Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America

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February 1997
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s, a trend towards demilitarization in Central America developed following the termination of the Cold War, shifts in ideologies, and subsequent decrease in military assistance to the countries of the region. As the capacity of the historically powerful militaries in the region were threatened, the idea of civilian control began to build momentum as institutions under civilians and business leaders were strengthened. These circumstances helped set the stage for a move to resolve the conflicts throughout Central America and demilitarize a region which had become highly militarized in the 1980s. Evidence of demilitarization with respect to troops and armaments has been greatest in Nicaragua and El Salvador following the end of their lengthy civil wars. To a lesser degree, this trend has been seen in Honduras and Guatemala.

One of the most visible components of demilitarization in Central America has been the reduction, elimination or structural change in the armies of these countries. The Central American peace process, which began in the early 1980s, established the framework for changes in the armies of the region. The process led to the establishment of a commission to oversee demilitarization, which helped increase transparency with respect to armaments and troops and pushed for structural changes and reductions in the size of the armies and disarmament. In addition, it defined a role for the international community in verification and observation of agreements, including the demobilizations. The national peace processes which took hold in Nicaragua and El Salvador brought an end to their lengthy civil wars and led to reductions in the size of their respective armed forces and the disbanding of the military structures of the opposition forces. Similar reductions are expected to take hold in Guatemala following the negotiated peace settlement concluded with the signing of the final peace agreement in late 1996; and Honduras is also undergoing plans to restructure and reduce its armed forces.

After the demobilization processes in post-conflict Nicaragua and El Salvador, a total of approximately 126,000 combatants between the two countries no longer belonged to a military structure and attempted to integrate into civilian life. The demobilization and reintegration processes often faced problems, such as lack of funding, political will and security—which in turn limited the reintegration assistance available for ex-combatants. (The term ‘ex-
combatants’ is used to reflect that the demobilized could be former government soldiers as well as former members of armed opposition groups). These hindrances, throughout stages such as early planning, disarmament, change in the role of the army and reintegration efforts limit the success and ‘peace dividend’ or positive benefits to be gained from the demobilization and reintegration exercises. In both cases, the post-conflict demobilizations required special attention and provide valuable lessons to countries such as Guatemala.

This report reviews reductions in armed forces and opposition forces of Central American countries and the context of each demobilization experience (the term ‘demobilization’ is described in BICC, 1996, p. 146). A brief background of the Central American peace process and the resolution of conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador will illustrate how a trend toward demilitarization in the region developed and established a sense of regional security—though at times unstable—essential to successful demobilization and reintegration experiences. The report will then review these post-conflict experiences in light of the peace agreements and commitments made by the respective governments. The challenges to demobilization and reintegration exercises and the reintegration support provided for ex-combatants are examined. Finally, the paper draws lessons from those exercises which may prove helpful for foreseen demobilizations or efforts to demilitarize.
II. DEMOBILIZATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Since the late 1980s, several countries of Central America have experienced a reduction in the number of people employed by the armed forces. Though not large in all cases, reductions have occurred in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The most significant of these reductions in the armed forces was experienced in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Guatemala and Honduras had smaller reductions relatively, but additional reductions are anticipated.

In general, there are several reasons for these reductions. Most often they are the result of one or more of the following factors (BICC, 1996, p. 153):

- Multilateral, bilateral or national peace accord
- Defeat of one of the fighting parties
- Perceived improvement in the security situation
- Shortage of adequate funding
- Perceived economic and development impact of conversion
- Changing military technologies and/or strategies

The context of each Central American country’s demobilization experience varies. By the late 1980s when most Central American countries were beginning to undergo changes in their security sectors, Costa Rica had already abolished its National Liberation Army (1948) and replaced it with a police force. Security forces now stand at 7,500 which includes several different police agencies (IISS, 1995; Dunkerley, 1995).

In El Salvador, the signing of a peace agreement in 1992 between the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Government of El Salvador ended a decade-long civil war and led to the demobilization of nearly 8,000 opposition forces of the FMLN. An additional 6,450 members of the FMLN, categorized as ‘injured non-combatants’ and ‘politicians,’ were also demobilized (ONUSAL, 1993).
TABLE 1: DEMOBILIZATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1989 - 1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of people demobilized</th>
<th>Size of the armed or opposition forces before demobilization</th>
<th>Current size of the armed forces and opposition forces in 1995</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>300-1000 National Liberation Army</td>
<td>300-1000</td>
<td>7,500 security force</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Change in strategy following a change in administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>30,000 FAES 8,000 FMLN</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Peace Agreement in Mexico, January 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>armed forces to be reduced by 33% in 1997 URNG to be totally disbanded in 1997</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Final Peace Agreement in Guatemala City, December 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2,000 armed forces</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1989-present</td>
<td>Change in strategy of the Reina Administration and military budget cuts in early 1990s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BICC data.
Subsequently, the Armed Forces of El Salvador were halved to their current level of 30,000, between 1992 and 1993. In addition, as the 6,000 strong National Police was phased out, the new National Civilian Police was deployed. The new force, formed as a result of the agreement, was to be made up of 60 percent civilians, 20 percent former guerrillas and 20 percent former police (United Nations, 1995a). Full deployment and operations of the force have been faced with problems including the lack of a defined chain of command and the continuation of behavior typical of the old force such as beatings and human rights violations.

In Guatemala, negotiations brokered by the United Nations resulted in a final peace agreement signed on 29 December 1996 between the Guatemalan government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). Since the negotiations began, a total of eleven accords have been signed addressing such issues as constitutional and electoral reforms, Indian rights, land reform, the reduction in the size and change in the role of the military, and the demobilization and reintegration of the URNG. Based on the accords, it is anticipated that the 44,000 strong army will be reduced by one-third and the URNG will be dissolved as a military force (New York Times, 29 December 1996; 5 January 1997). In addition to changes resulting from the peace agreement, efforts have been made to disband coercive institutions developed in the 1980s to exercise military control of the population and which have been accused of human rights abuses and terror in communities. For instance, 24,000 of the government’s ‘military commissioners’ (civilians who helped in recruitment and disclosed information to the military) were disbanded (Associated Press, 15 September 1995). It is speculated, however, that many have remained armed. The Civilian Defense Patrols (PACs), comprised an estimated 300,000 civilians, who since the early 1980s have fought against any action or threat to the government, were scheduled to be disbanded by the end of 1996. Some members voluntarily handed over their weapons prior to the scheduled demobilization. With weapons and training supplied by the army, participation in the PACs was mandatory up until 1985 and civilians refusing to serve often faced some sort of violent punishment.

In Honduras, the armed forces have experienced a slight reduction in the number of military personnel from approximately 20,000 in the late-1980s to about 19,000 in 1995 (IISS, 1995). Recent plans to reduce the number of soldiers, as a result of financial pressures and change in strategy, began with the Reina Administration (1994). As of June 1996, the armed forces are estimated as having a strength of about 18,000 and changes have led to the elimination of the
National Investigations Division and the transfer of the Treasury Police to civilian authority. Both were former units of the 5,500 strong Public Security Force (FUSEP), the Honduran security force under military rule. FUSEP is currently undergoing its own transition from military to civilian control. Though the military budget for the Honduran armed forces increased in 1995, the reductions and change in the role of the armed forces are expected to continue, provided the military continues to cooperate (Ruhl, 1996).

In Nicaragua, the end of the civil war, demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras) and the reduction in the armed forces were achieved after a series of negotiated agreements. In early 1990, the Nicaraguan Resistance committed themselves to demobilize in the Protocol on Disarmament with the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) government and the newly elected National Opposition Union (UNO). The electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in the election and the election of Violeta Chamorro were important factors in the willingness of the Nicaraguan Resistance to demobilize. Demobilization was nearly halted several times but was completed by late 1990 with a total reduction of 23,000 Contras (Child, 1992). After the presidential inauguration, plans were also made to significantly reduce the (still Sandinista controlled) regular army. By 1993, the 80,000 strong Sandinista People’s Army (EPS) had been reduced to 15,000 (Baranyi and North, 1993) and two years later to 12,000 troops under the name, Nicaraguan Army (IISS, 1995).

Unlike El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, the demilitarization experience in Panama was not a result of the broader Central American peace process. The Panamanian Defense Forces (FDP) disbanded its 15,000 members in 1989 after the defeat of the Noriega regime and was formally abolished in 1994 (Aguilera Peralta, 1994). Up to 80 percent of the members of the former army were recruited into the Panamanian Public Force, the country’s new security force established in 1990, which has a current strength of 11,800 (Conniff, 1992, p. 168; IISS, 1995).
III. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PROCESS

The end of the civil wars and subsequent demilitarization and demobilization in El Salvador and Nicaragua were made possible by a set of different national, regional and international peace processes that complemented each other. The peace settlements were achieved through a drawn out negotiation process which began in the early 1980s with the Contadora process and later under the direction of the then President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, into the Arias Plan/Esquipulas (Child, 1992). The peace process made several significant contributions to demilitarization in the region, including transparency between countries and reductions in armaments and troops. The process contributed to creating necessary circumstances for demobilization in El Salvador and Nicaragua. It also resulted in a framework for regional security and shaped the role of the international community in verification of agreements. In turn, the search for adequate verification led to the establishment of the Esquipulas Security Commission with the responsibility of urging negotiations with respect to security, verification and the reduction and control of armaments and troops in Central America (Child, 1992).

1. The Contadora process

The beginning of the Central American peace process, marked by a meeting on the island of Contadora in Panama in early 1983, was initiated by the Mexican government and involved the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. They came to be known as the Contadora Group. Later, an appeal for support to Latin American countries led to the involvement of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay—as the Lima Support Group. The initiative was inspired by concern for the conflicts in the region and military aid to Central America (Child, 1992). Between 1983 and 1987, several efforts were made to sign a treaty with measures to achieve democratization, national reconciliation and development in the region. Limited success was due to the failure of the Central American countries to agree on security objectives and a qualified neutral third party for verification of agreements.

Since the initial Contadora meeting, controversy over security objectives polarized the countries. In general, the most controversial measures in early documents called for inventories of arms, bases and troops and their ensuing control and reduction, the elimination of foreign military interference and an end to the use of one’s own territory for the support or tolerance
of armed groups involved in conflict in another country (Child, 1992). The negotiations were complicated by US military assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras), which was likely to continue unless there was some guarantee that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in government would no longer receive military assistance from communist countries. Thus, without US support for a treaty, continued assistance to the Contras could impede any progress in the peace process. The Sandinista government, on the other hand, wanted military aid to the insurgencies to end, but resisted the idea of a verification team with military power.

Several attempts by the Contadora Group to fulfill the task of verification proved difficult. Between 1984 and mid 1986, a number of draft Contadora Acts—which included the UN and OAS for verification—were discussed between the parties and rejected by Nicaragua or the other Central American countries and the US (Child, 1992). The final draft Contadora Act, presented by the Contadora and Support Groups was the last attempt to satisfy all parties. Though the desired results from the Contadora process were few, it brought the nations together—more than ever before—to communicate problems, accidents and misunderstandings in the hope of avoiding unnecessary conflict. With respect to demilitarization it introduced the concept of transparency in armaments and troops.

2. The Esquipulas peace process and Nicaragua

Having reached a stalemate in the Contadora process, President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica drafted a plan in early 1987 which—though similar to the Contadora text—suggested a broader approach for a “Procedure for Establishing a Stable and Lasting Peace in Central America.” The plan, formally agreed to in Esquipulas, Guatemala in August 1987 by the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, was perhaps the cornerstone of the resolution of conflict in the region. The agreement called for all five countries to agree to several stipulations to ensure peace and development in the region. It

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1 'The Nicaraguan Resistance’ and ‘Contras’ are used interchangeably throughout the text. The Nicaraguan Resistance was formed in the early 1980s by former members of Somoza’s National Guard and groups of small farmers who were disgruntled with Sandinista agricultural policy which nationalized land and agricultural production and persecuted those who did not go along with their political and economic plans. They established the base of their counterrevolutionary movement in Honduras and came to be known as ‘Contras.’ The Nicaraguan Resistance was made up of three main Contra groups: the United Nicaraguan Opposition (north), the Opposition Block of the South (southeast) and the Nicaraguan Coast Indian Unity (northeast).
called for measures to democratize, encouraged national reconciliation, a cease-fire, fair elections, general amnesty, an end to support for irregular forces by all governments and the non-use of national territory to destabilize other Central American countries (Esquipulas II, in Child, 1992, p. 179).

Initially, verification methods were to be determined by the UN and OAS, and implemented by the new International Commission for Verification and Follow-up (CIVS) made up of the foreign ministers of the Central American countries, the Contadora Group, the Support Group and the Secretary Generals of the OAS and the UN (Esquipulas II, in Child, 1992). The diversity of members and opinions made the Commission somewhat ineffective and the Central American countries, a small number of the total representatives, often felt defeated. In addition, following a report released by CIVS in early 1988 on the region’s lack of complicity with Esquipulas II, the Central American countries assigned all future verification duties to their own representatives on the Commission (Child, 1992). The Central American representatives of the Commission alienated the other countries by creating a new commission called the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) responsible for developing a verification plan for Esquipulas II. As part of TAG a Security Commission was established to push for demilitarization in the region. (See Demilitarization and the Security Commission, page 13)

Esquipulas II made little progress until advancements were made in resolving the conflict between the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Sandinistas. The conflict was complex, not only because of US interests in the region, but Honduras became increasingly concerned with the approximately 10,000 Contras in Honduras. In early 1988, talks between the Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan Resistance resulted in a breakthrough agreement seen as the beginning of the resolution of conflict in Nicaragua and the end of US military aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance. The Agreement and subsequent talks called for a 60 day cease-fire to be monitored by the OAS and the grouping of the Contras within Nicaragua into ‘security zones.’ Assistance from US Agency for International Development (USAID) for humanitarian aid would be channeled through the OAS (Child, 1992). In February 1989 in Costa del Sol, El Salvador the five Central American presidents met and the Sandinistas agreed to several political reforms and free elections. At the same time, in March 1989 US military aid policy changed when a plan was approved in the US Congress to provide non-military aid to the Contras until after the February 1990 elections in Nicaragua. Leaving details of a verification to the UN, it was agreed that small UN observer teams would verify the removal of the
Contras—with the most emphasis on the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The process went a step further in May when the presidents agreed to give the UN and OAS full responsibility for the demobilization of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (Child, 1992). Further progress was made in August 1989 when the presidents met and signed an agreement which called for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of the Contras by the end of 1989. It also appealed for the formal establishment of three groups for verification: the International Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV) made up of representatives of the UN and OAS; the United Nations Observer Group in Central American (ONUCA); and the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) (Child, 1992). The establishment of the verification teams and the February 1990 elections delayed the demobilization process, however, a framework was developed for the demobilization to be realized by mid-1990.

3. The peace process in El Salvador

Talks to resolve the conflict in El Salvador between the FMLN and government produced few results in the late 1980s, due to the unyielding positions each party held. A proposal submitted by the FMLN in late 1989 recognized the current administration and called for political and electoral reforms, but did not address disarmament. Ongoing talks between the parties provided few results. The FMLN wanted major structural, political and security changes and a purification of the armed forces. Adding to the tension between the parties was the concern that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua were supplying weapons to the FMLN. Despite the fact that no agreement was reached, both parties agreed to continued dialogue under UN and OAS supervision. From this point on, the UN began to play a definitive role as a third party mediator to the negotiations.

While the demobilization of the Contras began in 1990, the parties in El Salvador realized that neither side could win by military victory. Negotiations progressed as the parties agreed in early 1990 to a general agenda and timetable for negotiations on political, social and economic reforms (United Nations, 1995a). The San Jose Agreement on Human Rights was a substantive agreement in which both parties pledged respect for international human rights. The UN would play a significant role in monitoring compliance with the pledge. Progress was complicated by the fact that in order to implement changes called for in future peace agreements the
Constitution would have to be amended. Following intense negotiations in Mexico City in April 1991, the parties reached an agreement that reforms would take place with respect to the armed forces, public security, the judicial and the electoral system. The constitutional amendments were approved with some changes, but the reforms to the armed forces were left undecided as negotiations on that issue continued.

Despite advancements in the peace process, fighting continued throughout El Salvador. Some government forces were accused of violent acts including torture and executions, while the FMLN was accused of killing persons collaborating with the government. In early 1991, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established to monitor compliance with the San Jose Agreement on Human Rights (United Nations, 1995a). Since ONUSAL’s verification mission began before the end of the armed conflict its presence created unrest among some people who thought that the mission would act as the country’s temporary security force (United Nations, 1995a).

In the long run the FMLN wanted the army abolished, a request with which the government refused to comply. The FMLN was pushing for it to retain military capability during the cease-fire—another request the government could not accept. The New York agreement reached in September 1991 ended the standstill by establishing an agenda by which the armed forces, under a new doctrine, would be restructured and reduced, the National Police (often accused of human rights abuses) would be disbanded and a new police force established. In addition, the new National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), made up of representatives of the government, army and FMLN, would monitor agreements between the two parties (United Nations, 1995a). A cease-fire was agreed upon in the Act of New York signed by the parties on 31 December 1991. The Act included the previous agreements signed in San Jose, Mexico and New York and completed the negotiations on all substantive issues of the peace process. This was succeeded by the New York Act II finalizing outstanding points. The culmination of all the agreements resulted in a final peace agreement reached at the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on 16 January 1992. The Chapultepec Peace Agreement included a full plan for the disbanding of the FMLN which, despite delays, was completed by the end of 1992.

4. The peace process in Guatemala
After 36 years of civil war, 100,000 people dead and years of informal and formal negotiations between the government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the final peace agreement was signed between the parties on 29 December 1996 in Guatemala City (New York Times, 29 December 1996).

The peace process in Guatemala has been even more complex than in El Salvador and Nicaragua since the Guatemalan military tends to exercise more authority and has often abused its veto power when changes threaten its status. The process encountered obstacles similar to those in Nicaragua and El Salvador, i.e. what would be the role of the military and what would become of the URNG?

Talks between the URNG and government in early 1990 resulted in an agreement acknowledging Esquipulas II and requesting UN observation of the process. For some time the army held its stance that no agreement would be reached until the URNG disarmed and demobilized. Despite an agreement in 1991 on a schedule for the implementation and verification of agreements, progress was still limited due to the URNG’s unwillingness to disarm. A major effort to boost the peace process was made by the URNG in March 1996 when it declared a ‘temporary cease-fire’ and the government responded by ordering an end to the counter-insurgency actions (Reuters, 22 March 1996). During the negotiations, President Alvaro Arzú called for the firing, arrest or purging of certain groups or individuals in the officer corps and security forces. In December 1996, Congress passed a general amnesty law exempting soldiers and guerrillas from prosecution for any killings or violent acts committed during the war. Many human rights and religious groups feel this will only fuel bitterness since many Guatemalans are angered that the crimes committed in the past 36 years will go unpunished (New York Times, December 18, 1996).

By the end of December 1996, accords on all substantive issues such as human rights, rights of indigenous groups, social, economic and agrarian issues, a commission to document war crimes, the new role of the army and the demobilization and reintegration of the URNG have been signed (New York Times, 29 December 1996). The demobilization is scheduled to begin in mid-February 1997. The exercise will be overseen by 155 military observers from the UN, in addition to the already established United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).
A pressing issue is still whether or not Guatemala will be able to raise the necessary funds to follow through with the peace process. International attention to Central America has diminished since the 1980s and it is unlikely that President Arzú will be able to raise the US $1.8 billion that the country needs (San Francisco Chronicle, 22 January 1997).

5. Demilitarization and the Security Commission

An important contribution to the demilitarization process in the region was made by the Security Commission established as a part of the Esquipulas Technical Advisory Group in 1988. The members of the Security Commission included the deputy ministers of foreign affairs and their advisors of the Central American countries, but meetings often included their deputy defense ministers and observers from the UN and the OAS. In line with Esquipulas II, the Commission pushed for demilitarization and conversion in Central America by encouraging transparency and communication. Specifically, its purpose was to continue negotiations with respect to security, verification, and the control and limitation of armaments and troops. The resources acquired as a result of reductions in military activities were to be used for development in the region (Child, 1992).

The incomplete disarmament process in Nicaragua and El Salvador following the end of their civil wars continues to pose a threat to security in the region. Efforts in Nicaragua to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of rearmed ex-combatants were successful in reducing violence. The main method used by the Special Disarmament Brigade (BED), created by the government of Nicaragua, to collect weapons was the gun buy-back program. Similar efforts to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of civilians is now being seen in El Salvador in the form of gun-buy-back schemes. Both the UN mission in El Salvador and the Salvadoran Defense Ministry estimate that 200,000-300,000 weapons remain in the hands of civilians (Laurance and Meek, 1996). The abundance of weapons, coupled with the poor state of the economy and continuing social inequalities, poses a threat to the peace process.

In summary, both the Contadora and Esquipulas processes were important contributions to the peace process and demilitarization in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, the civil wars have ended, the armies have been reduced by over half and the irregular groups have been disbanded. However, in both countries, the socially and economically divided societies that brought rise to the civil wars often continue to disagree.
over complicity with the peace agreements, especially with respect to the reintegration support provided for ex-combatants. At times this has threatened the peace process. Arms are abundant in El Salvador and crime and violence are high. In Nicaragua, continuing political conflicts and poor reintegration efforts have led many former members of the Sandinista army and former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance to rearm. The increased violence, banditry, and use of arms in these countries is often a sign of former combatants frustrated at their inability to reintegrate and angered at their governments for not providing the adequate assistance. This frustration, coupled with a high poverty rate, has led to increased crime on the streets—at times worse than during the wars. Already in Guatemala, a wave of violent crime was seen one month following the signing of the peace agreement. It is anticipated that the reduction of the armed forces, disbanding of the opposition forces and the high unemployment rate in Guatemala will fuel the crime wave.

If unprepared and unplanned, the disarmament, demobilization exercises could have a greater negative than positive impact in a country such as Guatemala, where over half of the population lives in poverty (Reuters, 23 May 1996). Based on the final peace agreement signed in Guatemala, it is anticipated that the army will be reduced by one third and the opposition forces will be completely demobilized. The other experiences in the region may prove helpful to a demobilization in Guatemala. The following summary of the demobilization and reintegration experiences in Nicaragua and El Salvador illustrate problems and challenges encountered throughout the processes.
6. Case study methodology

These case studies include an account of the post-conflict demobilization exercise, disarmament, and the structure and role of the army. This is followed by a review of the reintegration exercises which includes an overview of the economic situation in the respective countries, reintegration incentives, the actual experiences and the social movement of the ex-combatants following reintegration efforts. Finally, each case study looks at the crucial aspect of support for the demobilization and reintegration process including external support, international non-governmental organizations and local non-governmental organizations.
IV. NICARAGUA

1. Post-conflict demobilization

With the foundation for peace in Nicaragua set from Esquipulas II and subsequent agreements, the details and obstacles facing the Contra demobilization were addressed in early 1990. Following the victory of Violeta Chamorro in the February 1991 presidential elections, the Contras said that there was no longer a need for conflict, though many leaders continued to refuse to disband until they received certain security assurances. In a period of two months, the planned demobilization was delayed several times due to lack of funding, political will, security, ongoing political conflict and the lack of guaranteed reintegration assistance for the ex-combatants.

Box 1: The role of the UN and the OAS in demobilization and reintegration in Nicaragua

After an unsuccessful attempt at an international verification team for Esquipulas II involving UN, OAS and foreign ministers of the Contadora and Support Group nations the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) were established in August 1989 and November 1989 respectively. The purpose of CIAV, involving the UN and OAS, was to assist in the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or resettlement of the Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras) in Nicaragua. CIAV-UN would be responsible for the repatriation to Nicaragua and the CIAV-OAS would be responsible for all the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Nicaragua.

ONUCA’s initial mandate, to verify the end of all aid to opposition groups and the non-use of one’s own territory to destabilize other countries, was expanded to monitor the cease-fire and separation of forces. The demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance by ONUCA included the destruction of weapons voluntarily handed over by the combatants. ONUCA was temporarily assisted in demobilizing the Resistance by a battalion of about 800 troops from Venezuela (Child, 1992). As its mandate expanded, the UN’s role in CIAV dissolved and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), already responsible for safeguarding refugees from Honduras to Nicaragua, picked up some of its responsibilities. Subsequently, the CIAV became more identified with the OAS and was responsible for other aspects of the demobilization, such as humanitarian aid, housing and social services (Baranyi and North, 1993).
An agreement was reached on 3 April 1990 in Montelimar, Nicaragua between the five Central American presidents, which set a 25 April date for the Contra demobilization. Weapons would be turned in and destroyed once the Contras went into one of eight ‘security zones’ (United Nations, 1990a). The purpose of the ‘security zones’ was briefly cause for dispute. The general view was that these areas would be temporary and for the demobilization process only, whereas some of the Contras, concerned for their security, felt the zones should be more permanent areas where they would be under ONUCA protection (Child, 1992). Based on the agreement, Sandinista forces would withdraw from these areas and members of the Resistance were to disarm upon entering the zones. The 25 April date set for the demobilization was formalized in an agreement two weeks later between the Sandinista government, the Nicaraguan Resistance and the newly elected National Opposition Union (UNO). This was the first pledge by the Nicaraguan Resistance to demobilize by a set date. Under the agreement there would be no military presence in the ‘security zones,’ except for ONUCA’s troops. Members of the Nicaraguan Resistance would begin disarming on 25 April and complete on 10 June and then receive humanitarian aid from CIAV. The Venezuelan troops would be responsible for verification and supervision of the demobilization (Child, 1992).

Although the demobilization process began, progress was initially slow for several reasons. The USAID was holding up anticipated funds, totaling US $138.8 million, for tools, medicine and training and it was unclear how the UN and OAS planned on coordinating their activities (Child, 1992). Ensuing funding problems included the realization that more Contras needed assistance then originally anticipated. Another obstacle was that ONUCA could do nothing if combatants did not want to demobilize. Based on the agreements the demobilization was to be voluntary and ONUCA, with a limited mandate, found it increasingly difficult to control the movements of the Sandinistas or members of the Nicaraguan Resistance (except where the Venezuelan battalions were located).

An additional hindrance to progress in the demobilization was the decision by the Chamorro government in April 1990 to keep General Humberto Ortega—brother of former Sandinista president Daniel Ortega—as head of the army. Despite President Chamorro’s call for civilian control of the armed forces and a reduction in the size of the army, the decision to keep Ortega (and the familiar power structure of the army) angered the Contras. Ortega, having agreed to
the new government’s reforms, announced plans to reduce the army by half. Nonetheless, most of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance feared for their security and refused to disarm. Despite efforts by the Chamorro government to revive the process, the demobilization was postponed within a month of its implementation, with only about 700 ex-combatants demobilized in Honduras and none in Nicaragua (Child, 1992).

Within two weeks the demobilization process was revived with the signing of the Managua Protocol on Disarmament on 30 May between the Nicaraguan Resistance, FSLN and the newly elected UNO government. This was a breakthrough in the stalemate since, having negotiated for ‘development poles’ to assist in the reintegration, more members of the Nicaraguan Resistance demobilized following the Protocol than after any of the previous attempts at demobilization (United Nations, 1990b). Though this concept would encounter various problems upon implementation, for the moment it was a promise to provide 23 development areas where the ex-combatants would settle under the protection of a police force (which would include their own members) and receive aid from the government for housing, credit and other development needs (United Nations, 1990b).

Although the pace of the demobilization process had increased significantly, the previously established deadline of 10 June for its completion was not met due to delays before the signing of the Managua Protocol. During the process, within the assembly areas, ONUCA took weapons, equipment and uniforms voluntarily handed over by the Contras. Combatants were provided with a Demobilization Certificate and brought under the responsibility of the CIAV for reintegration. The CIAV, responsible for humanitarian assistance, temporary shelter and basic social services, gave ex-combatants clothes and a bag of rice and beans which would be provided for approximately seven months following demobilization (Washington Post, 10 May 1990).

During the demobilization process, which had proceeded relatively smoothly, there was concern over the disarmament of the Nicaraguan Resistance and the humanitarian aid in the ‘security zones.’ Many of the weapons being turned in were old and rusty implying that the some had hidden other weapons that could later threaten the peace process. The Contras, on the other hand, complained that the humanitarian assistance they were receiving was inadequate especially for having fought for the country for so many years. Barely two and a half months from its inception, the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Honduras and Nicaragua was nearly complete. Many of the Contras in Honduras
went to Nicaragua to demobilize, leaving mostly the old and injured who were assisted by the CIAV and UNHCR. A total of 2,607 Contras demobilized at four different camps in Honduras (United Nations, 1990c). The process formally ended on 5 July 1990 with a total of 23,000 Contras demobilized and 17,000 weapons destroyed. The ‘security zones’ were closed and the Venezuelan troops began withdrawing (United Nations, 1990c). When the Chamorro government came to power in early 1990, plans began for the reduction of the 80,000 strong Sandinista People’s Army (EPS). By 1993 the EPS had been reduced to 15,000 (IISS, 1994). Current strength of the Nicaraguan Army, formerly the EPS, is 12,000 (IISS 1995).

Since the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and armed forces, there have been regular attempts to disarm and demobilize what has resurfaced as the ‘Recontras’, ‘Recompas’ and, ‘Revueltos’—groups of rearmed former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and former Sandinista soldiers and a combination of the two. The regroupings were initially motivated by anger at the government for failing to provide adequate reintegration assistance. The Recontras, in particular, felt the government failed to provide adequate protection from Sandinistas seeking revenge.

Some attempts to demobilize these groups since 1992 have been successful. For instance, in early 1992, approximately 300 Recompas participated in a gun buy-back, exchanging their rifles for US $100-$200 and promises for homes and clear titles to land (New York Times, 17 March 1992). The Special Disarmament Brigade, made up of members of both sides of the conflict, played a significant role in these post-conflict disarmament activities and offered cash, food, housing and construction materials in exchange for weapons (O’Conner, 1995). Other demobilizations of rearmed groups—some more organized than others—were negotiated. The demobilization of a leading Recontra group, Northern Front 3-80, headed by Jose Angel Talavera (nom de guerre ‘The Jackal’), took place in early 1994 after having secured agricultural development for a region called Quilali (the base of the Contra uprising against the FSLN), the inclusion of Contras into the local police force, and the withdrawal of the Sandinistas army from the area (Manchester Guardian/Le Monde, 28 August 1994).

2. Disarmament

As part of the demobilization process, members of the Resistance turned in their weapons upon entering the ‘security zones.’ Weapons handed over to ONUCA were smashed or cut into
pieces with torches. The destruction of the weapons went relatively smoothly but the disarmament process overall encountered problems. Many of the weapons being turned in were useless and were only a small percentage of the total. Having been militarily supported by the US for a number of years, it appeared that many Contras had hidden the newer weapons for future protection or as a source of income from trafficking.

There was little transparency with regard to the arms collection since the UN did not have an inventory list of weapons which had been supplied to the Nicaraguan Resistance. Some Contras reported that most of their heavy weapons, such as machine guns and surface-to-air missiles at Contra bases in Honduras, were returned to the original supplier before they came into Nicaragua (United Nations, 1990c). In addition, ONUCA’s limited mandate allowed it only to receive weapons, equipment and clothing voluntarily handed over. All weapons turned in to ONUCA were destroyed immediately.

Within less than a year of the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance, the incomplete disarmament, coupled with continued political violence and limited reintegration assistance, had fueled violence and banditry. Many former Contras—and later demobilized soldiers of the EPS—returned to their weapons. In addition, arms were transferred to other conflict areas, especially to the FMLN in El Salvador, fueling their civil war (Baranyi and North, 1992).

Between January 1992 and the end of 1993, the Special Disarmament Brigade (BED), created by the Government of Nicaragua, successfully confiscated or collected 142,000 weapons and approximately 250,000 munitions and ordnance. Armed groups were offered incentives such as US $100 for individual weapons, and in addition approximately US $ 100 worth of food (Laurance and Meek, 1996, p. 84).

3. Structure and role of the army

Before President Chamorro came to power, the new structure and role of the army was never specified. Once inaugurated, Chamorro declared herself Defense Minister, ended the military draft, called for the army to be reduced by half and limited the term of the armed forces chief to five years. In a decision that would lead to much conflict, she kept Humberto Ortega as head of the army. Although this was a national reconciliation strategy in a highly polarized society, the members of the Resistance and some Chamorro supporters were outraged since it
left the municipal and security forces in the hands of the Sandinistas. To the Nicaraguan Resistance, Ortega’s presence was a reminder of the strength of the Sandinistas and their continued military power in the country. To some Sandinistas it was proof that they could “rule from below” as former President Daniel Ortega had claimed upon losing the elections to Chamorro (New York Times, 29 October 1990). Nonetheless, Humberto Ortega quickly accepted the reforms and stated that the downsized army would emphasize professionalism. Despite the additional tension this created between the parties, it was not until February 1995 that Ortega retired from the army (IISS, 1995).

In an effort to change the image of the security forces Chamorro also called for a restructured police force under civilian rule and changed the name from Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Government. In addition, the name of the police force was changed to National Police even though members continued wearing Sandinista emblems (Christian Science Monitor, 4 January 1991). In early 1991, Chamorro amended a Sandinista law that gave most of the military power to the military chief, and brought the armed forces under her command. In general, the armed forces were responsible for guaranteeing the security of the country’s borders and dealing with internal disturbances.

In spite of the changes, Chamorro’s power over the military in 1993 was still limited. There were no government offices to shape policies for civilian control of the armed forces and many of the former and current members of the Sandinista People’s Army were still involved in the struggle for control. For instance, in one of several similar incidents, three army officers confessed in early 1991 to selling 28 Soviet surface-to-air missiles to the FMLN (Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1991). Though the army tried to distance itself from this incident its loyalty to the Sandinista movement appeared obvious and came into question. Many saw the army as another political party and not an institution which protects the country. The people found it difficult to forget the role of the Sandinistas during the civil war and therefore, found it difficult to separate them from the army.

4. Reintegration

The process of reintegrating ex-combatants proved especially challenging in economically unstable post-war Nicaragua, which did not have sufficient resources for the demobilization and reintegration exercises. The government had a very ambitious reintegration plan that
would be nearly impossible to comply with, due to limited funds, coordination and infrastructure. Support for these exercises, discussed later in the text, is essential for their success. The rebirth of conflict in Nicaragua shortly after the demobilization of the Contras was due not only to the poor state of the economy, but also to ongoing political conflicts and the inability of the government to comply with commitments made to the ex-combatants. The social and economic problems were compounded by the demobilization of over half of the armed forces. In addition, the limited reintegration support from the international community, including the slow response of donors and lack of coordination severely hindered the ability of the government to handle the crisis, and the ex-combatants to reintegrate.

As in many post-conflict countries, the state of the economy in Nicaragua made the reintegration of ex-combatants especially challenging. Austerity programs imposed by international lending institutions as a condition for continued assistance have successfully controlled inflation. However, the economic benefits of the free market economy have not yet been felt (Dijkstra, 1996). Opposition to these measures, in the form of wage demands and strikes from primarily Sandinista managed trade unions, added to the political and social unrest in the country, ultimately keeping foreign investors away (Financial Times, 18 November 1993). Also, foreign aid which made a significant contribution to reducing inflation and also increasing the debt, is not likely to continue as in the early 1990s (Dijkstra, 1996). Some sources have quoted the unemployment rate as high as 60 percent in 1995 and the foreign debt at US $11 billion with 80 percent of foreign loans going towards servicing the debt, further limiting social spending (Financial Times, 1 November 1995). These circumstances have made it especially difficult for ex-combatants, with limited skills, to find employment.

Determining the profile of the ex-combatants was also important to the success of the reintegration programs provided. Approximately 60 percent of the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance in 1990 were under 25 year of age (CEI, 1995). Many had fought for ten years in the civil war and did not have previous employment or education. Once demobilized, most of the ex-combatants who went to the cities had only those skills acquired during the war. Those that did have agricultural backgrounds and wished to return to farming could do so provided land was available and they had clear titles to the land which was necessary to apply for credit.

4.1 Land: a condition for successful reintegration
The core of reintegration support for ex-combatants was land. Much of the land that was confiscated by the Sandinistas in the 1980s was turned into state-run cooperatives where people were placed to farm, but had no titles. Following their electoral defeat, the Sandinistas distributed several thousand land titles to mostly influential Sandinistas. The Contras on the other hand had little access to land. To resolve the issue, the Chamorro administration, through its agrarian reform, committed to privatizing these state owned lands. The Nicaraguan Resistance, having little faith in the Chamorro plan, negotiated for the ‘development poles’ with assistance for agriculture, infrastructure and development as a condition to their demobilization. Former members of the Sandinista army who lost land from the state-run cooperatives were expected to receive their share of land, and officers would receive 6-12 months pay, benefits and land after being discharged.

The distribution of land promised to the ex-combatants was often delayed or never took place. Several incidents contributed to stalls in the process including the Sandinista government’s distribution of land to its own officials before leaving office, logistical problems and resistance from the Sandinistas once Chamorro took office (GAO, 1991). Another serious obstacle to the resettlement of ex-combatants in rural settings is landmines, of which 100,000 were planted in Nicaragua during the war (Arms Project, 1993). The mines have not only killed many but disabled men, women and children limiting their reintegration possibilities. Efforts to clear the mines increased following an appeal by the Nicaraguan government for financial and technical support. However, progress is slow due to the lack of records and maps of the mine fields (World Bank, 1993).

4.2 Reintegration experience

While some Contras headed for the ‘development poles’ with a promise by the government for schools, hospitals, water, electricity, roads, start-up costs and titles to land, others returned to the rural areas they came from years ago. The development areas were seen by some of the members of the Resistance as a tool for their reintegration into civilian life and by others as a way of isolating them and preventing them from being a part of everyday life in the country. The Sandinistas on the other hand felt it was too generous since the government offered the Contras what it could not even offer to the rest of the population.
Within two months of the disbanding of the Nicaraguan Resistance the ‘development poles’ did not prove to be the desired path to reintegration as hoped. As a result of the delay in the remainder of an US $30 million aid package from the US and the delay in assistance to these areas, the government was unable to meet the demands of the Contras (Washington Post, 15 July 1990). The areas often had no water, plumbing, electricity or telephones. In addition they had no form of transportation and had to rely on UN trucks to leave the region (Child, 1992). Angered by the poor infrastructure and reintegration assistance, many former Resistance members began leaving these areas and heading to their families or the capital. Most notable was the decreasing number of ex-combatants at El Almendro, one of the largest of these development areas. Of the 9,000 ex-Contras, who gathered in this area following the Protocol on Disarmament on 30 May 1990, only 3,000 remained as of July 1990 (Washington Post, 15 July 1990).

The government had also made commitments to the demobilized soldiers of the Sandinista army. They were to receive two years worth of pay and medical care, housing lots, access to farm land, credit for micro-enterprise and training. The government was also unable to comply with these promises. Many became frustrated that their skills, valuable as a soldier in the army, could not be used in civilian life (CEI, 1995).

The issue of land, which has been a recurring cause of conflict in Nicaragua for decades, was far from settled following the civil war. Many of those returning to their land after the war found that the land was occupied or destroyed. In addition, among some ex-combatants there was the feeling that their superiors had been bought out by the Chamorro administration. Sandinistas who had been given plots of land were never given a legal title and faced being evicted, while those guaranteed land as a result of agreements with the government, were either not granted land, or often did not have the resources to work their land.

**Box 2: Women in post-conflict Nicaragua**

The needs of women ex-combatants and wives of ex-combatants require special attention during the demobilization and reintegration process. Often, problems with reintegration stem from the woman’s changed role as a result of the war. During the war in Nicaragua, many opportunities opened up for women in organizations, production and government administration. Those women not only took on these responsibilities and maintained their traditional roles at home, but also became increasingly aware of their rights and abilities. Similarly, women ex-combatants were often treated with respect, and as equals on the battlefield fighting alongside men for a common cause. This increased awareness created
tension within families when the war was over and women were expected, by men, to return to their traditional roles (Poncela, 1996). In addition, those women who were involved in the conflict were generally excluded from receiving land and faced the same discriminations as the rest of the female population.

As men returned from the war, in combination with the impact of structural adjustment policies, the lives of women in Nicaragua changed again. One association for women in Nicaragua estimated that almost 16,000 working women—9,000 of whom were in agricultural positions—lost their jobs between the 1990 and the end of 1991. Many more women, as a result, have been forced to enter the informal sector in below poverty conditions. The effect of the reduction of social services is felt mostly by women as caretakers of the family. Thus, women must work more and often feel guilty because they are unable to meet all the needs of their families (Poncela, 1996).

Despite the economic challenges and gender bias, the women in Nicaragua have played a significant role in reconciliation since the end of the war. During the conflict it was common for family members or friends to take different sides in the conflict. Following the war, mothers encouraged reconciliation among their families and friends, as they reunited after having stood against one another as enemies (Arms to Fight, Arms to Protect, 1995).

Some organizations in Nicaragua have been established to serve the needs of demobilized women, widows and mothers of victims of the war. For instance, the Center for International Studies in Managua has supported the establishment of Commissions for women by developing workshops on issues such as the resolution of conflict and reconciliation (CEI, 1995).

4.3 Social movements of ex-combatants: reorganizations and threats to security

The incomplete disarmament process during the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and the availability of weapons to former members of the Sandinista army created a security risk in post-war Nicaragua. The frustration of the ex-combatants as a result of their limited skills and the Chamorro government’s inability to provide adequate reintegration assistance motivated many of them to rearm. Throughout the early 1990s, rearmed groups of former Contras, Sandinistas soldiers and the two working together posed a serious threat to the peace process.

The opposition to the government began to take shape within less than a year of the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance, creating an environment of insecurity. The Contras, disappointed in the ‘development poles’, demanded assistance in the form of clothing, better food, land, financial aid, protection and security. Increasing discontent led some former Contras to rearm and move to the northern regions of the country. Adding to the tension in the north was the presence of Sandinista troops left intact, despite the significant reduction in the
army. Other former Contras formed alliances with members of the UNO opposed to Chamorro’s policies and others became more violent and resorted to taking land by force. Many ‘Recontras,’ as they became known, expressed their anger with the government for not distributing land by staging strikes, blockades and kidnappings (Bataillon, 1994). In one of several incidents, the Recontras seized a church in Managua in an attempt to pressure the government for aid, homes and jobs.

In August of 1991, former members of the Sandinista army, referred to as ‘Recompas’ took up arms to confront and defend themselves against the Recontras and fight for what they felt was rightfully theirs, which among other things included the ‘gifts’ distributed in the form of land and homes when the Sandinistas were voted out of power. In addition, many felt that the economic policies implemented by the government were a cause of much of the violence. In 1992, the Recompas, well equipped with weapons, became increasingly involved in violent acts including takeovers of private and public property and blockades. In one incident, Recontras kidnapped government officials who were planning on negotiating with a group of Recompas. In retaliation, the Recompas seized the headquarters of the UNO. Some Recompa groups used death squad tactics to seek revenge or protect their holdings (Washington Post, 15 November 1992).

In some instances, Recontras and Recompas, facing the same economic hardships, chose to cease using their resources on each other and unite against the government as *Revueltos* (‘discontented’ or ‘agitated’). Similar to the other groups they expressed their frustrations either violently, or in joint activities which benefited both parties and the government (Bataillon, 1994).

**Box 3: Reconciliation between former warring parties**

In early 1992, former Contras and Sandinista soldiers facing the same problems, began to form alliances opposed to the government and its failure to comply with reintegration assistance as promised. These alliances began to take shape and resulted in the development of various organized entities using different tactics to push for demands. For instance, the National Peasant Alliance, made up of Sandinistas and Contras, put political differences aside to call on the government for changes to agrarian policies (Christian Science Monitor, 12 May 1992). The Association of the War Disabled of the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Sandinista Organization of Revolutionary Disabled at one time lobbied together against the government to increase pensions for those disabled during the war. They have also organized job training programs, sports activities and services for the disabled. Similarly, the National Campensino
Coordinators made up of members from both parties who were farmers before the war, pushed the government for land titles, credit and improved infrastructure (Christian Science Monitor, 12 May 1992).

A number of other reconciliation instances between ex-combatants from both sides were experienced to overcome mutual hardships. Some examples of this include Sandinista communities working with ex-Contra communities to extend a town’s drinking water system, finding solutions to an overcrowded school and fundraising activities. In other instances, together they demanded legal title to land, made demands for assistance and were involved in joint work programs (Ortega, 1994).

Several of the Recontra, Recompa and Revuelto groups were well armed, developed a strong following and had their own objectives. For instance, La Capaña cooperative was made up of those who had received land but not a title and therefore could not receive credit from a bank. The Nicaraguan Resistance Party, hoping to represent the views of the Recontras, pushed for the abolition of the army and the provision of reintegration support. In early June the Nicaraguan Resistance Party took over a radio station, demanding that their candidate be recognized for the upcoming elections (Reuters, 7 June 1996).

The Recompas also organized groups with different objectives. The Leftist Punitive Forces, organized in 1993, claimed responsibility for killing several people in their attempt to defend the land and homes that were confiscated by the Sandinistas. In mid-1993, the Revolutionary Front of Workers and Peasants, seized a northern town, robbed banks and occupied a hospital in an attempt to pressure the government to comply with promises for land and jobs. In one of the worst conflicts between ex-combatants and the army since the new administration came to power, 49 people were killed and approximately 100 wounded (Christian Science Monitor, 26 July 1993).

Since the birth of the rearmed groups, there have been several attempts by the government to resolve the conflicts and disarm the ex-combatants. For instance, the government tried to appease a group of Recontras by offering them a government office which would work with the CIAV-OAS on solutions to poor reintegration. However, progress came to a halt with the murder of a well known Contra leader, Enrique Bermúdez. In another move to ease increasing tension the Chamorro administration created the National Security Commission made up of representatives from the army, government, Sandinista political party, Catholic Church and the CIAV-OAS, to urge the rearmed groups to disarm. Efforts by the Special Disarmament Brigade (BED) in 1992-1993, created by the Nicaraguan government, also helped reduce the
number of weapons in the arms of civilians through primarily gun buy-back programs (O’Conner, 1995). In 1993, after granting amnesty to all rearmed ex-combatants and calling for a cease-fire, many groups disarmed.

Some groups which resisted disbanding and disarming for reasons of security or reintegration assistance negotiated individual agreements with the government. For instance, the Northern Front 3-80 headed by ‘The Jackal,’ demobilized in early 1994, after having secured an agricultural development plan for Quilali, the inclusion of the Contras in the local police force and the withdrawal of the army (Manchester Guardian/Le Monde, 28 August 1994). In early 1995, ‘The Jackal’ signed an agreement with USAID to receive US $1.5 million to assist in the development of the community (Miami Herald, 4 April 1995).

Several factors which compounded the violence following the demobilizations were the delay in the distribution of aid and the abundance of arms in the country. It became increasingly difficult for CIAV to handle the needs of all the ex-combatants. In addition to providing aid to 23,000 ex-combatants, were approximately 70,000 to 80,000 dependents in need of goods and medical assistance. The delay in funds from the US made it even more difficult to meet the needs of the ex-combatants. In 1992, the US agreed to provide assistance for the disarmament of an estimated 80,000 rearmed civilians (Baranyi and North, 1992, p. 16). In early 1993, there were still an estimated 30,000 weapons in the hands of civilians (Washington Post, 8 February 1993).

The northern regions of Nicaragua are still plagued with violence and the government to date has been unable to meet all the demands of the ex-combatants. They staged politically motivated violent acts which threaten to destabilize the October 1996 elections. In June 1996, 15 armed ex-combatants kidnapped 33 Nicaraguans, including 28 electoral workers and took them into Honduras. Negotiations between the OAS, the Catholic Church and the abductors led to the release of the hostages. Due to these incidents along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border, the armies of both countries have agreed to coordinate their activities to fight armed bands (Reuters, 28 June 1996). There are approximately 40 armed bands currently in northern Nicaragua making a living of robbery and kidnapping, some still rebelling against the government. It is believed that some are simply bandits and this has been their modus vivendi since the end of the war and some just do not want to return to the life of a poor farmer (Reuters, 25 June 1996).
5. Support for demobilization and reintegration

Support, beyond the Nicaraguan government’s commitment for land and credit, was necessary to assist ex-combatants and their families to reintegrate in Nicaragua. Many of the ex-combatants faced constraints in their efforts to reintegrate, due to limited skills, poor education and health problems. Efforts by the international community and governmental and non-governmental organizations have helped by providing humanitarian assistance, counseling, training, technical assistance and social services.
5.1 External support for demobilization and reintegration

The high cost of the demobilization and reintegration programs in post-conflict Nicaragua made it difficult for the government and local NGOs to finance the exercises alone. The international community played a significant role in providing some of the assistance necessary to implement these programs. Governments and multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental organizations provided support for many reintegration programs by financing operations of the UN or the OAS, providing services during demobilization, and supporting programs to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Though the costs for the demobilization of the Sandinista army are unavailable, the cost for the demobilization of 12,000 officers is estimated at US $40.8 million. The only known international donor for the reduction in the army is Spain which provided almost US $6 million for retirement plans (Aguilar, 1994). Reintegration programs in the form of land, housing, training and health care for the Nicaraguan Resistance, which went beyond resettlement assistance, did create some resentment among the former members of the Sandinista army and the people (World Bank, 1993). The former soldiers felt the members of the Nicaraguan Resistance were being favored and many civilians claimed they rarely had access to similar assistance.

The United States government was the main supporter for the demobilization and reintegration of the Nicaraguan Resistance. A total of US $43.3 million, was channeled through CIAV for the voluntary demobilization, repatriation and resettlement of the Nicaraguan Resistance and their dependents. This does not include the costs incurred by the Nicaraguan Government, ONUCA and the UNHCR for the repatriation (World Bank, 1993). Of the total, US $30 million was appropriated by the US Congress, US $10 million from USAID funds and US $3.3 million, food and medicine from USAID’s Task Force for Humanitarian Assistance in Central America (GAO, 1991). The US also provided US $12.5 million to UNHCR for its repatriation and refugee assistance programs in Nicaragua and Honduras. CIAV, in addition to the US aid, received smaller amounts of support from the European Community, UNHCR and the Government of Italy (World Bank, 1993).

The primary institutions responsible for managing the reintegration programs for the Nicaraguan Resistance were the UNHCR, CIAV-OAS, and an NGO created by the
Nicaraguan Resistance, the National Center for Planning and Administration of Development Poles (CENPAP). The UNHCR, in addition to overseeing programs for refugees, was responsible for the repatriation of Contras and their dependents from Honduras and Costa Rica. The CIAV-OAS was responsible for the humanitarian assistance and resettlement and reintegration programs and CENPAP’s for promoting development in communities affected by the war (World Bank, 1993).

The CIAV managed aid package from the US for the Contras included assistance in the assembly areas, before the ex-combatants depart for reintegration into civilian life. This was in the form of a US $50 cash payment in addition to compensation in the form of food, clothing for ex-combatants and dependents, housing materials, cooking utensils, tools, items for personal hygiene and health exams (CAII, 1995b). The cash payment in most cases did not serve the intended purpose of facilitating the transition to civilian life by the purchase of commodities or the implementation of other reintegration plans. Not only was the amount small, but most ex-combatants, not accustomed to handling lump sums of money, spent it within a few days on drink and food (CAII, 1995b).

Several other donor countries supported projects in Nicaragua and often channeled the funds through the UN or the OAS. For instance, the Government of the Netherlands has funded US $5.16 million for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to implement a project in the remote areas of the southern part of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. The project, which began in 1993, aims to assist 10,000 persons in this region to rebuild their lives after the war. The first two years of the four year program have focused on health and education, the second phase on agriculture and fishing (McConahay, 1994).

The Development Program for Displaced, Repatriated, and Refugee Populations (PRODERE) in Central America, implemented by the UNDP, was financed almost entirely by the Government of Italy, but included contributions from the Governments of France and The Netherlands. Launched in 1989, the program focused on the integration of those populations throughout Central America displaced by violence and most affected by the war. PRODERE has resulted in the construction of roads, schools and health centers in addition to provision of small-scale loans for production and employment (Speth, 1995).

The European Community provided financial support for the Atlantic Coast Rice Commercialization project implemented by the CIAV in collaboration with several government
and non-governmental organizations in the region. Rice seed and tools were successfully
distributed to 15,000 families and assistance was provided for the selection, storage and
transportation of the crop (World Bank, 1993). In addition, several European countries and
other donors including Canada, Japan and the US have provided funding to the OAS Secretary
General to establish a regional effort for demining in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras.
The main objective has been to provide local personnel with training and equipment to demine
(World Bank, 1993).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played a contributory role in providing
programs to ex-combatants quickly and efficiently. In some cases donors channeled their
programs through international and local NGOs who responded to the need for reintegration
assistance in the form of projects for counseling, institutional strengthening, reconciliation,
training and technical assistance. For instance, for greater reach, impact and number of
beneficiaries, CIAV and other donors sub-contracted NGOs to implement a variety of
programs to meet the different needs of ex-combatants. In doing so, donors had greater
flexibility and, CIAV in particular, kept a close watch on the distribution of resources and
examined the budgets of the NGOs in order to cut costs. Using this strategy, CIAV provided
funds to programs for disabled veterans, food and materials, housing and schools, income
generation, medicine distribution and vocational training (World Bank, 1993). In Nicaragua,
CIAV and USAID often supported the efforts of international and local NGOs.

5.2 International non-governmental organizations

Training programs implemented by NGOs in assembly areas helped prepare ex-combatants for
their reintegration. Often, by implementing a ‘training of trainers’ approach, more individuals
were reached and ex-combatants were involved in the implementation of the programs. For
instance, one of the most involved US based NGOs in Nicaragua, Creative Associates
International (CAII), implemented such a program which was highly successful, especially with
respect to training for literacy, health and sanitation. The Humanitarian Assistance Project,
under USAID’s Task Force for Humanitarian Assistance and implemented by CAII, offered
370 training programs to 7000 displaced persons and former members of the Nicaraguan
Resistance in Honduras and Costa Rica. By using the ‘training of trainers’ approach the
services from the programs reached over 40,000 individuals in the region. In general, training
was offered in health, literacy, numeracy, agriculture, vocational education and income generating activities (CAII, 1995a).

Some NGOs have provided support to the disabled in Nicaragua, though this sector has received less than the necessary attention. Workshops have been established to produce prostheses, crutches or wheelchairs. However the majority of disabled live in extreme poverty and cannot afford to buy these goods (CEI, 1995). Although, the international community has helped in increasing the mobility of the disabled in the cities, little has been done in the rural areas. CAII, contracted by the OAS, implemented a program for disabled war veterans of the Nicaraguan Resistance who repatriated from Honduras and Costa Rica. The first stage of the Nicaraguan Reintegration and Rehabilitation program, provided medical assistance, psychological and social rehabilitation. The second stage included medical and reintegration assistance, including training and counseling. Five sites were developed for those unable to return to their original communities. In each site cooperatives were established with a directorate, infrastructure was developed, houses were built or restored, services were provided for women and children, workshops with machinery were installed and technical assistance was provided (CAII, 1995a).

5.3 Local non-governmental organizations

Local NGOs are valuable actors in implementation of reintegration programs. Once established in the country, many are involved in community based programs, and are better able to assess the needs of ex-combatants. Some programs by local NGOs began as donor supported projects and were carried on by local counterparts when external aid was phased out. With counterparts working together there was greater flexibility in relating and reacting to the communities and government, giving the project better prospects.

The National Center of Planning and Administration of the Poles of Development (CENPAP), created by the Civic Association of the Nicaraguan Resistance, cooperated with the government’s National Training Institute and CIAV-OAS to implement a pilot project to train 3,000 ex-Contras in agriculture, animal husbandry and micro-enterprise management (CEI, 1995). With the end of CIAV support in 1992 and the lack of success of the development zones, the CENPAP continued to promote development in communities affected by the war. Support was offered in the form of social reintegration, legal and technical assistance, micro-
enterprises and cooperatives in agriculture, fishing, transport, carpentry and shoemaking enterprises (World Bank, 1993).

Several other local NGOs offered programs to assist ex-combatants in their reintegration. One is the Augusto C. Sandino Foundation (FACS) in Managua, which has directed its work towards economic and social reintegration. With support from counterparts in Canada, France, Holland, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States it has been working with uprooted populations since 1990. One project implemented by FACS began a process of discussion, needs assessment and project design. Initially, seed and agricultural support were provided to achieve self-sufficiency through crops followed by broader activities to assist in the transition from the emergency to rehabilitation. Leaders of these groups then became promoters in certain zones (FACS, 1994).

Other local NGOs focus their assistance via courses or hands on training. The Center for International Studies (CEI) in Managua offered various workshops to encourage reconciliation among ex-combatants. For example, its Education and Action for Peace Program, provided training to 26 Contra leaders and former Sandinista soldiers. Courses included conflict resolution, community development and project development and graduates now belong to a Network of Peace and Development promoters to assist in the social reintegration of ex-combatants (CEI, 1995). Other CEI workshops have addressed issues such as the contribution of the ex-combatant to community development, project designs for development and legal rights of the ex-combatant. In addition CEI provides support to ex-combatants establishing foundations by assisting with organization, discussion, confidence building and legal documentation. Assistance is also provided to strengthen organizations for women and the disabled by providing training and workshops on issues sensitive to their needs (CEI, 1995).

Additional examples of programs implemented by local NGOs or foundations illustrate their instrumental role to the reintegration and reconciliation processes. For instance, the Nicaraguan Foundation for Health and Community Development, made up of former officials of the CIAV-OAS, attempts to carry on programs once funding has ended in the ‘development poles.’ The Council of Pro-Alliance Evangelical Churches works to organize local commissions and create an environment, which better meets the needs of those in rural settings. The International Solidarity with People Disabled by War drives to educate the people on the disabled population, reduce discrimination and encourage assistance for their productive
participation in society. The Ex-Combatants of War Foundation, made up three individual organizations from the Nicaraguan Resistance, Sandinista army and Ministry of Interior, have joined forces to organize forums throughout the country to discuss measures for their reintegration.

Despite the success of many NGOs in offering assistance, several factors have hindered reintegration support for ex-combatants. With respect to the government, limited planning and insufficient follow-up in the form of training, counseling, technical support and access to credit restrained reintegration possibilities. In addition, the lack of coordination among the government, the military, donors and NGOs and the lack of funds hindered the effectiveness, continuation and availability of programs (World Bank, 1993).

The results of the reintegration efforts in Nicaragua are diverse. Programs to meet the immediate needs of ex-combatants were provided upon demobilization, despite delays in funding. In addition, they were also provided with support in the form of goods, services, technical and legal assistance, and protection. In light of the escalation of violence in 1993 by rearmed ex-combatants and groups of bandits, the impact of reintegration assistance is unclear.

The greatest threat to the success of the process has been the government’s lack of a clear strategy for the reintegration of ex-combatants and the inability to carry out its own reintegration programs. As a result, ex-combatants have often turned to their former comrades, some in established organizations, for a familiar sense of identity. The government hesitates to support programs of these organizations, often claiming they are “too politicized” (Ortega, 1994). One of the outcomes of these circumstances has been increased violence, though it exists to a lesser degree today than in 1993. Exact figures are not available, however, it is estimated that there are between ten and fifteen rearmed groups making political and economic demands through takeovers and kidnappings.
V. EL SALVADOR

1. Post-conflict demobilization

The Chapultepec Peace Agreement called for a wide spectrum of changes, from socioeconomic to military. The reforms addressed several issue areas including human rights, demilitarization, police reform, judicial reform and land reform. Demilitarization in El Salvador, a country with a historically powerful military, was essential for an improvement in civil-military relations and a successful transition to democracy (Walter and Williams, 1993). With respect to demilitarization, the Agreement redefined the military doctrine, called for purging of the officer corps, the dissolution of the security forces under the armed forces and a reduction in the size of the armed forces. Additionally, it called for the dissolution of the FMLN military structure and its transformation to a legal political party in El Salvador.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 4: Role of the United Nations in demobilization and reintegration in El Salvador</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), established in May 1991, was initially responsible for the verification of international human right laws and standards. Its mandate was expanded in January 1992 to include a peace-keeping operation to verify and monitor all agreements reached between the Government and the FMLN. Under the expanded mandate a Military Division was responsible for verification of the cease-fire and separation of forces and the Police Division for monitoring public order during the creation of a new police force. It was further enlarged in May 1993 to include an Electoral Division responsible for monitoring the elections. Once the duties of each division were complete they were dissolved (United Nations, 1995a). After several extensions in ONUSAL’s mandate to ensure compliance with agreements it was terminated on 30 April 1995 and replaced with the Mission of the United Nations in El Salvador (MINUSAL), a substantially downsized version of ONUSAL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For one year, MINUSAL was responsible for verifying compliance with pending aspects of the peace agreements. Though concerns still exist over certain reforms, MINUSAL’s mandate expired on 30 April 1996, and was replaced on 10 May with the United Nations Office of Verification (ONUV) through 31 December 1996. It included five experts responsible for following up on the implementation of pending aspects of the peace accords in El Salvador (United Nations Press Release, GA/9073, 10 May 1996). As of January 1997, a high-level envoy traveling from New York would be responsible for the verification activities.</td>
</tr>
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The distribution of land was a key reform for the FMLN who felt it was essential for their successful reintegration. In the mainly agricultural economy of El Salvador, the unequal
distribution of land has always been a sensitive issue and the cause of much unrest. Specifics of the land issue were left to the implementation stage which later led to delays in the demobilization and reintegration processes. Included in the Agreement was the revival of the government land-tenure system, which stated that those occupying land in conflict zones would be allowed to remain and receive assistance to increase production until a permanent plan for land in those zones was found (Peace Agreement, in United Nations, 1995a).

Logistics for the demobilization of the FMLN and the FAES were laid out in the Peace Agreement under the ‘Cessation of Armed Conflict’ (CAC). A detailed timetable for the demobilization, which would totally disarm and end the military structure of the FMLN, was scheduled to be complete between 1 February 1992 and 31 October 1992 and involved the following steps (Peace Agreement, in United Nations, 1995a):

1) cease fire,
2) separation of forces,
3) the end of the military structure of the FMLN
4) UN verification of 1-3.

During the time between the informal cease-fire which took hold after the signing of the agreement and the formal cease-fire on 1 February 1992, ONUSAL prepared its operation for verification. The ‘separation of forces’ to start on 6 February required the FMLN combatants to concentrate in 50 designated points around the country and the FAES in 100 designated points. Over the next few weeks, FMLN forces would further concentrate into 15 verification centers and the armed forces into 62 areas they would normally occupy during peacetime (Peace Agreement, in United Nations, 1995a).

The demobilization and subsequent reintegration of the FMLN combatants were due to take place in a period of six months, between May and October. Throughout this period, an additional 20 percent of the members were to officially reintegrate into civilian life. We should note, however, that the language used is not entirely correct. The process referred to is the ‘resettlement,’ rather than the ‘reintegration.’ If the demobilization proceeded as planned, 31 October 1992 would formally mark the end of the armed conflict (United Nations, 1995a):

**TABLE 2: DEMOBILIZATION TIMETABLE FOR THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>percentage reintegrated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 May 1992</td>
<td>No less than 20 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>No less than 40 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July</td>
<td>No less than 60 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September</td>
<td>No less than 80 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1992</td>
<td>100 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Agreement was unique and complex in that it was a move to end the military conflict in addition to social and economic ills that plagued the country and were a fundamental cause of the war. The coordination of various aspects of the Agreement called for completion of commitments by both parties throughout the demobilization process. With the support of all parties (under the best of circumstances) the reforms could be implemented according to the timetable set. However, due to the intricacy of the agreement, the pending deep rooted changes in both parties and the tight schedule, delays in fulfilling commitments and adjustments to the timetable were frequent. Mistrust and non-compliance by one party often led to a similar reaction by the other.

Throughout the demobilization process, progress was made with some reforms but a series of obstacles delayed the process. For instance, during the first stage, the ‘cessation of armed conflict,’ refugees protected under an amnesty law began returning to El Salvador and the number of complaints to the Human Rights Division had decreased. The FMLN, however, delayed demobilization of the first 20 percent of its forces claiming that the government failed to comply with commitments including humanitarian aid and infrastructure in the designated areas, and reforms with respect to land and their political participation in the country. In addition, the National Guard and Treasury Police, under the armed forces, were converted to different units instead of abolished as called for in the Agreement (United Nations, 1995a).

One of the main obstacles to progress in the demobilization process was land. It was clear that not all parties agreed to the reform allowing landholders in conflict zones to stay and receive assistance until a solution was found. Government forces were evicting landholders, land was being taken over by peasants and landowners were fighting for what they believed to be their own land. Because the FMLN felt land was the key to successful reintegration, it would not proceed with its demobilization as long as the land reforms were not implemented as promised.
The government maintained that it lacked land and funds to buy land to comply with the Agreement.

To resolve the stalemate, the parties reached a settlement based on an agreement proposed by the UN. It reiterated the rights of the landholders in former conflict areas and put a cap on the total number of beneficiaries of the land-transfer. Of the total 47,000 beneficiaries of the program, 15,000 would be former members of the FAES, 7,500 FMLN ex-combatants, and 25,000 those occupying land in former conflict areas (United Nations, 1995a). The agreement, reached in late October 1992, would begin the process of transferring land to FMLN ex-combatants and landholders. This agreement was followed by another rescheduling of the demobilization. The 31 October 1992 deadline for the complete demobilization of the FMLN (six months), was extended to 15 December 1992 (seven and a half months).

Challenges continued as parties argued over compliance. For instance, the government altered its promised reforms until the FMLN complied with a weapons inventory and destruction plan to begin immediately. The FMLN, on the other hand, delayed further demobilizations until the government agreed to implement changes recommended by the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces.

Following an agreement reached between the government and top UN officials, the government submitted a plan for the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations, the FMLN supplied an inventory of weapons and the destruction of those weapons was started (United Nations, 1995a). The demobilization process resumed and by the scheduled completion date, 15 December 1992, the approximately 8,000 strong FMLN military structure had been dissolved and the FMLN formally became a legal political party. The reductions in the armed forces from 60,000 to 30,000 was complete by March 1993 (Aguilera Peralta, 1994). Though the armed conflict had finally ended by 15 December 1992, a month and a half later than originally scheduled, the peace process was far from complete.
2. Disarmament

The disarmament process, as part of the demilitarization taking place in El Salvador, was essential in sustaining an end to the armed conflict. More specifically, it was necessary in order to reduce the threat of ex-combatants rearming and reduce the surplus of weapons available to civilians for crime and trafficking.

Following the peace agreement, the ONUSAL Military Division was responsible for the disarmament of the FMLN. Part of verifying the implementation of the ‘cessation of armed conflict’ was to oversee the assembly of FAES and FMLN in designated areas. Other duties included verifying inventories of weapons and receiving and investigating complaints of violations.

Prior to the formal cease-fire, both parties submitted to the ONUSAL Military Division information on their troop strength and weapons that were to be concentrated in the assembly areas. The FMLN-declared inventories located throughout El Salvador, were questioned by ONUSAL. Following reassurances that the inventories were in fact correct, ONUSAL confirmed the figures and investigated any discrepancies. During the third stage of the cease fire, the disbanding of the FMLN, all inventories were stored in lockers. To ease insecurities of the ex-combatants of an attack by the FAES, each container had two locks allowing both ONUSAL and a FMLN commander to have a key. Combatants were allowed to keep personal weapons until they left their designated areas to begin the process of reintegration or until the destruction of weapons program began. Under the surveillance of ONUSAL, the FMLN destroyed their weapons at all 15 sites. (Peace Agreement, in United Nations, 1995a). By 1 April 1993, almost all of the arms on the FMLN inventory list had been destroyed.

Despite reassurances with respect to arms inventories, ONUSAL’s suspicions were found to be true. On 23 May 1993, a large arms cache belonging to a constituent group of the FMLN was found in Managua, Nicaragua. Pressure by ONUSAL led to over one hundred more arms deposits—approximately 30 percent of the FMLN total arsenal—in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua which were quickly destroyed (United Nations, 1995a). Following the demobilization of the Contras in Nicaragua, arms were widely available in El Salvador. The abundance of arms is still visible almost five years following the signing of the Peace Agreement.
3. Structure and role of the army

What the new structure and role of the army would be after the war was subject of lengthy negotiations between the parties in 1991 before the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement. Though not eliminated entirely, the FAES was to undergo various changes subsequent to the signing of the Peace Agreement. Of the most noteworthy was a clear distinction between security and defense—national defense being the responsibility of the armed forces, used for internal security only when all other resources have been depleted. More specifically the Agreement stated:

“National defence, the responsibility of the armed forces, is intended to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside military threat...maintenance of internal peace, tranquillity, order and public security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces as an institution responsible for national defence.” (Peace Agreement in United Nations, 1995a, p. 194).

Only the new National Civilian Police, subordinate to civilian control, would be responsible for public security (Córdova, 1994). A purification process would be implemented whereby an ad hoc Commission would evaluate all officers of the armed forces for their human rights history, competence and ability to adjust to new peacetime measures. In addition, the Agreement called for training and education programs for the FAES to aid in developing positive ties with the society.

In an effort to transform the army to its new role in peacetime, structural changes and reductions were experienced in the troops, branches, equipment and spending. In addition, several forces under the control of the armed forces were abolished (i.e. National Guard, Treasury Police and National Intelligence Department) and five other counter-insurgency forces demobilized. (Peace Agreement in United Nations, 1995a). In 1993, several generals and colonels, accused of human rights abuses, were dismissed (Montes, 1994).

Despite the changes, increased organized crime in El Salvador has led to modifications in the role of the armed forces, due to the lack of experience of the new police force and insufficient manpower. A new, highly criticized, policy implemented by the government, in March 1995,
allowed soldiers to assist the police force in dealing with the public security crisis. Afterward, approximately 5000 troops were sent to the countryside to patrol, leaving more police officers to patrol in the cities (Montes, 1995). In addition to the increased crime and violence, habit has tempted the army to get involved in security issues. Since the beginning of the peace process, the military in El Salvador has resisted change, especially with respect to provisions for its subordination to civilian rule. The changes called for have resulted in a change in strategy by the military and its participation in an array of non-military activities for investments and to justify its presence. For instance, military pension funds have been used for a number of investments including mining and oil, publishing, athletic teams, shrimp farms and resort hotels. In addition, many army officers have gone for masters degrees in business (Miami Herald, 5 December 1994). Following the end of the war, the armed forces became more involved in reconstruction activities including infrastructure repair, distribution of medicine and equipment, public health and literacy projects. They also became involved in non-reconstruction activities such as conservation and reforestation (Walter and Williams, 1993). Although this kind of assistance is desperately needed in El Salvador, to many Salvadorans pushing for a change in civilian-military relations the armed forces are still seen as having a powerful military presence.

4. Reintegration

Much of the challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants in El Salvador originated from the stipulations in the Chapultepec Peace Agreements that the government was unable to fulfill. In addition, since the social and economic reforms were to be addressed in more detail after the signing of the Agreement, ex-combatants were often skeptical and became angered when the changes promised by the government were not implemented. This and the incomplete disarmament process, were obstacles to the reintegration of ex-combatants and posed a threat to security. In addition, similar to Nicaragua, the unstable economy in post-conflict El Salvador made it difficult to provide the necessary resources to create an environment that facilitates reintegration.

In post-conflict El Salvador, the government found it difficult to finance the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement while complying with limits it had agreed to as part of a stabilization package from international lenders. Thus the policies used to stabilize the
economy were the same ones restricting funds to finance reintegration programs and other peace-building programs. Therefore, throughout the reintegration process, despite support from the donors, funding was limited. In addition, the IMF concluded that the greatest amount of government spending in 1992 went to defense and the least to social security and welfare (Boyce, 1995a). Government spending on education is among the lowest in the world, basic health services are limited and many children are dying from preventable diseases. These conditions, in a country where over half of the population lives below the poverty level, coupled with high unemployment and underemployment rates and increasing crime, have made it especially difficult for many ex-combatants at the end of twelve years of war, with limited skills, to reintegrate.

4.1 The promise of reintegration assistance

In the Peace Agreement reintegration support for the ex-combatants was addressed under several topics but primarily under “Social and Economic Questions.” Land, historically a cause of conflict in El Salvador, was addressed at length. The revival of transfer programs under the Constitution of the Republic would give preference to ex-combatants of both parties for state-owned land. This was to begin on 1 February 1992 which coincided with the first day of the ‘cessation of armed conflict.’ However, until a solution was found for the issue of land in conflict zones, landholders would not be evicted (United Nations, 1995a).

Another important aspect of this section was the request to the government to submit the National Reconstruction Plan to the FMLN within 30 days of the signing of the Peace Agreement (Peace Agreement, in United Nations, 1995a). The Plan was to reflect the interests of all sectors of Salvadoran life but would mostly address the needs of those most effected by the conflict. Though it did address satisfying the most urgent needs of ex-combatants from both parties, the Plan specifically stated that steps would also be taken to aid in the reintegration of FMLN ex-combatants. These would be through national programs and in the form of scholarships, employment and pension programs, housing schemes and business advancement. (Peace Agreement in United Nations, 1995a)

Other sections where consideration was given to the reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants was the discharge of units of the armed forces and the development of the National Civil Police. Members of units which were abolished would receive one year’s pay and the
government would assist in developing projects for their reintegration. Finally, members of the old police force and FMLN ex-combatants had the option of qualifying to join the National Civil Police with neither group of recruits at an advantage over the other. Preference, however, would be given to those who had not been immediately involved in the conflict (United Nations, 1995a).

Several obstacles delayed the reintegration of ex-combatants in El Salvador following the demobilizations. Politically motivated violence in the form of death squads continued—though at a lesser degree than during the war—and threatened to disrupt the elections. In addition, increased crime and violence resulted in greater public insecurity. With respect to the ex-combatants, the land-transfer program was progressing very slowly, FMLN arms caches were discovered and the economy was unable to support the implementation of reintegration and peace programs. In addition, when programs for reintegration were under way they were often faced with administrative problems and financial constraints.

4.2 Reintegration experience

With the official disbanding of the military structure of the FMLN complete, by the end of 1992, and the reductions in the armed forces by March 1993, a delicate balance existed between stability and conflict for the remainder of 1993. Signs of democracy were visible in the form of free speech and movement, efforts to improve labor relations and decreasing human rights abuses. On the other hand, violence had increased and the judicial system was unable to efficiently guarantee the rights of the citizens (United Nations, 1995a). In addition, reintegration assistance for ex-combatants was often slow, which further increased tensions.

The National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) called for in the Chapultepec Peace Agreement was launched in early 1992 by the Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN). The SRN, established by the government, was the primary institution responsible for implementing the NRP. The NRP was a framework for reconstruction of post-conflict El Salvador but both parties had different views about its objectives. The FMLN believed reconstruction would be achieved through the strengthening of the weak sectors in the economy which traditionally had been governed by the wealthy. The government saw it as providing assistance to war-torn zones and reintegration programs which would, in the short-run, alleviate poverty and in the long-term create employment opportunities. For the first few years of implementation, the
difference in views proved to be counterproductive to many reconstruction activities. Another concern was the channeling of funds for the NRP through different government entities, instead of the SRN. A substantial amount of support has been channeled to local government offices, which has slowed implementation as a result of administrative problems and the abuse of power (Murray, Coletti and Spence, 1994). In addition, NGOs associated with the FMLN often faced resistance when trying to participate in SRN projects.

Among the various activities of the SRN are the projects for the reintegration of ex-combatants from the FMLN and the armed forces. An underlying concern was the delay in the transfer of land to beneficiaries which had a negative effect on the impact and implementation of other assistance programs such as agricultural credit and technical assistance. From a long-term development perspective, another concern was whether assistance in the form of credits, training and technical assistance would provide beneficiaries more than just temporary assistance. Despite delays, administrative problems and the perception that the NRP was mostly a government effort, it was able to meet the immediate basic needs of ex-combatants, improve infrastructure and create short-term employment opportunities.

Several factors delayed reintegration assistance provided by both SRN and non-SRN programs including limited donor response, administrative problems and an apparent lack of political will on the part of the government. In 1993, limited donor response hindered the ability of the government to implement reintegration programs for housing, credit, education and peace promoting programs. These problems persisted in 1994 as donors showed a reluctance to fund such programs, preferring programs for the environment and infrastructure. In addition, lack of political will and administrative problems made it increasingly difficult to implement reintegration programs for ex-combatants. Delays were experienced in the Land Transfer Program, agricultural credit and assistance to the disabled (United Nations, 1995a).

Assistance in the form of land encountered several problems delaying the ability of many to benefit from the 1993 planting season which began in May. The problems stemmed from administrative delays, limited credit, poor land quality, a greater number of expected beneficiaries than originally anticipated and the difficulties in relocating landholders who occupied land belonging to landowners who refused to sell. These human settlements in urban and rural settings by refugees and displaced persons, increased tensions and called for the efficient and timely distribution of land (United Nations, 1995a). Despite an attempt by the
government to speed up the process through the Acceleration Plan, distribution was slow due to the FMLN’s objections to the threats of evictions, time limits on the use of credit to purchase land and a new set of verification rules. By late 1994, almost 3 years after the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Agreement, only 32 percent of the expected 40,000 beneficiaries had received land (United Nations, 1995a).

These circumstances were further complicated by armed groups attempting to destabilize the peace process by dissuading cooperation with the parties. This politically motivated violence by death squads further increased insecurity among ex-combatants attempting to reintegrate into the political, social and economic life of El Salvador. In early 1995, violence continued to threaten the peace process and the development of the new police force encountered problems including lack of funds, organizational problems and the inability to control crime. In addition, many ex-combatants were frustrated at the delays in the land transfer program, their limited skills and the limited resources available for their reintegration. Most ex-combatants had easy access to arms, threatening to fuel social unrest which resulted from noncompliance with agreements. While President Calderon Sol claimed that most of the provisions had been met and that the remaining were held up due to bureaucratic delays, the ex-combatants began developing organized movements to protest the government’s noncompliance.

On 25 January 1996, the UN Secretary General released a report which expressed his concern with respect to delays in reintegration assistance. The “Report of the Secretary General on the Status of the Implementation of the Peace Accords in El Salvador” stated that reintegration of ex-combatants was still facing a number of difficulties with respect to credit, technical assistance and human settlements. The ex-combatants were often unable to service their debts making additional credit for necessities nearly impossible to obtain. Concern was also expressed for the potential social unrest likely to result if the displaced persons and refugees occupying land were not provided with the necessary infrastructure and housing. On the positive side, the report stated that the Land Transfer Program was proceeding at a faster pace–ONUSAL reported shortly thereafter that the Land Program was 93 percent complete. Despite the increase in the number of beneficiaries from the year before, most of the transferred land had not been officially recorded. Assistance in the form of land continued to be tightly linked to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. In addition, without access to credit it remains difficult for many to develop the land.
Box 5: Women in post-conflict El Salvador

An estimated 11 percent of the demobilized ex-combatants in El Salvador are women (Clark, 1996). Despite the significant number, adequate reintegration assistance for women in post-conflict El Salvador has been limited. Similar to Nicaragua, the women faced many constraints due to the male-dominated society and the poor state of the economy. Nonetheless, during the war, women combatants taking on non-traditional roles were treated as equals. Others, in the camps set up by NGOs for refugees, were able to take courses to improve their education and develop new skills. This empowerment has led many women in post-conflict El Salvador to expect more opportunities and equal treatment (Arms to Fight, Arms to Protect, 1995).

Following the war, a feminist movement developed (led primarily by former combatants) to fight for the rights of women. Nearly a dozen women’s organizations now exist, with varying objectives. For instance, the Melinda Anaya Montes Women’s Movement with approximately 5,000 members offers support to women facing discrimination. This may be in the form of legal advice or simply shelter from threatening circumstances (San Jose Mercury News, 13 June 1995).

The lack of adequate assistance for women, following the war, made reintegration especially difficult. An evaluation of the role of women in USAID funded programs found that women were unable to take advantage of training programs since no child care was available. On the other hand, they were able to access assistance in other forms such as credit, land, and micro-business activities. An assessment of the needs of women ex-combatants found that additional assistance is necessary with respect to legal matters, access to counseling, health services, education or technical training and assistance in obtaining formal employment and credit (Clark, 1996).

4.3 Social movements by ex-combatants: reorganizations and threats to security

Adding to the fragile circumstances in 1993 post-conflict El Salvador was the discovery of FMLN arms caches, the release of a report by the Truth Commission, and the pending compliance with the recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Commission on Purification of the Armed Forces. The discovery of the arms caches throughout the region made apparent the FMLN’s mistrust in the government and skepticism with respect to the promised reforms. Although ONUSAL’s pressure led to the discovery and destruction of over 100 arms caches, arms are still widely available to the citizens. Around the same time in early 1993, more than one year after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the Commission on the Truth released a report stating that the majority of the violence experienced in El Salvador was by the military and death squads. Many top officials in the armed forces were indicted for murders, tortures and other violent crimes and recommendations for their punishment were made. The report was met with resistance and anger from top officials and members of the armed forces who felt similar investigations should have been done on the FMLN. Finally, the government had still not implemented the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission on the Purification of the Armed Forces. The delays in these reforms were often seen by the FMLN as lack of support by the government in the peace process and the desire to keep the military strong.

In late 1993 and early 1994, following a string of assassinations of former FMLN commanders, ex-combatants, activists and other political figures, the Joint Group for the Investigation of Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups was established (United Nations, 1995a). The Group found that the violence exercised by the armed groups was often in the form of common and organized crime, was politically motivated and attempted to dissuade the people of El Salvador from participating in the reforms of the country.

Following the inability of the government to fully comply with the peace agreements, many disgruntled ex-combatants began reorganizing to express their frustrations. Some armed organized groups posed a threat to security and the peace process while others encouraged reconciliation. Despite the new administration’s commitment to the reforms in late 1994, delays in reintegration assistance, ongoing violence and failure to comply with other reforms resulted in discontent among the ex-combatants. Many disgruntled ex-combatants began forming organized associations which either through violent or non-violent activities expressed their frustrations and pushed for compliance.
The Association of Demobilized Members of the Armed Forces (ADEFAES), which claims to have 20,000 members, was established to guarantee compliance with the Peace Agreement. Additional objectives include the promotion of employment and development, and education for its members. Members have argued that credit to build homes is difficult to obtain, they receive no health services and less than 400 members have benefited from scholarship programs. Their limited access to health services, education and land has therefore, limited their ability to reintegrate (CEI, 1995).

The ADEFAES has expressed its demands both violently and non-violently. In one instance, the Association took over the Legislative Assembly and the Ministry of Finance due to noncompliance with the implementation of the peace agreements (Notisur, Latin American Political Affairs, 8 September 1995). A number of takeovers continued throughout 1995 with various objectives including a push for the quicker processing of agricultural loans, exemptions to qualify for loans, and demands for land and credit. Nonviolent activities of ADEFAES included strategies for development of communities, and the development of forums for parties involved in the peace process to address obstacles to reintegration and national reconciliation. In June 1995, ADEFAES renounced the use of violence to express their demands, and since then they have not organized violent protests.

Several organized groups were also established to support the rights of the disabled. The Association of Ex-Combatants and Victims of the War in El Salvador (AEGES) conducted a series of takeovers with various objectives including the demand for compensation for the disabled and dependents who lost family members in the war and the distribution of cash payments, all of which were called for in the peace agreements. The Disabled War Veterans Association of El Salvador (ASALDIG) was established in early 1992 by disabled former members of the FMLN to push for adequate assistance and rehabilitation for their reintegration. The group has since worked to guarantee the physical, psychological and occupational rehabilitation of its members and has become increasingly influential in protecting the rights of the disabled through active participation in negotiations and projects (CEI, 1995). The Association of Disabled Veterans of the Armed Forces of El Salvador (ALFAES) was also established to push for physical, occupational and psychological rehabilitation for its members through workshops, training and demonstrations (CEI, 1995).
Not all reorganizations taking place in El Salvador supported violent protests to declare their frustrations. Instead, some provided support to ex-combatant communities. For instance, the Foundation 16th of January was created by the FMLN to negotiate reintegration assistance with the government. In several communities the Foundation has established mental health programs run by local residents.

The economic policies implemented by the government were another motivating factor behind the reorganizations. The poor and ex-combatants alike claimed the policies were adding to the social and economic problems in the country and were destabilizing the peace process. The Revolutionary Front for the Defense of the People (FRDP) was established as a result of these policies with the objective of retaliating against the government. At least five other clandestine groups were known to operate originally as vigilant groups against crime which then began expressing their frustrations about the poor conditions of the country (Notisur, Latin American Political Affairs, 8 September 1995).

Since the end of the civil war, arms trafficking has become increasingly popular in Central America. The availability of arms has in turn fueled violence. The most visible sources of this violence are from disgruntled ex-combatants and criminal gangs. While both groups express frustration at the poor state of the economy, the ex-combatants alone feel the government has not provided them with sufficient resources for their reintegration. The criminal gangs or maras took shape following the end of the war and the return of exiled Salvadoran young men who were involved in gangs in large US cities. The maras, often outnumbering the police force, choose criminal activity as a means of survival over education or employment. Through robberies, theft and kidnapping these armed gangs further threaten security and exhaust resources otherwise intended to assist ex-combatants with their reintegration (Laurance and Meek, 1996).

The increase in crime has brought with it vigilant groups often referred to as death squads. Groups such as the Black Shadow or the White Hand have been set on violently controlling criminals. Although the tactics of these groups are illegal, they have gained support of some Salvadorans fearful of the increasing crime wave (Chicago Tribune, 2 June 1995; La Nación, 22 May 1995). Most recently, in mid-June 1996, a death squad appeared calling itself the
National Force Mayor Roberto D’Aubuisson. Members of the FMLN claim the group is made up of ex-military officials purged from the army, wealthy business people, land holders and the head of Operations of the Land Bank. The group has threatened 15 persons with death including journalists, politicians, religious leaders and the media, claiming they have defamed various members of the ARENA administration.

Other forms of organized crime involve contraband, drug trafficking, car theft and assassinations of political enemies (La Prensa Libre, 17 May 1995). A profile of the common criminal indicates that the causes of the ongoing violence in El Salvador are unemployment, the disintegration of the family, the critical economic situation affecting large portions of the population, the lack of education and the weak legal system. In addition, the majority of those exercising violent activity have experience using arms which they turn to with ease and comfort (Diario de Hoy, 29 July 1996).

5. Support for demobilization and reintegration

Donor support for the peace process helped finance many programs called for in the Chapultepec Peace Agreement. Financing was necessary to create new institutions and reform existing ones. The implementation of the land transfer, reintegration, poverty alleviation and infrastructure programs was made possible with funding from donors. Much of the assistance was in the form of grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral agencies. The Government of El Salvador made few reforms to finance the peace process and counted heavily on external assistance in order to implement the necessary reforms (Boyce, 1995b). The outline agreed to in the Peace Agreement for national reconstruction in El Salvador was laid out in the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) and primarily managed by the Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN) established by the government. The majority of the NRP and outside projects were intended to be implemented by the government, which led to resentment and a struggle to participate by NGOs. Though NGO participation increased, those NGOs which had operated in previous conflict areas against the desires of the government and which had

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2 Major Roberto D’Aubuisson was a key figure in the creation of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in the early 1980s. As a former military intelligence officer, he became head of the ARENA party in the early 1980s and fiercely expressed his belief that the country was under attack from terrorists, socialists, liberal academics and reformers. Although he is no longer alive, he is believed to be the force behind the death squad-style killings in the 1980s.
affiliations with the FMLN appeared to face more obstacles in acquiring funds for reconstruction than the rest.

Following the signing of the Peace Agreement, it was estimated that a total of US $1.8 billion would be necessary to implement specific high and low priority programs called for in the Agreement. High priority programs included democratic institutions, police, Land Bank, support for the demobilized (agricultural credit, housing, micro-enterprise credit and pensions for the disabled) and poverty alleviation under the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP). Low priority programs included productive and social sectors and human capital, infrastructure and environment (Boyce, 1995b).

5.1 External support for demobilization and reintegration

Following the Government of El Salvador’s appeal to the international community for support of the peace process, the donor response was considerable. The US has been the largest bilateral donor, having provided a total of US $304 million as of January 1994. Other donor countries in order of greater to lesser amounts of support include Germany, Japan, Italy, Spain, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and The Netherlands. The largest multilateral donor was the Inter-American Development Bank which provided US $196 million as of March 1993. Other multilateral donors in order of greater to lesser amounts of support include the CABI, World Bank, European Union, World Food Program, UNDP, Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development and UNICEF (Boyce, 1995b).

Despite commitments made by the international donors, not all of the support materialized, delaying the implementation of programs. As of early 1993, one year following the signing of the Peace Agreement, there was a US $600 million gap in necessary funds for 1993-1996 (United Nations, 1995a). Funding for the land and new police force programs was critical since their failure would leave many ex-combatants with limited reintegration assistance and the country with an inadequate security force to uphold the law. Additional appeals for funding were made in 1994 and 1995 before the United Nations. The response by the donors was slow, showing a preference for infrastructure and environmental projects over the promotion of democratic institutions, reintegration of ex-combatants (housing, purchase of land, agricultural credit, credit for small enterprises) and other peace related programs (United Nations, 1995a).
Several factors may be the cause of this discrepancy including a donor’s specific agenda, constraints and skepticism.

By 1995, there still existed an estimated US $137 million shortfall in funding. As the UN Secretary General urged the mobilization of domestic resources to aid in programs, government officials claimed they would have to increase taxes and cut into education and health care. We should note that education and health care were already low priorities of the government—defense being a high priority. In 1993, the government spent 0.5 percent of GDP on health care and 1.6 percent of GDP on education. At the same time it spent 1.7 percent of GDP on the military—more than double the pre-war level (Boyce, 1995b). Another advantage of mobilizing domestic resources would be to move away from the tendency to receive support in the form of loans, which financed more than 40 percent of the programs for the peace process. By doing so, El Salvador may avoid a debt crisis in the future (Boyce, 1995b).

Demobilization and reintegration support efforts experienced large shortfalls of funds. For instance, the demobilization of the armed forces had an estimated cost of US $31 million and as of September 1994, had a shortfall of US $6 million. Similarly, the reintegration of ex-combatants which included micro-enterprise credit and technical assistance, a scholarship program, leaders and mid-level commanders program, wounded combatants program and National Police reintegration, with an estimated cost of US $58.2 million, had a shortfall of almost US $27 million. In addition, the land transfer programs which included land transfers for the FMLN and FAES, agricultural credit and technical assistance also came up almost US $58 million short. The public security programs faced the greatest shortage, since most donors are not permitted to assist police forces or other armed groups for fear of their involvement in repression and abuse (Boyce, 1995b).

Despite limited funds, the donors played a significant role in the support and implementation of reintegration programs. USAID, the largest donor, channeled most of its funds through the government’s Secretariat for National Reconstruction (SRN) for land, reintegration and infrastructure projects, establishing it as a major player in the NRP. Following the Peace Agreement, USAID contributed a total of US $300 million for its Peace and National Recovery Program to assist the government in the support of the NRP. Thirty-five million US dollars of the total came from the Host Country Owned Local Currency (HCOLC) Funds placed in El Salvador by USAID before the signing of the Peace Agreement. The components of the program included immediate assistance, economic and social reactivation of conflictive
zones, transfer of land, infrastructure, administration and evaluation and ex-combatant assistance. The latter component included counseling, scholarships, land transfer, starter packages, vocational-technical training, micro-enterprise and agricultural credit and treatment for the disabled. This and the other components of the program were mostly implemented by NGOs or government agencies (Development Associates, 1994).

The role of the UNDP was significant in that it participated in a number of programs under the NRP and encouraged participation by all NGOs. This was to the benefit of the FMLN and its desire for fair participation in the reconstruction process. The UNDP was often credited for working with the government, other UN agencies and local NGOs to implement programs. On the other hand, some government sources claimed that the UNDP has favored the FMLN and its work (Murray, Coletti & Spence, 1994).

The UNDP supported an emergency program for FMLN combatants in zones and participated in other reintegration programs under the SRN. These programs included agricultural training offered by 6300 FMLN ex-combatants, agricultural technical assistance for 6000 ex-combatants, technical assistance, training and credit to 600 mid-level commanders of the FMLN and 6000 provisional housing units to 4000 former members of the FMLN and 2000 former members of the armed forces (Murray, Coletti & Spence, 1994; UNDP, 1995). Other UNDP programs include the strengthening of micro-enterprises, agricultural development, technical assistance for the disabled, training for judicial reform and programs in support of the land transfer program (UNDP, 1995). Unlike other donors with restrictions on funding for programs dealing with the security forces, UNDP’s role in these programs was significant. Programs included technical assistance for the new police force and the National Academy of Public Security, and technical assistance to improve planning, administration and operation of the various divisions of the security force (UNDP, 1995).

These programs were financed with contributions from several countries and multilateral agencies. For instance, the Agricultural Training Program for Ex-Combatants of the FMLN received contributions from the Governments of Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, US and the World Food Program. In addition, the UNDP worked in collaboration with the Government of El Salvador, FAO, ONUSAL, the International Labor Organization and UNESCO on this project (UNDP, 1993). This same program received technical support from the staff of the Development Program for Displaced, Repatriated, and
Refugee Populations (PRODERE). PRODERE was another program implemented by UNDP throughout Central America for the integration of populations displaced by war. In addition to technical support, participants of PRODERE shared their experiences of agricultural production and its advantages (UNDP, 1993).

Several other UN agencies continue to implement projects in El Salvador which either directly or indirectly support the peace process or the reintegration efforts. For instance, under the Culture of Peace Program, UNESCO attempts to bring formerly warring parties together as project actors with common goals. One of several of their projects include Alternatives for Educational Psychosocial Care for Children Affected by Armed Conflict. Other programs include literacy, disabled children, human development and development of the youth of El Salvador (UNESCO, 1996). Under another program, the University of El Salvador, with support from UNESCO, offered an educational program for 1,500 ex-combatants.

The European Union (EU) was also a large donor, supporting a US $18 million reintegration program for ex-combatants of the FMLN and the armed forces. The funds, primarily for the purchase of lands and production loans in Usulután, were managed almost completely by the co-directors (1 European, 1 national) of the program, with minimal interference by the Government of El Salvador which had made a small contribution to the project. Additional assistance was provided in the form of housing, water, production necessities, training and technical assistance. Under this program the EU was responsible for successfully negotiating land transfers and titles, significantly increasing the national level of land transfers (Murray, Coletti & Spence, 1994). Another example of activities supported by donors is the construction of almost 100 homes in an effort to ease tensions over available housing, financed by the Spanish government.

5.2 International non-governmental organizations

Skepticism on the part of the donors was at times due to the fact that most of the aid for reconstruction activities under the NRP had to be channeled through the government. Several donors, especially European agencies, expressed the necessity that part of the aid be channeled through NGOs which are working in the area. Based on the Peace Agreement, some aid for the NRP was channeled through the UNDP and NGOs but the bulk through the SRN.
Nonetheless, a number of SRN-NGOs and non-SRN NGOs implemented programs for ex-combatants.

Creative Associates International (CAII) implemented a number of reintegration programs for ex-combatants under USAID support. Under the program Reintegration of El Salvador National Police, CAII was responsible for registration, vocational training and reintegration assistance to 6000 members of the former police force who were replaced with the new civilian force. In another program, CAII, working with the German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) under the SRN, designed and implemented instruments to assess the status and needs of ex-combatants of the armed forces one year after their demobilization. By gathering data from other NGOs and government agencies involved in the NRP, a number of cost effective suggestions were made to meet the current needs of the intended beneficiaries. The program El Salvador Reintegration of Ex-Combatants provided counseling for combatants upon demobilizing. By identifying the needs of ex-combatants and working closely with leaders of the FMLN and armed forces, CAII matched recipients with the appropriate program. Other components of this program included institutional support and technical assistance to the SRN in the design and implementation of programs, the purchase, storage and distribution of emergency packages to 25,000 ex-combatants and assistance in the design and implementation of reintegration projects for long-term activities and programs (CAII, 1995a).

Several other NGOs were subcontracted by USAID under its Peace and National Recovery Project. As of September 1993, a total of 111 international and local NGOs participated in the implementation of this project as part of the NRP. Nine received grants from USAID, 24 from the SRN and 4 umbrella organizations worked with 74 NGOs (Development Associates, 1994). Under the Peace and National Recovery Project, Catholic Relief Services served as an umbrella organization to 35 primarily local NGOs. The UNDP served as an umbrella organization to 5 NGOs, and two other local NGOs, the Salesians and the Foundation for Integral Salvadoran Education (FEDISAL), served as umbrella organizations to several local NGOs (Development Associates, 1994). By working with these NGOs, USAID was able to improve the effectiveness and reach of the Peace and National Recovery Program. The NGOs carried out a variety of activities from technical assistance to rural electrification to war-wounded assistance. Other US based NGOs active in El Salvador under USAID and SRN support include the Salvadoran Integration and Reconstruction Committee (though Salvadoran based, created by the US NGO, International Rescue Committee) and Private Agencies
Collaborating Together (PACT) (GAO, 1992). PACT received US $2 million in 1992 to strengthen the institutional capacity of Salvadoran NGOs (Murray, Coletti & Spence, 1994). Additional examples of how USAID supported the reintegration process include a counseling center which linked veterans with non-veteran programs—adding funds for additional services—and offering a combination of training and stipends as in-kind assistance (CAII, 1995b).

Several other international NGOs participated in reconstruction activities in El Salvador. For instance, Caritas International, distributed beds, mattresses, blankets and dishes to the FMLN in assembly areas. In addition, some support was received by Scandinavian donors in order to improve living standards in assembly areas (CAII, 1995b). A Swedish NGO, Diakonia, identified regions where its support would bolster cooperation and reconciliation between local NGOs, government entities and the SRN. Following this activity, Diakonia supported a project in health and education by coordinating NGO work (Murray, Coletti & Spence, 1994).

5.3 Local non-governmental organizations

NGO participation in the SRN was initially very limited as the majority of the plan was meant to be implemented by government entities. Those NGOs which had worked in conflict zones during the war were charged with having ineffective, inadequate and dangerous operations and were often seen as suspicious by the government due to their possible alliances with the FMLN (Murray, Coletti and Spence, 1994). Because NGOs operating in FMLN areas during the conflict were generally not registered with the government, they were often excluded from participation in the NRP. Those that did try to participate claimed that they encountered lengthy administrative delay’s when trying to acquire funds, where other NGOs did not (GAO, 1992). International pressure, coupled with weaknesses in the policies and administration of many of the NGOs, encouraged USAID and SRN to work together to identify problems and develop policies to improve their effectiveness and the relationship between the counterparts (Development Associates, 1994). A review of some NGOs involved in reconstruction activities found that many Salvadoran based NGOs had limited experience in providing assistance for development since most had been established during the war and were more familiar with providing emergency assistance. Many of them had poor methods of accountability and operations (GAO, 1992). Although participation by local NGOs has increased, limitations
appear to persist. The established procedures for obtaining funds from the SRN and USAID for national reconstruction do not appear to discriminate according to a report “El Salvador: Role of Non-governmental Organization in Postwar Reconstruction” by the US General Accounting Office in 1992. However, some FMLN affiliated NGOs still believe they are not given equal consideration for funds.

Despite weaknesses found in the institutional capacity of many Salvadoran based NGOs, their participation in reconstruction activities was instrumental since most were established as a result of community initiatives. Their close ties with the communities and their understanding of the social, political and economic conditions of the country have helped the international community, specifically NGOs, understand sensitivities and assess the needs of ex-combatants.

In late 1992, the SRN had funded 12 Salvadoran based NGOs in addition to the four US based NGOs. The actual number of Salvadoran based NGOs was significantly higher since the four umbrella organizations, two of which were Salvadoran based, supported projects of several local NGOs. One of the four umbrella organizations, the Foundation for Integral Salvadoran Education (FEDISAL), played a key role in providing training to ex-combatants. For instance, it offered vocational, technical and administrative training for 3,100 members of the armed forces and 2,000 former members of the FMLN. In addition, it has offered training and rehabilitation to disabled members of the armed forces. The Salesians, the second Salvadoran based umbrella organization received a large portion of the funds designated to NGOs for the NRP.

Several other Salvadoran NGOs also received support for the NRP. To name a few and their activities, the Eastern Economic Development Coordinating Committee (COMCORDE) received US $435,500 for a project which offered micro-enterprise loans and technical assistance for projects. The Business Foundation for Educational Development (FEPADE) received support for vocational training programs for ex-combatants. The Salvadoran Association for Integral Support (ASAI) implemented a project which offered credit to displaced persons and refugees (GAO, 1992).

The Foundation 16 of January (F-16) represented the interests of the FMLN in a UNDP coordinated agricultural training program for FMLN ex-combatants. Under this program, F-16 was party to all discussions with UNDP, SRN and other multilateral development agencies to resolve problems and develop strategies for implementation. In addition, there was an F-16
representative in each region of training, allowing all the parties to coordinate their activities at a regional level. Under this same agricultural program, several local NGOs participated by offering different training programs to ex-combatants. For instance, the Salvadoran Corporation for Campesino Training and Rural Development (COSALCYDER), the Salvadoran Foundation for Reconstruction and Development (REDES) and the Enterprise Foundation for Educational Development (FEPADE) were selected to train ex-combatants (UNDP, 1993).

Many of the reintegration efforts in El Salvador have been successful in providing ex-combatants with additional skills and other resources for their reintegration. One of the greatest obstacles to the implementation of these programs however, was the limited funds available or the delay in receiving the funds. Though the Government of El Salvador has stated that over 90 percent of the Peace Agreement has been complied with, the demobilized continue to express themselves in protests, demanding compliance with what was promised to them for their reintegration. Four and one-half years following the signing of the Peace Agreement, crime and politically motivated violence remain among the greatest problems in El Salvador. It is reported, by the office of the Attorney General in El Salvador, that 40 percent of the 5,000 accusations of human rights violations are directed at the new police force, the National Civilian Police, further adding to the internal insecurity in the country (Diario de Hoy, 29 July 1996). Blame for the violence cannot be placed solely on the failures in the administration and implementation of reintegration programs. The factors leading to the current state of insecurity are varied and interrelated. Unemployment, poverty, limited education and a weak judicial system, coupled with the availability of arms have also fueled the crisis.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED FROM DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

Demilitarization has clearly been essential to the democratic transitions seen in Central America. These transitions, most clearly witnessed in Nicaragua and El Salvador, have experienced successes and failures that perhaps help define the economic, social and political status of these countries today. For instance, despite the successful demobilization of over 100,000 combatants in the two countries and various reforms to strengthen democratic institutions, arms and violent crimes are commonplace and ex-combatants continue to protest against their governments, due to lack of compliance with respect to reforms or assistance. Though the context of the demobilization experiences in Nicaragua and El Salvador vary—making generalizations hazardous—lessons can be drawn from the process of demobilization and reintegration in both countries. In both cases, these processes were complex and—especially in the case of El Salvador—highly interrelated with the peace process as a whole. It has been the experience that in these countries, and others such as in Africa which have undergone similar post-conflict reductions, if the processes are planned carefully they can create opportunities for sustainable peace and human development (Spencer, 1995; Kingma, 1996).

Following are several lessons learned from the issues addressed in this paper, including demobilization, disarmament, structure and role of the army and support for the demobilization and reintegration exercises.

1. Demobilization

- **Conflict stage.** During the conflict stage it should be anticipated what will happen with the ex-combatant once the conflict ends. Although the decision to demobilize the Nicaraguan Resistance resulted from extensive negotiation and a number of peace accords, the actual implementation proved far more difficult for several reasons, including the lack of clarity with respect to reintegration assistance to be provided to the ex-combatants and their social, political and economic role in Nicaragua following their demobilization.
• **Cease-fire and peace accord.** During the cease-fire and the peace negotiations, the demobilization should be dealt with in detail. Failure to do so in Nicaragua resulted in confusion among the ex-combatants and delayed the demobilization. For instance, only after several attempts to demobilize the Contras did the issue of the purpose and permanence of the security zones arise.

• **Encampment.** The ‘separation of forces’ or encampment stage should be carefully laid out to complete the process as quickly and efficiently as possible. If too much time passes, combatants can become restless threatening the peace process. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, the encampment stage was the most effective way to assemble, disarm and prepare ex-combatants for reintegration. Until the exercise of verification of the numbers demobilized is complete and arms are destroyed, combatants remain part of the opposition forces. In Nicaragua, directing the ex-combatants to designated areas proved difficult as most wanted to return to their homes (World Bank, 1993). The more carefully laid out plan in El Salvador proved successful in assembling the ex-combatants and guiding them to reintegration activities, though this stage lasted longer then necessary.

• **Humanitarian relief.** During this stage, humanitarian relief should be provided for the combatants in the form of food, shelter, civilian clothing and health care. This can be challenging, as donors have different standards and ex-combatants various expectations. In addition, humanitarian relief should include capacity building of local institutions for continued relief and development work once external assistance is phased out (Kingma, as cited in Spencer, 1995). The decrease in humanitarian assistance to members of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Honduras to match assistance received by other refugees resulted in complaints by the ex-combatants. USAID had been providing more calories per day to the ex-combatants, which was decreased by UNHCR when they began providing the assistance.
2. Disarmament

- **Need for disarmament.** Once combatants are in their designated assembly points, they must be disarmed. If it is done incompletely, ex-combatants can easily rearm, fueling banditry and violence. Upon the threat of an attack or failed reintegration ex-combatants can easily turn to their weapons as was seen in Nicaragua. Continued political conflict and the inability of the government to meet reintegration commitments led many ex-combatants to rearm themselves. Similarly, in El Salvador the abundance of arms almost five years following disarmament efforts as part of the Peace Agreement, continue to pose a threat to security.

- **Disarmament plan.** Thus, control of small and light weapons will discourage further conflict and help strengthen the peace and development processes. Designating assembly points for ex-combatants and containment points for weapons will help limit transfers to conflict areas. For safety, these designated areas should be separate but may be at the same location as was done for the FMLN in El Salvador. Under these circumstances the weapons were locked in containers and both an FMLN commander and the verification party had a key (Peace Agreement in United Nations, 1995a). In Nicaragua, despite a plan to disarm the Contras upon demobilization, many hid weapons and initially turned in only those that were useless.

- The logistical process requires **transparency** in order to effectively collect all weapons and to ease insecurities of an attack by the opposition. It is common for combatants to own more than one weapon. Often they will turn in one and keep the others hidden for their own security. Similar circumstances have threatened the peace process in El Salvador where many FMLN arms caches were found even after the force had completely demobilized. Often measures can be taken to reduce the number of hidden weapons and to help achieve a complete disarmament of ex-combatants. For instance, taking and checking inventories provided by the parties will help ensure transparency. Similar inventories were not taken in Nicaragua.
• **Cultural acceptability.** Another factor to be considered when disarming is that owning a weapon may be culturally acceptable. If so, disarmament is more difficult and should be negotiated. Options for the control of weapons could be to stipulate which types of smaller weapons can be used, licenses, or representatives of the community may try to impose traditional values on how to deal with weapons. In Central America, though owning a weapon is not really culturally acceptable, it has increasingly become a way of life for those raised in an environment of conflict. In such cases it is crucial that reintegration programs are developed that will teach ex-combatants how to resolve conflicts without violence, teach them new skills or help them determine what skills they do have that can be used in civilian life. Failure to do so will leave ex-combatants frustrated and tempted to return to a more familiar way of life.

3. **Structure and role of the army**

• **Reducing and restructuring the armed forces.** The demobilization process should not be seen as an end in itself but should include an extended process of making the military more streamlined and able to respond efficiently to the changing national security needs. With this in mind, a realistic agreement must be reached on the adequate size of the armed forces. In El Salvador, the Peace Agreement set the guidelines for reduction and change in role of the Armed Forces of El Salvador. In doing so, its new role of national security and no involvement in internal security, was understood by all parties. Such an agreement did not exist in Nicaragua. When President Chamorro came to power, sever structural changes were made to the armed forces, though it remained primarily Sandinista controlled.

• **Formation of national armies.** The creation of a national army can contribute significantly to peace-building and reconciliation in a post-conflict country. Several issues must be considered in order to create a professional army including transparency, equality, training, education, skills and expectations. Although the armed forces of Nicaragua and El Salvador saw both a change in their role and a reduction, neither witnessed the incorporation of members of the opposition forces. Although the Armed Forces of El Salvador were more than halved, based on the Peace Agreement, members of the FMLN were promised non-
discriminatory selection of anyone interested in joining the armed forces. Other aspects of the Peace Agreement, illustrate the inclusion of the FMLN in new security measures such as the new police force but not in the army. There was little evidence of a parallel example with the Contras in Nicaragua. In fact, the presence of the still Sandinista controlled army and of Humberto Ortega as head of the army following the war, are perhaps the cause of much of the distrust, insecurity and rebelliousness witnessed from the demobilized Contras.

• The role of the armed forces. Members of the armed forces may resist change or find other activities to justify their presence. In Nicaragua, this was clearly seen by the continuous resistance by the Sandinista army to many of Chamorro’s reforms. The army often came under scrutiny for continued involvement in inappropriate activities such as excessive military control in internal security matters and arms trafficking. This division between the administration and the army increased insecurity and limited reconstruction efforts. In El Salvador, the resistance to change was also visible (though not as aggressive) and at times even beneficial to people. In part, to justify its presence, the Armed Forces of El Salvador became increasingly involved in non-military activities such as infrastructure repair, medicine distribution, health and literacy projects and conservation and reforestation. On the other hand, its involvement in big business such as oil, mining, resorts and publishing has brought to question its strength and continued power following the war.

4. Reintegration

• Reintegration plan. A framework for reintegration is often required in post-conflict situations and could best be coordinated by the central level. Post-conflict demobilizations tend to be far more complex in these countries where economies are weak and political and social tension still exist. This has been the case in several countries in Africa and Central America which have undergone years of armed conflicts which had enormous destructive effects on their social and economic stability. Many are now faced with the challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants, which often determines the success of the demobilization process (Kingma, 1996). The framework for reintegration was far more detailed in El Salvador than in Nicaragua. As a result, during and after the demobilization of the Contras in Nicaragua, there were several delays due to fears by the combatants that they would not
be provided with adequate reintegration assistance. This led to their negotiation for ‘development poles’ as a condition of their complete demobilization.

- **Encouragement, incentives and participation.** Combatants often need to be aware of the benefits of their disarming and demobilizing in addition to the benefits to be derived from a reintegration program, provided they are committed. For instance, under the UNDP agricultural program for FMLN ex-combatants in El Salvador, participants of another UNDP program spoke to potential beneficiaries of the advantages of individual production for long-term development. Frequently, when ex-combatants are offered incentives or get involved in the development of ideas, they are encouraged to participate instead of resorting to anti-social behavior. For example, in Nicaragua, ex-combatants were given material for housing construction and only after all the homes of a designated team were built, were they allowed to move into their own homes (World Bank, 1993).

- **Education and training.** In order to reintegrate successfully it is necessary that ex-combatants have skills that will make them marketable candidates for work as civilians. This is difficult in economies with high unemployment rates. Frequently, the skills they acquire in the military fall short of those necessary to gain employment. For instance, many ex-combatants in El Salvador and Nicaragua, having fought in lengthy civil wars, have only skills they gained during the wars and know no other way of life. They are then faced with providing for themselves, and perhaps their families, with only limited skills and in an economic environment unable to absorb them.

- **Target groups.** Programs targeted only at ex-combatants and their dependents often result in resentment from non-participants. In Nicaragua, donors claimed that programs for ex-combatants often resulted in social divisions which would have been avoided, had the time frame of the programs been limited and had the programs been linked with general community development programs (World Bank, 1993).

5. Support for demobilization and reintegration
• **Donor funding.** Limited donor funding may lead to less funds for development efforts and the maintenance of peace. Limited funding in both Nicaragua and El Salvador hindered the ability of the governments to implement programs and curbed the effectiveness of programs. For instance, three years after the signing of the Peace Agreement in El Salvador, a gap still existed between the money planned for the National Reconstruction Program and that which was actually pledged by donors. In addition, some donors did not meet their pledges. Guatemala is now facing the same problem as it attempts to raise funds for its peace process. With less concern for Central America than in the 1980s, world leaders are not likely to pledge as much as was pledged for El Salvador and Nicaragua. In addition, rarely is all the aid pledged actually received from donors.

• **Donor response.** In the case of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the slow response by donors can be attributed in some cases to the avoidance of military issues, competition, skepticism and lack of funds. In both countries, several donors, as a result of their own agendas, were unable to implement programs which assisted armed groups such as the new police force. In El Salvador, many donors felt that the United States, which had played a significant role in financing the war, should also bear the burden of financing the costs of the peace process. This may also prove to be the case in Guatemala as the government begins to seek donors. Several donors were also skeptical about the government of El Salvador’s willingness to comply with the Peace Agreement (Boyce, 1995). Finally, the lack of funds severely hindered the effectiveness, continuation and availability of programs in Nicaragua. The government was in part responsible, as several NGOs claimed that much of the money that should have been spent on government reintegration programs was spent on administrative costs and the high salaries of the officials.

• **Donor coordination.** Most assessments of programs implemented in El Salvador and Nicaragua addressed the lack of coordination among the government, the military, donors and NGOs in implementing programs. Aside from the continued social, political and economic insecurity in Nicaragua, the NGOs stated that much of the government assistance was not well planned and failed to include sufficient follow-up in the form of training, counseling, technical support and access to credit.
• **Emergency relief to development continuum.** It is essential to look at what can be done within the international development agencies to successfully link relief and development and not leave governments of countries to manage it alone. Throughout the implementation of the National Reconstruction Program in El Salvador, the implementors of the programs, especially international NGOs and donor agencies were concerned with whether or not NGOs were providing sufficient assistance to the ex-combatants for long-term development needs. Many of the Salvadoran based NGOs had experience at providing emergency and relief assistance and were inexperienced at implementing long-term development projects.

6. **Results of the demobilization and reintegration processes**

• **Nicaragua.** The success of the demobilization, reintegration and demilitarization programs in Nicaragua are mixed. The complete demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and over half of the Sandinista army was implemented successfully, but some ex-combatants rearmed and fighting resumed. Successful demilitarization has resulted in disarmament processes which reduced the total number of weapons and defense spending. However, the public sector has also been cut. Arms are still available and low intensity fighting and banditry continue, further threatening security. The continued violence, and political instability have hindered economic production. With respect to reintegration, the CIAV-OAS estimated that as of late 1991, most of the former members of the Contras were self-sufficient. However, this is contradicted by the high unemployment rates in Nicaragua (World Bank, 1993). Programs to meet the immediate needs of ex-combatants were provided upon demobilization, despite delays in funding. In addition, they were also provided with support in the form of goods, services, technical and legal assistance, and protection. The greatest threat to the success of the process has been the inability of the government to comply with its promise to provide land. The difficulty in getting access to land and clear titles and the poor state of the economy with unemployment and underemployment rates over 50 percent resulted in upset among the demobilized (World Bank, 1993). The experience in Nicaragua following the demobilization of combatants is evidence of the potential danger which is likely to erupt among disgruntled ex-combatants in the transition to a democracy.
El Salvador. The development of a more clear and detailed framework for the
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in El Salvador proved effective in
disengaging the opposing forces. The complete demobilization of the FMLN, reduction in
the Armed Forces of El Salvador, moves to place the army under civilian control and other
reforms to the military and security forces are a clear indication of El Salvador’s transition
to a democracy. Demilitarization has also resulted in the disarming of the FMLN, though
this proved difficult facing challenges such as hidden arms caches and arms trafficking.
Reintegration efforts were successful in providing ex-combatants with additional skills and
other resources for their reintegration. However, many continue to claim that the
government has not provided promised reforms and assistance. The government, on the
other hand, claims that they have complied with over 90 percent of the reforms and
assistance called for in the Peace Agreement. Today, almost five years following the signing
of the Agreement, crime and politically motivated violence are the greatest threats to peace
in El Salvador. This is not only due to the failure in the administration and implementation
of reintegration programs, but also high unemployment and poverty rates and a judicial
system which is unable to control the crime. Finally, similar to Nicaragua, several of the
social, economic and political inequalities that existed before the war are still apparent
today.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

As indicated in the ‘Lessons Learned,’ in several instances the implementors of the demobilization and reintegration processes in El Salvador and Nicaragua were not well prepared for the various steps and obstacles encountered. Challenges, from the administrative delays in the governments to the slow response of the donors to skepticism on the part of the ex-combatants have threatened the effectiveness of reintegration efforts and overall the maintenance of peace. Though the context of the experiences are different, lessons drawn from these similar issues can help improve the responsiveness of donor agencies and central authorities implementing the programs. With these lessons in mind, obstacles can be anticipated for foreseen demobilizations such as in Guatemala. It should be noted that although these countries have experienced demilitarization, termination of their civil wars and a transition towards democracy, disgruntled ex-combatants and similar inequalities as those existing before the wars, continue to pose a threat to peace.

Despite obstacles, the successful disbanding of the opposition forces, reductions in the size of the armies, and the restructuring of the armed forces and security forces have become a visible components of demilitarization following the peace agreements in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The demilitarization was encouraged by international and regional efforts to resolve the interrelated conflicts of the region and later provide support for reconstruction activities. As the trend continues in Guatemala, and to a lesser degree in Honduras, the experiences in El Salvador and Nicaragua may provide insight into the best means of continuing this trend towards demilitarization in the region. In addition, more evaluations are necessary to assess the impact and effectiveness of programs in Nicaragua and El Salvador and to identify possible obstacles to successful implementation.
### VIII. ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADEFAES</td>
<td>Association of Demobilized Soldiers of El Salvador</td>
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<td>AEGES</td>
<td>Association of Ex-Guerrillas of El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>BED</td>
<td>Special Disarmament Brigade (Nicaragua)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Cessation of Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENPAP</td>
<td>National Center of Planning and Administration of the Poles of Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAV</td>
<td>International Support and Verification Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPAZ</td>
<td>National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPS</td>
<td>Sandinista People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAES</td>
<td>Armed Forces of El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Panamanian Defense Forces</td>
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<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Sandinista National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUSEP</td>
<td>Public Security Force (Honduras)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in El Salvador</td>
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<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Reconstruction Plan (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUV</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Verification (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>National Civil Police (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Resistance - Contras</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRN</td>
<td>Secretariat for National Reconstruction (El Salvador)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>National Opposition Union (Nicaragua)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URNG</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
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VIII. REFERENCES


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El Salvador: Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Postwar Reconstruction, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters. GAO/NSIAD-93-20BR. Washington, DC.


ANNEX: SELECTED INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE STUDY OR SUPPORT OF DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress
Center for Peace and Reconciliation
Apartado 8-6410-1000
San Jose, Costa Rica
TEL: (506) 233-6348
FAX: (506) 222-6782
email: funpaz@sol.racsa.co.cr

Bonn International Center for Conversion
An der Elisabethkirche 25
53113 Bonn, Germany
TEL: (+49 228) 9 11 96 0
FAX: (+49 228) 24 12 15
email: bicc@bicc.uni-bonn.de
homepage: http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

Centro de Estudios Internacionales
Apartado Postal 1747
Managua, Nicaragua
TEL: (505) 2-785413
FAX: (505) 2-670517
email: CEI@nicarao.apc.org

Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief
110 Maryland Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002 USA
TEL: (202) 543-6336

Creative Associates International, Inc.
5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 200
Washington, DC 20015 USA
TEL: (202) 966-5804
FAX: (202) 363-4771
email: caii@access.digex.net
homepage: forthcoming

Development Associates, Inc.
1730 North Lynn Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209 USA
TEL: (703) 276-0677
FAX: (703) 276-0432

Augusto C. Sandino Foundation (FACS)
Apartado 2458
Zona Postal 5
Managua, Nicaragua
TEL: (505) 74773
FAX: (505) 675670
email: facs@nicarao.apc.org

Foundation 16 of January
Prolongación Juan Pablo II, No. 7
Entre Boulevard Constitución y 75 Ave. Nte.
San Salvador, El Salvador
Fax: (503) 284-0453

German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
P.O. Box 5180, 65726 Eschborn, Germany
TEL: (+49) 6196 79 1317
FAX: (+49) 6196 79 7130
homepage:
http://www.gtz.de/english/homepage.htm

North South Center
1500 Monza Avenue
Coral Gables, FL 33124-3027 USA
TEL: (305) 284-8981
FAX: (305) 284-6370
homepage: http://www.miami.edu/nse/
In addition to the above mentioned institutions, there are a number of local NGOs that were established in Nicaragua and El Salvador during and following the wars. This paper refers to some of these and the roles they have played in demobilization and reintegration.