

# **Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Post-war and Transition Countries**

**Trends and Challenges of External Support**



Deutsche Gesellschaft für  
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
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## Preface

After almost ten years of implementation throughout the world programmes for the controlled demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants have become established tools of development aid and peacekeeping operations. During the 1990s massive downsizing of troops took place all around the world, triggered by the end of civil wars and the restructuring of post-conflict societies. Development agencies like German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) assisted with a whole range of interventions from emergency aid to training and long-term reconstruction. Today this experience is accompanied by new programmes for conflict prevention as well as contributions to the global fight against the illegal use of small arms. All such measures are designed to change the conditions of human security at the community level and ultimately create an environment for democratic control of armed forces. Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants are no longer merely seen as a humanitarian issue but have been recognised as a vital element of conflict prevention and a critical pre-condition of any security sector reform.

Looking back on the experiences of the past decade, many institutions drew up lessons learned and elaborated programmes for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as part of their official development policy. The OECD countries have in 1997 agreed on policy guidelines for development assistance in this field. The UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations published principles and guidelines for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and the Brahimi Report on the reform of UN peacekeeping operations recommends that demobilisation and reintegration programmes are to be considered in the “budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict”. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes are now compulsory elements of all new peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

For any organisation working in this field there are new challenges ahead. This paper gives an overview of global trends and demands, which development agencies like GTZ face in the future. The author Kees Kingma and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) analysed data on conflicts around the globe in order to project needs of future operations. This study is unique in the sense that it does not only consider the lessons learned over the past decade, but also tries to identify regions and political actors that will require our attention and assistance in the future. This is by no means political forecasting. Nevertheless, this study shows GTZ's awareness of its responsibility in ongoing conflicts and points out those areas where any peace process would entail appeals for international assistance.



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## Contents

Abbreviations .....	5
Summary.....	7
1. Introduction.....	9
2. Force downsizing in the 1990s.....	9
3. Recent demobilisations .....	10
4. Supporting demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war societies .....	13
5. External support for demobilisation and reintegration.....	15
6. Demobilisation and reintegration in a peacekeeping context .....	18
7. Anticipating demobilisation and reintegration support .....	19
<b>Africa .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<i>Angola .....</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Central African Republic.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Democratic Republic of Congo .....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Eritrea and Ethiopia .....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Guinea-Bissau .....</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Nigeria .....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Sierra Leone .....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Somalia.....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>South Africa .....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Sudan .....</i>	<i>27</i>
<b>Americas .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<i>Colombia.....</i>	<i>27</i>

<b>Asia .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<i>Cambodia.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>East Timor.....</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>North and South Korea .....</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Sri Lanka.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Tajikistan.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<b>Europe.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<i>Bosnia.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Croatia .....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Kosovo.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Turkey.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<b>8. Analysis and prospects.....</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>8.1 Different types of anticipated demobilisation .....</b>	<b>32</b>
8.1.1 Planned demobilisations .....	32
8.1.2 Postponed demobilisations .....	32
8.1.3 Revived demobilisations .....	33
8.1.4 Distant demobilisations .....	33
<b>8.2 Complex emergencies .....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>8.3 Issues requiring special attention .....</b>	<b>35</b>
8.3.1 Various types of forces .....	35
8.3.2 Security sector reform .....	35
8.3.3 Child soldiers .....	36
8.3.4 Female soldiers and dependents .....	36
8.3.5 Disarmament of the combatants .....	36
8.3.6 Psychosocial aspects .....	37
8.3.7 Human rights violations .....	37
8.3.8 Unraveling the war economies .....	37
8.3.9 National capacity.....	38
<b>9. Conclusions .....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Annexes .....</b>	<b>44</b>

## Abbreviations

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
CAR	Central African Republic
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHA	UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
EDRP	Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project
FRAP	Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Programme
GTZ	German Technical Co-operation
IASC	UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INTERFET	International Forces in East Timor
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JMC	Joint Military Commission
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MONUC	UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
PCF	Post-Conflict Funds
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SANDF	South African National Defence Forces
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TMK	Kosovo Protection Corps
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner on Refugees
UNICEF	UN Childrens' Fund



ABBREVIATIONS

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UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMEE	UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
USAID/OTI	United States Agency for International Development, Office of Transition Initiatives
WFP	World Food Programme
ZFD	Civil Peace Service

## Summary

This paper provides an overview of recent demobilisations and highlights countries in which in the future assistance might be required for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.

In the 1990s, major post-war demobilisations took place in a range of countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Uganda. In almost all cases, demobilisation played a significant role in the rehabilitation, peace-building, and development processes.

Demobilisation and efforts to support reintegration are currently being prepared or implemented in several countries, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Yugoslavia (Kosovo). Demobilisation will also have to be implemented sooner or later once the wars in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sri Lanka, and Sudan have finally ended. Most of these demobilisations are likely to be more complex than the ones dealt with in the 1990s, particularly those that have been postponed for some time, and those in countries where earlier demobilisation efforts have failed. In these cases, it will become all the more important to look at the interrelated issues of security and development.

Good preparation and coordination can prevent mistakes and provide timely clarity about the type of assistance required. Many different measures have been developed and used over the past decade to support post-war resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants. Experience shows that blueprints do not exist, and that demobilisation and reintegration support is best dealt with within the broader rehabilitation and development support.

External assistance has generally played an important role in making resources available for swift implementation of post-war demobilisation. Most international development agencies and bilateral aid donors involved in supporting demobilisation and reintegration processes have considerably institutionalised their efforts and improved mutual coordination over the past few years. Large amounts of resources have been spent in the past, and these organisations are currently making efforts to improve their responsiveness to forthcoming demobilisation and reintegration challenges. Financial support for these purposes comes from a wide range of sources, namely assessed contributions to the UN, voluntary funding raised through consolidated appeals, special trust funds, parallel financing from bilateral programmes or regional organisations, and cash or in-kind contributions from national organisations.

Several issues will require special attention in future efforts to support demobilisation and reintegration. For example, it is important to pay more attention to the broader economic, institutional and security environment. Several of the anticipated demobilisations are likely to be conducted as part of a general reform of the security sector. Special attention needs to be given during and after demobilisation to former child soldiers, female ex-combatants, their children, and the wives of ex-combatants. In addition, psychosocial and human rights aspects also deserve to play an important role in the design and implementation of demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration support. Lastly, a point that requires much more attention is the strength of civil society to deal with these conversion and reintegration matters.

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The aim of this paper is to provide a general picture of recent demobilisations worldwide and to indicate the countries in which assistance might be required and/or requested for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in the foreseeable future and what form this might take. The paper raises several issues that are important in efforts to make future support for resettlement and reintegration through external assistance more effective and efficient. It is merely a discussion paper, drawing attention to countries with plans or needs for demobilisation and reintegration support and raising issues related to policy development.

The general data used here are taken from ongoing work at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) to assess trends in the size of armed forces. The indications of countries that may be relevant for development co-operation and technical assistance in the area of reintegration support are quite obviously rather tentative or even speculative. In several cases, they require more specific follow-up in terms of fact-finding and assessment.

## 2. Force downsizing in the 1990s

The demobilisation that has taken place throughout the world in the past decade is quite impressive. There has been a considerable and steady reduction in the total number of armed forces personnel worldwide since 1989. Following the Cold War peak of 28.8 million military personnel in 1987, the number had dropped to 22.0 million by 1998, an overall reduction of 24 percent. The details of this trend, including the data by country and region, are presented in the Annex to this paper.

The most drastic cuts in the number of armed forces personnel over the past decade have taken place in Europe, reflecting the end of Cold War tensions and the reduced threat of war. In 1998, the overall number of European soldiers was only 60 percent of what it had been in 1987. In Eastern Europe, this figure was 49 percent. Europe now accounts for only 26 percent of the world's soldiers, compared with 33 percent in 1987. Germany and Russia are the European countries with the largest reductions in absolute terms.

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<sup>1</sup> The author gratefully acknowledges comments by Colin Gleichmann and Amanuel Mehreteab on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply.

In the Americas, the number of military personnel in 1998 was only 68 percent of what it had been in 1987. Broken down into regions, cuts were largest in relative terms in Central America (down to 52 percent), while North America had the largest reductions in absolute terms. Several major demobilisations were carried out in Central America following the end of civil wars in the 1990s. In Latin America as a whole, the total number of armed forces personnel has dropped to 71 percent of the 1987 levels. The United States has cut the number of its forces by 761,000 (33 percent) since 1987.

In Asia, the number of armed forces personnel peaked in 1989. By 1998, it had been reduced to 86 percent of this figure. This reduction was largely due to gradual demobilisation in China over the past decade, from 4.0 million in 1987 to 2.7 million in 1998 (a 33 percent reduction). Vietnam also demobilised 768,000 soldiers (61 percent) during the same period. Iraq reduced its armed forces to less than half their 1987 level—although this trend has recently been reversed. Reductions did not take place across the Asian continent as a whole, however. A breakdown into subregions reveals that the number of soldiers in central and south Asia has actually increased over the past decade. Half the world's soldiers are now serving in Asian armies.

The number of people serving in the armed forces of African states in 1998 stood at 88 percent of the 1990 level (93 percent of the 1987 level). The trends in Africa are rather erratic, however. In all five subregions, armed forces levels were lower in 1998 than in 1990, but in Central and East Africa, the number of soldiers was most likely higher in 1998 than it was in 1987. In West Africa, there has been a clear downward trend, largely due to the gradual reduction of the Nigerian armed forces over the years—from 138,000 in 1987 to 77,000 in 1998. There have been several major post-war demobilisations in Africa in the past decade, such as in Mozambique and Ethiopia. However, there have also been significant mobilisations, even in countries that initially underwent demobilisation, such as Eritrea and Ethiopia.

### **3. Recent demobilisations**

Demobilisation is defined here as a process in which the number of people under arms and in military command structures, including official armed forces personnel, paramilitary forces, and opposition forces, is significantly reduced. Over the past decade, a range of demobilisations and subsequent efforts to support reintegration of ex-combatants have been and continue to be implemented in many countries throughout the world (see, e.g., Pauwels, 2000). They have taken place in a variety of political and socioeconomic environments. Some were a direct result

of the termination of war, while others were conducted under more stable and peaceful circumstances.

In many countries, this downsizing of armed forces occurred gradually. Particularly in relatively rich countries, such as the OECD member states, these processes were usually well planned and funded. Downsizing was able to be coordinated with opportunities for reemployment and other reintegration support activities. From the perspective of international assistance, the most interesting cases are those where there is considerable time pressure, where there are critical bottlenecks in the process, and where domestic resources are not sufficient to implement the required activities. This paper therefore particularly focuses on demobilisation in a post-war setting and in (relatively small) transition countries. In these countries, there is usually also a more direct link with the general activities and experience of development co-operation and technical assistance.

In the 1990s, major post-war demobilisations took place in a number of countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Uganda. Smaller demobilisation activities were attempted in Somalia, and some degree of success, albeit limited, was achieved in the self-proclaimed republic of "Somaliland." Immediately after the democratic elections held in South Africa in 1994, there was an initial demobilisation process for those who did not wish to join the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) or did not meet the basic requirements. In addition, less extensive demobilisation has recently taken place in countries such as Chad, Lebanon, Mali, Panama, and Rwanda.

Another relevant, though less recent demobilisation process took place in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s. This is certainly an interesting case of demobilisation and reintegration to observe and assess, especially since it still plays a fairly central role in the country's current political and economic developments. The case of Zimbabwe also raises issues concerning the expectations of the ex-combatants and the responsibilities of European governments.


Some attempts at demobilisation have been outright failures. In Angola, demobilisation was attempted twice in the early and mid-1990s. However, both efforts failed for several reasons, and the country slipped back into full-scale war in late 1998. Demobilisation also failed in Cambodia in the early 1990s. More recently, the demobilisations in Eritrea and Ethiopia, which were initially quite successful, have been completely reversed since 1998.

Demobilisation, disarmament, resettlement, and reintegration are all complex processes, particularly after the end of a violent conflict, and they are often politically sensitive (Kingma,

2000b). Each of the cases of demobilisation under review here took place within a distinct political and socio-economic context. They usually involved a large number of different actors (see Fig. 1), each with their own particular roles and interests.

Particularly following civil wars, other important processes and policy interventions, such as democratisation, economic stabilisation, infrastructural rehabilitation, and repatriation of refugees, often occurred simultaneously. In some cases, demobilisation took place after one of the fighting parties had gained a victory, while in others the demobilisation followed a negotiated peace settlement. In several cases, it was not only regular soldiers who needed to be demobilised, but also ex-guerrilla fighters and members of militia groups. This added to the complexities and political sensitivity of the exercises.

**Fig. 1: Possible actors in demobilisation processes**

- 
- Demobilised combatants (male and female, ex-child soldiers, ex-government soldiers and ex-guerrillas)
  - Associations of demobilised combatants
  - Families of ex-combatants
  - Communities in which ex-combatants resettle
  - Other groups trying to become reintegrated (e.g., returned refugees and internally displaced people)
  - Local business communities
  - Government agencies
  - Armed forces and other security forces
  - Local NGO's
  - The UN and its agencies
  - Donor agencies
  - International NGO's

*Source: Kingma, 2000a, p. 41.*

Post-war efforts to support demobilisation and reintegration that were more or less completely implemented achieved fairly mixed results. Some have been implemented fairly systematically, while others merely happened spontaneously. Some went smoothly, while many faced considerable problems in their implementation. In terms of impact, some had a beneficial effect on peace and human development, while others had a neutral or negative effect on these processes. As mentioned above, the demobilisation process has even been reversed in a few cases due to the resumption of armed conflict.

Given the specific circumstances in the various countries, the procedures involved in the actual demobilisation exercises varied considerably. Generally speaking, once the decision to demobilise was taken, practical plans needed to be worked out and financing obtained. Successful post-war demobilisation and resettlement require reliable data for planning purposes, effective logistics and management, and substantial resources for shelter, registration, transport, provision of basic needs, etc. (BICC, 1996; Colletta et al., 1996a, b; Ball, 1997; Kingma, 2000a). In several cases, such as Ethiopia, Namibia, Nicaragua, and South Africa, demobilisation required several groups of combatants to be repatriated from neighbouring or other countries. In some demobilising countries, such as El Salvador and Mozambique, the international community played an active role in supporting the processes of demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration; while in others, such as Eritrea, the (new) Government was in charge and conducted most of the activities itself.

#### **4. Supporting demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war societies**

Demobilisation and resettlement are usually seen as important development efforts in post-war situations. The 1998 report by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan on “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” lists “the reintegration of ex-combatants and others into productive society” as one of the priorities of post-conflict peace-building (United Nations, 1998, p. 14). In early 2000, the UN Secretary-General issued a report on “The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” which reiterates the importance of demobilisation and reintegration in peace-building (United Nations, 2000a). A prominent panel of experts reviewing UN peace operations referred to demobilisation and reintegration as key factors in post-war stability that reduced the likelihood of conflicts recurring (United Nations, 2000b).

Many different measures have been developed and used over the past decade to support resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-war circumstances. There is, however, no blueprint for efficient and effective reintegration support. The histories of the wars and the political and socioeconomic circumstances at the time of demobilisation vary considerably. How appropriate the support is therefore differs from case to case. Much depends on the nature of the peace that has been established and the type of forces that have to be demobilised.

Research by the BICC found four general arguments for targeted support to ex-combatants (Kingma, 2000a, p. 226):



- 1) Demobilised combatants require support from a humanitarian point of view. Once demobilised, they are out of a job and usually away from their home. The minimum requirements are thus that their basic needs should be met for some time and they should be physically resettled.
- 2) In some cases, it can be argued that the demobilised combatants have sacrificed several years of their life to liberate their country and improve the development perspectives for their compatriots. In other cases, some of those demobilised might have been recruited under pressure. In such cases, support can be regarded as a form of compensation for foregone education or other investments.
- 3) A third reason why it makes sense to support ex-combatants is because of their potential contribution to the general development in their community and in the country as a whole. Their skills and other capabilities might bring new economic activities and employment opportunities (Nübler, 2000).
- 4) Failure to adequately address the risks involved in demobilisation may jeopardise sustainable peace-building and human development. Without support, demobilised soldiers and guerrilla fighters might have great difficulties in reestablishing themselves in civilian life, and frustrated ex-combatants may threaten the peace and development process by becoming involved in criminal activities or violent political opposition.

Given the scarce resources, however, the support provided for these people has to strike a balance between dealing with their specific needs and not creating discontent among their communities and other groups. In most countries emerging from war, ex-combatants are far outnumbered by returning refugees and internally displaced people, for example. A consensus appears to exist among analysts that special efforts for ex-combatants are generally necessary and justified during the demobilisation and resettlement process, but that support in the reintegration phase should, as far as possible, be community-based and form part of general post-war rehabilitation efforts.

Reintegration into civilian life is by nature a slow social, economic, and psychological process. Experience has shown that successful reintegration depends to a considerable extent on the support that the ex-combatants receive from their families and communities, as well as on the broader economic environment. In the longer term, reintegration also depends on the process of democratisation, including the recovery of a weak state and the development of an independent civil society (Kingma, 2000a).

As indicated above, various forms of support for demobilisation and reintegration processes can be of utmost importance. However, in most countries that have implemented demobilisation and reintegration programmes, post-war economic conditions appeared to be such that national resources were not sufficient. Governments had limited resources and capacity in the aftermath of these wars, NGO's also lacked sufficient resources, and these processes did not fund themselves "through the market." The following two sections will therefore look at the role that international organisations and bilateral aid donors have played and are anticipated to play in the future with regard to demobilisation and reintegration support.

## **5. External support for demobilisation and reintegration**

Over the past decade, several international development co-operation agencies have largely overcome their initial reluctance to become involved in development activities closely related to the military or the security sector in general. In the 1990s, multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental development agencies provided support in many cases of demobilisation through financing of UN peace operations, demobilisation packages, special services during demobilisation, technical assistance, and programmes to facilitate reintegration.

External assistance has generally played an important role in making resources available for swift implementation of post-war demobilisation. Lack of funding may cause problems. Demobilisation requirements are often urgent and, due to their expectations and skills, soldiers may indeed pose a threat to the entire peace process. If the provision of basic needs, such as water, sanitation, shelter, and food, is insufficient at the encampment and discharge stage, frustration is likely to occur. Clarity about the packages up front and proper implementation of these plans and commitments would also provide the best basis for the ex-combatants to become aware of their own responsibility. After much suffering, a new peaceful life full of opportunities is usually anticipated. In the short term, ex-soldiers returning to their villages need to feel that they have achieved something. However, there are also several risks that inappropriate aid might undermine the peace-building process, e.g., if aid creates new disparities, if the timing is not right, if its delivery is not sufficiently demilitarised, or if it is manipulated by local politics (Kingma, 2000b).

In addition, some problems related to foreign assistance are about more than timing and "management." In many cases, the efforts to support demobilisation and reintegration lack sufficient links with the broader post-war rehabilitation, capacity-building, and general development strategies, policies, and programmes. Local actors have often felt only limited "ownership" of the

projects. Moreover, although rapid implementation of the demobilisation phase is important, it also entails risks if the ex-combatants do not have sufficient time to prepare and adjust and/or if they find an inhospitable environment, and quickly designed and implemented projects are unlikely to contribute much to the development of local capacity.

Key international agencies involved in supporting the implementation of demobilisation and reintegration programmes include the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, German Technical Co-operation), and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). On the funding side, key donors include Canada, the European Union, Germany, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States, the World Bank, and the World Food Programme (WFP). In most cases, some of the above organisations and donors operate within one programme. The specific role they play may differ from one programme to another.

Over the past few years, several of the larger multilateral donors have considerably strengthened their departments dealing with post-conflict rehabilitation and conflict management. Most of them are still in the process of structuring their own procedures and guidelines to allow them to respond more effectively. In addition to its normal sources of funding, for example, the World Bank has established a special Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) to flexibly and quickly support innovative work in uncertain and fragile post-conflict societies. The aim of the fund is to support planning, piloting, and analysis of reconstruction activities by funding governments and partner organisations in the forefront of this work. Similarly, the ILO has a special "InFocus Programme" on Crises Response and Reconstruction. To improve its own responsiveness through short missions etc., it has a US\$ 500,000 Rapid Action Fund. UNDP uses both its own resources and trust funds to support demobilisation and reintegration. With financial backing from a wide range of donors, UNDP was able to channel more than US\$ 150.0 million into demobilisation and reintegration programmes in the 1990s (UNDP, 2000).

Over the past few years, most of the international development agencies and bilateral aid donors involved in supporting demobilisation and reintegration processes have considerably institutionalised their efforts and improved mutual coordination. In 1998, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development published a policy statement and guidelines on conflict, peace, and development co-operation, which included general findings on how demobilisation and reintegration could best be supported through development co-operation (OECD/DAC, 1998). At headquarters and policy level, the relevant

development agencies frequently consult each other and exchange information on demobilisation issues and experiences through the OECD/DAC. More informally, they do so through their Conflict Prevention and Post-conflict Reconstruction Network.

The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has set up an institutional memory at headquarters level on issues related to demobilisation in the form of a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre, located at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (<http://www.undp.org/erd/ddr>). In September 1999, the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) established a Task Force on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR), chaired by UNDP, to develop guidelines on the institutional division of labour and a broad strategy for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. The Task Force submitted a report to ECHA in July 2000, outlining strategic directives, guidelines for coordination of DDR support—with or without Security Council involvement—and requirements and measures for strengthening the UN's capacity to support the DDR (United Nations, 2000d).

As observed by the ECHA Task Force mentioned above, financial support for demobilisation and reintegration comes from a wide range of sources, namely assessed contributions to the UN, voluntary funding raised through consolidated appeals, special trust funds, parallel financing from bilateral programmes or regional organisations, and cash or in-kind contributions from national organisations (United Nations, 2000d). It is therefore very difficult to indicate how much money is currently being spent by, or is currently available from, the international donors for demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration support. Most international donors budget and spend their resources for these purposes within broader themes, such as post-conflict rehabilitation or conflict management and prevention. Specific allocation for demobilisation and reintegration programmes is usually made on a case-by-case basis once the specific programme has been designed and approved.

An overall picture of funding for demobilisation and reintegration support thus cannot be provided. However, indications of funding made available or committed by certain key donors are shown per demobilising country in section 7 below. Section 6, which focuses on demobilisation and reintegration in the peacekeeping context, discusses how the UN Secretary-General is making a determined effort to ensure that resources are available for demobilisation and follow-up activities in each peacekeeping operation that the UN embarks on in the future.

## 6. Demobilisation and reintegration in a peacekeeping context

For the more specific context of peacekeeping operations, the Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations produced a set of principles and guidelines on “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in a Peacekeeping Environment” (United Nations, 1999). In early 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report on “The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” which reiterates the importance of demobilisation and reintegration in peace-building (United Nations, 2000a). It puts particular emphasis on the demobilisation of child soldiers.

In August 2000, the United Nations (UN) published a report on a wide range of aspects of its peace operations (United Nations, 2000b). The report was produced by a panel of eminent experts in the field of peacekeeping and diplomacy and is usually referred to as the “Brahimi Report,” named after the chair of the panel Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria and currently UN Under-Secretary-General. It contains a frank review and analysis of the activities that the UN has undertaken over the past decades within and connected with its peacekeeping operations.

The report devotes attention to demobilisation and reintegration issues as part of the UN’s activities for peace-building—which include, but are not limited to, reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights, providing technical assistance for democratic development, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration have been features of at least 15 peacekeeping operations in the past decade. These programmes are funded by more than a dozen UN agencies and programmes and by international and local NGO’s. The report points out a central weakness of the demobilisation and reintegration efforts within UN peace operations, namely that these activities are voluntary funded, and funding has sometimes badly lagged behind. With regards to demobilisation and reintegration, the most concrete recommendation made by the panel is “that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilisation and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict” (United Nations, 2000b, p. 8). The panel also emphasises the positive role that “quick impact projects” can play in the peace-building process.

In October 2000, the UN Secretary-General presented a report to the UN General Assembly on the implementation of the Brahimi Report (United Nations, 2000c). In the report, he states that the UN Security Council had already recognised the importance of timely funding of disarma-

ment and demobilisation in its response to his earlier report on the topic (United Nations, 2000a). The Security Council then called for coordination of voluntary and assessed funding to that end among all elements of the UN system. The Secretary-General will in the future include comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes in his plans for peace operations, as appropriate, and the Security Council can therefore consider including aspects of these programmes in the operations' mandate and the General Assembly can review proposals for funding these programmes in the start-up phase through the mission budgets (United Nations, 2000c, p. 6).

## **7. Anticipating demobilisation and reintegration support**

Demobilisation and efforts to support reintegration are currently being prepared or implemented in several countries, such as Cambodia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia (Kosovo). Demobilisation will have to be implemented sooner or later once the wars in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sri Lanka, and Sudan have finally ended. In Sierra Leone, the ongoing demobilisation was totally disrupted when full-scale fighting broke out again in early 2000. Eritrea and Ethiopia will also most likely go through demobilisation again, now that they have brought an end to the inter-state war that started in May 1998, during which they (re)mobilised massive numbers of soldiers. This section will provide brief background information and comments regarding some of the main anticipated demobilisation exercises, listed by region.<sup>2</sup> Where relevant, it will also make observations on the external funding involved.

### **Africa**

#### ***Angola***

Demobilisation exercises failed twice in Angola in the 1990s, predominantly because the required real agreements between the political leaderships were not yet in place. In 1998, the country slipped back into full-scale civil war. There is no doubt that major demobilisation will be required once the war finally comes to an end. There are currently an estimated 114,000 government troops and 30,000 fighters of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

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<sup>2</sup> Information as of December 2000.

Forced recruitment practices on both sides and poor training and equipment have contributed to a very low morale among the combatants. The Government is currently welcoming UNITA defectors into its ranks. Although the Government suggests that it will be able to end the war through a military victory, the political situation is such that an end to the war is not likely in the short term and demobilisation will most likely have to be based on some sort of new peace agreement. Any such political solution is unlikely to be viable if it does not address the economic aspects of the war.

It should be noted that, although the total number of people currently under arms is very large, the number of displaced persons is about 25 times larger (3.5 million, about one third of the population). Any effort to resettle the ex-combatants therefore cannot escape the dilemma that spending resources on them will be at the expense of many other deserving groups and might undermine long-term peace-building (see section 4, above). In recent months, ex-combatants of the liberation war have also voiced their dissatisfaction. In September 2000, they sent President Jose Eduardo dos Santos a letter demanding better pay and living conditions and threatening a demonstration if he did not reply (UN-IRIN, 9 September 2000).

### ***Central African Republic***

The Government of the Central African Republic (CAR) started to prepare for demobilisation two years ago with UNOPS assistance. However, by early 2000, the Government still did not have sufficient funds for security sector reform, including the demobilisation of thousands of soldiers. In May 2000, at a two-day special meeting in New York, international donors pledged over US\$ 33.0 million for security and development programmes in the country. The meeting was co-sponsored by the UN, UNDP, and the German Government to mobilise donor assistance in support of the government programmes relating to the restructuring of its defense and security forces and the demobilisation and reintegration of military personnel (UN Department of Public Information, 16 May 2000). The total number of armed forces personnel is currently estimated at 5,000.

### ***Democratic Republic of Congo***

A cease-fire agreement was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 1999, which was designed to pave the way for comprehensive disarmament and demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, demobilisation still appears to be some way off, since the commitment of the parties to live by the agreement has proved to be very weak and fighting is still widespread. In collaboration with the UN and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) is to develop procedures for disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating combatants. The mandate of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (MONUC) includes the comprehensive disarmament, demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration of all members of all (named) armed groups, in collaboration with the JMC.

Withdrawal of all the foreign troops involved in the war is likely to be part of any new, more viable, agreement. A key complexity of any future demobilisation in the DRC is the very large and still proliferating number of rebel groups involved in the fighting. The total number of people currently under arms in the DRC is very difficult to estimate. Most of them will need to become aware that serious demobilisation will benefit them before assistance can be implemented. Moreover, the DRC is a very large country and has an extremely weak state. The state itself is therefore unlikely to be able to implement demobilisation and protect the demobilised groups and individuals. A UN peacekeeping force will have to disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate the armed groups. A key question in the case of the DRC is thus whether or not it will be necessary to enforce demobilisation. With such a large number of different groups, changing alliances, economic agendas, and, in all likelihood, a still limited UN peacekeeping force, this would be highly unlikely to succeed.

The *Interahamwe* militia and former Rwandan soldiers also pose a threat. They are seen by many as the main threat to future stability in the Great Lakes region, even if the main warring parties in the DRC were to keep to an agreed cease-fire and develop and implement a solid peace plan. Successful demobilisation will thus be linked to the peace processes in Burundi and Rwanda.

### ***Eritrea and Ethiopia***

In the early and mid-1990s, Eritrea and Ethiopia implemented large-scale demobilisations after the long civil war had come to an end, and Eritrea gained independence in May 1993. The two countries released 54,000 and about 500,000 combatants from their militaries, respectively. By 1996, the two countries had armed forces numbering about 43,000 and 120,000, respectively.

In May 1998, armed clashes broke out between the two countries, triggered by a border dispute. Subsequently, both countries have heavily armed themselves and called large parts of the population under arms—a dramatic reversion of the demobilisations in the early and mid-1990s. Between 50,000 and 100,000 soldiers are believed to have died in the fighting, large but unknown numbers of civilians have been killed, and more than 1.2 million people have been displaced by the hostilities. In June 2000, the two countries signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in Algeria, followed by a more comprehensive peace agreement, signed (again in Algeria) on 12 December 2000. The peace agreement reconfirms the termination of hostilities



and provides for the settlement of the conflict through the delimitation and demarcation of the border. A neutral Boundary Commission composed of five members is to be established to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty boundary, based on pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law. Under the agreement, all prisoners of war and other persons detained as a result of the war will be released.

Now that the countries have signed a peace agreement and initial troops of the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) (of up to 4,200 military personnel) have taken up positions along the disputed border, some form of demobilisation on both sides has become inevitable. Current estimates are that Eritrea has more than 250,000 soldiers under arms, and Ethiopia about 350,000. It should be noted that the war has also militarised the Horn of Africa region in a broader sense, since both countries have provided support to armed groups opposed to each other's regimes.

The forthcoming demobilisations will be quite different from those that took place in the 1990s. The armies and the war were different. The Ethiopian Government is reluctant to substantially cut its forces. On the Eritrean side, the numbers involved will be much larger than before, since by mid-2000 about half of the active workforce was in the army. In Eritrea, demobilisation is seen in the context of a broader process of social reconstruction. In addition, the profile of those to be demobilised is dramatically different from the highly motivated liberation fighters in the early 1990s. This time, the ex-combatants will be predominantly conscripts who have gone through a horrific war experience. The traumas caused by the recent atrocious war are likely to have a major impact on both sides. Both in Eritrea and in Ethiopia, the socioeconomic and institutional environment to which the ex-combatants will return is also different from that of the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, in the light of the above, it is important to learn the lessons of the earlier exercises (e.g., Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000; Ayalew and Dercon, 2000; Colletta, et al., 1996b) in the design and implementation of the future demobilisations and subsequent reintegration support.

Assisting in demobilisation and resettlement of combatants is not explicitly in the mandate of UNMEE. Both governments are, however, already discussing possible demobilisation and reintegration support with potential external donors. In late 2000, the World Bank drew up a three-year, US\$ 174.0 million Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (EDRP) to assist the Government of Ethiopia in demobilising and reintegrating 150,000 veterans (World Bank, 2000b). It will help these veterans to rebuild their lives and resume productive economic activities. The project will also facilitate the reallocation of public resources to priority social and infrastructure investments by reducing defense expenditures. In the first phase, the project will deal with 60,000 veterans. After demobilisation and resettlement, the veterans will be offered

a wide range of possible support activities to facilitate their economic reintegration. About 17,000 of the veterans who are disabled will also receive special medical services. IOM is cooperating with the Government to plan the establishment of a comprehensive database of, and self-employment opportunities for, demobilised soldiers (United Nations, 2000d).

In Eritrea, the Government has started discussions with UNDP regarding possible demobilisation and reintegration support for about 200,000 soldiers. Actual demobilisation depends on the progress of the peace process, but the Government has already indicated that it will be interested in drawing on international assistance, more so than in the demobilisation process in the 1990s. Money for an initial demobilisation programme is likely to be made available from a Dutch trust fund managed by UNDP. In addition, a World Bank team visited the country in December 2000 to assist in demobilisation planning. The amount of external resources available is still unclear.

### ***Guinea-Bissau***

The Government of Guinea-Bissau has decided to demobilise part of its forces in the aftermath of the 1998/1999 armed conflict. The armed forces are estimated to number 9,000 soldiers. However, the data are weak and the Government claims that about 15,000 soldiers were under arms at the end of the violent conflict. According to the Government's plan, about 9,000 men would have to leave the army (UN-IRIN, 18 August 2000).

In May 2000, the World Bank approved an Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit to support such a demobilisation and reintegration exercise, and in January 2000 the IMF approved a credit of SDR 1.4 million (about US\$ 2.0 million) in emergency post-conflict assistance for Guinea-Bissau to support the Government's reconstruction and economic recovery programme (M2 PRESSWIRE, 12 January 2000). According to the IMF, the Government still needs to deal with specific post-conflict issues, including putting in place a comprehensive demobilisation programme, continuing to strengthen tax administration, and accelerating the rehabilitation of key infrastructure. Bilateral donors, such as France and Italy, have also indicated that they will support the demobilisation programme.

Recent events in the country show, however, that relations with Senegal on the Casamance issue and the relationship between the Government and the highly politicised military are still quite fragile. In November 2000, a former military ruler was shot dead in a shoot-out with government soldiers after an alleged coup attempt. The UN Security Council underlined the importance of determined continuation of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration

process and the need for an urgent and accurate census of all military forces (UN Press Release, SC/6965, 29 November 2000).

### ***Nigeria***

In July 2000, Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff spoke at a press conference about the ongoing restructuring efforts to build a more compact, mobile, and effective army. He stated that 5,000 personnel would be discharged in 2000, while 1,000 others would be recruited, bringing the net rate of reduction to 4,000 in that year. According to the Defense Minister, the Nigerian military will be reduced from its current estimated strength of 80,000 to 50,000 as part of the restructuring process embarked upon by the new Government since assuming office in May 1999 (PANA, 5 July 2000).

### ***Sierra Leone***

Sierra Leone is clearly one of the major demobilisation and reintegration challenges for the international community. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) is likely to become the largest peacekeeping (peace-enforcement) operation since the one in Cambodia. Part of the UNAMSIL's mandate is "to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration plan" (UN Security Council resolution 1270 (1999)). With the subsequent UN Security Council resolution 1289 of 7 February 2000, the mandate was revised to include the following: "To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme" and "To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction."

The demobilisation and resettlement that started under the UNAMSIL operation initially made some slow progress. The UN Secretary-General reported (S/2000/455) that, by 15 May 2000, a total of 24,042 ex-combatants had been disarmed: 4,949 from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 10,055 from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)/ex-Sierra Leone Army, and 9,038 from the Civil Defence Forces. Of all of them, 1,701 (seven percent) were child soldiers. However, the whole process was seriously disrupted by the outbreak of renewed fighting in April 2000. It is widely perceived that the RUF broke the peace agreement in early 2000, which escalated into heavy fighting between the RUF on the one side and UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) on the other. Two demobilisation centers were destroyed by the RUF in early May 2000, and operations were suspended in four of the remaining seven centers. Ultimately, intervention by British troops brought back relative calm by mid-2000. Nevertheless, the RUF controls still about two thirds of the country.

Although there is little reliable information, it is likely that most of the combatants who had been demobilised before May 2000 have been reabsorbed into the fighting forces. Military sources estimated in July that only 6,000 of those who had come forward before May could still be accounted for (Reuters, 27 July 2000). Even before the new outbreak of large-scale fighting, many of the “demobilised” child soldiers returned to the RUF, some because of intimidation and some because there were no funds available for rehabilitation (Africa Confidential, 26 May 2000, p. 8). By mid-2000, there were an estimated 11,500 pro-government forces under arms, plus a few thousand Civil Defence Forces, such as the *Kamajors*. The size of the RUF, together with some Liberian allies, was estimated at no more than 15,000 forces (Africa Confidential, 9 June 2000, p. 2). UNICEF estimated that more than 5,000 of the combatants are child soldiers, mostly fighting for the RUF (PANA, 1 June 2000). The loyalties of some groups are hard to establish and military discipline, even within the current government army, is limited.

Despite the outbreak of violence and the setbacks in the demobilisation programme, efforts to disarm and demobilise continued in mid-2000. Some camps have remained open, and despite insecurity, small numbers of combatants from various factions have reported for demobilisation. However, by mid-October, it was reported that the demobilisation programme had come to a standstill (URIN-WA, 12 October 2000). Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of all combatants are still seen as key elements in a political process towards achieving durable peace in Sierra Leone (UN S/2000/832). However, a UN Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone in October 2000 recommended a thorough overhaul and reorientation of the programme (S/2000/992). Ex-combatants must be processed through the system much more quickly, and better provisions need to be made for their dependents. Quick-impact projects and incentives for economic activities are seen as vital. However, the central constraint for the implementation of the programme is the lack of security and the absence of a commitment to peace by all parties.

Given the continuation of the fighting, similar problems will have to be addressed as indicated above for the DRC. Will the combatants have to be disarmed and demobilised by force? When will the new SLA have gained sufficient power? It now has about 8,500 members, but they are largely inexperienced and untrained. A critical factor will be the success of the UN peace-enforcement mission and the extensive British support to the reform of the entire security sector, including training and equipping the new SLA.

In March 2000, international donors pledged US\$ 158.0 million for peace-building activities in Sierra Leone, which included demobilisation and reintegration support (UN Department of Public Information, 28 March 2000). The Government of Japan has recently approved the allocation

of US\$ 306,094 to the UN Trust Fund for Sierra Leone to specifically support reintegration and rehabilitation projects (IRIN, 30 November 2000).

### ***Somalia***

As indicated above, smaller demobilisation activities were attempted in Somalia in the mid-1990s, and some degree of success, albeit limited, was achieved in the self-proclaimed republic of "Somaliland." Since the establishment of an interim government in Somalia in August 2000, planning for demobilisation has been resumed. Some initial demobilisation and recovery of "technicals" (pickup trucks mounted with heavy machine guns) have been reported. A meeting of UN agencies, aid donors, and demobilisation experts was convened in November 2000 to assess the situation and discuss various options and financing requirements (PANA, 15 November 2000).

The new Government has established a National Demobilisation Committee. The goal is to demobilise up to 75,000 militia over the next three years, providing them with basic education, religious and civics instruction, and job training in areas such as driving, mechanics, welding, carpentry, farming, fishing, and animal husbandry (PANA, 28 November 2000). Mogadishu's most prominent businessmen are already financing a plan to lure militiamen away from their leaders and into a separate 4,000-strong force for training as policemen (Reuters, 15 September 2000).

Meanwhile, the Government appealed to all former Somali soldiers to come forward and register for the new national army. Some 10,000 former Somali soldiers did so and gathered in November 2000 in the main soccer stadium (IRIN Weekly Round-up, 11-17 November 2000). In spite of the encouraging developments, the established warlords continue to threaten the process.

### ***South Africa***

South Africa has been considering efforts to downsize the SANDF ever since its establishment in 1994 (Batchelor et al., 2000). In 1995, the SANDF's full-time force numbered almost 120,000 members. By early 2000, the number of personnel in the SANDF was estimated at 82,000. Based on the 1998 Defence Review process, the Government has decided to further reduce the number of people in the military to about 70,000. Given that personnel costs account for almost 60 percent of the defense budget at a time when the need is felt to upgrade the SANDF's weapons and equipment, the number of people might be even further reduced. This process of "rationalisation"—as it is called in South Africa—is expected to start in late 2000. If actual implementation of the rationalisation process is postponed beyond 2000, the number of people that will have to be actively retrenched will reduce. One of the disadvantages of the natural

attrition approach is that not necessarily those are retrenched that the military would want to get rid of in the light of its efforts to improve the ethnic balance and quality of the forces.

### ***Sudan***

Estimates regarding the number of people under arms in Sudan vary considerably. The BICC estimates that the government forces number around 119,000. The number of forces of various factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is estimated at around 50,000. In the event that the Government and the opposition forces eventually reach a serious peace settlement, satisfying the main groups in Southern Sudan, a very large demobilisation process will most likely be required.

### **Americas**

#### ***Colombia***

Despite a two-year old peace initiative by President Pastrana, peace does not seem to be in sight. It is highly unlikely that the army will be able to defeat the guerrillas and disarm the right-wing paramilitary forces, with their alleged links to the military. However, once the parties are able to settle their disputes, considerable demobilisation is anticipated, since the number of people under arms is very large and reducing the role of the army is one of the key demands of the guerrillas. The national armed forces are estimated at 146,000 troops. The two main guerrilla groups are estimated to have a total of about 20,000 fighters. In addition, paramilitary forces in Colombia are estimated to number 4,000-5,000 (Lemoine, 2000; Shifter, 1999). The viability of any peace accord, and thereby of demobilisation, would clearly depend on the effectiveness of addressing the deeply rooted structural problems in the economy and society.

### **Asia**

#### ***Cambodia***

Efforts to support demobilisation and reintegration in Cambodia have experienced their ups and downs since the demobilisation effort prior to the UN-monitored elections in 1993 (Bertrand and Pauwels, 2000). Over the last two years, most of the old rivalries causing war and other violence in Cambodia have disappeared. In 1999, the last remaining group of Khmer Rouge supporters defected to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). In early 1999, the Cambodian Government announced that it planned to reduce the size of the armed forces by about 55,000 soldiers over a period of five years (Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 January 1999, p. 17; Asian Defence Journal, 4/99, p. 51). More recent figures indicate that Cambodia is planning to demo-

bilise 31,500 troops over three years (South China Morning Post, 8 May 2000).

At their meeting in Paris in May 2000, the donors agreed that successful implementation of demobilisation is critical for the Government's entire reform programme (Okonjo-Iweala, 2000). It acknowledged that failure could have extremely negative consequences. The meeting agreed that the emphasis of this programme should be less on the short-term transitional needs of the ex-combatants and more on long-term reintegration and sustainable livelihood support. Delegates underlined that demobilisation needed to form an integral part of a broader programme of military reform. Donors were urged to make arrangements for financing the full-scale demobilisation programme—or at least the first tranche scheduled for 2000—as quickly as possible, so that the momentum would not be lost (Okonjo-Iweala, 2000).

Initial World Bank plans for demobilisation included a severance pay of US\$ 1,200 per person, plus retraining of the soldiers in other trades. However, donors and the Government did not manage to mobilise these funds and thus agreed on a cash payment of US\$ 240 per veteran, plus some assistance in kind and reintegration support at community level. A pilot demobilisation of 1,500 soldiers took place from May to July 2000. The reintegration phase will be completed with the distribution of goods and the allocation of houses in early 2001. Japan, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, the World Food Programme, and the Cambodian Government financed the pilot demobilisation programme.

In July 2000, Prime Minister Hun Sen himself threatened that the Government would terminate the demobilisation programme if more resources were not committed and disbursed by the international donors. In September 2000, the World Bank announced that it would be making an additional US\$ 15.0 million available (Kyodo News, 1 September 2000). The Government is planning to demobilise a further 10,000 soldiers in 2001, provided that the funds committed by the World Bank and other donors are readily available.

In spite of the fact that all RCAF soldiers were registered in 1999, the numbers are still disputed. According to official registration results, 140,693 names have been registered, of which 9,433 were widows of deceased soldiers. This puts the official strength of the RCAF at 131,260 troops. The majority of RCAF soldiers are, however, not in active service but have to earn additional income to support themselves. This situation has led to allegations that the figure is still highly inflated and that numerous “ghost soldiers” still exist and to warnings about a serious risk of large-scale corruption (Bangkok Post, 29 October 2000).

### ***East Timor***

In October 1999, the UN Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), mandated to run the public administration of the country and provide humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation. It also comprises an international peacekeeping force to control the violence that followed the referendum on independence. UNTAET's mandate includes the provision of security and the maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of East Timor. Under this mandate, it makes efforts to demobilise militias within the territory. However, in early 2000, it was reported that the UN-authorized International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) were much more concerned with disarming the pro-Indonesia militias than the pro-independence *Falintil* militia, which had till then refused to disarm (Bostock, 2000). The *Falintil* militia was indeed allowed to retain its arms, but only inside a cantonment in the town of Aileu. There is continuing international criticism concerning the lack of willingness and ability of the Indonesian Government to disarm the militia opposed to East Timor's independence, who are operating from West Timor (Indonesia). Currently, the 7,700 UN peacekeepers are still instrumental in protecting the population against these militias.

In spite of earlier intentions by the new East Timorese leadership to keep the newly independent country demilitarised, it has becoming increasingly clear that independent East Timor will establish its own armed forces. In an international meeting hosted by the UN in Dili in November 2000, a wide range of relevant countries supported this development in principle. The Australian Government offered assistance of up to about US\$ 14.0 million for the establishment of a defense force (Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 2000), and the UN has also offered its assistance (Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 November 2000, p. 8). Given the country's turbulent past, it will be a major challenge to have the new defense forces established in such a way that they contribute to national reconciliation. The *Falintil*, which is expected to form the base of the new forces, is in disarray. Its earlier discipline has eroded and some groups are involved in illegal activities (Lintner, 2000).

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has recently begun to support the reintegration of the *Falintil* into civil society by conducting a survey of 1,600 soldiers, designed to assess their current situation and future requirements (IOM Press Briefing Notes, 12 December 2000). The US\$ 108,000 project, funded by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), will create a database covering key information on the soldiers, their level of education, skills, health, and economic and social circumstances. The database will form the basis of a broader *Falintil* Reinsertion Assistance Programme (FRAP) currently under discussion. Of the soldiers surveyed, some 1,050 are likely to be demobilised to start a civilian life. The remaining 550 are likely to form the core of a future East Timor defense force.



### ***North and South Korea***

Given the recent détente between the two Koreas, it is well possible that their enormous military arsenals and forces on both sides of the border will be downsized in the foreseeable future. The number of armed forces in North and South are currently estimated at 1,055,000 and 672,000, respectively (not including the some 36,000 US troops in the South). Downsizing would thus lead to the demobilisation of quite considerable numbers of soldiers.

### ***Sri Lanka***

Recent events in Sri Lanka do not suggest that the war will come to an end soon. However, negotiations have started, facilitated by the Norwegian Government. Any deal will include some sort of demobilisation. The forces of the *Tamil Tigers* (LTTE) are quite limited, probably about 5,000–8,000 (Financial Times, 26 May 2000, p. 4). However, estimates put the member of the government forces at around 113,000. They are known to be demoralised, badly trained, and under-equipped. The *Tamil Tigers* are believed to have large numbers of child soldiers in their ranks.

### ***Tajikistan***

Tajikistan has had considerable difficulties with implementing the military component of the peace agreement signed in 1997, particularly with demobilising former opposition fighters into civilian life (Olimov and Gonchar, 2000). Parts of the former opposition forces have been absorbed into the regular armed forces. However, despite some external assistance for reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, this process is still underway. Persistent problems in Tajik society also hinder the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. The armed forces in Tajikistan are currently estimated to number about 8,000 soldiers.

## **Europe**

### ***Bosnia***

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, formal demobilisation was not even included in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, because the parties would most likely not have been able to agree on these sensitive issues. Approximately 425,000 combatants therefore merely dispersed, without prior encampment or registration (King, 2000). The total armed forces currently number about 65,000 soldiers. In October 1999, the collective presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to reduce the size of their armies by 15 percent, predominantly because of economic pressures (Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 October 1999, p. 5). The Bosnian Serb Republic defense minister warned that the planned cuts in both entities' armies in Bosnia, and in their budgets, would cause social problems for those soldiers who are demobilised (SRNA news agency, Bijeljina; BBC Worldwide

Monitoring, 13 March 2000). Some of the money committed during the donor meeting in Brussels in March 2000 is to be used to demobilise troops in Bosnia (Reuters, 30 March 2000). In June 2000, the World Bank approved a three-year US\$ 15.0 million Pilot Emergency Labour Redeployment Project, aiming to provide ex-soldiers with the means for self-reliant existence (World Bank, 2000a). The focus of the project is on supporting the ex-soldiers in their search for employment and creating sustainable jobs and businesses.

### ***Croatia***

The Croatian Prime Minister has announced that he aims to reduce the army from 60,000 to 40,000 troops. His Government has asked the Belgian, Dutch, and Hungarian Governments for advice on matters such as the phasing out of the conscription system (The Economist, 27 May 2000, p. 30).

### ***Kosovo***

Following the end of the war, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was officially disbanded in September 1999. The force was believed to number more than 20,000 fighters at that time. The KLA has now become the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), which is supposed to deal with civilian matters only, such as disaster response, demining, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction of infrastructure. It is widely believed, however, that although it officially ceased to exist, the core of the KLA command structure is still present. It is also believed that some of the serious crime in Kosovo is run by former chiefs of the KLA (Harris, 2000). NATO and the UN are currently trying to reestablish a civilian police force in Kosovo. It might need to be considered whether, at some point in the future, the members of the former KLA need to be supported in taking on civilian roles.

### ***Turkey***

The current détente between Greece and Turkey and the abandoning of the armed struggle by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) are quite likely to allow large cuts in the Turkish defense forces in the medium term. There is already discussion on abolishing the 100,000 strong Aegean army, created in 1975 with Greece as its focus (Financial Times, 6 June 2000, p. 3). The total Turkish armed forces number 833,000 soldiers (Greece and Cyprus have 202,000 and 10,000 soldiers, respectively).

## **8. Analysis and prospects**

The anticipated demobilisation exercises indicated above pose several challenges for demobilisation and reintegration support in the future. In this section, observations will be put forward that might help to focus the general and more specific expectations for future demobilisation and reintegration support.

### **8.1 Different types of anticipated demobilisation**

Section 7 shows that there are different types of demobilisation that might be anticipated with regard to external assistance. As we have seen, each case of demobilisation will take place within a distinct political and socioeconomic context. Nevertheless, in broad terms, the anticipated demobilisations can be categorised into four different groups: planned, postponed, revived, and distant demobilisations.

#### **8.1.1 Planned demobilisations**

In some countries, demobilisation has been announced and is likely to be implemented in the foreseeable future. This group includes Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, and East Timor, for example. As we have seen, in countries such as the DRC, it might take some time before the political situation allows the actual demobilisation exercise to be implemented.

#### **8.1.2 Postponed demobilisations**

Some demobilisations have been clearly announced, although their actual implementation is still not quite clear, such as in the Central African Republic, South Africa, and Tajikistan. In the countries where demobilisation has been in the pipeline for quite some time or has been repeatedly postponed, we need to consider what that means. First, has the demobilisation already taken place through natural attrition, including voluntary separation? If so, what does that imply for targeted reintegration support? If the ex-combatants have already been resettled, but are still struggling to become reintegrated, the most appropriate way to support reintegration is likely to be through support to the community and improvement of the general economic environment (see also section 4). The benefits of channeling general development assistance to regions (or sectors) where large numbers of ex-combatants have resettled, and not calling it a (demobilisation and) reintegration programme, would thus have to be considered.

### **8.1.3 Revived demobilisations**

There are countries in which demobilisation has occurred some time during the past few years, but in which it failed the first time around. In Angola, it even failed twice. Another example in this category is Sierra Leone, and Eritrea and Ethiopia could to some extent also be included in this group. However, as shown in section 7, the first demobilisations in these countries were based on quite a different war experience and a different type of peace. Cambodia could also be grouped in this category, although the demobilisation that was initiated in the early 1990s never really took place. For countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone, in particular, it is important that the lessons of the earlier failure have been learned before a new demobilisation and reintegration process is initiated. The various actors, including the previously demobilised combatants and their leaders, will likely perceive new initiatives with a dose of skepticism. Their experience is likely to induce them to keep options of returning to war open.

### **8.1.4 Distant demobilisations**

Lastly, there is a group of countries in which demobilisation will be inevitable at some point in time, although the countries are currently still in a state of outright war or there is considerable insecurity. In those countries, demobilisation might still be a long way off, but it is never too early to start anticipating the fact that at some point they will have to demobilise some or most of their forces. This group includes Afghanistan, Colombia, the two Koreas, Sri Lanka, and Sudan, for example.

## **8.2 Complex emergencies**

Much of the recent experience with demobilisation and reintegration support is based on cases such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Uganda. With hindsight, these cases were more “straightforward” than the ones that are now anticipated. Most of them took place after a clear “watershed,” when the risk of returning to war was limited. In most of the countries listed above, such as in Angola, Colombia, the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, the political environment is likely to be more difficult and complicated. In these cases, it will become all the more important to look at the complex and interrelated issues of security and development, and not to perceive demobilisation as a technical procedure. These situations might also become extremely complex if demobilisation of various groups is attempted to be implemented by force. A question relevant in some cases might be whether some groups have actually armed themselves in order to obtain demobilisation and reintegration support in the future.

Experience shows that demobilisation and reintegration support is best dealt with within the broader range of post-war rehabilitation and development issues (Kingma, 2000a). As with most efforts in development co-operation programmes, a long-term perspective should be employed and the support efforts designed through a participatory process. Central concerns include helping to develop local capacity and ownership, ensuring that the efforts are sustainable, empowering women, and looking at the security situation and overall development process rather than at the one specific project. Support for security sector reform, such as training and equipping the police, might facilitate the resettlement and reintegration process (see section 8.3.2.). A good deal of political awareness among the aid workers may make it easier to anticipate problems and conflict and to prevent the assistance from being manipulated (Anderson, 1999). Experience has also shown that demobilisation support in complex emergencies requires a large degree of flexibility and willingness to coordinate on the part of the donors.

### **8.3 Issues requiring special attention**

#### **8.3.1 Various types of forces**

In future demobilisation and reintegration support, improvements can be made by giving more attention to the variety of forces to be demobilised. The differences between regular troops, paramilitary troops, and opposition forces are quite considerable in terms of their needs and potential during and after demobilisation. For example, regular troops can be expected to be more willing to accept training and employment schemes etc. Paramilitaries might pose a higher security risk if they do not find acceptable alternatives to their military work. In some cases, other uniformed security forces might also be affected by demobilisation, such as border guards, military police, and internal security organisations.

#### **8.3.2 Security sector reform**

As shown above, several of the anticipated demobilisations are likely to be conducted simultaneously with—or as part of—a more general reform of the security sector (Wulf, 2000a, b). During wars, the armed forces often deal with most security functions—both external and internal. A major challenge in the post-war period is to reorganise the government's role in protecting its citizens' security and human rights. Often, a new national police force needs to be created that is professional, civilian, and well-trained and that deserves the respect of the entire population. Attention to these wider concerns in the security sector—possibly in combination with more general “good governance” measures—would improve the impact of demobilisation and reintegration support.

However, in the light of the above, some cautionary notes seem required. Reductions in the number of military personnel are sometimes the consequence of a military reform. This may include the acquisition of new technologies, the upgrading of existing equipment, or the reorientation of forces towards new roles. The recent prevailing trend has been one of modernising armed forces with the objective of achieving “leaner and meaner” military organisations, implying a need for increasingly higher levels of qualification. Demobilisation has indeed been used to get rid of those soldiers that do not meet the required standards, due to age, health, disciplinary problems, etc. Demobilisation therefore does not always equate to a reduction in military capacity or expenditure. In such cases, it needs to be asked whether such a process should be supported with funds that are meant for human development.

### **8.3.3 Child soldiers**

Many of the wars that have ended over the past decade involved thousands of child soldiers. Nevertheless, these young ex-combatants have received little special attention. Most demobilised child soldiers—although they may now be adults—have been seriously traumatised by the brutal experiences they have undergone and the violent acts they themselves have committed. They have been socialised in a war environment, knowing little else. If their reintegration fails, they may well contribute to new “cycles of violence,” and they can easily be recruited into newly formed armed opposition groups. For the above and also for purely humanitarian reasons, special attention needs to be given to these former child soldiers during and after demobilisation. A recent report by the UN Secretary-General (United Nations, 2000a) particularly highlights the problems of disarmament and demobilisation of child soldiers and their reintegration into society.

### **8.3.4 Female soldiers and dependents**

In the demobilisation and reintegration programmes implemented thus far, too little attention has generally been paid to female ex-combatants, their children, and the wives of ex-combatants. In the former guerrilla forces in El Salvador and Eritrea, about one third of the fighters were women. These female ex-fighters and other women in war-affected communities have usually acquired new roles during wars, and men often expect them to return to their traditional roles once the war is over. Thus reintegration creates tensions. A very high divorce rate has been observed between ex-fighters in Eritrea, for example (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000). In Uganda, wives of returning soldiers who came from other regions were very often not accepted by the soldier’s family and their community.

### **8.3.5 Disarmament of the combatants**

Demobilisation exercises are usually not sufficiently used to reduce the number of arms in circulation. Although in some countries it has been shown that disarmament of people leaving the forces can be properly conducted and controlled, in others large numbers of uncontrolled weapons—and the associated ammunition—have remained in the hands of ex-combatants or have ended up in the hands of other unauthorised people. In some countries, considerable numbers of weapons are also believed to have “leaked” from the control of government forces during and after demobilisation. There are several other ways of taking weapons out of circulation (e.g., Faltas and Paes, 2000), but the moment of encampment for demobilisation provides a particularly appropriate timing to disarm people and show that alternatives exist in terms of a non-violent future.

### **8.3.6 Psychosocial aspects**

Yet another issue which has not been adequately dealt with in the context of demobilisation is war trauma. The mental health of ex-combatants can be an important factor in their reintegration. During the often long wars, many people have been victims or perpetrators of horrendous violence. This has left deep emotional and psychological scars among the ex-combatants and other people, something which is reflected by depression, apathy, or rage, for example. The results of war trauma—sometimes in combination with drug addiction—may also seriously disturb public life. Thus far, external agencies have only paid very limited attention to the required assistance. The support required is likely to have more similarities with public health interventions than with Western therapeutic approaches that deal with individuals. In contemplating external support measures, it is important to note that many ex-combatants in several African countries have to undergo cleansing rituals in order to be accepted (back) into the communities (e.g., Baptista Lundin *et al.*, 2000; Honwana, 1999). These rituals have an impact on the acceptance by the community and on the state of mind of the ex-combatants themselves.

### **8.3.7 Human rights violations**

Human rights issues should also be taken into account in the design and implementation of demobilisation and reintegration support. The confidence in and perception of security that people, including ex-combatants, have depends to some extent on how past and ongoing human rights violations committed by members of the armed forces, or of opposition forces, are being handled. Soldiers and ex-guerrillas who have violated human rights during the war should be appropriately punished. However, heavy punishment might also increase tensions. Trials and hearings conducted by “Truth Commissions” also have the potential to improve understanding for the experiences of different groups during war and the individual processes of healing. General amnesties granted to ex-combatants in Guatemala and in Sierra Leone, some of whom have committed horrendous atrocities, are seriously disputed. These questions—and similar ones regarding the prosecution of former dictators—are currently prominent in international debate.

### **8.3.8 Unraveling the war economies**

Achieving economic stability and an enabling environment for economic activities is often critical for economic reintegration processes. Too little attention has been given thus far to the economic setting in which the war ended and the demobilisation was implemented. There is often a need to broaden both the analysis and the assistance to include structural adjustment policies and entangling the war economy, an economy which often involves trade in drugs, gems, and/or



weapons. We should also note, however, that tightened macroeconomic policies lead to fewer public sector jobs and increased urban unemployment during the adjustment period. In post-war settings, it often seems attractive and easy to take the resources that used to be used for fighting and invest them in reconstruction and development instead. The resources used during wars are often immense, including the time and energy of young men and women. Indeed, sometimes one wonders why countries that have waged protracted wars—requiring massive resources, logistics, and management—appear so dependent on outside resources and technical assistance for their post-war rehabilitation.

### **8.3.9 National capacity**

Lastly, a point that requires much more attention in future support for demobilisation and reintegration is the strength of civil society to deal with conversion and reintegration matters. Demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration are not just activities to be implemented in a technocratic manner. They need to be part of, and embedded in, a broader political process. In addition, the national capacity—inside and outside government—to analyse and debate defense, disarmament, and security issues is likely to have an impact on the implementation and sustainability of demobilisation exercises. Demobilisation cannot be implemented by “sending in a group of experts”; it requires time and the development and strengthening of local capacity. While important general lessons have been learned and have been able to be applied, demobilisation and reintegration still require a continuously creative and open-minded attitude on the part of the people concerned.

## **9. Conclusions**

There are currently almost 7.0 million fewer soldiers in the world’s official armed forces than there were in 1987. Major post-war demobilisations took place in a wide range of countries in the 1990s. In almost all cases, demobilisation played a significant role in the rehabilitation, peace-building, and development processes. Some experiences with demobilisation and reintegration have been very positive. Ex-combatants returned to peaceful work and received considerable support from their families and communities. However, some others have failed or have not significantly contributed to peace-building and human development.

In the foreseeable future, several demobilisations are anticipated in a wide range of countries. These demobilisations will most likely show a significant variety in terms of their context and approach. Most of them are likely to be more complex than the ones dealt with in the 1990s.

Particularly those demobilisations that take place in complex emergencies, those that have been postponed for some time, and those in countries where earlier demobilisation efforts have failed raise special concerns.

In some countries, demobilisation will be inevitable at some point in the future, although the countries are currently still in a state of outright war. It is important to anticipate these demobilisations and the required assistance at an early stage. Good preparation and coordination can prevent mistakes and provide important and timely clarity about the type of assistance that will be provided.

Most international development agencies and bilateral aid donors involved in supporting demobilisation and reintegration processes have considerably institutionalised their efforts and improved mutual coordination over the past few years. Large amounts of resources have been spent in the past, and these organisations are currently making efforts to improve their responsiveness to forthcoming demobilisation and reintegration challenges. The actual overall amounts available for demobilisation and reintegration are hard to establish, as financial support for these purposes comes from a wide range of sources, namely assessed contributions to the UN, voluntary funding raised through consolidated appeals, special trust funds, parallel financing from bilateral programmes or regional organisations, and cash or in-kind contributions from national organisations.

Lastly, this paper presents a range of issues that will require special attention in responding to new efforts to support demobilisation and reintegration and in anticipating demobilisation in the future. For example, more attention should be paid to the broader economic, institutional, and security environment. Various groups of ex-combatants have special needs, which play a role in the type of assistance required. In addition, psychosocial and human rights aspects also deserve to play an important role in the design and implementation of demobilisation, resettlement, and reintegration support. A debate on these issues would help to refocus and strengthen the potential for effective and efficient external support for peace-building and human development.

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## Annexes

**Annex: Armed forces personnel, numbers in 1000s**  
- Countries -

Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Afghanistan	55	56	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Albania	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	55	34	34
Algeria	126	126	126	139	139	136	120	124	124	122
Angola	107	115	150	128	128	100	100	97	100	114
Argentina	95	85	70	65	65	67	67	72	73	73
Armenia	NA	NA	NA	20	21	45	60	57	45	40
Australia	70	68	68	68	68	59	58	58	57	57
Austria	48	44	44	44	44	45	45	45	43	43
Azerbaijan	NA	NA	NA	43	63	83	87	73	67	72
Bahamas	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1
Bahrain	5	8	8	7	7	8	10	11	11	11
Bangladesh	103	103	107	107	107	115	118	118	121	121
Barbados	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Belarus	NA	NA	NA	153	130	108	100	90	84	85
Belgium	110	106	101	79	70	53	47	46	45	43
Belize	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Benin	5	6	7	6	6	7	7	6	5	5
Bhutan	NA	NA	NA	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Bolivia	30	30	33	32	32	32	32	32	34	34
Bosnia-Herzegovina	NA	NA	NA	80	150	200	264	116	65	65
Botswana	6	6	7	6	6	7	7	8	8	9
Brazil	319	295	295	296	296	296	295	300	314	313
Brunei	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5
Bulgaria	150	129	107	99	52	53	80	90	102	102
Burkina Faso	8	10	10	9	9	7	10	9	10	10
Burundi	11	12	12	7	7	13	15	22	22	35
Cambodia	99	112	112	135	102	100	90	90	90	89
Cameroon	21	23	24	24	24	24	24	22	22	22
Canada	88	87	86	82	76	75	70	66	61	61

Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Cape Verde	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Central African Republic	5	4	4	7	7	5	5	5	5	5
Chad	33	50	50	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
Chile	95	95	90	92	92	93	99	90	94	95
China	3500	3500	3200	3160	3031	2930	2930	2935	2840	2700
Colombia	91	110	110	139	139	145	146	146	146	146
Comoros										
Congo	15	9	9	10	10	9	9	10	10	10
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	NA	NA	NA	103	103	105	105	73	58	56
Cuba	297	297	297	175	175	107	105	90	75	60
Cyprus	14	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Czech Republic/ Czechoslovakia	NA	NA	NA	NA	100	93	86	70	62	59
Czechoslovakia	175	198	154	154	NA	NA	NA			
Denmark	31	31	30	28	27	28	27	28	25	25
Djibouti	4	4	3	8	18	18	17	15	10	10
Dominica										
Dominican Republic	21	21	21	22	22	23	24	25	25	25
Ecuador	46	53	53	57	57	57	57	57	57	57
Egypt	450	434	434	424	424	434	430	432	434	434
El Salvador	45	55	60	49	35	30	30	28	28	24
Equatorial Guinea	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Eritrea	NA	NA	NA	95	82	58	45	43	46	130
Estonia	NA	NA	NA	3	5	5	5	5	4	4
Ethiopia	400	450	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	200
Fed. States of Micronesia										
Fiji	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	4
Finland	39	31	32	33	31	31	31	32	32	32
France	554	550	542	522	506	506	504	501	475	449
Gabon	10	9	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5



Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Gambia	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Georgia	NA	NA	NA	35	35	35	35	30	23	23
German DR	262	137	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA		
Germany	503	545	457	442	398	362	352	339	335	333
Germany, FR										
Ghana	16	9	9	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Greece	201	201	205	208	213	206	213	212	206	202
Guatemala	43	43	43	44	44	44	44	44	41	32
Guinea	15	15	15	15	15	15	12	10	10	10
Guinea-Bissau	10	12	12	11	11	11	9	9	9	9
Guyana	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Haiti	9	8	8	8	8	8	7	0	0	0
Honduras	19	18	17	17	17	17	18	19	19	8
Hungary	109	94	87	78	78	75	71	64	56	49
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	1260	1262	1265	1265	1265	1265	1145	1145	1145	1175
Indonesia	285	283	278	283	271	276	275	299	299	299
Iran	604	440	465	528	528	528	513	513	518	540
Iraq	1000	1390	475	407	407	407	390	383	388	430
Ireland	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	12
Israel	191	190	190	181	181	177	177	175	176	176
Italy	506	493	457	471	450	436	435	431	419	402
Ivory Coast	8	15	15	15	15	15	15	14	14	14
Jamaica	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Japan	247	250	250	242	242	242	240	236	236	243
Jordan	190	100	100	100	100	98	99	99	104	104
Kazakhstan	NA	NA	NA	44	44	40	40	40	42	45
Kenya	20	20	20	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
Kiribati										
Korea, North	1040	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200	1128	1054	1055	1055
Korea, South	647	650	750	750	750	750	655	660	672	672
Kuwait	20	7	10	12	12	15	17	15	15	15

Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Kyrgyzstan	NA	NA	NA	12	12	12	9	9	12	12
Laos	56	55	53	37	37	37	37	37	29	29
Latvia	NA	NA	NA	5	5	7	7	7	5	5
Lebanon	18	36	36	37	37	40	44	49	55	55
Lesotho	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Liberia	7	8	5	2	2	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
Libya	86	86	86	85	85	80	76	65	65	65
Liechtenstein										
Lithuania	NA	NA	NA	10	10	10	9	9	10	11
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Macedonia	NA	NA	NA	10	10	10	10	10	15	20
Madagascar	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
Malawi	7	7	8	10	10	10	8	10	5	5
Malaysia	115	130	128	128	115	115	115	115	112	110
Maldives										
Mali	8	13	13	12	12	12	7	7	7	7
Malta	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Marshall Islands										
Mauritania	16	17	17	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Mauritius	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	154	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175	175
Moldova	NA	NA	NA	9	13	11	12	12	11	11
Monaco										
Mongolia	33	32	31	21	18	21	21	21	11	10
Morocco	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	194	195	196
Mozambique	65	65	65	50	50	10	12	11	6	6
Myanmar	200	230	286	286	286	286	312	330	386	391
Namibia	NA	NA	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	12
Nepal	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	43	46	46
Netherlands	106	104	100	90	86	77	67	64	57	57
New Zealand	12	11	11	11	11	10	10	10	10	10
Nicaragua	65	28	20	15	15	15	12	12	17	17

Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Niger	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Nigeria	107	94	94	76	76	74	77	77	77	77
Norway	43	51	41	36	32	33	38	38	33	33
Oman	29	32	29	35	35	41	42	44	44	44
Pakistan	520	550	565	580	580	590	590	587	587	587
Panama	14	11	12	11	11	11	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Paraguay	16	16	16	16	16	16	20	20	20	20
Peru	110	125	123	112	112	112	115	125	125	125
Philippines	112	109	107	107	107	107	107	108	111	118
Poland	350	313	305	270	250	230	215	200	195	190
Portugal	104	87	86	80	68	122	78	73	72	75
Qatar	7	11	11	8	8	9	11	12	12	12
Romania	207	126	201	172	167	200	209	229	227	220
Russia/Soviet Union	NA	NA	NA	2600	2300	1900	1685	1430	1200	1120
Rwanda	6	6	30	30	30	30	40	39	62	40
Samoa										
Sao Tome & Principe	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Saudi Arabia	82	146	191	172	172	164	175	175	160	160
Senegal	15	18	18	18	18	14	13	13	13	11
Seychelles						0	0	0		0
Sierra Leone	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	14	n.a.	NA
Singapore	56	56	56	56	56	54	54	54	60	62
Slovakia/										
Czechoslovakia	NA	NA	NA	NA	40	47	47	43	41	45
Slovenia	NA	NA	NA	15	12	8	8	10	10	10
Solomon Islands										
Somalia	47	47	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
South Africa	100	85	80	72	72	84	120	107	100	95
Spain	277	263	246	198	204	213	210	203	197	189
Sri Lanka	22	22	100	110	110	126	125	115	115	113
St Vincent & the Grenadines										

Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sudan	65	65	65	82	82	110	110	109	100	119
Suriname	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Swaziland	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Sweden	62	65	63	63	63	64	64	63	57	57
Switzerland	23	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Syria	400	408	408	408	408	408	400	380	320	320
Tahiti										
Taiwan	406	370	370	360	442	425	376	376	376	376
Tajikistan				3	3	3	5	7	8	8
Tanzania	40	40	40	46	46	46	35	35	35	34
Thailand	283	283	283	283	295	256	259	254	266	306
Togo	6	8	8	6	6	7	7	7	7	7
Tonga										
Trinidad & Tobago	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Tunisia	40	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
Turkey	780	769	804	704	686	811	805	818	828	833
Turkmenistan	NA	NA	NA	28	25	20	18	18	17	18
Tuvalu										
Uganda	50	70	80	90	70	50	48	50	48	40
United Kingdom	318	308	301	293	271	257	233	221	218	216
Ukraine				600	510	517	453	400	387	346
United Arab Emirates	43	66	66	55	55	61	70	65	65	65
Uruguay	27	25	25	25	25	26	26	26	26	26
United States	2241	2181	2115	1919	1815	1715	1620	1575	1539	1518
USSR	3800	3700	3600	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Uzbekistan	NA	NA	NA	40	40	45	40	45	65	80
Vanuatu										
Venezuela	75	75	73	75	75	79	79	79	79	79
Vietnam	1249	1052	1041	857	857	572	572	550	492	484
Yemen	NA	127	127	64	64	65	50	42	66	66
Yemen, North	88	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Yemen, South	62	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Name	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Yugoslavia	225	180	169	137	137	140	127	114	114	114
DR Congo (Zaire)	51	55	60	55	55	55	55	60	n.a.	NA
Zambia	17	16	16	16	16	18	18	18	22	22
Zimbabwe	51	45	45	48	48	47	45	43	39	39

(Source: B/ICC data)

### Annex: Armed forces personnel, numbers in 1000s - Regional distribution -

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	in World
World	28442,8	28227,8	26521,8	25812,841	25020,677	24157,142	23393	22649	22014	21963	
Developing	16720,8	17002,8	15756,8	15373	15239,4	14709,8	14356	14246	14071	14203	65
Industrialised	11722	11225	10765	10439,841	9781,277	9447,342	9036	8403	7943	7759	35
Oceania	89	88	88	88	88	77	76	76	75	75	0
Africa	2292	2346	2047	2086,4	2063,2	1990	1980	1967	1891	2067	9
Africa , Central	152	168	199	170,4	170,2	173	185	195	156	147	1
Africa , East	648	718	350	487	464	448	421	418	405	579	3
Africa , North	897	876	876	878	878	880	856	850	853	852	4
Africa , Southern	359	344	384	343	343	289	323	307	293	307	1
Africa , West	236	240	238	208	208	200	195	198	184	182	1
America	3917,8	3850,8	3759,8	3440,178	3316,611	3156,41	3052	2993	2960	2900	13
America, Central	676,8	665,8	662,8	526,6	512,2	439,8	423	401	388	349	2
America, North	2329	2268	2201	2000,578	1891,411	1789,61	1690	1641	1600	1579	7
America, South	912	917	896	913	913	927	939	951	972	972	4
Asia	13066	13305	12382	12197	12098	11697	11348	11264	11182	11203	51
Asia Central	33	32	31	148	142	141	133	140	155	173	1
Asia , East	8299	8284	8118	7888	7795	7354	7154	7103	7029	6940	32
Asia , South	1995	2028	2117	2147	2147	2181	2063	2058	2064	2092	10
Asia , West	2739	2961	2116	2014	2014	2021	1998	1963	1934	1998	9
Europe	9078	8638	8245	8001,263	7454,866	7236,732	6937	6349	5906	5718	26
Europe, East	5081	4805	4688	4643	4236	3925	3719	3166	2796	2662	12
Europe, North	175	178	166	178,299	174,189	178,242	181	182	167	167	1
Europe, South	1884	1825	1810	1673,262	1633,492	1798,706	1753	1749	1734	1712	8
Europe, West	1938	1830	1581	1506,702	1411,185	1334,784	1284	1253	1209	1176	5
EU	2873	2842	2678	2565,49	2446,251	2411,226	2320	2272	2195	2135	10
OECD	7637	7513	7392	6922,841	6751,877	6701,342	6385	6265	6142	6057	28
OSCE	11407	10906	10446	10128,841	9470,277	9146,342	8738	8109	7650	7459	34
NATO	5863	5777	5572	5153,841	4904,877	4892,342	4700	4617	4512	4437	20
OPEC	2435	2724	1875	1840	1828	1829	1803	1807	1802	1864	8
ASEAN	2104	1917	1897	1718	1705	1384	1386	1385	1345	1385	6
USSR/CIS	3800	3700	3600	3567	3175	2774	2483	2154	1916	1821	8

(Source : BICC data )



*The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) facilitates the processes whereby people, skills, technology, equipment, and financial and economic resources are shifted away from the defense sector and applied to alternative civilian uses. BICC supports governmental and non-governmental initiatives as well as public and private sector organizations by finding ways to reduce costs and enhance effectiveness in the draw-down of military-related activities. As a result, BICC contributes to disarmament, demilitarization, peace-building, post-conflict rehabilitation and human development.*

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- Reorientation of military R&D – A potential largely untapped
- Defense industry restructuring – Facing a changed environment
- Demobilization and reintegration – Opportunities for human development
- Base closure and redevelopment – A challenge for communities
- Surplus weapons – Dismantling the remnants of conflicts

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