

# Lessons from Small Arms and Weapons Control Initiatives in Africa

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Africa is partly attributable to weak national controls, the porosity of state borders, and ongoing armed conflict on the continent. To address these problems a number of initiatives have been undertaken by states, regional organisations, and other various implementing agencies with the aim of enhancing small arms control. This report examines these initiatives over a ten year period (2005–2015) in sixteen countries across the Greater Sahel region and generates a set of lessons learned. These lessons cover topics such as project duplication, the impact of internal donor restructuring, and the importance of identifying the needs and implementing capacities of local partners. While these lessons are intended to contribute to the existing body of research on small arms control, they are also, more importantly, intended to help donors and practitioners improve project design and impact.

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## Main findings

This report<sup>1</sup> analyses SALW control interventions between 2005 and 2015, in sixteen countries across the Greater Sahel. These sixteen countries cover the Sahel, West Africa and Maghreb regions, and include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tunisia. Information on small arms control projects in these countries was primarily drawn from a desk-top review and was analysed to generate the following set of lessons learned:

### **SALW projects should take a regional approach for a wider and more effective impact**

A regional approach to the challenge of SALW seems to stand a better chance of success than when the problem is dealt with at the national level, without due consideration for the sub-regional and cross-border dynamics of arms proliferation. Regionally-based projects also hold the potential to enhance information sharing, coordination, and co-operation amongst participating states.

### **Innovative research can establish new approaches to arms control**

African countries are often unwilling to share sensitive information on the manufacture, import, and export of weapons and ammunition. Recently however, the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN, 2010) broke through this barrier, gathering and sharing information on the manufacture and export of SALW across the continent. While research on the trade and manufacture of arms in Africa has most often been conducted by Western institutions, the encouragement and support of Africa-based research institutions, such as the AEFJN, could contribute to a culture of greater transparency.

<sup>1</sup> \ The report benefitted from advice provided by Ms Cheryl Frank (ISS Division Head), Ben Coetzee (ISS Senior Researcher), Joanne Richards (BICC), Wolf-Christian Paes (BICC), and Nicolas Kasprzyk (ISS Senior Research Consultant).

### **Project design and tools should be tailored to local needs and capacities prior to the implementation of projects**

While it is important to conduct a thorough needs assessment before embarking on a small arms control project, it is equally as important to assess the capacity of the state to implement a particular project. Numerous small arms control initiatives, including projects to mark and register arms, have been hampered by attempts to begin activities in a setting where the necessary infrastructure and legislative backing is not in place. Implementation tools should therefore be tailored to local capacities, including local technological capacities.

### **Projects should be protected, where possible, from changes in donor priorities and internal donor restructuring**

Donor countries and institutions are vulnerable to internal changes and conflicts, including turf disputes over whether funding should be dispersed through one policy instrument or another. Such internal conflicts can cause delays in the release of funds to recipients. While it is difficult to generalise the impact of delayed donor funding on recipient states, internal realignments and conflicts on the side of donors must be managed cautiously.

### **The over-funding and duplication of projects should be addressed through increased donor co-ordination and national planning**

In emergency or post-conflict situations many donors may react to the same small arms related problem in a similar way, perhaps even utilising the same local partner. Such situations can result in project duplication and can stretch the ability of local partners to cope with an influx of resources and projects. For donors, the need for co-ordination is raised consistently in relation to all foreign aid provision and is not unique to the issue of small arms control. In cases of crisis intervention, co-ordination may not

be easy to achieve, yet should nonetheless be prioritised. Certain steps can also be taken to improve co-ordination, including joint needs assessments (conducted at the same time by different implementing agencies), and ongoing communication relating to project activities.

### **Risks should be identified and managed early rather than focusing on crisis management**

A general examination of the landscape of small arms control initiatives in the Greater Sahel indicates that there are a greater number of emergency intervention projects (those that respond to crisis or conflict) than preventive or early intervention efforts.

### **Public information should be provided by donors and beneficiary governments throughout the lifespan of a project**

Small arms control projects typically receive greater publicity at the time of their launch than during project implementation and closure. While exposure during a project launch may be productive, in part because it creates public awareness, similar public information should be provided throughout other notable phases of a project's implementation and end. Greater transparency in terms of the closure and actual impact of projects may help to minimize project duplication. Furthermore, dissemination of lessons learned may help other donors and implementing agencies to avoid repeating past mistakes.

## Introduction

The proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Africa is partly attributable to weak national controls, the porosity of state borders and ongoing armed conflict on the continent. These factors continue to pose a challenge to the safe storage and use of SALW, and present a significant threat to Africa's security and development. Whether lawful or illicit, arms contribute to a wide range of Africa's existing and emerging security concerns due to the risk of diversion in various contexts including during armed conflict, violent extremism, organised crime, and community and domestic violence. Nonetheless, Africa continues to engage in a range of initiatives to control the misuse of arms including participation in the implementation of international agreements such as the United Nations (UN) Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), among other efforts. The success of these initiatives lies ultimately in their implementation at the national and sub-regional levels, and this requires significant commitment from governments, non-state actors and donors to act cooperatively to achieve the changes required.

Given the many and varied efforts made thus far, it is critical to assess what lessons may have emerged up to now, particularly in relation to programme design, delivery and results. This is an important exercise given that it can contribute to improved programme design in the future and, more specifically, to the strengthened impact of donor investments in this sector. To this end, this study examines not only the original objectives of programmes and their actual outcomes, but also the processes involved in the design and implementation of those initiatives. As is explained in the methodology section below, this was a complex endeavour, with a range of limitations and difficulties.

This study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge on promoting effective programming in the field of SALW. This was undertaken through a review of programme interventions in 16 selected African countries, over a 10-year period, and by the drawing of lessons and observations (both positive and negative) relating to programme design, implementation and results. The study is specifically designed

to offer information to donors, implementing agencies and potential programme beneficiaries with the expectation of contributing to improved programme design in terms of the funding, planning, execution and evaluation of programmes.

Commissioned by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) and conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), this report is part of a broader programme of activities being undertaken by BICC to strengthen the control of SALW in Africa. It consists of two parts: The first part contains the lessons drawn from an analysis of projects implemented in the 16 countries studied. These lessons are illustrated by selected examples drawn from the countries reviewed. This is followed by an overview of the conclusions emerging from these lessons. The second part of the study is presented as an Annex consisting of an additional list of projects, which were included in the review of the 16 selected countries.

The study had a range of limitations, which are discussed in the Methodology section below.

## Methodology

The initial idea was to structure the study in two parts. The first part of the study would involve extensive data collection on SALW programmes utilising open, web-based sources. This search would relate to the 16 countries under review, i.e. Algeria, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Mali, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mauritania and Tunisia, and cover the period 2005 to 2015.<sup>2</sup>

This review involved gathering and analysing relevant documents in both English and French. This review also produced information on several multi-country and/or sub-regional initiatives, and the data from these reports was also analysed. As indicated, this analysis was used to generate a set of lessons learned. It should be noted that the documentary sources consulted for this study, which are fully referenced, were taken at face value, and that it was not within the scope of this study to verify the reliability of the documented information.

It was envisaged that the second step of the research would be to verify the data as well as the set of lessons gathered from the desk-top review. This would be done by engaging directly with respondents in the 16 countries, who were familiar with the projects identified by the web-based searches in the 16 countries. This process was meant to generate more detailed information on the projects, including views on whether the project/s had achieved their objectives, and what lessons may have been learned. This was to be done through semi-structured telephone interviews. Respondents were to remain anonymous, owing to the potential sensitivities of the questions to be asked. Respondents were to be selected from a pool of names obtained from official sources (e.g. designated national focal persons) as well as individuals (from governments or implementing agencies) known to have either participated in or to have co-ordinated projects.

A number of challenges emerged in relation to the interview process. While the exercise provided some further clarification and verification, due to the

broad time period under review, respondents tended not to have complete, nor often specific knowledge of particular projects. In addition, in a number of cases, these discussions raised a number of questions that required additional information which could only be obtained through further interviews with project donors and/or implementing partners. Undertaking these additional interviews was beyond the time frame and scope of this study. Due to these factors, the interview data was deemed too problematic to include in the analysis. This occasioned a shift in methodology where the study was adjusted to rely strictly on the documented sources obtained through the desk-top review described above. The study was conducted under other restrictions and limitations, which are noted below:

- \ *Time constraints.* The study had to take place within a short time-frame (two months from start to completion). Within this two-month interval, there was a short two-week period to generate preliminary, emerging lessons to be presented at a workshop in Addis Ababa.
- \ *Limited publicly accessible project documentation via the Internet:* Extensive reviews undertaken by researchers (in both English and French) found significant weaknesses related to the public availability of information posted on the Internet. While the existence of many projects could be noted, limited information could be accessed about the details of these projects throughout their lifespans, including their design processes, implementation processes and ultimate results. While this information may have been produced (e.g. for donor reporting purposes), it was not comprehensively published for several projects. In many cases, information was made available about the project upon its announcement or launch, but limited or no additional (or only very limited) information was found (also refer to discussions below under Lessons 6 and 7).
- \ *Period under review:* The project was designed to survey SALW initiatives over a 10-year period. This is a significant period, and while extensive searches were conducted, it was not

<sup>2</sup> \ The list of countries and the period under review were determined by BICC, the commissioning organisation.

possible to exhaustively and comprehensively review all relevant projects for the entire period. One important factor relates to the limited availability of project documentation noted above, and whether project implementers regularly posted information online in the earlier years of this period.

\ *Mapping of the context:* It should be noted that the scope of this paper did not allow for analysis of the context in each country, and how this may have contributed to the selection and design of projects. For example, significant political developments, including forms of conflict, have taken place in the 10-year period under review in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia. There is clear evidence in some cases that such dynamics influenced donor funding patterns and priorities, as well as the priorities of implementing organisations. It was not within the scope of this project to map this context in relation to each country under review.

Generally, the design of this project, and the limitations experienced are in themselves lessons for future efforts to extract lessons on SALW programming, as well as for SALW programmes themselves. In terms of the latter, it is particularly important to note the need for programmes to be documented and evaluated, and for this information to be made publicly available, as far as is possible.

Notwithstanding the tight time frames, this study benefited from the discussion of its preliminary findings at a workshop on SALW held in Addis Ababa in September 2015, co-hosted by the African Union (AU) and BICC.

The study is a result of ongoing consultations and meetings between BICC and the ISS, before and during the period of the study. The final methodology was agreed during the course of these consultations.

Overall, the findings presented below cannot be viewed as conclusive in any way, but rather should be viewed as a contribution to the body of available knowledge on lessons from SALW programme interventions. This study should provide food for thought, as donors, governments and practitioners plan new

programmes. Furthermore, this study identifies several issues that warrant further investigation in future research activities.

Overall, the findings presented below cannot be viewed as conclusive in any way, but rather should be viewed as a contribution to the body of available knowledge on lessons from SALW programme interventions. This study should provide food for thought, as donors, governments and practitioners plan new programmes. Furthermore, this study identifies several issues that warrant further investigation in future research activities.

### 3. Lessons Learned

#### Lesson 1: SALW projects should take a regional approach for a wider and more effective impact

A regional approach to the challenge of SALW seems to stand a better chance of success than when the problem is dealt with at the national level, without due consideration for the sub-regional and cross-border dynamics of arms proliferation. Two projects that are currently being implemented at the regional level help to illustrate this. (It should be noted that both projects are ongoing and that this lesson therefore represents a promising approach that should be the subject of future research.)

The first of these two projects is currently implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the other is a joint effort between the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

##### Box 1

##### UNDOC Sahel Programme

*This Programme is at an advanced stage of implementation, and has thus far registered promising outcomes (UNDOC, 2015). Here, the UNODC aims to strengthen the Sahel against crime and terrorism. The Programme is part of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel 2013 to 2017, created in response to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056 of 2012.*

*The objective is to benefit countries of the Sahel by strengthening government capacities and enhancing the accessibility, efficiency and accountability of criminal justice systems in order to combat drug trafficking, illicit trafficking (including of arms), organised crime, terrorism and corruption. While the Programme was originally designed to benefit only member states of the Sahel region (i.e. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), the UNODC identified the advantages of an inter-regional approach in implementing the Programme. Its current design therefore takes cognisance of the cross-border dynamics of small arms proliferation and seeks to address these dynamics by including countries within the Sahel region but also within the adjoining regions of the Maghreb and West Africa. This includes Algeria, Libya and Morocco (from the Maghreb region) as well as wider West Africa (such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo). By doing so, the UNODC report indicates that the Programme has been able to register gains in the area of firearms control, terrorism prevention, asset disclosure, anti-corruption, money laundering and information exchange.*

##### Box 2

##### UNREC and UNDP-led Baseline Surveys on SALW for Sahel countries

*Limited information is available on a project conducted throughout the Sahel region by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), in co-operation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This study, which also takes a regional approach, is titled: "Small arms surveys for Sahel countries,"<sup>3</sup> and was implemented between December 2014 and May 2015. The terms of reference (ToR) for this Baseline Survey as extracted from a document outlining requirements for research services in Burkina Faso<sup>4</sup> indicates that these surveys are national baseline surveys, but that the initiative will serve six states in the Sahel region, namely, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. The term, "baseline survey" indicates that these studies are a precursor to further project interventions; however, limited information is available in this regard. The project's stated objective is to improve the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) abilities of the Sahel states so as to reduce the risk of illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition in the six countries. According to the terms of the research,*

*.... UNREC would conduct an assessment of all existing PSSM-related legislation, as well as administrative and standard operating procedures, making full use of already available assessments and liaising with ongoing regional and bilateral projects supporting legislative reforms in SALW, to avoid duplication and overlap (European Council, 2014).*

*Desktop research into the UNREC-UNDP project did not generate further information on this project, or on whether the country-level baseline reports will be made publicly available.*

##### Comment

A few issues of interest emerge from the projects noted above. Both projects have taken note of the need to strategically approach SALW problems from the regional level, rather than limit their focus to the national level. Firstly, this approach, if successfully implemented, not only serves to benefit a wider range of countries, but critically has the potential for several other important benefits. These projects may be able to consider the regional dynamics of arms flows and obtain innumerable advantages through the enhancement of co-ordination and co-operation

3 \ Experts Meeting for the AU-Germany Project on Enhanced SALW Control and PSSM in the Greater Sahel Region. Power Point Presentation, 4 September 2015, Addis Ababa.

4 \ Terms of Reference Consultant Small arms and light weapons expert, [http://unrec.org/docs/jobs/ToR\\_SAHEL\\_BASELINE\\_SURVEY\\_Burkina\\_Faso.pdf](http://unrec.org/docs/jobs/ToR_SAHEL_BASELINE_SURVEY_Burkina_Faso.pdf) (accessed on 22 September 2015).

amongst participating states on a range of arms control issues.

Secondly, projects implemented at the regional level may also enable countries to share lessons and exchange new ideas on similar projects. This can potentially increase capacity-building and strengthen the allocation of resources among countries. Thirdly, this approach allows other donors who may be supporting similar initiatives at the national level to strengthen their efforts through joint efforts.

The reports produced thus far by UNODC indicate that the approach is showing progress. The latest report dated April 2015, states:

*... Following UNODC support, Mali, Niger and Senegal can now trace illicit small arms in a fast and reliable manner, implementing international best practices of marking such weapons. Draft firearms legislation aligned with international standards is set for adoption in Senegal (UNODC, 2015).*

UNODC's progress reports can also be considered a "best practice" in terms of project reporting, which was a specific concern referred to in the earlier Methodology section of this report. While the UNODC project has a five-year cycle (2013–2017), its design has provided for planned progress reports that document successes and challenges emerging from the implementation process. This type of reporting enables early intervention, where necessary, to correct any elements of the project that may not be working as expected.

The project implemented jointly by UNREC and UNDP is similar to the UNODC project in its adoption of a regional view. Notwithstanding the planned completion date for the initial study set at May 2015, neither progress reports, project updates nor the final reports have been made available online, making any further assessment difficult.

The preference for regional approaches is also reflected in the projects listed in the Annex to this report, and the reasons for this should be the subject of further investigation.

Another interesting question raised by this lesson is whether these projects were co-ordinated with each other given their common focus on the Sahel countries, and the fact that they were both

implemented simultaneously by UN agencies. This issue also emerges under Lesson 3 and Lesson 5 below.

## Lesson 2: Innovative research has established new approaches to arms control

While, in principle, all African states can generally accept that the control of SALW should be on the agenda, one specific aspect remains rare. This relates to the willingness of African countries to share details of the arms and ammunition they manufacture between themselves (including to whom such items are sold, and in what quantities). Equally rare is the disclosure of such weapons-related information to non-governmental organisations.

This lesson illustrates an unusual and positive effort towards the documenting of legal manufacturing and transfer of arms and ammunition from an African country to other African countries. This effort was undertaken by the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN) and is documented in a research report titled "Arms Exports and Transfers: From Sub-Saharan Africa to Sub-Saharan Africa" (AEFJN, 2010). This report denotes success in an area that is deemed sensitive due to the perception that arms manufacturing is a matter of state secrecy and therefore the preserve of state security organs.

### Box 3

#### **AEFJN continental study on the manufacture and export of SALW**

*In 2010, the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN) released a study that provided information on African countries that manufacture arms and ammunition. The study notes that while South Africa is the leading manufacturer on the continent, other countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe also manufacture arms, ammunition or both. The study also documents the intra-continental transfer of arms between countries as well as from producing countries to non-state actors (ibid.)*

*The study provides some unique information. Table 1.1 of this study, for example, lists 29 African countries to which South Africa exported conventional weapons between 2008 and 2009, including the value of the arms exported. In addition, Table 1.5 on pages 5 to 6 of the same*

study lists Sub-Saharan African countries with emerging weapons manufacturing capacity (*ibid.*)

*Apart from the UN register to which African countries report (as is the case with other member states of the UN system), there is no continental mechanism to foster intra-continental transparency in arms manufacturing and transfers. Noting this deficiency, one might expect that donors funding SALW work in Africa would also support the establishment of a continental register system to build the continent's capacity to feed into the UN register. However, this seems not to be the case, as online research reveals. This makes the study by AEFJN one of the very few that provides publicly accessible data on this issue.*

*The weakness of the AEFJN report, however, is that it does not indicate what its main purposes are, and neither does it state who financed the research. This information would be useful in informing potential donors on how to get involved in reinforcing the process further.*

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### Comment

In Africa, as in many other countries, issues of arms manufacturing, their export and import are held as the preserve of the state. This study, uniquely, broke through this barrier to obtain and publish information on the manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition within Sub-Saharan Africa.

Of the other similar types of studies in existence, most tend to source information not from African countries directly, but rather from reports that countries submit to international databases such as the UN registers. Reporting to such registers can be irregular. Such studies are often about arms coming into Africa from Western manufacturers, as opposed to the intra-African arms trade. Moreover, such studies have been predominantly conducted by Western research institutions, with very limited equal collaboration (if any) with Africa-based research institutions. A case in point is an annual report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa*, which primarily documents arms imports to African countries from Western manufacturers. (Wezeman, Wezeman & Sudreau, 2011).

If encouraged, reports that incorporate the work of / findings of African institutions, by using an approach similar to that taken by AEFJN, have the potential to enhance transparency relating to the manufacture and transfer of arms within Africa. Such reports may also contribute to a culture of greater transparency in Africa relating to arms manufacture

and sales, and serve to mainstream the more regular sharing of such information, especially through established channels such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Such studies, if regularly undertaken, could also serve as a peer review mechanism for African countries to assess their own continental capacities in arms manufacturing, and encourage additional countries to share information in regard to these questions.

Also of interest in this case was the fact that this report was produced by a non-governmental, faith-based network. Could it be that African countries may be more responsive to studies led by faith-based organisations? On a related note, an additional open question is why such information was availed to AEFJN?

At the global level, the approach taken in the AEFJN report is not unique. Findings from elsewhere demonstrate that it is possible for countries to develop joint mechanisms to deal with concerns regarding the disclosure of sensitive information on the manufacture and transfer of arms and ammunition. Therefore, donors and recipient countries should explore how lessons drawn from elsewhere could be applied in Africa. For example in 1998, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay,) adopted the Southern Cone Presidential Declaration on Combating the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials, and thereafter established the Firearms Working Group, which developed a Joint Registration Mechanism for small arms and light weapons, ammunition, explosives and other related materials within the MERCOSUR Security Information System<sup>5</sup>.

5 \ The Joint Registration Mechanism's Security Information System includes (i) a register of individuals and legal entities to buy, sell, exchange, import, export and distribute firearms; (ii) a register of ports of shipment and importation, including intermediate points; and (iii) national registers of individual and institutional firearms owners. The parties also agreed to use the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) Model Regulations framework to establish national data processing centres to monitor compliance. See, "A Multi-pronged Approach to Transnational Criminal Networks: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean," [http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working\\_papers/05JULIA.pdf](http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_papers/05JULIA.pdf) (accessed on 2 October 2015).

In 2004, the MERCOSUR countries also adopted a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the manufacture and illicit trafficking of firearms. This MoU was aimed at tackling illicit cross-border trafficking and promoting co-operation among national law enforcement authorities. MERCOSUR also conducts technical meetings between police and security forces on the problem of illicit trafficking in firearms to exchange information and share experiences.<sup>6</sup>

The approach taken by the AEFJN report is in line with the initiatives described above. However, such research should be undertaken with regularity, if it is to be of value. Donors and recipient governments in Africa should explore how to invest in such initiatives, especially to complement current reporting systems such as the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

### Lesson 3: Project design and tools should be tailored to local needs and capacities prior to the implementation of projects

Identifying the needs of a recipient of donor support does not necessarily mean that the recipient has the capacity to implement the requisite project. The needs of a recipient, whether it is a country or an organisation, and the capacity to utilise resources such as donor funds should be the guiding principles in determining whether and how a project should be funded and implemented. Furthermore, the implementation tools should be tailored to local capacities, including local technological capacities. In brief, both capacities and needs should be assessed when designing projects and determining implementation strategies.

6 \ Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/tools/ro-poa/profiles-of-regional-organizations/the-americas/mercosur.html> (accessed on 3 October 2015).

#### Box 4

##### RECSA Small Arms Marking Project

*In 2005, the UN recognised the important role that the marking, record keeping and tracing of arms play in strengthening national controls by adopting the International Tracing Instrument. This is a non-binding instrument that complements the provisions in the binding UN Firearms Protocol (2001). The general implementation of the marking and tracing process has been slow because the computerisation of records, which helps to enable a process in which each gun can be linked to its last legal user, has been problematic.<sup>7</sup>*

*The SALW marking project implemented by RECSA was launched in 2010 after the European Union (EU) provided €3 million for a three-year programme. In 2013, the EU extended the project for a further three years, providing an additional investment of €2.7 million. This is a trans-regional project managed by RECSA and co-ordinated by the African Union (AU). The project focuses on select countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the RECSA region (which covers the member states of the East African Community—EAC).<sup>8</sup>*

#### Box 5

##### Programme of Conventional Arms Control in Libya (2012 to 2017)

*This programme is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office and the European Union. The budget is €6.6 million. In its decision to support the project, the EU underscored the need for capacity-building in Libya as a prerequisite for implementing the project. It declared that*

*It is necessary to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, Libyan ownership in implementing PSSM activities, in line with the core principles of national ownership and effective empowerment of local partners. Accordingly, the Programme seeks to involve relevant Libyan stakeholders, including, as appropriate, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and other relevant actors, in PSSM activities. GIZ will provide operational support and technical advice to the key partners of the Programme (European Council, 2013, .*

*The objectives of the programme are to provide support to Libyan state institutions to:*

- \ exercise control over conventional weapons in-country,
- \ minimise the flow of such weapons,
- \ manage security-related challenges resulting from the war.

7 \ Marking and Tracing, <http://www.iansa.org/workarea/marking-and-tracing> (accessed on 3 October 2015).

8 \ Additional EU Funding for Small Arms Project, <http://www.recsasec.org/index.php/en/what-we-do/european-union-eu> (accessed on 2 October 2015).

**Box 6****Implementation tools for SALW programmes:  
Examples from SAS and the ISS**

In 2006, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) developed a set of small arms identity (ID) cards to help in the identification and reporting of firearms. The cards were designed to assist researchers, peacekeepers and other practitioners working in the field with the visual identification of a select number of firearms likely to be encountered during their work. The cards were designed to be practical and useful in situations of contemporary armed conflict but also in cases of armed crime. It was hoped that the ID cards would help field workers to increase the accuracy of their SALW reports and that the ensuing identification of patterns and similarities would help policymakers to design more targeted interventions. According to SAS, the cards were requested by peacekeepers and researchers in Afghanistan and Uganda.<sup>9</sup> SAS introduced a similar initiative in 2010 as part of the Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) initiative<sup>10</sup>. The cards contained images of guns, provided information on calibre and were meant to create awareness amongst users. This initiative was undertaken as part of a "Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) best practices" initiative in general, and was intended to promote better understanding of the importance of stockpile management. Again in 2012, SAS introduced marking, record-keeping, and tracing implementation support cards, which were designed to promote the easy understanding and use of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). It was a project that was also designed to contribute to the enhancement of the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) best practices initiative. The project received financial support from the United States Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. However, after producing the cards widely and in various languages (including French, Russian, and Spanish), SAS seems to have realised that the same could be done better through a virtual system, in line with advances in technology. In this regard, SAS seems to be gradually moving away from the card system to an electronic database. It notes,

*In response to growing demand for small arms identification resources, the Survey redesigned its Small Arms ID Cards into a comprehensive visual identification system... and features downloadable Weapons ID Sheets, which detail the visual information required to accurately identify and record particular types of weapons.<sup>11</sup>*

9 \ Identification and support cards, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/id-cards.html> (accessed on 10 October 2015).

10 \ Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction, <http://www.rasrinitiative.org/> (accessed on 10 October 2015).

11 \ The Weapons ID Database, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/tools/weapons-id-database.html> (accessed on 16 November 2015).

*In a similar vein, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has developed guidelines to help countries implement various international arms control regimes. One such recent guide is a publication on the ratification and implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). However, no clear framework is provided on how the intended beneficiaries of the publication could be encouraged to adopt the product. According to the author of the report, interpretation of how to use the guidelines seems to be dependent upon a country's own interpretation of what it needs,*

*... Since the issues addressed are only of a general nature, countries need to take their own constitutional and legislative system, as well as their political and strategic environments into account when considering the changes that need to be made to ensure compliance with the ATT (Coetzee, 2014)*

*The reality however is that although ISS uses the ATT guide in projects aimed at building the capacity of African states in line with the objectives of the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), the process is not structured along any specific guidelines. It would be equally useful for ISS to package the ATT guide into a simplified virtual guide, possibly with audio explanation, or any other technologically relevant format that would increase the visibility of the tool.*

**Comment**

The essential purpose of marking arms is to enable a process of weapons tracing which is both effective and timely. This process allows countries to properly control the flows of arms not only within their territories, but also of arms entering the country. The aim of arms marking, according to the United Nations, is to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) (United Nations, 2006). The intention is that all legal guns should be marked and the data on each weapon stored in such a way that facilitates expeditious retrieval whenever needed. Tracing is the systematic tracking of illicit weapons from their source (the manufacturer, or last legal importer, or last legal owner) through the lines of supply, to the point of diversion to illicit markets.<sup>12</sup> Tracing is a useful element of arms control because once the point of diversion is identified, countries can apply preventative measures to mitigate the weakness.

The approach of using sub-regional implementing partners (such as the RECs and UN agencies) as discussed above in Lesson 1 seems to show promise.

12 \ Marking and Tracing, <http://www.iansa.org/workarea/markings-and-tracing> (accessed on 12 October 2015).

This is especially so as it can foster confidence and co-operation at the regional level which may in turn lead to better cross-border controls. However, this can only be successful where the needs and capacities of recipients coalesce.

RECSA has been implementing a project on the marking of arms in its member states. A major lesson to be drawn from the RECSA initiative is the need to treat each country individually, by identifying capacities, existing systems and obstacles that might impede the marking process before marking machines are made available. As noted by Bevan and King (2013) in considering lessons learned from this project, most countries in the region began marking weapons in their capital cities before rolling out the process in the countryside. The challenges relating to this roll-out were not anticipated, and hampered the full implementation of the process. Shortcomings include the misallocation of budgets and unanticipated increases in transport logistics. The report identifies four phases of the marking process, of which only two were successfully catered for, while the other two phases faltered.<sup>13</sup>

In a review of the successes and challenges encountered during RECSA's arms marking project, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) and the Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) note that despite the implementation of the marking process,

*... Levels of tracing activity...based on PoA national reports, shows that 9 countries are strong and 17 moderate in international cooperation in tracing.*

13 \ Phase 1 - requires start-up resources, including expenditure on training, marking machines, IT infrastructure, software and the allocation of fixed assets such as offices and marking spaces in military or police facilities. Phase 2 consists of weapons marking in capital cities (for example, at police and military facilities or civilian registries). Resource requirements are relatively light, because neither marking machines nor weapons have to be transported over long distances. Phase 3 involves the deployment of marking teams into the countryside. Distances increase as the teams move further afield, and resource expenditure - on vehicles, fuel, personnel and subsistence allowances. Phase 4 begins when the state has marked its entire existing weapons stockpile and begins to mark weapons it imports by installing marking machines in the facilities where the weapons are unpacked and catalogued - and before they are deployed to military or police personnel. See the report, "Making a Mark: Reporting on Firearms Marking in the RECSA Region," <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR19-Making-a-Mark-RECSA.pdf> (accessed on 15 October 2015).

*Among RECSA countries, only one (Rwanda) was assessed as strong (SAS / GRIP, 2013, p. 24).*

The report adds that within Africa, only three states have explicitly clear legislative measures concerning small arms marking and have reported success in marking state and civilian small arms, i.e. Botswana, Egypt and South Africa. Other challenges include operating costs, lack of funds, logistical difficulties regarding the transportation of marking machines, non-operational marking machines and/or software, an absence of national action plans, and a lack of policies which prioritise the marking of arms (ibid., p. 23).

From the above analysis, RECSA's initiative to support the marking of SALW regionally appears to be a step in the right direction in controlling the illicit proliferation of SALW. Arms marking and registration would indeed ease the burden of tracing. However, given the challenges faced by countries participating in the RECSA project, it appears that the sequencing of the marking process may not have been properly planned. Perhaps it should have been preceded by not only building the capacity of national stakeholders but also by ensuring that the necessary conditions for implementation were already in place. These conditions include the national level political support, the development of relevant legislation, an enabling logistical environment (for the transportation of machines to various parts of the recipient country), and the identification of software which is both affordable and adaptable to the local context.

The RECSA project serves as a practical lesson that illuminates the challenges that regional organisations may encounter at the national level. Such challenges become increasingly severe in situations where national priorities and commitments are not aligned with the objectives of donors or implementing partners. Such potential constraints should be identified at the project design stage, with plans to alleviate these constraints put in place prior to the implementation of projects.

Contrary to the RECSA example, the EU project to strengthen PSSM practices in Libya demonstrates more appropriate sequencing. Although this project stalled owing to the recent political upheaval in Libya,

a review of the decision of the European Commission (EC) shows that the Commission recognised the need to involve relevant Libyan stakeholders such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and other relevant actors, in PSSM activities. The EU project also took into account the importance of working with an implementing partner able to identify immediate needs and build capacity before implementing a project. Indeed, according to the EC decision, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) would provide operational support and technical advice to the key partners of the programme. This is a commendable approach as it encourages capacity-building and inclusivity in implementation. The local buy-in is highly likely to success, hence sustainability of the programme.

Finally, and as evidenced by the example of the Small Arms Survey's ID and Best Practice cards mentioned above, attempts to develop tools that support both research and policy implementation processes are important. This is not least because such initiatives have the potential to enhance the capacity of the recipient while also inculcating a spirit of co-operation between donor, implementing partner and beneficiary. However, how such tools serve countries and implementing institutions is difficult to measure, especially through a review such as this, as there is seldom sufficient information documenting the use of such tools.

As mentioned above, to meet their objectives, such tools must be tailored to the different needs of different local users, be made available in relevant languages, and be packaged and disseminated in simplified formats to ensure that they are relevant to, and can be accepted by the user community. Depending on technological capacity, it is likely that "apps" will be the next stage in the development of SAS's tools.

## Lesson 4: Projects should be protected, where possible, from changes in donor priorities and internal donor restructuring

Donor countries and institutions, like other structures, are vulnerable to internal changes, including changes in political priorities, institutional re-alignment, etc. Two examples relating to the EU are used to illustrate this lesson. The first relates to the funding of an ECOWAS SALW project, and the impact a change of policy within the EU had on this project. In the second example, the approach adopted by the EU presents a positive illustration of how projects may be protected from internal changes.

### Box 7

#### *Donor restructuring and ECOWAS*

*The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 15 member states, which are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.*

*Between 2004 and 2005, SALW funding for ECOWAS was an issue of controversy within EU aid policy. The controversy centred on whether small arms assistance to ECOWAS should be provided under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (on the basis of the EU treaty) or, as the European Commission argued, within the framework of Community Development Cooperation Policy. In February 2005, the European Commission asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to nullify the Council decision providing financial and technical support to ECOWAS initiatives in fighting SALW proliferation to ECOWAS (European Council, 2004). These funds were released only in 2008 when the ECJ passed a judgment in favour of the European Commission. Subsequently, the EU released €597 million to ECOWAS for a five-year plan for the period 2008 to 2013.<sup>14</sup>*

14 \ EU relations with the Economic Community of West African States, [http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/ecowas/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/ecowas/index_en.htm) (accessed on 18 October 2015).

**Box 8****EU Small Arms Strategy and Multi-Year Funding Approach**

*One further aspect of the donor–recipient relationship that influences the trajectory of funded projects is how donors implement common positions and co-operate in relation to recipients of their support. A case in point is how the EU has ensured that the “EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition” keeps pace with changes in the field of SALW, including new regulatory instruments, without hurting the expectations of its funding recipients (Poitevin, 2013).*

*The EU Strategy, developed in 2005, seeks to build consensus in relevant international negotiations by strengthening policies related to both SALW norms and to carrying out bilateral small arms assistance projects with third countries. For example, the EU took part in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and events in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel have continued to be at the centre of its foreign policy. Given these developments, the EU constantly reviews its 2005 strategy in order to remain relevant to the realities of the day and, more particularly, to maintain the relevance of its SALW funding.*

*The EU also adopts a multi-year funding approach, which may include funding programmes for up to seven years. Projects may initially be funded for three years and extended based on mid-term reviews (usually undertaken by external parties), during which adjustments to project design may also be recommended.*

**Comment**

Although donor restructuring is sometimes unavoidable due to donors’ internal operations, its impact on recipients needs to be managed cautiously so as not to cause delays in envisaged projects. However, the impact of donor restructuring on the implementation of projects is difficult to generalise. For example, in the ECOWAS example cited above, it is unclear to what extent the delay in the release of the funding to ECOWAS may have affected the recipient countries, and whether any additional costs were associated with this situation. Nonetheless, there would likely have been higher risks associated with the delay had the funds been intended for emergency intervention. In contrast, the case of the EU small arms strategy shows how the organisation tries to minimise the potential negative impact of internal re-alignment on projects in recipient countries.

From the two case studies above (relating to the EU funding), it is apparent that the EU plays a dual role in global SALW matters—one, as a participant in policy and programme formulation and two, as a donor. As a participant in international policymaking processes, the EU and its member states are involved (alongside other UN member states) in negotiating new regulatory instruments on SALW, among other matters. Through negotiations at the UN level, the EU and recipient countries come to collective decisions on policy matters (e.g. on the adoption of the ATT and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms). The EU is then in a position to help other member states implement these agreements. However, to ensure that its focus is maintained and not subject to, for example, changes in member state priorities, the EU adopts policy instruments such as its Small Arms Strategy. Its multi-year funding approach also serves to protect recipients from policy or organisational changes. This approach, taken since 2005, has been shaped over time and appears to offer important benefits to recipients.

**Lesson 5: The over-funding and duplication of projects should be addressed through increased donor co-ordination and national planning**

There are cases where donors react to a specific situation by funding projects that are either the same or closely linked and that are implemented through the same local partner. This creates a bloated situation in which the capacity of the recipient/s to sustainably absorb funding is stretched. The resulting “donor-bloat”<sup>15</sup> risks either the under-utilisation of resources or their mismanagement. “Donor bloat” can also result from the failure of a donor to build the capacity of the recipient, as explained in Lesson 3 above. When analysing a variety of projects implemented in the countries reviewed in this study (see Annex), it appears that this phenomenon is more prevalent at the national

<sup>15</sup> “Donor bloat” is a term adopted for this Paper to explain the phenomenon in which a set of donors, unknowingly or otherwise, fund the same project or set of projects in similar or different ways, thereby creating parallel projects and duplicating efforts.

level than at the regional level. This trend also seems to be more common in emergency and/or humanitarian situations, where donors may wish to respond quickly.

### Box 9

#### The case of Libya

*In the aftermath of the Libyan civil war, a range of donors supported SALW programmes. Within the same time frame as the EU Non-proliferation Consortium, DanChurchAid (DCA) and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) were also implementing SALW programmes, while Switzerland was funding the UN Mine Action Service's (UNMAS) work in country. As these efforts continued, the Small Arms Survey was also conducting a study on SALW in Libya as was the German Federal Office (see Annex).*

*Demining is one area where efforts were made to reduce project duplication through improved co-ordination. The Libyan revolution of 2011 resulted in the widespread dispersion of landmines across the country. The problem of abandoned and unstable ordnance accompanied by the proliferation of SALW posed a very high risk to human security. Worse still, the civilian uprising that ensued led to the creation of improvised weaponry, unsafe storage and abandoned ordnance in areas to which the war spread. Abandoned ammunition storage sites allowed weapons and ordnance to become easily accessible, and, subsequent illicit SALW proliferation posed a danger to civilian populations.<sup>16</sup>*

*A number of demining agencies intervened in Libya. It is reported that in April 2011, the UN Mine Action Service partnered with non-governmental organisations including the Danish Demining Group, DanChurchAid, Handicap International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Norwegian People's Aid, MAG (Mines Advisory Group), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action and UNICEF to form a Joint Mine Action Committee Team. Noting the range of donor agencies focusing on demining and the fact that Libya lacked an institutional mechanism to co-ordinate these activities, the Libyan leadership at the time—the Rebel Freedom Fighters—created the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LMAC), which operates under the Ministry of Defence as a body through which the activities of demining agencies could be co-ordinated.*

*Despite this, the LMAC was still faced with the challenge of co-ordinating the huge influx of funds presented by the many organisations intervening in Libya. The impact of all these efforts in terms of the use of funds, and the success of demining efforts is not clear. Currently, LMAC is continuing to work on the creation of a system to co-ordinate all humanitarian mine action organisations in the country. This includes organising non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to co-ordinate their efforts so that they may work simultaneously without duplication of effort.<sup>17</sup>*

<sup>16</sup> \ See <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/libya>

<sup>17</sup> \ Country Profile: Libya, <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/16.3/profiles/ober.shtml> (accessed on 20 October 2015).

### Box 10

#### The case of Mali

*Since 2012, Mali has been the target of a range of funding and project activities implemented by international organisations. In 2014, Mali received €5.56 million from the EU, which was provided, "...recognising the urgent need for a comprehensive Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration across the Mano River and the Sahel Sahara regions in order to enhance security..." (UNDP, 2014). This was preceded, in 2013, by a project by Handicap International (HI), in which HI sent an explosive weapons expert to Mali to identify areas contaminated with explosive weapons and to prepare for clearance operations to protect the local population.<sup>18</sup> Between October 2013 and February 2014, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) also supported the UNMAS Mission in Mali with the survey and identification of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) as well as arms destruction.<sup>19</sup>*

### Comment

A general trend that can be observed in the funding of small arms control initiatives is that because donors react in crisis mode in response to a conflict situation, they find themselves in higher concentrations during and immediately after a conflict. This can sometimes overwhelm the capacity of the recipient country. It is specifically during such periods that the local and national institutions of government may be weakened, disorganised, considered illegitimate, or even completely absent. This makes the capacity to participate in, organise and institutionalise such interventions incredibly limited for the states involved.

Libya seems to have recognised the importance of creating a national structure to co-ordinate the work of demining agencies in good time. The existence of LMAC and the fact that it operates under the country's Ministry of Defence serves to manage the risks associated with a bloated donor environment, which include the duplication of efforts and non-optimal use of resources. This presents a good example of donor-recipient co-ordination. However, as Libya remains in flux, it remains too early to judge the ultimate successes of LMAC.

<sup>18</sup> \ See <http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/handicap-international-begin-clearing-explosives-mali>

<sup>19</sup> \ See <http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag-works/mali/#.VrHiAFLfmlR>.

The National Commission in Mali seems somewhat different. While it has established a set of objectives, it does not seem to actively co-ordinate donors or projects towards the achievement of these objectives. The powers of the National Commission are unclear in this regard. This is instructive for national governments who are recipients of donor funding and could serve as a lesson for national focal points and national commissions in Africa of the need to put in place institutions and systems able to co-ordinate funding and project SALW partners. Most importantly, national structures should serve the purpose of ensuring that donor funding serves national priorities and focus on directing funding so as to avoiding duplication.

For donors, the need for co-ordination is raised consistently in relation to all foreign aid provision and is not unique to this issue. In cases of crisis intervention, co-ordination may not be easy to achieve, yet should nonetheless be prioritised. Certain steps can also be taken to improve co-ordination, including joint needs assessments (conducted at the same time by different implementing agencies), and ongoing communication relating to project activities. This could be modelled along the same lines as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which brings together different humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.<sup>20</sup>

## Lesson 6: Risks should be identified and managed early rather than focus on crisis management

In general, there are more emergency intervention projects (those that respond to crisis or conflict) than there are preventive or early intervention initiatives. For instance, donor support on matters of arms control was not significantly visible in countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt prior to the “Arab Spring.” This indicates that less attention was paid to building these countries’ capacities in arms control pre-crisis, than to post-crisis situations. One indication of this is that the states of the Sahel region, including North

Africa, do not have a regional co-ordinating body to address SALW issues.

### Box 11

#### Egypt after the “Arab Spring”

*Between 2005 and 2010, little evidence can be found of major donor-funded projects on SALW in the Maghreb region. However, from 2011, following the events of the “Arab Spring,”<sup>21</sup> many donors intervened. In situations such as this, recipient governments may use the influx of aid as an opportunity to cast aspersions on foreign funding, terming it “external influence.” In some cases, this has led to the closure of donor offices in recipient countries, as was the case in Egypt in late 2011:*

*... the then ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) raided the local premises of a number of foreign organisations in Egypt – Freedom House, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Arab Centre for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP), and the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory accusing them of working illegally on Egyptian territory. As a result, KAS and Freedom House offices were closed, their work suspended, electronic devices confiscated, and many of their US and Egyptian employees were eventually tried in Egyptian courts (Elagati, 2013).*

*Perhaps if donors had begun engaging with the government of Egypt prior to the crisis, they would have gained greater acceptance, notwithstanding the changes in leadership. Similarly, could this have reduced the risk of weapons proliferating outside the conflict zone into neighbouring countries, as was the case for Libyan weapons entering Mali and other surrounding countries?*

### Comment

This lesson argues for preventative efforts in all countries to ensure that SALW initiatives are implemented so that states can honour their international obligations and ensure the security of their citizens. When conflict occurs, often with the need for emergency interventions to address the more direct risks, there are significant limitations to what can be achieved in this environment. Therefore, the old adage, “prevention is better than cure”, is more than

<sup>21</sup> “Arab Spring” refers to the democratic uprisings that arose independently and spread across the Arab world in 2011. The movement originated in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The protesters challenged the existing authoritarian regimes. See: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/arab+spring>

<sup>20</sup> \ Coordination, <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination/overview> (accessed on 26 October 2015).

appropriate here. Conversely, notwithstanding the risks noted, conflict may also create opportunities for external intervention that may not have previously existed, creating opportunities for prevention measures. Such opportunities may arise during the conflict as peacekeeping measures may be taken, or in the post-conflict environment, where a range of peacebuilding measures may be implemented, including in the context of peace agreements. For example, measures such as incorporating SALW control best practices may be integrated into security sector reform (SSR) processes.<sup>22</sup>

The Egyptian experience was replicated across other Arab countries in North Africa that suffered similar conflicts such as Tunisia and Libya (see the Annex for further information).

## **Lesson 7: Public information should be provided by donors and beneficiary governments throughout the lifespan of a project**

It is common to observe from this online review that projects receive more publicity when they are being launched than during their implementation and closure. Examples of well-publicised launches include those of the joint UNDP, EU and ECOWAS project to boost the fight against the proliferation of small arms in West Africa (UNDP, 2014), and also the launch of the Africa-EU Partnership on disarmament<sup>23</sup>, which is the first Pan-African project on SALW to be funded by the European Union (SAS & GRIP, 2013). Yet, information relating to project progress and closure of these projects is limited or non-existent.

### **Comment**

Extensive publicity around the launch of a project can be productive, in part because it creates public awareness of the fact that actions are being taken

towards achieving greater public security. However, this should be complemented by similar public information throughout the lifespan of a project, including its closure, in order to outline the project's achievements. There are great opportunities to build public confidence in government agencies and donors if project results (both positive and negative) as well as lessons learned are profiled. External communication should be incorporated into project design and take place throughout the lifespan of a project.

It appears that donors and government beneficiaries may be more focused on garnering attention at the inception stage of a project, after which both gradually become less interested in providing public information. It is unclear whether this may also be due to donors taking less of an interest in projects after their launch, with implementation being left to beneficiaries and implementing agencies. While allowing this kind of ownership is important, donor engagement throughout the lifespan of the project remains equally important to ensure that project objectives are met.

Overall, as discussed in the Methodology section above, deficits in the public availability of project documentation not only severely limit efforts to extract lessons from project interventions, but, as illustrated here, may also influence levels of public confidence in projects and in how public money is spent. Again, while it is likely that reports are produced for internal reporting purposes, making these available to the public should be an imperative that is taken seriously by both donors and beneficiary governments in the near future.

<sup>22</sup> \ Some of the preventative aspects that could be incorporated in the SSR programmes include training security agencies on stockpile security, construction of secure storage facilities (armouries), strengthening national legislation, public awareness campaigns and accountability in government security apparatus.

<sup>23</sup> \ The Africa-EU Partnership, <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/success-stories/co-operating-disarm> (accessed on 27 October 2015).

## Conclusions

This study has presented seven lessons that are intended to help donors working on issues of small arms control to maximise the impact of the financial and technical support they provide to recipient countries in Africa on SALW initiatives.

These lessons were drawn from an analysis of projects implemented in 16 Sahel countries. It is, however, important to note the range of limitations relating to this study, as detailed in the Methodology section above. As illustrated by the case studies accompanying each lesson, there is room for donors to improve in a number of ways if their efforts are to achieve maximum benefit.

In summary, the lessons presented in this study refer to a range of actions that should be noted of by the donors, implementers and beneficiaries of SALW intervention projects. These lessons are:

- 1\ Donors need to note that regional organisations can potentially have a positive impact on many stakeholders (member states) simultaneously, thereby creating cross-border linkages among countries. This is necessary for confidence-building and co-ordination among countries.
- 2\ Donors need to recognise and support innovative research that covers previously understudied areas of SALW control. One such area is an analysis of African countries with the capacity to manufacture and export arms and ammunition. The study by the Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN) proves that this kind of research can be conducted, particularly through Africa-based research institutions, or through joint ventures involving both Western and African-based institutions. This arrangement seems to increase the acceptability of the research by African governments, as demonstrated in the case of the AEFJN.
- 3\ It is advisable that donors undertake due diligence in determining the immediate needs and capacity-building requirements of recipient countries before rolling out a project. This helps to ensure the proper planning and sequencing of activities ahead of a project implementation process.
- 4\ It is equally important for donors to ensure that changes and re-alignments in their internal policies do not harm the programmes they are funding in recipient countries. One way of ensuring this is for the donor to engage with the recipient through all available avenues, especially through the UN, where multilateral negotiations on instruments related to the implementation of SALW processes are negotiated and adopted.
- 5\ Donor co-ordination is especially important in situations of crisis. The research revealed that at times several donors operating in the same field crowd the scene, only to end up duplicating efforts. This leads to an environment bloated with interventions well beyond the recipient state's absorption capacity. Improved donor co-ordination would easily eliminate this challenge.
- 6\ Donors should identify risks that have the potential to undermine projects and institute mitigating procedures before starting to implement such projects. It is always advisable to manage a problem when it is still a risk rather than when it has become a crisis.
- 7\ As a reflection on the entire study, this lesson argues that project documentation should be made publicly available from project inception to termination. The discussion has noted the positive outcomes that may be achieved when this approach is taken.

## Annex: Other Identified Programmes and Projects

Apart from the projects reviewed in the main report, this section comprises a listing of other projects related to small arms and light weapons (SALW) identified through the online review indicated in the Methodology section.

As discussed in the Methodology section, publicly available documentation on arms control projects can be extremely limited: sometimes there is as little as advertisements for consultants to undertake specific jobs in support of the project.

The brief descriptions provided below include projects at the regional and national level. Regional projects refer to those initiatives that have included two or more countries in a specific sub-region on the continent.

As will be seen from the projects profiled below, national projects were not identifiable in all of the 16 countries reviewed in terms of the methodology utilised. However, all 16 countries under review were identified through this review to have been included in SALW initiatives, often at the regional rather than the national level.

As has been noted in the Methodology section, the projects included below are by no means an exhaustive list of the initiatives undertaken in the countries under review.

### Projects on the regional level

#### Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) SALW Project

This project targeted ECOWAS member states.<sup>24</sup> Between 2004 and 2005, SALW funding for ECOWAS became an issue of controversy within EU aid management policy. The question was whether small arms assistance initiatives aimed at achieving the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)<sup>25</sup> rather than those of European Community

Development Co-operation Policy.<sup>26</sup> In February 2005, the Commission asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to nullify the Council decision providing financial and technical support to ECOWAS initiatives in fighting SALW proliferation to ECOWAS (European Council, 2004). It was only in 2008 that the ECJ passed a judgment in favour of the Commission with regard to matters of development co-operation. The EU eventually released €597 million to ECOWAS for a five-year plan (2008 to 2013).<sup>27</sup>

In September 2014, the EC provided ECOWAS with a further €2.9 million in support of the ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Project. This new funding, unlike the 2008 to 2013 project, has a wider coverage, but includes SALW initiatives (ECOWAS, 2014).

In yet another case, the EU and West Africa, represented by ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) entered into a six-year European Union-West Africa Regional Indicative Programme (2014 to 2020). Under this arrangement, the EU is to avail to West Africa €1 billion (€150 million between 2014 and 2020) (European Union, 2015).

#### UNSCAR (UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation)

UNSCAR is a multi-donor flexible funding mechanism operated by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Its objective is to fund projects aimed at supporting the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), including South-South co-operation on assistance.<sup>28</sup>

UNSCAR channels the funding through UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) partners, international organisations, NGOs, research institutes, including universities. Governments wishing to apply for funds through the Facility should work with eligible organisations to design and submit

24 \ ECOWAS Member States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. <http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/> (accessed on 26 October 2015)

25 \ European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm), accessed 8 December 2015

26 \ European Community development. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=uriserv:r12001>, accessed 8 December 2015

27 \ EU relations with the Economic Community of West African States, [http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/ecowas/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/ecowas/index_en.htm) (accessed on 28 October 2015).

28 \ <http://www.un.org/disarmament/UNSCAR/> (accessed on 11 October 2015).

project proposals. During the 2014 Call for Proposals (May to July 2014), UNSCAR received 57 proposals from qualified applicants. Eighteen (18) projects were funded through UNSCAR to be implemented in 2015/2016.<sup>29</sup>

#### **Regional Workshop on Arms Export Controls in Algeria: 28 to 29 October 2014**

This two-day workshop benefitted officials from government customs and licensing departments. Participants were from Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The objective of the workshop was for countries to discuss national practices and challenges in the field of arms control with a focus on the export of arms specifically.<sup>30</sup> It is unclear from available information whether this workshop was part of a broader project.

#### **Outreach Activities in the Field of Arms Export Controls: Lessons Learned and Way Forward**

This seminar brought together the North African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The initiative was part of the EU activities to promote the control of arms exports from EU member states to third countries. It took place from 17 to 18 December 2008 in Rabat, Morocco (BAFA, 2012). It is unclear from the available information whether this workshop was part of a broader project.

#### **OSCE Mediterranean Conference 2014**

This conference took place in Neum, Bosnia and Herzegovina from 27 to 28 October 2014. The theme was “Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons and Fight against Terrorism in the Mediterranean Region” (OSCE, 2014). Algeria, Morocco and Egypt were the only countries from Africa that participated, due to their proximity to the Mediterranean region. It took place under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

29 \ UNSCAR 2014 - 2015 Cycle: List of funded projects, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/UNSCAR-2014-Funded-Projects.pdf> (accessed on 17 October 2015).

30 \ Regional Workshop on Arms Export Controls in Algeria, <https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/News/ArtMID/481/ArticleID/203/Regional-Workshop-on-Arms-Export-Controls-in-Algeria>, accessed on 24 November 2015

#### **Project on Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding**

This project was aimed at the League of Arab States<sup>31</sup> in developing the capacities of its members through the establishment of a Crisis Response Centre. Of the Arab League’s 22 members, nine are African states (Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia), and five of these are included in this review (Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia).

The project was supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and was advertised online as a consultancy, with a deadline for application in April 2013. The terms of reference are wide, and they include an analysis of “...The role played by Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).”<sup>32</sup> There seems to be no further information online that indicates progress and outcomes of this project.

#### **League of Arab States–German Federal Foreign Office: Workshop on SALW Control and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)**

In a speech by German Ambassador and Federal Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control at a workshop on “Small Arms and Light Weapons control and Confidence Building Measures” in May 2013 at the Arab League, Germany renewed its commitment to support Egypt and other Arab States in the war against SALW proliferation.<sup>33</sup> It is unknown what support may have resulted from this commitment.

#### **ECOSAP support**

ECOWAS co-ordinates its SALW activities under the guidance of the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP). In its 2010 annual report, the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA)

31 \ The League of Arab States consists of 22 members: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

32 \ Consultancy Services For Conflict Analysis And Peace-Building In Egypt, <https://www.devex.com/projects/tenders/institutional-contract-conflict-analysis-and-peace-building-training/124371> (accessed on 27 November 2015).

33 \ Opening Speech by Ambassador Nickel, Federal Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2013/130513-Nikel.html?nn=424204> (accessed on 28 November 2015).

continued to receive support from ECOSAP for national co-ordination and community mobilisation by the civil society organisations (CSOs) in support of SALW projects.

### **Joint EU-ECOWAS-UNDP project on the fight against SALW proliferation**

In May 2015, the EU, UNDP and ECOWAS held a meeting under the aegis of the Commission Nationale pour le Contrôle et la Collecte des Armes Illicites (CNCCAI) in Niamey, Niger. The objective was to validate Niger's national strategy on SALW, as part of the greater Mano River Union project that the EU is funding with a budget of €5.56 million.<sup>34</sup>

### **European Union support to Nigeria.**

In November 2015, the EU and ECOWAS announced a new initiative known as "ECOWAS-European Union Small Arms Project." The objective is to support activities on arms control in a number of countries in the ECOWAS region. Through this project, the EU seeks to contribute towards "consolidation of good governance and regional stability," and is also known as EU-West Africa Regional Indicative Programme.<sup>35</sup>

### **Workshop by the Club of Sahel, ECOWAS and OECD**

In October 2007, the three parties held a four-day workshop in Dakar. The objective was to assess the implementation of various regional instruments and local mechanisms available for doing so. Groupe Agence de Développement, Agence Canadienne de Développement International and Organisation Internationale de la francophonie funded the workshop (Agboton Johnson, 2007).

34 \ La CEDEAO, l'Union Européenne et le PNUD joignent leurs efforts pour appuyer la lutte contre les armes légères et de petit calibre au Niger, <http://www.ne.undp.org/content/niger/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2015/alpc.htm> (accessed on 29 November 2015).

35 \ ECOWAS-European Union Small Arms Project, <http://newtelegraphonline.com/nigeria-to-benefit-from-eu-small-arms-project/> (accessed on 26 November 2015).

## **Projects at the national level**

### **Burkina Faso**

#### **RESEARCH ON SALW PROLIFERATION IN BURKINA FASO**

In 2009, research was published by the Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement on the proliferation of SALW (Yameogo, 2009). The study made reference to other countries in the region, but also presented specific empirical information on Burkina Faso.

#### **REPORT ON STATISTICS OF SALW IN BURKINA FASO**

According to a statement by the UN Special Rapporteur released in April 2013,<sup>36</sup> and confirmed by the country's Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères (CNLPAL), approximately two million illegal SALW were in circulation in Burkina Faso, which has a population of about 17 million inhabitants.

### **Cameroon**

#### **TRAINING WORKSHOP FOR WOMEN ON VIOLENCE AND SALW**

The workshop was organised by the government of Cameroon in collaboration with the Secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). It took place in Yaoundé in February 2015. The objective was to build the capacity of civil society with respect to the implementation of the Kinshasa Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons—aimed at curbing the proliferation of SALW in Central Africa.<sup>37</sup> The workshop was specifically of interest due to its focus on women.

36 \ Statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13227&LangID=E#sthash.wadojyxj.dpuf>

37 \ Training Workshop in Cameroon: Women, Violence and SALW, <http://cps-avip.org/capacity-building/2015/training-workshop-cameroon-women-violence-and-salw> (accessed on 27 October 2015).

## Central African Republic (CAR)

### DDR ET ARMES LÉGÈRES PROGRAMME DE CONTRÔLE ET DE RÉDUCTION DES ARMES LÉGÈRES (2006–2009)

This UNDP-led initiative aimed to reduce the circulation of arms among civilians. They implemented projects such as “Arms for Development,” in which arms were exchanged for development projects. The project targeted 50 000 arms that were circulating amongst civilians. However, there is no report available online that reviews the achievements of this project, including the number of arms collected.<sup>38</sup>

### CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

GRIP and SAS (2014) conducted this capacity assessment study in 2014, which focused on the fight against the proliferation of small arms in the CAR. The report was for the benefit of the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, and part of a larger project under the UN Mine Action Services (UNMAS). It is unclear how the results of the study have been used to benefit the country.

### REPORT ON CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR) AND SMALL ARMS

This report by the Small Arms Survey (SAS) and GRIP (2014), is a baseline study on the proliferation of SALW in the CAR., published in July 2014. It is additionally intended to benefit the peacekeeping operations and security sector reform processes in the country.

## Chad

### CHAD'S CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS MINE CLEARANCE

Between 2008 and 2012, Chad contributed almost US \$12 million to its mine action programme.<sup>39</sup> This is an exemplary show of commitment for a country that is still faced with many other human security challenges.

38 \ DDR et Armes Légères Programme de Contrôle et de Réduction des Armes Légères 2006-2009, [http://www.bibliomines.org/fileadmin/tx\\_bibliodocs/DDR\\_et\\_armes\\_legeres\\_en\\_centrafrique.pdf](http://www.bibliomines.org/fileadmin/tx_bibliodocs/DDR_et_armes_legeres_en_centrafrique.pdf).

39 \ Chad - Support for Mine Action, <http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2014/chad/support-for-mine-action.aspx>

### EU FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

In 2012, the European Union provided US \$3.2 million to Chad in the form of international assistance towards mine clearance. Other donors towards this effort included Finland and Switzerland.<sup>40</sup>

### MINE CLEARANCE PROJECT (2014 TO 2016)

In late 2014, MAG initiated a mine clearance project in the northern regions of Chad. The project is funded by the European Commission. The project aims to foster safety in Chad by clearing areas of landmines and unexploded ordnances as well as through building Chad's national capacity to deal with the issue by training members of Chad's National Demining Centre.<sup>41</sup>

## Côte d'Ivoire

### GERMAN FEDERAL FOREIGN OFFICE FUNDING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

This project runs from 2011 to 2016 and its objective is to support the national commission (ComNat) in implementing actions on SALW.<sup>42</sup> Details of the budget for the project are not provided online.

### COMNAT ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT 2013

This seems to be the only annual activity report of the ComNat that is accessible online (ComNat-ALPC, 2013). It presents the activities covered in 2013, the challenges and lessons learned. The report acknowledges the following partners: GIZ, UNDP, the Government of Japan, the Government of Australia, UN, EU, RECSA and ECOWAS.

### SMALL ARMS SURVEY NATIONAL REPORT

This report is dated 2012 and it provides information and analysis on the state of SALW proliferation in the country. The data collection was undertaken in the period 2010/2011 before the political crisis took place (de Tessières, 2012).

40 \ *ibid.*

41 \ Chad: <http://www.maginternational.org/mag/en/where-mag-works/chad/#.Vq9F8VLfmk8>

42 \ Support for the national commission for the control of small arms and light weapons in Côte d'Ivoire, <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/19304.html> (accessed on 29 November 2015).

#### **PROJECT ON SALW PROLIFERATION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY**

This project was initiated in 2012 and was initially funded by the Government of Japan at a budget of US \$4,764,000 in 2012, followed by another amount of US \$2,508,147 in the year 2013.<sup>43</sup>

#### **Guinea**

##### **EUROPEAN UNION PROJECT ON SALW**

In November 2015, Guinea announced that it had received funding from the EU as part of the seven-country funding for a three-year project (2015 to 2017). The objective of the fund is to support community and border security by encouraging voluntary disarmament. The total fund is €5.5 million.<sup>44</sup>

##### **PROJECT TO COMBAT ILLEGAL PROLIFERATION OF SALW**

This project was recorded as having been launched in October (year unknown). It listed three objectives: to initiate a community radio project, educate the public on the dangers of SALW, and to conduct voluntary civilian disarmament by exchanging SALW for development projects.<sup>45</sup> No further information is available online relating to this project.

#### **Libya**

##### **EUROPEAN UNION (EU) INITIATIVE**

This is an initiative of the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium (Poitevin, 2013) set out in an EU decision taken in June 2013 with the aim of assisting the Libyan government to strengthen the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of state-held SALW and ammunition. It is a five-year project co-financed by the EU (€5 million) and the German Federal Foreign Office (€1.6 million).

43 \ Programme d'Appui à la Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (ALPC) et à la Sécurisation Communautaire," [http://www.ci.undp.org/content/cote\\_divoire/fr/home/operations/projects/democratic\\_governance/project\\_sample1121.html](http://www.ci.undp.org/content/cote_divoire/fr/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/project_sample1121.html). (accessed on 30 November 2015)

44 \ Armes légères: L'UE appuie la Guinée, <http://www.guineeconakry.info/article/detail/armes-legeres-lue-appuie-la-guinee/> (accessed on 29 November 2015).

45 \ Gaoual: lancement des activités de lutte contre la circulation des armes légères <http://www.agpguinee.com/fichiers/livre.php?pseudo=rub17&langue=fr&code=calb1780&num=5073>

The German Agency for International Co-operation is implementing the project.

##### **SMALL ARMS SURVEY STUDY ON THE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT (PSSM) OF SALW**

This study provides a brief overview of the PSSM practices adopted by Misrata revolutionary brigades in Libya, which controlled an estimated 75 to 85 per cent of non-state combatants and weapon stockpiles following the uprising against Muammar Qaddafi's regime in 2011. The focus of the study was to establish how brigades have remained active and prominent armed actors well after the end of the 2011 Libyan civil war, with the aim of establishing their PSSM procedures several months after the conflict had ceased (Small Arms Survey, 2013).

##### **SECURITY, PROTECTION AND STABILIZATION PROGRAMME**

This was an initiative of DanChurchAid (DCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC). In June 2013, the EC provided Libya with funding of €5 million. The programme focused on securing stockpiles in conventional weapons and ammunition, as well as SALW risk reduction (European Union, 2014). The project increased the focus on national capacity-building and training for national mine action actors (Wichmann & Millard, 2014).

##### **PROGRAMME ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN LIBYA (2012 TO 2017)**

This Programme is funded by the German Federal Foreign Office and the European Union. The budget is €6.6 million. As a way of ensuring Libyan ownership in implementing PSSM activities, in line with the core principles of national ownership and effective empowerment of local partners, the Programme seeks to involve relevant Libyan stakeholders, including, as appropriate, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and other relevant actors, in PSSM activities. The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) will provide operational support and technical advice to the key partners of the Programme (European Union, 2013).

#### HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL'S SALW RISK AWARENESS PROJECT IN LIBYA (2011 TO 2012)

UNMAS<sup>46</sup>, along with organisations such as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and Handicap International (HI) have conducted risk education programmes aimed at the Libyan population in areas affected by the proliferation of SALW (Handicap international, 2012). The objectives of these programmes are to raise awareness around the dangers posed by SALW, thereby minimising the risks these posed to civilians in contaminated areas.

#### Mali

#### NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON THE CONTROL OF SALW (2014 TO 2018)

With the technical support of UNREC, Mali has adopted a five-year national action plan (2014–2018) to combat SALW. Financial support for the development of this plan was provided by the German government (UNREC, n.d.).

#### COMMUNITY LIAISON AND RISK EDUCATION

This set of projects has been financially supported by Good Gifts, the Swiss government and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). MAG implements this work, and describes its focus as

*reducing the risk of death and injury in communities through the delivery of Community-Based Risk Reduction strategies, the establishment of a network of Community Focal Points (CFPs) and the delivery of targeted Risk Education messages amongst IDP, returnee and resident populations in northern Mali.*<sup>47</sup>

#### ARMS MANAGEMENT AND DESTRUCTION

This is implemented as part of MAG's regional programme in the Sahel-Maghreb. It has been running an Arms Management and Destruction Programme in Mali since 2013, which is supported by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Department's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.<sup>48</sup>

46 \ Humanitarian Mine Action, <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/libya>. (accessed on 19 October 2015).

47 \ See <http://www.maginternational.org/where-mag-works/mali/#.VrHeNVLfmlQ>

48 \ First Weapons Are Cut As Arms Management and Destruction Pro-

#### UN MINE ACTION SERVICE (UNMAS) IN MALI

Following the outbreak of armed conflict in Mali in 2012, Japan, France, the United Kingdom (through UNMAS) and Sweden (through the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) contributed US \$7,681,063 to Mali to begin a mine action programme in order to train the Malian Defence and Security Forces in explosive ordnance disposal.<sup>49</sup>

In January 2013, UNMAS deployed a rapid response capacity to Mali at the request of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in order to conduct an emergency assessment of the situation with regard to explosive threats and in support of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 (GICHD, 2015).

#### Mauritania

#### PROJECT ON DESTRUCTION OF SURPLUS SALW IN MAURITANIA (2011 TO 2012)

Through this project, HI assisted in the safe destruction of ammunition and weapons identified as decommissioned or obsolete by the Mauritanian army. Fundraising was done through the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund for Mauritania, and a budget of €2.25 was established. Italy led the Trust Fund, with contributions from Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as Germany, which was not part of the Trust Fund (Houliat, 2014).

#### SWEDISH-FUNDED PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED BY MINE ACTION

From 2006, the following projects were implemented:

- \ Technical Surveys, Demining and Cluster Battle Area Clearance Operations in Mauritania. (2011 to 2014) . The budget was \$1,079,653, and implementing partners were the UNDP, Programme National de Développement Humaine Durable (PNDHD), Corps of Army Engineers and the project duration was March 2011 to March 2014.

gramme Begins in Mali <http://www.maginternational.org/our-impact/news/guncutting-programme-opens-in-mali/#.Vq9cz1Lfmk8>

49 \ "Mali -Support for Mine Action." At: <http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/mali/support-for-mine-action.aspx>. Accessed on 26 November 2015.

- \ Victim Assistance in Mauritania” was implemented at a cost of US \$510,000. Implementing Partners were PNDHD, UNICEF, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the country’s Ministry of Health. The project ran from March 2011 to December 2015.
- \ A project on “Mine Risk Education for Nomads in Mauritania.” The budget was \$295,000 and the implementing partners were the Network of national NGOs. The project started in March 2011 but the closing date is incorrectly recorded as 2010 (UNMAS, UNDP & UNICEF, 2011).

#### PROJECT ON HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT IN MAURITANIA

This project was undertaken by the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), with the funding of the government of Japan and established in April 2013. With NPA’s support, Mauritania declared its compliance with Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2014, ahead of the clearance deadline of 1 January 2016 for states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>50</sup>

#### Niger

##### MAG AND HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL PROJECT ON PHYSICAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

In December 2015, HI advertised for the post of project head in Niger. The recruit would act as advisor and link between the Armed Forces of Niger and CNCCAI on matters of stockpile safety.<sup>51</sup> The project is funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement as well as by the government of Germany.

##### UNDOC AND UNODA FIREARM MARKING PROJECT

In September 2014, the UN United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) donated three marking machines to the government of Niger. This was followed by training that also involved UNREC. The UNODC stated,

50 \ Humanitarian Disarmament in Mauritania, <http://www.npaid.org/Our-Work/Countries-we-work-in/Africa/Humanitarian-Disarmament-in-Mauritania> (accessed on 27 November 2015).

51 \ Chef der Projet - Niger, <https://unjobfinder.org/jobs/146406>

*These activities are part of the Global Programme on Firearms and the UNODC Contribution to UN Strategy on the Sahel which aims to fight against transnational organised crime, including terrorism, illicit trafficking firearms and corruption...*<sup>52</sup>

#### Nigeria

##### SMALL ARMS SURVEY RESEARCH

In 2007, SAS released a paper titled “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective.” The objective of the research was to raise awareness about issues of insecurity, armed violence, and the proliferation of illicit small arms in Nigeria since the return to democracy in 1999 (Hazen, 2007).

#### Senegal

##### TRAINING OF JOURNALISTS ON THE AREA OF SALW CONTROL

In March 2015, ECOWAS, in collaboration with la Commission Nationale sur les Armes Légères (ComNat) du Sénégal offered training on SALW proliferation to a group of about 30 journalists in Dakar. The objective of the training was to jointly explore ways in which journalists would play a positive role in disseminating information to the public regarding the negative impact of SALW.<sup>53</sup>

##### UNODC AND COMNAT COLLABORATE TO REVIEW LEGISLATION ON SALW

In September 2014, UNODC held a joint workshop with the COMNAT in Dakar in an effort to review Senegal’s 1966 law on SALW and to facilitate the destruction of arms that are not in state use. The project budget stood at four billion CFA.<sup>54</sup>

52 \ UNODC and its partners facilitate the process of marking and registration of small arms and light weapons in Niger, <https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/markings-and-registration-of-small-arms-in-niger.html>. (accessed on 30 November 2015).

53 \ La CEDEAO forme des journalistes sénégalais sur les Armes légères et de petit calibre, <http://www.panapress.com/La-CEDEAO-forme-des-journalistes-senegalais-sur-les-Armes-legeres-et-de-petit-calibre--12-900740-99-lang1-index.html> (accessed on 30 November 2015).

54 \ Contre la circulation des armes légères : Le Sénégal chiffre sa guerre à 4 milliards, <http://www.lifxew.com/2014/09/contre-circulation-armes-legeres-senegal-chiffre-guerre-4-milliards/> (accessed on 29 November 2015).

## Sudan

### SMALL ARMS SURVEY BORDER STUDY (SUDAN–DRC)

This is a baseline assessment report, published in 2007. It explores the unregulated small arms trade on the western part of the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, and the influence that armed conflict has had on this trade. The research was funded by the governments of Canada and the United Kingdom (Marks, 2007).

## Tunisia

### MINE CLEARANCE

In 2009, Tunisia reported the clearance of nine major minefields, in accordance with its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. Activities were overseen by the National Implementation Committee for the Mine Ban Treaty while the Tunisian army was responsible for the actual clearance of the mines.<sup>55</sup>

### SMALL ARMS SURVEY ASSESSMENT

In 2013, Small Arms Survey (SAS) published a security assessment report titled, “On the Edge? Trafficking and Insecurity at the Tunisian-Libyan Border.” (Kartas, 2013). This report reviewed the proliferation of SALW along the Tunisia-Libya border region and was funded by the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. SAS runs a broader project known as “Security Assessment in North Africa”,<sup>56</sup> with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and additional financial support from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The project also received earlier support from the German Federal Foreign Office.

55 \ Mine Action – contamination and impact, [http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region\\_profiles/theme/19](http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/19) (accessed on 26 October 2015).

56 \ Security Assessment in North Africa, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/focus-projects/security-assessment-in-north-africa.html>

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

|             |  |             |
|-------------|--|-------------|
| ACIJLP      | Arab Centre for Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession   | ACIJLP      |
| AEFJN       | Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network  | AEFJN       |
| ATT         | Arms Trade Treaty  | ATT         |
| AU          | African Union  | AU          |
| BICC        | Bonn International Center for Conversion   | BICC        |
| CAR         | Central African Republic   | CAR         |
| CASA        | United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms   | CASA        |
| CFSP        | Common Foreign and Security Policy   | CFSP        |
| CNLPAL      | Commission nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères  | CNLPAL      |
| ComNat-ALPC | Commission nationale de lutte contre la prolifération et la circulation illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre | ComNat-ALPC |
| CNCCAI      | Commission Nationale pour le Contrôle et la Collecte des Armes Illicites   | CNCCAI      |
| CSBMs       | Confidence and Security Building Measures  | CSBMs       |
| CSOs        | Civil society organisations  | CSOs        |
| DCA         | DanChurchAid   | DCA         |
| DRC         | Danish Refugee Council   | DRC         |
| EAC         | East African Community   | EAC         |
| EC          | European Commission  | EC          |
| ECCAS       | Economic Community of Central African States   | ECCAS       |
| ECJ         | European Court of Justice  | ECJ         |
| ECOSAP      | ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme  | ECOSAP      |
| ECOWAS      | Economic Community of West African States  | ECOWAS      |
| EOD         | Explosive ordnance disposal  | EOD         |
| GICHD       | Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining  | GICHD       |
| GIZ         | Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit  | GIZ         |
| GRIP        | Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité  | GRIP        |
| HI          | Handicap International   | HI          |
| ICICAD      | Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission   | ICICAD      |
| ID          | Identity card  | ID          |

|          |  |          |
|----------|--|----------|
| IRI      | International Republican Institute                                 | IRI      |
| ISS      | Institute for Security Studies                                     | ISS      |
| ITI      | International Tracing Instrument                                   | ITI      |
| KAS      | Konrad Adenauer Stiftung   | KAS      |
| LMAC     | Libyan Mine Action Centre  | LMAC     |
| M&E      | Monitoring and Evaluation  | M&E      |
| MAG      | Mines Advisory Group   | MAG      |
| MERCOSUR | Southern Common Market countries                                   | MERCOSUR |
| NDI      | National Democratic Institute                                      | NDI      |
| NGO      | Non-governmental organisation                                      | NGO      |
| OCHA     | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs                | OCHA     |
| OECD     | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development             | OECD     |
| PNDHD    | Programme National de Développement Humaine Durable                | PNDHD    |
| PSSM     | Physical security and stockpile management                         | PSSM     |
| RASR     | Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction Initiative                | RASR     |
| RECSA    | United Nations Regional Centre on Small Arms                       | RECSA    |
| SADC     | Southern African Development Community                             | SADC     |
| SALW     | Small arms and light weapons                                       | SALW     |
| SAS      | Small Arms Survey  | SAS      |
| SIPRI    | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute                   | SIPRI    |
| SSR      | Security sector reform   | SSR      |
| UN       | United Nations   | UN       |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Programme                               | UNDP     |
| UNICEF   | United Nations Children's Fund                                     | UNICEF   |
| UNMAS    | United Nations Mine Action Service                                 | UNMAS    |
| UNODA    | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs                      | UNODA    |
| UNODC    | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime                           | UNODC    |
| UNPoA    | United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons | UNPoA    |

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|        |   |        |
|--------|---|--------|
| UNREC  | United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa      | UNREC  |
| UNSCAR | United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation | UNSCAR |
| UNSCR  | United Nations Security Council Resolution                              | UNSCR  |
| WAANSA | West African Action Network on Small Arms                               | WAANSA |

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