Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool
Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool

By Vanessa Farr

Published by
© BICC, Bonn 2002
Contents

Acknowledgements 3

Acronyms 3

1 The Social Impacts of Gender-Aware Demilitarization 4

1.1 Introduction 4

2 Gender Ideologies in Times of Conflict 5

2.1 Women’s Roles in War and Peace 5
2.2 The Demobilization of Women Combatants 7
2.3 The Effects of Gender Stereotypes on Demilitarization Processes 9
2.4 Gender and the Identity Politics of War 12
2.5 Women’s Status After War 15

3 Demilitarization from a Gender Perspective 18

3.1 The Social Impact of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs 18
3.2 Disarmament After Conflict: A Gendered Perspective 19
3.3 Demobilization: A Gendered Perspective 21
  3.3.1 Definition of Combatant Status 22
  3.3.2 Assembly of Combatants 24
3.4 Reintegration: A Gendered Perspective 25
  3.4.1 Political Reintegration 26
  3.4.2 Economic Reintegration 27
  3.4.3 Social Reintegration 28
  3.4.4 Psychological Aspects of Reintegration 31

4 Conclusions 33

References 35
Appendix A – The Demobilization and Reintegration of Women

Combatants, Wives of Male Soldiers and War Widows: A Checklist

Introduction

1 Gender-Sensitive Planning of Demobilization and Reintegration Support

1.1 Demobilization of Troops
1.2 Funding
1.3 Women’s Political Participation

2 Networking to Assist Reintegration

3 Economic Concerns

4 Gender-Sensitive Implementation of Demobilization and Reintegration Support

4.1 The Encampment Phase
4.2 Resettlement
4.3 Financial Payment
4.4 Education and Retraining Schemes
4.5 Medical, Health and Psychological Needs

5 Nutrition, Accomodation, Land Use and Economic Activities (for ex-combatants resettled in rural areas)

6 Accomodation and Economic Activities (for ex-combatants resettled in urban and peri-urban areas)
Acknowledgements

I have spent a most rewarding period at the Bonn International Center for Conversion while preparing this paper, and am grateful both to BICC and to the Ford Foundation for the opportunity to have focused so intently on this research as a Ford Fellow. For his interest in, and support of this work, I should particularly like to thank Kees Kingma. In addition, I am grateful to the directors of BICC, Herbert Wulf and Michael Brzoska, who play a significant role in making the Center the welcoming and intellectually diverse place it is. I thank Karin Buhse for her administrative support.

Members of the gender reading group at BICC, Mary Foster, Henri Myrtinnen, Corinna Hauswedell, and Renée Ernst, were wonderfully supportive and offered helpful insights and close readings of this paper as a work in progress. Further afield, Nathalie de Watteville, of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Heidi Hudson of the University of the Free State, South Africa, generously read and commented on the paper, and discussions with Sheila Meintjes, of the African Women’s Anti-War Coalition, helped refine my thinking.

I should also like to thank Lynn Benstead, Christina Yeung, Mariska Wijt, Zachary Moss, Christian Kraft, Svenja Bends, Kaska Morah, Christiane Johag, Derya Manda, Ricardo Berg and Lars Fischer for their support and friendship during my stay in Bonn. Dankeschön: all of you made my stay not only productive, but lots of fun.

Acronyms:

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Authority on East Timor
UNIFEM – United Nations Development Fund for Women
1 The Social Impacts of Gender-Aware Demilitarization

1.1 Introduction

In its Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, adopted by the Security Council on October 31, 2000, the United Nations formally recognizes that achieving gender justice is as central to social transformation as any other form of reparations after war. Resolution 1325 came about as a result of years of campaigning by the international peace community, and draws from a growing body of feminist scholarship which proposes that, when demilitarization begins after violent conflict ends, understanding the effects of gender ideologies is essential to successful peacebuilding.

An aspect of the peace process whose gender dimension has often been overlooked in the past is addressed in point thirteen of Resolution 1325, which encourages “all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants.”1 This paper will consider what the gender-aware demobilization, disarmament and reintegration that is called for in this important Resolution might look like. In it, I shall show how gender awareness in the earliest transition and post-conflict periods impacts upon the possibility of peaceful development in the longer term.2

I shall analyze a broad spectrum of case studies of demobilization processes in which women’s rights have been compromised, and use feminist theories to draw conclusions about how demobilization exercises can be improved to address, more fairly, the needs of both women and men ex-combatants. In order to demonstrate how demobilization also impacts on those members of society who were not in active service, I shall explain why plans for peaceful reintegration, through which ex-combatants become productive social players, must incorporate a careful analysis of the gender ideologies at work in the society under review.

Accumulated feminist analyses prove that, while male oppression of women is universal, there are variations in gender ideologies in different societies. There are also likely to be striking differences between women, who will be differently oppressed depending on their class, race, geographical location, sexual orientation, and physical or mental disabilities. As peace activists searching for connections between gender-based violence in its domestic manifestations and the broad-scale violence that is characteristic of armed conflict and prevalent in the aftermath of war, it is obvious that we cannot provide a universally applicable solution for the

---

2 This paper focuses most specifically on the African continent, where wars of liberation, guerilla wars and civil wars have made considerable use of women, including in fighting roles.
evils committed in support of ideologies of violence and male supremacy. To make a lasting difference, we need to understand how patriarchal power operates in each society that is reconstructing itself after war, and we have to pay attention to how different women are affected by, and differently able to respond to, this power.

Even while programs to meet combatants’ needs must be put into place as quickly as possible after the formal cessation of hostilities, I argue in this paper that planners should not lose sight of how demobilization, disarmament and reintegration interact with other social reformations after war. To improve the chances that this interaction will be peaceful and constructive, an awareness of longer-term goals, such as the promotion of greater equality through the re-formulation of previously exclusionary social, political and economic practices, is essential to the successful implementation of demobilization and reintegration processes.

Carefully implemented, the gender-aware approach to demilitarization called for in Resolution 1325 will help promote several changes in the ways in which combatants’ needs are managed after war. The first is immediate and practical, in that the establishment of a course of action which highlights the requirements of women as well as men will contribute to the fairer demobilization of all soldiers. Secondly, in the longer term, gender awareness in the demobilization process can play an important role in promoting the recognition that gender systems are dynamic and thus present a potential site for change. From this perspective, I shall show, demobilization can arguably play a greater part in achieving the broader goal of social transformation after war.

In the first section of this paper, I discuss the ways in which the gender identities of women and men are differently constructed in times of war, and how this construction affects combatants and civilians in peace negotiations and in the aftermath. I then move to a detailed discussion of the processes of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration and consider the potential social effects of gendering these procedures. To help increase the effectiveness of institutions when they design and implement the gender-sensitive long-term support for ex-combatants encouraged in Resolution 1325, the paper culminates in a practical checklist which should be consulted both during the development phase of demobilization and in its implementation.

2 Gender Ideologies in Times of Conflict

2.1 Women’s Roles in War and Peace

In a world where poverty and dispossession are on the rise, armed violence is increasingly the result of contestations of identity, and feminist theorists have proved that ideas about women and femininity form an essential part of the process of constructing a male identity that is deemed appropriate for a warring society. Cynthia Enloe notes that the manipulation of notions of gender-appropriate behavior is a central component of ethnic nationalism (Enloe, 1998), and holds that
the “militarization of women has been crucial for the militarization of governments and of international relations. The militarization of women has been necessary for the militarization of men” (Enloe, 2000 p. 3). Yet while significant attention has been paid to the ways in which men and ideas about masculinity are mobilized as part of the war machine—and this attention has not always been critical—it is only in recent years that we have begun to understand that women, and deeply-held beliefs about femininity, are also both militarized and mobilized in support of the ideology of war (Cock, 1991; Goldstein, 2001).

Recognizing a pattern in the ways in which societies manipulate gender ideologies, feminist scholars have worked to nuance our understanding of how women’s roles, and the identities they take on to fulfill these roles during the build-up to war, in wartime, and afterwards, are strategic and shifting (Cockburn, 2001).3 Arguing against the predominant stereotypes of women as innately peaceful and men as inevitably warlike (Fukuyama, 1998; Goldstein, 2001), feminists have urged that we recognize the complexity of gender ideologies and the multiple roles they play in drawing different social actors into war.

In peacetime, as in wartime, women display a wide variety of responses to organized and/or state-sanctioned forms of violence. There is a long and much-celebrated history of feminist pacifism (Schreiner, 1911), and some women, as peace activists, play essential roles in maintaining social connections, build coalitions across communities divided by violence, and therefore are ideally positioned to play important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration support and peace-building roles in the aftermath (Anderlini, 2000; Farr 2000a). At the same time, however, there are also many examples of women embracing “revolution with hope and war with enthusiasm” (Hill, 2001 p. 21). Even if they do not enlist as soldiers, women can, and do, participate in conflict through supporting and maintaining guerrilla forces. They supply the essentials of war: information, food, clothing and shelter. They nurse soldiers back to health. Yet like the work undertaken by other women—both peacebuilders and combatants—these contributions are all too frequently overlooked after conflict has come to an end. As Linda Grant De Pauw writes,

Women have always and everywhere been inextricably involved in war [but] hidden from history….During wars, women are ubiquitous and highly visible; when wars are over and the songs are sung, women disappear (De Pauw, 1998 p. xiii).

While many feminists have remarked that women’s peacebuilding activities receive too little recognition in the period of reconstruction (Anderlini, 2000; Enloe, 2000), it is also true that women who saw active combat are not allowed to participate, as leaders, in the development of transition and reconstruction processes. They are

---

3 Although Cockburn’s essay is exemplary in its efforts to capture people’s contradictory and shifting identities in wartime, the title of the book in which it appears, Victims, Perpetrators or Actors (2001) is somewhat misleading, since it seems to set up a dualism (either/or) which denies that women, like men, can and do occupy multiple subject positions at different times during periods of armed conflict.
ignored in veteran’s associations, where a recognition of their support is reduced to that expected from their kinship to male soldiers: they are acknowledged only as mothers, sisters, wives or daughters (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming). However varied their levels of involvement in the business of war, they remain at the margins of political, economic, and social power, and their voices and experiences tend to disappear when peace processes begin (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1996).

To address the problems that result from their invisibility, this paper will consider the question of what happens to women soldiers before, during and after demobilization. For lack of space, I do not, except peripherally, try to deal with the needs of some of the other—even more invisible—women associated with the military or with militarized structures, a group which includes military nurses, the wives of male soldiers, war widows, and sex workers. Despite the significant contribution they make to the support and maintenance of male soldiers, these women are often denigrated as mere “camp followers.” This makes invisible the fact that they serve a significant function during wartime and present both a challenge during the period of demobilization and reintegration, and a potential strength in the reconstruction process. Like women combatants, these military women form a group whose needs are neglected during the demobilization phase and in the process of reintegration that follows armed conflict. Although I am forced to leave them out of this paper, I do not wish to diminish their importance. I hope, therefore, that the checklist will assist those who, in planning demobilization and reintegration procedures, are resolved to pay proper attention to what non-combatant women in militarized structures require to make an easier transition to civilian life.

2.2 The Demobilization of Women Combatants

Women’s participation in war-related work can be overlooked because stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate labor are often re-mobilized after war when a society strives to return to “normal.” In Zimbabwe, popular images of the liberation war reinforced the belief that women had made their greatest contribution as wives and mothers. Women who challenged the re-imposition of patriarchal authority were vilified, and those who had seen active combat became objects of shame (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming). In Namibia, observes ex-combatant Teckla Shikola,

[N]o one mention[s] the contributions women made during the…struggle. That’s true all over the world. You never find an appreciation of what women did. Men appreciate women who cook for them, and they respect women who fought the war with them, but after independence, they [don’t] really consider women as part of the liberation movement (Shikola, 1998 pp. 147-48).

4 Cynthia Enloe’s most recent book, *Maneuvers* (2000) makes these “peripheral” women visible. Since she offers an extended analysis of how women “camp followers” are manipulated to uphold changing military requirements, her insights into the difficulties faced by these women form a solid basis from which to begin a planning process to address their specific needs.
Similarly, in South Africa, during the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), women only spoke out about what had happened to their male partners and kin. It was not until a group of feminists activists challenged the TRC to hold private hearings for women that their stories began to emerge (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1996).5

The exclusion of women soldiers from decision-making positions is a particularly important problem when demilitarization is set in motion, because women who have seen active combat are likely to be even more marginalized than other women in the society under reconstruction: they do not occupy a position that can be easily reconciled with predominant gender ideologies, and so militarized women pose a unique set of challenges in the demobilization phase. Unlike male combatants, they are drummed out of the army, excluded from new political structures, refused access to re-training or land, overlooked in veteran’s organizations, and regarded with fear and suspicion when they attempt to return to the lives they lived before war broke out (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming).

Their experiences prove that, even though some of the normally accepted ideas about “womanly” behavior might be suspended during wartime, women who contradict the stereotype of appropriate female behavior through active participation in the violence of war “are often regarded as more deviant or unnatural than men” (Byrne, 1996 p. 18).6 To address the challenges faced by women combatants after war, demobilization planning has, therefore, to take cognizance of the different needs of fighters of both sexes, not to assume that one plan of action will be suitable for all ex-combatants.

Before I move to suggestions for how to achieve positive change, however, I shall take some time to consider the negative effects of gender insensitive demilitarization processes. Through reference to accounts of demobilization which do not highlight the experiences of women combatants, I shall show that, unless the different needs of male and female ex-combatants and military supporters are differently addressed, any instruments that are designed to facilitate demobilization and reintegration are likely to assume, re-establish or reinforce unequal gender relations in the society under reconstruction. As is evident in the increased rates of gender-based violence after war, this has serious implications for the possibility of establishing a culture of respect for human rights in the longer term.

Earlier, I asserted that militarization relies on the mobilization of particular notions of appropriate manly and womanly behavior, and that gender systems are dynamic. In direct correlation to these observations, we can conclude that gender-

---

5 See also the special issue of the South African feminist journal AGENDA (43: 2000), which focuses on women’s experiences in the aftermath of war.

6 Because men are engaged in the business of killing, historically, women have been able to take on new social roles in times of conflict, for example, in the medical field or in industries considered essential for war (the famous World War Two poster of “Rosie the Riveter” is probably the best known example of recruitment propaganda aimed at luring women into non-traditional forms of labour in war). As this paper will go on to discuss in greater detail, attempts are usually made to remove women from these professions as part of the process of re-imposing notions of gender-appropriate behavior when war ends.
Vanessa Farr

sensitive demobilization has important implications for long-term peace and stability. It directly impacts upon how a society moves towards true demilitarization because in the best instances, it facilitates a profound shift from the belief that violent aggression is a solution to social problems, to a commitment to resolve conflict, whether it occurs in the domestic arena, in the broader community, or in the nation at large, by peaceful means.

2.3 The Effects of Gender Stereotypes on Demilitarization Processes

In contrast to existing practical guidelines for dealing with ex-soldiers, I am suggesting that demilitarization should be regarded as a broad process of which demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs form only one aspect. In addition to these mechanisms, then, other supports to the consolidation of profound change in a post-conflict society will also be discussed.

The usefulness of the term demilitarization is primarily derived from the fact that it describes “not a static phenomenon, but a process” (Lamb, 2000 p. 120). Obviously, given the diversity of cultural, social and political ideologies in different conflict zones, demilitarization is a context-dependent term. At its most comprehensive, demilitarization has two significant aspects. The first of these, the demilitarization of State apparatuses, involves the deconstruction of ideologies and military organizations and the reassertion of civilian control over the state and economy (Willett, 1998). Through demobilization, “a process that significantly reduces the number of people under arms and in military command structures, including official armed force personnel, paramilitary forces and opposition forces” (Kingma and Pauwels, 2000 p. 13), state demilitarization implies a reduction in arms and in military expenditure, and frees up resources—both human and structural—for conversion to non-military activities.

The second aspect is the demilitarization of broader society, which is central to the process of national rehabilitation. This should be understood as a psychological as well as a practical process, because demilitarization can only succeed if, after demobilization, there is a commitment to “the de-glorification of the armed forces by the media and society in general, the withdrawal of observable military influences in the education system, and a sustained reduction in consumerist militarism” (Lamb, 2000 p. 122), all of which relies on the support of broader political, economic, social and cultural structures.

An analysis of prevalent gender values is essential to this work, because gender colors the ways in which all other aspects of life are organized. Yet while militarism and certain images of masculinity are closely associated, so that the development of new ideals of masculine behavior has come under scrutiny, it has proven exceptionally difficult to pay similar attention to women’s varied roles, especially their support for the unfolding of the process of demilitarization.

As I have already mentioned, a paralyzing paradox lies at the heart of women’s exclusion from peace processes. In the first place, the ideal of woman as a nurturer who only has jurisdiction in the private sphere of the home is difficult to dislodge,
even when women behave in contradiction to this stereotype. Secondly, while they may be active in a number of arenas, in times of conflict, many women make themselves as invisible as possible. As Julie A. Mertus observes:

Fear of rape and fear of being caught in the crossfire…may cause women to stay at home and hide. Fear of violence limits women’s ability to go to work, gather fuel, shop, or stand in line for humanitarian aid (Mertus, 2000 p. 8).

Their invisibility may thus reinforce women’s representation as innately peaceful and nurturing, or at least, as home-bound, since men can argue that women were less involved in war-waging and therefore have no business in post-war negotiations (Anderlini, 2000 pp. 28-31). The difficulty for women combatants is that this stereotype of innate peacefulness can be mobilized to allow men to ignore those women who did actively participate in the war. As we have seen, for many people, it is so uncomfortable to admit that some women are capable of becoming warriors and supporting military ideologies, that they would rather ignore women combatants in the aftermath than admit they require the same specialized demobilization programs afforded to men.

By stepping back and observing how broader social mores both derive from, and are used to support the gender ideologies of the military machine, it is possible to understand how this marginalization of military women is a product of the process of militarizing an entire culture (Enloe, 2000). As we have seen, a warring society relies implicitly on ancient and deep-seated stereotypes of appropriate womanly (private) and manly (public) behavior. According to well-worn tradition, women’s business in war is “to keep the home fires burning,” which implies that they are removed from direct contact with the conflict and located in their “proper” domestic sphere where they perform “merely supportive” reproductive tasks such as childbirth and child rearing, growing and processing food, and other such labor. Although this labor is essential to the continued functioning of the warring society, because women are dismissed as marginal to the action of war, relegating them to an arena on the periphery of the “real” action allows them to be imagined as passive, non-essential, voiceless, and reliant on male decision-making power (Enloe, 2000; Farr, 2000b; Goldstein, 2001).

By contrast, in most societies, militarism is associated with manliness, with vigor, and with battles waged on some remote “front” away from the safety of home (Hill, 2001). These activities involve men in shaping, through what is imagined to be necessary acts of violence, the political future of a country. Women are supposed not only to be incapable of perpetrating such acts of politically sanctioned violence, but to be ignorant or incapable of understanding why they are necessary, and therefore unable to assert their own agency in directing social reconstruction in the aftermath.

With these ideologies firmly in place, it seems natural that when wars end, it will be men and not women who predominate in the peace agreements and reconstruction processes that are set in motion. This might account for why, at the Arusha peace talks on the Burundi conflict, women were granted observer status
only when male delegates insisted that “the women are not parties to this conflict. This is not their concern. We cannot see why they have come, why they bother us. We are here and we represent them” (qtd. in Anderlini, 2000 p. 10). Similarly, at the Dayton Peace talks that ended the Bosnian conflict in 1995, “there were no Bosnian women in the delegation, even though the international community was well aware of the trauma that women had experienced and the responsibilities that they would be shouldering during reconstruction” (Anderlini, 2000 p. 28). At Rambouillet, a lone Kosovar woman formed part of the peace talks delegation, and in recent attempts to end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa’s Foreign Minister, Dr Nkosasana Dlamini-Zuma, has been the only prominent woman delegate (Cock, 2001).

The extremely entrenched ideas about the spaces inhabited by women and men during wartime are difficult to contest, although in the majority of conflicts, the theatre of war is not confined to a space remote from civilian life (Mertus, 2000). Yet even today, among scholars who are trying to develop an alternative picture of the realities of war, it has proved difficult to shake the idea that there were ever wars with a “battlefront” where men struggle against other men and a “homefront” where women were located, and which men struggled to protect. It is true that late twentieth century wars, with their steady increase in civilian casualties, have offered several terrible instances of how inappropriate it is to uphold notions of a gendered division of space in wartime. Nonetheless, it is important not to forget that earlier wars, such as those fought in the period of European colonial expansion, explicitly relied on “slash and burn” campaigns against civilian populations. The destruction of people’s homes and crops, as well as the violation and murder of women and children, have long been understood as devastating weapons of war. They are aimed to overwhelm, both psychologically and physically, the resistance of those cast as “the enemy.”

A careful deconstruction of our ideas about space in wartime shows how effectively gender stereotypes naturalize ideas of how people behave. This is why it is difficult to articulate the ways in which militarization negatively impacts upon the lives of women as well as of men. However, if we understand, as feminists urge us to do, that militarization is promoted and maintained not just by “the ideology of manliness” with its emphasis on guns, intrigue and machismo, but by “ideas, especially ideas about femininity” (Enloe, 2000 p. xv), it becomes clear that effective demilitarization can only take place if opportunities are created for the examination and redefinition of gender identities and their function in the social order under review. This process of reassessment will of necessity differ from society to society, and is dependent on how gender ideologies functioned before the war, how they were mobilized in the conflict period, and how they are expected to operate in its aftermath (Goldstein, 2001). No catch-all solution can be offered, for, as Guy Lamb observes, demilitarization processes are explicitly “determined by context and historical experience” (Lamb, 2000 p. 122).

7 For a contemporary example of this tendency to overlook the impact on civilians of wars fought before the Twentieth century, see Bridget Byrne (1996).
According to Lamb, demilitarization will succeed and be sustainable only “if internal and external enabling environments exist” (Lamb, 2000 p. 122). It is internally enabled by several mechanisms. Most essentially, it requires a reduction in violent inter-group conflict. If demilitarization is to be gender-sensitive, this implies paying proper attention to violence against women and children, developing education programs to reduce such violence, and putting in place adequate law enforcement mechanisms to deter, among other misdemeanors, sexualized violence. All of this hinges on the development of a political will to design, implement and monitor all aspects of demilitarization processes, and requires widespread support not only from the country’s leaders, both political and military, but also from the public and the media (Enloe, 2000 p. 103-107; Cock, 2001).

Good regional relations and minimal rivalry are significant enablers of demilitarization in a broader geographical sense. Active national and regional coalitions and international co-operation must be supported. To achieve gender justice, an association with the international feminist movement is essential (Enloe, 2000). When both internal and external mechanisms are taken into account, it becomes clear that demilitarization is a “complex and multi-faceted” process (Lamb, 2000 p. 128; see also Kingma, 2000b).

Despite the breadth of scope implied, demilitarization is “generally viewed as the reverse of ‘militarization’, a contested concept,” and the term is avoided by peace and disarmament organizations. Lamb argues that this is one reason why “analyses of demilitarization have remained underdeveloped” (Lamb, 2000 pp. 122-123). In his view, existing studies lack a theoretical outlook. They generate policy proposals that are broad and vague, offer insufficient detail for implementation, “especially in situations where resources are scarce” (Lamb, 2000 p. 128), and are poor at helping identify and establish long term goals. They also fail to account properly for the “origins, influences and use of demilitarization” in different areas, as well as the historical, national, regional and international contexts in which it is taking place (Lamb, 2000 p. 132). Paradoxically, Lamb himself perpetuates these problems because he does not pay specific attention to the ways in which gender ideologies are mobilized as a central aspect of militarization, even though, as we have seen, decades of feminist scholars have researched and analyzed this phenomenon (Byrne, 1996; Cock, 1991; Cock 2001; Enloe, 2000; Hudson, 1998).

2.4 Gender and the Identity Politics of War

Countries that are emerging from situations of violent conflict are often seen as a potential site of positive change, even, despite the problem of their invisibility, for women. Some theorists argue that war and the aftermath of war can present opportunities to influence social and political structures which, in peacetime, were beyond women’s purview. In this vein, Matthias Stiefel writes: “gender roles and

---

8 The benefits of this association will be discussed in more detail later.
9 The experience of South African women, who are rare in having successfully influenced the drafting of a gender-aware constitution after the apartheid war ended, suggests, however, that it
Vanessa Farr

social values are deeply affected by the experience of war,” so that “the reconfiguration of gender roles and positions is an integral part of the challenge” of reconstruction (Stiefel in Sorensen, 1998 p. iii).

Feminist activists have tried to capitalize on opportunities for positive change in women’s political participation by developing international instruments under the auspices of the United Nations. I have already mentioned the importance to women’s rights of Resolution 1325. Even before this Resolution came into being, the Beijing Platform for Action, signed by 189 countries at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, was designed to promote women’s equal participation in every stage of a peace process, especially decision-making. Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ratified to date by 165 countries, calls for the use of quotas and reservations to increase the number of women in all aspects of political leadership.10

Facilitating a woman-friendly process of post-war rebuilding is, however, a complicated business, especially since it may be difficult to determine exactly when a country can be said to have emerged from the conflict period.11 After social catastrophes, the levels of violence in a society may appear to have diminished, but in reality, the violence may only have been redirected (Cock, 2001; Farr 2000b). This is particularly true of sexualized violence, which tends to take place in the domestic sphere, a domain that, as I have pointed out, is considered in many countries to be a private space separated from the mechanisms of public control. Given the swiftness with which women are re-consigned to the domestic sphere after war (see Ranchod-Nielsson, forthcoming, and Shikola, 1998), it is best to be cautious about Stiefel’s view that “it is not possible to return to pre-war mores” in which women may have been expected to play a subordinate social, political and economic role.12 This

is only in the presence of an active women’s movement that positive developments are possible after conflict (see Vanessa Farr, “A Chanting Foreign and Familiar: The production and publishing of women’s collective life writing in South Africa.” Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, York University, Toronto, 2002).


11 Amanuel Mehreteab’s account of demobilization and reintegration support in Eritrea offers a useful account of the effects of this state of uneasy non-war (Mehreteab, forthcoming).

12 Two papers on Mozambique offer a striking example of how violence against women is made invisible unless researchers are committed to analyzing levels of community violence from a gender perspective. In their analysis of the success of demobilization and disarmament in that country, Lundin and others consider that an increase of violence, particularly with small arms, is a problem but one that has been somewhat exaggerated (Lundin, Iraê Baptista, Martinho Chachiuia, et al. 2000. "Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise: the Impact of Demobilization in Mozambique." In K. Kingma, ed., Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The development and security impacts. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 173-212.) By contrast, Alcinda António de Abreu claims that the country is caught in a growing spiral of violence, and recognizes women as particularly vulnerable to its effects. She points out that rape at gunpoint is a new and particularly egregious example of this violence De Abreu, Alcinda António. 1998. "Mozambican Women Experiencing Violence." (In M. Turshen and C. Twagiramariya, eds.,
caution is particularly warranted because whatever political advances women had previously made, including efforts to combat domestic violence, can be wiped out at a stroke if there is another build-up to or outbreak of conflict.\(^{13}\)

It is clear that the potential of achieving positive change for women in the aftermath is compromised by the fact that gender relations tend to become extremely polarized in wartime, and prevalent stereotypes of gender-appropriate behavior are more strictly enforced (Goldstein, 2001). Yet what is less obvious is the fact that, since warfare is so explicitly connected to patriarchal ideals of male dominance, men are also victims of this conservatism: they are likely to lose the possibility to negotiate the extent to which they identify with the *machismo* of soldiering. In South Africa, for example, the price of resistance to the militarized apartheid state was high. Long-term imprisonment or exile were the only options open to those white men who refused to serve in the army. As a result, the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), formed in 1983, became one of the most vociferous anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa. Its members were detained and otherwise intimidated before it was banned outright in the late 1980s, and conscientious objectors were treated more harshly than in any other country in the world at the time. Significantly, one of the central taunts hurled at members of the ECC was that they were “wimps” or homosexuals who objected to conscription not on the moral grounds that they objected to racist segregation, but because they were too afraid to play their manly part in supporting a just campaign against Communist and terrorist infiltration (Cock, 1991, chapters 3 and 5).\(^{14}\)

Alongside this campaign of sustained resistance to the state-sanctioned identity politics of militarism, however, many men felt empowered by the use of violence as a means of resistance, especially after the introduction of the defiance campaign in the 1980s, which aimed to make South Africa ungovernable by whatever means necessary. In post-apartheid South Africa, as Jacklyn Cock has recently observed, it has proved extraordinarily difficult to promote a radically different identity for men who were socialized to condone violence as a legitimate political strategy:

> [T]he social legacy of thirty years of armed conflict...includes a militarized nationalism that regards violence as a legitimate way of dealing with conflict and a means of obtaining and defending

\(^{13}\) As the conflict over land in Zimbabwe escalates in the build-up to elections, there is evidence that women’s rights are being swiftly eroded. Rural women have been the specific targets of increasing violence, and women leaders in the opposition movement have been singled out for gender-based harassment (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming).

\(^{14}\) For reflections on the homophobia of the apartheid regime and the resistance mounted by the gay and lesbian liberation movement, see Mark Gevisser and Edwin Cameron (eds.) *Defiant Desire: Gay and Lesbian Lives in South Africa*. New York: Routledge, 1995. As a result of the part played by openly queer members of the resistance movement, the new South African Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of sexual association. This is extremely unusual in Southern Africa, where the Presidents of Zimbabwe and Namibia are increasingly fanning homophobic sentiments.
power….There is a militarized conception of masculinity among diverse social categories and classes that is linked to a proliferation of small arms throughout the region. Moreover, militarized nationalism is embedded in a range of social meanings and promotes myths of power and protection (Cock, 2001 p. 1).

Yet another of the far-reaching effects of gender ideologies, which in the context of war cast “enemy” men as needing to be overpowered because they are dangerous, threatening (especially to women and children), and subversive, is that all male persons regardless of age or physical capacity are treated with suspicion. Even though women and children have increasingly been targeted, many more men than women die in wartime, either because they are conscripted into the military, or because they are rounded up and eliminated as a potential threat.\(^{15}\) In recognition to the various ways in which men’s freedom of choice is compromised by the exigencies of militarization, while they have emphasized the need to pay careful attention to how women are affected by war, feminist activists have also focused on the political potential of male resistance. They have argued that, if we understand how the human potential of women as well as men is destroyed by conservative gender stereotypes and the specific ways in which these are interpreted in armed conflict, ever more powerful coalitions for peace will be formed (Enloe, 1998, 2000).

2.5 Women’s Status After War

Perhaps it is not as clearly demarcated as that of men, but as we have seen, the oppression of women in wartime also takes many contradictory forms. I have already pointed out that their labor, both in the military and the civilian spheres, is essential to the maintenance of the war machine, but is nevertheless trivialized as “non-essential” (implying that only combat is essential and valuable). This undervaluing of women’s labor means that, after conflict ends, they are supposed to give up their temporary occupation of jobs which returning (male) combatants expect to reoccupy. This is a particularly pressing concern when economic recovery is slow and few jobs are generated (Lundin, Chachiua et al., 2000). Women ex-combatants, unlike men, are expected not to anticipate any rewards—such as pensions, promotions, or other financial recognition—for the work they have undertaken (Shikola, 1998).

In the social sphere, the build-up to war often results in women’s loss of bodily autonomy (Mertus, 2000; Shikola, 1998; Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). Their bodies are often appropriated to fulfil pro-natalist policies to produce more children who will either replace those lost in battle, or be able to carry on the nation’s cultural traditions. This process of elevating women as “the bearers of the cultural heritage of a nation or community” in times of crisis (Byrne, 1996 p. 16), means,

however, that they are extremely vulnerable as targets of sexualized violence (Enloe, 2000). This is one reason why, in the recent conflicts in Cambodia, Haiti, Peru, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, and the former Yugoslavia, women were subject to mass rape and/or forced prostitution “as a calculated part of war strategy” (Mertus, 2000 p. 7).

The official end of war may not signal the end of women’s suffering; their physical vulnerability may mean that they are doubly afflicted. As if the horror of their ordeal in wartime were not enough, raped women may come to be perceived as “damaged goods,” living symbols of a nation’s humiliation and bearers of “enemy” children.16

After war, especially when they have been defeated, it is often a matter of pride for male survivors to demonstrate their control over women through appealing to cultural and religious customs that restrict women’s mobility. Women’s human rights rapidly deteriorate in societies which, when conflict ends, take an extremely conservative turn in an effort to restore an imagined “Golden Age” before the war, as was evident in Afghanistan under the reign of the Taliban. In situations such as this, whatever political gains women made during or immediately after the war are rapidly eroded.

The primary drawback of the United Nations platforms for action is perhaps most visible in countries which embrace fundamentalist ideals after war, because signing and implementing them is voluntary. What results is a Catch-22 situation: as tools to advance women’s rights, international instruments are only effective when, as was the case with South Africa, a country already has a strong women’s movement that is able to convince political leaders to endorse and enforce them.

CEDAW and other such agreements have had limited utility in war zones like Afghanistan, Algeria, and Iraq, and have been almost inconsequential in countries recently emerging from conflict. In East Timor, for instance, they do not seem to have helped women faced by an extremely patriarchal and conservative leadership which has been reluctant to facilitate or promote women’s political participation in the transition and post-conflict governments.17

Despite ideals to the contrary, as I have shown, there are many more instances of women losing political ground after conflict ends than of their gaining it, and overwhelmingly this occurs because, despite their active engagement in all aspects of

16 Rwandese delegates at the 2001 Women Waging Peace colloquium at Harvard University spoke movingly about the effects of this attitude on women’s and children’s psychological health after the genocide.

17 Members of East Timor’s National Council transition legislature rejected a UN proposal for quotas for women candidates on party election lists as recently as March 16, 2001. In their statement, council members claimed that this would support the “commercialization” of women.” Women’s groups protested the decision to no avail (LUSO: Portuguese News Agency, March 16, 2001). UNTAET’s Gender Affairs Unit and UNIFEM are providing training for women political candidates, but it remains to be seen, in the absence of a quota system, whether any women will successfully contend the upcoming elections (UNTAET Daily Briefing, 05.04.01).
social life in times of conflict, when post-war reconstruction processes begin, “women tend to fade into the background” (Stiefel in Sorensen, 1998 p. iii). As Jacklyn Cock observes, it is not only within a nation that women’s exclusion has been normalized: international policy, too, is designed by men to serve male interests and supports “historically male preoccupations with hierarchy and domination” (Cock, 2001 p. 2). Because they do not have a loud enough voice in reconstruction processes or in the international arena, women’s ability to influence the demilitarization and democratization processes that are desirable after war is all too frequently undermined (Anderlini, 2000 p. 9; see also Bennett, Bexley et al, 1995; Byrne, 1996; Caprioli, 2000; Cockburn, 1998; Enloe, 2000; Goldstein, 2001; Jacobs, Jacobson et al, 2000; Lindsey 2000; Mertus, 2000; Anderlini, Manchanda, et al. 1999; Reimann, 1999; Sorensen, 1998; Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998).

In response to this problem, promoting recognition of the importance of involving women in peace negotiations has been central to feminist peace politics, especially in the last decade. It is, as Jacklyn Cock puts it, crucial to draw from women’s perspectives, since peacemaking, the most important aspects of which often occur at grassroots level, “cannot be left to a male elite” (Cock, 2001 p. 1). Similarly, Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, in her paper Women at the Peace Table: Making a Difference, remarks that peace cannot succeed without women “because the civilian population is largely responsible for translating the agreements reached into concrete initiatives for reconstruction long after the ink has dried on the accords themselves” (Anderlini, 2000 p. 6).

As compelling as these observations are, especially for those who hold that women’s lesser involvement in the violence of conflict makes them more capable of peacebuilding, there is a hidden danger in them. From the perspective of my earlier observation about the need to respect difference, we need to be careful of asserting that civilians (especially women) will be more committed to peaceful reconstruction than not. A danger arises when, in focusing our attention on civilians as Anderlini does, we overlook women who are not civilians, or whose primary social and political loyalty is to military structures. As Jean Bethke Elshtain and Cynthia Enloe have repeatedly observed, women can also be complicit in constructing gendered identities that support the waging of war, and may choose to actively promote war if they consider it to be to their advantage to do so (Elshtain, 1987; Enloe 1998. See also Goldstein, 2001). This is a particularly important observation to keep in mind in analyses of civil wars, in which fighters “are often informally organised, [so that] the distinction between civilians and armed forces may be blurred” (Byrne, 1996 p. 5).

Feminist and other peace activists have to guard against upholding a view which supports women as invariably peaceable (Goldstein, 2001). Recognizing women’s potential for complicity in organized violence is an important step on the road to deconstructing commonly-held stereotypes of gender-appropriate behavior. In a variety of ways, from the achievement of transitional justice in which women, too, are held accountable for crimes committed during the conflict period, it has important implications for the long-term success of demilitarization and peacebuilding, and for women’s political position in a post-conflict society.
3 Demilitarization from a Gender Perspective

3.1 The Social Impact of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs

As a result of the discomfort they evoke in every quarter, as well as their relatively small numbers, the group of women constituting of combatants, the wives of male soldiers and war widows, are frequently disregarded as conflicts draw to a close. Consequently, as Resolution 1325 highlights, the specific needs of this group have been overlooked or poorly addressed in the development of support structures for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. The long-term effects of this marginalization can be devastating (see Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming; Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000). To begin the process of redress, in what follows, I shall discuss how current planners view demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs, and propose ways in which these should be made more gender-sensitive.

Demobilization is an important aspect of conversion, and is critical for post-conflict development because it frees up human and financial resources. It is also closely linked to reductions in security expenditures and to successful weapons management (Kingma, 2000a p. 25). Reflecting the complexity of demobilization as a process, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in their recent handbook, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines,” observe that “where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins, and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences” (DPKO, 2000 p. 5). However, although they clarify how mutually dependent the processes are, they do not sufficiently emphasize that these are only support measures for demilitarization as a whole. This, as has been stated earlier, is a complex and long-term process involving radical changes in the hearts and minds of conflict survivors and perpetrators alike.

As I have shown, the potential for radical change after war is to some extent dependent on the recognition that gender roles are not natural or static, but are aspects of social behavior that can be deliberately manipulated to achieve certain political goals. This “has to be understood if the processes of militarized nationalism are to be accurately portrayed” (Enloe, 1998 p. 56). Gender stereotypes are such a potent means to mobilize violent nationalist sentiments that, in the end, inadequately engaging with how gender ideologies are formed will compromise the success of demilitarization programs.18

How do gender ideologies impact on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs? Because of their far-reaching impacts on the implementation of long-term alternatives to war, such programs are essential

---

18 The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) have already expressed their fear that the US and Britain, in supporting the Northern Alliance in their war against the Taliban and the Jehadi, are condoning extreme sexism and establishing the basis for the continued brutalization of women in the name of Islam. They continue to emphasize that whatever nation-building takes place after the current offensive, women’s opinions must be solicited (e-mail discussions on the Womenact listserv).
supports to the peace process and are fundamental to the re-development of a post-
conflict society. Successfully implemented, disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration can set an example for how a post-military society functions, because
they require the convinced participation of people who reject militant behavior and
ideologies. New connections can be forged with civil society if civilians trained in
the management of post-conflict situations work in cooperation with the military to
implement the demobilization process. The broad spectrum of a society and its
supporters—internal, regional and international—can be prepared for, and lend
their support to a spectrum of demilitarization exercises. These include weapons
collection, the restructuring of defense and security forces, and the identification
and funding of civic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to monitor the
progress of demilitarization processes. Demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration explicitly require that parties to the conflict are actively engaged in
peace-building exercises, establishing trust and developing channels of
communication.

Women are extremely important in this arena because it is so often left to them
to establish alternatives when the State is in turmoil. There is widespread evidence
that the civil society initiatives they establish, especially grassroots programs that
grow from people’s determination to survive conflict, are not only remarkably
resilient, but also astonishingly adaptive to a post-conflict situation (Anderlini, 2000;
Cockburn, 1998; Mertus, 2000; n.a., 1997; Turshen and Twagirimariya, 1998).
Because of their tenacity, civil society partners should be formally recognized and
encouraged to contribute significantly to the reconstruction process. Working
alongside local NGOs and civic organizations, demobilization, disarmament and
reintegration programs can also be understood, then, to establish the grounds for
broader public education programs to consolidate peace.19

While these transformational objectives are aimed at the practicalities of
redirecting human and material resources away from destructive ends, it is clear that
dismantlement, demobilization and reintegratin have a positive psychological effect.
They are essential for mental conversion, particularly when they are based in
partnerships between the reconstructed state and civil society.

3.2 Disarmament After Conflict: A Gendered Perspective

In the DPKO handbook, disarmament in a post-conflict situation is defined as “the
collection, control and dispersal” of various kinds of weapons, light and heavy, as
well as “the development of responsible arms management programs” (DPKO,
2000 p. 15). As sensible as it sounds, this approach implies that weapons control can
be undertaken in a rational and orderly manner in a post-conflict period, and that

19 Enloe (2000) warns, however, that non-military structures are easily coerced or manipulated into
supporting militarized goals against their better intentions. See, for instance, her discussion of
feminists’ difficulties in the former Yugoslavia, where even “a woman’s anti-rape crisis center
could be militarized” by war-waging governments seeking to mobilize public sentiment against
enemy (in this case Serb) men.
gun-holders will willingly give up their weapons and develop arms management structures in the interests of peace.

Yet, since the ownership and utilization of arms is profoundly attached to perceptions of masculinity in many cultures, successful disarmament support will only be likely if cultural constructions of manliness are squarely addressed. This has implications for how disarmament programs are designed and implemented. The circumstances of the conflict, the extent to which traditional control mechanisms have broken down, and the degree to which armed men have learned to rely on violence to secure their economic interests, will also dictate whether rational arms control programs are possible.

In cases where a regulated army or armies have been engaged in conflict, or in rarer cases such as Eritrea, where a liberation army responded positively to a call to hand in its weapons, it has been possible to collect arms in a comparatively orderly manner. However, in the majority of situations in which guerrillas or members of liberation movements have been involved in armed conflict, much more effort is needed to win arms’ handlers belief that it is safe to give up their weapons, to assure them that there are economic alternatives to crime, and to block arms from circulating across permeable (and lucrative) smuggling or trade routes. In Southern Africa, for example, although there has been some success in destroying arms caches in Mozambique, in a combined effort of the Mozambiquan and South African defense forces, the circulation of illegal weapons and continued poverty and unemployment all contribute to high levels of violent crime. Gender-based violence, especially, is on the increase (Cock, 2000; Cock, 2001; Meintjes, 1998; Turshen and Twagiramaraya, 1998).

A conscious strategy of disarmament should be to engage with both women and men on the subject of small arms, but this is complicated by women’s often paradoxical relationship to arms. While it is true that their proliferation makes women’s safety much more precarious, it cannot be assumed that women will not participate in the smuggling and storage of small arms and ammunition. In Sierra Leone, for example, women were very active movers of light weapons (Mansaray, 2000 p. 148). In the liberation struggles in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, while relatively few women formally entered the armed struggle, large numbers were engaged in supporting the conflicts by other means such as arms smuggling (Goldstein, 2001 p. 82). In the struggle years, the ownership and usage of arms was perceived as a legitimate means of supporting a political cause. As a result, laissez-faire attitudes to weapons became normalized. In South Africa today, the price for casual attitudes to gun ownership is being paid in a spate of armed banditry as well as accidental deaths from gunshot, the latter often involving children.

20 Small arms trafficking, in itself, demands a gendered analysis, since there may be connections between the structures and routes used to traffic both arms and women and children abducted into sexual slavery.
At present, it is a matter of speculation whether women are more actively opposed to the proliferation of small arms in a society than are men. Therefore, we cannot assume that, when a conflict ends, women might lead the way to the establishment of civilian-initiated supports for arms reduction. However, in her discussion of the demilitarization of Sierra Leone, Binta Mansaray proposes that women are morally responsible for reversing the effects of their weapons-smuggling activities. In her view, women also need to exert their “influence and moral authority” as mothers to persuade and sensitize their sons to the need to surrender their weapons, and to act as “good neighbourhood watchdogs” to observe and report gun-running activities (Mansaray, 2000 p. 157).

If women are indeed to become a resource in the struggle for the control of weapons after war, their political advancement must be prioritized. While women may succeed in offering some input into decisions made at the local level over how small arms are managed, there is a danger that their ideas, experiences, and wishes will not move beyond this informal sphere. In cases where women’s political goals are perceived as secondary to other development issues and become sidelined, as they have after national liberation struggles in countries like Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, Eritrea; and when women are left out of peace negotiations, as they were in Burundi, they have had few opportunities to encourage and support long-term disarmament programs or to help reduce the destabilizing effects of small arms in the time of social reconstruction (Anderlini, 2000; Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998).

### 3.3 Demobilization: A Gendered Perspective

Demobilization aims to downsize, or where possible, completely disband armed forces (government and guerilla). This is typically achieved by assembling combatants, quartering and disarming them, and usually offering them “some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life” (DPKO, 2000 p. 15). The primary intent of demobilization is to remove combatants from their fighting roles as quickly as possible.

Successful demobilization reduces the number of members of the armed forces and helps to prevent a spill-over of trained combatants into neighboring conflicts where they might work as mercenaries. Most programs aim to re-skill ex-combatants and assist their reintegration into civilian economic and social processes. Although an initially expensive process, in the long term, demobilization facilitates the redirection of economic resources once used for the maintenance of war into development initiatives (Kingma, 1996, 2000a).

With growing experience of demobilization, there has been a considerable refinement in the ways in which combatants are thought about. The differences between participants in guerilla movements and conscripts to a national army have

---

21 In the literature review undertaken for this paper, I found a surprising lack of gender-disaggregated research on attitudes to small arms. I am currently preparing a proposal to undertake such research.
long been highlighted, and demobilization planners are committed to the development of support systems to deal with combatants from different groups. Most contemporary studies are also careful to differentiate between combatants on the basis of their sex and age and to emphasize their different physical and psychological needs. Increasingly, they reflect on the special concerns of child soldiers.22

After the adoption of Resolution 1325, women soldiers are officially on the agenda of demobilization planning. There are, however, still some significant oversights in the ways in which the “special needs” of female ex-combatants are approached, oversights which the checklist at the end of this paper aims to correct. Issues such as their need for security in the cantonment stage, their difficulties in receiving financial payment in areas where women may not open bank accounts, and their autonomy in the issue of resettlement should be more carefully addressed, preferably through greater reference to feminist work on women in war that has been undertaken in the past twenty years. The DPKO handbook is exemplary of the difficulties that still hinder official efforts to engender the process of demobilization. While it does make an effort to “engender” its work by referring to both male and female soldiers, it epitomizes an “add women and stir” approach since the authors have not examined, with enough care, the practical challenges that might arise when their strategies are applied to women soldiers.

The multiple facets of a successful demobilization process must be considered from the perspective of women soldiers, combatants’ wives and war widows, because they will need to be differently implemented to reach this group. In the next section, I shall elaborate on how to engender demobilization support. I emphasize that planners must recognize that the ability of women soldiers and other military women to cope with civilian life, just like that of men, will be influenced by their capacities and experiences, their views on violence as a legitimate means of achieving political goals, their adaptability to different economic and cultural circumstances, and their levels of physical and psychological stress.

3.3.1 Definition of Combatant Status

In the process of assembling soldiers, will women even be asked to report?23 Whether or not they are counted as legitimate members of the military and are targeted to benefit from demobilization support will depend on two things. Firstly, women’s rank and status during the conflict period will become significant. Because women soldiers are only infrequently allowed to take part in active combat during

---

22 For recent work on children and war, see the findings of the International Conference on War-affected Children held in Canada in September 2000 (www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/menu-e.asp).

23 Again, when women have mostly participated in a guerilla movement, their status as combatants may be difficult to determine, as it was, for instance, in Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone Ranchod-Nilsson; Mansaray, Binta. 2000. "Women Against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament." In A. Ayissi and R.-E. Poulton, eds., Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone. Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 139-162.
war, they find it more difficult than men to rise to positions of importance in the military structure (Byrne, 1996; Cock, 1991). This negatively affects their ability to negotiate their demobilization and reintegration after conflict. When demobilization is voluntary or phased, women are likely to be over-represented in the troops that are instantly dismissed.\(^2^4\) This should not always be assumed to be their first choice, particularly in an environment where securing other paid work is difficult. There is also evidence that women’s access to veteran status after war can be compromised by selection criteria or committees which refuse to validate their conflict experience (de Watteville, 2002).

Women’s classification as soldiers or other military supporters is likely to be influenced by the reassertion of gender ideologies which affect post-war perceptions of their role in the conflict. If they are seen to have participated in a legitimate struggle for liberation, as women soldiers were in Zimbabwe and Eritrea, then at least some formal measures are likely to be taken to facilitate their demobilization and reintegration.\(^2^5\) If, however, the situation after the ceasefire is still unsafe, women soldiers may have to pretend to be civilians in order to escape retaliation. In Namibia, women guerillas returned home, changed from military clothing into dresses, which were considered gender-appropriate civilian attire, and were sent to refugee rather than demobilization camps, where they received no benefits, retraining, or psychological counseling to assist them in their reintegration (see also Mansaray, 2000; Shikola, 1998).

If, however, women are members of an armed group that is defeated or continues to be perceived as illegitimate, they will face extreme stigmatization and even danger in the aftermath. In countries which institute a severely restrictive gender ideology after war, women who were active in the conflict, in whatever roles they fulfilled, are likely to become invisible in the demobilization process because of the threat they pose to this ideology (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998).

There is ample evidence in the literature I consulted in the preparation of this paper that the fair and successful management of military women during the demobilization phase is reliant on women’s political status in the country more broadly. Since there is so much emphasis in this phase on briefing sessions, and opportunities often exist for education and training, demobilization represents an ideal opportunity to ensure that women veterans are made aware of their political rights. In the checklist, I also propose that those who are willing to enter the political arena should be offered education, training, contact with established women’s groups, and other forms of support to facilitate their entering the political arena as leaders. Demobilization is also an excellent phase at which to ensure that governing authorities are aware that military women exist and need to be accounted for in the planning and funding of reintegration support.

\(^2^4\) For gender-disaggregated statistics on Eritrea’s first demobilization, see Mehreteab (forthcoming). See also Ranchod-Nilsson on Zimbabwe.

\(^2^5\) Although women were included in the first phase of demobilization in both countries, their status declined rapidly in the post-war period (Mehreteab, forthcoming; Ranchod-Nilsson).
While the integration of military women into the political arena is a future-oriented goal, then, the demobilization and reintegration processes represent an ideal opportunity to lay the groundwork for long-term changes in the political status of women ex-combatants.

3.3.2 Assembly of Combatants

Assuming that women meet the criteria for demobilization, the next difficulty that arises is the problem of accommodating them in the encampment phase. Ideally, encampment should be brief in order to reduce security and health threats and overall costs (Colletta, Kostner et al., 1996a p. 23). Evidence from several demobilization exercises shows that soldiers’ families will be likely to join them if encampment continues for too long (Colletta, Kostner et al., 1996a; Kingma, 2000a). If this happens, the needs of non-combatant women will also become an issue of concern, and their presence is likely to trigger complex reactions from the military who have a long tradition of exploiting yet rendering invisible those who are dismissed as mere “camp-followers” (Enloe, 2000. See especially ch. 2-3).

One of the most pressing issues in the encampment phase is the danger of violence against women, especially sexualized violence. If military women are to be encamped, arrangements must be made to ensure their safety. If education and training are begun in the encampment phase, this is an ideal opportunity to raise the awareness of all demobilized personnel on the problem of sexualized violence, HIV/AIDS, and women’s rights within the broader context of human rights (see Carballo, Mansfield et al., 2000). Women—who generally suffer a higher incidence of such violence than men—should not, however, be the sole targets of information programs. Male soldiers also need to be educated about women’s rights, especially their right to sexual autonomy, and made aware of the penalties that can be enacted against sexual offenders. In my view, their recognition of women’s right to live in a society free of gender-based violence is one of the most significant psychological changes that can be instituted in male soldiers after war, and has profound implications for the reconstruction of society and the sustainability of long-term peace (Farr, 2000a; Farr, 2000b).

In the checklist, I suggest that the encampment phase offers an opportunity to encourage the engagement of civil society in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration support. Since one goal is to educate military women about their political rights and potential role after demobilization, while they are encamped, efforts should be made to introduce them to support structures such as the women’s movement and local NGOs. It is also incumbent upon the planners and trainers of demobilization programs to ensure that women’s expectations of life outside the military are not unrealistic. Evidence from post war zones indicates that successful reintegration can be severely hampered when soldiers have not been adequately prepared for the difficulties of civilian life (Chitiyo, 2000; Colletta, Kostner et al., 1996a; Mehrreteab, forthcoming; Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998).
Finally, the encampment phase offers an opportunity for research and surveys which could be significant for planning purposes (including lessons learned), and also for later monitoring of the demobilization process. Past experience has shown that to enhance future demobilization exercises, it is essential to collect gender-disaggregated data that is specific to women’s experiences and accurately reflects their concerns.26

3.4 Reintegration: A Gendered Perspective

The period of rehabilitation and reintegration is normally, for the majority of ex-combatants, a long one. This fact needs to be recognized from the outset to ensure long-term stability and peacebuilding. Although priority is usually placed on assisting ex-combatants to become economically independent, it is often their difficulty in reintegrating into social networks which proves most challenging to manage (Kingma, 1996). Unless an holistic approach is taken, the difficulties of negotiating a new social role may overwhelm all other efforts to reintegrate ex-military personnel. Reintegration is not merely a stage between conflict and development: it requires a long-term process of role negotiation and psychological rehabilitation. Without suitable emphasis on this aspect of post-conflict transition, developmental goals are less likely to succeed.

Reintegration programs provide assistance to former combatants to increase the potential for their and their families’ economic and social reinsertion into civil society (DPKO, 2000; Pauwels, 2000). Such programs can include a variety of initiatives such as re-training for income generation, job placement, healthcare, cash payments or compensation in kind, all of which are designed to facilitate different aspects of the reintegration process. However, when a country’s infrastructure has been decimated, as, for instance, in Mozambique, poverty relief measures may not make much economic impact.27 In the end, they might do little to solve family problems and fail to generate development (Lundín, Chachiua et al., 2000 p. 188).

Some analysts argue that reintegration has three main aspects: social, political and economic (Colletta, Kostner et al., 1996b; Kingma, 2000b). Because mental health issues are at the base of the challenges faced by combatants after war, a consideration of the psychological effects of post-traumatic stress on reintegration is therefore essential.

Ex-combatants may have lived for many years within the rigid structures of military and paramilitary groups, and must be prepared to face a world in which


27 Indeed, there is growing evidence that land redistribution schemes in Southern Africa, which were intended to be at the forefront of reconstruction after the wars of liberation in that region, “have sold out the region’s peasants in favour of quick profits and short-term expediency” (samaYende and Arenstein, 2002; see also Chitiyo, 2000).
their needs will no longer be met by a military structure (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000). Yet the social reintegration component of demobilization programs is intended not only to facilitate the transition of soldiers and their dependants into civilian life, but also to help reshape societal attitudes towards soldiers (Lundin, Chachiua et al., 2000). The process of economic reintegration helps ex-fighters to find new ways to make a living. After all, apart from their strikingly different experiences of the war that has passed, on the most practical levels, combatants have a great deal in common with all survivors of conflict. They need to be housed, fed, educated, reunited with lost family members and treated for psychological disturbances and physical injuries. Political integration, whose importance has repeatedly been emphasized by Kees Kingma (Kingma, 2000a; Pauwels, 2000), helps ex-combatants become responsible and peaceable citizens and influential in the decision-making processes of their community.

Knowing that it is in the best interests of the entire society does not mean that the re-integration of ex-combatants into civilian life is less fraught, especially since women and men are likely to require different kinds of support. In the next sections of the paper, I shall consider the ways in which economic, social and political integration programs might be designed to address women’s particular experiences, needs, and interests.

3.4.1 Political Reintegration

Reintegration processes need to emphasize the promotion of the greater political participation of ex-combatants, especially of women. Effectively, women’s social and economic reintegration is reliant on their being broadly represented in the governance of a post-conflict state. The checklist appended to this paper proposes ways in which, from the encampment phase onward, networking with women’s movements and NGOs and a commitment to women’s political education can become part of the demobilization process. The promotion of women’s political participation is a long term effort. Yet even in the earliest post-conflict planning, it must be understood that, without adequate representation, women stand little chance of influencing the nation’s reconstruction, are ill-equipped to resist a potential backlash against the implementation of their rights, and most of all, are denied the possibility to participate in the broader demilitarization processes that are needed at the end of a period of armed conflict.28

---

28 South Africa, which is an exception among African countries in having been gender-aware in its reconstruction after apartheid, proves the significance of these assertions. Unlike that of women in neighboring countries, especially Zimbabwe and Namibia, the participation of South African women in formal political structures has steadily increased since the advent of democracy, and awareness of the importance of gender sensitivity in managing the fall-out of apartheid has remained strong. The effects of the country’s gender policies were vivid in the recent United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban 31 August to 7 September 2001. To an extent unprecedented in a UN meeting whose topic was not specifically women, gender issues were prominently on the agenda. That the conference was presided over by a South African woman, Dr Dlamini-Zuma,
3.4.2 Economic Reintegration

At the beginning of this paper, I mentioned that some scholars see the aftermath of war as a potential site for women’s positive gains. In this section, I shall discuss how a gender-sensitive demobilization and reintegration process might, indeed, contribute to the advancement of women’s rights in the economic sphere.

One of the greatest needs of ex-combatants and their families is access to land and housing, but at the same time, a loss of access to land is one of the greatest disadvantages faced by single women after war (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). Therefore, in securing land rights for ex-fighters, the specific needs of women have to be taken into account, particularly when traditional practices are not willing to accommodate women-headed households. In some African countries, because they cannot own land, women have become predominant in casual farm labor which, while it may provide them with a small income, does little to secure their survival above the subsistence level (Sorensen, 1998 p. 29).

It must be remembered that merely gaining access to land may not be enough to improve women’s economic position. There may be access-related difficulties to be faced even after land has been granted, or women may not be physically able to manage the heavy labor of farming (W/Giorgis, 1999). They may also face problems such as taboos surrounding women’s use of certain implements and animals, or against women growing certain crops. This points to the fact that gender-based social customs are entwined in complex ways and must be considered by program planners if militarized women’s needs are to be successfully accommodated.

The land-use issue points to one of the ways in which women ex-combatant’s participation in the economy is overlooked and thus inadequately planned for. In more urban settings, demobilized women are also affected by a failure to take an holistic approach to the challenges they face. For instance, because women rarely achieve high-ranking military positions, their work experience in the army may be disregarded. Despite receiving training both during the period of armed struggle and in the period of demobilization, they may become marginalized in the work force because they are not offered formal accreditation for skills they have gained (de Watteville, 2002). Even when women are as well-educated as men, they may not succeed in entering the labor force to the same extent (Sorensen, 1998 p. 36). This was also an encouraging sign of the effectiveness of the country’s commitment to women’s rights.

29 Recent events in Zimbabwe, where war veterans have become increasingly militant around the issue of land distribution, highlight the importance of developing a comprehensive land policy. Tapera Knox Chitiyo offers an in-depth analysis of the history of the land crisis there, but does not mention whether and how women veterans have been affected and involved in the debate (Chitiyo, 2000.)

30 There is a vast body of feminist development literature in which many of the issues relating to women’s land access are discussed. Extrapolating from this literature, the checklist appended to this paper enumerates a number of the issues that are related to land access after war, including questions of how women can be assisted to work their land in order to do more than merely maintain themselves and their families.
can have the effect of ghettoizing them into poorly paid and unprotected work. Their unrecognized skills are wasted and their creative efforts to maintain themselves and their families are overlooked. Both forms of exclusion represent an immeasurable loss in a post-conflict context.

There is evidence that women trained in non-traditional forms of labor experience difficulties in finding employment after war (Sorensen, 1998; Mehreteab, forthcoming). Their economic marginalization results not only from a reluctance to allow women to enter new segments of the labor force, but can also be a manifestation of the reassertion of control over women’s freedom of movement. In countries where women have successfully entered into previously male-dominated sectors such as cross-border trade, they are sometimes stigmatized as prostitutes. At home, they run the risk of becoming the targets of resentment because successful women often experience increased violence from less successful male partners (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). These dangers prove that gains in women’s equality within an armed force cannot necessarily be assumed to be irreversible or capable of withstanding the powerful influence of gender norms in the civilian world. Indeed, “women’s economic strategies” may lead, even if indirectly, to an exacerbation “of gender tensions in different arenas” (Sorensen, 1998 p. 32).

Finally, in every country in the world, there is more to women’s labor than that which is conducted in the public sphere, and here too, stereotypical ideas of “women’s work” affect the ways in which this labor is valued—or made invisible (Luxton, 1980). When women’s labor in the home (such as child or eldercare) is uncounted, or when their labor outside the home (such as food production or sexual services) is seen as merely an extension of their domestic duties, perceptions of women as dependents of male wage earners are reinforced (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming).

There is far more to making demobilized women economically viable than merely offering them training programs. While women’s access to economic independence should receive emphasis in demobilization processes, planners also need to understand the implications of reconstruction activities for women’s broader political success. Ultimately, demobilization stands more chance of successfully promoting long-term peace if it can be seen as part of the healing of the whole society. It can prove a vehicle for finding mechanisms for people to move beyond the limits of gender stereotypes, which from a feminist perspective is an essential milestone on the road to social transformation.

3.4.3 Social Reintegration

When soldiers are demobilized, they may find themselves in an ambivalent social position. They may have lost all sense or knowledge of “home” and family; or they may have married someone from a different social group or geographic location and be unable to return to their original home. Their length of military service will be an important factor in determining ex-soldiers’ current social ties, especially if they
have formed partnerships with other military personnel (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000 p. 115).

When they have to move back to a sedentary post-conflict life, women soldiers as well as the wives and widows of male combatants might discover that marriages or partnerships contracted during times of armed conflict are completely altered by the war’s ending (Mehreteab, forthcoming). Particularly in countries that are based on an agrarian economy, where social status is largely dependant on access to land, and where access to land itself is dependant on gender, her partner’s familial ties will profoundly affect a woman’s connection to, or disconnection from her community of origin.

Marriage and land-use practices are often deeply entwined in agrarian economies, and because of wide-scale war displacement, may prove a significant site of social reintegration. Where social infrastructures have been so severely damaged by war that official programs are inadequate to the task of reconstruction, community goodwill and “a commitment to survive and provide a better life for relatives and former strangers,” particularly through traditional marriage practices, can give ex-combatants access to land, family, and community status (Lundin, Chachiua et al., 2000 p. 190).

However, it may be that male ex-combatants alone benefit from this adaptability. Because of notions of women’s sexual purity, they often find it impossible to make a home in a new community (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). Especially in cases where young women are abducted by soldiers in order to become servants, prostitutes or even combatants themselves, the likelihood of their being able to return to their natal community is small, even if they are abandoned by the men who forcibly removed them from home (Ayissi and Poulton, 2000; Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). As a result of their inadequate access to resources, communities of women-headed households are often forced to subsist on the fringes of society, where they are subject to “immense insecurity,” both physical and emotional (De Abreu, 1998 p. 76).

Whether they have been soldiers or performed non-military tasks, women with military partners (and possibly dependent children) are likely to have little autonomy over where they will live after demobilization. All the same, particularly in countries with narrowly defined gender roles, the benefits of staying married will outweigh the disadvantages since being married entitles a woman to social status and land access, and possibly to greater economic stability and protection from post-conflict

violence (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998 p. 16). Nevertheless, it is also true that women who follow their partner to a new area might have to face, in addition to their other burdens, the problem of trying to adapt to a new culture where they are socially isolated because they are perceived as an “outsider” (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000 p. 120). This could be particularly complex in polygamous societies, where the shortage of men after a war may drive women into accepting “subservient positions as third or fourth wives.” One difficulty of polygamy for women ex-combatants is that, while it might be seen as “preferable to dependence on grudging relatives or to prostitution” (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998 p. 16), if a woman fighter comes from outside a community, being one of several wives might make her social position even more precarious (W/Giorgis, 1999).

Especially in guerilla movements, there is evidence that relationships between male and female soldiers end after the conflict period because, upon their return to civilian life, men find it easy and advantageous to “forget” the gender equality practiced in the army (Mehreteab, forthcoming; Shikola, 1998). Suddenly, women ex-combatants may be considered too emancipated. In Eritrea, to cite one example of the effects of this attitude, such women frequently find themselves replaced or superceded by a more submissive wife (Mehreteab, forthcoming). Ironically, then, given traditional images of the masculine character of military life, one of the most difficult problems that faces demobilized women soldiers is that of being assimilated into a society in which gender stereotypes are much more rigidly upheld than within military structures (Shikola, 1998).

Here, gender ideologies play out in at least two ways: on a practical level, ex-combatants who are skilled in non-traditional jobs may be unable to find work or a market for their produce (W/Giorgis, 1999 p. 93). On a social level, they may encounter a whole range of problems if they are ignorant of, or no longer value, notions of gender-appropriate behavior (Bruchhaus and Mehreteab, 2000 p. 110). As we have seen, women ex-combatants suffer from being labeled morally lax or subversive. They are perceived as a danger to the traditional order of the society into which they have entered (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming), and frequently, through economic and physical insecurity, they are driven into relationships which enforce low status and submissiveness or forced to subsist on the fringes of society (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998).

Men’s and women’s wartime actions might be differently judged by their community, and because of gender-blindness, space is rarely negotiated in a community structure in which the choices that women are sometimes forced to make in wartime can be discussed and understood. Women who are known to have had relationships with enemy men may be cast out by their community, as they were in Burundi, even if those “relationships” were coerced (Turshen and Twagiramariya, 1998). Considering the role played by conflict on the spread of HIV/AIDS, women often become ill as a result of the sexual contracts entered into in times of social catastrophe (Carballo, Mansfield et al., 2000). Yet such outcast women often have no other recourse except to prostitution or other marginal and insecure economic activities (Carballo, Mansfield et al., 2000; Enloe, 2000; Shikola, 1998).
A final danger is that the uncertainty of combat situations often means “ongoing relationships are not possible” (Shikola, 1998 p. 143). As a result, after brief liaisons, women find themselves with children whose fathers are unknown, or have had no contact with their children since birth. In Eritrea, Namibia and Zimbabwe, women soldiers were often unable to marry or settle when they had children (Shikola, 1998 Mehreteab, Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming). In Eritrea, where the needs of the children were met by the resistance army, this did not seem burdensome at the time. It is only in the aftermath that the struggle of single parenthood has become obvious (Mehreteab, forthcoming). Even though there was a relatively high number of women soldiers (some of whom achieved a comparatively high profile as wartime leaders), women’s reintegration has been hampered by inadequate childcare and traditional beliefs about gender-appropriate labor (W/Giorgis, 1999 p. 71). In Namibia and Zimbabwe, because of their marginalized status, women ex-combatants have had difficulty in obtaining assistance to meet the ongoing needs of their children (Ranchod-Nilsson, forthcoming; Shikola, 1998).

3.4.4 Psychological Aspects of Reintegration

The physical demobilization of combatants may in some cases be a relatively simple matter of logistics. The mental demilitarization of military personnel is usually, however, an enormous and time-consuming process (Winter and Sivan, 1999). Even so, moving towards the psychological well-being of ex-combatants is an essential part of reintegration as the success of long term peacebuilding initiatives relies on people’s ability to shed the mentality of war (Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd, 2000). Not only is a return to arms made more likely if combatants see no future for themselves in the non-military arena, but levels of civil disobedience, disorder and violence are likely to increase and to undermine the best efforts of a society to move towards sustained peace (Sivan, 1999). Since a disproportionate amount of this violence will be directed at society’s most vulnerable members—women, the elderly and children—it is obvious that the psychological rehabilitation of ex-combatants must be approached, from the outset, from a gender perspective (Sideris, 2000).

There is evidence that demobilized soldiers find themselves competing for scarce resources when they go home since they frequently encounter a shattered infrastructure along with a flood of returning refugees (Carballo, Mansfield et al., 2000; Colletta, Kostner et al., 1996b; De Abreu, 1998). They may also face community resentment if care is not exercised to extend information and training about the kinds of social and emotional support that is needed after war not only to soldiers, but to all who need it.

The logistics of setting up post-war counseling services will be different in each post-conflict zone, and will depend to a great extent on the availability of resources
and the extent to which a community feels connected to the process.\textsuperscript{32} The most difficult task is always to attend to the devastating psycho-social wounds of war that are known to affect communities for years—even generations—after conflicts have come to an official end (Winter and Sivan, 1999). Although this work may be overshadowed by the perception that resources need to be allocated to meet basic needs first, dealing with psychological healing requires significant commitment, vision and time. It is a far greater task than anything which can be covered by the practicalities, and the time limits, of reintegration programs, because it lies at the heart of community transformation.

Although questions about ex-combatants’ state of mind are sometimes addressed by the planners of demobilization, the most difficult questions are often left unasked. What happens if, after soldiers have returned to their communities in a way that is deemed satisfactory by program administrators, a community entirely rejects an ex-combatant because of his or her war-time actions, or accounts that have filtered back of these actions (Shikola, 1998)? Where will this person go, and in what kinds of activities is a pariah likely to become involved? In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is evidence that such displaced persons, if they do not become roving bandits who prey on the most defenseless members of society, are vulnerable to recruitment as mercenaries. They thus perpetuate both community and regional instability (Malan, 1997; Stiefel, 1999).

Another difficulty that has to be faced is that a veteran might return to his or her natal community only to conduct a campaign of terror. He or she may maintain an illegitimate but powerful hold over members of his community, and if post-war tribunals are planned, might be able to prolong the insecurity of the war situation and defeat the ends of justice through instilling fear of on-going reprisals if the truth is told about his or her involvement in war crimes (Mansaray, 2000).

Alternatively, ex-combatants who are severely traumatized may become a burden on their community, either because they are unable to recover sufficiently to work, or because they become irrational, violent, and dangerous. Despite attempts at psychological counseling by innovative and culturally appropriate means which are now a fairly standard aspect of demobilization and reintegration support systems (Colletta, Kostner et al., 1996a; Kingma, 2000a), post-conflict communities need to deal with the reality that it takes time and resources to recover from the traumas of war. Because women are predominantly perceived as care-givers, dealing with the problems associated with post-traumatic stress disorder is a task frequently delegated to them. Will their labor in this arena receive official recognition, funding, and support? Or will it become yet another aspect of women’s “invisible” labor—essential to community survival, but unacknowledged, as was almost the case in South Africa before the intervention of the Women’s National Coalition in the transition period (Meintjes, 1998).

\textsuperscript{32} See Maeve Moynihan, “Interviewing and Counselling at the Grassroots: A manual for small groups in crisis countries wishing to improve their interviewing and counseling skills” (Amsterdam, 2001.)
Finally, it must be understood that some individuals never do recover from war, whether physically or mentally, and are never reintegrated in any meaningful way. Yet they require care, so the question is, who provides it? Does the state have an official program to deal with post-traumatic stress disorder and disabled veterans, or will kinship networks or the broader community, relying on stereotypes of women as caregivers and assumptions that they are willing to provide this labor for free, be called on to tend the casualties of war?

4 Conclusions

In this paper, I have shown that the gender-aware demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of female and male combatants is necessary not only because it formally recognizes women’s participation in armed combat, but also because it can prove a catalyst to increasing the participation of women in politics in the post-war period, and thus act as a support to long-term peacebuilding. I have pointed out the existence of diverse gender regimes, and argued that demobilization planners need to consider how different ideals of gender-appropriate behavior might impact on reintegration. I have proven, in support of United Nations Resolution 1325, that to succeed as fully as possible, future exercises must be gendered in their approach and must more consciously aim to help soldiers and civilians alike to cope better with the new ideas and practices they will have to encounter after war.

An awareness of difference, I have pointed out, is essential to successful demilitarization. This implies not only an admission that women and men have different war experiences and different needs in the demobilization and reintegration processes, but also the recognition that not all women, whether ex-combatants, wives of ex-fighters, or war widows, will face similar challenges after demobilization. The differences between women—their capacities, experience, length of service, connection to, or disconnection from communities of origin, number of dependants, health status, geographic location after demobilization, and levels of physical and psychological stress—will all influence how well they manage their new lives. Given this, when training and rehabilitation programs are planned, they should expect to encounter, and aim to accommodate, differences among women as well as between women and men.

I have gathered evidence about how gender differences impact on people’s ability to adjust to post-war conditions, both material and psychological, and argued that the adequate demobilization of combatants requires an approach which is sensitive to the different challenges faced by women and men in the post-war era. Social transformation after war, as the checklist which follows aims concretely to show, implies far more than the disbanding of militarized structures: developing the means to support women’s access to social, cultural and political representation, as well as changing attitudes to land access and developing a heightened awareness of levels of violence against women in a post-conflict society, are also essential parts of the process of conversion.
To move into successful long-term peacebuilding processes, I have argued, narrow social constructs of masculinity and femininity need to be consciously addressed. I have shown that while demobilization and reintegration processes form only one part of the broader task of demilitarizing society, they present an opportunity to do more than manage the transition of personnel into non-combatant roles after war. Demobilization and reintegration can also become part of the broader movement for social change if planners take on some of the responsibility for increasing the levels of gender awareness in a country.

Feminist accounts of reconstruction after war have indicated that the process by which people become aware that gender roles are not fixed in stone but are adapted to meet changing social circumstances will, in the longer term, aid the development of a social and political environment which facilitates positive changes in women’s status. The potential social benefits of this shift in perceptions are enormous, since there is growing evidence that there is a higher rate of success in peace processes in which women play a significant part (Anderlini, 2000; Cock, 2001; Hill, 2001).

All of these insights lend support to Resolution 1325, which commits governments, the United Nations and civil society to finding ways to help women, including ex-combatants, participate in post-war reconstruction. Peacebuilding and the advancement of human rights will both be strengthened by this means, because Resolution 1325 sends a powerful signal to the world community that women’s essential social contributions have been recognized and will be upheld. From this recognition, we hope, will come an ever greater commitment to the promotion of women’s full participation in social transformation projects which aim to facilitate the reconstruction of a peaceful national identity after war.
References


Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool


Appendix A – The Demobilization and Reintegration of Women Combatants, Wives of Male Soldiers and War Widows: A Checklist

Introduction

This checklist aims to draw attention to the particular challenges that face women combatants, the wives of male soldiers and war widows during the demobilization phase and the process of reintegration that follows. Because peacebuilding needs to continue for a long time after the demobilization and reintegration processes come to an end, it is intended to assist planners in designing and implementing both gender-sensitive short-term goals, and to assist in envisioning future-oriented long-term support measures.

The processes of demobilization and reintegration take place under a wide variety of conditions, and it would be impossible to address each of the circumstance-specific challenges which might arise. This list raises issues which frequently disappear in the planning stages of demobilization and reintegration, and aims to provoke further thinking and debate on the best ways to address different women’s varied needs. Since the needs of child soldiers are not always comparable to those of women and men, this list does not pay special attention to them.

Programs need to address the needs of women ex-combatants as well as women who are “wives” or “widows” of combatants (these women have not always been officially married to the male fighter, and might be especially vulnerable because of this). Programs also need to take into account the needs of women who follow male partners to a new geographical location. Trying to adapt to a new culture where you are perceived as an “outsider” brings with it particular challenges. Planners should keep this in mind and aim to facilitate this group’s transition into their new community.

Without a consideration of how communities of soldiers interact with communities of civilians, demobilization as a peacekeeping measure is likely to fail in the long run. A specific challenge for planners may be to address the fact that life in the armed forces was relatively egalitarian. Reintegrating into a society with rigidly gendered social structures will put enormous stress on women who have been accustomed to freer modes of behavior and fairer divisions of labor. The attitudes of these women after the conflict ends may lead to social stigmatization from communities who resent or do not understand this freedom. With careful planning, however, such differences can be mobilized to lead to positive change and greater equality for the whole society.

1 Gender-Sensitive Planning of Demobilization and Reintegration Support

Although the primary intent of demobilization is to remove combatants from their fighting roles as quickly as possible, in the planning stages, it is imperative to
consider how returning soldiers will be received by the civilian community. The period of rehabilitation and reintegration will be a long one. Recognizing this from the outset is an imperative part of ensuring long-term stability and peacebuilding. The reintegration period is particularly important in the case of women, who might be especially stigmatized as fighters or war widows.

In the planning process, the following issues must be considered:

1.1 Demobilization of Troops

- Have gender-aware questionnaires been developed and gender-disaggregated data collected by means of which to identify the socio-economic profile of groups to be demobilized?
- Who is demobilized and who is retained as part of the restructured force in the post-conflict zone?
- If there is a choice about demobilization, do women have the same right to choose to be demobilized as men?
- Has a selection criteria for the attribution of veteran status or the entitlement of benefits which been developed which does not result in de facto gender discrimination?
- Are safeguard mechanism in place, with, for example, the establishment of a committee with the power to point out discrimination and take appropriate measures to avoid it? There needs to be fair and efficient representation on this committee of female veterans who are dedicated to promoting women’s needs.
- Do phasing-out programs include women soldiers?

1.2 Funding

- Is there sustainable funding to ensure the long-term success of the demobilization and demilitarization processes? Attention should be given to innovative practices like revolving credit and other such schemes.
- Are special funds allocated to women, and if not, what measures are in place to ensure that their needs will receive proper attention?

1.3 Women’s Political Participation

- Is there a commitment to establish a quota of women at peace negotiations, particularly if there are non-party or NGO attendees invited?
- Are women fighters adequately represented? Do existing veterans’ associations recognise women’s needs?
- Are mechanisms in place to ensure the recognition and political participation of female ex-combatants after elections?
- Are women equipped to participate in democratic civil and political structures and supported in their political activities?
Has the collaboration of women leaders (local and national) in assisting ex-combatants and widows’ return to civilian life been enlisted?

2 Networking to Assist Reintegration

Although priority is usually placed on training ex-fighters to become economically independent, combatants frequently experience enormous difficulty in reintegrating into social networks. Unless an holistic approach is taken, the challenges of negotiating a new social role may overwhelm all other efforts to reintegrate soldiers. Reintegration is not merely a stage between conflict and development; reconstructing a society after war requires a long-term process of role negotiation and psychological rehabilitation. Without suitable emphasis on this aspect of post-conflict transition, developmental goals are less likely to succeed.

- Has the support of local, regional and national women’s organisations been enlisted to aid reintegration?
- If so, are existing women’s organisations trained to understand the needs and experiences of ex-combatants? This may include negotiation or brokering to assist non-military women to understand the lives of the ex-combatants, as well as providing long-term support and assistance to ex-combatants through helping them join non-military community structures.
- Are women ex-combatants made aware of these organisations and able to access them?
- Is the expertise of women ex-combatants—which may be non-traditional—recognised, respected and utilised by other women? How can this be facilitated?
- Is there space in women’s organisations for healing and reconciliation work in general, and can existing infrastructures be used, in particular, to assist the reconciliation and reintegration of ex-combatants from different factions?
- Can women ex-combatant’s reintegration be connected to broader strategies aimed at women’s post-conflict development in order to prevent resentment against fighters as a “privileged” group?
- Have women in the post-conflict zone already begun the process of reconstruction after war?
- Can their expertise combine with the experiences and expectations of women fighters to guide the development of strategies for demobilisation?
- Can women’s networks (local, national, regional and international) be approached for reintegration support?
- Is adequate use made of radio networks to educate local people about those who are being reintegrated, and thus to alleviate potential tensions? Are women’s experiences adequately represented on radio?
3 Economic Concerns

Women’s participation in the economy is often overlooked. Women may be especially marginalized when they are not offered formal accreditation for skills gained during the period of armed struggle. This can have the effect of ghettoizing them into poorly paid and unprotected work. Their unrecognized skills are wasted and their creative efforts to maintain themselves and their families are overlooked. Both forms of exclusion represent an immeasurable loss in a post-conflict context.

When women’s labor in the home is uncounted and when their labor outside the home (such as food production) is seen as merely an extension of their domestic duties, perceptions of women as dependent on male wage earners are reinforced. On the other hand, women who do achieve a measure of economic success may experience increased violence from less successful male partners. They may also become the targets of community resentment. This is among the reasons why, while women’s access to economic independence should receive emphasis, reconstruction activities must aim for the rehabilitation of the whole society.

• Does a functioning economic infrastructure exist in the region? If so, how is economically active labor measured (i.e., is household and agricultural labor reflected in the GDP so that women’s contributions are properly measured)?
• Are women in informal economic activities considered (by themselves and others) as employed or productively active members of society?
• Do plans to rebuild the economy pay proper attention to women’s potential contributions and economic needs?
• If a social security system exists, are women ex-combatants informed about it and do they have independent access to it?
• If a labor office exists, can women ex-fighters access it easily? Does it target their particular needs and promote their skills?
• Do women ex-combatants have access to legal aid or support to assist them in combating discrimination (in both private and public spheres)?
• Can self-employment be turned to women ex-combatant’s benefit through innovative economic support systems (such as rotational credit schemes and “barefoot bankers”) and the development and formalization of trade and investment networks owned and operated by women?
• Are women ex-fighters more severely affected by a generally poor labor market/high unemployment than men? To facilitate women’s employment, are feasibility studies / assessments of economic growth direction undertaken before re-training is begun?
• Can the economy support the kind of training women might ask for during the demobilization period? For instance, they may wish to be trained as nurses and teachers. Before training begins, it is necessary to determine whether a healthcare or education infrastructure still exist to support workers in this sector.
• Have obstacles, such as employers refusing to hire women ex-combatants, or narrow expectations of what work women are permitted to do, been taken into account before re-training is offered?

4 Gender-Sensitive Implementation of Demobilization and Reintegration Support

4.1 The Encampment Phase

• Are cantonment sites women-friendly: i.e., are women’s training needs, their need for childcare, their safety, their need for specific sanitary facilities and specialized healthcare recognized at the outset?
• Is domestic labor fairly divided between male and female combatants so that women can take equal advantage of briefings, re-training and other facilities at the site?
• Will civilian society accept and accredit training programs offered in the camps?
• Are support workers trained to recognize and address women’s needs, including their political needs?
• Is the threat of sexualized violence within the camp recognized and dealt with?
• Are men offered education and counseling on the prevention of sexualized violence?
• Are men and women offered equal access to education about HIV/AIDS?
• Are interviews designed to collect data specific to women’s experiences? (This data could be significant for planning purposes and also for later planning and monitoring).
• Are the political needs of encamped women adequately represented at government level?
• If male soldiers are in the majority and demobilization is slower than expected, what contingency plans are in place to attend to the needs of women who move to the cantonment area, either to join partners or as domestic/sex workers?
• Are women’s particular security needs recognized when planning their transport home?

4.2 Resettlement

• Do women have the right to choose where they will live? I.e., can they elect to return to land from which they or their partner came, or to move to semi-urban or urban areas where they may have more freedom from traditional gender roles.
4.3 Financial Payment

- If money is disbursed as part of the demobilization program, are the different funding needs / spending patterns of women recognized and accommodated (i.e., do women prefer large payments of cash or monthly disbursal?)
- Do women have geographic access to banks as well as the right to open and manage a private bank account? If not, what measures can be put in place to safeguard their money?
- Are women trained as “barefoot bankers”?
- Are women’s traditional forms of money management recognized and supported (e.g., rotational loan and credit schemes)?
- Are single or widowed women able to access social security and pension schemes?
- Are women equipped to manage money in day-to-day life, i.e., paying for services, etc?

4.4 Education and Retraining Schemes

- What are the training needs of women ex-combatants, and who defines these?
- Are women informed of different job options and the potential drawbacks of entering previously “male” workplaces?
- Do the kinds of training packages offered to women reflect local gender norms and standards about gender-appropriate labor, or attempt to broaden them? Does this benefit or hinder women’s economic independence?
- Do training programs teach women to manufacture and repair labor-saving devices that might free up time used on domestic labor and permit them to engage in activities that earn money?
- Is childcare and other family support (e.g., elder care) available for women attending re-training programs?
- Are educational opportunities equally available to female and male children of ex-combatants or widows?

4.5 Medical, Health and Psychological Needs

- Are mechanisms in place to certify or otherwise recognize the expertise of female “barefoot doctors”?
- Are women in the medical services encouraged to focus on women’s health needs?
- What are women’s specific health and psychological needs in the context of demobilization? Are they recognized as different from those of men?
- Do women have a right to determine their own fertility and sexual availability, and is this recognized and promoted?
• Are separate counseling and health facilities available to women and men?
• Are women’s specific reproductive health care needs met?
• Is there awareness of sexualized violence against women combatants, both during the conflict and after, and are there facilities for treatment, counseling and protection?
• Is the problem of HIV/AIDS addressed, from the perspectives both of education and of care practices?
• Are mechanisms in place for community mental health practices (such as cleansing ceremonies) to contribute to the long-term psychological rehabilitation of ex-combatants; and how do these address women’s specific suffering (often a result of sexualized violence)?

5 Nutrition, Accommodation, Land Use and Economic Activities (for ex-combatants resettled in rural areas)

One of the greatest needs of ex-combatants and their families is access to land and housing. In securing these, the specific needs of women have to be taken into account, particularly when traditional practices are not willing to accommodate women-headed households.

Studies show that negotiation space is often opened after conflict ends. Can this opportunity be used to get new land and property rights for women?
• Are single or widowed women ex-combatants recognized as heads of household and permitted access to existing housing and land?
• How is this access determined, and by whom?
• How secure is their tenure, and what measures can be taken to protect women ex-combatants or war widows from being forced into casual labor on land which is not their own?
• Are legal measures in place to protect their access to quality land and water?
• Are there water sources close to the land?
• Are women permitted all usufructuary rights, including the right to farm cash crops?
• Can they choose how to dispose of crops grown on their land (i.e., for family needs or for marketing), and exercise control over cash money earned from agriculture?
• Is women’s agricultural activity measured and acknowledged as part of the economic activity of the country? What benefits might accrue from this?
• Are women permitted to farm animals? If not, how does this affect their nutrition and also their ability to work the land?
• Do women have equal access to communally-owned farm implements and water pumping equipment, and can women own such equipment?
• Can traditional taboos on access and usage be negotiated?
• Do training programs during the encampment phase include adequate information on nutrition, and do they recognize and work around traditional farming patterns, nutritional taboos, etc?
• Do re-training programs offer women ex-combatants and war widows adequate access to information on farming cash crops?

6 Accommodation and Economic Activities (for ex-combatants resettled in urban and peri-urban areas)

• Can single or widowed women sign rental agreements (housing, telephone, etc)?
• Is there adequate childcare / elder care for women pursuing economic activities outside the home?
• Do businesses and industries accept and employ women ex-combatants, especially those trained in non-traditional income generating activities?
• What measures have been taken to prevent the ghettoization of women ex-fighters and war widows on the fringes of the economy? This includes excessive reliance on NGO activity, which might become a substitute for long-term participation in the labor market.
• What measures can be taken to avoid stigmatization of economically active women, especially those who have also served in combat?
• What measures are taken to address women’s security in urban areas?