya is seen as a ‘major contributory’ factor in the proliferation and illicit trade in SALW. Refugees are blamed for the illegal importation into Kenya (and illicit export), sale and use in the commission of other offenses such as homicide, cattle rustling, drug trafficking and car jacking.

There can be little doubt that the civilian character of the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya has been compromised by illicit arms trafficking and brokerage being undertaken by some refugees. Neither can it be disputed that some of the refugees residing in Nairobi’s Eastleigh suburb form part of the arms trade syndicate. And yet, Mogire (2003) states that “there is actually little authoritative evidence to support” the claim that refugee presence is the major contributory factor in the proliferation of SALW.

And this cautious approach is warranted. If the link between refugee presence and proliferation of SALW has to acquire credibility then it is critical that the following factors be given consideration. First, weapons seized in the country of asylum must bear resemblance with those that are stocked or in circulation in the country of origin. Second, data on seized weapons should reveal their owner. Third, even where refugee possession of weapons is established, thought should be given to the motives of possession. As a number of studies show, criminal intention is not always the rason d’être for weapon acquisition. In some occasions it is to defend oneself and family from all manner of foes including bandits and involuntary conscription.

One study found out that in Tanzania, the link between refugee presence on the one hand, and insecurity owing to proliferation of illicit SALW on the other, is widely held to be a fact, while available data was not as unequivocal. Such is the quality of data (primarily from police, prison sources, and the judiciary), it remains unclear whether captured weapons predominantly belonged to refugees. Neither are refugees pre-eminent on the list of those prosecuted for illegal weapon possession, nor do they constitute the bulk of inmates. Finally, refugees are seemingly no more inclined to criminal behavior than were host community members (Kamanga and Rutinwa, 2003).

Nevertheless, it would be misleading if the foregoing was to be taken as playing down the impact of refugee presence. Mogire’s (2004) extensively researched work does concede that whereas the causal link between small arms and violent conflict has received a fair amount of scholarly attention, the same cannot be said of the nexus between displacement and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The study makes the further pertinent observation that refugees have a dual relationship with small arms—as victims of small arms proliferation, but also as perpetrators (Mogire 2004, pp. 18–19). However, we still must interrogate extant notions and data, contextualize the problem and draw appropriate conclusions and make policy recommendations. One such conclusion is that it is not in all cases that refugee presence is necessarily the key factor in the proliferation of SALW.

The major contributory factor lies outside, rather than inside the areas of refugee settlement. One such critical factor, and one that is often cited by academics and practitioners alike, is the proximity to theaters of war. Related to this is the incapability of a belligerent state to monitor and control the flow of weapons. Weapons are not only freely available. They can be procured at relatively low prices, ranging from one goat or for a sum of between US $15 to $400 (Mogire, 2004, p. 49). Another is the prevalent practice by major arms trading countries to illicitly pour in weapons in locations already known for gross human rights abuses (Small Arms Survey, 2007, pp. 98–107).

Possible Way Forward

Repatriation, resettlement and integration

The voluntary return home of refugees is in the overwhelming number of cases the ideal resolution of the problem of displacement. A major challenge in effecting repatriation is the high legal threshold international refugee law sets: return must be ‘voluntary’ and in conditions of ‘safety and dignity’. Few countries in the Great Lakes region can fully satisfy these preconditions; the latter in particular is difficult to satisfy. Crisp (2006, p. 14) succinctly captures the complications associated with undertaking repatriation as a ‘quick fix’ strategy. According to the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (2007, p. 36) a mere 731,000 refugees were repatriated (the same number as in the previous year) as opposed to a global refugee population of 11.4 million. This should bring us to the second ‘durable solution’, that is, resettlement.

A major setback with resettlement is the fact that the offer of resettlement is a discretionary act of a sovereign, there being no binding legal obligation on any state to grant resettlement. And even where a state opts to resettle refugees, it alone is competent to determine the quantity and quality. It probably explains why less than one percent (or 821,000) of the world’s refugees benefitted from relocation and reintegration into a third country (UNHCR, 2007, p. 37).
Where it leads to a significant decrease in the refugee population in the host state, resettlement does contribute to a substantial and meaningful amelioration, with the burden shouldered by a country of asylum. However, in practice, its impact has been modest if not almost inconsequential since the resettled refugees represent more often than not a negligible proportion of the total refugee population. Further, because resettlement often targets the young and educated, the host state is left saddled with those that need help the most, thus compounding, rather than alleviating problems for the country of asylum. More generally, instead of serving as a meaningful manifestation of the principle of ‘burden sharing’ and ‘international solidarity’ it has been reduced to a tool, and a whimsical one at that, of refugee protection. Out of a total refugee population of 435,600, only 6,100 were resettled from Tanzania with the equivalent figures for Kenya, being 6,500 out of 337,700 (UNHCR, 2007, p. 26; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2007).

Finally, there is ‘local integration’, which has recently been defined to mean the granting of full membership and residency status to the refugee by the host government. It is a process of legal, economic, social and cultural acceptance of the refugee, culminating in the offer of citizenship. Tanzania in the 1980s formally extended this right to refugees. The critical issue here is to distinguish local integration from other forms of accommodation in which refugees are allowed to enjoy a wide array of rights without legally ceasing to be refugees. Examples of the latter include the policy permitting refugees to live in rural settlements (such as Mishamo and Katumba in Tanzania’s Rukwa Region) or spontaneous settlements in urban areas (Eastleigh, Nairobi) or the Zone d’Accueil des Réfugiés (ZAR) in Côte d’Ivoire for Liberian refugees. This leads us to the question: “What are some of the practical challenges that accompany local integration?”

To begin with, research (Kamanga, 2001) reveals that there is considerable antipathy towards this option to the extent that local integration has come close to a disparaging term. There is the fear (and not wholly unjustifiable) of demographic imbalance in favor of refugees, with implications for the local community’s politics, economy, social and cultural life. Within the context of the Great Lakes region, local integration, for example, is seen as playing into the Bahima/Banyankole aristocracy, and nominally, in Burundi and the DRC, the Great Lake region peoples are, allegedly, one ominous short step from recreating the erstwhile Great Bahima Empire. What remains, the ‘conspiracy theory’ goes, is the conquest of western Tanzania, home to yet another significant number of Bahima communities. Second, and related to this, is the resource-based approach, which views integration as a threat to critical resources such as land, water, and forest-based items. Third, granting refugees permanent residence and broad economic, social and political rights might serve as a ‘pull factor’ on the one hand, and worse still, encourage refugee-generating regimes to continue ‘offloading’ its nationals onto other states. Fourth, it is argued that refugee presence is a major causal factor for a host of security problems. These include militarization of camps, the spillover of conflict from their countries of origin, and increased criminal activity (Crisp, 2006, p. 5, Mogire, 2004 passim). Fifth, refugees are seen to impose unbearable economic and environmental burdens. Sixth, their presence creates tremendous work for institutions of local governance (including the police, prisons and the judiciary) and is an unbearable drain on such social services as education and health. Seventh, and finally, it is often claimed that refugee presence serves to explain the retarded economic growth of Refugee Hosting Areas (RHAs).

According to Jacobsen (2002), for local integration to find approval, there ought to be “good will of key groups in the host country” in the RHAs to be specific. Whether local integration would succeed or not will depend to a large extent on who benefits and who loses from the continued presence of refugees, and on whether the interests of the various actors, particularly the most powerful, are being sufficiently served (or at least not opposed).

Whatever the case, it is a fact that RHAs tend to be remote, rural areas with host communities’ members being among the most poverty-stricken in the country. Invariably the area is endowed with crude if not non-existent basic infrastructural and social facilities: roads, houses, medical care, education, safe water, and telecommunication. Partly for this reason, “local integration is not a solution that is available or feasible for a large proportion of Africa’s refugees” (Crisp, 2006, p. 12)

Jacobsen (2002, p. 2) articulates an idea that is not too often heard, which is to acknowledge the dual faces of refugee presence. Although predominantly refugees are viewed as imposing “a variety of economic and environmental burdens on host countries” the “significant resource transfer” accompanying “refugee flows” is being acknowledged.

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Other Possible Options

Refugee-generating countries

The most common ‘immediate’ cause of forced migration in the Great Lakes region we have seen, is armed conflict. But a critical interrogation reveals other, more fundamental factors as the primary determinants. Typically, it would be the denial or suppression of such human needs as identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy. And there is ample evidence that the system found in these countries is, generally speaking, unjust.

These countries need therefore to be urged and encouraged to develop such political, social and economic systems that ensure enjoyment of basic socio-psychological human needs that relate to growth and development. Deeply-rooted conflicts (and forced migration) result from needs, which cannot be compromised and the denial of participation in mainstream politics, denial of access to a legitimized system of norms and institutions. As an illustration, the armed conflict in Rwanda of 1990–1994 can be viewed as a struggle to regain the non-negotiable right to a nationality and return to one’s home country.

Refugee-hosting countries

The practice and policies in a number of countries of asylum is characterized by the existence of a weak legal, institutional and policy framework. The case of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda is revealing. As recently as 2006, Kenya had neither refugee-specific legislation nor a national refugee policy, despite being a major refugee destination. Until 2006, Uganda (another pre-eminent host country) continued to be regulated by the archaic Control of Alien Refugees Act enacted in 1964. Tanzania repealed the archaic 1966 Refugee Control Act only in 1998 but the latter does exhibit several gaps as does the National Refugee Policy adopted in September 2003 (Kamanga, 2005).

There is, in addition, the fact that the three states are signatories to the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC) of 1999. Among others, the EAC Treaty requires member states to ‘harmonize’ refugee policy and legislation. Given the disparate conditions of law and policy in the region one must wonder at the prospects of attaining a successful harmonization (Juma, 2002, p. 12).

An examination of perceptions held by the general public as well as some policy- and decision-makers reveal that gross exaggerations are common. The stereotyping of refugees, especially by such critical socializing institutions as the media must be of concern. One way of setting right the situation is to embark on a deliberate sensitization campaign with a view to allowing the development of policies and laws whose basis is verifiable and accurate information. Not only citizens of countries of asylum could benefit from such sensitization. To maintain a harmonious relationship between refugees and host communities it is important that refugees be made aware of the reality within which they live. Critically, they need to be reminded that they are obliged to obey the laws and regulations of the host state.

In parallel with this sensitization, the fundamental question of the role of refugees in national policies must be opened up for informed debate. An increasing number of observers are, for example, questioning the whole approach by which refugees are viewed exclusively as a security threat, as an unmitigated burden rather than possible agents of development.

Another key conceptual and policy issue is that of the forms of refugee settlements. For most host governments, the preferred form is that of encampment or organized settlements.

But encampment (or the ‘warehousing’ of refugees) is an option that is also popular with aid agencies even if on occasion their rhetoric seems to suggest otherwise. The often-given justification is that camps are convenient for the efficient delivery of outside emergency assistance. The more serious explanation, however, must be sought in the manner in which aid agencies raise their funds (Harrell-Bond, 2002, passim).

Camps not only concentrate militant elements in one location. But by so doing they make it difficult for the host government to exonerate itself from allegations of aiding and abetting subversion directed at the country of origin, and the tirade of accusations and counter-accusations between the Burundian capital, Bujumbura, and Dar es Salaam over much of 2001 and 2002 is testimony enough. Tension on the mutual border arose largely on account of what was viewed from Burundi as Tanzania’s reticence in separating and screening out political and military elements from the Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Jacobsen, 2002, p. 10). Often, camps have become the targets of attacks in the course of which not only refugee lives are placed at risk but those of host communities as well. Given this reality, it becomes exceedingly hard to sustain the argument that encampment enhances the security of refugees and host community members.

Most of the problems from the encampment policy, it would appear, emanate from the policy perception that refugee presence is a passing phenomenon and therefore refugees should be ‘warehouse’ close to border areas awaiting repatriation. But there can be little doubt that the refugees in the Great Lakes region represent a ‘protracted situation’ and for this reason it is unwise to adopt an approach that seemingly ignores this stark reality.
Host countries should therefore be urged to consider forms of refugee settlement other than encampment. Encampment in the view of this author, represents an exercise in the wasteful utilization of scarce resources. The more than 1.3 million refugees in Eastern Africa ‘warehoused’ (World Refugee Survey, 2008) in camps could be harnessed and converted into a real potential force in spurring mutually beneficial socio-economic development. Instead, they are being let to live off ever dwindling handouts. The Great Lakes region is endowed with ample agricultural land and other economic opportunities.

Regional political or economic groupings

A number of observers feel convinced that there should be a greater role for regional bodies in addressing security challenges of which forced migration is a subset. Whether the problem at hand is that of refugees or IDPs the interests of more than one state, and sometimes the entire region, are at stake. It therefore makes sense to adopt a collective approach be it in the context of conflict management, resolution, peacemaking or peacebuilding. Indeed conflict management strategies would appear to be a consistent, even if in varying degrees, preoccupation of regional bodies (Juma, 2002). In the context of the Great Lakes region, the following regional bodies are pertinent. These are the EAC, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), ICGLR, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Let us, however, confine ourselves to the EAC and ICGLR, to which, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda both belong.

Despite the evident pre-eminence of the refugee and IDP problem in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda; one finds little evidence to suggest that the issue is treated as a priority requiring bold, innovative approaches. Instead, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, signed in 1999 (EAC Treaty) deals with the issue in a perfunctory manner and critically, as an exclusively security matter. Structured around 29 Chapters, it is in Chapter 23 that the Treaty begins to address itself to the problem of forced displacement. Eschewing any mention of IDPs, the Treaty affirms the undertaking by Partner States to “establish common mechanisms for the management of refugees”.

The fact that the only explicit mention of refugees in the entire Treaty is to be found in the section (Article 124) addressing “political affairs”, regional peace, “security” and “defence”, betrays somewhat the policymakers’ outlook on refugees. Given the phenomenal numbers of the displaced (particularly refugees and IDPs) in the region, it might have been appropriate to have a separate chapter on matters of ‘forced migration’ within the Treaty. An additional justification arises from the Treaty declared objective of establishing a Common Market, amongst whose distinguishing characteristics is the “Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence”. And indeed, writers such as Juma (2002) have long noticed the imperative of a harmonized approach to protecting refugees in the region.

With the accession to the EAC of both Burundi and Rwanda, the stage has been set for a more proactive foreign policy approach on the part of the EAC’s founding members (i.e. Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda) in respect of Rwanda and Burundi, both known to be refugee-generating countries.

Let it be noted that the EAC Treaty proclaims “paramouncy” of EAC organs, institutions and laws over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of the Treaty (Art. 8 (4)). Hopefully, with time and intervention of judicial activism, this paramouncy rule might well be the welcome and arrival signal of the ‘direct effect’ principle entrenched in European Union Law.

The ICGLR is one of two (the other being the impending African Union Convention on IDPs) recent regional initiatives in addressing, among others, the challenges of displacement. While too early to definitively comment on the impact of the ‘Great Lakes Process’, a number of preliminary comments may safely be made. Its remit is remarkably wide, probably a consequence of the strategy of addressing the diverse challenges confronting the region, in a holistic rather than isolated manner. To this extent the Great Lakes Process is as bold as it is innovative. It ultimately seeks to transform the region into a space of sustainable peace and security, political and social stability, shared growth and development. Of the ICGLR Pact (or, the Nairobi Pact of 2006) 10 accompanying Protocols, two are of direct relevance to the issue of displacement, and these are the Protocols on IDPS, and Property Rights of Returning Persons, respectively.

Final Observations and Recommendations

With a total population of around 5.7 million refugees and IDPs against a global population of nearly 20 million, the Great Lakes region continues, unhappily, to hold the dubious status of being a leading global and regional flash point of forced migration with little evidence that the problem would be resolved irreversibly in the foreseeable future.

Being the ‘protracted situation’ it is, calls for approaches that are long-term, participatory, and which depend for their sustainability on interventions grounded in, and reflecting the reality of the region.

\[3\] Foreword by the ICGLR Executive Secretary, Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, to the IDMC, 2008 publication.
More specifically, current precepts which view refugees and refugee presence exclusively in security terms, and which are incapable of contributing meaningfully to national socio-economic development must be reconsidered, as is the resultant encampment policy characterized by its determination to have refugees live off ever dwindling handouts. To condemn a 1.3 million-strong work force to camps would seem to be an exercise in the wasteful utilization of a strategic resource.

Armed conflicts, and ‘ethnic/tribal wars’ in particular, easily represent themselves as the ‘immediate cause’ of forced displacement. There is reason, however, to believe that ‘root causes’ lie elsewhere and possibly in the denial of individual biological needs as well as basic socio-psychological human needs such as participation, identity, autonomy, recognition and security. More sustained studies in this area are necessary.

The prevalent ‘criminal typification’ of refugees (e.g. in illicit gun running) is based to a large extent on unverifiable data. The resulting misconceptions and misinformation adversely affect the quality of policy and regulatory systems. For example, there is a striking convergence between views of key decision-makers and the restrictionist leanings of existing laws and policies.

The traditional, durable solutions (repatriation, resettlement, and local integration) have proven to be severely constrained so much so that there is a necessity to embark on a search for additional solutions. In this context, purposeful economic integration and an enhanced role for regional institutions presents itself as an approach worth pursuing with increased vigor. The EAC, IGAD, ICGLR, and SADC should serve as the case in point.

References


IDMC. See: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.


UNHCR. See: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.


USCRM. See: US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants.
Current Trends in the Migration-Security Discourse

Panel Discussion
This Panel, which was chaired by Andrea Warnecke, BICC, discussed the consequences of forced migration for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees on the one hand and for the recipient countries and communities of arriving and returning migrants on the other.

The panelists were: Marc Stal, Research Associate at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS); Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, Country Analyst at the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC); Joseph Chilengi, Executive Director of Africa Internally Displaced Persons Voice (Africa IDP Voice), and Dr. Sadia Hassanen, Tutor at the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO).

Environmental Change as a Cause of Forced Migration?

Marc Stal introduced research conducted within the framework of the EACH-FOR project by UNU-EHS. The underlying hypothesis for this work was that natural and human-made environmental changes (such as disaster, development and slow-paced environmental change) lead to forced migration. Research showed that these environmental stressors in combination with a lack of sufficient aid and/or capability to maintain or establish alternative livelihoods can lead to migration; and that land tenure plays a role as to whether or not people decide to move. Migration can also be a climate change adaptation strategy but the very vulnerable may not be able to move very far.

Research has been conducted in Malta, where many asylum seekers arrive from Africa. These people, as well as others in the detention centers in Malta were interviewed on their individual causes of migration.

Despite the fact that the 1951 Refugee Convention does not foresee environmental degradation to be one of the causes for granting asylum, some asylum seekers, especially from Mali claimed that they had moved because of environmental degradation (desertification).

One case study focused on Mozambique, one of the least developed countries according to the UNDP Human Development Index ranking. In the last ten years, the country suffered from four major flooding events that displaced and affected millions of people. A visit to Mozambique, and especially the Zambezi River Valley in Central Mozambique, revealed that the government had been trying to resettle people after the major flooding event of 2001 from lower-lying river fields to higher grounds. The flood-safe resettlement areas are sometimes five, sometimes 20 km away from the places of origin and they face drought, so people often can’t make their living there in a traditional way. Thus they commute to the river for farming. After the 2001 flood, a lot of people returned down to the river sites, however, in 2007 and 2008 they lost their whole livelihoods again due to flooding events. In the interviews in the resettlement center, people stated that they didn’t want to go back to the river to live there. However, many still go there for farming, leaving the elderly and children behind in the resettlement centers and coming back on the weekends. Or they stay at their fields for two or three weeks in little huts while they have proper houses in the resettlement center as an incentive from the government for the people to stay.

So what we have here is some kind of a mix between forced and voluntary migration, forced by the flooding events and voluntarily, because they are not forced to stay in the resettlement centers.

However, there are people who lived in the drought-prone area before and who become even more dependent on humanitarian aid than before because of the ‘resettlers’. Therefore resettlement is not an ideal solution. A hypothesis based on these observations could be that if people were not provided with humanitarian or governmental aid, this might lead to international migration or urbanization. However, nowadays, there is hardly any international migration from Mozambique. Prior to the flooding events, a lot of people were displaced due to the civil war, and most of these people went to neighboring countries, such as Malawi. Many returned to Mozambique after the 1992 peace agreement leaving degraded land, depleted fish populations and deforestation behind so that Malawians now claim land in Mozambique plus some natural resources as compensation. The migratory movement as such can be seen as internal displacement that became transboundary in nature because of the social networks that happened to be there connecting people on both sides of the Malawi-Mozambiquan border.

The Guiding Principles: The Case of a Failed State and Failure of State

Nuur Mohamud Sheekh focused his statement on the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by states and development agencies. As they are not legally binding, governments can choose to implement or ignore them.

In the case of Somalia, there is no state to enforce the Principles so it is upon international, humanitarian organizations to meet the standards set by them. However, the humanitarian space in Somalia is shrinking, international actors cannot operate in the south and the center of the country, where more than 90 percent of the IDPs are. In Somaliland, an entity...
trying to establish itself as an independent state, but not recognized internationally, there is at least some stability. Humanitarian agencies do their best to fill the gap created by the absence of the state in responding to humanitarian needs.

In the case of Kenya, there are functioning state institutions, donor presence, a vibrant civil society, humanitarian organizations and media that raise awareness for what the Guiding Principles stand for. But in terms of practicality and implementation of the Principles, there is still a long way to go. Kenya is a signatory to the Great Lakes Pact and its protocol on IDPs, both of which have just entered the implementation phase and thus have to be translated into national legislation. However, members of the Kenyan government have been mentioned adversely by the commission of inquiry to post-election violence, and their will to protect the six hundred thousand people who have been displaced must be doubtful.

Somalia is not a signatory to the Great Lakes Pact because there is no government that can be held accountable. There, it is upon the donors and humanitarian agencies to push for protection standards. Even though the Guiding Principles have been translated into Somali language, very few people have access to them and their adoption and use are seriously limited.

Progress in the Great Lakes Region

**Joseph Chilengi** commented on the Guiding Principles against the background of his NGO work. The Guiding Principles are legally binding in the Great Lakes region because they are annexed to the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons. And the Guiding Principles constitute one document, which is also part of the broader pact on peace, security, and development in the Great Lakes region. This pact has three priority projects to operationalize ten protocols, which have now entered into force. It was ratified by the required number of states to enter into force within a period of seven months, i.e. record time. The Great Lakes pact is different from the Draft AU Convention as the latter one didn’t annex the Guiding Principles, and instead selected certain Principles and included them into the Convention. The Great Lakes Protocol makes them an international instrument in terms of international law. And the Protocol on IDPs clearly states that individuals and groups can now be held accountable for causing displacement.

Speaking of displacement vs. international migration, one issue that needs to be raised is the income level of people who move. If you go into IDP or refugee camps, the majority of the people are poor. International migrants again tend to be better off economically and are rather well educated. Even within Africa there are instances of international migration (e.g. from the DR Congo into Zambia), which are well organized (i.e. refugees arriving in a hired bus), which requires refugees to mobilize social and financial resources.

Migrants Rights versus Reality?

**Sadia Hassanen** mainly spoke about the human rights situation of international migrants. Although there are big differences in human rights records of individual countries, none of them accepts the conventions containing those rights as they are stated. So for example in Sweden, there were times when Eritreans or Ethiopians or any other group were welcomed; even those who didn’t have a genuine case were accepted on humanitarian grounds. Now, even those who have a genuine case are not accepted and there are incidents of human rights violations of asylum seekers by the police.

She emphasized the importance of social networks for migrants, which provide them with the information that is relevant for them to move. Without them, refugees have to pay smugglers to tell them, which country receives refugees and where human rights are respected.

However, not only the states, even individuals working with the refugee regime are sometimes part of the problem. This is, for example, true for repatriation from Sudan between 2001 and 2003. Repatriation took place simultaneously with new arrivals of refugees. Although repatriation in principle has to be voluntary, people concerned are often neither asked nor presented with a real alternative; at times they do not have the chance to extend their refugee status which means they have no choice. This is an example of how Principles such as voluntariness are just written on paper but not taken seriously; human rights regimes originating in Geneva cannot be implemented by the people working in the fields if they want to live up to the requirements they face. So the problem is that even those who are preaching for human rights issues are not implementing them and this problem is hard to solve.
One contributor emphasized that to solve the problems of IDPs successfully it is important to give more attention to the knowledge and skills of IDPs themselves and to what they have done to protect themselves.

It was stated that in Africa many governments would like to shy away from their—sole—responsibility of protecting and assisting IDPs, and that this in itself constitutes a problem. But yet, even when governments respond to this challenge, it is because many of them attempt to cover their shame from the international community without really being committed to the ideals of what they are doing.

Therefore, it was suggested that it would be helpful to carry out a comparative analysis that could provide insights into how many governments have national legislations on IDPs and how that affects the situation of IDPs, also with a view to voluntary resettlement and reintegration. Even in Kenya, there are many IDPs who are forced to return and others, who are willing but unable to return. And if they continue to stay in their camps or places of residence, the challenges they are facing should be documented in order to inform programming.

Nuur Mohamud Sheekh asked to consider that non-implementation of the Guiding Principles is mainly due to governments considering them as an infringement on their sovereignty. Therefore even in Kenya the options of humanitarian organizations are limited. Most of the displacement took place in Kenya’s bread basket and return was considered necessary by the government in order to avoid food insecurity. The neglect of the Guiding Principles in the return process resulted in NGO pressure and criticism of the government policy, which ultimately resulted in a refusal by some donors to fund the IDP return program.

Responding to a question about what caused the rapid increase in IDPs and refugees in Somalia between 2006 and 2008 (despite ongoing conflict and instability for about eighteen years) he explained that the number of IDPs tripled because when the Ethiopians went in, many insurgency groups sprung up and started fighting the Ethiopians especially in the South-Central of Somalia. Therefore, Ethiopian attempts to stabilize the situation backfired and led to massive displacement.

One participant asked about the new phenomenon of a ‘feminization of migration’, i.e. more women migrating in their own right as professionals instead of following their spouses. According to this statement, the number of female migrants is close to 50 percent globally with Africa being no exception. (Voluntary) migration thus empowers women either through income or exposure or training, and changes the role of women, especially in Africa, at the household level, at the community level and even at the work places.

Sadia Hassanen responded by stating that in Africa, especially the Horn of Africa, despite the fact that women participate in everything, in the production and processing of food and goods, society does not recognize their contribution and does not give them equal property rights.

Against the background of her own refugee experience, she stressed that forced migration is not only linked to negative experiences but also to positive ones. Many studies show that migration empowers women. Poor and conflict-prone areas, for example Eritrea, receive huge sums in remittances and a big part of this comes from women who work in countries like Saudi Arabia or Europe. What needs to be discussed is how women can be empowered and who can support such processes.

Concerning repatriation, she continued, the principles put down in conventions such as dignity and security have not been followed by every country or NGO. In cases where return is really safe, there is not even a need for NGO guidance. A majority of African refugees returned by themselves without receiving any support from UNHCR or governments. In the case of resettlement programs, compliance with human rights standards depends on the country. For example, women will be denied registration for resettlement without the permission of her husband or brother in some places in Sudan.

One question raised the issue of how information and scientific results can be brought to the attention of governments. Most of the time the scholars and people who work with humanitarian organizations, the United Nations and NGOs consume this information, but it needs to be made sure that such information can be and is translated into action by the governments.

Marc Stal mentioned the example of the research UNU-EHS is doing. UNU-EHS enters into a dialogue with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and cooperates with UNHCR by raising awareness on the topic of environmentally-induced migration thus trying to achieve a mandate for the protection of people concerned, when they cross international borders. There is a mandate in the Guiding Principles for people who are displaced internally by natural disasters and/or environmental degradation but there is no mandate for them when they move internationally.

It is also important to build capacity. Therefore, UNU-EHS works closely with people on the ground, especially in developing countries to build research capacities,
to spread the knowledge, and gain more data and research.

One contribution touched upon the issue of definitions. It was mentioned that some definitions and concepts might be relevant for academics and policymakers but it is also important to look at things from the operational point of view. Sometimes definitions, especially the legal working definitions, have to facilitate assistance and protection, especially when it comes to providing assistance to IDPs, where responsibilities are less clear than with refugees, hence definitions are important.

**Joseph Chilengi** pointed out that the problem of internal displacement is the result of the IDP concept. IDPs are the responsibility of national protection but when there is internal displacement in one country it has regional repercussions, thus has to be addressed on the regional level. The Great Lakes Initiative has done so and this is what the African Union wants to do.

He stressed the importance of the donor aspect in this context. Currently, only the US American government has a donor policy on internal displacement, although they have not operationalized it. There must be a specific donor basket to handle problems of internal displacement, different from refugees, and despite much argument about it, in the Great Lakes region governments have decided to endorse this.

These developments have to be seen in the context of the Great Lakes peace process first, which started in 2003. At the beginning was a perpetual process where all countries designated national preparatory committees, which met monthly in one of the participating countries. In 2006, the pact and all the ten protocols were signed, and now the implementation phase has started. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) has already been signed between the Great Lakes countries and the African Development Bank on hosting the special fund for construction and development. At the same time, countries meet and are planning a harmonization of their national IDP policies and a peer review mechanism.

**Sadia Hassanen** brought up the topic of urban refugees and refugees settled among local people, rather than in camps, which according to her is the majority of African refugees. In Sudan, for example, 75 percent of the Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees have settled in urban areas. Officially, however, the Sudanese Refugee Commissioner denies this fact; in Sudan refugees are not allowed to settle among local people because of fears that they will compete for the scarce resources. This means, these self-settled refugees are also denied proper refugee status and can be even more vulnerable than refugees in the camps.

The role of the state was a recurring topic in the discussion. It was argued that either state failure or strong state activities lie at the heart of every refugee or IDP crisis. So, although states cannot use sovereignty as a blanket to avoid accountability, states will remain an instrument of improving or worsening the situation. Prevention, protection and provision of assistance are the three core responsibilities of state regarding refugees and IDPs. However, if you look at Darfur, Sudan, the Sudanese government is trying to reach the peripheral area of Darfur—which has not been touched by any government activity for a long time until recently—because it is interested in the resources and issues of energy security that attract different actors even from outside of Sudan. Also in the DR Congo, in Kenya or Zimbabwe, the state is unable to provide the necessary protection for its citizens. IDPs have to be protected because of their vulnerability and reduced agency vis-à-vis adversity towards them and not because they want a special status to be granted to them.

However, despite the central role of the state, both voluntary and forced migrants themselves should be taken as actors and should be respected, heard and their voice taken into account.

On state responsibility, another participant reminded the audience of their own responsibility as the people who put governments in power. Besides indicating a lot of issues, which governments should be tackling and blaming them for not doing so, we need to ask what we are doing ourselves. This all goes back to the core of democracy; by voting people have to make sure that the government in power that is violating human rights, does not get back into power again.

One participant expressed astonishment about the stated fact that an asylum seeker might be denied refugee status in Zambia and be granted it just over the border in Zimbabwe. How is this possible if authorities in both countries apply the same rules or legal principles?

There appears to be a tendency in Sub-Saharan African countries to no longer welcome refugees but instead to block refugees or to refuse them their refugee status because of the rights attached to it. Refugees, on the other hand, also develop mechanisms of obtaining the refugee status, which is a key to their security and enjoyment of some of its rights.

**Joseph Chilengi** was asked how Africa IDP Voice helps these asylum seekers to argue their case in order to get the refugee status. Asylum seekers, already affected by the events and not well educated about the norms determining the refugee status might need someone who knows the procedures to intervene and assist. Even if some obtain their refugee status by providing
wrong information, there are also some genuine refugees who are denied refugee status because they did not know how to argue their case and thus convince the authorities.

Sadia Hassanen commented on the difficulty of research about forced migration. As researchers, she said, the way we use the materials is controlled by our funders. For example, if the state or agency that is funding our research has its own agenda and if your research proposal has a different agenda, then that research will not take place. Or, to give another example, there are institutions that order you to conduct research for them, such as the one she did last year on illegal migrants in Sweden. However, when you have concluded your research, written the report and handed it in to them you don’t know how they use it. To be able to do general research you need to be independent.

Joseph Chilengi responded to a question on how the peer review system within the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is related to the African peer review mechanism by stating that the peer review mechanism in the Great Lakes process is a legal obligation of the states, dictated by the pact. At every summit the Heads of States give themselves country assignments of what is to be done on the three priority projects and 10 protocols, etc. and there is a regional center or civil society observatory, where the media, private sector, women, youth, as independent organs of the center monitor compliance in order to provide the checks and balances to the government process. So when the Heads of State meet, they question each other and have to report on goal completion.

He also confirmed that IDPs are used in strategies of conflict and war and power politics. Many elections in Africa are won when you have IDP situations, because it creates community polarization; the communities are vulnerable and African elections thrive on vulnerability. When individuals start gaining human dignity and security, the leadership is threatened, because then people have a choice to make. So they want to ensure that certain populations remain vulnerable so they become a basket for the winning votes.

Khoti Kamanga raised the question of how to deal with the issue of refugees. The traditional approach is that there are three durable solutions, but do they really exhaust the entire range of approaches that could realistically and effectively be put in place to address the issue of refugees?

On a more general note he put forth his doubts whether is it always proper and effective to have a legal instrument for each problem that arises in Africa. According to him, there is already a legislative constipation in the area of human rights, there is the AU Constitutive Act, the African Charter on Human Rights, one on women and another one on children. And should there be a legal instrument on the problems of one’s eyes, there will be a protocol on the left eye and a protocol on the right eye. It is not reasonable given the resources available to have a legal instrument for each problem there is.

Lastly, one question addressed the issue of environmental migration. It was confirmed that in Mali many people have to migrate because of desertification. However, causes for forced migration are different throughout Africa and therefore there is neither a master nor a magic solution.

On desertification as a cause for migration (that includes land degradation) the answer would be land management, also in arid and semi-arid areas. So it was asked if there are any international actors that take land and water management into account in order to fight forced migration; and if there is any group or any region or state which recognizes the term environmental refugees.

Marc Stal replied that there is no government that takes into account environmental refugees. There are governments that recognize that there is a problem with desertification, therefore migration is not always a failure of the state, it can also be an adaptation strategy. It has always been like that in the history of human mankind that people were free to move when climatic conditions were changing. In his view, climate change, let it be human-made or natural, in the future it is going to be a bigger problem for governments and for states. Therefore, awareness on this issue has to be raised and, both developed and developing states, have to try to fight it now through sustainable development. Environmentally-induced migrants don’t really need to be included into the refugee convention, but rather into the whole human rights approach.

Sadia Hassanen replied on the question of what should be put on the policy agenda, that she considers gender and diaspora to be an important topic because when one looks at forced migration the gender issue is one of the vital issues. This also includes women in peace processes and their contribution to development.

She stated that the diaspora is becoming part and parcel of African development for now and in the future, and many countries are linked through their migrant communities and value the influence of these diaspora groups especially in Europe for democratization processes, for equality or for gender issues.
In Joseph Chilengi’s opinion, the issue of impunity is a big problem in IDP-producing countries. Institutions’ capacity needs to be improved to better address impunity.

Nuur Sheekh concluded that it is important to realize that we really need to move towards policy measures at a confluence of forced displacement and social vulnerability. Second, he pointed out that measures are needed that address vulnerability created by forced displacement, both in the response, mitigation, and planning processes.

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5

The Policy Agenda
Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is a world leader in human displacement. Refugees, internally displaced persons, and every other imaginable variety of forced migrant are all represented far too well. But this Paper is not about combating displacement. I am not so optimistic as to think that we can rapidly reform the politics of poverty, plunder and persecution we see throughout so much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, I take on an only slightly less modest task: how we learn about and engage with those displaced by forces beyond our control. In doing so, I critically review a series of issues currently informing the forced migration policy and research agendas. These include human trafficking, climate change, humanitarian reform, internal displacement, and durable solutions.

Without denying these concerns’ potential importance, the Paper suggests that their prominence stems as from the interests of European and American states and international organizations as from their relevance to displaced people and host communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. In beginning to reshape the policy agenda, there is a need to shift our analytical attention to migration and displacement within Africa and local responses to it. Doing so leads to two primary findings. First, that the current loci of policy debates risk disguising practices that may worsen the condition of displaced people within Africa. Second, that there is a need to consider a range of more immediate, if poorly understood, concerns over those unable to flee, the influence of local authority and agency, and the intersections of displacement with broader social, economic, and political processes. It ends by arguing for an autonomous research agenda that will at once problematize prevailing presumptions and reveal more effective avenues for domestic and international intervention.

Approach and Qualifications

This is not an empirical paper although it draws on empirical studies from Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Rather, it critically reviews the policy debates and discussions in which I have participated or observed. As an academic based far from the global centers of power and dialogue, my exposure to and understanding of current and emerging policy trends are partial at best. What may be common currency and knowledge among donors and Euro-American policy analysts only filters slowly to those in my position—itself a symptom of some of the discursive imbalances I discuss below. But much as my grasp on current policy thinking is colored by my position, so too are European and US-American policy discussions impoverished by their distance from the developing countries in which most of the world’s displacement occurs. In some instances, this is due to deliberate oversight of inconvenient facts, elsewhere it stems from the poor quality of available information, in many instances it comes from how information is produced and processed.

Although I by no means represent a coherent ‘third world’ voice—or a third world voice at all—my perspectives have nevertheless been shaped by almost a decade of work in East and Southern Africa. If nothing else, this short essay is an attempt to open clearer avenues for alternative views to reach those who, for better or worse, set the parameters of the global research and policy agenda. Despite its lack of nuance, I hope it will nonetheless animate future debates. As such, the remainder of the document should be read as a serious of provocations: points for discussions and deliberation rather than conclusions.

Distortions and Dangers in the Current ‘Forced Migration’ Agenda

Displacement is a consequence of global trends translated and shaped by local socio-economic and political configurations. The legacies of colonialism, uneven development, and institutional fragility serve to continually generate the violence and deprivation that force people to move. These same factors simultaneously deny us many of the tools needed to assist those forced to do so. Few dismiss these relationships and challenges, but dominant policy approaches tend to overlook the socio-political and historical contexts in which displacement occurs. Part

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of this is tied to the imperative to act quickly in diverse settings: there is simply not the time to learn. But it is not only the need for rapid response that blinds actors to the environments in which they work. Rather, we have a humanitarian regime—an agglomeration of users and generators of knowledge—whose survival depends on their evident neutrality. At the center of this, of course, is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) whose mandate explicitly excludes initiatives to achieve political change or promote economic and institutional development. Funding for the UNHCR and its cognate institutions around the world depends on their willingness to remain beyond the political fray.

More accurately, the success of the humanitarian project relies on the continued appearance of political neutrality. Only by remaining outside of overt political engagements will ostensibly sovereign states allow interventions by outside actors. Only through continued interventions can those actors—international organizations, international, and domestic NGOs—source the funding needed for their survival and important work. This is not a blanket condemnation of the structures or a conspiracy theory; it merely describes the humanitarian ethos and the institutions that support it.

But we must never confuse the appearance of political neutrality with the practice of engaging in highly political and politicized environments. Any interaction in times of crisis will generate change. This goes beyond saving lives to changing attitudes, environments, and authority structures (see Stepputat, 1999). Even before hitting the ground, a range of overt and naturalized systems of politics and power determine how we understand what constitutes crisis and the justification for intervention is itself a political process. Simply put, the identification of a humanitarian problem, support for humanitarian assistance, and the delivery of assistance are not neutral processes no matter how many red crosses, crescents, or stars we put on our vehicles.

At times, the presence of a humanitarian need stimulates action from parties who recognize an opportunity to further their agendas whether it is to win allies or manipulate international opinion. The Interahamwe’s mid-1990s efforts to generate an international humanitarian crisis in North Eastern Zaire is a graphic illustration of how a genocidal army was able to play on international sympathy and guilt to help rebuild its force. In other instances, a form of intervention can have little justification apart from serving the interests of those who support it. In all instances, intervention is potentially far more transformatory and political than much of the literature on humanitarian assistance suggests.

This is not to say that actors’ motivations are necessarily nefarious or self-serving or that there is any other way within the current legal and institutional configurations. Rather, we must recognize that in many cases, humanitarianism is deeply embedded in systems of meaning and structures far wider than humanitarians’ claims suggest. Failing to recognize this means that the motivations and structures of humanitarian assistance often blind us to what are more pressing matters. In some instances, they divert energy and resources from more practical and durable strategies. Most worryingly, they can also help generate problems and solutions that, over time, risk doing more harm than good.

The remainder of this Paper all too briefly surfaces four issue areas that illustrate the points raised above. I do not wish to deny the risks and suffering associated with these concerns or the need to dedicate attention to them. Nor do I wish to impugn those whose work is clearly motivated by the interests of the displaced. Instead, I raise these points to illustrate the politics surrounding them: whose interests they are intended to serve, those they are likely to serve, and the potential harm they may do.

**Internal displacement**

Due to the work of Mr. Deng, Walter Kälin, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, and others, internal displacement has garnered considerable international attention. For a process that affects millions but had been largely ignored by the international community, there is much to celebrate in its new found prominence. But drawing attention to IDPs’ protection challenges need not hide the risks in current approaches to address them. My concern stems from three reasons.

Most obviously, the focus on internal displacement or, indeed, displacement at all, ignores what could arguably be seen as a far more vulnerable group: those who do not move at all (Lubkeman, 2008). As with all forms of migration, it is often the relatively privileged and able who are in a position to move. Those left behind are likely to include the elderly, the sick, and the young. Are they to be forgotten in our efforts to help the displaced? IDPs may be less able than refugees to attract international aid and support, but others receive even less succor.

I also sense—although without much evidence behind it—that strengthening mechanisms to protect the internally displaced coincides with a tendency to deny asylum where an ‘internal flight option’ exists. In South Africa, for example, asylum seekers from Eastern Congo regularly have their applications rejected on the grounds that they should have first attempted to find safety in Kinshasa. Globally, countries—including those in Africa—are looking for reasons to deny asylum. I worry that the strengthening of the IDP protection mechanisms offers them justification for doing so. As in the Congolese case mentioned above, internal flight is not an effective or practicable option.
My greatest concern with the Guiding Principles and other efforts to build international protection mechanisms for the internally displaced relates to their redundancy and potential to undermine domestic legislation and activism. In almost all countries, the persecution or displacement of people is already illegal under domestic or international law. The same goes for trafficking, critiqued on other grounds below. What, then, is the value of a new set of instruments? If a villainous leader is prepared to ignore extant human rights laws, what makes us think he (or she) will adhere to others? Moreover, by appealing to international standards explicitly designed for IDPs, we tacitly accept that countries’ domestic laws matter little. It seems that if our interest is in people’s long-term safety and dignity, we should find mechanisms to enforce existing domestic and international legislation already designed to protect the rights of all citizens.

### Climate change

Due in part to Al Gore’s successful foray into cinema, policymakers (and voters) are at last serious about human activities’ environmental and social consequences. Stricter regulations on energy use and industrial production are being considered almost everywhere. In the United States, President Obama has shrewdly linked the country’s economic recovery with the promotion of a green economy. Although having played a small role in aggravating climate change—apart from providing the raw materials and labor—we now recognize that many developing countries will suffer from accelerated desertification, droughts, and rising sea levels. This realization has rekindled long-standing debates over the possible numbers of ‘environmental refugees,’ their legal status and the appropriate actors for addressing them (see Jacobson, 1988; Castles, 2002). With millions of people potentially displaced, there is good cause to be alarmed.

While there is every reason to begin planning for people forced to move by climate change, here too I am apprehensive about three aspects of the response to ‘environmental refugees’ as forced migrants. The first is the diversion, in policy and funding, for research on climate change. While there indeed may be millions of people forced to move in the coming decades, there are already millions now displaced due to war and persecution who need help. Given the limited global resources for research and interventions on displacement, the fascination /fixation with environmental change risks ignoring those displaced for other reasons.

Second, the categorization of people losing their livelihoods as environmental refugees or forced migrants risks drawing the humanitarian project into areas where it should not go. Permanent displacement due to environmental factors, unlike war or persecution, is almost completely predictable. Rather than address this as an acute emergency, does it not make more sense to integrate the discussion of ‘environmental refugees’ into long-term reviews of global migration policy? There may be particularities associated with people moving due to endemic floods and drought, but how different are these from those moving due to economic collapse? A global migration regime founded on principles of equity and justice could adequately deal with both. Retaining climate change as a humanitarian concern distracts us from this broader objective.

Third, the language of environmental displacement is far too apolitical to describe the displacements occurring across Sub-Saharan Africa. It is violence and political persecution, not oceans or storms, which displace the vast majority of Africans. While climate change may exacerbate conflicts over resources, it is the political battles that remain the primary problem. Apart from distracting us, as noted earlier, the language of climate change and environmental displacement provides a convenient cover for corrupt and inept political leaders and policies. We already see the ever-wily (if sinister) Robert Mugabe, exploiting a new, naturalized discourse of environment change to explain his country’s economic collapse. If he is to be believed, it is not political mismanagement that is the problem for Zimbabwe’s poor, but rather drought brought on by the evils of the industrialized West. Environmental change is real, but we must not let it become an apolitical cover for far more immediate causes of displacement.

### Trafficking?

Along with climate change, human trafficking is at the forefront of contemporary policy debates, an issue effectively promoted by the International Organization for Migration, and Western governments. Over the last two decades in Europe, trafficking in persons has risen sharply on the political agenda, acquiring broad-based popular attention and demands for public action and legislation. When it occurs, trafficking (as opposed to smuggling) undoubtedly represents a gross transgression of a variety of human rights; and a potential issue for monitoring within Sub-Saharan Africa. However, there is little evidence to suggest that trafficking is a crucial area of regional migration policy reform, nor is it a pressing concern for that many people. Robust research on the sex industry in the Western Cape suggests that trafficking is either not as prevalent as previously thought, or not in the sectors most commonly presumed (Gould and Fick, 2007). Even those research projects deliberately designed to track and trace instances of the phenomenon have failed to report significant numbers of cases across the region.

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Despite these factors, there has been a relative frenzy of activity in South Africa, punctuated by the IOM media campaign against trafficking and South Africa’s recent drafting of legislation to counter this disturbing form of international trade. For researchers and advocates of migrant issues across the region this outcome seems out of proportion given the well-known and widely documented problems having to do with other less-well publicized migration-related forms of hardship and exploitation (e.g. abused deportees, unaccompanied minors, and refugee victims of refoulement). The point here is not to deny the horrors of trafficking or the possibility that new legislation will help migrant advocates to detect and act against the trade in human beings. Rather, the prominence of trafficking in policy discussion merely illustrates a trend with which Africans are all too familiar: policy processes initiated by external partners seem to neither reflect nor respond to realities on the ground.

Beyond its relative empirical irrelevance, anti-trafficking interventions risk two long-term consequences that will ultimately work against broader efforts to assist forced migrants. The first is to reinforce the perception that migration and displacement are inseparable from law enforcement. By regularly linking trafficking to all forms of sex work, exploitative labor, and international crime syndicates, the IOM and others strengthen the hand of those who seek to stigmatize and criminalize the migration of the poor. Even more worryingly, the counter trafficking effort legitimizes the militarization of borders. If trafficking syndicates were indeed swamping countries, border management should be a job for the police and military. But without evidence that mafiosi and triads are banging on the gates, such an approach is misplaced and dangerous. Given what we know about the operations of African militaries and police, their heightened presence at the border—far from supervision—will do little to improve anyone’s security. However, it will exacerbate corruption, violence, and exploitation while spawning ever more sophisticated smuggling operations. It may also prevent asylum seekers from crossing into safety as it has in South Africa. Informal discussions with European officials in Southern Africa also suggest that by promoting tightened border controls in Africa, the hope to soften critiques by African states when the European Union tightens its own borders against refugees and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Humanitarian reform and policies for durable solutions

The last area I wish to explore relates to the general focus on humanitarian reform and, more broadly, on formal, international humanitarianism. The United Nations agencies, international non-governmental organizations, and their domestic counterparts have a critical role to play in protecting the lives of forced migrants around the world. In areas where local capacity and resources are severely strained, hundreds of thousands of lives would be at risk without their assistance. But this is only part of the story. Across Africa, significant numbers, if not the majority, of displaced persons receive no direct assistance from the international community. In these instances, it is local communities, resources, and authority structures that make the difference (see Polzer, 2008; Misago and Landau, 2005). In some places, locals may violate national laws to provide life saving relief and open the way for durable, permanent solutions through the reallocation of land and nationalization. As we saw last year during South Africa’s urban violence, even those granted domestic or international recognition as refugees are unsafe when local communities deem them undesirable. Even where international assistance is important, how it is delivered is often equally dictated by local power structures as international intentions (Landau, 2007).

Recognizing that most forced migrants are not in camps or do not receive international assistance means broadening the range of actors we consider central to efforts to promote protection. In almost all instances, this means working with local authorities whether urban or rural; elected or selected; ‘modern’ or ‘traditional’. We must also consider the welfare of forced migrants in situ. Often efforts to promote the welfare of refugees risk fostering popular resentment against them. Moreover, building parallel structures to assist them risks undermining local authority structures or promoting hostility among local leaders who must ultimately be part of any durable solution (see Juma and Suhrieke, 2003; Landau, 2008). International humanitarianism matters, but we may save more lives by finding ways of promoting local authorities, citizens, and forced migrants’ efforts to find their own solutions.

Conclusions: Shifting from Law and Policy to Implementation and Protection

A short essay of this kind is invariably a caricature of policy debates and issues. My conclusions, even more than the text that precedes them, reflect this. With these caveats in mind, I wish to make two sets of related recommendations. The first is for policymakers and those who bear the burden of intervening under the watchful and all too critical gaze of scholars, donors, and directly affected populations. For them I would argue that we...
will gain the most value from efforts to strengthen local laws, advocacy efforts, and the agency of forced migrants and those who are forced to stay. At one level this goes against the interests of organizations who need to justify large-scale interventions. It also goes against their imperative to remain apolitical. However, if we are to promote long-term durable solutions, there is no way to remain politically neutral. We must also not be too sanguine about the likelihood that any policy—no matter how well informed—will achieve the desired ends. In almost no cases do African governments have the capacity to measure, predict, and proactively respond to human mobility in ways that will contribute to the public good. Even where African states have good migration or asylum policies, they often lack “the trained personnel, as well as the systems, procedures and technology required to implement them in an effective and consistent manner” (GCIM, 2005, p. 9). Similarly, international humanitarianism provides only limited impacts. And, as I have tried to argue above, we must not assume that the long-term benefits of international intervention will accrue to those we ostensibly seek to assist.

Effective interventions of the type alluded to above lead to my second recommendation, this one aimed at the research and scholarly community. Here my suggestions are also twofold. First, there is an acute need to politicize our analysis. To reconsider how policy categories and issues are generated; the political processes and forms of learning that shape current debates, and to be critical and cautious of issues emerging in the future. There are interests everywhere and it is important we name and understand them.

If forced migration scholars intend to fulfill the dual imperative of satisfying academic standards and influencing policy and practice (cf. Jacobsen and Landau, 2003), there is a need to broaden our audience and those to whom we listen. This means stepping outside dominant discussions and categories to situate forced migration within the contexts in which it most regularly occurs: not London or Geneva, but Lomé and Goma. Forced migrants are not divorced from their environments and neither should our approaches to learning about or assisting them. A focus that moves beyond formal policies and institutions will invariably generate a range of categories, challenges, and solutions that we have not yet considered. As Figure 1 suggests, we must also recognize the wide range of actors that affect the welfare of forced migrants. In most instances, those actors are not directly involved with humanitarian action. Rather, they are a range of other actors and agents geographically proximate
to the displaced populations but far from the sources of knowledge and formal policy-making. Only by understanding their influence can we hope to build mechanisms to protect the poor and vulnerable.

Reflecting my own interests as a scholar based in a Southern institution and my deep belief that we must understand displacement better before we set a humanitarian agenda, we must recognize that few of us are in a position to challenge dominant policy agendas. Given the unequal distribution of resources, those closest to the majority of refugees, local scholars and activists, are often unable to conduct research, publish, or otherwise disseminate their views. To gain access to global debates, they often rely on international donors who demand a focus on particular issues that all too often confirm what they already know. Where possible, we should push, as Bakewell (2008) argues, for a greater separation of academic enquiry and advocacy. Such autonomy need not mean irrelevance, quite the contrary. The only way to ensure that the political interests described above do not trump the immediate interests of refugees and migrants is to build the capacity to observe and critique those whose work is irrelevant, unethical, or simply misguided. But this means encouraging additional resources into research outside the power centers of the global north. I hope that in this short Paper I have gone some way to doing just that.

References


GCIM. See: Global Commission for International Migration.


National and Regional Responses to Forced Migration

Panel Discussion
Integration, once the application for asylum has been processed. One important characteristic is South Africa’s no-encampment policy.

Camps are perceived as discouraging integration and contributing to the emergence of protracted refugee situations. The RSA approach aims at fostering quick integration, once the application for asylum has been processed.

Under the South African constitution refugees are entitled to all the rights in the bill of rights except for those, which are expressly confined to citizens (especially the right to vote). They are protected against refoulement, cannot be prosecuted on grounds of their illegal entry into the country (given they present themselves to the authorities), have the right to live in safety and human dignity and are to be granted access to employment and education. Furthermore, South Africa recently set up a refugee integration strategy to facilitate integration of refugees into communities, educational institutions and the labor market; to protect their rights, counter xenophobia and discrimination, create a cooperative climate and educate refugees about their rights and responsibilities. One of the challenges in implementing the strategy is that South Africa is in its 15th year of democracy and still struggling to address the imbalances of the past, with most government departments still focusing on the needs of RSA citizens and in the process of addressing the rights of refugees.

The xenophobic attacks in South Africa were caused by a negative perception of immigrants i.e. South Africans claiming that foreigners are taking away their jobs while indeed migrants bring skilled labor and South Africa has been built through the contributions of immigrants. The South African government condemned the attacks and the victims were not deported, even those without documents; on the contrary, they were allowed to legalize their stay making use of a special exemption provided by the Immigration Act and for a particular period could stay in shelters. Despite South Africa’s non-encampment policy some of these shelters are still necessary and there are still some Somali nationals resisting to integrate back into society, asking the UNHCR to resettle them to other countries.

Outlook

In terms of tasks for the future, there is the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Free Movement of Persons, which aims at eliminating visa requirements for migration between SADC member states. Nine of the fifteen member states have signed while only four have ratified the protocol, which will come into effect once nine of the member states have ratified it. Border security was indeed one of the major concerns during the negotiations towards this protocol as well as regarding the introduction of the UNIVISA system that would allow tourists to travel freely within the SADC region.

Furthermore, there is the African Union Draft Convention on IDPs, which is the first of its kind in the world. Regarding this document, it has to be made sure that once a country signs it, it is then forced to have a national legislation on the protection of IDPs, which some countries find problematic under aspects of state sovereignty. Besides the states concerned, IDPs...
will therefore remain a challenge for donor countries that have to cooperate with credible NGOs and other countries to make sure they focus on the concerns of the most vulnerable groups.

Veronica Eragu Bichetero
Uganda: Advocacy for the Rights of IDPs and Refugees

The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) is an independent body that advocates for policies and legislation and comments on every bill with human rights implications. Especially, the UHRC advocates for the rights of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), because they are a very vulnerable group and don’t really have a voice.

Uganda has a troubled history when it comes to migration. Migration from the South brought the Bantu-speaking groups and migration from the North brought the Hamitic and the Nilotic groups. As a land locked country, Uganda has to host many refugees as well as its own internally displaced people.

The major causes of forced migration from and within Uganda have been conflict, especially with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and disasters. There is also a pastoral group, the Karimojong, who degrade the land and force other tribes to flee. Some forced migration stems from cultural practices, mainly female genital mutilation, and there was development-induced migration and religious persecution. Dictatorial regimes in Africa have greatly contributed to the problem of forced migration i.e. through political persecution.

Today, about 1.8 million Ugandans are internally displaced because of the LRA war and Karimojong warriors. In the ‘height’ of the LRA war in 2003 and 2004, about 2.4 million people were internally displaced. This resulted in a special UN envoy being sent to Uganda. The country was asked to declare the state of emergency so that the international community could assist but the government denied doing so. Finally the UHRC and other civil rights activists succeeded with their calls for an international intervention. Uganda also hosts more than 200,000 refugees from neighboring countries and this number has recently increased with refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Until today, refugees keep coming from countries like the DRC, Rwanda, and many from Sudan.

Legal and policy responses to forced migration in Uganda

Uganda has ratified the 1951 UN Convention and adopted a national policy on IDPs in 2004. That was a very long process, starting with research into what needed to be done to solve the problem of IDPs, what the international community could do and how duplications could be avoided. After its adoption, the IDP policy was housed in the office of the prime minister, mainly to give it the importance it deserves and in order to hold the highest government official accountable for its implementation. In recognition of the international treaties and conventions that Uganda is a signatory of, a new law for refugees was put in place in 2006. The UHRC contributed a lot to both of them. The Refugee Act reflects international legal standards of refugee protection as put down in the 1951 UN Convention, its 1967 protocol and the OAU 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Problems of Refugees in Africa and it allows refugees to vote (not at the national level but to elect their own representatives at the grassroots level). Uganda has a fully-fledged ministry for refugees and disaster preparedness, which is also responsible for questions relating to IDPs. The government has been pursuing peace talks with the LRA movement in Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan. The office of the prime minister has also established a National Emergency Coordination and Operation Center that cooperates with the UNHCR.

These policies represent the commitment of the government and set standards upon which the government can be held accountable. They address protection against displacement and during return, resettlement and reintegration and recognize the right of IDPs to request and receive protection and humanitarian assistance. They call for action to enable IDPs to attain the same education as other Ugandans and they urge for more participation of IDPs in matters that affect them, especially women and children. Finally, the policies recognize the right of IDPs, not to be discriminated against and not to be stigmatized.

The government has been providing the victims of forced migration with relief items. The majority of IDPs have returned home, apart from the Karimojong-induced IDPs, some LRA- and other conflict-induced refugees and IDPs. The policies have also been helpful in defining the roles of various stakeholders, so that bi- and multilateral donor cooperation is now better coordinated.

The challenges and the way forward

There is insufficient funding for the policy intervention on forced migration, un-ending conflicts in Africa, an increase in natural disasters due to climate change and the problem of ailing democracies in Africa.
For the future, there is a need to address the causes rather than the consequences of migration and a need to increase pressure on the African governments to democratize instead of just talking about democracy. Furthermore, early warning mechanisms for the prevention of conflict and disasters will have to be put in place followed by the joint setting up of monitoring mechanisms at the regional and national levels. The United Nations in particular should increase funding for human rights and humanitarian support.

Lastly, against the background of the BICC conference, people should place much more efforts on integrating and utilizing research results.

Anthony Barclay
Regional Cooperation on Migration in West Africa

At the outset of the ECOWAS Treaty, there is this stipulation that there should be concentrated efforts towards eliminating barriers to the free flow of goods and services as well as rights of establishment and residence for migrants. Following up on that Treaty, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol on the Free Movement of People. Quite lately, ECOWAS has adopted what is called the Common Approach on Migration, and in this document explicit reference is made to measures for the prevention of forced migration as well as the protection and provision of humanitarian assistance for refugees and asylum seekers. ECOWAS has several measures in place, such as a poverty reduction strategy, a plan of action on poverty reduction and employment measures from a regional perspective. While not directly targeting refugees or forced migrants, they do address some of the root causes of forced migration.

Addressing the root causes of forced migration

ECOWAS has been instrumental in addressing conflict areas in the West African region. For example, ECOWAS assistance in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Togo (during the transition period) and in the ongoing military intervention in the political process in Guinea have been well noted. Despite remarkable success, ECOWAS interventions have sometimes been criticized for being less strategically focused as they could have been and for lacking an effective coordination mechanism. In addition to other factors, these criticisms should be considered in the context of ECOWAS’ limitations in terms of human and institutional capacities as well as wavering political commitment over the years, even though in recent times the latter situation has been less pronounced. As a response to some of the criticisms, ECOWAS developed the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which entered into force in 2008.

The goal of the ECPF is to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa by creating space within the ECOWAS system and in member states for creative interaction within the sub-region and with external partners to push conflict prevention and peacebuilding up the political agenda of member states. This would be done in a manner that will trigger multi-actor and multi-dimensional action to diffuse or eliminate potential and real threats to human security predictably and institutionally. One intention here is to forge strong interlinkages among other regional initiatives designed to strengthen human security and incorporate conflict prevention activities as well as peace building. These initiatives include:

- early warning;
- preventive diplomacy;
- democracy and political governance;
- human rights and the rule of law;
- media (encouragement of the media to play a positive role);
- natural resource governance;
- cross-border initiatives;
- security governance;
- practical disarmament;
- women, peace and security;
- youth empowerment;
- ECOWAS stand-by force;
- humanitarian assistance, and
- peace education.

With this comprehensive conflict prevention framework, ECOWAS places a focus on preventing crisis and thus forced migration.

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Potentials and limitations of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

What are the current potentials of this ECPF? The first one is prevention, as it contains both measures applicable in the face of imminent crisis and structural measures, which aim to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place and if they do, that they do not recur. Second, it has a protective aspect. This aspect involves both military and non-military elements. Non-military elements take precedence and the military ones ideally constitute a measure of last resort within the broad peace and security architecture. Third, with the feminization of migration, the inclusion of gender issues should go a long way.
way to provide an appropriate response along those lines. Fourth, the participation of civil society adds value to the process. Civil society organizations are pivotal actors in providing a wide array of social and economic services. They also monitor human rights and advocate in the interest of forced migrants. Fifth, while additional assistance to forced migrants is usually humanitarian, ECOWAS has included allowance for the provision of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the short-to-medium-term. In essence, the framework emphasizes not only the prevention of conflicts but also halting its degeneration into systemic violence. Moreover, it emphasizes ownership through means, which encourages the participation of stakeholders. Enabling mechanisms including advocacy, communication, resource mobilization and cooperation are hallmarks that will be critical to its effectiveness.

What are the limitations of this framework? As with most frameworks, protocols, declarations and conventions, the crucial aspect in the realization of their potential is meeting their implementation challenges. ECOWAS has many protocols and declarations but their potential can only be realized if efforts are made to ensure that there is greater coordination, adequate capacity, sustained financial support, political commitment, and strong international collaborative arrangements. 

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Kamel Esseghairi
Regional Cooperation in Africa and its Limitations

With the growing importance of the EU parliament the EU Commission became more effective and transparent. The same, however, cannot be said about the AU Commission, for a simple reason. The budget of the AU parliament is decided upon by the Commission, therefore the parliament is confined in fulfilling its watchdog function and there is no room for transparency. When talking about the harmonization of regional efforts and coordination of activities, the European Union is a case in point. Despite their amount of resources they have nevertheless tremendous difficulties in harmonizing their activities. When you compare the amount of resources that, for instance regional organizations like the African Union, ECOWAS, etc. have, then you see that this task is going to be much more difficult.

African economies and governing institutions are weak, international support is shrinking and will further shrink in 2009–2011. These factors combined give rise to critical challenges with regard to the protection and assistance of refugees, returnees and internally displaced populations in Africa. The 2006 AU Ministerial Meeting on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, was a set of wishful recommendations and so was the 2008 AU Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa in Addis Ababa, in November 2008, which only deliberated on the latest developments and did not give any concrete and helpful directions to alleviate the burden of injustices undergone by African forced migrants. At least the Summit attempted to delimitate new settings of the status of forced displacement in Africa, including its recent and expected evolution, trends, and key issues.

It also specifically addressed five thematic issues:
• preventing forced displacement;
• effective protection of victims of forced displacement;
• meeting the specific needs of displaced women and children;
• rebuilding communities emerging from conflict and natural disasters, and
• forging partnerships in addressing forced displacement.

The Summit offered an opportunity for member states to reflect on the current situation and to adopt measures to invigorate the continent’s commitments and obligations to the forcibly displaced populations. The main recommendations were to enhance and strengthen existing structures and create capabilities that will enable Africa to confront the various challenges related to forced migration, such as to attend to the root causes of displacements in order to prevent forced displacements, improve the protection and assistance regime, focus attention on the specific needs of vulnerable categories such as displaced women, children, disabled and the aged, and to build the capacity of the affected populations.

The need to strengthen AU capacities and action beyond the state

African Union states were asked to increase the efficiency of existing capabilities to respond to such emerging threats as climate change and food shortages, and to promote international cooperation to ensure effective burden sharing.

Outcomes of all these meetings, however, which sometimes take place twice a year, result in two hundred, three hundred recommendations, are doomed not to be implemented. Therefore, my only request is: bearing in mind that supra-governmental organizations stop at recommendations, let us deal
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Mehari Taddele Maru
Migration as a Challenge to the African Union

Before I begin with my statement, let me remark that the title of this conference (including ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’) is unacceptable from the African Union point of view. Such a separate view on Sub-Saharan Africa was introduced by global financial governance institutions, mainly for the purpose of economic assessments.

The African Union (AU) has four priority axes: Peace and security, social development, integration, and institutional reform. Migration may thus fall into either of them and the AU is faced with some serious challenges regarding migration. Some players within the AU, like Libya, push for union government but at the same time deport Africans thereby constraining their freedom of mobility. Some countries, which have privileges and have actually been served by other African Union member states turn to xenophobic attacks on Africans who have been hosted by them. Freedom of movement is a cause, which we cherish as a guiding principle of integration, but it has led to some free movement of trafficking in drugs and human beings too.

Migration is an individual decision, but it has global implications and it requires international coordination to address the negative impacts and to make better use of the positive aspects of it. Concerns of security are embedded in issues of voluntary and forced migration. In the 1970s and 1980s, rebel groups in Africa were based in refugee camps. Governments have used forced migration as a political tool in election and post-election periods.

Security concerns can be seen as a trend that came up as a containment of population movements after the end of the Cold War. So there is pressure on regional institutions, and states are at the center of them. This turns into a problem of conceptualization of the refugee status. The OAU 1969 Refugee Convention for example doesn’t prescribe for the individual determination of refugees. It is a general designation of people who fear massive violation of human rights, massive generalized violence. At the African Union level, as well as at any global governance institution, there are four processes to make them work.

The AU’s role in norm setting and diffusion

The first one has to do with policy formulation or norm setting. More than 220 policies were adopted during Alpha Oumar Konaré’s time. Bringing 53 masters, the member states of the African Union (almost twice as many as there are member states in the European Union) to agree on these policies was an enormous challenge. The second process is of course the norm diffusion or policy dissemination process, which the AU is now beginning to work towards in order to bring other regional organizations such as the Economic Community Of West-African States (ECOWAS), the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to deal with some of the local problems they have. The third process is policy implementation and this requires capacity-building, funding and coordination. The fourth and the last one is compliance and norm monitoring. Member states have to be pushed to take part. International norms do not aim at destroying states; they try to make states accountable but at the same time capable of dealing with the problems their populations face.

Aims and tasks for the future

The African Union has four general migration documents. The ultimate aim of these conventions is to make sure that migration remains voluntary and legal, so that the laws and rules of countries of destination and transit are respected.

Human trafficking is one of the challenges the AU faces. Every day, 300 individuals try to pass through Boosaaso at the Gulf of Aden and most of them die there. Many migrants are trying to reach Europe through dangerous routes, which has led to a number of casualties. Still, some are so desperate that they consent to be smuggled. A smuggled person, however, can immediately fall victim of traffickers and can be forced to execute some kind of exploitative business.

The laws and policies in Africa, especially from the AU side are very progressive, unlike the practice. In order to achieve progress here, voluntary and forced migration have to be treated as cross-cutting issues in terms of institutional mandates and this requires more coordination.

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The moderator Dimitria Clayton, Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration ([MGFFI], Land of North Rhine-Westphalia addressed two questions to the panelists, “How can practical implementation of the promising laws and legal instruments that are in place be improved at the national level? and “What can be done to make work at the supra-national level become more effective?”

Norm Implementation at the National Level

Veronica E. Bichetero confirmed that norm implementation has been the biggest problem, however, sometimes the practice can be even better than the laws. This the case, when the practice is rooted in the experience of meeting with and talking to refugees and IDPs, for example by visiting an IDP- or a refugee camp.

Kamel Esseghairi raised the point that instead of funding more books of recommendations and meetings, the scarce funds (which can be expected to be cut even further within the next decade) should be used to really benefit the people concerned.

Finally, Busisiwe J. Mkhwebane-Tshehla explained that the most important issue within South Africa is the need for better coordination between the various spheres of departments. During the xenophobic attacks the challenges of better coordination became evident; otherwise victims could have been taken care of more quickly. The second issue concerns the conflicting interests of citizens and migrants with the provision of more services and access to all socio-economic rights.

Increasing Effectiveness at the Regional Level

On this matter, Mehari Taddele Maru emphasized that there is progress despite enormous challenges. At the AU level it is necessarily slow due to the immense coordination efforts required; however, there is visible progress in terms of policy formulation and diffusion.

Kamel Esseghairi supported this statement and added that the African Union, contrary to the OAU, has created the space to interfere when there is conflict. This reduction of the indefeasibility of state sovereignty has been a very important step.

Anthony Barclay argued that from the perspective of ECOWAS, compliance by the member states is one of the major challenges as it lies within the prerogative of the member states to execute the protocols, mandates, and declarations. Some of the governments simply do not have the capacity, and where the capacity exists, political will is sometimes lacking even though, in recent times, such situations have improved. At the institutional level, ECOWAS has just concluded an internal restructuring exercise in order to become more effective, but when it comes down to crucial issues such as implementation regarding poverty alleviation and human development problems, most of such activities depend on member states. This is within the context of ECOWAS applying the principle of subsidiarity, that is member states do what they can do best on the national level and ECOWAS does what it can do best on a regional level. Sometimes there are problems of coordination and information-sharing.

The open discussion, moderated by Dimitria Clayton, evolved around issues of compliance with international standards and the contended issue of human trafficking. Concrete questions were addressed to the representatives of ECOWAS and the Republic of South Africa on what the respective institutions do to protect refugees when they are threatened.

At the Heart of Refugee Protection: Norm Compliance

One impediment to norm compliance was said to be the fact that hardly any African state has a central location where data is collected on how many international or regional instruments have been ratified, which ones have been domesticated and which ones have been implemented or a treaty body, i.e. a committee of independent experts to monitor the implementation of the human rights provisions contained in those treaties. Only the Great Lakes Process aimed at ensuring that each country had a treaty body.

Veronica E. Bichetero pointed out that compliance is a question of institution-building. She mentioned the example of the UHRC, which has the mandate to monitor government’s compliance with the treaties and conventions they sign as well as the mandate to urge governments to translate some of these conventions into local laws that can be utilized and accounted for. Building human rights institutions and other legislative institutions based on international treaties, which will become laws is a concerted duty, a duty for every one to get the institutions to do their work.

Busisiwe Mkhwebane-Tshehla focused on the importance of policy coherence. She outlined that in South Africa the department of foreign affairs is responsible for ensuring that all treaties the RSA has acceded to and ratified are also domesticated. It thus has to make sure that there is a follow-up process, i.e. that country reports are submitted, etc. So, the department makes sure that the other departments keep track and coordinate their activities, as each department has the lead in a particular set of conventions. At the same time, the department of home affairs is responsible
for guaranteeing that whatever legislation other departments develop, they also consider the issues of migrants.

Mehari T. Maru agreed on the importance of institutions and pointed to the progress that has been made. Some institutions are already dealing with voluntary and forced migration while some countries have set up treaty bodies and conduct monitoring and implementation activities. Many of the countries have ministries for the African Union and regional integration, or ministries (or directorates in one ministry) for diaspora. Often, however, the migration issue in general and forced migration in particular is divided among various ministerial portfolios, which can be problematic in terms of coordination.

How Big is the Problem of Human Trafficking?

Attention was drawn to the release of the report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in New York, because on this occasion its Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa described the term ‘trafficking’ to be misleading. He stated that it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish between smuggling and trafficking. People need to be more precise in their terminology, sometimes slavery might be the more appropriate term.

Kamel Esseghairi summarized the principal consensus that there is human trafficking within SSA. From his background as former supervisor of HIV/AIDS programs in the SSA region, he explained that prostitution is a big problem. But since there is a lot of family-run prostitution in Sub-Saharan African, of the people who prostitute themselves, about two or three percent have been trafficked. However, there is a lack of reliable data. There is no denying that trafficking should be fought hard but against this background it might be a good idea to reconsider how the scarce resources are invested in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Charles A. Kwenin added that there is a thin line between human smuggling and human trafficking. Elements of exploitation, deceit and abuse are central in the definition of trafficking. In mass migration flows you tend to have both. For this reason, IOM and UNHCR and other international partners are convening a meeting to strategize on how to deal with this mass flows to be able to distinguish between these categories of migrants and provide the necessary assistance. It is very difficult to persecute human traffickers, because it is very difficult to obtain evidence or to get people testifying against human traffickers. So normally countries use immigration laws in these cases.

Finally, Mehari T. Maru pointed out that even with trafficking, implementation of existing legislations is the most crucial aspect, because the ICC Statute and customary international law define human trafficking as slavery and crime against humanity.

Refugee Protection put in Practice by National and Regional Actors

A number of questions were directly addressed at ECOWAS. “How does ECOWAS react to the situation of Liberian refugees in Ghana?” “How are Liberian refugees, now sent back from the United States, supported by ECOWAS upon their return?” and “What concrete action does ECOWAS take also in relation to other refugee and IDP crises, for example between Nigeria and Chad?”

Anthony Barclay responded by explaining the situation from the perspective of the individual players. From Ghana’s perspective, the refugee status is time-bound depending on the prevailing improved situation in Liberia. Moreover, given that assistance is being provided for the return of the refugees by UNHCR and IOM there is no reason for the refugees to stay in Ghana as refugees. From the perspective of the refugees, they argue that they have been living in Ghana for over ten years and many have children and other family responsibilities there. The situation is being resolved through a quiet diplomatic arrangement worked out bilaterally as well as regionally: instead of forcing the Liberian refugees to return, they are given specific timeframes to either return to Liberia or legalize their stay in Ghana under the ECOWAS Protocol. Under this Protocol refugees have the right of residence and right of establishment. ECOWAS has been assisting the two countries in the process.

In the United States, Liberians were granted temporary protection status, which was renewed every year as the situation merited it. Now, as the situation has improved in Liberia, they are subject to being sent back or they have the possibility of legalizing their status. ECOWAS does not play a role in this process to the best of his knowledge.

Concerns were raised about the security of migrants, especially refugees, in South Africa. Even if the non-encampment policy is more humanizing and integrative for refugees, they are in a very vulnerable position and their safety cannot be guaranteed. It was also argued that integration, at least in a case where it is impossible for refugees to return, should include citizenship of the receiving country in order to really be a durable solution.

Busingwe Mkhwebane-Tshehla explained that while the department of home affairs has the mandate to document and determine refugee status and takes this very seriously, perhaps it should also inform other government departments about the rights of refugees,
although they have their own legal sections. At the end of the day, she said, it is true that there is no one to accompany refugees and introduce them to the receiving communities. Authorities only grant refugee status and refugees are expected to integrate, find employment, etc. all by themselves. On the issue of integration as a durable solution, however, refugees can apply for permanent residence after five years of continuous residence in the country. After having been granted this status and given that there is no chance to return they can apply for citizenship after another five years.

Sadia Hassanen questioned the proposition that refugees are a security threat by pointing out that refugees are far too constrained in their liberties in their host country to be able to create insecurity. In Sudan, for example, refugees from Ethiopia do not even have the right to move away from their refugee camp. She also argued that regarding repatriation, the difficulty is to define what ‘home’ is, after people have been living abroad for ten years or more. This definition is one that refugees have to find for themselves; therefore host countries should legalize their stay after some years.
Introduction

In Africa, migration takes varied forms and trends. Apart from forced migrants due to conflicts, there is spontaneous migration of peasants due to drought and famine as well as seasonal migration of pastoralist communities in search of water and grazing lands. The number of migrants within Africa in search of better opportunities and security outside the country of origin is also large. If we look at the causes of migration, we find that they are multifaceted and often overlap and reinforce each other. Poor socio-economic and environmental conditions as well as armed conflicts (affecting one-fourth of Africa’s 53 countries) have resulted in a significant increase in refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Bad governance contributes to poverty and conflict, which in turn contributes to unemployment, migration, and to flows of refugees and IDPs. The rising number of forced migrants who are women and children is also a serious cause of concern. The negative impacts of forced migration on the human rights of migrants, on the security and stability of the host countries, on the health, particularly of migrants, and host communities, as well as the impact of refugee and IDP camps on the environment are huge and need to be addressed hand in hand with the prevention of displacement and the protection of IDPs, and refugees, as these factors are not only the effect but also the cause of forced migration. Not only have the numbers of migrants increased in Africa but their social and economic impact is also widely felt. To tackle these challenges, the African Union has been interested and engaged in the governance of migration and policy issues for a long time. This Paper provides a brief summary of African Union policy and legislative frameworks as well as institutional initiatives on migration, particularly the protection and assistance of forced migrants. These policies and institutions do indeed show that forced migration remains a priority on the agenda since the foundation of the Organization of African Unity and later on the African Union. Two major initiatives are the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Refugee Convention), and the draft AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (draft AU IDPs Convention), which is expected to be adopted in early 2009. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention is ratified by more than 45 of the 53 Member States.1

AU Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework to Address Forced Migration

The following list of instruments and policies provides the legislative and policy frameworks as well as the institutional mechanisms to address and govern forced migration in Africa.

A. Legal and Policy Framework

a. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Refugee Convention);

b. The AU Constitutive Act;

c. The Ouagadougou Declaration on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons 2006;

d. The AU Peace and Security Council Protocol;

e. The Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons;

f. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;

g. African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD).

B. Institutional Mechanisms

a. African Union Peace and Security Architecture (AU PSA) with its seven structures including

i. The Peace and Security Council (PSC)

ii. The Panel of the Wise (PW)

iii. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS),

iv. The African Standby Force (ASF)

v. The Peace Fund

vi. The Military Staff Committee (MSC)

vii. The Commission of the African Union


Presently, the AU Commission has finalized two drafts regarding IDPs: a) AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, and b) Declaration for a Special Summit planned to be held in 2009 expected to adopt the AU IDPs Convention.

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b. The Commission of the African Union with several departments working on the issue of migration and forced migration. It includes
   i. AU Social Affairs Department, Labour, Employment and Migration Division;
   ii. African Migration Fund;  
   iii. Civil Society and Diaspora Directorate;
   iv. Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division.

c. Other Organs of the AU also have mandates on forced migration
   i. The African Commission which has a Special Rapporteur for Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrants in Africa;
   ii. The African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (African Court of Justice and Human Rights);
   iii. Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives’ Committee.

d. Regional Economic Communities and their policy and institutional mechanisms

AU Legal Instruments on Forced Migration

The most prominent legal instruments of the African Union governing forced migration are the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, and the draft AU IDPs Convention, which is expected to be adopted in April 2009. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention is ratified by 45 of the 53 Member States. It not only strengthened the underpinning principles of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention but also improved it through its liberal and more contextual redefinition of the legal concept of refugees.

The Ouagadougou Declaration on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, which was adopted in 2006, is the basis for the draft AU IDPs Convention. Since then, the African Union has organized different consultative meetings of experts, ministers and Heads of State towards a better governance of displaced migration, particularly the preparation of a draft AU Convention on IDPs. After almost three years of consultation, the preparation of the draft AU Convention on Protection and Assistance to IDPs in Africa and a draft declaration on the adaption of the AU IDPs Convention is now completed. It will be presented to the AU Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees, and Displaced Persons in Africa, which will take place in Kampala, Uganda, in April 2009. When adopted and ratified, the AU IDPs Convention will be the first legally binding convention on IDPs at continental level. At sub-regional level, we already have another legally binding instrument which is the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons adopted in 2006. This Protocol has contributed to the drafting process of the draft AU IDPs Convention. In the next few pages, I shall try to briefly introduce the main arguments and discussion points during the preparation of the draft Convention.

The Main Principles and Core Discussion Points of the Draft AU IDPs Convention

The underpinning principles of the draft AU IDPs Convention is the state’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by ensuring effective prevention of displacement, protection during displacement and provision of assistance to IDPs. It reasserts that IDPs have special human needs different than ordinary citizens due to their vulnerability and reduced agency. Hence, such status should not be seen as a source of special privilege or a basis for discrimination but for protection and assistance. The approach is rather a human rights-based approach designed to meet the specific needs of IDPs in terms of protection during displacement and provision of assistance as well as prevention of forced migration. As provided under the UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27, forced migration has to be seen from the prism of freedom of movement and residence. It is also necessary to notice that freedom of movement and residence is not only about freedom to move and reside but it is also the freedom to remain in the place of one’s choice. It includes the freedom “not to move” (United Nations, 1999). Thus, states have to protect and come to the aid of people forced to migrate. The draft Convention also clarifies the state’s obligation not only in terms of protection and assistance of IDPs but also with regard to their responsibility in cases of development-induced displacement. It also has provisions on the protection and restitution of property rights, political freedoms of IDPs as they remain legal citizens of the country.

Defining IDPs

Even if there are attempts to concisely define IDPs, such definitions still lack clarity (Norwegian Refugee Council et al. 2008). The concept of IDPs is neither legally clear nor sociologically coherent. For example, pastoralist communities in Africa rove around not only in search of water and grazing land but also in search of security. Migration for them is one of the several coping and survival mechanisms when they are faced with natural and man-made adversities. Are these pastoralist communities IDPs? And if so could they claim assistance and protection from their state, the international community including the United Nations and African

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4 An establishment of the African Migration Fund will serve as capacity for dealing with migration in general. This is now being put as one of the activities of AU on migration in the next 2009-2012 Strategic Plan.

5 Available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm>.
Union? Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa (across Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan) cross the border without identifying themselves as displaces or refugees. This is true even if the cause of their displacement is violence, or conflict, or famine and drought. Where is their home or place of habitual residence? They do not identify and consider themselves to be refugees or IDPs. Mainly because perpetual seasonal mobility is their way of life, which, strictly speaking, does not grant them the status of ‘displaces’. Nor are they ‘refugees’, in legal terms, for borders to them are meaningless, and external imposition and state protection are alien to them. Protection is given by kin communities or clan authorities (not the states) on both sides of the porous border. They rather understand state power as an encroachment on their ‘soil and life’. While they are ‘displaced’, however, they are not proper ‘displaces’ or ‘refugees’. Most often they join their ethnic community across arbitrarily drawn borders. Life, in general, is not attached to the space they are in; the inherent defining element of their existence is mobility, whether it be spontaneous, forced by nature or man-made. Immobility, not displacement, is uprooting them from their way of life. In such a case, being displaced, not to be ‘rooted’ is a normal condition. Pastoralist would stay in some UNHCR refugee camps in the Somali region of Ethiopia until the right season for grazing comes and walk away from the camps. The assumption that people are displaced when they are not rooted in one place is wrong. First it presupposes that all people are rooted disregarding the pastoralists communities, second, it implicitly assumes that all displacements are bad.

Hence, the concept of IDPs is very uncertain as it is an extremely difficult exercise to categorize people as IDPs as a social category. The categorization of people as IDPs swallows everybody in one category, disregarding the diversity of causes and impact of displacement, needs and identification of the individual displacee. There will always be relatively better development somewhere else, which results in internal migration even if there is development in a certain area. Moreover, as there is no common conception as to which degree of ‘lacking development’ causes IDPs, such movement remains migration. People migrate because they hope to have more opportunities and a higher living standard somewhere else.

Legally, even if it is difficult, it should not be impossible to carve out a legal definition for IDPs, which could however be inconsistent with sociological facts. For example, one of the vital criteria of refugee determination is the crossing of an international border. However, this criterion was highly criticized by many scholars who subscribe more or less to the African conception of refugees and the difficulty of accepting crossing an international border as one of the vital and objective criteria (see Shacknove, 1985). For the Organization of African Unity, international borders were accepted as a necessary evil, as borders were arbitrarily drawn by colonial powers dividing kin communities and livelihood resources. This makes the definition of ‘refugee’ under the 1951 UN Refugee and 1969 OAU Refugee Conventions an imposed definition which served its purpose very well. As refugee status determination, it seems that the 1951 Convention is not capable of giving a solution to such problems coherently. The only coherent ground for the determination of refugee status would be the international border crossing (jurisdictional aspect of state obligation to protect) which may still be an artificial legal construct rather than reality for many pastoralists. The refugee regime serves as a ‘back-up protection’ when your state fails to protect its citizens. IDPs are rather still the responsibility of their own state. The need may be the same; the experience may be similar for IDPs and refugees, but the tools used to solve the two problems are different. Beneath such a different assortment of tools lie ethical and moral considerations—the principles of responsibility to protect, crossing of an international border, sovereignty and jurisdiction, self-determination and autonomy. More than the shared experiences, causes and needs of refugees and IDPs, the definition and criteria given when determining refugees and its clarity stems from its imposed legal construct.

Currently, the concept of IDPs is less clear than that of refugees, not only because of its diverse causes, patterns and nature but also because it lacks a commonly-shared agreement or developed state practice, or an imposed meaning. Hence, as the Refugee Conventions did, the draft AU IDPs Convention could construct its own legally binding expanded concept and definition of IDPs like the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement although it will be a very ambiguous definition leading to discrepancies in interpretation and implementation.

Under the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, IDPs are:

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border (emphasis added) (United Nations, 1998).

The draft AU IDPs Convention under Article 1(k) and (l) provides the definition of IDPs. Article 1(k) is a verbatim copy of the above definition under the Guiding Principles. However, the draft definition does not stop there. Under Article 1(l), it provides as follows:
“Internally Displaced Persons” also means persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of large scale development projects, or lack of development and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

Nonetheless, it must be clear that the inclusion of the “due to lack of development” (cf. below) makes the definition of IDPs under the draft AU IDPs Convention more of an economic or sociological rather than legal definition. It is important to note that this conceptual ambiguity is not limited to IDPs and refugees but also to other forms of migration. This is clear from the terms we use to describe migrants falling under this. People who do not fall either under the category of refugee or IDP are called many different, and most often confused and confusing terms, such as ‘economic migrants’, ‘mixed migrants’, ‘illegal migrants’, ‘irregular migrants’, ‘circular migrants’ and ‘failed asylum seekers’.

With regard to the persons who migrate “as a result of or in order to avoid the effect of large-scale development projects”, persons concerned by unless, such measure is taken arbitrarily, then such movement or population transfers conducted in accordance with international human rights laws and constitutions of the specific country should be excluded from the IDP definition of the IDP Convention. In other words, all unconstitutional decisions related to development projects such as nationalization of land and those in violation of international law as adjudicated by court of law.

Disagreement on ‘IDPs due to lack of development’

The draft AU IDPs Convention added another category of migrants under IDPs. These are persons who are forced to migrate “due to lack of development” or “as a result of or in order to avoid the effect of large-scale development projects”. On this issue, the disagreement was whether migrants due to “lack of development” could be categorized as IDPs. Many member states of the African Union expressed their concern on the inclusion of this broad and non-legal definition of IDPs in the draft. A long debate ensued on this kind of broad definition of IDPs. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement does not include such a broad definition of IDPs: Lack of development at the local level can be a cause of displacement, but is such a person who migrates due to lack of development or in search of better opportunity an IDP? Another question that was raised with regard to the concise conceptualization and definition of the term IDPs: Can an individual be treated as IDP or is it a group status? Is it a collective or an individual category?

Indeed, in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention the term ‘refugee’ is more or less clearly defined. However, the 1951 UN Refugee Convention then had time limits, as it was designed to apply only to refugees in Europe after the Second World War. It was also geographically limited at least in the case of Africa, thus the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention has defined ‘refugee’ in an expansive manner to include almost all people crossing international border due to generalized and massive violence and persecution due to anti-colonial struggle, civil war or disasters. The status determination of refugee in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, consequently, is rather on a collective than on an individual basis. Hence, can we say that the draft AU IDPs Convention is following this trend of having an expansive and broad definition of IDPs? If so, is it practically possible to provide protection and assistance to all those ‘IDPs’ who migrate to better developed areas?

Responsibilities of states and armed group

Another point of much debate, during the drafting process, were provisions on the responsibility of states and armed groups. Many delegates of African Union member states, as expected, seem to support that on the one hand responsibility be imposed on ‘armed groups’ but on the other do not want the convention to implicitly grant recognition to them. This is very difficult to legally conceptualize as responsibility can not be imposed on groups not recognized by the law of their respective countries. Many member states expressed their concern, and some argued vehemently, that a mere mentioning of armed groups and their responsibility in the draft AU IDPs Convention entails the recognition of armed groups by the state parties. Principle 2 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement stipulates that:

These Principles shall be observed by all authorities, groups and persons irrespective of their legal status and applied without any adverse distinction. The observance of these Principles shall not affect the legal status of any authorities, groups or persons involved (United Nations, 1998).

Rebel groups and liberation movements clearly fall under such category of ‘armed group’. But why are only armed groups responsible for forced migration (IDPs)? The term ‘armed groups’ does not necessary include opposition groups, rioters such as town gangsters responsible for the attacks on migrants in South Africa or political parties and self-styled groups in Kenya who caused the displacement of a large part of the population in the post-election violence. National or transnational companies could also be responsible for forced migration. However, such companies do not fall under the term ‘armed group’. Hence, to avoid
this problem, a suggestion was made to change the
term ‘armed groups’ to ‘non-state actors’. The term
‘non-state actors’ is not only all inclusive but could also
avoid the disagreement and concerns expressed by
AU member states regarding recognition of ‘armed
groups’. This was another area of serious disagreement
and the suggestion was not taken and no change was
made in the draft.

Other AU Migration Policies

There are four other African Union policies on migration
that emphasize the importance of the governance
of forced migration as a priority activity of the African
Union. These are the “Migration Policy Framework for
Africa”, the “African Common Position on Migration
and Development”, the “Joint AU-EU Declaration on
Migration and Development”, and the “Ouagadougou
Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings,
Especially Women and Children”.

The ultimate aim of the policies is to ensure migration
is voluntary and legal through methods such as the
respect for human rights of migrants and collaboration
among actors, including migrants, countries of origin,
transit and destination. The Migration Policy Framework
for Africa mainly focuses on building the capacity
of African states to effectively respond to forced
migration, refugees, asylum seekers, and particularly
IDPs, and to refugee crises. It also focuses on efforts to
find durable solutions for refugees in collaboration with
UNHCR and other national and international partners.
More importantly, an emphasis is given to the need
to address the root causes of refugee movements,
including conflict and political instability. The Policy
Framework also calls for equal treatment of African
refugees in comparison to refugees from other parts of
the world in line with international standards. The main
points of recommendation of the Policy Framework are:

a. Ratification and compliance with the 1951 Conven-
tion on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,
the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa;
b. Ratification of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
and their two Additional Protocols of 1977;
c. Respect for the principle of non-refoulement;
d. Capacity-building through training and the estab-
lishment of a body working on refugee issues and
establishing intra-regional cooperation;
e. Strengthening bilateral cooperation between states
with regard to the treatment and status of refugees;
f. Integration of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement into regional and national legislative
and policy frameworks, and
g. Establishing a system of peer accountability by
member states.

In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that even if
the policy framework and institutional architecture for
the prevention of forced migration, protection, and
assistance of forced migrants already exists at AU level
it will still have to be harmonized. Until now the African
Union has focused on norm-setting and, to some
extent, on norm-diffusion by way of popularizing and
disseminating these policies. It now has to move fast
towards the norm-implementation phase of it policies.
Moreover, the devil lies in the details of implementation.
Even if the duties of the African Union and Regional
Economic Communities are mainly in facilitating
the implementation and monitoring the progress
of the implementation of these policies, ultimately
implementation remains mainly the responsibility of the
African Union member states.

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October.
Some Common Ground? The Role of Third Parties and International Organizations
Panel Discussion
This Panel, which was chaired by Dr. Koko Warner, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), discussed the role of third parties and international organizations in displacement settings.

The panelists were:

Steven Corliss, The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR); Anne Zeidan, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); Lisbeth Pilegaard, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); Sicel’mpilo Shange-Buthane, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA); Charles A. Kwenin, International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Claudia Bürkin, KfW Entwicklungsbank

Steven Corliss
Protecting and Finding Solutions for Refugees within an Increasingly Complex Migration Dynamic: A UNHCR Perspective

Without diminishing the challenges of cyclical and seemingly endless conflicts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Darfur, Sudan and Chad, one should not lose sight of some of the positive developments in Western and Southern Africa. With some notable exceptions, mainly Mauritania, Guinea and Zimbabwe, most countries of the region are largely peaceful and stable today. Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned home to rebuild their lives.

At the end of 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) declared the cessation of refugee status for Sierra Leoneans, and this is also on the horizon for Liberian refugees. UNHCR has worked together with ECOWAS and the member states to provide the remaining Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees with the options of voluntary repatriation or permanent residence and eventual naturalization in their countries of asylum. In addition to voluntary repatriation and resettlement, local integration, once called the forgotten solution, is now an emerging trend. The most remarkable example is Tanzania where some 150,000 Burundian refugees from the 1972 influx have naturalization applications pending with the Tanzanian authorities. Local integration in Tanzania forms a part of a comprehensive solution strategy that has also seen a group resettlement of nearly 7,500 Burundian refugees to the United States during 2007 and 2008 and the voluntary repatriation of more than 95,000 Burundian refugees in 2008.

These positive developments suggest several areas for inquiry. What made the peace processes in West Africa and, so far, in Burundi work? How can we build upon the positive examples of these models of local integration? What role can regional integration and regional organizations play in providing a platform for solving or at least ameliorating forced displacement problems?

For example, the expansion of the East African Community (EAC) to include Burundi will bring into play a new framework governing the rights of residents of EAC citizens. Similarly, an effective legal framework for the freedom of movement and labor mobility in the SADC region might have contributed toward managing displacement situations in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The lack of alternatives for legal migration burdens national asylum systems. Legal migration channels must not be a replacement or substitute for asylum but such arrangements can actually contribute to preserving asylum space.

Continuing relevance of UNHCR’s mandate

UNHCR was established nearly sixty years ago to ensure the protection of refugees and to work with governments in seeking solutions for their plight. International refugee law and UNHCR’s mandate for protection and solutions provide a broadly accepted global framework for addressing the needs of refugees.

With some 11.4 million refugees in need of protection globally, nearly one-quarter of whom are hosted in African nations, UNHCR’s mandate remains vital and relevant today. The phenomenon of forced migration, however, has evolved and has become increasingly complex. In Africa, UNHCR now takes responsibility for an additionally 5.9 million IDPs, as compared with 2.4 million refugees.

The changing dynamics of displacement require UNHCR to develop creative new strategies and to engage with an ever expanding circle of partners—from governments to sister UN agencies and other international organizations, to NGOs and other civil society actors, to refugees and displaced persons to the receiving communities.

To illustrate the complexities of fulfilling UNHCR’s mandate for protection and solutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the need for international cooperation, an interdisciplinary approach and new and more effective partnerships, the following key challenges should be highlighted:

• Protecting refugees and asylum seekers travelling in mixed migratory flows;
• Finding solutions for refugees in protracted situations;
• Providing effective protection and assistance for refugees in urban settings.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, selected these themes for the

Some of the challenges for UNHCR that lie ahead can be listed as follows:

1. Expanding peace processes taking into account the interest of refugees and displaced person communities, and in particular women.
2. Building institutional mechanisms that ensure protection, respect for human rights not only for refugees but also for all that travel in mixed migratory flows.
3. Giving refugees and IDPs in protracted situations real possibilities for sustainable solutions, which means including them within national frameworks for development.
4. Responding to the challenges posed by the urban dimension of refugees and IDP regarding integration.

Anne Zeidan
Prevention of Forced Displacement of Civilian Populations: A Challenge in Armed Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

Despite Africa’s long history and culture of generosity towards victims of displacement and its progressive normative framework and humanitarian practice, the growing complexity of the patterns, trends and challenges relating to forced displacement are impeding the realization of Africa’s vision for sustainable development.

Some African countries belong to the ‘world top five’ of the worst-affected countries in terms of internal displacement. Sudan alone accounts for more than five million internally displaced persons (IDPs), followed by northern Uganda with 1.7 million and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with 1.1 million. During recent years, significant new internal displacement has occurred in Chad, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.

A legal framework for preventing displacement

The prevention of forced displacement or refugee flows is part of the wider protection of the civilian population required by international humanitarian and human rights law. To prevent arbitrary displacement of citizens is the primary responsibility of states, but also of other parties to an armed conflict. There are various treaties and international initiatives which provide protection from forcible displacement and require states to take measures to help populations to cope with the consequences whenever such displacement occurs.

The African Union Convention on IDPs, which shall be adopted in Kampala in October this year, is codifying a set of Principles (soft law) and turning them into binding obligations for states. Such an instrument responds to the particularities of the region, making the instrument directly applicable to specific circumstances.

The lack of protection of the civilian population against the effects of violence (lack of precaution in the conduct of hostilities and/or indiscriminate attacks but also gaps in the responsibility to care for the protection of civilian populations) has forced millions of people to flee their homes. Massive displacement consequently often results in aggravated vulnerabilities for IDPs with an increased lack of respect for their fundamental rights.

Humanitarian action preventing forced displacement should first prevent a harmful event from occurring (or recurring), should limit the scope of such an event if it does occur, and should contain or keep to a minimum the harmful effects of the event.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) seeks to promote the whole range of humanitarian principles so as to prevent—or at the very least to limit—excesses of war by the promotion of humanitarian law through teaching and training and the integration of humanitarian law into official legal, educational and operational curricula. The ICRC targets in particular those people and groups who determine the fate of victims of armed conflict or who can obstruct or facilitate humanitarian action. These groups include armed forces, police, security forces and other bearers of weapons, decision-makers and opinion leaders at the local and international level. With an eye to the future, young people and university students are also targeted.

Preparredness and early warning is a second important element in preventing abuses. This activity is undertaken in connection with a potential pattern of abuse, preparing responsive/remedial action in order to prevent or alleviate its immediate effects. This includes response-building to anticipate immediate effects, consulting potentially affected communities, setting up rapid-response mechanisms and developing preventive assistance for populations at risk.

The response to the needs resulting from displacement depends on the situation of the IDPs; in particular whether they are living in host communities or in camps. Displaced people often seek refuge with relatives or friends in more secure locations. They are less visible

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than IDPs in camps, but may be no less vulnerable, particularly where they have few resources of their own and are dependent on their hosts. Furthermore, their presence can further impoverish communities that are already poor, and can lead to increasing resentment between IDPs and their hosts.

In keeping with its ‘all-victims’ approach, the ICRC considers the needs of both the IDPs themselves and the families hosting them, or the local residents living in the area of the camp. It aims to ensure that the local population is not adversely affected by the IDPs’ arrival, and to prevent a new set of protection concerns arising.

The coping mechanisms of both residents and displaced populations must be strengthened in order to avoid a situation in which those residents, in their turn, are also forced to move elsewhere. The rapid depletion of resources may weaken their independent capacity to cope in the event of violence or natural disaster, and thus their ability to remain where they are.

Forced displacement is not fate. This is why it is important to often recall that prevention remains the most effective way of avoiding the harmful effects on populations of a rapid-onset crisis.

Anne Zeidan is Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ IDPs project—Direction of Operations—where she is in charge of implementing its institutional plan of action on internal displacement.

Lisbeth Pilegaard
Challenges in Responding to Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa

I would like to first address the need to clarify terminology and streamline the discussion while speaking about migration, forced migration, asylum or refugees at this conference. I see and hear participants using the terminologies a bit different – and they do have different meanings. This is also important in terms of clarifying responsibilities. Clarify about roles and responsibilities of humanitarian and development actors is of mayor importance to increase efficiency in preventing displacement and assisting refugees and IDPs. This includes the gap between humanitarian and development responses in the field, which is of concern to NRC.

Approaches to tackle displacement have to take into account the various contexts and challenges of displacement in the different regions of Africa as well as the different phases of a displacement. There is a huge contrast between the phases of intervention both from a humanitarian and a development perspective in terms of what has to be done, how one can assist and who should be assisting in the respective phases of conflict. Indeed, the number of conflicts in Africa has decreased, but recent conflicts last longer, which faces the humanitarian agencies, the development agencies and other state actors with new challenges in terms of responding adequately.

Another issue that has to be taken into consideration by humanitarian and development actors is environmental degradation and natural hazards contributing to migration flows. In this context, also the food security crisis, the rising food prices and the riots accompanying the crisis poses a mayor challenge. The food crisis as a cross-cutting issue is being dealt with by a variety of agencies but without one ‘lead’ agency that deals specifically with it. Roles and responsibilities in responding to these challenges need to be clarified. Not only has the gap between academics and practitioners to be bridged, but also the gap within the sector of response to displacement, i.e. between humanitarian and development agencies.

Third parties, including both international and national NGOs, play an important role in conflict settings. Their role can be operational or consist of providing assistance. In some places NGOs advocate for the rights of the displaced. Nonetheless, there are also situations where NGOs can neither operate nor provide assistance. Accordingly, access to a displaced population is a mayor challenge for NGOs trying to assist. This can be exemplified by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)’s presence in Darfur before it was expelled. For an NGO it is always a challenge to operate in a country without being able to count on a strong United Nations presence. Another case is Somalia with a weak presence of the United Nations and where both national and international NGOs play a crucial role.

The security context in which displacement is often embedded and which often puts a stigma on any displaced person as being a security threat has to be dealt with carefully. It has the inherent danger of increasing the role of national and international military actors in the area of humanitarian assistance. The roles played by civilian providers of humanitarian assistance and the military have to be clearly defined and separated.

The issue of housing, land and property, a reason for but also a solution to and the end of displacement is essential to identify durable solutions. It has to be dealt with by all actors involved, including the returnees themselves. However, dealing with land issues in Africa is a huge and extremely sensitive task that needs to be addressed by practitioners but also by researchers.

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The Role of Civil Society in the Promotion and Protection of Refugee Rights

The Consortium for Refugee and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) is a national network of organizations working with refugees and migrants in South Africa. It is committed to the promotion and protection of refugee and migrant rights. CoRMSA’s mandate is to improve coordination and information sharing in the sector, advocacy and lobbying, building networks in the various provinces.

Characteristics of forced migration in South Africa

South Africa currently hosts thousands of refugees and asylum seekers from different regions of the world with the majority being from other African countries.

Refugee legislation in South Africa guarantees certain rights and responsibilities for asylum seekers and refugees, which are further strengthened by the provisions of the South African Constitution. South Africa is also a signatory to all the international conventions on the protection of refugees, including the OAU Convention which has specific provisions for refugee situations in Africa. However, the asylum system abounds with problems. Had it not been for the role played by NGOs in advocating for the realization of these rights, many asylum seekers and refugees would be a long way from achieving some of these rights.

Most of the forced migrants in South Africa have fled their countries of origin due to wars e.g. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Angola. Also the current economic and political situation in Zimbabwe has forced a large number of Zimbabweans to flee to neighboring countries, including South Africa and Botswana. While some of the Zimbabweans currently in South Africa may qualify for asylum, others do not fall under this category nor can they be classified as highly skilled. This then leaves a large number of people who do not fall under the current documentation dispensation.

The role of NGOs in addressing complex refugee emergencies and internal displacement

South African NGOs play a major and critical role in addressing refugee situations and internal displacement. NGOs are normally the first point of call for refugees and asylum seekers, since services that address their needs are mostly provided by NGOs.

South Africa has a policy of urban integration for asylum seekers and refugees. There are neither refugee camps nor subsidies from the government. As a result, asylum seekers and refugees have to secure their own accommodation, food and find employment. NGOs then play a major role in providing social assistance, which includes food, accommodation/shelter, funding for education, and psycho-social support. Some NGOs are UNHCR implementing partners and others are independent and raise their own funds to be able to assist.

While access to healthcare is guaranteed for everyone, asylum seekers and refugees often experience problems in accessing these from government facilities. Some NGOs have bridged this gap by providing Primary Health Care to this group while they continue to engage in advocacy work in this regard.

NGOs also do advocacy work on behalf of forced migrants, since immigrants have limited channels by which to articulate their grievances or contest their treatment in the country. This is through providing advice on the asylum process, services, legal assistance in cases of appeals and making recommendations on policy debates.

NGOs were among the first to assist those affected by the May 2008 xenophobic attacks and coordinate assistance. Before these attacks, South Africa did not experience internally displaced people. Consequently, neither the government nor civil society could draw from former experiences, which resulted in an uncoordinated response of national and international actors.

NGOs are engaged in fundraising activities and continue to play a role in the reintegration projects. Furthermore, NGOs have been lobbying for qualifying Zimbabweans to be granted refugee status when the government was denying that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe. There is ongoing work by NGOs in advocating for other means of documentation for Zimbabweans.

NGOs also play a major role in making sure that rights of asylum seekers and refugees are respected by government and other service providers. While some improvements were noted in the reception of asylum seekers at Refugee Reception Offices, much work still needs to be done to ensure that asylum seekers are granted the right to apply for asylum without fear of being arrested because they could not access the offices.

Policy recommendations from NGO perspective

While we, at CoRMSA, acknowledge that a lot has been done by the government to improve and alleviate the situation of forced migrants in South Africa, there is still much room for improvement. It is commendable that the Department of Home Affairs opened a temporary

Refugee Reception Centre in Musina in 2008. This has gone a long way in addressing the plight of Zimbabweans who seek asylum. However, challenges still remain. The following policy recommendations are based on the CoRMSA 2008 Report:

- The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) needs to ensure that Zimbabwean and other migrants have access to the basic welfare services to which they are entitled by educating and monitoring ground-level staff of the rights of documented and undocumented asylum seekers/refugees and migrants.
- A temporary permit for Zimbabweans should be introduced that would allow them to remain in South Africa, be able to access basic services and work.
- DHA should pursue procedural reforms in the refugee reception process to ensure that prospective asylum seekers are not unduly exposed to arrest and detention. Currently asylum seekers are not able to renew their permits because of new procedures implemented from August 2008 onwards.
- The South African Police Service (SAPS) should cease the illegal deportation of Zimbabweans from the border area without them having been screened by DHA officials.
- Incorporate training on the rights of non-nationals into police training college syllabi.
- The Department of Health should train staff on the Schedule relating to the Admission Policy that the 2007 Health Directive on antiretroviral drugs is implemented at all levels.
- The Department of Education ought to revise the Admission Policy for Ordinary Public Schools to reflect the right of children without South African birth certificates to access education.
- The Department of Local Government ought to facilitate the opening of Migrant Helpdesks in other Metros as already done by the City of Johannesburg.
- There is a need for a coordinated approach by various government departments to address the challenges faced by forced migrants.

Addressing forced migration and the needs and rights of forced migrants requires a multi-sectoral approach. While states have the primary responsibility to protect those within their borders, they cannot carry this out alone. The role of third parties like NGOs and IGOs is critical in addressing this issue.

Charles A. Kwenin
Challenges and Recommendations to International Organizations

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As the leading international organization for migration, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration management, to advance understanding of migration issues, to encourage social and economic development through migration, to uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

IOM programs and activities could be categorized into four broad areas of migration: Migration and Development, Facilitating Migration, Regulating Migration and Forced Migration.

In the area of forced migration, IOM closely cooperates with many partners notably UNHCR, the African Union regarding policy development, the Economic Community of Africa (ECA), the Regional Economic Communities (REC), the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community Of West-African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), East African Community (EAC), etc. and NGOs.

The coordination of the partners engaged in displacement settings and the definition of respective roles and responsibilities is essential for efficient assistance to refugees and IDPs. The Cluster Approach to humanitarian response developed by the United Nations aims to define the roles played by each partner during an intervention and gives guidance for the coordination and cooperation among humanitarian actors. According to this cluster system, UNHCR is the lead agency at the global level regarding IDPs resulting from conflict. IOM takes the lead when it comes to IDPs resulting from natural disasters. This cluster system is flexible and can be arranged on the country level according to the capacities and presence in the field of the corresponding partners.

Also information management, especially registration and profiling information sharing is a major challenge to third parties. Profiles of IDPs are important to identify specific needs of the affected people, to be able to respond to them in a targeted and timely fashion. However, some governments and sometimes humanitarian actors do not share their information or data which undermines the quality and timeliness of service delivery to vulnerable or needy populations. A major challenge for the international community also lies in the lack of recognition of IDP emergencies in some African countries. A number of governments,
motivated by political considerations, do not want to accept or recognize the presence of IDPs on their own territory and obstructs humanitarian protection and assistance efforts by international organizations and NGOs.

Furthermore, access to the vulnerable population, either due to the physical constraints, political considerations or due to security reasons, challenges the international actors’ ability to protect or assist.

Finally, the expectations and needs of the host community have to be taken into greater account. Support has to be provided not only to the displacees but to the host or affected community according to a holistic approach of assistance.

Policy recommendations

It is important to set certain standards or some guided principles while providing support and assistance to vulnerable populations. The African Union provides a policy framework, which informs or inspires the national policy frameworks on a number of migration issues. For instance, the Migration Policy for Africa is supposed to serve governments or regions as a basis to develop their own national or regional frameworks. There is also the AU Draft Convention on Refugees, IDPs and Returnees which provides operational and policy guidelines towards protection and assistance to vulnerable populations.

Furthermore, there is a need for regional consultative processes and strategic partnerships between countries of origin, transit and destination countries as part of a common platform to be able to create a common understanding and policy coherence for a comprehensive, integrative and holistic approach to migration management.


Claudia Bürkin
The Role of Development Actors in Displacement Settings

KfW is the German financial cooperation working for the German government implementing development programs. KfW has 15 to 20 programs worldwide that deal directly with migration and many more that have indirect links to migration issues. Nonetheless, KfW is not a specialized migration agency.

KfW is not an actor in humanitarian assistance but comes in at the stages of early recovery and transition and development approaches. In this context, KfW’s projects focus on the (re)integration of forced migrants due to conflict. All KfW programs follow an inclusive approach.

In the last two years, a tendency can be observed that development actors come in much earlier than they used to and in parallel to the humanitarian actors. This means that while humanitarian programs and early recovery activities are implemented, also development programs and long-term cooperation are defined.

One very typical approach for KfW at these early stages are community-based reintegration programs, mostly targeting returnees. These programs aim at increasing the absorptive capacities of the community, enhancing the social and economic reintegration of returnees along with other special target groups in post-conflict contexts (e.g. ex-combatants), at mainstreaming specific conflict-related issues such as gender-based violence.

One approach that has proven to be very successful is to rehabilitate and reconstruct basic infrastructure by integrating all different groups—IDPs, returning refugees, ex-combatants. This not only creates the physical basis for peace consolidation but also contributes to reconciliation by involving communities in reconstruction activities and making the peace dividend visible.

Another aspect, which deserves more attention, is migration to urban areas. Many (forced) migrants settle down in urban areas, a phenomenon which might gain even more relevance with regard to climate-induced migration. Urban migrants are more difficult to single out than refugees/IDPs in camps or specific rural areas.

The role of a development agency can be to assist the integration process and to help urban areas increase the absorptive capacity of cities and local communities receiving migrants (increase revenues, slum rehabilitation).

There is the need for more in-depth studies on the challenges for recipient countries of migrants and the possible contribution of development actors to cope with these challenges. Furthermore, approaches to avert forced migration have to be elaborated and implemented. In this context, the question arises of ‘When’ and ‘How’ an intervention should take place to prevent forced migration.

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After the introductory remarks by the six panelists, Steven Corliss, Anne Zeidan, Lisbeth Pilegaard, Sicel’mpilo Shange-Buthane, Charles Kwenin and Claudia Bürkin, the discussion, chaired by Koko Warner, United Nations University − Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), revolved around the role of third parties in the context of displacement with a special focus on complementary institutional mandates and approaches of humanitarian and development actors. The discussion focused primarily on the need for coordination mechanisms between different actors in the field of humanitarian assistance to displacees and development cooperation, the role of development actors, especially focusing on the prevention of forced migration and constraints to of international organization and NGO engagement.

Lisbeth Pilegaard underlined that assistance to refugees and IDPs requires different approaches depending on the different phases of displacement. Assistance to refugees and IDPs is a multi-faceted task that requires complementarities and coordination mechanisms on the international, regional, national, and local level. Steven Corliss added that these complementarities based on different comparative advantages also provide the basis for synergies and efficiency of programs and projects targeting forced migrants. Also the development of common advocacy areas and the coordination and sharing of needs assessments could enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance.

It was also stated that the development community should be actively involved, especially in the prevention of displacement. In this context, it was also suggested to discuss migration in the framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, the linkage between migration and the achievement of the MDGs has not been widely explored, yet, and an integration of international migration into the development agenda of many actors in the field of development is still lacking.

With respect to the prevention of forced migration in Africa, Anne Zeidan emphasized that there was a great difference in apprehending prevention in a conflict setting than, for example, displacement due to environmental degradation. Protection in a conflict setting meant in the first place assisting people leaving the combat zone. She stated, “We should not prevent people from being able to cross a border and to take refuge in a peaceful or safe area”. Claudia Bürkin stressed that with regard to migration, development per se was supposed to improve livelihoods and prevent people from having to find better living conditions somewhere else. Development must therefore be understood in a broad sense, also including institutional capacity-building to ensure the protection of human rights.

Especially what concerns the prevention of environmental degradation and its impact on migration a much better understanding on where and how to intervene is needed.

Various questions and answers ensued regarding the funding of humanitarian assistance. The audience and the panelists voiced their concern that media coverage of the displacement scenario and domestic and foreign policy-driven donor interests influence the decision to raise funds for a humanitarian emergency. This may also partly explain the difficulties in raising funds for prevention activities. Nonetheless, it is not only financial constraints that impede humanitarian assistance, but also lack of security for humanitarian personnel, poor access to populations concerned and lacking willingness of state and local actors in the affected countries to cooperate or support protection and assistance activities by humanitarian actors. As illustrated by Steven Corliss, the case of Darfur shows that some level of at least acquiescence by the government is necessary to be able to deal with and handle the responsibility of UNHCR to protect IDPs. In the discussion, Steven Corliss also stated that there is a great need for mechanisms to guarantee that large-scale development projects by states or regional organizations like the European Union, which can also be a cause of displacement, are implemented according to human rights principles and principles of compensation.

Finally, Lisbeth Pilegaard raised the issue and emphasized the importance of national and international burden-sharing and solidarity between the origin, transit and host countries of refugees and IDPs and the international community in responding to displacement and in addressing its root causes.
Conclusion
Conclusion

This conclusion summarizes the key issues discussed at the international conference “Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Security-Migration Nexus II”.

The conference brought together international experts from research and politics, as well as civil society organizations and representatives from relevant ministries and international organizations.

Based on the discussions and presentations of the current state-of-the-art in research on forced migration, the conference aimed at identifying future research needs and discussing concrete political approaches. Causes of forced migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and humanitarian, social and legal consequences for those concerned were discussed. Participants attempted to shed light on the effects resulting from forced migration, resettlement and return on the social, political and economic conditions in the countries of the region. Concrete instruments in migration governance at national and regional level as well as experiences and perspectives of international organizations and civil society groups were also discussed.

The Concept of Forced Migration

Finding an adequate definition of forced migration that serves both academic and operational purposes is difficult (for a discussion of the various different concepts see the Keynote Speech by John Oucho). In most cases a complex combination of push and pull factors drives people to leave their homes. Consequently, academic conceptualizations, which differentiate between voluntary and forced migration are not always applicable or useful in practice. In his Keynote Speech John Oucho emphasized that there is rather a continuum than a clear-cut divide between migration and forced migration, the impact of push factors dominating in the latter case.

It is especially the complexity of the matter, which makes it problematic to simply assume a (sub-)category such as ‘forced migration’. The concept of forced migration encompasses different legal categorizations, which partly overlap (refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, stateless persons) and are subject to change during the period of displacement (e.g. repatriating refugees becoming IDPs). It also encompasses categorizations, which are based on the dominating causes of their flight. This is not a simple matter either, since there is a variety of mutually interacting factors that force people to flee, be it within or beyond national borders. Generally, distinctions can be made between displacement caused by conflict, political persecution and human rights violations, development projects, and natural and environmental disasters. The role of economic factors (‘underdevelopment’) and environmental degradation in forced migration are contested. Additionally, these factors influence each other in various ways and therefore cannot easily be disentangled.

In any case, it is essential to recognize that any given definition shapes and determines the realities on the ground by defining the rights and responses that forced migrants can count on. This is particularly evident in the distinction between refugees and IDPs or in the ongoing discussion about environmental change as cause of forced migration (which is not recognized in any refugee protection regime).

Notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties and despite the criticism that was expressed with regard to the regional focus of the conference (instead of including the African continent as a whole), it was frequently underlined that mass displacement has turned into a “defining characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa”, however with significant regional differences (Crisp, 2006, p. 1–2).

Call for an Interdisciplinary Approach

The complexity of causes, faces and consequences of forced migration for the persons concerned, the countries and communities of origin, transit and destination as well as the variety of stakeholders engaged in displacement settings, require an interdisciplinary approach. Besides social, political and geographical perspectives on migration, such an approach should take the historical dimension of migration into account. Migration due to poor socio-economic and environmental conditions, armed conflict and bad governance is an old phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ever since a large number of nomadic peoples have moved regularly from place to place, staying within or crossing international borders and seasonal or permanent migration of (non-pastoralist) families or individuals as a response to environmental changes are common adaptation strategies in some regions. An analysis of how African societies dealt with migration in the past could enrich the discussion of current approaches to migration governance.

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Furthermore, the gender dimension of migration and development should be taken into account. Recent trends show the phenomenon of a ‘feminization of migration’, i.e. the increasing tendency of women to migrate in their own right. In 2000, female migration in Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to 47 percent (Zlotnik, 2003). Not only does the large proportion of female migrants but also the increased vulnerability of women in conflicts and displacement settings make it necessary to take the gender perspective into account. Displaced women are severely affected by human rights violations, sexual violence and human trafficking, which can in turn become causes of further displacement. Recognizing the needs of women and children is necessary for designing and implementing individualized assistance programs. Therefore, data collection on the sex and age of displaced populations is essential. The involvement of refugee women and children in program development will further improve the quality and adequacy of humanitarian responses. In addition, the important role women can play in reconstruction and peacebuilding processes should be considered in the context of reintegration and return processes.

An Autonomous Research Agenda?

As concerns the determination of the research agenda i.a. by donor interests, the need to be aware of and take into account the political context of the scientific analysis has been stressed. According to Loren Landau, research always has to be aware of and take into account the politics surrounding debates on concepts of forced migration, migration governance and humanitarian response, and the interests of various actors involved in migration governance and humanitarian intervention. Despite being embedded in a political context, research should try to gain autonomy from political interests and advocacy endeavors. At the same time, research has to provide policy-oriented applicable results, which makes autonomy all the more crucial and challenging.

The Data Gap on Forced Migration

During the discussions, the huge data gap on forced migration in Sub-Saharan Africa was repeatedly stressed. Besides, where data exists, data quality, e.g. accuracy, reliability and credibility is deficient. This can be traced back to different causes: First, migration per se is a very dynamic phenomenon. Second, there is no consistent conceptualization of forced migration. Third, many refugees do not claim their refugeehood, and other non-refugees claim it in order to achieve an asylum status. Fourth, data gathering practices and standards of national authorities in different states are very diverse. Finally, decisions of state actors to deliver statistical data on displacement (or to retain them) are often driven by political interests.

To fill these migration data gaps it was suggested that state capacities to collect, accurately document and share data on forced migration should be strengthened. Data exchange, information-sharing and cooperation between national statistical systems, researchers and humanitarian agencies must be pushed forward. The retrievability and accessibility of available data has to be promoted.

With regard to different shapes of forced migration, discussions evolved especially around the following three facets of the phenomenon: Internal displacement, environmentally-induced migration, and human trafficking.

Internal Displacement

Internal displacement has gained considerable international attention in the last decade, especially in the context of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. IDPs are commonly characterized by two main criteria, namely involuntarily movement and the fact that they do not cross national borders. IDPs do not have the means or the will to leave the territory of the state that caused or was unable to prevent their displacement. With 12.7 million people, Africa hosted almost half of the world’s IDP population in 2007 (IDMC, 2008).

It was contended among conference participants to what extent IDPs should be treated as a special category. It was claimed that humanitarian assistance should be allocated on the basis of vulnerabilities rather than on the basis of a category. During the conference, concerns were raised that improved protection schemes for IDPs might lead to the withdrawal of resources from refugee protection, whereas currently assistance and protection for refugees is equally insufficient. Furthermore, Loren Landau stressed that a focus on IDPs risks ignoring other, possibly more vulnerable, groups, i.e. those forced to stay. Concerns have also been raised regarding the risk that strengthening IDP protection mechanisms might offer states a justification for denying asylum to refugees.

On the other hand, the establishment of an own category of IDPs does not necessarily lead to a ‘privilegization’ of IDPs compared to other vulnerable groups, but can contribute to their special protection needs being more adequately addressed. Furthermore, singling out IDPs as a special category could help to call upon governments to assume responsibility and advocate for international action on behalf of IDPs (Crisp, 2006, p. 19).

The Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement (GPs) promoted IDPs as a special category of forced migrants and set up minimum standards for their protection and assistance, based upon international humanitarian and human rights law. Although not binding legally, some African states began translating the GPs into national policies and law. At regional level, the 2008 Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons to the Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region became the first and—so far—only binding multilateral treaty on IDPs in force. In the course of 2009, African Heads of state and government are expected to adopt the African Convention on The Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa at a special summit in Uganda. Humanitarian organizations use the Principles as the leading protection and assistance standard and displacees themselves and local human rights NGOs draw upon the Principles to claim their rights. However, the implementation of the GPs remains flawed.

Accordingly, participants emphasized the need to strengthen the application and implementation of the human rights standards at national and regional levels in general. Monitoring and advocacy by international and local actors to promote the rights of forced migrants and their wide dissemination among displaced communities and those working with them was considered necessary.

The existence of the GPs was more a matter of concern to some participants. Especially their redundancy (in almost all countries, the persecution and displacement of people is already illegal) and their potential to undermine domestic legislation and initiatives was criticized. Participants called for mechanisms suited to enforce existing domestic and international human rights legislation instead of establishing new instruments that might signal that domestic law carries little weight and warned of “legal constipation”, a term used to describe the trend to use resources misguidedly for the creation of ever more detailed legal instruments instead of enforcing existing ones.

Finally, a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of the GPs was recommended, in order to see if their translation into national legislation has any impact on the human rights situation of IDPs.

Environmentally-induced Migration

The importance of giving more attention to environmentally-induced migration was also disputed. The extent of the phenomenon of ‘environmental refugees’ now and in the future is still unknown. However, this is not just due to an incomprehensive understanding of the links and little data but to a lack of an internationally-agreed definition of environmental migrants as well. Researchers conceptualizing environmental change as a cause of forced migration usually stress that this impact is only effective in combination with other socio-economic factors such as migrants’ adaptive capacity. Wim Naudé’s term of an economy-conflict-environment nexus reflects this complexity well. Koko Warner presented a complex decision-making tree to show how many different aspects contribute to people moving for environmental reasons, starting with the type of environmental trigger event (rapid vs. slow onset, or in other words, environmental disasters vs. slow environmental degradation).

Numerous open questions relate to responses to and consequences of environmentally-induced migration. Some of these are: “Are the faces of environmentally-induced migration different from other forms of forced migration?” “Are there specific needs of environmental displacees?” “Are the consequences for the host communities different when they host environmental displacees?” “What are the appropriate durable solutions for environmentally-induced displacement?” The question of whether we need to establish a new (legal) category of forced migrants, namely environmental displacees including a specific mandate to protect and assist them, can only be answered on the basis of more substantive research.

In this context however, possible political and humanitarian implications of the establishment of new categories of forced migrants have to be taken into account. Loren Landau problematized the classification of environmentally-induced migration as forced migration. First, he stated that, given the limited resources for research and interventions on displacement, the prominence of the issue of environmental change and its possible future repercussions on migration risked ignoring those displaced due to war and persecution. Second, Landau suggested integrating the discussion on ‘environmental refugees’ into long-term reviews of global migration policy. Third, he reminded us that violence and bad governance remain the primary cause of displacement on the continent. The language of environmental displacement runs the risk of providing an apolitical cover for political mismanagement.

Human Trafficking

Another topic, which was subject to controversial debate at the conference, was that of human trafficking, especially its actual extent and implications. Some participants, such as Mehari T. Maru, stressed that human trafficking was a big and growing problem especially difficult to combat due to the involvement of transnational criminal groups, the fear of potential witnesses, and the lacking attention and resources for the topic in general. Others denounced the issue
as an agenda set by international agencies without any tangible evidence. Instead, particularly given the scarcity of resources for the protection of forced migrants, they argued that greater attention should be given to problems that concern more people. Partly, what caused this disagreement was the difficulty of delimiting human trafficking and smuggling. On the one hand, participants argued that smuggled refugees are at an increased risk to fall victim to traffickers, on the other hand fears were raised that the commonality of what caused this disagreement was the difficulty of linking smuggling and human trafficking could lead to an overestimation of the extent of the latter.

Solutions to Displacement

One focus of the conference also lay on solutions to displacement. Discussions evolved around the three traditional durable solutions to displacement, namely return, reintegration, and resettlement, the implementation of which was assessed critically in a number of presentations.

In her Paper, Sadia Hassanen raised the issue of return and questioned its general adequacy as a solution to forced migration. Asylum and refugee policies in Sub-Saharan Africa have gone a long way since independence but have become increasingly restricted in recent years. Against this background, return has become the first choice of refugee-hosting countries, although return is not necessarily the best option for the refugees themselves. Sadia Hassanen pointed out that the notion of ‘home’ did not always correspond with the place of origin, especially after a long period of displacement. Destabilizing effects of return movements to the places of origin, and conflicts associated with the return of refugees to their places of origin, for instance due to lost property rights, etc. also have to be taken into account. It was also stressed that the principle of voluntary return should be maintained and promoted. Despite the fact that refugee repatriation should take place on an entirely voluntary basis and in conditions of safety and dignity, a great proportion of recent African refugees who return do not meet these standards. Voluntary return is important since refugees returning voluntarily to their homelands can play an important role in rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery of a post-conflict country. Voluntary return can also have an impact on public confidence in the peacebuilding process (Crisp, 2006, p. 15).

Furthermore, especially with regard to protracted refugee situations (see Ndonga for a definition), resettlement or local integration are often not an available option for putting an end to displacement due to a lack of political will in refugee receiving countries. Given the impossibility of return, integration was favored over encampment of refugees in the debates and this is in fact a way that the Republic of South Africa, for example, has chosen. However, xenophobic attacks against immigrants in some African countries show that even this option is inapt to guarantee the safety and human rights of (forced) migrants in all circumstances.

It was therefore agreed that the three durable solutions should be reexamined. Comparative studies on the sustainability of these options should be conducted and alternative approaches in finding a solution for displacement need to be developed.

Alternative approaches, already implemented by some humanitarian actors in refugee situations, suggest to link refugee aid to development programs that also benefit the refugee-receiving communities. With regard to these community-based approaches, conference participants also called for an enhanced engagement of development actors and a greater cooperation between humanitarian and development actors.

One of the most pressing challenges is to find solutions to the protracted refugee situations. Of globally 38 protracted refugee situations, 22 are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa (Crisp 2006, p. 11). This requires not only targeting the root causes of the long-lasting conflicts that initially caused the displacement and prevent return of the displaced. It also requires new and strengthened refugee protection policies and increased state responsibility.

The principle of refugee self-reliance should be promoted by the international community. It would allow refugees to participate in the local economies and enable international donors like UNHCR to disavow ‘care-and-maintenance’ programs which only guarantee basic subsistence to refugees (Crisp, 2006, p.14).

Furthermore, the need to find proper solutions to urban displacement was stressed, since social, economic and legal circumstances, needs and expectations of urban displaces may differ from those of refugees or IDPs staying in camps. Urban refugees constitute a great portion of the refugees worldwide and continuing conflict, tightening asylum policies and restrictive encampment schemes instituted by host countries make it likely that the number of self-settlers moving to urban areas will continue to grow (UNHCR, 2006).

Restitution, compensation and land use for the displaced are issues that need to be taken into account while governing return and reintegration processes and deserve major attention both by researchers and policymakers.

Finally, finding solutions to displacement should always include the recognition of the agency of refugees and IDPs as well as the promotion of their involvement in the development of sustainable solutions.
Migration and Security

The migration-security nexus was already discussed in detail during last year’s BICC conference. There it was agreed to aim at giving equal weight to the three dimensions of security, both of sending and receiving countries and last but not least that of migrants. In line with traditional state security concepts it is often assumed that the influx of large numbers of migrants or refugees poses a security threat for receiving countries and host communities, especially in the African context, where state capacities to guarantee the security of its citizens are limited and can easily become overstrained, for example when rebel groups use refugee camps as an area of retreat or mobilization. Some participants at the conference endorsed this view of in-migration potentially posing security risks and recommended that some African states might actually need support to enhance their security capacities and be able to deal with such challenges, as only strong states are able to protect their citizens as well as refugees as required.

However, research presented at this year’s conference clearly showed that:

- there is no statistical evidence for an increased conflict probability in relation with in-migration in Sub-Saharan countries (Naudé);
- increased crime rates and availability of small arms could not be linked to refugees and migrants empirically (Kamanga);
- besides fears that security aspects might contribute to undermining refugee protection it was also argued that refugees are far too weak and limited in their resources and freedom of movement to be able to cause any insecurity to the host state (Hassanen), and finally
- security implications of refugee populations were clearly linked to the kind of welcome they receive in host countries (i.e. encampment vs. integration) (Rwamatwara).

In line with the discourse on human security that draws attention to more individual and less state-centered aspects of security, the focus of the conference was mainly on the security needs of forced migrants themselves. Although emphasis was given to the fact that the most vulnerable populations do not even have the means to move (Landau), there was a consensus about refugees and IDPs belonging to the weakest groups within societies, being extremely exposed to human rights violations, not just as a cause of forced migration but also during their stay in host communities and even in connection with return and resettlement.

The capacities of states to act preventively are very different. State activities or inactivity can be at the heart of expulsion and insecurity, and interestingly enough this can be true for failed as well as stable states (Sheekh). Participants even expressed their concern that displaced populations have been instrumentalized for different political ends by political actors i.e. in election campaigns. Finally, it was argued that the weaker state institutions the more important the role of international humanitarian actors in providing security. Nonetheless, their capacities and (donor dependent) priorities were regarded with some skepticism by some and it was emphasized that their involvement must not lead to a further weakening of state structures or institutions.

The Humanitarian Regime

The conference dealt with the progress but also with persistent organizational, political and conceptual shortcomings of the current humanitarian regime. Especially redundant mandates and structures, insufficient coordination and cooperation among partners, limited funding and the competitive funding environment have to be addressed. Other challenges to humanitarian interventions are difficult access to the populations concerned, lack of security for humanitarian personnel and limited cooperation of governments. With regard to the coordination of humanitarian engagement, the UN Cluster Approach is meant to strengthen the collaborative response, improve coordination and complementarity among the United Nations and NGOs. Furthermore, it was emphasized that complementarities of working fields of humanitarian actors based on comparative advantages provide the basis for synergies and efficiency of programs and projects targeting forced migrants.

Future Tasks for Policymakers

Migration policy and governance face various challenges. Perpetual violent conflicts, failing and failed states, human rights violations and persecution, natural disasters and environmental degradation but also development projects are causes of forced migration and displacement in the Sub-Saharan region. To design and implement return, reintegration and resettlement programs, to address protracted refugee situations and to provide protection to refugees and IDPs are also major challenges for policymakers.

Participants called for a shift in development policies and stressed the importance of development cooperation in the field of forced migration, especially in terms of prevention. In this context, the promotion of good governance and the support of local government structures in particular were raised. Development cooperation can also play an important role in supporting community-based reintegration programs. Forced migration must become a constant feature of the development agenda and has to be taken into account with respect to the accomplishment of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Migration, and especially forced migration can be an impediment to development and stability in the region. Both, causes of displacement like conflict, natural disasters and environmental degradation as well as the social, economic and political consequences of migration, such as the loss of skilled workers (‘brain drain’) have to be addressed so that the MDGs can be achieved at all.

Conference participants stressed the importance of an integrative approach to the development and implementation of migration policies. Effective migration governance needs to involve all stakeholders, i.e. origin countries, transit and host countries, local NGOs, the international community and the refugees themselves.

Migration is a cross-cutting issue affecting different policy sectors. The harmonization of the work of different ministries dealing with migration and displacement at national and regional level could help to achieve policy coherence and efficiency. Furthermore, institutional capacity-building for all governmental and non-governmental institutions is a means to improve norm and policy implementation as well as compliance with national and international law and humanitarian standards.

Since migration and displacement are often a transnational phenomenon, policy coherence and cooperation is required not only at the national level, but also at the regional and international level. In this regard regional approaches to forced migration of ECOWAS and the African Union were discussed and the need to further develop multilateral frameworks and mechanisms was stressed.

In this context it was also claimed to promote effective burden sharing between origin, transit and host countries and the international community.

According to Lisbeth Pilegaard, significant numbers of displaced persons receive no direct assistance from the international community. Against this backdrop, the important role of local communities, resources and authority structures in providing assistance and promoting protection has to be stressed. Accordingly, cooperation with local authorities, citizens and refugees needs to be fostered. It was stipulated to strengthen local laws and advocacy efforts. Building parallel structures to assist forced migrants, risks undermining local authority structures that must be part of any durable solution to displacement.

Especially the pivotal role local NGOs play in advocating refugee rights and monitoring compliance of state actors with their responsibilities was stressed. Furthermore, the need to strengthen the agency of refugees in formulating needs and expectations and in shaping the research and policy agenda policy was emphasized.

Forced migration is a prevailing and pressing phenomenon, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, international support to strengthen academic research institutions in Africa is needed to enable them to play a significant role in migration research and the development of policy frameworks and the humanitarian agenda. Participants also called for addressing the research-policy gap and to foster cooperation among professional, practitioners and academia through networking and capacity-building. For researchers, this means finding a balance between striving for independence and delivering applicable answers to political questions. As a positive example the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) was mentioned. It aims to facilitate regional dialogue and cooperation on migration policy issues amongst the governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Its overall objective is to facilitate regional cooperation in migration management by fostering greater understanding of migration and strengthening regional institutional and personnel capacities.

This conference aimed to create a forum for intra- and inter-regional and interdisciplinary exchange and collaboration. However, much more attention has to be given to listening to and empowering the voices of forced migrants in the future.

References


## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APIX</td>
<td>Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements et des Grands Travaux (Senegal)</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AU PSA</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAOS</td>
<td>Bureau d’Accueil, d’Orientation et de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Emigrés (Senegal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion (Bonn, Germany)</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA Franc</td>
<td>Currency used in twelve formerly French-ruled African countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIGEM</td>
<td>Centre for Information and Control of Migration (Mali)</td>
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<td>CIPEV</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry into the Post Elections Violence (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPAS</td>
<td>Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (University of Oxford, Great Britain)</td>
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<td>CoRMSA</td>
<td>Consortium for Refugee and Migrants in South Africa (Johannesburg, South Africa)</td>
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<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (Brussels, Belgium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations)</td>
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<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Home Affairs, South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIASPEACE</td>
<td>Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora Involvement in Conflict Settings</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Drought Monitoring Centre (Nairobi, Kenya)</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (University of Sussex, Great Britain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Community of Africa</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West-African States</td>
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<td>ECPF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front</td>
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<td>EM-DAT</td>
<td>Emergency Disasters Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration (Geneva, Switzerland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDMD</td>
<td>Global Dialogue on Migration and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLR</td>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPs</td>
<td>Guiding Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IASFM  International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (Washington, DC., USA)
ICGLR  International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICPD  International Conference on Population and Development
ICPD/PA  ICPD Programme of Action
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva, Switzerland)
ICU  Islamic Courts Union
IDMC  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (Geneva, Switzerland)
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IOM  International Organization for Migration (Geneva, Switzerland)
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KfW  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany)
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MGFFI  Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration, Land North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany
MIDSA  Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MPI  Migration Policy Institute (Washington, DC., USA)
MSC  Military Staff Committee
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council (Oslo, Norway)
NRGS  Non-Resident Ghanaians Secretariat
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OCHA  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA  Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares
PCRD  African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PSC  Peace and Security Council
PW  Panel of the Wise
RCPs  Regional Consultative Processes
RECs  Regional Economic Communities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHAs</td>
<td>Refugee Hosting Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLDF</td>
<td>Sabaot Land Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community (Gaborone, Botswana)</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
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<td>SAMP</td>
<td>Southern African Migration Project (Kingston, Canada / Cape Town, South Africa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPS</td>
<td>Temporary Protection Status</td>
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<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala University Conflict Database</td>
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<td>UHRC</td>
<td>Uganda Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCCD</td>
<td>United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
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<td>UNU-EHS</td>
<td>United Nations University—Institute for Environment and Human Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNU-WIDER</td>
<td>United Nations University—World Institute for Development Economic Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>Zone d’Accueil des Réfugiés</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Friday, 13 February 2009

8:00  Registration
9:00  Initial Addresses
  Peter J. Croll, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Bonn
  Dr. Doris Witteler-Stiepelmann, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn
  Winfried Mengelkamp, Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration, State of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dusseldorf
10:00 I. Voluntary vs. Forced Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa
     Keynote Speech
     Dr. John O. Oucho, The University of Warwick, Coventry
11:00 Coffee break
11:15 II. Drivers of Force: Causes and Faces of Forced Migration
     a. Conflict and Persecution
        Dr. Wim Naudé, United Nations University (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
     b. Environmental Degradation in West Africa
        Dr. Koko Warner, United Nations University (UNU-EHS), Bonn
        Facilitator: Lars Wirkus, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Bonn
13:00 Lunch
14:00 III. Social Dynamics and Repercussions
     a. The Social Vulnerability of Forced Migrants
        Joseph Chilengi, Africa IDP Voice, Lusaka
     b. The Special Case of Internal Displacement
        Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Geneva
     c. Return, Resettlement and Reintegration in the Aftermath of Conflict
        Dr. Sadia Hassanen, Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO), Stockholm
15:30 Coffee break
15:45 IV. Panel Discussion: Current Trends in the Migration-Security Discourse
     Joseph Chilengi, Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, Dr. Sadia Hassanen and Marc Stal, United Nations University (UNU-EHS), Bonn
     Facilitator: Andrea Warnecke, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Bonn

Buffet reception by the City of Bonn to follow
9:00 Musical welcome

9:30 V. Perceptions and Challenges
   a. The Semantics of Forced Migration
      Summary presentation
      Dr. Khoti Kamanga, Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CSFM), University of Dar es Salaam
   b. The Policy Agenda: Stakeholders and their Scope of Action in Sub-Saharan Africa
      Dr. Loren B. Landau, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

10:30 Coffee break

10:45 VI. Panel Discussion: National and Regional Responses to Forced Migration
   Busisiwe J. Mkhwebane-Tshehla, South African Department of Home Affairs, Pretoria
   Veronica Eragu Bichetero, former Commissioner of the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), Kampala
   Dr. Anthony Barclay, Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), Abuja
   Dr. Kamel Esseghairi, African Mediterranean Institute of Peace and Sustainable Development, Bardo
   Mehari Taddele Maru, African Union (AU), Addis Ababa
   Facilitator: Dimitria Clayton, Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration (MGFFI), State of NRW, Dusseldorf

13:00 Lunch

14:00 VII. Panel Discussion: Some Common Ground? The Role of Third Parties and International Organizations
   Steven Corliss, The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Geneva
   Anne Zeidan, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva
   Lisbeth Pilegaard, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Oslo
   Sicel’mpiLO Shange-Buthane, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), Johannesburg
   Charles A. Kwenin, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Addis Ababa
   Claudia Bürkin, KfW Entwicklungsbank, Frankfurt a.M.
   Facilitator: Dr. Koko Warner, United Nations University (UNU-EHS), Bonn

16:00 Coffee break

16:15 VIII. Recommendations: Summary and Outlook
   Baffour Amoa, West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), Accra

17:30 Departure
Annex II: Contributors

Amoa, Baffour Dokyi

Baffour Dokyi Amoa, Ghana, is currently the President of the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), a civil society organization which seeks to address the proliferation of small arms within the West Africa Sub-region. Baffour Amoa is a Management Consultant and the Director of the Accra-based Centre for Management and Institutional Development. He has a wealth of experience in North-South partner relations, South-South dialogue, having initiated and participated in several of such meetings. As an international consultant, he has carried out several assignments for a number of organizations in North America, Europe and in Africa.

Barclay, Anthony, Dr.

Anthony Barclay, Liberia, is currently the Human Development and Poverty Alleviation Advisor with ECOWAS. As development specialist with a particular interest in human development, economic management and governance, he has conducted research and published papers on sustainable development, governance, migration and related issues and has vast experience working in national and international development as a consultant and staff of national development agencies and international and regional organizations. Anthony Barclay earned his PhD degree in Urban and Regional Planning with a minor in Economics and a Masters of Arts degree in Public Policy and Administration with a specialty in Development Economics and Planning from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in Madison, Wisconsin, USA.

Bürkin, Claudia

Claudia Bürkin, Germany, is a Program Manager at KfW Entwicklungsbank’s sector and policy division Good Governance and works, on a policy level, on conflict management issues. A special focus of her work is program design and policies of financial cooperation in post-conflict situations. As a program manager she is in charge of peace consolidation programs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Before joining KfW in 2006, she worked for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels. Claudia Bürkin holds a Master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a Diploma in International Business and Cultural Studies of the University of Passau.

Chilengi, Joseph

Joseph Chilengi, Zambia, is an international expert in forced internal displacement and human rights and is Founder and Executive Director of Africa Internally Displaced Persons Voice (Africa IDP Voice) headquartered in Lusaka, Zambia, a continental pan African NGO working to raise awareness and promote effective protection of IDPs in Africa. He has been an expert and a delegate of the Zambian government to the International Conference on the Great Lakes region peace process. With over 20 years in humanitarian and development sector with the United Nations System and other multilateral institutions, he has been instrumental in elaborating and negotiating standard setting protocols among the eleven member states of the international conference on the Great Lakes region. Joseph Chilengi is also an independent expert of the African Union Commission on the draft Convention on the protection and assistance of IDPs in Africa and the African Union Special Summit on refugees, IDPs and forced displacement. He is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford on internally displaced persons in Africa.

Clayton, Dimitria

Dimitria Clayton, United States, has been Program Officer in the Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration, State of North Rhine-Westphalia, Department of Integration and International Cooperation in Dusseldorf, Germany since 2005. She is responsible for programs in the field of migration and development. Before that, Dimitria Clayton was Head of Unit Equal Opportunity and Anti-Discrimination Policy, Landeszentrum für Zuwanderung NRW (Regional Policy Centre for Migration Policy), State of North Rhine-Westphalia. She is a Member of the Metropolis International Steering Committee, and coordinated the 13th International Metropolis Conference in Bonn.

Corliss, Steven

Steven Corliss, United States, is a Deputy Director with the Regional Bureau for Africa at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva, where he oversees UNHCR operations in Southern Africa and the Bureau’s legal advice, policy and external relations activities. Before taking up his current post, Mr. Corliss served as Deputy Representative to the High Commissioners Sadako Ogata and Ruud Lubbers and Head of the North America and Caribbean Unit at Headquarters. Earlier, Steven Corliss was a UNHCR Protection Officer during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Pakistan.

Croll, Peter Johannes

Peter Johannes Croll, Germany, is the Director of the Bonn International Center for Conversion—Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn, BICC—which as an independent, non-profit organization is
dedicated to promoting peace and development. He graduated (MA) in Economics and Applied Linguistics in Germany. After working in several international companies in Germany and the Netherlands, he was engaged as an associated expert in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Since the early 1980s, he has been working for the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in several positions in Germany and abroad, for instance as country director in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Peter J. Croll is internationally recognized for his expertise in development policy, conflict prevention, crisis management, program- and project planning, human resource development, policy advocacy, and as facilitator. A special focus of his expertise is Sub-Saharan Africa.

Eragu Bichetero, Veronica Isala, Adv.

Adv. Veronica Isala Eragu Bichetero, Uganda, is a lawyer by profession and an Advocate of the High Court of Uganda. She has held several positions with National and International bodies of repute, most notably with UNICEF and as a Commissioner with the Uganda Human Rights Commission. She is heavily involved in Children’s Rights, Women’s Rights, and Vulnerable persons Rights Issues. For the last seven years she has been active in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and has represented the Uganda Human Rights Commission as an Observer and Mediator at the Peace talks in Juba, Southern Sudan between the Government of Uganda and the Lord Resistance Army/Movement. Veronica Eragu Bichetero has a wealth of experience on forced migration and the rights of refugees, having been the Commissioner in charge of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees and she has advocated extensively for policies and legislation on the same.

Esseghairi, Kamel, Dr.

Dr. Kamel Esseghairi, Tunisia, is a Doctor of Medicine and works as Medical and Hospital Inspector and Assessor at the Ministry of Health in Tunis. From 2007 to 2008, he was Senior Advisor for Public Health Policy and Management at the Ministry of Health in Iraq. Previous to this, he was Team Leader of the World Bank (IDA), GTZ, Health Sector Rehabilitation Support Project in the DR Congo. From 2004 to 2006, he was Director, of the Department of Social Affairs at the African Union Commission. He has a wide experience in national public health program and activities conception, implementation, improvement, management, evaluation and operations research (in Tunisia since 1986 and in North Africa and Middle East since 1994 with IPPF and UNFPA/EU) and has more than 20 years international development experience, implementing public health and RH programs in the Middle East and Northern Africa. He is highly experienced in the design, management and implementation of advocacy campaigns, programs, aiming at achieving gender equality and women empowerment. Kamel Esseghairi holds a Master of Public Health Major in Epidemiology and Population Studies, a Master of Sciences in Social Statistics Major in Health Statistics and Demography as well as a Master in Philosophy in Social Sciences Major in Sexual and Reproductive Health.

Grote, Ulrike, Prof.

Prof. Ulrike Grote, Germany, is professor at and Director of the Institute of Environmental Economics and World Trade at the Leibniz University Hannover. Her research focuses on international trade, environmental and development economics. She studied agricultural economics at the University of Kiel. After receiving her PhD from Kiel in 1994, she worked at the OECD in Paris and the Asian Development Bank in Manila. From 1998 to 2006, Grote worked at the Center for Development Research (ZEF) in Bonn.

Hassanen, Sadia Dr.

Dr. Sadia Hassanen, Eritrea, has been Tutor at Stockholm University since 2003, where she lectures about migration, development and livelihoods within refugees in Sweden compared to the African context. Before that she was Research Assistant at the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relation, at Uppsala University Hospital, and at the Department of Epidemiology and Public Health. Her Dissertation was about “Repatriation, Integration or Resettlement: The Dilemmas of Migration among Eritrean Refugees in Eastern Sudan.”

Kamanga, Khoti Chilomba, Dr.

Dr. Khoti Chilomba Kamanga, Tanzania, is co-founder of the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CSFM). Between 2005 and 2008 he held the position of elected Secretary of the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM). He has published works in the area of refugee law, international criminal law and regional economic integration. More recently, he has undertaken studies on agrofuels and security. In addition, he sits on the editorial boards of the Journal of Refugee Studies and the African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law. Khoti Kamanga studied law in Moscow and Amsterdam before joining the Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam where he also serves as Associate Dean.
Kwenin, Charles

Charles Kwenin, Ghana, is Chief of Mission and IOM Representative to the African Union, Economic Commission for Africa and IGDA—an IOM special liaison mission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Before that he was Chief of Mission—IOM Kamoala, Uganda until he took over the Regional Programme Development Office for East and Central Africa. From 1992-1996 he joined the IOM Brussels as Programme Officer. He holds a Master in Public Administration und Management.

Landau, Loren B., Dr.

Dr. Loren B. Landau, United States, is Director of the Forced Migration Studies Programme at Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg, South Africa. He is currently co-directing a comparative project on migration and urban transformation in Southern and Eastern Africa and has published extensively on human mobility, development, and sovereignty in the academic and popular press. Along with coordinating a teaching and research program on migration and social transformation, he serves on the executive committee of the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), a national advocacy network, and has consulted for the South African Human Rights Commission, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the UNDP, the French Development Agency (AFD), and others. Loren Landau holds a Masters Degree in Development Studies from the London School of Economics and a Doctorate in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Mehari Taddele Maru

Mehari Taddele Maru, Ethiopia, is Executive Director of African Rally for Peace and Development (ARPD) and Programme Coordinator at the African Union Commission (AU). He is a fellow at the Max Planck Institute, and was a George Mason Fellow at John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. He holds an MPA from Harvard University and MSc from the University of Oxford and LLB from Addis Ababa University. He has Postgraduate Diplomas in International human rights law including International Protection of Human Rights from Abo Akademi Finland, and Certificates in the Right to Adequate Food from Central European University and Ethno-Political Conflict Studies from the University of Pennsylvania, and Comparative Studies on Federalism and Multinational States from University of Fribourg. Mehari Maru served as Legal Expert of the African Union Commission and as Director of the Addis Ababa University Office for University Reform.

Mengelkamp, Winfried

Winfried Mengelkamp, Germany, is the Head of Division “International Cooperation” at the Ministry for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration Nord Rhine-Westphalia and Head of the German Foundation for International Development (Deutsche Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung” (DSE). Previous to that, from 1991 on, he was Head of the Department “Structural- and Technology policy” of the DGB North Rhine-Westphalia. After being part of the Scientific Consult “Parlament of North Rhine-Westphalia” Mr. Mengelkamp was the Head of the Unit “Retail trade and technical services” and Head of Division “Strategic Planning and Controlling” in the Ministry for Economic Affairs North Rhine-Westphalia. Before that he worked as a Senior Fellow for the “Sozialforschungsstelle Dortmund – Central Scientific Institute”. Since August 2005, he has been a member of Shareholder Meeting of InWEnt gGmbH. He is Member of the Board of Trustees of the German Institute for Development Policy (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik” (DIE) as well as of the Supervisory Board of BICC, Bonn.

Mkhwebane-Tshehla, Busisiwe, Adv.

Adv. Busisiwe Mkhwebane-Tshehla, South Africa, joined the Department of Home Affairs in 2005 as Director Refugee Affairs in RSA and she is still occupying the post. She joined the South African Human Rights Commission as Researcher in 1998, conducting research on compliance by the RSA government on the enjoyment and protection of human rights by everyone in RSA and moved to the Office of the Public Protector in 1999. Her duties entailed investigating government departments on maladministration, undue delay in service delivery and abuse of power by government and public institutions officials. In 1995, she started working as the Public Prosecutor in the Department of Justice and also worked as the Legal Administration officer for the same Department specializing on extradition and mutual legal assistance between RSA and other countries. Busisiwe Mkhwebane-Tshehla holds B Proc and LLB Degrees from the University of the North, Limpopo, South Africa. She holds Diplomas in Tax Law and also a Diploma in Corporate Law. She was admitted as Advocate in 1997.

Naudé, Wim, Dr.

Dr. Wim Naudé, is Senior Research Fellow and Project Director at the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki. He was Professor in economics and research director at the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa and Lecturer and Research Officer at the Centre for the Study of African Economies at the University of Oxford, UK (Senior Associate
Ndonga, Eunice

Eunice Ndonga, Kenya, is Senior Programme Officer at the Refugee Consortium of Kenya charged with coordinating its programs on legal aid, advocacy, information and research. Presently, she is conducting research “Engendering peace processes in Africa: A case study of the Sudan Peace Process”. She holds a Masters of Arts degree in International Studies and is a trained paralegal. She is trained in international human rights and humanitarian law, with over four years of experience in refugee and displaced persons protection and over 10 years in human rights and community development.

Pilegaard, Lisbeth Vibeke

Lisbeth Vibeke Pilegaard, Norway, is the Head of the Technical Support Section in the International Department of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the interim Representative of NRC Zimbabwe. She has been with the NRC since 2002 when she worked for the Regional Resident Representative in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. In 2005, Ms. Pilegaard went back to Oslo working as an Adviser in the International Department at the NRC headquarters. She holds an MA in Rhetoric from the University of Copenhagen with a special focus on Public Communication and International Negotiation.

Rwamatwara, Egide

Egide Rwamatwara is a PhD student at the University of Zimbabwe, Department of Sociology, faculty of social studies. His research interest lies in the fields of migration, sustainable development, social justice and human rights in Africa. He holds an MPhil degree in Sociology (University of Zimbabwe), a Masters degree in Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action (University of Geneva), Licence en droit (LLB) (Université Libre du Congo) and BSc. Hons degree in Sociology and Anthropology (University of Zimbabwe). He enjoys reading and writing; and traveling around the world.

Shange-Buthane, Sicel’mpilo

Sicel’mpilo Shange-Buthane, South Africa, is Advocacy Officer with the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa. She has a Bachelor of Social Science (Social Work) degree from the University of Natal and did a number of short courses on forced migration at Oxford University. With her extensive eight year experience in forced migration in South Africa, she has presented on forced migration and the rights of non-nationals at various conferences and seminars including the Metropolis International Conference on Migration in Bonn (2008), the IMBISA Refugee Conference, South African Conference on Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights seminar on equality.

Sheekh, Nuur Mohamoud

Nuur Mohamud Sheekh, Great Britain, currently works as a Country Analyst at the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) covering Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. He has previously worked for the United Nations and other research organisations in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. He is also a member of the newly formed Somalia Working Group—an expert group of researchers and analysts on Somalia that is coordinated from the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria. He holds a Masters Degree in Conflict and Development from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He has published articles on IDPs and conflict.

Stal, Marc

Marc Stal, Germany, is a Research Associate at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). He supports the Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability and Adaptation Section. Prior to working at the UNU-EHS, he was a Project Assistant at the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research located in Davos, Switzerland, where he supported the national Natural Hazards Competence Centre (CENAT). Marc Stal holds a Diploma in Geography from the University of Heidelberg, his studies focused on natural hazards, international aid, and development studies with minor subjects in international relations and environmental economics.

Stückradt, Michael

Michael Stückradt is Deputy Minister for Innovation, Science, Research and Technology at the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia. He read law in Cologne and, after the completion of his studies worked at the Institut für Bankwirtschaft und Bankrecht (Institute for Bank Management and Banking Law) at the
University of Cologne. Until 1988, he was acting financial Department Head at the University hospital Aachen. He then became Director of Administration at the University hospital in Dusseldorf. Before his position of Deputy Minister, he was Kanzer (Director of Administration and Finance) of the RWTH Aachen University for five years.

**Warnecke, Andrea**

Andrea Warnecke, Germany, joined BICC in 2006 after having completed her studies in History, Media Studies and English Philology at the Ruhr-University Bochum. As a researcher she works in the field of Migration, Diaspora and Conflict, Peacebuilding and UN Peacebuilding missions. Conflict prevention and mitigation through Development and Comparative Genocide research. Her regional expertise is the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. At the moment, Andrea Warnecke is working on the DIASPEACE-project (Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora Involvement in Conflict Settings. Case studies from the Horn of Africa. Project funded under the 7th EU Framework Programme), is part of the team which organized the conference: The Security-Migration Nexus II: Migration and Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Warner, Koko, Dr.**

Dr. Koko Warner, United States, is currently an academic officer and Head of the Social Vulnerability and Environmental Change Section at the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). Her research focuses climate adaptation, financial mechanisms to assist the poor including insurance, and environmentally-induced migration and environmental change. Ms. Warner is an executive board member of the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII). She serves on the editorial board of the International Journal of Global Warming. Koko Warner studied economics at George Washington University, and the University of Vienna where she received her PhD in 2001 and is pursuing a Habilitation at the ETH Zürich, Department for Environmental Science and Economics, and serves as an assistant professor at the University of Richmond’s Emergency Service Management graduate program.

**Wirkus, Lars**

Lars Wirkus, Germany, is a Senior Researcher at BICC and a Research Associate and Project Manager at the Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) of United Nations University. In the past, he was a visiting lecturer at the Institute for Conflict Research at the University of Marburg, Germany and a freelancer in the field of national and European environmental protection planning at TÜV Rheinland Sicherheit and Umweltschutz GmbH, Germany. Lars Wirkus has a post-graduate degree (Diplom) in Geography, Biology, Limnology, and Social Sciences from the University of Bonn. His expertise areas are environmental security, environmental degradation and (violent) conflicts, (transboundary) water management and conflict, crisis prevention, and conflict management.

**Witteler-Stiepelmann, Doris, Dr.**

Dr. Doris Witteler-Stiepelmann, Germany, is Head of Division Federation/Lander cooperation; export credit guarantees; migration; reintegration; CIM at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Before, she worked in divisions dealing with the European Union, Southern Africa, political planning of development policy and as Head of Division peace development and crisis prevention, foreign and security policy, and research.

**Zeidan, Anne**

Anne Zeidan, France, has been with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) since the early 1990s. Since October 2008, she is Head of its IDPs project—Direction of Operations—where she is in charge of implementing ICRC’s institutional plan of action on internal displacement. Before, she was Diplomatic Advisor, Unit for Humanitarian Diplomacy, in charge of bilateral relations with UN agencies. Head of sector, Division of Protection, in charge of protection activities in Iraq and Middle East, Deputy head of Operations for Central and Southern Africa from 1999–2002, covering Rwanda, Burundi, Angola and regional delegations in South Africa and Zimbabwe. From 1996 to 1999, she was Deputy Head of Operations for North Africa covering ICRC’s operation in the regions. She holds an Oc M. LL in International Relations from the University of Oxford, United Kingdom.
## Annex III: Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institutional Affiliation</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adegboye, Kayode Raphael</td>
<td>ARTS (Agricultural Science and Resource Management in the Tropics and Subtropics), University of Bonn</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afifi, Tamer</td>
<td>United Nations University (UNU-EHS), Bonn</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akude, John Dr.</td>
<td>Chair of International Politics, University of Cologne</td>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Albus, Simone</td>
<td>InWEnt, Bonn</td>
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As an independent, non-profit organization BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion) is dedicated to promoting and facilitating peace and development.

Our task

BICC seeks to assist in preventing violent conflict and hence contribute to their constructive transformation.

While disarmament frees resources, which can be employed in the fight against poverty, conversion allows for a targeted, best possible reuse of these resources.

Our work

Peace and development: BICC offers advisory services on demobilization and reintegration (DD&R). It evaluates demobilization and reintegration processes as well as peacebuilding tools, studies the role of the security sector, researches on the nexus between development and peace as well as early warning systems for crises.

Arms—global trends, exports and control: BICC analyzes global trends in defense expenditures, armed forces personnel and militarization. It reveals interrelationships between arms exports, development aid and human rights and lobbies for global arms control.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): BICC offers advice and trainings worldwide on small arms control. It also consults on the marking and tracing of SALW as well as the safe stockpiling of SALW and ammunition. It collects data on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and evaluates small arms control activities.

Resources and conflict: BICC studies the nexus between natural resources and conflict while lobbying and training on the topic of ‘natural resources and conflict’.

Migration and conflict: BICC carries out research on the nexus between migration in Africa and security. It discusses challenges of migration and displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa and studies the African diaspora in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), in Germany and in the European Union.

Base Conversion: BICC has carried out research on base conversion for 15 years—not only in Germany but worldwide.

Our services

Applied research (research papers, background and evaluation studies, impact analysis, indicator development, data collection and analysis as well as project assistance and implementation).

Advisory services (Background analyses, policy recommendations, expert workshops).

Capacity-building through the elaboration of concepts and modules for education and training.

Public relations (publications, conferences, events, and exhibitions).

Our donors and partners

- International and UN-organizations
- Governments
- International and national foundations
- International and national research institutions
- International and national NGOs
- German Federal States (Land) and federal ministries.

Our organization

On the basis of applied research, BICC offers consultancy, policy advice and training. Its international staff carries out self- and third-party financed projects.

BICC collects and publishes information, carries out evaluations and prepares publications and makes these materials available to NGOs, governments and private organizations. It is co-publisher of an international scientific book series (Sustainable Peace and Global Security Governance) and the annual State of Peace Report (Friedensgutachten).

The Center organizes exhibitions, conferences, expert workshops and talks on a regular basis. These events help make the public even more aware of the issues that are important to BICC.

BICC was founded in 1994 with the support of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) as a non-profit limited liability company (GmbH). Shareholders are the Land NRW and Brandenburg. BICC bodies are its Supervisory Board, its Board of Trustees, and the International Board.