Observations from a Visit to Syria: Reconstruction, Social Fragmentation, and the Limits of Return Discussions
Osman Bahadır Dinçer
After many years, I had the opportunity to visit Syria again, returning to Damascus for the first time in over a decade. Although earlier plans had been postponed due to escalating regional tensions, this visit—long overdue—finally became possible. My last time inside Syria was in 2013, during a brief crossing into Tel Abyad, at a moment when broader travel within the country was not feasible. Since then, Syrians have endured extraordinary levels of violence, displacement and socio-economic deterioration. While fear and anxiety remain embedded in daily life, the environment in Damascus today is noticeably different from the earlier years of the conflict, with more visible space for public expression and interaction.
During this recent visit in November, I spent a week in Damascus to participate in the 9th edition of the Day of Dialogue—held in the capital for the first time and organised by the European External Action Service—while also conducting meetings with local actors and civil society representatives as part of ongoing research at bicc. I visited several heavily affected areas in Damascus and Rif Dimashq, including Ghouta, Harasta and Douma, to assess the scale of physical and humanitarian damage. The destruction is so vast that defining where reconstruction should even begin has become a monumental challenge. Rebuilding is not only a matter of physical infrastructure but also a deeply social and psychological process.
This observation note aims to summarise key insights and assessments gathered during the visit, with a focus on their relevance for policymakers. Syria’s current context presents numerous interconnected priorities that require simultaneous attention. Under these conditions, discussions on refugee return are not realistic. Even prior to contemplating large-scale refugee return, the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) would need to take precedence—and yet the country is not prepared for this either, whether in terms of infrastructure, economic capacity or social cohesion.
Overall, the visit reinforced the complexity of Syria’s situation and the scale of work that still lies ahead in efforts towards recovery, stabilisation and social rebuilding.
1. Syria is not only “unsafe for return,” but fundamentally “unprepared for return.”
One of the clearest findings of this visit was that the issue of return is not considered—by almost any local actor—as a topic that can realistically be discussed at this stage. As many interlocutors stressed: “Returnees will drown Syria. It is nothing for the host countries—especially European countries—but a huge burden for Syria.” Another observer put it even more plainly: “Let’s continue a little bit more in Germany. Make your investment worth it. Syria needs at least a couple more years for infrastructure.”
These assessments highlight that the challenge is not merely about safety or security conditions. The deterioration of infrastructure, the collapse of the economy and the sheer scale of destruction collectively eliminate Syria’s capacity to absorb returns on any meaningful scale. In other words, the country is not only “unsafe for return,” but fundamentally “unprepared for return.”
Indeed, even the limited number of returns that have already taken place are reported to have created significant pressures: rising rents, increased food prices and mounting strain on essential services. In Damascus and Aleppo in particular, housing costs have surged due to the return of IDPs and refugees, while the destruction in Rif Dimashq has pushed many returning displaced families into the capital, intensifying demand even further. Some local observers went as far as arguing that returns should temporarily stop until basic infrastructure is restored. There are even heartbreaking cases of families who have returned only to pitch tents next to the ruins of their former homes—an indicator of both desperation and the absence of viable living conditions.
In sum, Syria currently lacks the capacity to absorb large-scale returns, a conclusion shared across political, institutional and societal actors. Discussions about return can only become meaningful once infrastructure, health, education and economic systems recover to a minimum functional level. This has long been an argument made by many of us working on the topic, but witnessing the realities on the ground reinforces how essential—and unavoidable—this assessment truly is.
2. Social Fragmentation and the Need for a National Dialogue
Syria’s deep social fragmentation is far from new. Rather than being a by-product of conflict, it is actually the outcome of an intentional strategy of social control adopted by successive Assad governments. As one observer put it, “social fragmentation has always been there… We were never united, not introduced to each other.” This long-standing division continues to shape social relations across the country.
Although many Syrians hope that the post-Assad era will gradually reduce these internal divides, no one harbours illusions about rapid change. After decades of isolation among social, sectarian and geographic communities, the process of rebuilding trust and social ties will inevitably take time. In this context, the Day of Dialogue meeting served as a symbolic but meaningful milestone. Several participants went to Damascus—or even specific neighbourhoods within the capital—for the first time in their lives. As such, the meeting became not only a political platform but also one of the earliest opportunities for Syrians from diverse backgrounds to encounter one another. It underscored the need for such initiatives to occur more frequently and on a broader scale. There are notable efforts underway to institutionalise these spaces for exchange.
Discussions repeatedly underscored that what Syria urgently needs—beyond EU-led initiatives—is a genuine, comprehensive national dialogue (al-hivar al-watani). Conversations revealed a consistent set of observations. First, people do not know one another, nor do cities; years of fragmentation have entrenched social distance. Second, distrust remains deep and widespread, acting as a barrier to cooperation. Third, hate speech is evident in various regions, especially on campuses and among youth, although its intensity varies geographically. Fourth, the absence of transitional justice is widely viewed as a major underlying factor behind recent tensions in coastal areas and Sweida. Complicating matters further, Syrians hold very different understandings of what “transitional justice” actually means, making it difficult to build consensus around a shared framework.
Given these realities, rebuilding trust will be a gradual, uneven process—one that will likely involve setbacks and moments of tension. Many interlocutors therefore stressed the importance of expanding the space available to civil society. While there is currently a noticeable degree of operational room for civil society actors, it remains fragile. This space must be formalised, strengthened and sustained so that civil society can contribute effectively to bridging divides and facilitating dialogue.
Ultimately, social reintegration in Syria is not merely a political endeavour; it is a profound social challenge that requires reconstructing the very fabric of society. This will demand patience, long-term engagement and an enabling environment that encourages dialogue across communities, institutions and regions. Only through such a comprehensive approach can Syrians begin to mend the fractures that have shaped their collective experience for decades.
3. Civil Society: Syria’s “Insurance Policy”
One of the most striking and encouraging aspects observed on the ground is the continued presence, resilience and dynamism of Syrian civil society. Numerous interlocutors described its importance in very clear terms: “Civil society is the only insurance policy for Syria.” Throughout the conflict, civil society organisations remained active in the field and provided essential humanitarian services—often filling gaps left by state institutions. Today, they remain not only indispensable but also among the few actors with the capacity to meaningfully contribute to reconstruction. Even government officials openly acknowledge this reality, noting that: “The government cannot do everything—not possible.”
There is also a visible generational shift within emerging governance structures. Younger cadres are taking up roles, and many individuals from the “revolution generation” have returned—despite ideological differences—to participate in state and community structures. This reflects a pragmatic attitude toward the current phase of transition.
Yet, alongside these positive dynamics, several structural challenges persist. Many international NGOs face deliberately slow registration processes, echoing bureaucratic patterns reminiscent of the former regime. While some of this can indeed be attributed to limited administrative capacity, local actors insisted that security concerns and political sensitivities (which are understandable to some extent) also play a role. Nevertheless, given the scale of needs on the ground, there is a clear expectation that the government should adopt a more cooperative stance. Greater trust in civil society—and in allowing international funding to flow through local organisations—is essential. Long-term support for civil society initiatives, rather than short-term project cycles, is also crucial for sustainability.
Concerns were also raised that some government actors still perceive civil society as a competitor, particularly in fields like service delivery, community engagement and international partnerships. Moreover, coordination among civil society organisations varies significantly across regions. In some areas—Homs, for instance—stakeholders pointed to a striking lack of structured cooperation and a general absence of active initiatives.
At the national level, the visibility and influence of civil society remain limited. Women, despite their significant presence and effectiveness in local initiatives, remain underrepresented in national-level structures and decision-making spaces. This gendered imbalance constrains the inclusiveness and long-term legitimacy of reconstruction and reconciliation processes.
Despite these obstacles, the overall perception among local actors is that civil society currently enjoys a meaningful operational space—one that is neither closed nor openly obstructed by the government. The challenge now is to safeguard, expand, and institutionalise this space so that civil society can continue to serve as Syria’s most reliable mechanism for resilience, recovery and social cohesion.
4. Reconstruction: A Vast Task with Limited Capacity
Seeing the physical, social and economic devastation in Syria firsthand makes it unmistakably clear that reconstruction represents an undertaking of enormous scale. As many interlocutors phrased it quite simply, “Nothing works properly in Syria now.” The level of destruction—visible not only in buildings but also in institutions, governance structures and social relations—renders the idea of state-led reconstruction alone entirely unrealistic. No government, certainly not one facing Syria’s current fiscal and administrative constraints, can rebuild the country on its own.
Reconstruction, therefore, requires substantial investment across multiple sectors simultaneously. Critical priorities include restoring basic infrastructure such as water and electricity; rehabilitating the education system, including addressing severe shortages of teachers and materials; revitalising the health sector, which remains overstretched and under-resourced; and reforming curricula to reflect new social realities and support long-term social cohesion. Additionally, the inclusion of youth in decision-making processes is essential for legitimacy and sustainability. Economic revitalisation also hinges on the promotion of small-scale entrepreneurship, particularly for women and young people, as a pathway toward greater economic self-reliance. Many local actors stressed that fostering such micro-initiatives is crucial not only for economic recovery but also for restoring dignity and agency at the community level.
Importantly, reconstruction does not need to—and should not—be executed solely by the state. The government’s primary role should be to create an enabling environment for investors, entrepreneurs and civil society organisations to operate. This includes opening space for domestic and international private sector initiatives, reducing bureaucratic barriers and providing regulatory clarity. As several interlocutors emphasised, investment does not require the state to build everything; it requires the state to allow others to build.
Many stakeholders proposed practical mechanisms to ensure transparency and efficiency in reconstruction funding. Among these, the 30/70 model—allocating 30 per cent of funds to government bodies and 70 per cent to civil society organisations and implementing partners—was highlighted as a promising approach. Such a model, they argued, would not only incentivise governmental accountability but also leverage the comparative strengths and local knowledge of civil society to deliver measurable and timely results.
The success of reconstruction hinges on a balanced partnership between state institutions, civil society and international actors. As one participant stated: “The more we support civil society, the more successful Syria will become.” Strengthening civil society’s role is therefore not a secondary consideration—it is a prerequisite for any sustainable recovery given the country’s fragmented institutions, overstretched state capacity and vast social needs.
Conclusion: Syria at a New Threshold—But there is a Long Road Ahead
What stood out most during this visit was the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory realities: a profound sense of stagnation and, at the same time, a noticeable momentum for change. Discussions on refugee returns remain detached from reality, as the country currently lacks any meaningful absorption capacity. Social fragmentation runs deep, making a comprehensive national dialogue not merely desirable but essential. Civil society, though resilient and active, remains fragile and in need of consistent support if it is to become a genuine engine of transformation. And the reconstruction challenge is simply too vast for the government to shoulder alone.
A phrase repeated by several local actors encapsulated the fragility and urgency of this moment: “Syria is now like a fragile toy. If we don’t act now, when will we?” Indeed, both local stakeholders and the international community face a narrow yet critical window of opportunity. How this window is used will largely depend on strengthening civil society, opening channels for inclusive dialogue and designing reconstruction processes that are participatory and equitable. While the European Union is pushing for forms of dialogue and engagement, many interlocutors emphasised that dialogue must also occur nationally, not only within international frameworks. Civil society organisations have been active on the ground for years and possess invaluable experience that must be leveraged. The government, for its part, must remain open to external assistance directed toward civil society, particularly in areas where state capacity is limited.
At present, it would be inaccurate to claim that there is broad governmental resistance to civil society activity. A balanced approach is required from both the government and international actors, ensuring that engagement strategies neither sideline state institutions nor weaken civil society’s ability to operate independently and effectively.
Syria stands at a delicate yet pivotal moment. Progress will depend on whether actors can navigate this complexity with patience, pragmatism and a commitment to inclusive, locally grounded solutions. The choices made now—by Syrians and international partners alike—will shape the country’s trajectory for years to come.